Titusland,+SR 2006 Sanbonmatsu
Titusland,+SR 2006 Sanbonmatsu
Titusland,+SR 2006 Sanbonmatsu
insists we are entitled to ask only such questions, and so conflates inquiry into
the ways that discourse about truth produces particular effects with endors-
ing the claim that truth-telling as such is impossible.
This fateful move can be traced to Friedrich Nietzsche, the intellectual
forefather of poststructuralism.The faith in truth of the Christian and Jewish
traditions, Nietzsche held, was merely a distorted or intellectualized version
of the frustrated will to power of the oppressed. It was for this reason that
Nietzsche viewed truth with deep suspicion and hostility, seeing it as the
origin of nihilism in European culture. ‘There is no pre-established harmony
between the furtherance of truth and the well-being of mankind’, he wrote.3
Rather, only the free, unapologetic exercise of power – power as power over
– over the self, over others – could provide a ground for new human values.
But the ancient prophets and theologians were not wrong to believe that
the oppressed, lacking power, have only the truth to console them. Deny the
oppressed even this – the right to bear witness to the way things really are
– and they have nothing. Surrender the possibility of truth, and one surren-
ders too the possibility of comparing the way things are with the way things
ought to be. Nietzsche’s contempt for justice (which is at root always and
only a claim of truth against power), was thus an attack on the very desirability
of general or social liberation.
As brilliant, if one-sided, as Nietzsche’s critique of religious asceticism and
repression was, it succumbed at the tail end of the 20th century to the very
nihilism Nietzsche hated and tried to vanquish. Postmodernism, misappropri-
ating Nietzsche, embraces a nihilism without borders. And this nihilism has
been institutionalized by the bureaucratic institutions and modern pedantic
types that Nietzsche abhorred. Since Foucault’s death in 1984, truth has been
continuously put on trial, interrogated, and found guilty of being ‘truth’ – an
epiphenomenon of power, an artifact of discourse – by countless postmod-
ernist academics who have made theory a profitable career. The effect of this
highly ritualized repetition compulsion by the erstwhile ‘leading’ wing of
the intelligentsia has been to blunt the critical imagination and to erode our
capacity for truth-telling, precisely at humanity’s hour of greatest need.
This is not to say that no poststructuralist thinker has ever contributed
to the history of ideas. Our thinking has been improved, for example, by
Foucault’s insights into disciplinary apparatuses, by Derrida’s discussion
of the pharmakon and the equivocal nature of signs, and by Jean-François
Lyotard’s far-sighted comprehension of the postmodern condition of knowl-
edge and the waning of the intellectual. A fair accounting, however, would
have to conclude that such contributions have on the whole been modest,
and that they have come to us exclusively from ‘first wave’ poststructuralist
thinkers, not from their subsequent innumerable (and mediocre) epigones.
198 SOCIALIST REGISTER 2006
Worse, such an accounting would also have to conclude that the many critics
of postmodernism have been basically right: that postmodernism is explicit
where it should be vague or open-ended – e.g., on the subject of the best
means of praxis, which it offers in prescriptive form (dispersion, difference,
anti-strategicism, etc.) – and exasperatingly vague or noncommittal where it
ought to be most explicit – e.g., on the ethical values and strategic goals of
social movements.4 Such aporias and contradictions would be of little conse-
quence but for the fact that many academics and some activists, who count
themselves on the Left, turn first to postmodernism for theoretical guidance.
As a result, the postmodernist sensibility has gravely damaged the critical
instruments of not one but several classes of intellectuals.
work solely with their heads or intellects (instead of their hands or bodies),
but because of their distinctive role in what Gramsci termed the ‘ensemble
of social relations’ in which intellectual activity takes place and produces
certain effects. Because the work intellectuals do is connected not to the
production of goods and services, but to the circulation of ideas and culture,
their function is primarily ideological. This does not, however, mean that
they produce ideas in a vacuum. Whereas other kinds of knowledge workers
have a more or less direct role in the production process – e.g., managing
insurance accounts, working in sales or service – intellectuals have a mediated
relationship to production. Specifically, the intellectual’s labour is mediated
‘by two types of social organization’ – the state and civil society (‘the ensem-
ble of private organizations in society’).8
Intellectuals today are far more mediated than they were in Gramsci’s
time. We must first note that there are far fewer ‘organic’ intellectuals today
(i.e., intellectuals who developed naturally out of particular classes and social
groups), and many more ‘traditional’ ones (individuals tied to disciplinary
regimes and professional associations). Not to put too fine a point on it, the
sympathetic intellectual today is far more likely to enter a Ph.D. program
than, say, to assume a leadership role in a political party or social movement,
or to take up arms (the present author not excluded). Whereas the critical or
revolutionary intellectual of the past would have emerged out of a particular
class, a national or ethnic identity, or a church or religious network, today’s
intellectuals are ostensibly ‘free-floating’ – deracinated thinkers without close
connections to specific movements or identities. Or rather, they would be
free-floating, were it not for the chains binding them to a limb of the state
apparatus: the accredited, degree-granting college or university. The destruc-
tion of the public sphere, the decline of social movements, and the virtual
disappearance of an independent press has shunted much of the intelligentsia
into the academic system. There, the ‘state nobility’ finds its mental labour
mediated through the tenure process and the competition for scarce federal
grants and fellowships (the National Science Foundation, the National Insti-
tutes of Health, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and so on).
The bureaucratization and professionalization of knowledge over the
last century – particularly the last half century – has in turn shaped the
content and form of knowledge itself. ‘Universities’, Russell Jacoby observes,
‘hire by committees: one needs degrees, references, the proper deference, a
pleasant demeanor’. As such, they ‘encourage a definite intellectual form’.
Serious authors today are obliged to precede their tomes with ‘a dense list
of colleagues, friends, institutions, and foundations’, as if to suggest ‘that the
author or book passed the test, gaining the approval of a specific network,
which filtered out the unkempt and unacceptable’. The result is cautious
POSTMODERNISM AND THE ACADEMIC INTELLIGENTSIA 201
avoid celebrity worship and poststructuralist canards alike. To give but one
example, the Women’s Studies Department at Duke University (perhaps the
best programme of its kind in the US) continues to sponsor institutes and
conferences that are staunchly materialist, politically engaged, and historically
grounded.24 But most of the leading centres for the distribution of ‘critical’
theory in the United States, Canada, and Europe – in cities like Atlanta,
Birmingham, San Francisco, New York, Dublin, and Cardiff – still place the
poststructuralist star at the centre of their philosophical cosmos.
standardization, cannot help but result. The star’s very proximity to power
(academic capital) makes her or him coveted by graduate students, which in
turn leads to corruption of the ethical relation between teacher and taught.
Bourdieu observed of the fate of knowledge within highly competitive and
hierarchical fields:
At the end of his first year in graduate school at one of the ‘flagship’
humanities programs in the University of California system, a Persian Marxist
friend of mine who, years before, had had to flee Iran after being sentenced
to death there by the Islamic regime, angrily remarked that ‘There is more
intellectual orthodoxy [in his graduate program] than under the Ayatollah!’
As this anecdote suggests, postmodernism, notwithstanding its veneer of
radicalism and iconoclasm, in practice functions as a cultural force that stifles
genuine critical inquiry and creative thought and penalizes those who dissent
from its ideological frame.
Frederic Jameson has argued that a symptom of postmodernity is the
waning of affect.30 This is not quite correct, however. From the shallow depths
of postmodern or commodity culture there erupt potent displays of aggres-
sion and hostility.The struggle for scarce university resources exacerbates the
anxiety and insecurity; hence too, the aggressive instincts of a portion of the
intelligentsia, which the postmodern subculture thrives on. If the personal
is political, then in the highly competitive world of academia the personal
is frequently also pathological. This is especially true of the contemporary,
high-pressure humanities program, an autoclave where only pathogens of
the stoutest genetic build can survive, thrive, and multiply. The liquidation
of humanism in theory parallels and mirrors increasingly inhuman relations
between and among graduate students, faculty, administrators, and univer-
sity staff. In this regard, the received poststructuralist wisdom, that ‘modern
society cannot be saved’,31 perpetually leaves social practice vulnerable to
scarcely concealed authoritarian impulses. It is telling that Michel Foucault’s
instinctive response to the paroxysm of the Iranian Revolution was initially
not to sympathize with the leftists and feminists who participated in that
POSTMODERNISM AND THE ACADEMIC INTELLIGENTSIA 207
Foucault’s sympathy for the Islamic militants has its counterpart today in the
offhanded contempt with which some young academics now treat the very
idea of democracy – i.e., not merely ‘really existing’ democracy’s imperfect
or distorted practice.
Another striking aspect of the postmodernist habitus is the way that post-
modern philosophy’s casual indifference to truth as an ontological category
– that is, as a means of ascribing signs or meaning to matters of fact, the
Real – gets mirrored in the bad faith with which postmodernism’s advocates
engage in conversation and debate. I still recall, for example, a conversation
I had with a fellow graduate student while attending a doctoral program in
the humanities in the early 1990s. The student, who had apprenticed herself
to a leading poststructuralist scholar, announced in seminar that truth did
not exist, and that the assembled company had no business talking about it as
though it did. At the break, I asked the student what she would say if I told
her that, in the middle of our class, I had seen Abraham Lincoln open the
door to our classroom, take a stroll around, and leave.Wouldn’t she then have
to assess whether such a thing really happened, or whether I had imagined
it? ‘Not at all’, she confidently replied. ‘I would be concerned for your safety
and would try to protect you. Because we live in a disciplinary society that
would try to interpellate you as “mad”’. The theorist-in-training here was
not simply applying Foucault’s critique of the discourse of madness; she was
tacitly disavowing her participation in a shared or common human condition
in which questions of truth are an inescapable and vital feature of our lives.
An obscure Cartesianism lurks here: the poststructuralist’s self-image is that
of a disembodied mind hovering above the play of mere mortal events. Yet
208 SOCIALIST REGISTER 2006
presumably the graduate student in this case did not doubt the existence of
her TIAA-CREF benefits account, and was careful to check the accuracy
– truthfulness – of its balance.
In my own graduate school experience, the students most insistent on
the point that truth was nothing but a discourse also happened to be the
ones most credulous toward occult systems like astrology. My postmodernist
friends spent countless hours running horoscope programs on their comput-
ers, and always swore to the accuracy and veracity of their astrological charts,
even as they disputed all materialist and scientific descriptions of reality.
Stendhal’s ironic depiction of Fabrizio, the credulous young protagonist of
The Charterhouse of Parma, a man who prides himself on being intellectually
sophisticated but naively clings to his own brand of superstition, comes to
mind: ‘Fabrizio’s reasoning could penetrate no further …. He was far from
devoting his time to patient consideration of the real particularities of things
in order to divine their true causes. Reality seemed to him flat and muddy
…’.33
In point of fact, poststructuralists exhort their followers not to inquire into
causality – or politics. Thus Kirstie McClure:
the class has raised her hand and asked why they were being shown women
being killed, and in what way this could be considered erotic, the instructor
replied, ‘If you’re not prepared to have fun, you shouldn’t be in this class’.
But many other students are attracted by postmodernism’s self-referential
playfulness, its apparent iconoclasm and lack of respect for tradition. For
this group of students, postmodernist theory resonates with the nihilism of
mass popular culture – the fast-moving, ‘hip’, faux alternative, cynical pose
of MTV, Beavis and Butthead, South Park, and first-person shooter video
games.38 These students are rewarded by their instructors with the pleasure of
the arcane – honorary membership in the priesthood of Theory.
More than this, they come to believe that they are involved in an important
political project. For example, female undergraduates encountering women’s
studies or literature courses are taught that it is political to dismiss second
wave (liberal and radical) feminism as outmoded, or to eschew the feminist
pedagogy of consciousness-raising.Young ‘post-feminists’ are more comfort-
able discussing ‘the lack’ or ‘the differend’ than the material circumstances and
experiences of being a woman in society today – e.g., fraternity violence and
date rape, the feminization of poverty, the sexual objectification of women
by the media, the pervasiveness of pornography. Actor Maggie Gyllenhall,
who majored in English Literature at Columbia University in the late 1990s,
has said in interviews that she was drawn to her role in the film The Secretary,
in which she played a submissive office worker who becomes empowered
through sado-masochist humiliation at the hands of her boss, by the film’s
‘political agenda’ – the fact ‘that it was intended to be transgressive and to
push something forward’.39 Gyllenhaal took the role in part, she says, ‘to fight
against all those old-school feminists’ (i.e., those who used to think that it
was bad politics for women to want to be dominated). ‘I began to think that
my entire college education was preparing me to defend the politics of this
movie …’.40
But postmodernism now affects virtually all undergraduates, not just those
majoring in literature, through the writing and composition programmes
and centres that proliferated on college and university campuses in the 1980s
and 1990s.41 Many instructors and lecturers in such programmes, which now
serve as the first point of contact between many undergraduate students and
self-reflexive or theoretical bodies of knowledge, have adopted postmod-
ernist theories as a way of addressing multicultural and pluralist themes in
the classroom. Much of the critical literature in Composition, Education,
Rhetoric, Writing, and Art Education now draws on poststructuralist figures
like Derrida, Bakhtin, Cixous, Kristeva, and Lyotard.42 The new writing
critics champion approaches to literacy and writing that emphasize disjunc-
ture, plurality, and a pedagogy carefully shorn of normative judgment or
POSTMODERNISM AND THE ACADEMIC INTELLIGENTSIA 211
According to Panaccio, Lépine’s act was not, in the first instance, an enact-
ment of misogynistic violence, but was a case of ‘Madness … running wild’,
a madness which ‘has eluded social control and is attacking the very foun-
dations of order’.55 While admitting that the widespread feminist view of
Lépine as representative of a ‘kind of male thinking which threatens women
with execution if they reject the place which keeps them socially inferior’
was ‘not entirely wrong’, Panaccio suggested that ‘the truth is surely not
so simple’.56 Lépine’s attack was directed not against women or feminists
(the simplistic, perhaps even simple-minded, view) but against ‘jouissance’
– play outside the Law. To understand the ‘truth’ of Lépine’s action, we must
acknowledge it as an event unavailable to conventional means of descrip-
tion. ‘This is the point at which all discourse comes to a complete halt,
whether psychiatric, feminist, psychological or other. This is the point where
a limit is irreversibly, irreparably transgressed, where the Symbolic and the
Imaginary topple over …. This is the point where love and hate merge in
the site of what is unnameable’.57 Having effectively declared Lépine’s act
to be historically unintelligible, Panaccio now implicates modern society as
such in ‘the unnameable’ – i.e., in the facticity of the fourteen young corpses.
‘Marc Lépine’, she concludes, ‘accomplished what is for all of us both desir-
able and taboo: incest and murder’.58 Lépine’s atrocity, in other words, was a
crypto-transgressive or subversive act that enacted our own collective fanta-
sies (men’s and women’s alike).
What we see here is the osmosis of academic poststructuralism by the
non-academic grassroots. Clinical psychotherapy has begun to be colonized
by poststructuralist rhetoric.59 The same dynamic can be observed elsewhere.
Consider the following three passages.The first two are by academic theorists,
Homi Bhabha and Hardt and Negri, while the third is by a self-described
‘nineteen-year-old radical black feminist-student-activist-educator’ (and
fourth-year undergraduate at UC Berkeley), who is heavily involved in the
‘abolitionist’ anti-prison movement:
say that the process itself is virtual and that its power resides in the
power of the virtual.61
What is significant is not only that the anti-prison activist now speaks in
a Foucauldian idiom, but that she also affirms and reproduces the central
tenets of the poststructuralist orthodoxy – a collapsed sense of temporal-
ity (‘the now’), the spatial indeterminacy of power, and a prejudice against
building alternative institutions. Postmodernist ways of knowing can in fact
be found in a growing number of social movements. Many on-line activ-
ist communities and blogs now bandy about poststructuralist rhetoric or
ideas without seeming to have any direct knowledge of, or connection to,
the academic humanities. The Hacktivist website, for example, describes
computer hacking as a ‘rhizomic’ form of political action, invoking a term
popularized by Deleuze.
Postmodernism has even seeped into that most putatively universal of
social movements – the movement for international human rights. When I
recently engaged a friend of mine, a senior manager at one of the world’s
largest international human rights organizations, over questions of theory, he
wrote: ‘… I don’t find all of poststructuralism to be so negative. I think there
is a liberatory potential in undermining Absolute Truth systems, including
those of the Liberal Centre or the Authoritarian Left. I suspect a lot of these
Truth systems take science as their archetype, and as an ex-quantum physi-
cist I would certainly argue that the Truth claims of scientific ontology are
untenable…’.63 On the one hand, I agreed with my friend’s further assertion
(in the same email) that, ‘In a post-Enlightenment spirit, I’m tempted to
describe Human Rights, for example, as a myth – but in the positive sense
of Sorel’s ‘Myth of the General Strike’ (i.e. as an inspirational emblem rather
than a concrete existent)’. On the other hand, I was struck by the fact that
even members of the technical intelligentsia (my friend works in informa-
tion technology) have come to think of scientific claims as mere narratives.
What is going on here? How do we account for the remarkable intrusion
of an effete, complicated, and self-contradictory philosophical movement into
the mainstream of grassroots activism? How has postmodernism succeeded
in displacing what came before – namely, the entire Western Marxist tradi-
tion? A good part of the answer is that the historical crisis of socialism and
left social movements in the 1980s and 1990s left a gaping hole in theories
216 SOCIALIST REGISTER 2006
In Gramsci’s view, then, the role of the ‘critical’ intellectual – the revolu-
tionary – is primarily to discern patterns of significance in history and culture,
in order to identify more or less promising lines of action. Effective political
knowledge is always rooted in a perception of the totality or gestalt of histor-
ical probabilities – in the complex interplay of economic and cultural factors,
class interests, and human passion and will, over time. It is not a question
of our being able to predict the future ‘scientifically’, but of understanding,
as accurately and fully as we are able, the subtle combination of forces that
structure the field of meaning and which therefore are likely to give rise to
one or another phenomenon. This much radical or revolutionary theory
has in common with other varieties of human political or strategic thought.
What differentiates the critical theorist from other theorists or intellectuals
is, first, her or his belief that society – the ensemble of social relations – can
be changed, and second, the moral conviction that it ought to be changed.
This may seem a trivial point, but it in fact places the critical intellectual ‘in’
the world in a qualitatively different way. The normative commitments of
the critical intellectual – the subjective will to know the world in order to
change it – enables a particular way of seeing and perceiving.
If we define critical theory in this way, as a means for making history and
world intelligible in order that we might act consciously to change history and world,
then the inadequacies of postmodernism become apparent. Postmodernism
is a doctrine that systematically renders intelligibility impossible. That is its
message, as well as its method. Knowing and not-knowing – the distinc-
tion is irrelevant to it. If Marxists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were overly confident about the power of thought to arrive at mastery of
the totality – and they often were – today’s generation of critical theorists
commits the opposite mistake, stripping thought of the right and ability to
POSTMODERNISM AND THE ACADEMIC INTELLIGENTSIA 219
know the world at all. But without the ability to think clearly and criti-
cally about the nature of existing power (and about how to defeat it) we are
blind to historical possibility. It is therefore ironic that poststructuralism has
become conflated with ‘theory’ as such, because at root it is profoundly anti-
theoretical. Like the vulgar Marxism that it both arose out of and developed
in reaction against, postructuralism’s doctrines have reduced complex social
and historical problems to a catechism of pre-digested formulas, mecha-
nistic banalities, and unexamined and frequently tautological propositions
concerning the nature of society, power, and the subject. And its few modest
theoretical contributions can never begin to compensate us for the harm
done to critical thought by the destructive conceits that postmodernism has
spawned. I am speaking of the movement’s naive spontaneism and amorality;
of the facile disavowal, by figures like Foucault and Lyotard, of the need for
political leadership on the Left; of the grand narcissism of the postcolonial
intellectuals (whose celebration of their own ‘hybridity’ and ‘border crossings’
obscures the traumas of less privileged refugees and economic immigrants
made rootless by capital); of the deconstructionists’ search-and-destroy
mission against empathy and imaginative identification in literary studies; of
the repellant defence of pornography and ‘debasement’ by poststructuralist
feminists; of the rococo Lacanian fetish of the dis-integrated subject; of the
refusal of the language of universals – now déclassé concepts like humanism,
liberation, revolution, and totality.
Postmodernist critics have ridiculed universal metanarratives and truth,
even while sombrely discussing such weightless metaphysical conceits as
episteme, phallologocentrism, différance, and ‘the lack’ – the contemporary
theorist’s version of ectoplasm and ether. They have systematically privileged
local, particular movements over global and universal ones, without consid-
ering the exigencies or needs of actual practice. Unaware of or indifferent
to its own internal contradictions and elisions, postmodernism has preached
epistemological scepticism and radical historicism, all the while remaining
innocent of its own social determinations. But most damning of all, when it
comes to offering us something concrete, something really useful with which
to gain traction on the great intellectual, social, and political problems of
our day, postmodernism falls silent. Here, postmodernism truly distinguishes
itself: unlike virtually every other intellectual movement or ideology of the
past – anarchism, socialism, liberalism, libertarianism, conservatism, commu-
nism, fascism – postmodernism offers a theory neither of society nor of
politics and the state.
In the past, such obvious deficiencies in the doctrine have not affected its
fortunes. But reality may finally have begun to intrude upon the postmod-
ern idyll. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States
220 SOCIALIST REGISTER 2006
without social movements to support and invigorate it, which explains why
postmodernist theory has grown at the same rate that contemporary social
movements have declined and lost momentum.
The crisis of the Left, of which postmodernism is both symptom and
cause, will therefore not be dissolved simply by the collapse of the illusions of
theory. What we need, and need urgently, is not merely a repudiation of the
poststructuralist canon, but a bold new theoretical project – a paradigmatic
theory of action that yokes materialist analysis to an unabashedly moral,
utopian, ecological vision. Such a project, closely interwoven with practice,
would both take up and go well beyond the lost thread of Marxist-human-
ist and socialist-feminist thought. The work of our combined intellects must
be to map the totality of oppression and liberation – not by seeking the
Holy Grail of a scientific theory of everything, but by establishing an ethical
horizon for liberatory practice as such. Only by returning, in this way, to
holism in theory and practice might we begin to undo the terrible damage
inflicted by nihilism on our praxis, and on truth.
NOTES
The author would like to thank Joel Brattin for his most helpful comments
in preparing this manuscript.
1 Postmodernism began as a separate – initially aesthetic – current from
poststructuralism, but the two did converge: the poststructuralist critique
of humanism, subjectivity, and foundationalism became indistinguish-
able from a general rejection of modernity and modern institutions
(hence ‘post-modernism’, a philosophical outlook). For the purposes
of this essay the two are used interchangeably to denote a theoretical
discourse and set of assumptions, rather than to describe a general social
experience – i.e., a ‘postmodern condition’ (Lyotard) or ‘condition of
postmodernity’ (David Harvey).
2 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, Power/Knowledge, New York:
Pantheon, 1980, p. 133.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, §168, Human, All Too Human, in R.J. Hollingdale,
ed., A Nietzsche Reader, New York: Penguin, 1977, p. 198.
4 See especially Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism, New York:
Blackwell, 1997; Norman Geras, Discourses of Extremity: Radical Ethics
and Post-Marxist Extravgance, London:Verso, 1990; Peter Dews, The Logic
of Disintegration, London: Verso, 1987; and Teresa Ebert, Ludic Feminism
and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1996.
222 SOCIALIST REGISTER 2006