Turbulence After Lift-Off: Global Economic and Insurance Market Outlook 2022/23

No 5 /2021
Turbulence after lift-off: 02 Executive summary

03 Key takeaways
global economic 06 Macroeconomic

environment and
outlook
and insurance market 21 Insurance market
outlook 2022/23
outlook 2022/23 36 Alternative
economic and
insurance scenarios
40 Appendix
2 Swiss Re Institute sigma No 5/2021
Executive summary
A robust cyclical economic recovery is set The world economy is making a strong recovery from the COVID-19 shock and the
to gradually slow as supply-side shocks outlook is positive. However, peak growth is behind us and this cyclical recovery is not a
constrain growth and lift inflation. structural one. We forecast global real economic growth of 5.6% in 2021, 4.1% in 2022
and 3.0% in 2023. The recovery will be uneven, with risks tilted to the downside.
Supply-side shocks, including global supply chain issues, labour shortages and energy
shortages, may persist, while monetary policy is becoming less accommodative.1
Inflation is our number one near-term macro risk and we expect it to be elevated for
some time, stemming from the same supply-side factors that are constraining growth.
Pressure is starting to feed into slower-moving but harder to reverse areas such as rent
and wages. We expect these headwinds to weigh on the outlook in 2022 and 2023,
making structural healing – the policies that work to reverse the permanent negative
impacts of the pandemic on the economy – difficult.
Three Ds shape the long-term We identify three structural trends that will shape the long-term path of the world
outlook: divergence, digitalisation and economy. These are the “three Ds”: divergence, digitalisation and decarbonisation. We
decarbonisation. are concerned by growing divergence within and between countries in economic
recovery, wealth, income and socio-economic opportunity. These divergences make the
recovery fragile. To overcome them, swift progress towards inclusive digital
transformation is vital. Digitalisation – the adoption of digital technology throughout the
economy including digital infrastructure – is key to higher productivity growth. Finally,
the extreme weather events worldwide this year indicate that climate risks are
materialising and rapid progress on decarbonisation is imperative. How we transition to
a green economy will define the economic outlook going forward, but will not be easy or
come without pain, as the energy crisis shows.
Global insurance demand should grow at We are positive on the outlook for global insurance premiums, expecting above-trend
above-trend rates in the coming years. real growth of 3.3% in 2022 and 3.1% in 2023. Growth is benefiting from rising risk
awareness in both the life and non-life segments, as consumers and businesses alike
seek protection following the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and above-average
natural catastrophes. The ongoing rate hardening in non-life insurance commercial lines
will provide further support. By our projections, global insurance premiums should
exceed USD 7 trillion for the first time by mid-2022, sooner than we had estimated in
July.2 In 2021 we estimate global premiums to grow by 3.4% in real terms, taking global
direct premiums written in 2021 to 8% above the 2019 level.
The year has taught important lessons on The past year has taught important lessons. The pandemic shock has highlighted the
risk, resilience, climate and digitalisation. important role the insurance industry plays as a risk absorber in times of crisis by
providing financial relief to households, businesses and governments. At the same time,
the global supply chain disruptions we have seen highlight the need for better protection
to improve societal resilience. Climate risk has also been front of mind given extreme
weather events, and above-average insured losses from natural catastrophes add
urgency to the race to net-zero carbon emissions. We have also learned how much
consumers welcome digital and online insurance, and of the need to be aware of how
rising inequality may worsen social inflation in casualty lines.
Insurance profitability should improve next Insurance sector profitability has come under pressure in 2021, as the industry absorbs
year after a challenging 2021. COVID-19-related claims, above-average catastrophe losses and high inflation. We
expect a strong rebound from 2022. Non-life underwriting profitability should recover
fast as insurers internalise expectations of higher inflation, and rates in commercial lines
rise again. For life insurers, advances in COVID-19 vaccinations should strengthen
profitability after a year of high mortality. In Brazil for instance, the life insurance benefit
ratio in April 2021 (97.3%) was more than double that of April 2020 (42.5%). Investment
returns will likely be challenged by ongoing low interest rates that do not fully
compensate for inflation, making underwriting discipline crucial.
1 On the energy crisis: The global energy crisis: adding fuel to the fire, Swiss Re Institute, 5 October 2021.
2 sigma 3/2021 - World insurance: the recovery gains pace, Swiss Re Institute, 14 July 2021.
sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 3
Key takeaways
We see a positive growth outlook, but the strongest recovery momentum is behind us.
Inflation is the number one near-term macro risk.
2020 2021E 2022F 2023F
Actual SRI Consensus SRI Consensus SRI Consensus
Real GDP growth, US –3.5% 5.5% 5.6% 3.7% 4.0% 1.5% 2.4%
annual average Euro area –6.6% 5.0% 5.1% 4.1% 4.3% 2.0% 2.1%
China 2.3% 8.0% 8.0% 5.1% 5.4% 5.7% 5.4%
Inflation, all-items CPI, US 1.2% 4.7% 4.4% 5.0% 3.3% 2.2% 2.3%
annual average Euro area 0.3% 2.5% 2.4% 2.6% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5%
China 2.5% 1.3% 1.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.5% 2.2%
Yield, 10-year govt US 1.0% 1.4% 1.7% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 2.4%
bond, year-end Euro area –0.6% –0.2% –0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4%
Note: E = estimates; F = forecasts. Data as of 11 November 2021.

Source: Bloomberg, Swiss Re Institute
Three key structural trends will define the long-term economic outlook:
divergence, digitalisation and decarbonisation.
Divergence – across countries, within countries, and from pre-pandemic global trends – will shape future world growth. Governments
are investing heavily in digital transformation to “future proof” economies. And as climate change materialises, rapid progress on
decarbonisation is imperative.
Diverging output loss versus pre-pandemic levels, major economies
20% Forecasts
15%
10%
5%
0%
–5%
–10%
–15%
Q1 20 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 21 Q2 21 Q3 21 Q4 21 Q1 22 Q2 22 Q3 22 Q4 22
US Europe China
Note: output loss or gain is in comparison with 2019 level. Source: Bloomberg, Swiss Re Institute
Growing global market size estimates of new technologies, USD billions Estimated market size of oil and selected clean energy technology to reach
net zero emissions by 2050
1 0.7 2.2 2 000 5G
3.7 0.6 9.7 61
277 5G O
44
Blockchain
16 10 1 500 Blockchain
191
32 Clean 2% Nanotechnology
5% Nanotechnology 4%
130 energy 16%
2%
32 2018 2025 1 000 $123B 0%
1500 Gene editing Gene editing
$350 billion 499 $3.2 trillion Clean
Oil
91% 3D Printing 61% energy
$1.25T 3D Printing
54 500 $1.2T
157 AI
69
5% AI
Oil
344 Robotics
141 0 13% $182B
Big data Robotics
2020 2030 2040 2050
Solar PV
Internet of things Drones Solar PV Big data Robotics AI Fuel cells Batteries Wind Solar Oil Big data
3D(right):
Note Printing Gene
estimates areediting Nanotechnology
the product Blockchain
of anticipated average market prices5G
and sales of tradeable units. Drones
Source: (left) Technology and Innovation Report 2021, UNCTAD, February 2021; (right) World Energy Outlook 2021, IEA, OctoberIoT
2021; Swiss Re Institute Solar PV
Drones
IoT
4 Swiss Re Institute sigma No 5/2021 Key takeaways
We forecast global insurance demand to grow faster than its long-term trend rate in 2022
and 2023.
Real insurance premium forecasts, global regions
Total Non-Life Life

2021E 2022–23F 2021E 2022–23F 2021E 2022–23F
World 3.4% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 2.8%
Advanced markets 3.3% 2.4% 2.8% 2.4% 4.1% 2.3%

North America 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 2.4% 1.2% 2.2%
EMEA 4.9% 2.0% 2.3% 2.3% 6.9% 1.7%
Asia-Pacific 3.9% 3.2% 4.6% 2.9% 3.8% 3.3%
Emerging markets 3.4% 6.4% 5.8% 8.2% 1.4% 4.6%

Excl China 5.7% 5.1% 4.7% 4.7% 6.9% 5.8%
China 1.5% 7.0% 6.4% 10.3% –2.8% 3.6%
Note: Total insurance premium forecasts are for life and non-life combined. Icons show direction of deviation from long-term trend (2005–2020) for each region. Green
triangle indicates a growth rate 0.5% or more above the long-term trend; dash indicates +/–0.5% relative to long-term trend, and red triangle 0.5% or more below the long-
term trend. Source: Swiss Re Institute
The pandemic and economic recovery have provided key lessons for the insurance industry.
The key lessons learned this year
Increasing inequality The re/insurance industry

risks exacerbating remains a vital risk
social inflation absorber in times of crisis
Consumers welcome
digital and online insurance
Key lessons Supply chain disruptions to
business and society show
and it should grow rapidly of 2021 that better protection is required
Rising risk awareness is Record-breaking weather

generating demand for extremes add urgency to
more insurance protection the race to net-zero
Source: Swiss Re Institute

Key takeaways sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 5
We consider three alternative macroeconomic scenarios to our base case of positive global
economic growth over the next three years. We give the base case a 65% likelihood, and the
three alternatives a combined probability of 35%.
Optimistic Pessimistic
Golden 20s (probability: 10%) Stagflation (probability: 15%) Renewed recession (probability: 10%)
̤ Structural reforms effectively direct ̤ Persistent supply chain disruptions and ̤ Demand-driven growth slowdown
spending to infrastructure (including ongoing de-globalisation translate into and recession triggered by pandemic
green energy) and making economies emergence of parallel supply chains. setbacks.
more competitive. ̤ Overheating of economies de-anchors ̤ Unwind of crowded investor positioning
̤ Higher long-term productivity and higher long-term inflation expectations. tightens financial conditions abruptly.
interest rates. ̤ Higher inequality and rising social ̤ Geopolitical risks, including China-US
̤ Companies increase capex spending to discontent lead to redistributive policies tensions as well as within the euro area,
make their corporations future fit. (e.g. tax reforms, universal basic income, are amplified.
increase in minimum wage, etc).
2022E 2023F 2024F 2022E 2023F 2024F 2022E 2023F 2024F
Real GDP US 5.3% 3.2% 2.7% 2.2% 1.0% 1.2% –0.4% 1.1% 1.7%
growth Euro area 5.7% 3.0% 1.7% 2.1% 0.6% 0.8% –2.2% 0.9% 1.4%
China 5.9% 5.9% 5.7% 3.1% 4.5% 4.0% 2.9% 4.5% 5.1%
Inflation US 3.6% 2.8% 2.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 2.4% 1.2% 1.7%
Euro area 2.4% 1.9% 1.8% 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 1.9% 0.9% 0.9%
China 2.6% 2.9% 2.8% 6.2% 6.8% 7.4% 1.7% 1.3% 2.0%
10y yield US 2.3% 3.1% 3.5% 2.6% 3.8% 4.9% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Euro area 1.1% 1.3% 1.7% 1.3% 2.0% 2.6% –0.5% –0.5% –0.3%
China 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3%
Note: The probabilities reported for each scenario are conditional on the realisation across two dimensions (macroeconomic and financial markets) over a three-year
horizon (from 2022 to 2024). The reported narratives are not exhaustive. We give the stagflation scenario a 15% likelihood over three years, but see substantially higher
likelihood over a one-year period, and even more so if only the macroeconomic dimension is considered (without the associated financial markets developments).
Geopolitical risks are ordered according to their importance and relevance under each scenario. There are other risks that are present under any possible scenario without
representing a large threat to the real economy, such as cyber-attacks. Other risks, such as climate policy gridlock, carry significant risk for the real economy but are longer-
term than the three-year horizon considered here.
Macroeconomic environment and outlook

The world economy has made a strong cyclical recovery from the COVID-19 crisis as vaccination rollout and stimulus,
particularly in advanced markets, has generated surging demand. However, growth is hitting bumps in the road caused by
supply side disruptions, and we anticipate an uneven recovery for the next two years with risks tilted to the downside.
We expect growth rates to slow in 2022 and 2023 from their 2021 post-crisis peak and inflation to stay elevated despite
interest rate rises by central banks. We expect government bond yields to remain low. Three “Ds” define this outlook:
divergence, as the world risks pulling further apart on the economic recovery and inequality, digitalisation, as new
technologies strengthen productivity; and decarbonisation, as the world grapples with climate change. Further risks
come from very high asset valuations and the unfolding energy crisis.
Economic and inflation outlook

We forecast a positive growth outlook, This year has marked a strong cyclical recovery for the world economy and the growth
albeit with slower momentum ahead. outlook remains positive, though the strongest momentum is likely behind us. We
forecast growth of 5.6% in 2021, followed by a slowdown to 4.1% in 2022 and 3.0% in
2023 (see Table 1). Near-term momentum is weighed down by ongoing supply-side
shocks, including protracted global supply chain issues, labour shortages and energy
shortages that are expected to persist for months.3 Demand, on the other hand, remains
strong. At the same time, policy conditions are tightening, given fading fiscal stimulus
and a move towards less accommodative monetary policy. We expect these headwinds
and supply-side constraints, in addition to dissipating base effects, to weigh on growth
through 2022 and 2023. This will make structural healing – reversing the permanent
negative impacts of the pandemic on the economy with macro policies – difficult.
Longer-term growth will likely be lower than before the pandemic due to the structural
damage done. We see three factors at play: divergence, digitalisation and
decarbonisation (see Three “Ds” define our outlook).
The outlook for growth remains uneven and The growth trajectory will be uneven across countries and the momentum fragile.
fragile, especially amidst lower levels of Growth momentum is declining in both the US and China, albeit from high rates, with the
resilience. lagging recovery in the euro area and Japan in turn also impacted by this slowdown.
There is still significant risk of new virus variants and waves that bring restrictions on
economic activity as long as global vaccine distribution and up-take is uneven. This
could perpetuate supply chain disruptions and friction in labour markets, as well as the
shifts in demand we have seen so far in the pandemic.4 The legacy of high debt, low
interest rates and lower growth render countries significantly less resilient at absorbing
future shocks (see Rebuilding ecoonomic and health resilience).
3 For more on the energy crisis, see The global energy crisis: adding fuel to the fire, op. cit.
4 While 57% of the entire populations in the US and 75% in China have been fully vaccinated, globally the
coverage remains at only 40% (as of 10 November according to vaccinations data from local governments
via Our World in Data). Coverage is much lower in emerging markets, including some that are key for global
supply chains. For example, in Vietnam and India only 32% and 25%, respectively, of people have been fully
vaccinated.
Macroeconomic environment and outlook sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 7
Table 1
Real GDP growth, inflation and interest rates in select regions, 2020 to 2023
2020 2021E 2022F 2023F

Actual SRI Consensus SRI Consensus SRI Consensus
Real GDP growth, US –3.5% 5.5% 5.6% 3.7% 4.0% 1.5% 2.4%
annual average UK –9.7% 6.9% 7.0% 4.7% 5.1% 2.0% 2.0%
Euro area –6.6% 5.0% 5.1% 4.1% 4.3% 2.0% 2.1%
Japan –4.9% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 1.2% 1.3%
China 2.3% 8.0% 8.0% 5.1% 5.4% 5.7% 5.4%
Switzerland –2.5% 3.4% 3.5% 3.0% 3.0% 1.5% 1.6%
Global –3.6% 5.6% 5.9% 4.1% 4.5% 3.0% 3.5%
Inflation, all-items CPI, US 1.2% 4.7% 4.4% 5.0% 3.3% 2.2% 2.3%
annual average UK 0.9% 2.4% 2.3% 3.8% 3.2% 1.9% 2.0%
Euro area 0.3% 2.5% 2.4% 2.6% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5%
Japan –0.1% 0.0% –0.2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6%
China 2.5% 1.3% 1.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.5% 2.2%
Switzerland –0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7%
Global 2.0% 3.5% 3.6% 3.5% 3.3% 2.6% 2.8%
Policy rate, US 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%* 0.6% 0.3%* 1.1% 0.9%*
year-end UK 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
Euro area 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Yield, 10-year govt US 1.0% 1.4% 1.7% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 2.4%
bond, year-end UK 0.3% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5%
Euro area –0.6% –0.2% –0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
E=estimates, F=forecasts. Note: Euro area policy rate refers to the interest on the main refinancing operations; data as of 11 November 2021. * US policy rate consensus is
taken as the mid-point of the range.
Inflation outlook
Inflation will remain elevated for a Inflation is our number one near-term macro risk and we expect it to be elevated for
protracted period. some time. We forecast above-consensus inflation globally throughout 2022, with
pressure most acute in the US, UK and among emerging markets. We expect CPI for the
US, euro area UK and emerging markets to be above central bank targets in 2022. In
particular, we forecast average annual inflation to be 5.0% in the US, 2.6% in the euro
area and 3.8% in the UK, relative to central banks’ targets of 2%. The risk in the euro area
is less pronounced given its significant economic slack, placing the risk of overheating a
way off. Inflation forecasts for 2021 are lower in China and Japan, given faster-falling
prices for some items (eg, pork in China and mobile phone charges in Japan) and weaker
consumption, but we still expect increases in 2022. The risk of higher medium-term
inflation has also increased.
Supply shocks may continue to drive In addition to base effects and firm demand, the acceleration in inflation is being fuelled
inflationary pressures. by cost pressures stemming from the same supply-side factors that are constraining
growth – persistent supply chain bottlenecks, labour shortages and the energy crisis.
Indicators suggest that the situation may still be intensifying. For example, the Baltic Dry
Index, the global benchmark for bulk shipping prices, remains above the level seen in the
decade before the pandemic, amid a shortage of shipping containers and backlogs at
ports. Natural gas prices are at 10-year highs and Brent crude oil is the highest since a
brief spell in 2018 and before that 2014 (see The global energy crisis: adding fuel to the
fire energy crisis box). Increasing house prices also play a role (see Surging house prices
Cost pressures are feeding through into heighten risks of retrenchment or inflation).
long-term inflation expectations and hard-
to-reverse items. Cost pressures are starting to feed into slower-moving but harder to reverse prices such
as for rent and wage increases, as well as changes to household and financial market
inflation expectations, particularly in the US and UK. For example, US long-term
8 Swiss Re Institute sigma No 5/2021 Macroeconomic environment and outlook
household inflation expectations are now well above the target.5 UK and German 10-
year breakeven inflation rates, a proxy for market inflation expectations, have increased
substantially as the energy crisis is felt more strongly in the region (see Figure 1). A
granular assessment of inflation drivers in the US reveals broad price pressures (see
Table 2). It is critical to monitor inflation dynamics closely.
Figure 1 5% 2.0%
Evolution of the 10-year breakeven
rates for major economies 4% 1.5%
3% 1.0%
2% 0.5%
1% 0.0%
0% –0.5%
0
20
20
20
21
21
21
02
02
20
20
20
20
20
20
y2
y2
ril
ly
er
ril
ly
er
ar
ar
Ju
Ju
Ap
Ap
ob
ob
nu
nu
ct
ct
Ja
Ja
O
O
US (LHS) UK (LHS) Germany (RHS) Japan (RHS)

Table 2
US inflation monitor indicators
Percentile vs
Indicator Latest data point last 10 years Recent trend evolution
CPI & sub-components Headline inflation (yoy) 6.2% 100%
Shelter CPI (yoy) 3.4% 79%
Car rental CPI (yoy) 40.5% 95%
Recreation CPI (yoy) 3.5% 100%
Consumer/market 5-year breakeven rate 2.9% 100%
expectations 10-year breakeven rate 2.6% 100%
Conference Board Inflation Expectation 7.0% 100%
Fed Common Inflation Expectation 2.1% 72%
Supply disruptions Supplier delivery times (slower responses, PMI) 52.5 96%
Inventories (lower responses, PMI) 14.2 8%
Global container freight cost (yoy) 363% 94%**
Demand Consumer spending (yoy) 6.2% 10%
Household savings (yoy) –46.7% 32%
Business sentiment ISM Manufacturing PMI 60.8 96%
ISM Services PMI 66.7 100%
Commodities Natural gas future (yoy) 62% 92%
Brent crude future (yoy) 125% 98%
Lumber future (yoy) 19% 60%
Wages Hourly wages (yoy) 4.9% 95%
Weekly wages (yoy) –1.6% 2%
Employment Cost Index (yoy) 3.7% 100%
Note: * Last 20-day average instead of the last available reading as for all other variables. ** Due to data availability, the percentile of the Global container freight costs is
computed from October 2017.
Our US inflation monitor considers inflationary dynamics along six dimensions as shown bucketed in the table. Percentiles are computed based on monthly data over
the past 10 years, with the exception of the US Fed Common Inflation Expectation percentile which is based on quarterly data given availability. A cautious approach is
warranted when drawing conclusions on wage evolution due to COVID-19-induced distortions in the labour market data. The Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) captures
business sentiment, specifically whether market conditions are perceived to be expanding (>50) or contracting (<50).
5 The latest University of Michigan 5–10yr household inflation expectation survey is at 2.8%.
The global energy crisis: adding fuel to the fire

Energy prices have surged this year after A series of energy supply shocks, coupled with a worldwide post-COVID-19 surge in
both demand and supply shocks. demand, has led to dramatic surges in global energy prices this year. This is primarily in
fossil fuels (see Figure 1) but also renewables.6 This year, European wholesale natural
gas prices have approximately tripled, dwarfing the ascent of Brent and WTI crude oil to
multi-year highs. Immediate consequences range from a dozen small UK energy
suppliers going bust in under three months, to a nationwide power outage in Lebanon,
and streetlights in China being kept in the dark overnight. This situation is expected to
worsen in the coming months, as weather forecasters predict a particularly cold winter
ahead, while countries’ gas reserves are already depleted versus the same time last
year.7
Figure 2 500
Energy prices indexed to 1 June 2021
400
300
200
100
0
June 2021 July 2021 August 2021 September 2021 October 2021
EU carbon allowances European gas US gas Asia gas Chinese coal

Brent
Source: WTI
Bloomberg 8, Swiss Re Institute
The crisis is lowering economic growth and The crisis weighs on GDP growth and puts upward pressure on inflation. In China, power
contributing to inflation. rationing has caused factory closures and power cuts that are dragging on economic
activity. In the UK, the impact on the entire industrial supply chain is evident, as the surge
in gas prices shut down fertiliser production, leading to a collapse in the supply of its key
by-product carbon dioxide, which in turn impeded the meat industry. Still, we expect
only a partial and staggered passthrough from higher energy prices to Consumer Price
Indices (CPI) since household energy prices are typically capped (e.g. in Spain9 and the
UK10). The short-term and idiosyncratic drivers of this crisis, such as the demand shock,
should normalise within 12 months. However, structural flaws decades in the making,
such as lower capital expenditure by traditional energy companies amid decarbonisation
efforts, coupled with still too low capacities in alternative energy sources, leave energy
markets vulnerable to similar flare-ups in the long term.
6 In Germany, wind power generation was 50% below its five-year average in the first two weeks of September.
In the UK, wind power usually provides over 20% of the UK’ s power, but recently the share has been below
10%. “Natural-gas prices are spiking around the world”, The Economist. “Europe’ s Power Crisis moves North
as Water Shortage Persists”, Yahoo Finance, 4 October 2021.
7 “Cold Christmas raises fears of further gas price rises”, The Times, 15 October 2021.
8 Chinese coal prices were not published from 1–7 October 2021 inclusive.
9 “Tackling soaring energy bills, Spain to gap gas price, utilities’ profits”, Reuters, 14 September 2021.
10 “UK’ s promised energy price cap will expire in 2020”, Financial Times, 12 October 2021.
Interest rate outlook

Modest interest rate rises are ahead as As central banks start to rein in accommodative monetary policy to address inflation,
central banks start to rein in monetary policy rates and government bond yields will increase modestly in the near term. The
policy. Fed will commence in December with tapering of USD 15 billion per month through the
first of half of 2022 and we expect two rate hikes in the second half of the year. We also
expect two rate hikes from the Bank of England next year. Monetary policy has limited
power to address supply disruptions, which has potentially difficult implications for
central banks’ credibility. We expect long-term government bond yields to remain largely
flat globally this year, increasing modestly into next year. We forecast 10-year US
treasury yields to be 1.4% at year-end, 1.6% by end-2022 and 1.9% by end-2023.
The low-for-longer interest rate There is no easy way out of the low interest rate environment that has dominated the
environment is nevertheless still valid. global landscape for the past decade and financial repression is here to stay.11 The
underlying drivers of this environment, including debt, demographics, and other
structural characteristics (e.g., the distribution of wealth), among others, will not reverse
soon. Given higher inflation, most sovereign bond yields will yield negative real interest
rates in the coming years. Structural policies aimed at increasing the natural rate of
interest are needed (see A solution to the productivity conundrum?).
Three “Ds” define our outlook

We identify three trends that will define the path the world economy takes. We are
calling them the three Ds: divergence, digitalisation and decarbonisation.
Divergence
Economic indicators are diverging both Divergence – across countries, within countries, and from pre-pandemic global trends –
between and within countries. will shape the future world growth trajectory. Policies that address the structural drivers
of these divergences need to be prioritised to support sustainable growth (see
Rebuilding economic and health resilience).
China’ s recovery has diverged from the Across countries, divergence in the speed and extent of the economic recovery reflects
other two major global economies. differences in public policy choices, structural features, and national vaccination rates.
The euro area is the only one of the three major economies (the US, euro area, and
China), not to have reached its pre-pandemic output (adjusted for inflation) of end-2019
by the third quarter of 2021. We forecast the lost output to be recouped in Q4 2021 (see
Figure 3). China’ s aggressive early response to the outbreak enabled a quick return to
pre-pandemic output, by the second quarter of 2020, which supported emerging
markets more broadly. We expect emerging economies to exceed their 2019 output by
more than 4% by end-2021 (versus 1.8% for advanced economies). Excluding China,
however, we expect emerging markets only to reach pre-crisis output in early 2022.
11 Financial repression is defined as a situation where government interventions influence private capital
allocation. See Financial repression: here to stay and stronger than ever, Swiss Re Institute, September 2020,
and sigma 7/2020 – Rebuilding better: global economic and insurance market outlook 2021/22, Swiss Re
Institute, November 2021.
Figure 3
Output loss versus pre-pandemic levels for major economies
20% Forecasts
15%
10%
5%
0%
–5%
–10%
–15%
Q1 20 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 21 Q2 21 Q3 21 Q4 21 Q1 22 Q2 22 Q3 22 Q4 22
US Europe China
Note: output loss or gain is in comparison with 2019 level. Source: Bloomberg, Swiss Re Institute
Emerging markets are falling behind in the Should high inflation continue to force tighter monetary policy in emerging economies, it
global economic recovery. will intensify the divergence with advanced markets. Global financial conditions are likely
to worsen as monetary policy tightens in advanced economies, with potentially higher
volatility in capital flows to emerging markets. Advanced countries’ fiscal responses will
also give them an edge, as seen in Europe’ s NextGenerationEU plan and Biden’ s
infrastructure push. Emerging economies, especially China and in southeast Asia, may
lose some of the gains from their integration into global supply chains over the past
decade, given moves to reshore and re-route supply chains post-pandemic. There is also
a divergence in vaccination rates between advanced and emerging regions (see Risk
considerations).
Income and wealth disparities within There are also disparities in the recovery within countries across different agents in the
countries risk fuelling social tension. economy, which risk aggravating discontent and social tensions. The pandemic’ s impact
on employment and earnings have been felt very differently across the population and
risks increasing income inequality within countries (both emerging and advanced). Job
losses have disproportionately affected younger and lower-skilled workers. Inflation is
surging just as COVID-19 support measures are being withdrawn, adding pressure to
low-income households. Wealth inequality is also on the rise, as asset price rises have
outperformed the real economy (see Stretched asset valuations: limited upside and
large downside).12 With more moderate growth ahead, the average household may be
left behind.
GDP, consumption and inflation patterns Finally, the economic recovery is associated with large deviations from pre-pandemic
continue to show large deviations relative global trends (see Figure 4). In the US, for example, core goods inflation is 1% up from
to pre-pandemic trends. the average seen in the five years prior to the pandemic. Consumer goods spending, in
turn, is seeing massive fluctuations, with deviations up to 15% relative to its pre-
pandemic trend. This illustrates the current high demand and constrained supply
environment. The US real GDP shortfall has been estimated at 2.7% as of Q3 2021
relative to its potential pre-pandemic pace (vs 5.6% for the euro area), with some of this
gap expected to persist beyond 2022.13 We forecast some degree of convergence back
to pre-pandemic trends is likely, but more permanent scarring of the supply side of the
global economy is possible, with the result that some of these growth constraints and
divergences may persist. By end-2022, we forecast the euro area shortfall versus its
potential pre-pandemic pace to stand at twice that of the US (2.8% for the euro area
versus 1.4% for the US). China, in contrast, should see further divergence from its
potential pre-pandemic pace given the changes to the country’ s economic structure.
12 As of 11 November the US stock market (proxied by the S&P 500 Index) has grown by more than 107% since
the trough in March 2020, whereas real GDP has grown by 12% since the trough in Q2 2020.
13 The potential pre-pandemic pace of GDP growth is taken as the average real GDP growth in the five years in
the lead up to the pandemic (i.e., from 2015 to 2019 included).

Figure 4 20% 2.0%

Deviation of US goods spending (left axis) and
15% 1.5%
core inflation (right axis) from 2014–2019 trend
10% 1.0%
5% 0.5%
0% 0.0%
–5% –0.5%
–10% –1.0%
–15% –1.5%
–20% –2.0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Real consumption expenditure on goods (LHS) Core CPI (RHS)

Stretched asset valuations: limited upside and large downside

Asset valuations are at very high levels, but Loose financial conditions have supported asset valuations, but this trend may now
further upside is likely to be limited. reverse. COVID-19 stimulus measures and high household savings have intensified the
rise in asset prices seen since the GFC (see Figure 5). Stock market growth has outpaced
corporate earnings and economic growth since the start of the pandemic, with the ratio
of stock market capitalization to GDP (the “Buffett indicator”) the highest in at least a
decade. In the US, the ratio exceeds that seen at the peak of the dot-com boom. Similar
trends are evident in the housing market (see Surging house prices heighten risks of
retrenchment or inflation). However, this divergence between market performance and
the real economy results largely from financial repression and not fundamentals.14 High
valuations can be sustained while financial conditions are loose, but long-run interest
rates are unlikely to decline much further as policy support rolls off. Weaker performance
in equity markets is also likely as growing concerns about the global recovery and
inflation weigh on the optimism that has been driving markets.
Figure 5 250% 30%

Financial market valuation indicators
200% 24%
150% 18%
100% 12%
50% 6%
0% 0%
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Wilshire 5 000 to GDP (LHS) S&P 500 to GDP (RHS) Euro Stoxx to GDP (RHS)
14 Financial repression: here to stay and stronger than ever, op. cit.
A sudden and unexpected tightening in Financial markets fragilities also make them susceptible to downside risk. Interest rate
financial conditions could trigger a reversal sensitivity, or duration risk, in major asset classes is the highest in 20-years (Figure 6).15
of high asset prices. This means that market prices will react more to unexpected changes in interest rates
than in the past. The corporate credit universe is also riskier. For example, the share of
lower-rated (BBB) debt in the investment grade credit market grew from just 17% in
2001 to more than 50% today.16 In addition, the search for yield has directed investors
towards overlapping investment positions. This carries the risk that investors would seek
to liquidate similar positions at the same time, which would drive large and self-
reinforcing downward price moves. Any unexpected tightening in financial conditions
could result in a correction of equity prices that in turn induce higher volatility and larger
mark-to-market losses.
Figure 6 95 10
Modified duration across assets (years) 9
85
8
75 7
6
65
5
55
4
45 3
2
35
1
25 0
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
US equities (LHS) US IG credit (RHS) US treasuries (RHS)

Source: Barclays, Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re Institute
Digitalisation
Digitalisation can help to increase The cyclical recovery from the pandemic is not enough to address structural damage.
productivity growth and resilience at the Digitalisation – the adoption of digital technology throughout the economy – is a
macro and micro levels. promising path to higher productivity growth, which has declined since the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC). Digitalisation improves productivity growth by automating manual
processes, enabling innovation and reducing costs. Higher productivity growth raises
living standards and increases the natural rate of interest – r* (see A solution to the
productivity conundrum?). This allows policymakers more room for monetary
manoeuvre and strengthens economies’ resilience. Digitalisation also supports resilience
in business and can mitigate climate risk. Firms that digitalised effectively (even in
typically high-contact services) navigated the pandemic more successfully, while remote
work and less travel helped reduce emissions.17
The push for digitalisation is best The pandemic accelerated digital transformation by restricting physical movement.
complemented by investment in skills and Internet-enabled “frontier technologies” are expected to grow strongly (see Figure 7).
cyber security. Governments are furthering this transformation with investment, to “futureproof”
economies.18 For example, in the US, Biden’ s infrastructure bill earmarks USD $65
billion for broadband alone.19 More should be done to foster an environment in which
digitalisation can flourish. As more devices are connected to the internet, cyber security
is also crucial, especially given current geopolitical tensions, in which cyber is a key
arena for conflict. The EU has recognised these conditions and earmarked 20% of its
EUR 724 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility funds for digital-related investments
alone, including in supercomputing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, advancing
15 Duration risk: an antidote for new-year financial market optimism, Swiss Re Institute, 21 January 2021.
16 Covid-19 pandemic and market risks: a systemic crisis in the making?, Swiss Re Institute, January 2020.
17 COVID-19 digital transformation & technology, McKinsey, 5 October 2020.
18 Technology and Innovation Report 2021, UNCTAD, February 2021.
19 FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Support for the Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework, The White
House, 24 June 2021.

digital skills and increasing the wider use of digital technologies across the economy and
society.20
Figure 7 2.2
1 0.7
Growing global market size estimates 3.7 0.6 9.7 61
277
of new frontier technologies, USD billions 44
16 10
191
32
130
32 2018 2025
1500
$350 billion 499 $3.2 trillion
54
69 157
344 141
Internet of things Drones Solar PV Big data Robotics AI

3D Printing Gene editing Nanotechnology Blockchain 5G
Source: “Technology and Innovation Report 2021”, UNCTAD February 2021
A solution to the productivity conundrum?

Productivity growth has the potential to Productivity growth has declined since the GFC, but if reversed, has the potential to raise
drive interest rates higher. living standards and end the decades-long decline in interest rates (see Figure 8). A low r*,
the “natural” rate of interest at which the market for savings clears, poses problems for
policymakers including limiting monetary authorities’ ability to lower interest rates, given
the zero lower bound.21 This is important because COVID-19 has left monetary policy
largely exhausted, meaning macroeconomic resilience in the face of future shocks is weak.
Figure 8 5%
Modelled estimates* of natural interest
rates in the US, Canada, euro area and UK
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
18
20
19
20
20
20
20
19
20
19
19
19
19
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
US Canada Euro Area UK

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
*Note: Estimates of the model described in “Measuring the Natural rate of Interest: International Trends and
Determinants,” by Kathryn Holston, Thomas Laubach, and John C. Williams, Journal of International Economics,
2017. Data from: Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest – Federal Reserve Bank of New York (newyorkfed.org)
COVID-19 has disrupted capital, labour and The pandemic has impacted capital, labour and technological progress, all of which
technological progress. influence productivity and output. Pandemic-induced uncertainty has discouraged
investment in capital. Stimulus has also flowed to “unproductive” assets, encouraging
the zombification of firms. The pandemic is unlikely to have disrupted the prior trend of
decline in the working age proportion of the population, however, it has disrupted the
education of millions of schoolchildren and students. The longer-run impact of the
20 “The EU’ s 2021–2027 long-term budget & NextGenerationEU”, European Union, 29 April 2021.
21 A. Mian, L. Straub and A. Sufi, “What Explains the Decline in r*? Rising Income Inequality Versus Demographic
Shifts”, University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics, 22 September 2021.
pandemic on technological progress remains to be seen. Support for productivity growth

should come from the acceleration in uptake of technological innovations, such as AI and
machine learning.
Policymakers have an opportunity to usher The net effect of the pandemic on productivity growth will depend on the policy
economies towards higher productivity response to these developments as well as the extent to which opportunities that have
growth. arisen are harnessed. Policymakers need to target stimulus towards capital that
ultimately helps to make economies more productive, whilst also being mindful of
exacerbating inequality. Investment in education should be prioritised in order to avoid
some falling permanently behind, leveraging on further digital diffusion to expand access
to education. Workers should be enabled to re- and up-skill as less productive sectors
shrink. To address the slowdown of technological progress since the GFC, more
investment in R&D is needed. Productivity gains should be more widely shared, as during
the pandemic they have been concentrated in firms that were already advancing,
including professional, scientific and technical services such as IT, healthcare and
communication.22
Decarbonisation
Climate change is materialising, but the Climate risk looms as perhaps the biggest societal threat, and no longer only in the
decarbonisation transition will be difficult. longer-term. The extreme weather events seen worldwide this year underline the
realization that climate risks have already started to materialise (see Climate change and
the global economy). How we approach the decarbonisation transition today will define
both our economic and social outlook, but the energy crisis (see The global energy crisis:
adding fuel to the fire) illustrates the complexity of this transition. The energy crisis is
partly an unintended consequence of the global push to reduce reliance on fossil fuels
and reaffirms the need to accelerate investments in greater and more reliable alternative
energy supplies to fill the gap (see Figure 9). The supply of renewables needs to be
ramped up alongside existing oil capacity with the latter being reduced once renewables
become more reliable. At the same time, this green transition has the potential to unlock
new economic opportunities and jobs, as every USD 1 invested is estimated to yield an
average USD 4 in economic benefits.23 A global annual investment to the green
economy between now and 2023 of USD 1 trillion, about 0.7% of current global GDP, is
also estimated to create or save roughly 9 million jobs a year and add 1.1% to economic
growth, essentially paying for itself.24
Figure 9 2 000
Estimated market size of oil and selected
clean energy technology to reach net-zero
emissions by 2050 1 500
Clean 2%
5% 4%
energy 2%
$123B 0% 16%
1 000
Clean
Oil
91% 61% energy
$1.25T
$1.2T
500
5% Oil
0 13% $182B
2020 2030 2040 2050
Fuel cells Batteries Wind Solar Oil

Note: estimates are the product of anticipated average market prices and sales of tradeable units.
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2021, Swiss Re Institute
22 Will productivity and growth return after the COVID-19 crisis?, McKinsey, 1 March 2021.
23 Financing Climate Action, United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/raising-ambition/climate-
finance
24 “IEA offers world governments a sustainable recovery plan to boost economic growth, create millions of jobs
and put emissions into structural decline,” International Energy Agency, 18 June 2020. https://bit.ly/3AsBZry
Climate change and the global economy

Climate change will incur large economic This year has brought extremes of temperatures, wildfires and flooding. In August the UN
losses. The Paris Agreement temperature Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a “code red” alert, warning
target would be the most desirable that without drastic further action, the world’ s surface will likely be around 2°C warmer
outcome. by mid-century relative to pre-industrial times.25 Rising global temperatures and more
extreme weather events will increasingly set economies back through physical risks such
as property damage, disruption to trade, and lost productivity. We estimate that the
world stands to lose around 11% of GDP under a scenario of 2°C warming by 2050.26
Achieving the Paris Agreement target would reduce the economic losses and be the best
possible outcome. Limiting warming to well-below 2°C by mid-century would mean a
global GDP loss of 7% less than under 2°C warming, with some regions benefiting much
more. In ASEAN, for example, a GDP loss of as much as 13% could be prevented (see
Figure 10).
Figure 10 14%
Mitigated GDP loss by mid-century
if Paris Agreement target is met, 12%
versus 2°C rise
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
N
ia
ld
ia
a
ric
ic
ic
p
EC
EA
As
As
or
ro
er
er
Af
O
AS
Eu
d
Am
Am
ce
d
an
n
h
rth
va
ut
st
No
Ad
So
Ea
e
dl
id
M
Note: The figure is based on simulation of the severe economic impacts from climate change. It shows the
difference between the 2°C scenario and the Paris scenario, as % of GDP in a world without climate change.
Substantial additional investment and The transition to a green economy has a long way to go and requires huge investment.
mitigation is needed to put the world on a Global emissions must fall by 45% by 2030 (relative to 2010) to limit emissions to a level
path towards the Paris Agreement target. consistent with global warming of no more than 1.5°C, but we are on track for a 13.7%
increase.27 Total additional capital expenditure of USD 131 trillion is needed by 2050 to
hit the Paris target, as well as a global carbon price of at least USD 75 per ton.28 The
global average price is only USD 3 per ton today, and covers merely one-fifth of global
emissions.29 Scalable carbon-capture capacity is also crucial to achieve net-negative
emissions for the long term.
Governments are mobilising to combat Momentum on climate change action and decarbonisation is growing. The COP26
climate change but it is still not enough: a climate talks in Glasgow have prompted new net-zero targets and agreements on coal,
systemic approach is needed. methane and deforestation. But this is not enough; the world is still on track to miss the
Paris Agreement target.30 Governments and the private sector need to work together to
combine additional investment with a systemic approach that focuses on multiple drivers
of change at once. Around 30% of the EU’ s 2021–2027 budget and
“NextGenerationEU” (NGEU) fund – together worth around EUR 2 trillion in current
prices – will be spent on fighting climate change – the highest share ever, from the
25 Sixth Assessment Report (AR 6), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2021.
26 The economics of climate change: no action not an option, Swiss Re Institute, April 2021.
27 COP26: Update to the NDC Synthesis Report, UNFCCC, November 2021.
28 The State of the Global Energy Transition, Aurora Energy Research, 2021.
29 Five Things to Know About Carbon Pricing, IMF F&D, September 2021.
30 Glasgow’s 2030 credibility gap: net zero’s lip service to climate action, Climate Action Tracker.
largest EU budget ever.31 In the US, the proposed USD 550 billion bill for new physical
infrastructure includes USD 198 billion of investments that will work towards combating
climate change, including modernising the power grid, promoting electric vehicles and
zero-emission upgrades to public transit, water infrastructure to protect against climate-
related disasters, and environmental clean-up.32
Greater public infrastructure investments Insurers can support the transition to a low-carbon economy as a provider of risk transfer
provide opportunities both on the asset and capability, risk knowledge and management, and long-term investment. Infrastructure
liability side of insurance companies. projects can deliver attractive yields to help insurers match their long-term liabilities,
while the construction and operational phases of infrastructure projects will require
insurance solutions for engineering and property risk. More broadly, actions such as
pledges to implement a “net zero” approaches in re/insurers’ asset and underwriting
portfolios, and public-private partnerships with sustainability criteria at their core, can
help to nudge global stakeholders towards a greener future.33
Risk considerations
The balance of risks is tilted to the The balance of risks to our baseline outlook is tilted to the downside, with the most
downside, with inflation the biggest near- prominent near-term risks being further upside to inflation. Though elevated inflation
term risk. globally is already factored into our baseline outlook for 2022, there is high uncertainty
about the persistence and magnitude of the ongoing supply shocks that are fueling
inflation. Spillovers from one supply chain to another, including across countries, are
feeding into and strengthening one another, amplified by labour shortages and higher
input prices. Given that inflation risk is asymmetric, increases can come about rapidly,
whereas reversals are hard and painful to effect. We assign a 35% probability to near-
term upside inflation risks and 15% probability to a stagflation scenario over three years
across both macroeconomic and financial market dimensions (see Alternative economic
and insurance scenarios). Under stagflation, higher inflation would feed back into a
weaker growth outlook by weighing on consumer sentiment and demand, particularly if
price rises outpace wage increases. Very low real rates and elevated inflation uncertainty
further suggest material tail risk of spiking long-term nominal yields and suddenly
tightened financing conditions.
COVID-19 is here to stay, but there are risks There is still the possibility of winter resurgences in COVID-19 cases as colder weather
associated with variants and countries’ approaches in the Northern hemisphere, with a key risk being the emergence of new
responses. virus variants that could decrease vaccine effectiveness. Though political and public
appetite for full lockdowns is much reduced, this could nevertheless cause tightening or
extensions of restrictions already in place (such as zero-COVID strategies). This will be
the case as long as global vaccine distribution and uptake is uneven. Going forward, the
speed and scale of booster shot rollouts will also become critical.
Geopolitical risks also remain a threat. Geopolitical tensions are heightened on several fronts. The Russia-Europe gas pipeline in
development, Nord Stream 2, has gained attention amid the energy crisis and remains
controversial. Tension between Russia and Ukraine persists. Middle East tensions
continue to pose a risk to oil supply. There is potential for military flashpoints in the South
China Sea. US and China bilateral relations on trade and technology continue, with other
sectors potentially drawn in. The economics-versus-politics tug of war caused by the
tension between strong integration and mutual reliance on the one hand, and the
opposition to fully liberalising trade on the other, will remain. Emerging market financial
stress adds to the uncertain environment.
31 “The EU’ s 2021–2027 long-term budget & NextGenerationEU”, European Union, 29 April 2021.
32 FACT SHEET: Historic Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal | The White House, October 2021.
33 Launch of UN-convened Net-Zero Insurance Alliance, Swiss Re, 11 July 2021.
Surging house prices heighten risks of retrenchment or inflation

House prices have been surging in many Housing prices have risen rapidly in many countries (see Figure 11), leaving prices more
countries. vulnerable to a correction on the one hand, and feeding through into rents and inflation
on the other. Over the past year alone, nominal prices in the US have soared by 20%
year-on-year. Low interest rates, policy support, excess savings and shifting household
preferences have boosted demand, while limited building permits, construction
shortages and rising material and labour costs have weighed on supply.
Figure 11
Real house price growth between Q4 2019 Q4 and Q1 2021
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
–5%
–10%
s
sia
ly
ce
en
UK
sia
da
ey
d
ne
nd
an
ar
di
in
ai
pa
ur
an
n
US
Ita
rk
an
ed
na
Ko
ay
s
Ch
Sp
In
nm
bo
pi
rm
rla
Ja
Ru
al
Tu
Fr
Ca
Sw
al
ilip
Ze
ng
m
e
Ge
De
M
th
xe
Ph
Ho
w
Ne
Lu
Ne
Source: IMF
Rapid house price increases come with Given the value of global real estate–more than 3.5 times total global GDP–a fall in
risk of retrenchment. house prices could lead to financial instability.34 Some of the factors that have been
driving the recent price surges, especially on the demand side, may ease. Still, as in other
sectors, tight supply is expected to persist, mitigating the risk of price falls. The IMF
estimates a worst-case scenario for house price declines over the next three years of
about 14% in advanced economies, and more elsewhere.35
Tightening financial conditions and We see other risks from the rise in house prices. Excess leverage could mean higher debt
excessive leverage pose a risk in some service costs that push homeowners and property developers to default on repayments.
countries. China, for example, has tightened financing conditions for property developers as part of
the government’ s intentional deleveraging of the real estate sector. More stringent
regulations (“three red lines”), loan requirements and cap, have softened the real estate
sector’ s performance in 2021 and turned the liquidity issues of Evergrande into a
solvency crisis. There is a risk of volatility spillover from the housing market to other
financial markets. Surging house prices may also add to affordability concerns and
inflationary pressures. This is the key risk in the US rather than financial stability
concerns, as borrowers have far stronger credit scores and are using adjustable-rate
mortgages much less than prior to the GFC. High house prices will increase rents, which
account for roughly 40% of the US consumer inflation basket. Rises are not yet reflected
in price indices, suggesting upside pressure to come. The IMF estimates that in general,
across countries, a 5.3% increase in nominal house prices, which is the increase globally
in 2020, the largest in 15 years, can add a cumulative 1.5ppt to inflation over two years.36
34 8 things to know about global real estate value, Savills Impacts.

35 Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, October 2021.
36 World Economic Outlook, IMF, October 2021.
Rebuilding economic and health resilience

Macroeconomic resilience is set to partially The almost 20% decline in macroeconomic resilience we recorded in 2020 is set to
recover. begin to reverse as the world economy recovers. Cyclical indicators dragged global
economic resilience downwards in 2020, and some structural indicators, primarily
labour force-related such as human capital and labour market efficiency, have also
declined (see Table 3).37 While economic resilience will improve, it will only be a partial
recovery. Policy should focus on ways to structurally replenish it, such as by prioritising
the labour market and climate action.
Table 3 Indicator Recent evolution Outlook

Key movers in the 2020 Cyclical Fiscal space
Macroeconomic Resilience Index Monetary space
Structural Insurance penetration
Financial market development
Human capital
Economic complexity index
Labour market efficiency
Soundness of banks
Income inequality
Note: Recent evolution: the change in 2020 in cyclical indicators (i.e., fiscal and monetary policy space), and the
change 2016–2020 for the structural indicators (given the lag in data releases). Outlook: expected change in
the next year for cyclical indicators; the mid-term outlook for structural indicators.
The economic rebound should partially We expect the cyclical economic rebound from the COVID-19 crisis to support the
recover fiscal space this year. macroeconomic resilience index in 2021 as growth improves governments’ fiscal
headroom, and there is gradual tightening in monetary policy. The more structural
declines in the labour force will take longer to reverse. While normalising labour markets
should allow workers to reallocate more easily to more productive sectors, we expect
some scarring from employees being out of the workforce for a long time, and with the
need for re-/up-skilling. And though global trade is increasing again, the reshoring and
localisation of supply chains may permanently alter trade flows and labour market
demand across the different economies. The next decade will need greater emphasis on
supply management, reflecting on the lessons learnt from the pandemic, after a largely
demand-focused decade.
We find higher resilience heading into Policymakers cannot afford to be complacent. Widening income inequality linked to the
the pandemic is associated with faster pandemic is yet to show in the index and may create downward pressure. The pandemic
economic recoveries. has also underlined the importance of resilience. Besides benefitting from higher health
insurance resilience, advanced markets with higher economic resilience pre-pandemic
suffered lower economic output shortfalls during the pandemic (see Figure 12).
Governments that enact structural reforms such as targeted investments into sustainable
and quality infrastructure and the digital economy, will be better positioned to cope with
future crises.
37 swiss-re-institute-sigma-resilience-index-update-june-2021.pdf (swissre.com)
Figure 12 16%
Pre-pandemic levels of macro resilience
14% Spain
and subsequent output shortfalls
12%
2020 Output shortfall

10% Italy
8% Greece Canada
US
6%
Switzerland
Japan
4%
Finland
2% Norway
0%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2019 Macro resilience (index level)
sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 21
Insurance market outlook 2022/23

We expect global insurance premiums to grow by 3.2% in real terms annually on average for the next two years, above the
long-term trend.38 In non-life insurance, advanced Europe and emerging markets will see above-trend growth, while
advanced Asia Pacific and North America will grow in line with their long-term trend. In life insurance, advanced markets
growth will be above-trend but emerging markets will lag below trend. Premium forecasts are underpinned by rising
risk awareness by consumers and businesses after the shock of COVID-19, and a stronger performance in non-life insurance
personal lines, alongside the continued hard market for rates in commercial lines. Non-life insurance profitability will rely
on underwriting discipline as ongoing low interest rates do not fully compensate for inflation, while for life insurers,
advances in vaccination and lower mortality should bolster profitability.
Global insurance premiums should grow We are positive on the outlook for global insurance premiums, expecting above-trend
above-trend for the next two years and growth of 3.3% in 2022 and 3.1% in 2023. This forecast is underpinned by rising risk
surpass USD 7 trillion by mid-2022. awareness in both the life and non-life segments, as consumers and businesses alike
seek protection following the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic. The ongoing rate
hardening in non-life insurance commercial lines will provide further support. By our
projections, the global insurance market should exceed USD 7 trillion in premium terms
for the first time by mid-2022, sooner than we previously estimated in July.39 The
insurance industry has displayed strong resilience to COVID-19 and we estimate that
global premiums will grow by 3.4% in real terms in 2021, taking total global direct
premiums written in 2021 to 8% higher than the pre-crisis 2019 levels.
Table 4
Insurance premium forecasts, global regions
Total Non-Life Life

2021E 2022–23F 2021E 2022–23F 2021E 2022–23F
World 3.4% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 2.8%
Advanced markets 3.3% 2.4% 2.8% 2.4% 4.1% 2.3%

North America 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 2.4% 1.2% 2.2%
EMEA 4.9% 2.0% 2.3% 2.3% 6.9% 1.7%
Asia-Pacific 3.9% 3.2% 4.6% 2.9% 3.8% 3.3%
Emerging markets 3.4% 6.4% 5.8% 8.2% 1.4% 4.6%

Excl China 5.7% 5.1% 4.7% 4.7% 6.9% 5.8%
China 1.5% 7.0% 6.4% 10.3% –2.8% 3.6%
Note: Figure shows insurance premium forecasts, in real terms. Total insurance premium forecasts are for life and non-life combined. Icons show direction of deviation
from long-term trend (2005–2020) for each region.
38 “Trend” refers to the long-term 2005–2020 average CAGR. Trend growth for total global real insurance
premiums is 2.0% per annum.
39 sigma 3/2021 – World insurance: the recovery gains pace, Swiss Re Institute, July 2021
22 Swiss Re Institute sigma No 5/2021 Insurance market outlook 2022/23
Table 5
Insurance market key indicators
Advanced markets
World North America EMEA Asia-Pacific Emerging markets
Past Current Outlook Past Current Outlook Past Current Outlook Past Current Outlook Past Current Outlook
Non-life, direct
Premium growth rate (real), CAGR %
3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.0% 2.7% 2.4% 2.0% 2.3% 2.3% 1.9% 4.6% 2.9% 6.5% 5.8% 8.2%
              
Premium growth (USD), difference
139 305 233 83 147 119 17 63 30 10 24 15 29 71 69
Profitability ROE average, %
6.8% 4.9% 6.5% 6.7% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 5.6% 7.0% 7.5% 6.3% 6.1%
           
Underwriting results average*, %
0.7% –0.1% 2% –0.1% 0.6% 2% 2.4% 2.0% 4% 2.5% 4.9% 5%

           
Investment results average*, %
9.8% 8.3% 8% 10.7% 9.7% 9% 8.4% 7.3% 7% 7.4% 6.4% 7%

           
Life, direct
Premium growth rate (real), CAGR %
1.0% 3.5% 2.8% 2.0% 1.2% 2.2% –0.2% 6.9% 1.7% –2.9% 3.8% 3.3% 7% 1.4% 5%
              
Premium growth (USD), difference
57 232 159 24 43 41 3 101 36 –4 34 32 35 54 49
Profitability ROE average, %
9.0% 10.9% 8.9% 13.0% 8.0% 7.6% 9.5% 11.4%

       
Total (Stock market indicators)
Price to book, insurance sector average
1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2

       
Price to book, total market average
2.2 1.9 3.5 4.4 1.8 2.1 1.5 1.7

       
Stock prices, insurance sector, CAGR %
5% 5% 8% 18% 1% 3% 5% –14%
       
Stock prices, total market, CAGR %
9.2% 8.6% 12.9% 12.8% 2.5% 10.3% 4.9% 0.1%

       
* as a % of net premiums earned
Remarks: Non-life insurance encompasses property, casualty and also health insurance. Past trend (2016–2020); Current (2021); Outlook (2022–2023). CAGR =
compound average growth rate. Regional stock market indicators contain advanced and emerging countries in each of the region. Colouring based on deviation from long
term trend (2005–2020) for each region:
    
< –1.5% –1.5% to –0.5% –0.5% to 0.5% 0.5% to 1.5% >1.5%
Sources: Swiss Re Institute, Bloomberg
Insurance market outlook 2022/23 sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 23
What lessons have we learned in 2021?

We have learned several key lessons this The insurance industry has confronted multiple new dynamics introduced by the
year. pandemic this year (see Figure 13). This has brought new lessons in all areas of the
global market.
Figure 13
The key lessons learned this year
Increasing inequality The re/insurance industry

risks exacerbating remains a vital risk
social inflation absorber in times of crisis
Consumers welcome
digital and online insurance
Key lessons Supply chain disruptions to
business and society show
and it should grow rapidly of 2021 that better protection is required
Rising risk awareness is Record-breaking weather

generating demand for extremes add urgency to
more insurance protection the race to net-zero
The re/insurance industry remains a vital risk absorber in times of crisis. The
pandemic was a significant global shock, and one that has been compounded by severe
and costly natural catastrophe losses this year. The re/insurance industry’ s timely
provision of financial relief to households, businesses and governments has enabled a
fast and effective rebuild and recovery. The experience has reiterated the supportive role
the re/insurance industry plays in strengthening global resilience.
Supply chain disruptions show that better protection is required to improve

societal resilience. Insurers continue to upscale their digital technology and data
analytics capabilities to provide better understanding of supply chain risks and design
innovative covers, particularly in the realms of contingent business interruption and non-
physical damage solutions.40
Record-breaking weather extremes add urgency to the race to net-zero. 2021 is a

year of extreme heat, cold, drought and water. We estimate that 2021 will be the fourth-
costliest year on sigma record for the insurance industry. Flood is the year’ s most
prominent secondary peril, from Europe to China and the US. Insured claims from
secondary perils have been rising for a decade decade and represent the majority of
insured losses globally each year, with climate change a key driver. We expect this to
continue given urbanisation, concentration of assets in exposed areas, and climate
change risk of more intense precipitation as rising temperatures increase moisture in the
atmosphere. Insurance plays a crucial role not only in absorbing catastrophe losses, but
also in supporting investments in resilient infrastructure to mitigate the impacts of
volatile weather conditions.
40 sigma 6/2020 – De-risking global supply chains, Swiss Re Institute, September 2020
Increasing inequality risks exacerbating social inflation. While everyone suffers, the
pandemic has disproportionally affected some lower-income segments and we expect it
to worsen social trends such as inequality. This has ramifications for US insurers, which
face rising claims costs higher than general economic inflation in commercial casualty
lines from litigation case awards. The drivers of this social inflation are non-economic,
and it is heavily influenced by jurors’ attitudes to issues such as social injustice, inequality
and negative sentiment toward corporations. A policy reset that supports greater
societal inclusion and cohesion could help to address this divergence in attitudes.
Rising risk awareness is generating demand for more insurance protection. The
pandemic has increased consumers’ awareness of health and mortality risk and
underpinned life and health insurance premium growth. Our 2020 and 2021 surveys of
consumer trends in major Asia-Pacific markets find consistent evidence of consumers’
rising awareness of health and mortality risks and a perception of being under-insured.41
The change in risk perception is reflected in observed growth in life and health insurance
premiums. Health insurance premiums globally increased at an above average rate of
5.5% in 2020 and 3.2% in 2021, even as many other lines had experienced a decline.
The broad-based elevation of risk concerns also helped sustain positive growth in life
protection insurance premiums last year, with volumes up 1.5% in 2020 and 4.9%
globally in 2021, our own analysis finds. The growth contrasts with previous crises,
during which life premiums contracted. For instance, life protection premiums
contracted 0.7% during the GFC in 2008 and remained almost flat in 2009, while health
insurance premium growth slowed two percentage points to 3% during the GFC.
Consumers welcome digital and online insurance and it should grow rapidly. The
pandemic has transformed consumers’ receptiveness to interacting with insurance
digitally, our research has found. Whether for sales, after-sale service, claims or add-ons,
people now see online provision as essential. In Asia Pacific, our consumer surveys find
two thirds (66%) of respondents see online features as key criteria for life and health
insurance purchases. Of those who purchased new insurance policies online in early
2021, 85% would do the same for future purchases. Another Swiss Re survey in Asia
found 42% of respondents prefer to buy non-life insurance products online. Since digital
penetration of non-life insurance is still low, at 1–2% of premium sales, this suggests
huge growth potential.42 Beyond Asia, Swiss Re qualitative research into mental
wellbeing with consumers in advanced markets including US, Canada, Germany, France
and the UK finds almost all participants expect to see an app in a mental wellbeing
insurance solution.
Non-life insurance
Global non-life premiums to return to trend growth
Global non-life premiums continue to We estimate that global non-life premiums will expand by 3.3% in real terms in 2021
grow despite the lingering impacts of the despite headwinds from the lingering impacts of the pandemic. The magnitude of the
pandemic rise in inflation this year, particularly in advanced markets, erodes nominal growth of
8.7% in non-life premiums. Motor premium growth worldwide has been generally weak
this year and particularly in China, where we estimate a 7.1% motor premium decline
caused by de-tariffication rate cuts. We estimate the segment globally to contract by
0.4% in real terms in 2021 but to recover both in China and worldwide in 2022. Overall,
global real non-life premium growth should be above-trend at 3.7% in 2022 and slightly
weaker at 3.3% in 2023.
41 Swiss Re COVID-19 Consumer Survey: Financial anxiety, demand for insurance products accelerates across
APAC, Swiss Re, April 2040, Swiss Re COVID-19 consumer survey 2021: views of insurance in Asia Pacific
one year on, June 2021
42 Source: Digital adoption in personal P&C insurance in south and southeast Asia, Digital adoption in personal
P&C insurance in south and southeast Asia | Swiss Re

We expect further, albeit more moderate, The divergence in growth trends between commercial and personal lines of business is
rate hardening in commercial lines and expected to fade. In commercial lines, market sentiment points to continued hard market
stronger results in personal lines. momentum in 2022, reflecting strong demand and inflation-induced higher claims
developments, though rises may be more moderate than in 2021. We expect property-
catastrophe rates to improve in 2022 after another year of high losses this year (see
Above-average catastrophe losses support hardening rates). Casualty rates should also
be stronger in 2022 against the background of ongoing social inflation. Personal lines
will benefit from early signs of improving motor pricing in the US and Europe. However,
motor premium growth will continue to lag the recovery in other personal lines as this
segment is highly competitive. For global health and medical insurance, we anticipate
growth of 4.2% in 2022 and 4.1% in 2023, up from 3.7% in 2021, driven by growth in
the US economy and stable advanced market demand. In emerging markets, where
public health systems are often weak, higher risk awareness will likely increase demand
for health-related insurance covers.
Table 6 2020 2021E 2022F 2023F 2011–2020 average

Real non-life growth rates by segment
Commercial lines 1.6% 4.0% 3.6% 2.9% 2.7%
Personal lines 0.5% 2.1% 3.1% 2.6% 2.7%
Medical insurance 2.0% 3.7% 4.2% 4.1% 4.5%
Non-life 1.5% 3.3% 3.7% 3.3% 3.5%
Note: E = estimate, F= forecast

Figure 14
Global non-life premiums 2020, by line of business, USD billions
Health
24% Health
210
180 Personal Lines
210 Motor
230 Property
1680 48% Other
160
220 Commercial Lines
Property
590 Liability
28%
Motor
Other
Note: We harmonise the allocation of lines of business to compare regions. Accident & health business is allocated to non-life insurance, independent of whether it is
written by life, non-life or composite insurers (see Appendix for methodology). Health insurance accounts for almost half of global non-life insurance; personal lines
represent 28% and commercial lines 24%.
Premium growth in advanced markets By region, non-life premiums in advanced markets will recover to above-trend real
should return to trend-growth in 2022 and growth of 2.6% in 2022 and 2.3% in 2023, slightly down from 2.8% in 2021. The
2023. momentum of recovery in 2021 is faster than it seems – in nominal terms premiums in
advanced markets should grow by 8.0% in 2021, compared with 3.1% in 2020, but the
CPI inflation surge will erode that. Driven by higher rates, commercial property and
liability lines will see much faster growth: we project more than 3.4% growth in real
terms in 2022 in advanced markets. In the first half of 2021, US P&C (excluding medical
insurance) direct premiums written increased by 9.0% in nominal terms (6.7% in real
terms), driven by exposure growth tied to the economic recovery, a hard market in
commercial lines, and a favourable year-on-year comparison.43 Medical insurance in
advanced markets will grow at a steady 2.6% annually from 2021 to 2023, slightly down
43 Quarterly statutory financial data aggregated by AM Best and S&P.
from 2.7% in 2021. The key driver is the US market, at 80% of global medical insurance
volume, which is benefiting from a rebound in employment and growth in enrolment and
premiums into the Medicare and Medicaid government programmes.
Emerging markets will see above-trend Expansion in emerging markets is expected to be strong with above-trend growth of
growth for the next two years... 8.9% for 2022 and 7.6% in 2023, up from 5.8% in 2021. We expect China to grow at
10% in each of the next two years, largely driven by strong demand for medical
insurance (including critical illness covers). However, commercial lines (excluding motor)
will also benefit from government initiatives such as a five-year investment plan for ’ new
infrastructure’ projects (i.e. the digital economy) and promotion of cyber insurance
programmes for telecommunications, as well as Internet of Things (IoT) in mobility and
industrial sectors. China’ s motor insurance segment should resume growth after two
years of de-tariffication-triggered contractions in 2020 and 2021, albeit only moderately
as the market remains very competitive, with expected rises of 3.8% and 3.0% in 2022
and 2023 respectively. Growth in other emerging markets has recovered in 2021 after
two years of sluggish development, and we forecast strong, above-trend growth of 4.9%
for 2022 and 4.6% for 2023 as heightened risk awareness boosts personal lines and
higher rates support commercial lines.
…although advanced markets remain the In terms of the contribution to the global non-life premium pool, North America will add
largest in premium volume terms. most with USD 113 billion annually in total in 2022 and 2023. Over the same period,
China will add USD 49 billion annually, followed by USD 30 billion annually from
advanced EMEA. Other emerging markets (excluding China) will contribute about USD
20 billion annually. Advanced markets remain dominant in terms of absolute premium
contribution, at 70% of additional premium volumes.
Figure 15 12%
Global non-life insurance premium growth
rates in real terms, actual and forecasts (2021 10%
values in brackets)
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
World All North America EMEA Asia Pacific All Excl. China China
(3.3%) (2.8%) (2.7%) (2.3%) (4.6%) (5.8%) (4.7%) (6.4%)
Advanced markets Emerging markets
2021E 2016–20 2022–23F

Positive pricing momentum to continue

Rate improvements across all lines of Pricing in non-life insurance commercial lines has strengthened again this year, and we
business will continue into 2022, due expect this to continue into 2022. The third quarter of 2021 marked again a significant
partly to Inflation-induced higher claims. rate increase, with prices up 15% year-on-year (y-o-y). The upswing has broadened
across lines of business and by region. There were strong price increases in Property (9%
in the third quarter) and in Financial and Professional liability (FinPro) (+32%) lines in
almost all regions. For Property, rates have been mainly driven by cat-related covers, and
in FinPro by rising D&O claims. Casualty business, which had remained soft until 2018,
exhibited 6% price improvements this year. This is again being driven by improvements
in the US and Europe, while Asia and Latin America remain sluggish. We see sustained,
but moderating rate hardening in commercial lines into 2022. Our positive view on rate
increases into next year is based on inflation-induced higher claims developments in all
lines of business, and a still significant profitability gap in non-life as witnessed by the
average ROE of 6.2% in 2021 (see Figure 16). We expect prices in casualty to improve
against the background of ongoing social inflation in the US and interest rates remaining
persistently low.
Figure 16
Commercial insurance composite rate rises and outlook
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Global US UK Europe Latin America Asia Australia
3Q 2020 4Q 2020 1Q 2021 2Q 2021 3Q 2021 Trend

Note: up arrow: accelerating rate increase, flat arrow: stable rate increase in high level, down arrow: decelerating rate increase.
Rate changes in % Global USA UK Europe LatAm Asia Pacific

Property  9%  10%  11%  12%  2%  5%  11%
Casualty  6%  7%  7%  5%  –3%  1%  15%
Financial & Professional Liability  32%  27%  54%  24%  17%  17%  25%
Composite  15%  14%  27%  10%  2%  6%  17%
Note: Green arrows indicate the rate is increasing y-o-y, yellow arrows indicate the rate is neutral y-o-y; red arrows indicate the rate is falling y-o-y.
Source: Marsh, Global insurance rate index, Swiss Re Institute
Above-average catastrophe losses support hardening rates

We expect more than USD 100 billion of Natural catastrophe activity has been above-average throughout 2021 and we
insured losses from natural catastrophes anticipate a full-year insured loss of above USD 100 billion. This would make 2021 the
this year. fourth-costliest year on record for the insurance industry (after 2005, 2011 and 2017).
US Hurricane Ida in August provided a powerful reminder of the loss potential of primary
perils in densely populated areas. The hurricane inflicted an estimated USD 28–30 billion
of insured losses as of 29 October 2021, from extensive wind, storm surge and inland
flood damage in Louisiana and across the southeast.44 The storm’ s remnants also added
to the secondary peril loss tally for the year through severe flash floods and tornadoes in
the mid-Atlantic and northeastern regions. The heavy precipitation that accompanies a
hurricane often results in major flooding that can impact regions far from the landfall and
long after the winds have subsided.
Flood is a major physical climate risk that is Flood is the peril we expect to increase the most as a result of climate change, in
causing increasing insured losses. particular pluvial flood (from both thunderstorms and tropical cyclones). 45 Europe’ s
flooding in July was the costliest of all European natural catastrophe in sigma records,
with close to USD 12 billion estimated insured losses. The wider economic losses of the
flood may reach USD 40 billion, we estimate. China has also been impacted by
devastating floods this year. At USD 1.9 billion insured losses, floods in Henan, also in
July, were one of the costliest natural catastrophes the insurance industry has ever faced
in the country. Most climate models project that the extreme precipitation events that
cause floods will become more intense as rising temperatures lead to more moisture in
the atmosphere.
US infrastructure vulnerability has Weak infrastructure in the US exacerbated catastrophe damages this year. In February,
exacerbated cat losses in 2021. winter storm Uri caused insured losses of USD 15 billion, a record for this peril, from
wind damage and burst pipes. Severe multiple failures of the Texas power grid played a
big contributing role in the losses. Similarly, the remnants of Hurricane Ida exposed the
New York City storm drains’ and transport system’s vulnerability to rainfall. Previous
investments in coastal protection after the storm surge from Hurricane Sandy in 2012
were ineffective against the rainfall-induced stormwater in City neighbourhoods. With
more extreme weather events anticipated from climate change, substantial investment
in hardening critical infrastructure is needed. Insurance can support investments in
resilient infrastructure, to mitigate the impact of volatile weather and projected increases
in rainfall intensity, to strengthen societal resilience to climate change.
Non-life profitability to strengthen in 2022 after a challenging 2021

Non-life sector ROE will rebound in 2022 We expect global non-life insurance profitability to improve slightly in 2022 after a soft
after a softer 2021. 2021, as rates in commercial lines continue to rise and investment returns are stable. We
estimate non-life insurance return on equity (ROE) at 6.6% in 2022, comparable to the
estimated 6.6% in 2020 and up from an expected 6.2% for 2021. Underwriting
profitability is weaker this year as the resumption in mobility from low levels due to the
2020 COVID-19 lockdown measures has created higher claims in segments such as US
liability, and motor globally. Higher natural catastrophes have also had an impact (see
Above-average catastrophe losses support hardening rates), while high inflation has
impacted claims payments in the US (see Inflation impacts on non-life insurers).
… slightly improved current investment Investment returns in non-life should be slightly up in 2021, driven by realised
yields, but negative real returns will be a investment gains. We estimate the total yields on the combined investment portfolios of
concern the G8 non-life insurance markets to be about 3.0% in 2021, up from 2.9% in 2020.
Current investment returns should improve slightly in 2022, supported by small interest
rate rises. Nevertheless, the still very low interest rates and still elevated inflation mean
real investment returns will likely be negative and reinforces insurers’ need to focus on
strengthening their underwriting performance. Financial market and credit risks are
serious as insurers have taken more equity, credit and illiquidity risk in their asset
portfolios to hunt for yield in response to the persistently low interest rate environment
since the GFC. 46
44 Loss estimate excludes US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) losses.

45 sigma 4/2021 – More risk, Swiss Re Institute, September 2021
46 “Lower for even longer: what does the low interest rate economy mean for insurers”, Swiss Re Institute,
September 2020.
Figure 17
Aggregated performance of eight of the largest non-life insurance markets, 2012–2022F
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
–2%
–4%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021E 2022F
Underwriting result Investment result Operating result ROE after tax
Note: The sample consists of the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, UK, Germany, France and Italy.
Supply shortage-driven inflation impacts on non-life insurers to unwind by 2023 –

but pressures from wages, healthcare and social inflation to persist
Inflation poses a short- to medium-term Elevated global inflation presents a short- to medium-term risk to non-life insurers’
profitability risk. profitability. It has implications for both sides of insurance balance sheet. On the asset
side, rising inflation expectations and gradual normalisation of monetary policy will
increase somewhat bond yields, while equity performance could falter should there be
real rates turn positive as a result of faster than expected policy rate hikes. For liabilities,
exposure to economic inflation in different P&C lines of business varies according to the
origins of claims inflation.
Inflation shocks in construction and car In the US, where inflation has been acute this year, not all sectors are equally affected
prices will cause a temporary surge in (see Table 7). Construction has one of the highest inflation rates, at an estimated 12% by
property and motor claims. the end of 2021, more than four times the average of the past decade. This is driven
primarily by supply and labor shortages. This shock will put pressure on property claims
in 2021, but we see this as temporary and expect price rises to revert to the wider US
CPI level over the next two years. Motor vehicles and car parts have also experienced a
large-magnitude inflation shock driven by supply chain disruptions, with price rises
estimated at 9% on average for 2021. We expect this to put upward pressure on motor
claims for 2022, but this will unwind by 2023.
Moderate, but sustained inflationary US wages and health care costs have experienced relatively smaller inflation shocks, but
pressures on wages and health care costs they could be more permanent. We expect US wage growth of 4.5% in 2021, twice the
to drive medium-term increases in liability average rate of the past decade. Inflation in healthcare prices is expected to reach 3% in
and workers comp claims. 2021, though total expenditure growth in 2021 will be skewed due to the postponement
of much healthcare spending from 2020 to 2021. We expect these inflation rates to
persist, and we forecast wages to grow at 4% to 4.5% and health care prices at 2.5% to
3.0% per annum for the next few years. The most exposed lines of business are liability,
motor and workers comp, and we expect claims in these lines of business to see
prolonged moderate inflationary pressure.
Table 7 Impact on P&C Historic Medium term

US inflation and forecasts by category Category claims inflation 2010–19 2021E SRI forecast
General (CPI) Medium 1.8% 4.7% 3.5%
Cars and repair* High 0.7% 9.0% 
Construction** High 2.7% 12.0% 
Medical expenses*** High 1.5% 3.0% 2.5–3%
Wages**** Medium 2.6% 4.5% 4–4.5%
Notes: *Personal consumption expenditures (PCE): motor vehicles and parts; **Price Index of new single-family
houses under construction; ***PCE: health care services; this index under-states the impact on liability claims
costs since it is adjusted for increasing quality and standard of care. ****Average hourly earnings of all private
employees.
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Swiss Re Institute
Social inflation creates additional claims In casualty, claims severity may continue trending higher in the medium term due to
inflation risks for casualty lines. potential increases in healthcare and wage inflation. In parallel, we expect social inflation
to continue unabated post-pandemic, further pushing claims costs higher. The US has
experienced a new episode of social inflation since about 2015, with liability claims
growth trending higher. This is driven by factors such as the trial bar increasingly using
psychology-based strategies, data analytics, digital media advertising and litigation
funding. Other factors relate to jurors’ attitudes to issues like social injustice, rising
inequality, and negative sentiment toward corporations. We expect the trend of social
inflation and higher liability claims to continue over the next couple of years, not least as
the COVID-19 crisis is likely to amplify rather than alleviate the societal factors in play,
such as economic, educational, and health inequality.
Motor profitability is being squeezed In motor, claims are rising this year after an extraordinarily positive 2020. The mobility
by rising claims as normal mobility has restrictions imposed globally last year to suppress the pandemic resulted in far fewer
resumed. motor insurance claims than normal. This brought gains to insurers’ profitability in 2020.
For instance, in five major European markets, the motor combined ratio dropped
between six and 10 percentage points in 2020. This translates into lower claims of
~USD 30 billion in those markets.47 We expect motor claims to jump back to pre-
COVID-19 levels in 2022 and insurers to try to raise premium prices. Higher new and
used auto prices and the semiconductor shortage resulting from the reopening demand
surge are also raising prices in the auto industry and subsequently motor claims.
Property claims will rise due to higher In property insurance, we expect claims costs to grow due to higher claims severity on
construction prices, but the surge will be top of above-average cat losses. Claims severity for homeowners and commercial
only temporary. property is set to rise in line with the current supply-demand imbalance, which is
triggering price rises in building materials and a shortage of labour in the construction
sector. For example, US home construction prices surged 12% y-o-y in August, though
non-residential construction remains depressed.48 In the EU, the Eurostat database
shows input prices for construction grew 3.2% y-o-y in the first half of 2021, almost 10
times faster than the average of the past five years. Still, we expect the surge in
construction-related prices to be temporary and fade in 2022.
Liability and workers’ compensation claims Liability and workers’ compensation claims are most exposed to medical cost inflation,
are most exposed to medical cost inflation. which has risen more than general CPI inflation. For liability, we expect that claims
severity will continue trending higher in the medium term due to potential increases in
healthcare and wage inflation. In parallel, we expect social inflation to continue post-
pandemic, pushing claims costs higher.
Regional profitability trends

ROE of US P&C to remain at around 6% in The US P&C underwriting result in the first half of 2021 was 96.9%, stable compared
2022 and 2023. with 2020, as USD 9.5 billion of reserve releases partly offset USD 18.8 billion in natural
catastrophe losses.49 Adjusting for these factors, the underlying underwriting result
improved to 94.1%, as improvement in commercial liability lines offset unfavourable
47 Calculated based on improvement of underwriting result vs 2019 for five major markets (US, Germany, UK,
France and Italy).
48 United States Census Bureau: Index of New Single-Family Houses Under Construction
49 M. Coppola, “First Look: Six-Month 2021 Property/Casualty Financial Results”, AM Best, 23 August 2021.
motor trends.50 However, we expect combined ratios to deteriorate in the second half of
the year due to significant third-quarter catastrophe losses and ongoing struggles in
motor lines given the return to pre-pandemic driving levels. By 2Q21, loss ratios for
motor physical damage had surpassed pre-COVID levels, and commercial auto liability
loss ratios are now trending up toward 2019 levels. In response, by the end of 3Q21,
major US personal auto insurers had filed for rate increases in the mid-single digits to low
double digits in several states.51 Commercial auto rate changes averaged 6.8% in the
second quarter of 2021.52 As a result, we estimate 2021 US P&C ROE at 6.1%, improving
slightly to 6.2% in 2022 and 2023 as better underwriting results in commercial lines are
mostly offset by severity increases outpacing rate gains in personal lines.
We expect underwriting results in Europe In Europe we expect that on average non-life sector underwriting performance will
to rebound strongly in 2022 as motor decline y-o-y in 2021. In major markets such as the UK, Germany and Italy, combined
pricing improves. ratios are expected to be significantly higher this year. Higher claims in motor are
partially to blame, as mobility levels return to pre-COVID-19 trends. Property losses are
also significantly higher, especially due to record-level flooding in Germany. Overall, we
expect ROE in major European markets to average around 5.6% in 2021, and to rebound
to 7.2% in 2022 as motor pricing improves and assuming property claims return to trend
levels.
Underwriting results in Australia and Japan In Asia-Pacific we expect strong improvement in profitability this year, on the back of a
have improved and ROE is set to stabilise at strong recovery in underwriting results. We estimate that on average, the ROE of major
around 6% over 2022–2023. Asia-Pacific markets will be up to 6.3% in 2021, up from 5.3% last year, and will remain
stable at around 6% over next two years. In Australia, the non-life underwriting result
was significantly weakened in 2020 due to higher BI, natural catastrophe and liability
claims, all of which have improved since. In Japan also, we are expecting improvements
in underwriting results driven by improved loss ratios in commercial lines.
Profitability in China is projected to improve In China, non-life insurance profitability has rebounded strongly to CNY 42.5 billion
moderately in 2022 and 2023. (USD 6.6 billion) by the end of the third quarter this year, attributed to better investment
returns and a stronger underwriting profit after insurers paid large claims for credit
insurance in 2020.53 The total profit of non-life insurers reached CNY 41.9 billion
(USD 6.5 billion) in 1Q 2021, of which underwriting profit was only CNY 3.5 billion (USD
534 million).54 Motor remains the major profit contributor, adding 76% to overall
underwriting profit, despite a 72% y-o-y decline in its profit contribution resulting from
de-tariffication. Health, liability and agricultural insurance have all reported underwriting
losses in 1Q 2021 due to higher market competition, under-pricing of new risks and
catastrophe losses. We expect profitability of non-life insurers in China to improve
moderately in 2022 and 2023, supported by investment returns and improving
underwriting profit. However, downside risks to underwriting profit remain, including
intensifying market competition on motor and health insurance, and challenges for risk
pricing for liability lines as the improving legal and regulatory environment creates a
growing scope of liability.
Life insurance to continue above-average growth

Higher risk awareness and recovery in group business to drive growth
We estimate global life premiums to We estimate that global life premiums will increase by 3.5% in real terms in 2021, above
increase by 3.5% in real terms in 2021 and the 1.0% average between 2016 and 2020 (see Table 5). Premium growth will be
strong growth in protection-type products above-trend in both advanced EMEA and Asia Pacific excluding China. Increased
from 2022. consumer risk awareness in the wake of COVID-19 has raised demand for protection
products, while improved stock market performance and base effects will support a
stronger rebound in savings business in 2021. We forecast life insurance premiums will
50 M. Coppola, ibid.; T. Zawacki, “US P&C industry written premium growth may have peaked in Q2 at 15-year
high”, S&P Global Market Intelligence, 8 September 2021.
51 T. Zawacki, “2021 US Auto Insurance Market Report”, S&P Global Market Intelligence, 30 September 2021.
52 “Commercial Property/Casualty Market Index: Q2/2021”, Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers.
53 P&C insurers made an underwriting loss of over CNY 10 billion (USD –1.6 billion) in 2020 whereas
underwriting profit was CNY 0.215 billion in 2019, and CNY –1.36 bn in 2018. Source: https://www.
financialnews.com.cn/bx/bxsd/202104/t20210407_215909.html, http://www.news.cn/fortune/2021-
11/04/c_1128028803.htm
54 Overall profit for all non-life insurers reached CNY 42.5 billion by the end of Q3 2021, however, breakdown
details are limited. Source: http://finance.china.com.cn/money/insurance/20210506/5564519.shtml

continue to grow at an above average real growth rate of 2.9% and 2.7% in 2022 and
2023, respectively. However, we see a divergence in growth between the protection
and savings types of life business in the medium-term. Protection-type products should
see strong demand, supported by higher risk awareness, a recovery in group business
and increased digital interaction. We expect savings business to grow moderately in
2022 and 2023, reflecting slightly higher government bond yields and a recovery in
employment and household incomes. Downside risk to both segments may come from
new COVID-19 variants that lead to lockdowns and above-average mortality among
insured populations.
Excess mortality shows a mixed trend. COVID-19 continues to affect the life insurance industry. In November 2021, North
America is recording average daily death numbers similar to November 2020.55 Europe
is seeing an increase in cases over the past several weeks, but this is not converting into
a proportional increase in deaths or hospitalisation. Excess mortality shows a mixed
trend, with most countries returning to positive excess mortality after having
experienced negative excess mortality over the summer months. Unlike many European
countries, the US has experienced continuous excess mortality since the start of the
pandemic.56 In Latin America, there has been an unprecedented increase in life claims
(see The mortality impact of COVID-19 on Latin America’ s insurers).
The mortality impact of COVID-19 on Latin America’ s insurers

Latin America has been particularly hit The Latin American region has been hit particularly hard by COVID-19. Although it was
by COVID-19, and so the life insurance one of the last regions to register an officially recorded case of the virus, the number of
industry. new deaths per million people has constantly been higher than that of the global
aggregate (see Figure 17). As a result, life insurers have faced an unprecedented
pandemic claim. In Brazil, the life insurance loss ratio in April 2021 (97.3%) was more
than double the rate in the same period in 2020 (42.5%). By September 2021, 15% of all
COVID-19 deaths in the country were covered by life insurance policies.
Figure 18 10
New COVID-19 deaths per million people
8
0
21
ch 20
ril 0
ay 0
ne 0
pt st 0
O er 2 0
No tobe 020
De be 020
Ja er 2 0
Fe ary 0
r 21
ch 21
ril 1
ril 1
ne 1
Ju 021
pt st 1
O er 2 1
er 1
Ap 02
2
Ju 202
Se ugu 02
2
ob 02
Ap 02
M 02
Ju 202
Ju 02
Se gu 02
02
20
br 20
M y 20
20
em 20
M y 20
em 20
nu 0
2
2
2
Au ly 2
ve r 2
ce r 2
l y
ar
Ap
ua
b
b
ar
ar
ru
ct
b
A
Fe
World Latin America

Source: Our World in Data, Swiss Re Institute
The COVID-19 pandemic is the costliest For Mexico, the pandemic is the costliest event ever recorded for the local insurance
event for the Mexican insurance industry. industry. This is remarkable given the country’ s high exposure to damaging natural
catastrophes such as earthquakes and hurricanes. Pandemic-related insured losses over
18 months total USD 2.5 billion as of September 2021, surpassing the USD 2.4 billion
loss from hurricane Wilma in 2005.57 Of the total COVID-19-related losses, 57.5% stem
from life insurance payouts and the remainder from health insurance. The average
COVID-19-related life insurance payout in Mexico to date is USD 11 287, and for medical
expenses it is USD 24 096. The number of life insurance claims related to the pandemic
almost triples that of health insurance claims, highlighting the low penetration of health
insurance in Mexico, which is representative of the region at large.
55 CDC COVID Data Tracker.

56 Excess mortality during the Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.
org/excess-mortality-covid
57 Conferencia COVID-19, 30 de septiembre. Asociación Mexicana de Instituciones de Seguros.
Regional trends
Advanced EMEA life premiums should Based on year-to-date premium numbers for major markets, we expect life insurance
grow by 6.9% in 2021 and around 2% per premiums in advanced EMEA to register a real growth of 6.9% in 2021, far above the
year thereafter. –0.2% average growth from 2016 to 2020. The key driver is France, Europe’ s second-
largest life insurance market by premium volume, for which we estimate 22% real terms
growth in 2021. This results from a very strong recovery in unit-linked business, as
consumers’ investment appetite rebounds sharply from the pandemic shock. The unit-
linked business accounted for close to two-fifths of the life sector’s premiums in the first
seven months of 2021, up from 20% during the same period in 2016, reflecting French
insurers’ initiatives to reposition their new business in favour of capital-light and unit-
linked products.58 Protection-type business will also grow strongly in France in 2021.
Growth will be close to historical average of about 1.3% in 2022.
We expect trend growth in the UK and Advanced EMEA premium growth should return to its trend rate of about 2% from 2022
Germany. onward. UK life premiums should grow by 1.8% in 2021 and ~1.1% in 2022 and 2023 in
real terms (2011–2020 average: 1.9%). The UK bulk annuity market will be subdued in
2021 after fewer “mega” deals than in recent years. Demand for with-profit products and
investment bonds has also fallen due to ultra-low interest rates. In Germany, we expect
real life premiums to grow by 0.4% in 2021 and close to on average 0.7% growth in
2022 and 2023 (2011–2020 average: 0.5% in real terms) supported by continued
positive momentum in risk premiums and a recovery in savings business, which
constitutes over 80% of total life premiums.
Accumulation-focused products will drive US life insurance premium growth should be subdued this year (0.9% in real terms) after
premium growth in 2022 due to the tax law a strong 2020 in which demand for stable-value group annuity premiums surged in the
change. early stages of COVID-19, leading to overall life premium growth of 3.9%. In 2021
demand for stable-value products has receded along with the pandemic-related
uncertainty, and lower employment has led to a contraction in group real premiums.
Moving ahead, we anticipate life insurance premiums to grow by 2.3% in 2022 and
1.9% in 2023. This is linked to higher risk awareness and stronger demand for
accumulation products, which are seeing high premium inflows due to a tax provision
change.59
Life premiums in advanced Asia-Pacific will Advanced Asia Pacific life insurance premiums should grow at above-trend ~3.8% in real
grow at an above trend 3.8% this year and terms in 2021 and 2022, led by Australia. We expect Australian life premiums to
next. increase (in real terms) by 6% in 2021 and by 10.5% in 2022 after a sharp decline in
2020, when allegations of mis-selling during COVID-19 led to a precipitous fall in
consumer confidence. Australia’ s economic growth will also modestly boost group
insurance, which is bought primarily by the superannuation funds. In Japan, life
insurance sales are recovering gradually due to new initiatives such as use of online and
digital tools to mitigate reduced face-to-face sales activity, and promotion of new
product features such as healthy lifestyle rewards and gym coupons.
China will likely experience a transitional China has had a transitional year in 2021 with life insurance premiums estimated to
year in 2021 with growth expected to decline 2.8% in real terms, compared with our previous estimate of 7.5% growth. The
rebound only moderately in 2022. major challenge has been a revision of the definition of Critical Illness (CI), and pricing
directives of CI products, by the Insurance Association of China in April. The revisions
introduce more stringent claims criteria and reduce lump sum payments for certain
common CI (such as thyroid), which makes new CI products less attractive, though some
protection demand was realised before the changes took effect. A significant shrinkage
in the number of life insurance sales agents, as the job has become less attractive, is also
depressing sales of life policies. The agent workforce at China’ s four major listed
domestic insurers was down by 28.7% y-o-y by the end of June.60 We expect life
premiums to recover gradually to real terms growth of ~3% in 2022 and ~4.3% in 2023,
supported by higher incomes, greater risk awareness and new products.
58 Life Insurance at end July 2021, French Insurance Federation, 09 July 2021; and Life Insurance at end
December 2016, French Insurance Federation, 31 January 2017.
59 In December 2020, the US Congress increased the amount policyholders could contribute to life insurance
policies while retaining tax-advantaged status.

60 Refers to the number of total sales from half-year business operation reports of New China Life, Ping An, China
Life, and CPIC, as of end of June 2021,

Figure 19 10%
Global life insurance premium growth
rates in real terms, actual and forecast 8%
(2021 values in brackets)
6%
4%
2%
0%
–2%
–4%
World All North America EMEA Asia Pacific All Excl. China China
(3.5%) (4.1%) (1.2%) (6.9%) (3.8%) (1.4%) (6.9%) (–2.8%)
Advanced markets Emerging markets
2021E 2016–20 2022–23F

Emerging Asia excl. China will see above- Emerging markets excluding China are recovering strongly, with above-trend real life
average premium growth in 2022 and premium growth of 6.9% in 2021 and 6% in 2022. In emerging Asia (excl. China),
2023. premiums should grow by 7.4% 2021 and 7.9% in 2022, supported by economic revival,
rising risk awareness, use of digital distribution channels and life sector liberalisation.
Latin America is benefiting from a strong increase in demand for all life and health-
related business, with the first half of 2021 stronger than anticipated in several
countries. Pensions-related premiums are bouncing back strongly this year in line with
the labour market. We expect a slower economic recovery in Latin America in 2022 and
2023 than in 2021 given lingering structural problems that preceded the pandemic and
monetary policy tightening, and insurance demand should outpace the economy. We
estimate Latin American life insurance premiums to grow at a real rate of 10.7% in 2021,
before returning to the near trend growth rate of 5.1% in 2022 and 3.8% in 2023.
Vaccination should cut mortality claims and raise profitability in 2022

Anecdotal evidence points to an increase in Life insurers’ earnings will be challenged by higher mortality, low interest rates and
COVID-19 related mortality claims in 2021. tightening bond spreads this year but recover in 2022. Anecdotal evidence points to
considerable COVID-19 related mortality claims in 2021. For example, in the US, the
advanced economy hardest-hit by COVID-19 mortality, death benefits paid increased by
11% y-o-y in the first half of 2021, at the tail-end of the severe second wave.61
Vaccination should reduce mortality claims Vaccination rates have a negative correlation with COVID-19 related mortality and so
and improve profitability in 2022 mortality rates would be expected to decline as vaccination rates advance globally. As of
9 November 2021, more than half (~51.2%) of the world population has received at least
one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. Vaccination rates are much higher (65–75%) in key
insurance markets such as the US, Canada, China, Germany, the UK, France, and Italy.62
However, waning immunity is a risk, since both vaccines and recovery immunity are less
effective over time. One study suggests that vaccine effectiveness may be ~90% in the
first month but only 70% after six to seven months.63 Many highly vaccinated countries
are now offering booster doses to vulnerable or exposed groups.
61 First Look: Six-Month 2021 Life/Annuity Financial Results, AM Best, 24 August 2021.
62 Share of people vaccinated against COVID-19, Our World in Data, 17 October 2021, https://ourworldindata.
org/covid-vaccinations
63 COVID vaccine immunity is waning – how much does that matter?, Springer Nature Limited, 17 September
2021, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02532-4#ref-CR1
Investment returns are expected to increase only gradually

Life profitability will improve only gradually Improved stock market performance and slightly higher 10-year government bond yields
in 2022. should support insurers’ investment returns this year. Return on equity (RoE) in the life
sector increased to 10.9% in the first half of 2021, up by 2.4ppt from full year 2020,
according to a sample of 87 life insurers. Investment income also increased by 14% y-o-y
in the first half of 2021. While slightly higher government yields will support life
insurance sector profitability in 2022, yields are still far below 2019 levels in most major
markets and are expected to increase only gradually. Life insurers are adjusting their
product portfolios to cope with persistently low interest rates, for instance by moving
more towards biometric risk and away from guarantees in investment-based products.
Insurers are moving quickly to fee-based product offerings. Many life insurers in France
and Germany have successfully repositioned their new business to favour the
distribution of capital-light and unit-linked products.64
Figure 20
RoE of a sample of life insurers, by region
20%
15%
10
0
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
1H21
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
1H21
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
1H21
North America Europe Asia-Pacific
Middle 50% Median Unweighted average ROE Weighted average ROE
Note: From a sample of 87 life insurers. Arrows indicate RoE expectation for 2022 compared to full year 2021
Source: Bloomberg, Swiss Re Institute estimates
64 Market Segment Outlook: Germany Life Insurance, AM Best, 23 April 2021 and Market Segment Outlook:
France Life Insurance, AM Best, 27 April 2021.
Alternative economic and insurance scenarios

Economic policies and conditions change rapidly. We monitor signposts that may indicate that an alternative scenario to
our baseline will play out. We focus on two downside scenarios: “stagflation” and “renewed recession”, and one upside
scenario: the “Golden 20s”. In this upside scenario, commercial lines will benefit most from improved economic activities.
Life business will see lower lapse rates. Higher interest rates and strong capital markets will improve investment returns.
The renewed recession scenario serves a double blow to premium and investment. Non-life long-tail lines will benefit from
lower claims severity in a disinflationary environment. For life saving products with guarantees and duration mismatch
will see a stronger hit on profitability. Under the stagflation scenario, long-tailed non-life business will be more sensitive to
claims inflation, while in-force life savings products with guarantees will see improved profitability from higher interest
rates.
Economic scenarios
Several drivers and risks could set the We consider three alternative scenarios to our baseline outlook for the world economy,
economy onto one of our alternative over a three-year horizon. We see several drivers and risks that could push the world
economic scenarios. economy onto one of these alternatives. These include supply chain challenges and
heightened reliance on technology. While the tech sector has been a clear winner from
the COVID-19 pandemic, we anticipate greater tech regulation. Industrial policies will be
upgraded to take into account of the digital economy and international competition in
this respect. Increasing global inequality could damage social cohesion domestically and
cooperation internationally. Geopolitical tensions are rising between world powers, and
strategic competition between the US and China is driving global fragmentation as both
focus on decoupling their economies. Finally, the house price surge worldwide needs
close monitoring.
The three alternative economic scenarios in depth

In a stagflation scenario, prices enter an The stagflation scenario (15% probability for the scenario to materialise over a three-
upward spiral and growth slows. year period and across both dimensions of macroeconomic and financial market
variables) envisages high inflation readings until the end of 2021 driven by consumer
demand, supply disruptions and an energy crisis. Entering 2022, major central banks
grow uneasy as long-term inflation expectations become unanchored. As central banks
raise interest rates, consumption loses momentum, financial markets tighten, and cracks
show in the real estate market. Monetary tools are ineffective at addressing supply-
driven inflation and the economy slows while prices enter an upward spiral. A prolonged
inflationary period with low economic growth ensues. Wealth inequality and the erosion
in purchasing power increase social tensions. Governments respond with redistributive
policies that raise taxes for the rich and transfer payments to lower income households.
We give the stagflation scenario a 15% likelihood over three years, but see a substantial
higher likelihood over a one-year period given price pressures and a possible fading in
consumer spending as pent-up demand subsides.
Our pessimistic scenario anticipates Under the renewed recession scenario (10% probability)65, pandemic setbacks derail
economic contraction and financial market global economic activity. Policy responses still attempt to support economies but given
selloffs in 2022. the weaker macroeconomic resilience (see Rebuilding economic and health resilience),
authorities are constrained in their ability to deliver substantially more support. The focus
is much more directed towards distributional outcomes with tax increases and spending
cuts. The result may even lead to a fiscal cliff with investments falling sharply. Risk assets
thus benefit less from policy support and are negatively affected by the renewed
uncertainty. This in turn causes an unwind of crowded investor positions and an
65 Probabilities for the alternative scenarios are over a 3-year horizon and consider the materialisation across
both macroeconomic and financial market dimensions.
Alternative economic and insurance scenarios sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 37
abrupt tightening in financial conditions. Corporate defaults and rating downgrades

increase as persistent high unemployment becomes a reality. Large fiscal deficits are
increasingly financed by central banks, which keep interest rates unchanged for years.
Even as bond yields reach new lows, financial markets remain weak and recover only
slowly. US-China tensions and resurfacing euro area internal pressures add to
geopolitical risks.
The “Golden 20s” see sustained growth The Golden 20s scenario (10% probability) is positive, projecting a sustained growth
and benign financial markets. rebound based on pent-up demand and curtailed pandemic. Emergency monetary and
fiscal stimulus is smoothly phased out, with interest rate rises translating in benign
financial conditions in 2022. Smarter and long-term oriented spending both by
governments towards more sustainable infrastructure investments, education, and
research and development, and by corporates towards more capital investment, is a key
driver of the outlook. Governments and corporates’ strong focus on climate change
supports the transition to “net zero” which is in line with the Paris Agreement.
The scenarios are complemented with For a more detailed overview of the narratives surrounding the alternative scenarios, see
frequent indicators. Table A1 in the Appendix. For effective scenario thinking we complement these
scenarios with “signposts” that act as early signals of the direction of travel. Signposts
are predominantly frequent indicators (monthly or quarterly) that quickly indicate new
developments to allow the appropriate response. See Table 9 for the conceptual
approach.
Table 8
Economic and financial market assumptions under alternative scenarios
Optimistic – Productivity Pessimistic - Pessimistic -

Country/Currency Baseline revival (Golden 20s) Stagflation Renewed recession
2022E 2023F 2024F 2022E 2023F 2024F 2022E 2023F 2024F 2022E 2023F 2024F
Real GDP (%) USD 3.7% 1.5% 1.7% 5.3% 3.2% 2.7% 2.2% 1.0% 1.2% –0.4% 1.1% 1.7%
EUR 4.1% 2.0% 1.3% 5.7% 3.0% 1.7% 2.1% 0.6% 0.8% –2.2% 0.9% 1.4%
RMB 5.1% 5.7% 5.5% 5.9% 5.9% 5.7% 3.1% 4.5% 4.0% 2.9% 4.5% 5.1%
Inflation (%) USD 3.3% 2.2% 2.2% 3.6% 2.8% 2.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 2.4% 1.2% 1.7%
EUR 2.1% 1.5% 1.5% 2.4% 1.9% 1.8% 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 1.9% 0.9% 0.9%
RMB 2.3% 2.5% 2.4% 2.6% 2.9% 2.8% 6.2% 6.8% 7.4% 1.7% 1.3% 2.0%
Policy rate (%) USD 0.1% 0.4% 1.0% 0.6% 1.4% 2.2% 0.6% 1.6% 1.9% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
EUR 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
RMB 2.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.5% 2.6% 2.2% 2.5% 2.5% 0.9% 1.3% 1.3%
10y yield (%) USD 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% 2.3% 3.1% 3.5% 2.6% 3.8% 4.9% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
EUR 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 1.1% 1.3% 1.7% 1.3% 2.0% 2.6% –0.5% –0.5% –0.3%
RMB 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3%
Risk Assets USD IG, bps 100 115 130 65 75 105 180 270 295 240 185 155
USD HY, bps 345 400 455 155 250 375 645 800 1175 870 650 605
US Equities, % 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 15.0% 10.0% 6.0% –10.0% –10.0% –5.0% –30.0% 2.0% 6.0%
Note: The probabilities reported for each scenario are conditional on the realisation across both dimensions (namely macroeconomic and financial markets) over a 3-year
horizon (from 2022 to 2024)
Source: Swiss Re Institute as of 1 November 2021
38 Swiss Re Institute sigma No 5/2021 Alternative economic and insurance scenarios
Table 8
Top 3 signposts for the alternative scenarios
Series to monitor Assessment

Persistent supply disruptions Input cost inflation
Supplier delivery times (PMI survey)
Inventories (PMI survey)
Change in inventory (NFBI survey)
Unanchored inflation expectations Common Inflation Expectations
Stagflation
Breakeven rates
Bloomberg inflation consensus
Consumer inflation expectations (University of Michigan survey)
Public policy responses Monetary Policy Uncertainty index
Economic Policy Uncertainty index
Fiscal and monetary policy coordination
Distributional fiscal policy (e.g., higher taxes on wealth)
Regulatory scrutiny on tech
Renewed COVID-19 wave COVID case numbers
Hospitalisations and deaths
Mobility data
Demand slowdown Consumer spending
Renewed recession
Disposable income
Savings
Credit creation/bank loan extension
Composite PMI survey
Inequality
Abrupt market/financial conditions stress Financial conditions index
Surging corporate credit spreads
Bankruptcies of enterprises (OECD)
Strong productivity growth Labour productivity
Government investment
Capital expenditure
Golden 20s
Tightening labour market Official unemployment rate, U-3

Broad unemployment rate, U-6
Labour force participation
Jobless claims (initial)
High sentiment Business confidence (PMI survey)
US consumer confidence survey
Note: The signposts listed are meant to illustrate how scenario narratives could develop. The list of triggers is not exhaustive and can Legend:
come into play both independently and in different combinations at the same time. The assessment is based on thresholds identified Not close to being met
by the Swiss Re Institute (in terms of the magnitude of the readings and the timing). The assessment gauges which signposts might be
pointing to the materialisation of one of the scenarios (red) and which readings are still remote from their identified thresholds (green). Near being met
Source: Swiss Re Institute Threshold breached
Insurance implications
Insurers should watch for interest rate and Table 9 illustrates the expected impact of the three alternative economic scenarios on
inflation surprises for long-tail business… insurance premium paths, claims trends and profitability relative to the baseline scenario.
Key takeaways for insurers’ growth and profitability are:
In the optimistic scenario: premium growth and investment returns would be stronger
than the baseline. Commercial lines will benefit most from improved economic activities.
Life business will also benefit from lower lapse rates. Higher interest rates as well as
strong capital markets will improve investment returns.
The renewed recession scenario serves a double blow to premium revenues, with a
contraction in 2022 and slower growth in 2023 and 2024. Non-life long-tail lines will
benefit from lower claims severity in a disinflationary environment. For life business,
Alternative economic and insurance scenarios sigma No 5/2021 Swiss Re Institute 39
saving products with guarantees and duration mismatch will see a stronger hit on
profitability than unit-linked business, where the asset risk is borne by the policyholder.
The stagflation scenario would bring a weaker growth in premium revenues in the US
and Euro Area in 2022. Long-tailed non-life business will be more sensitive to claims
inflation. On the other hand, in-force life savings products with guarantees will see
improved profitability from higher interest rates.
Table 9
Impact of alternative economic scenarios on insurers’ growth and profitability (2022–2023)
Optimistic Renewed recession Stagflation
Premium growth
Non-life
Property   
Casualty   
Trade credit   
Life
In-force
Protection   
Life savings, guarantees   
Life savings, unit linked   
New business
Profitability excluding general investment returns

Non-life
Property   
Casualty   
Trade credit   
Life
In-force
New business
Investment returns   
    
Negative Moderately negative Neutral Moderately positive Positive

Appendix
Table A1
Alternative scenario narratives
Optimistic Pessimistic
Golden 20s (probability: 10%) Stagflation (probability: 15%) Renewed recession (probability: 10%)
̤ Structural reform drive effectively ̤ Persistent supply chain disruptions translate ̤ Demand-driven growth slowdown and
directs spending towards infrastructure into emergence of parallel supply chains recession triggered by pandemic setbacks
High-level scenario
investments (incl. green energy) and making amidst ongoing de-globalisation ̤ Unwind of crowded investor positioning
narrative
economies more competitive. Leads to ̤ Overheating of economy with de-anchors tightens financial conditions abruptly
higher productivity and higher interest rates long-term inflation expectations ̤ Amplified geopolitical risks versus baseline
long-term ̤ High inequality leads to redistributive including China-US tensions as well as
̤ Companies embark on more capex policies (e.g. tax reforms, universal basic within the Euro Area (EA)
spending programs to make their income, increase in minimum wage, etc)
corporations future fit amid rising social discontent
̤ No renewed intrusive containment ̤ Renewed localised containment measures ̤ Renewed stringent containment measures
developments
measures in response to rising cases/hospitalisations on a global scale

Pandemic
COVID-19
̤ Vaccinations successfully allow ̤ Vaccines remain effective at preventing ̤ Vaccine-resistant mutations accumulate
hospitalisations and death rates to be serious disease sufficiently for a new variant to be declared
broadly contained ̤ Vaccine-acceptance rate plateaus making
̤ Continued roll-out of vaccinations herd immunity harder to achieve
̤ Policy mix groundwork is done for future ̤ Reversal in globalisation hampers ̤ Low productivity growth
Structural
changes
productivity boost (eg, digitalisation, reform productivity and increases price pressures ̤ Sustained increase in inequality
drive, infrastructure investment, etc) ̤ Sustained increase in inequality ̤ Increased role of government
̤ Reversal of globalisation
̤ Quick and broad-based labour market ̤ Persistently elevated unemployment ̤ Persistently elevated unemployment
Cyclical evolution
recovery ̤ Financial market stress, sharp tightening ̤ Systemic market stress, sharp tightening
Economics
̤ Sustained rebound in corporate earnings in financial conditions and market liquidity, in financial conditions and market liquidity,
̤ Strong consumer and business sentiment increasing defaults increase defaults
̤ Fiscal policy mix: eg, transfers more ̤ Business bankruptcies, zombification of
inflationary than infrastructure spending firms
̤ Poor consumer and business sentiment ̤ Poor consumer and business sentiment
Narrative / characterization of scenarios
̤ Real estate benefits from sound economic ̤ • Stagflation environment combined with ̤ Renewed recession exposes real estate
estate
Real
backdrop while central banks tighten rising yields apply pressure on mortgage market which recovers slowly, supported by
monetary policy at a reasonable pace rates, negatively affecting real estate market the extremely low yield environment
̤ Structural reform drive with spending ̤ Redistributive policies such as universal ̤ Certain governments are severely
policy
Fiscal
directed towards: basic income, increase in minimum wage, constrained in their ability to do more, with
– Infrastructure higher taxes on wealth, and stronger social major economies evening tightening their
– Making economies more competitive policies for affordable housing policies which leads to a fiscal cliff
Policies & responses
̤ Central banks gradually increase their policy ̤ Monetary policy framework changes (eg. ̤ Financial conditions tighten significantly
rate as economic activity benefits from a high inflation tolerance, helicopter money) but central banks are left with little room to
strong rebound in demand ̤ Overheating of the economy leads to de- manoeuvre
Monetary policy
anchoring of inflation expectations ̤ Central banks introduce yield curve control

̤ Loss of central bank independence, with to maintain low yield environment
government funding needs dominating
monetary policy (fiscal dominance)
̤ Higher tolerance for above-target inflation
to alleviate reduction of real debt burdens,
but central banks fail to prevent a massive
inflation spike
̤ Financial markets are supported by the ̤ Low growth environment alongside ̤ Challenged economic backdrop leads to
Financial
strong economic backdrop that offsets the increasing yields are hurtful to risk assets poor risk asset performance
reaction
markets
Market
higher discount rate from rising rates ̤ Spreads widen and equities contract ̤ Low bond yields provide low investment
̤ Rise in rating downgrades and defaults income
̤ Rise in rating downgrades and defaults
(1) US-China tensions (incl. Taiwan/HK) (1) Rising inequality with associated social (1) US-China tensions (incl. Taiwan/HK)
Geopolitics
Key risks1
(2) Major cyberattacks unrest (2) Social unrest given rising inequality
(3) Global tech decoupling/rising regulation (2) US-China tensions (incl. Taiwan/HK) (3) Emerging market blow out
(3) Global tech decoupling/rising regulation (4) European fragmentation
(4) Emerging market blow out (5) Global tech decoupling/rising regulation
Note: The probabilities reported for each scenario are conditional on the realisation across both dimensions (namely macroeconomic and financial markets) over a 3-year
horizon (from 2022 to 2024). The reported narratives are not exhaustive. Geopolitical risks are ordered according to their importance and relevance under each scenario.
There are other risks that are present under any possible scenario without representing a large threat to the real economy such as cyber-attacks. Other risks such as
climate policy gridlock carry significant risk for the real economy but are longer-term than the three-year horizon considered here.
Published by
Swiss Re Management Ltd
Swiss Re Institute
Mythenquai 50/60
P.O. Box
8022 Zurich
Switzerland
Telephone +41 43 285 2551

Email institute@swissre.com
Authors
Lucia Bevere
Fernando Casanova Aizpun
Irina Fan
Dr Hendre Garbers
Fiona Gillespie
Dr Anja Grujovic-Vischer
Dr Thomas Holzheu
Roman Lechner
Charlotte Müller
Patrick Saner
Rajeev Sharan
The authors thank Sakshi Baluja, Caroline De

Souza Rodrigues Cabral, Xin Dai, Ashish Dave,
James Finucane, Jessie Guo, Hao Jiang, Jake
Meyer, Mahesh Puttaiah, Olga Tschekassin,
Ayush Uchil, Diana van der Watt and Li Xing for
their contributions to this report.
Explore and visualise sigma data on natural catastrophes and the
world insurance markets at www.sigma-explorer.com
sigma editor
Alison Browning
The editorial deadline for this study was 27 October 2021.
sigma is available on Swiss Re’ s website: www.swissre.com/sigma

Managing editor
Dr Jerome Jean Haegeli
The internet version may contain slightly updated information.
Swiss Re Group Chief Economist
Graphic design and production:
Corporate Real Estate & Logistics / Media Production, Zurich
The entire content of this sigma edition is subject to copyright with all
rights reserved. The information may be used for private or internal
purposes, provided that any copyright or other proprietary notices are not
removed. Electronic reuse of the data published in sigma is prohibited.
Reproduction in whole or in part or use for any public purpose is

permitted only with the prior written approval of Swiss Re and if the
source reference “sigma 5/2021, Turbulence after lift-off: global
economic and insurance outlook 2022/23,” is indicated. Courtesy copies
are appreciated.
Although all the information used in this study was taken from reliable
sources, Swiss Re does not accept any responsibility for the accuracy
or comprehensiveness of the information given or forward looking
statements made. The information provided and forward-looking
statements made are for informational purposes only and in no way
constitute or should be taken to reflect Swiss Re’ s position, in particular
in relation to any ongoing or future dispute. In no event shall Swiss Re
be liable for any loss or damage arising in connection with the use of
this information and readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance
on forward-looking statements. Swiss Re undertakes no obligation to
publicly revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a
result of new information, future events or otherwise.
Order no: 270_0521_EN

Swiss Re Management Ltd.
Swiss Re Institute
Mythenquai 50 /60
P.O. Box
8022 Zurich
Switzerland
Telephone +41 43 285 2551

swissre.com/institute

Turbulence After Lift-Off: Global Economic and Insurance Market Outlook 2022/23

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Turbulence After Lift-Off: Global Economic and Insurance Market Outlook 2022/23

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Turbulence After Lift-Off: Global Economic and Insurance Market Outlook 2022/23

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

No 5 /2021

Turbulence after lift-off: 02 Executive summary

global economic 06 Macroeconomic

Note: E = estimates; F = forecasts. Data as of 11 November 2021.

Total Non-Life Life

World 3.4% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 2.8%

Advanced markets 3.3% 2.4% 2.8% 2.4% 4.1% 2.3%

Emerging markets 3.4% 6.4% 5.8% 8.2% 1.4% 4.6%

Increasing inequality The re/insurance industry

Rising risk awareness is Record-breaking weather

Source: Swiss Re Institute

Macroeconomic environment and outlook

Economic and inflation outlook

2020 2021E 2022F 2023F

US (LHS) UK (LHS) Germany (RHS) Japan (RHS)

The global energy crisis: adding fuel to the fire

EU carbon allowances European gas US gas Asia gas Chinese coal

Interest rate outlook

Three “Ds” define our outlook

the lead up to the pandemic (i.e., from 2015 to 2019 included).

Figure 4 20% 2.0%

Real consumption expenditure on goods (LHS) Core CPI (RHS)

Stretched asset valuations: limited upside and large downside

Figure 5 250% 30%

US equities (LHS) US IG credit (RHS) US treasuries (RHS)

18 Technology and Innovation Report 2021, UNCTAD, February 2021.

House, 24 June 2021.

Internet of things Drones Solar PV Big data Robotics AI

A solution to the productivity conundrum?

US Canada Euro Area UK

pandemic on technological progress remains to be seen. Support for productivity growth

Fuel cells Batteries Wind Solar Oil

Climate change and the global economy

Surging house prices heighten risks of retrenchment or inflation

34 8 things to know about global real estate value, Savills Impacts.

Rebuilding economic and health resilience

Table 3 Indicator Recent evolution Outlook

2020 Output shortfall

Insurance market outlook 2022/23

Total Non-Life Life

World 3.4% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 2.8%

Advanced markets 3.3% 2.4% 2.8% 2.4% 4.1% 2.3%

Emerging markets 3.4% 6.4% 5.8% 8.2% 1.4% 4.6%

139 305 233 83 147 119 17 63 30 10 24 15 29 71 69

Profitability ROE average, %

0.7% –0.1% 2% –0.1% 0.6% 2% 2.4% 2.0% 4% 2.5% 4.9% 5%

9.8% 8.3% 8% 10.7% 9.7% 9% 8.4% 7.3% 7% 7.4% 6.4% 7%

57 232 159 24 43 41 3 101 36 –4 34 32 35 54 49

Profitability ROE average, %

9.0% 10.9% 8.9% 13.0% 8.0% 7.6% 9.5% 11.4%

1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2

2.2 1.9 3.5 4.4 1.8 2.1 1.5 1.7

9.2% 8.6% 12.9% 12.8% 2.5% 10.3% 4.9% 0.1%

What lessons have we learned in 2021?

Increasing inequality The re/insurance industry

Rising risk awareness is Record-breaking weather

Source: Swiss Re Institute

Supply chain disruptions show that better protection is required to improve

Record-breaking weather extremes add urgency to the race to net-zero. 2021 is a