Before Attempting To Characterize Archaic Greece
Before Attempting To Characterize Archaic Greece
Before Attempting To Characterize Archaic Greece
unsatisfactory. Only for Athens is anything like a proper political tradition known, and Athens’
development toward the democracy of the 5th century was amazingly and untypically rapid by
comparison with other states, many of which never became democratic at all. A tiny but salutary
scrap of evidence makes this point: Thucydides in Book II of his History of the Peloponnesian War
casually mentions a man called Evarchus as “tyrant” of a small northwestern Greek polis called
Astacus in the 420s BCE. But for this chance mention, one would never have guessed that tyranny
could have existed or persisted in such a place so late or so long. Another difficulty is that, while a fair
amount about the social structure of Classical Athens is known, some of it must go back to Archaic
times; just how much is disputed.
1:055 Alexander the Great: The Boy Who Conquered a Horse, Greek warriors riding horses with
spears
BRITANNICA QUIZ
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There is a further complication. In both the political and the social spheres, one has to reckon—chiefly
at Athens, but elsewhere too—with “invented tradition,” a distorting element for which proper
allowance is only now beginning to be made. Thus, it seems that not just Lycurgus, the famous
Spartan lawgiver (whose historicity was doubted even in antiquity), but even a reforming figure like
Solon of Athens, who certainly existed in the 6th century and large fragments of whose poetry still
survive, was in some respects what anthropologists call a “culture hero.” Much was projected onto
him anachronistically or just wrongly, and reformers in later generations established their credentials
by claiming (if they were reactionaries) that they were trying to “get back to Solon” or (if they were
democrats) that Solon was their founding father. Such errors should not induce too much pessimism:
at Athens at least, individual aristocratic families preserved oral traditions, which affected the later
literary records in ways that can be properly understood with the help of anthropological analogy.
That is to say, not all the evidence so preserved is unusable, but it needs handling in special ways.
It has even been argued that social life too was creatively manipulated. Later Greek cities contained,
alongside such transparent political institutions as the Popular Assembly and the Deliberative
(“Probouleutic”) Council, a more-opaque set of institutions, ostensibly based on kinship groupings.
The biggest and most basic of these groupings were the phylae, or “tribes,” according to which the
citizen body was subdivided. Thus, all Dorian states had the same three tribes, and there were four
Ionian tribes (although Ionian states were less conservative than Dorian, and one finds among them a
greater readiness to innovate; late 6th-century Athens, for example, switched from a four-tribe
hereditary system of citizenship to a 10-tribe one based on simple residence as well as descent).
Smaller subdivisions were the phratry, a word connected with a philological root meaning “brother,”
and the genos, a smaller cluster of families (oikoi).
The existence of these groupings in historical times is beyond question; one finds them controlling
citizen intake (as in the so-called “Demotionidai” inscription from the Attic village of Decelea, datable
to as late as the early 4th century BCE) and entering into complicated property arrangements. What
has become a matter of debate, however, is the question of just how old they actually were.
According to the most-skeptical view, the whole apparatus of tribe and genos was an invention
without any Dark Age history to legitimate it. This view, which rests partly on the near absence of the
relevant kinship terminology in Homer, is not ultimately convincing in its hypothesis of a kind of
complicated collective fraud on posterity. Yet it is right to allow for an element of conscious
antiquarianism at certain periods (the 320s in Athens being one), which may well have affected
specific traditions.
საზოგადოება და ღირებულებები
Bacchiadae და Eupatridae
კოლონიზებადი სახელმწიფოების სამყარო არისტოკრატიული იყო იმ გაგებით, რომ
მცირე რაოდენობით ექსკლუზიური კლანები ქალაქებში მონოპოლიზირებდნენ
მოქალაქეობას და პოლიტიკურ კონტროლს. მაგალითად, კორინთოში პოლიტიკური
კონტროლი მონოპოლიზირებული იყო ერთი გვარის, ბაკიადას ზრდასრული
მამაკაცებით. მათი რიცხვი, ალბათ, არაუმეტეს ორიოდე ასი იყო. ათენში არსებობდა
ევპატრიდას ზოგადი კლასი, სიტყვა, რომელიც ნიშნავს "კარგი წარმოშობის ხალხს" -
არისტოკრატებს. (შეიძლება სიტყვას ერთდროულად, მაგრამ უფრო ვიწროდ იყენებდა
ერთ ცალკეულ გვარზე. ამასთან დაკავშირებით სადავოა და, ნებისმიერ შემთხვევაში,
ჰიპოთეტური ოჯახი მრავალი პრივილეგიიდან მხოლო
The case, therefore, is not analogous to that of the Bacchiadae.) It is unlikely that the Eupatridae were
as rigidly defined as the Bacchiadae, and the negative tradition that Solon in the early 6th century
deprived them of their exclusive claim to political office may just be the excessively formal and precise
way in which later ancient commentators described a positive change by which power was made
more generally available than it had been before.
With regard to those same early Archaic times, one hears—for example, in the poetry of the 7th-
century Boeotian Hesiod—of control, sometimes oppressively exercised, by basileis (singular
basileus). That word is usually translated as “kings,” and such titles as the Athenian basileus (an
official, or archon, with a defined religious competence, conveniently but less correctly called the
archon basileus by modern scholars) are then explained as survivals of an age of monarchy. That
account in terms of fossilization certainly eases the awkwardness of explaining why, for instance, the
wife of the archon basileus was held to be ritually married to the god Dionysus. The very existence of
kingship in Geometric (as opposed to Mycenaean) Greece, however, has been challenged, and a case
has been made (though not universally accepted) for seeing most of those Archaic basileis not as
kings in any sense but as hereditary nobles. In the latter case, there is no great difference between
those basileis and such aristocrats as the Bacchiadae.
In Classical times, strong homosexual attachments were another way in which values were inculcated,
passed on by the older man (the erastes) to the younger eromenos, or beloved. The gymnasium was
the venue where such relationships typically developed. As with the symposium, there was an almost
ritual element to it all; certain gifts—such as, for example, the gift of a hare—were thought especially
appropriate. The date, however, at which Greek homosexuality became a central cultural institution is
problematic; it is notoriously absent from the Homeric poems, a fact that some scholars explain as
being the result of poetic reticence. The more-plausible view is that homosexuality was in some way
connected with the rise of the polis and was part of what has been called the “8th-century
renaissance.” If so, Homer’s silence is after all significant: he does not mention it because in his time it
was not yet important.
Both symposia and gymnasia in different ways mirrored or were preparatory to warfare (see below).
Interpolis athletic competitions (such as the Olympic Games) are another reflection of warfare.
Epinician poetry of the Classical period (that is, “victory poetry” like that of Pindar, whose epinician
odes celebrate the athletic victories of aristocratic individuals) constantly uses the language of war,
fighting, and victory. Indeed, one influential view of organized athletic competitions is that they are a
restructuring of the instinct to hunt and kill.
ამრიგად, საქმე არ არის Bacchiadae- ს ანალოგიური.) ნაკლებად სავარაუდოა, რომ
Eupatridae ისეთივე მკაცრად განსაზღვრულიყო, როგორც Bacchiadae, და უარყოფითი
ტრადიცია, რომლის მიხედვითაც სოლონმა VI საუკუნის დასაწყისში მათ ჩამოართვა
პოლიტიკური თანამდებობისადმი განსაკუთრებული პრეტენზია უბრალოდ იყოს
ზედმეტად ოფიციალური და ზუსტი გზა, რომლითაც მოგვიანებით ანტიკურმა
კომენტატორებმა დაახასიათეს პოზიტიური ცვლილება, რომლის მიხედვითაც
ძალაუფლება უფრო ზოგადად ხელმისაწვდომი გახდა, ვიდრე ადრე იყო.
სიმპოზიუმები და გიმნაზია
არქაულ ბერძნულ საზოგადოებებში ცხოვრება, რომელსაც ამგვარი ოჯახები მართავენ,
შეიძლება აღდგეს მხოლოდ იმპრესიონისტურად და მხოლოდ სოციალური მასშტაბის
ზედა ნაწილში; მტკიცებულებები, ბერძნულ-რომაული ანტიკურ დროსაც კი, უჩვეულოა,
არსებითად ელიტარულია. არისტოკრატიული ღირებულებები გადაცემული იყო
როგორც ვერტიკალურად, ოჯახის ზეპირი ტრადიციებით, ასევე ჰორიზონტალურად,
გადამწყვეტი ინსტიტუტის საშუალებით, რომელიც ცნობილია როგორც სიმპოზიუმი, ან
დღესასწაული, რომლისთვისაც თავდაპირველად დაწერილი არქაული პოეზია
დაწერილი იყო (მრავალი ლიტერატურის მეცნიერის აზრით). შესაძლოა, ბევრი კარგად
მოხატული ჭურჭელიც იყო გათვლილი ამ ბაზრისთვის, თუმცა განიხილება ასეთი
ჭურჭლის სოციალური და მხატვრული მნიშვნელობა. ზოგიერთი მკვლევარი ამტკიცებს,
რომ მართლაც შეძლებული ადამიანები ნებისმიერ დროს გამოიყენებდნენ ოქროს და
ვერცხლის ჭურჭელს, მაგრამ მათ არცერთი რიცხვი არ შემორჩენილა, რადგან ისინი
დიდი ხნის წინ გამდნარი იყო.
At the individual level, the basic institution in intercity relationships was that of “guest-friendship,” or
xenia. That was another area where ritual elements were present to such a marked degree that the
whole institution has been called “ritualized friendship.” The same aristocrats who drank and heard
poetry together inside their own communities naturally expected to find comparable groups inside
other states. They cemented their ties, which had perhaps been formed on initially casual or trading
visits, with formal relationships of xenia. At some point quite early in the Archaic period that
institution developed into something still more definite, the proxenia. Proxenoi were citizens of state
A living in state A who looked after the interests of citizens of state B. The status of proxenos was
surely in origin hereditary, but by Thucydides’ time one hears of “voluntary proxenoi”
(etheloproxenoi). The antiquity of the basic institution is not in doubt, however much the 5th-century
Athenian empire may have exploited and reshaped it for its own political convenience; a 7th-century
inscription from the island of Corcyra mentioning a proxenos from Locris is the earliest attestation of
the institution.
Another way of institutionalizing relationships between the nationals of different states was epigamia,
an arrangement by which the offspring of marriage were treated as citizens of the wife’s polis if the
husband settled there; and so was the husband. Athens, for example, granted epigamia to Euboea as
late as the 5th century, a time when Athenian citizenship was fiercely protected. There are still earlier
instances: usually one hears of epigamia when for one reason or another it was being suspended or
denied. Thus, there was an early arrangement between the islands of Andros and Paros, which,
Plutarch says, ended when relations went sour. More interesting is the statement, again by Plutarch,
that there was no intermarriage between members of two of the villages, or demes, of Attica, Pallene
and Hagnous. Far from being evidence that these places were somehow originally separate states, the
prohibition was more like a ban on endogamy: in other words, the two communities were regarded—
like members of a family—as being too close to be allowed to intermarry.
Thus, both marriage itself and prohibition of marriage were ways of defining the relations between
communities, including communities within a single large state like Attica, and of keeping those
relations friendly. One way in which ties of xenia and marriage can now be traced in detail is the
scientific study of Greek personal names, because patterns of naming reflect social realities; foreign
names enter a city’s name pool as a result of both formal connections and less formal ones, such as
temporary residence. Such “onomastic” evidence, as it is called, can now be studied in bulk and in
depth, thanks to the computer-aided publication of all known Greek personal names, most of them
attested from inscriptions.
დიდი ატლეტური ფესტივალების დროს, რომლებიც ბერძნებს აწყობდნენ წლების
გარკვეული ინტერვალებით ოლიმპიაში, შემდეგ კი - დელფოში, ნემეასა და ისტმოსში
(ოთხი დიდი პანელენური, ან „მთლიანი ბერძნული“ თამაში), ერთი გადადის შიდა
ორგანიზაციიდან ინდივიდუალური ბერძნული საზოგადოებები მათ
ურთიერთმიმართებაში. უკვე აღინიშნა ორი სახის ძლიერი ურთიერთმიმართება - ეს
კოლონიზაცია ან დედაქალაქი და ქალიშვილი და ამფიქტიონიის საყოველთაო
წევრობაა. მითიური კავშირები ერთ ქალაქსა და სხვა ქალაქს შორის შენარჩუნებული და
გამოყენებული იყო ყველა პერიოდის განმავლობაში, რომელსაც წარმატებით
უწოდებდნენ "ნათესაური დიპლომატია". ყველაზე გავრცელებული ასეთი კავშირი
დედასა და ქალიშვილს შორის იყო და საერთო წარმოშობის ხაზგასმას გულისხმობდა -
ეს არის მითიური გმირის ან დამაარსებელი მოღვაწისგან საერთო წარმოშობა. ასეთი
ნათესაური დიპლომატია ყველა მხარემ ძალიან სერიოზულად აღიქვა და ჯერ კიდევ
ელინისტური პერიოდი იყო ალიანსების ან სხვა სახის საერთო მოქმედების საფუძველი.
თანამედროვე ისტორიკოსები ხაზს უსვამენ ბერძნული კულტურის
"განსაკუთრებულობას", ანუ ცალკეული პოლიციის ცალკეულ განვითარებასა და
ყურადღებით გაშენებულ ადგილობრივ იდენტობას. ნათესაური დიპლომატიის ქსელები
იყო ერთ-ერთი საშუალება, რომლის საშუალებითაც ეს პარკლეიტალიზმი
პრაქტიკულად დარბილდა.
ინდივიდუალურ დონეზე, საქმიანი ურთიერთობების ძირითადი ინსტიტუტი იყო
"სტუმართა მეგობრობა", ანუ ქსენია. ეს იყო კიდევ ერთი სფერო, სადაც რიტუალის
ელემენტები იმდენად გამოხატული იყო, რომ მთელ ინსტიტუტს "რიტუალიზებული
მეგობრობა" უწოდეს. იგივე არისტოკრატები, რომლებიც თავიანთ თემებში ერთად
სვამდნენ და ისმენდნენ პოეზიას, ბუნებრივად ელოდებოდნენ, რომ სხვა შტატებში
იპოვნებდნენ შესადარებელ ჯგუფებს. მათ გაამყარეს თავიანთი კავშირები, რომლებიც
შესაძლოა ჩამოყალიბებულიყო თავდაპირველად შემთხვევითი ან სავაჭრო ვიზიტების
დროს, ქსენიას ოფიციალური ურთიერთობებით. არქაული პერიოდის გარკვეულ
მომენტში, ეს ინსტიტუტი გადაიქცა კიდევ უფრო გარკვეულ, პროქსენიად. პროქსენოები
იყვნენ A სახელმწიფოში მცხოვრები A მოქალაქეები, რომლებიც ზრუნავდნენ ქვეყნის
მოქალაქეების ინტერესებზე. პროქსენოს სტატუსი წარმოშობით მემკვიდრეობითი იყო,
მაგრამ თუკიდიდეს დროს ისმის "ნებაყოფლობითი პროქსენოი" (etheloproxenoi).
ძირითადი ინსტიტუტის ანტიკურ ეჭვს ეჭვი არ ეპარება, თუმცა შესაძლოა მე -5 საუკუნის
ათენის იმპერიამ გამოიყენოს იგი და შეცვალოს იგი საკუთარი პოლიტიკური
მოხერხებულობისთვის; მე -7 საუკუნის წარწერა კუნძულ კორცირაზე, რომელიც ახსენებს
ლოკრისის პროქსენოსს, ეს ინსტიტუტის ადრეული დამოწმებაა.
ამრიგად, როგორც თავად ქორწინება, ისე ქორწინების აკრძალვა იყო თემების, მათ
შორის ატიკის ერთ დიდ სახელმწიფოში მყოფი თემების ურთიერთობის განსაზღვრისა
და ამ ურთიერთობების მეგობრული შენარჩუნების გზები. ქსენიასა და ქორწინების
კვალდაკვალ ერთ – ერთი გზაა ბერძნული პირადი სახელების სამეცნიერო შესწავლა,
რადგან დასახელების ნიმუშები ასახავს სოციალურ რეალობას; უცხოური სახელები
შედის ქალაქის სახელწოდებაში როგორც ფორმალური კავშირის, ისე ნაკლებად
ოფიციალური კავშირის, მაგალითად, დროებითი ცხოვრების შედეგად. ამგვარი
"ონომასტიკური" მტკიცებულება, როგორც მას უწოდებენ, ახლა შეიძლება ნაყარი და
სიღრმისეული შესწავლა მოხდეს ყველა ცნობილი ბერძნული პიროვნული სახელების
კომპიუტერით გამოქვეყნების წყალობით, რომელთა უმეტესობა დასტურდება
წარწერებით.
The chief vehicle of interaction among poleis, however, was through warfare and through the formal
suspension or renunciation of warfare by means of heavily ritualized treaties (one of the most
common words for such a treaty is spondai, which literally means “libations” to the guaranteeing
gods). The earliest surviving inscriptional peace treaty “for all time” dates from the 6th century and
was found at Olympia. Nonetheless, there were surely agreements to limit warfare over strips of
boundary land before that date. Archaeology may offer unexpected help in this matter: it is possible
and plausible that some frontier zones were by tacit or explicit agreement left fallow. One such zone
seems to have been the remote Skourta plain, which separates part of northern Attica from Boeotia;
preliminary surface survey (i.e., the estimation of settlement patterns by gathering of potsherds)
carried out in and after 1985 suggests that it was—perhaps deliberately—left uncultivated in the
Archaic period.
პოლეისში ურთიერთქმედების მთავარი საგანი იყო ომი და ოფიციალური შეჩერება ან
უარი თქვა ომზე მძიმე რიტუალიზებული ხელშეკრულებებით (ასეთი ხელშეკრულების
ერთ-ერთი ყველაზე გავრცელებული სიტყვაა სპონდაი, რაც სიტყვასიტყვით ნიშნავს
"ლიბას" ღმერთების გარანტია). გადარჩენილი ადრეული სამშვიდობო ხელშეკრულება
"ყველა დროისთვის" მე -6 საუკუნისაა და იგი ოლიმპიაში იპოვნეს. ამის მიუხედავად,
აუცილებლად არსებობდა შეთანხმებები საზღვრების ზოლებზე ომის შეზღუდვის
შესახებ, ამ თარიღამდე. არქეოლოგიამ შეიძლება შემოგთავაზოთ მოულოდნელი
დახმარება ამ საკითხში: შესაძლებელია და სარწმუნოა, რომ ზოგიერთ სასაზღვრო
ზონაში ჩუმად ან მკაფიოდ შეთანხმებული იყო დაუდევარი. როგორც ჩანს, ერთ-ერთი
ასეთი ზონა იყო შორეული სკურტას ვაკე, რომელიც ჩრდილოეთ ატიკის ნაწილს
გამოყოფს ბეოტიისგან; 1985 წლის შემდეგ და მის შემდეგ ჩატარებული წინასწარი
ზედაპირული გამოკვლევა (ე.ი. დასახლების ნიმუშების შეფასება ჭურჭლის
შეგროვებით) მიანიშნებს იმაზე, რომ იგი არქაულ პერიოდში, შესაძლოა განზრახ იყო,
დაუუშავებელი.
Modern scholars have tried to look for more general factors behind Cypselus’s success than a desire
in a new world of wealth and opportunity to put an end to Bacchiad oppressiveness and exclusivity.
One much-favoured explanation is military, but it must be said straightaway that the specific evidence
for support of Cypselus by a newly emergent military class is virtually nonexistent. The background to
military change, a change whose reality is undoubted, needs a word.
Aristocratic warfare, as described in the Homeric epics, puts much emphasis on individual prowess.
Great warriors used chariots almost as a kind of taxi service to transport themselves to and from the
battlefield, where they fought on foot with their social peers. The winner gained absolute power over
the person and possessions of the vanquished, including the right to carry out ritual acts of corpse
mutilation. That general picture is surely right, though it can be protested that Homer’s singling out of
individuals may be just literary spotlighting and that the masses played a respectably large part in the
fighting described in the epics. There is some force in that objection and in the converse and related
objection that in Archaic and Classical hoplite fighting individual duels were more prevalent than is
allowed by scholars anxious to stress the collective character of hoplite combat. Still, a change in
methods of fighting undoubtedly occurred in the course of the 7th century.
The change was to a block system of fighting, in which infantry soldiers equipped with heavy armour,
or hopla (including helmet, breastplate, greaves, sword, spear, and a round shield attached to the left
arm by a strap), fought, at least during part of an engagement, in something like coherent formation,
each man’s sword arm being guarded by the shield of the man on his right. This last feature produced
a consequence commented on by Thucydides—namely, a tendency of the sword bearer to drift to the
right in the direction of the protection offered by his neighbour. For this reason the best troops were
posted on the far right to act as anchor-men. The system, whose introduction is not commented on
by any literary source, is depicted on vases in the course of the 7th century, though it is not possible
to say whether it was a sudden technological revolution or something that evolved over decades. The
second view seems preferable since the discovery in the 1950s of a fine bronze suit of heavy armour
at Argos in a late 8th-century context.
Clearly, the change has social and political implications. Even when one acknowledges some
continuation of individual skirmishing, much nonetheless depended on neighbours in the battle line
standing their ground. An oath sworn by Athenian military recruits (ephēboi) in the 4th century
includes clauses about not disgracing the sacred weapons, not deserting comrades, and not handing
down a diminished fatherland (to posterity); the oath and the word ephēbe are 4th-century, but the
institutionalizing of hoplite obligations and expectations is surely much older. Early land warfare can,
in fact, be thought of as a symbolic expression of the Greek city’s identity. This helps to explain the
strong ritual elements in a hoplite battle, which typically began with a sacrifice and taking of omens
and ended with victory dedications, often of bronze suits of armour, in some appropriate sanctuary. It
is above all the heavily armed troops, not the lightly armed or the sailors in the fleet (nor even the
cavalry), who were thought of as in a special sense representing the Classical polis. Thus at Classical
Athens the 10-tribe citizen system determined the organization of the hoplite army but is much less
important in the manning of the fleet.
თანამედროვე მეცნიერები ცდილობდნენ ციპსელუსის წარმატების მიღმა უფრო ზოგადი
ფაქტორების ძიებას, ვიდრე ახალი სამყაროს სიმდიდრის სურვილს და ბაქიადის
რეპრესიულობასა და ექსკლუზიურობას დასრულების შესაძლებლობას. ერთ-ერთი
ყველაზე სასურველი ახსნა სამხედროა, მაგრამ დაუყოვნებლივ უნდა ითქვას, რომ
ახლადშექმნილი სამხედრო კლასის მიერ ციპესელის მხარდაჭერის კონკრეტული
მტკიცებულება პრაქტიკულად არ არსებობს. სამხედრო ცვლილებების ფონი,
ცვლილება, რომლის რეალობაც უეჭველია, სიტყვას საჭიროებს.
In the first place, the connection is never made by intelligent ancient writers interested both in the
mechanics and psychology of hoplite warfare on the one hand and in tyranny on the other.
Thucydides, for instance, a military historian if ever there was one, saw tyranny primarily in economic
terms. Aristotle does indeed say that the extension of the military base of a state is liable to produce a
widening of the political franchise, but this comment has nothing specifically to do with tyranny. He
explains tyranny elsewhere either as resulting from splits within oligarchies or by an anachronistic
4th-century reference to demagogic leadership, which, when combined with generalship, is liable to
turn into tyranny (there he is surely thinking above all of Dionysius I of Syracuse).
In the second place, it is discouraging for the hoplite theory that there is so little support for it in the
best-attested case, that of Cypselid Corinth. Attempts have indeed been made to get around the
natural implication of the evidence, but they are not convincing. For instance, the ancient statement
that Cypselus had no bodyguard ought to be given its natural meaning, which is a denial of the
military factor; it ought not to be ingeniously twisted so as to imply that he did not need a bodyguard
because (it is argued) he had the support of identifiable army groups. Furthermore, although it is true
that Cypselus is called polemarch (which ought to mean a “leader in war”), it is suspicious that his
activities in this capacity were entirely civil and judicial. Suspicion increases when one notes that
polemarch was indeed the title of a magistrate in Classical Athens.
ტირანიის წარმოშობის გავლენიანი "ჰოპლიტის თეორია" ცდილობს VII საუკუნის ერთი
ზოგადი ფენომენის ახსნას - კერძოდ, ტირანიის დასაწყისს - მეორეზე მითითებით,
ჰოპლიტის იარაღისა და ტაქტიკის დანერგვით, რაც უფრო მეტ ყურადღებას ამახვილებს
კოლექტიურ, კორპორატიულ ეთოსი რამდენადაც ორივე ფენომენი არისტოკრატიული
მმართველობის საწინააღმდეგო რეაქციაა, გონივრულია, რომ ეს ორი ერთმანეთთან
ასოცირდება, მაგრამ მნიშვნელოვანია გავითვალისწინოთ, რომ თეორია, თუმცა
მაცდურია, მკაცრი ფორმით თანამედროვე კონსტრუქციაა.
მეორე მხრივ, ჰოპლიტის თეორიისთვის იმედგაცრუებაა ის, რომ მას ძალიან მცირე
მხარდაჭერა აქვს საუკეთესო დამოწმებულ შემთხვევაში, ციფსელიდ კორინთში.
მართლაც გაკეთდა მცდელობები მტკიცებულებების ბუნებრივი გავლენის
მოსაგვარებლად, მაგრამ ისინი დამაჯერებელი არ არის. მაგალითად, უძველეს
განცხადებას იმის შესახებ, რომ კიპესელს არ ჰყავდა მცველი, უნდა მიეცეს მისი
ბუნებრივი მნიშვნელობა, რაც სამხედრო ფაქტორის უარყოფაა; ეს არ უნდა იყოს
დამახინჯებული, ისე რომ გულისხმობდეს, რომ მას არ სჭირდებოდა მცველი, რადგან
(ამტკიცებს) მას ჰქონდა საიდენტიფიკაციო არმიის ჯგუფების მხარდაჭერა. გარდა ამისა,
მართალია, რომ Cypselus- ს პოლემარქს უწოდებენ (რაც ნიშნავს "ომის ლიდერს"),
საეჭვოა, რომ ამ საქმიანობაში მისი საქმიანობა მთლიანად სამოქალაქო და
სასამართლო იყო. ეჭვი მატულობს, როდესაც აღნიშნავენ, რომ პოლემარქე
ნამდვილად იყო მაგისტრის ტიტული კლასიკურ ათენში.
ჰოპლიტები
Although helmets and armour were worn by warriors before and after the introduction of
hoplite warfare, it was the hoplite shield that helped to bring about the change. From the
beginning of the period until about 700, there was a wide variety of shields in use, judging
by both archaeological finds and artistic depictions. At the end of the Mycenaean period
we saw that the round shield with central grip was the most common type, perhaps with
larger examples being carried by foot soldiers, and smaller examples by chariot-borne
infantry. An exception is a vase fragment from Iolkos in Thessaly dating from the
thirteenth century, which seems to show a small shield with in-curving sides (Bulletin de
Correspondance Hellénique 1961, p. 770, fig. 20). This is similar to contemporary Hittite
shields and also to the Dipylon shield.
From 900 to 700, the single-grip round shield remained in use and came in varying sizes
(Boardman 1998, p. 118, fig. 213). Much of our evidence comes from bronze shield bosses
with which they were sometimes reinforced. These round bosses had a central dome
protecting the handgrip, sometimes reinforced with a spike which could be used as an
extra weapon at need (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 38). A major problem has been that tombs
often contain round bronze objects which are not shield bosses, but cymbals, horse
trappings or belt fittings. Snodgrass did admirable work in sorting out criteria to
distinguish these items, which seem to show that such shield bosses lasted down to c. 700,
but no later. The exception is Cyprus where, as we have seen in the case of helmets and
armour, the Greeks there were doing their own thing and may have come to hoplite
warfare rather late (Snodgrass 1965a, pp. 40 ff.). The bosses average around 15cm in
diameter and are generally reconstructed as fitting onto shields of about 45–50cm in
diameter. Snodgrass (1965a, p. 48) points out, however, that a round shield boss does not
necessarily mean a round shield. The Kaloriziki shield from Cyprus was probably not
round, and Ognenova (1952, pp. 61–81) has reconstructed round shield bosses onto
‘Boeotian’ shields. While that seems unlikely, round bosses could certainly have been
attached to the square shields that also appear in art at this time, and perhaps even the
Dipylon shields.
Graves are sometimes found with more than one boss, which Snodgrass thinks may have
been mounted on the same shield (like Kaloriziki), but I disagree. I think the Kaloriziki
reconstruction is incorrect, and that it is far more likely that multiple bosses equals
multiple shields, especially when they are of a similar size. A grave at Mouliana had four
bosses, each about 19cm across; they are all bosses to protect central handgrips and cannot
be seen as decorative extra bosses. The quantity simply points to the status of the warrior.
Apart from warrior burials, a large number of shield bosses have been found at Olympia
(Fellman 1984). Nearly all of these fall into the 900 to 700 date bracket, although there are
some from the seventh century. Fellman sees these as being dedications from further
afield in Europe, where single-grip shields with bosses continued to be used. He also
points out that there were some areas of Greece that did not adopt hoplite shields and
warfare in the seventh century. Achaea, for example, still used rectangular shields (the
thureos) a couple of hundred years later, and so small, single-grip shields may still have
been used in ‘backward’ parts of Greece.
With the increased availability of bronze, shields with complete bronze facings first made
their appearance in Crete in the eighth century. The idea possibly came from the Near
East, where similar shields were also in use (Snodgrass 1965a, pp. 52–3). There are three
types. The animal-head protome shield has a three-dimensional animal head in the centre
of the shield, instead of a simple boss. Examples are known from Olympia, although they
may also be Cretan. They date from the eighth century and, although Snodgrass says this
may have been a Cretan idea instead of the mainland shield blazon, they did not really
overlap chronologically as the animal-head protome shields were no longer in use by 700.
The second type of bronze-faced shield is also Cretan and is called the Omphalos shield,
after the conical Omphalos stone at Delphi marking the centre of the world. This shield
has a cylindrical or conical bulge in the middle of the bronze facing to protect the
handgrip and is decorated with concentric circles. Examples from the Idaean Cave in
Crete are 34.5cm and 27cm in diameter. There are no certain examples from Olympia, but
fragments are difficult to distinguish from Herzsprung or later hoplite shields. It is
probably another mainly Cretan shield.
900 – დან 700 – მდე, ერთიანი მჭიდის მრგვალი ფარი გამოყენებაში დარჩა და
სხვადასხვა ზომის იყო (Boardman 1998, გვ. 118, ნახ. 213). ჩვენი მტკიცებულებების დიდი
ნაწილი მოდის ბრინჯაოს ფარის ავტორიტეტებზე, რომლითაც ისინი ზოგჯერ
აძლიერებდნენ. ამ მრგვალ პატრონებს ჰქონდათ ცენტრალური გუმბათი, რომელიც
იცავდა ხელბორკილს, ზოგჯერ გამაგრებული იყო სპაიკით, რომელიც შეიძლება
გამოყენებულიყო როგორც დამატებითი იარაღი საჭიროების შემთხვევაში (Snodgrass
1965a, გვ. 38). მთავარი პრობლემა ის არის, რომ სამარხები ხშირად შეიცავს მრგვალ
ბრინჯაოს საგნებს, რომლებიც არ არიან ფარის უფროსები, არამედ ციმბლები, ცხენების
ხაფანგები ან სარტყლის ფიტინგები. Snodgrass- მა აღფრთოვანებული საქმე გააკეთა ამ
ნივთების გამოსაყოფად კრიტერიუმების დასალაგებლად, რაც, როგორც ჩანს,
აჩვენებს, რომ ასეთი ფარის ავტორიტეტები ძვ. 700, მაგრამ არა უგვიანეს. გამონაკლისი
არის კვიპროსი, სადაც, როგორც ჩაფხუტისა და ჯავშანტექნიკის შემთხვევაში ვნახეთ, იქ
ბერძნები აკეთებდნენ თავის საქმეს და შესაძლოა გვიან მოვიდნენ ჰოპლიტებზე
(Snodgrass 1965a, pp. 40 ff.). ავტორიტეტების დიამეტრი საშუალოდ დაახლოებით 15 სმ
სიგრძისაა და ზოგადად რეკონსტრუირებულია, რადგან ისინი დაახლოებით 45–50 სმ
დიამეტრის ფარებზე არიან მოთავსებულნი. Snodgrass (1965a, გვ. 48) აღნიშნავს, რომ
მრგვალი ფარის ბოსი სულაც არ ნიშნავს მრგვალ ფარს. კალორიზიკის ფარი
კვიპროსიდან, ალბათ, არ იყო მრგვალი და ოგენენოვამ (1952, გვ. 61–81) გადააკეთა
მრგვალი ფარის უფროსები "ბოოტიკურ" ფარებზე. მართალია, ეს ნაკლებად
სავარაუდოა, მაგრამ მრგვალი ავტორიტეტები შეიძლება მიმაგრებულიყვნენ
კვადრატულ ფარებზე, რომლებიც ამ დროს ასევე გვხვდება ხელოვნებაში და შესაძლოა
დიპილონის ფარებსაც კი.
ზოგჯერ საფლავებს გვხვდება ერთზე მეტი ავტორიტეტი, რომლებიც სნოდგრასის
აზრით შეიძლება იმავე ფარზე იყო დამონტაჟებული (მაგალითად, კალორიზიკი),
მაგრამ მე არ ვეთანხმები ამას. მე ვფიქრობ, რომ კალორიზიკის რეკონსტრუქცია
არასწორია, და რომ ბევრად უფრო სავარაუდოა, რომ მრავალრიცხოვანი ავტორიტეტი
მრავალ ფარს უდრის, განსაკუთრებით მაშინ, როდესაც ისინი მსგავსი ზომის არიან.
მოლიანას საფლავს ოთხი ბოსი ჰყავდა, რომელთაგან თითოეული 19 სმ სიგრძის იყო.
ისინი ყველა უფროსები არიან ცენტრალური ხელჩანთა დასაცავად და არ შეიძლება
მათ განიხილებოდეს, როგორც დეკორატიული დამატებითი ავტორიტეტები.
რაოდენობა უბრალოდ მიუთითებს მეომრის სტატუსზე. მეომრების სამარხების გარდა,
ოლიმპიაში ფარის უფროსების დიდი რაოდენობაა ნაპოვნი (Fellman 1984). თითქმის
ყველა მათგანი 900 – დან 700 – მდე თარიღის სამაგრში ხვდება, თუმცა არსებობს
მეშვიდე საუკუნიდან. ფელმანი მიიჩნევს, რომ ეს არის მიძღვნა როგორც ევროპაში,
სადაც ერთპიროვნული ფარები გამოიყენება უფროსობით. მან ასევე აღნიშნა, რომ
საბერძნეთის ზოგიერთ რაიონში არსებობდა მეშვიდე საუკუნის ჰოპლიტის ფარები და
ომები. მაგალითად, აკეა ორიოდე ასი წლის შემდეგ კვლავ იყენებდა მართკუთხა
ფარებს (thureos) და ასე რომ, მცირე ზომის ერთჯერადი ფარები შეიძლება
გამოყენებულიყო საბერძნეთის "ჩამორჩენილ" მხარეებში.
ბრინჯაოს სახის მეორე ფარი ასევე კრეტულია და მას ომფალოს ფარს უწოდებენ,
დელფის კონუსური ომფალოს ქვის შემდეგ, რომელიც მსოფლიოს ცენტრშია. ამ ფარს
აქვს ბრინჯაოს შუა ცილინდრული ან კონუსური ამონაკვეთი, ხელბორკილების
დასაცავად და გაფორმებულია კონცენტრული წრეებით. კრეტაში იდაას მღვიმის
მაგალითებია 34,5 სმ და 27 სმ დიამეტრით. ოლიმპიიდან არ არსებობს გარკვეული
მაგალითები, მაგრამ ფრაგმენტები ძნელად გამოირჩევა ჰერცპრუნგის ან მოგვიანებით
ჰოპლიტის ფარისგან. ეს ალბათ კიდევ ერთი, ძირითადად, კრეტული ფარია.
The last type of bronze-faced shield is called the Herzsprung shield after a find spot in north Germany.
Similar to the Omphalos shield, the bronze facing of the Herzsprung type has a V-shaped notch in the
centre and no bulge covering the handgrip (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 55 and plate 24; Sekunda 1999, plate
A, no. 3 for a reconstruction). This decoration was derived from an original hide construction and,
after translation into bronze, the notch became smaller and more stylised, allowing for some
typological dating. Examples are known from Crete and Delphi, and there are also votive miniatures
from the islands. Snodgrass thinks the Herzsprung shield is Cypriot in origin, and spread from there to
the Aegean by 700. It became larger than the Omphalos shield; an example from Idalion is 83cm in
diameter, and is thus as large as some hoplite shields, which may have been derived from it. The
Herzsprung shield spread northwards and became popular in Europe, but was supplanted by the
hoplite shield in Greece by c. 675.
Another type of shield, probably of Cypriot invention, is the small spiked shield, which developed
from the small round shields, with or without bosses. Votives of such shields dating from the seventh
and sixth centuries have been found on Rhodes and Crete, but it does not seem to have been in use
on the mainland (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 56). Rhodes was later famous for its slingers and Crete for its
archers, and these small shields may have been used by such troops, where skirmishing warfare
rather than hoplite warfare was the norm.
What appears at first to be a very strange shield type is depicted on Geometric vases in the eighth
century, particularly those by the Dipylon Master and his followers at Athens from 760 onwards
(Coldstream 1977, pp. 109–14). Known as the Dipylon shield, it is oval in shape but with two, often
very large cut-outs in each side. In the seventh and sixth centuries this shield design developed into
the Boeotian shield, with much smaller cut-outs, depicted on vases showing mythical scenes, and with
a hoplite grip that simply would not have worked (see below). Since this is generally considered to be
an artistic invention, Snodgrass (following Webster) states that the Dipylon shield is also the result of
artistic licence and does not depict a genuine shield (Snodgrass 1965a, pp. 58–9). He is quite correct in
his assertion that a shield shaped like those we see on Late Geometric vases (late eighth century) is of
no practical use. Such large cut-outs as are generally depicted would render the shield useless. But did
the Dipylon shield really look like that? The problem is the style of Geometric art. People are drawn in
a stylised way with broad shoulders and a very narrow waist, quite unlike real people. If we assume
that the cut-outs are exaggerations, then we come up with a reasonable shield which could be used in
combat, and had those cut-outs for a reason.
ბოლო ტიპის ბრინჯაოს სახის ფარს ჰერცპრუნგის ფარს უწოდებენ ჩრდილოეთ
გერმანიაში მდებარე ადგილის შემდეგ. ომფალოსის ფარის მსგავსად, Herzsprung ტიპის
ბრინჯაოს მოსაპირკეთებლად აქვს V- ფორმის ამონაკვეთი ცენტრში და არ აქვს
დაფარული გადახურვა ხელზე (Snodgrass 1965a, გვ. 55 და ფირფიტა 24; Sekunda 1999,
ფირფიტა A, plate3 for a რეკონსტრუქცია). ეს დეკორაცია წარმოებული იყო
ორიგინალური დამალული ნაგებობიდან და ბრინჯაოზე თარგმნის შემდეგ, ზომა უფრო
მცირე და სტილიზებული გახდა, რაც ტიპოლოგიურ დათარიღებას იძლევა. მაგალითები
ცნობილია კრეტადან და დელფიდან და ასევე არსებობს კუნძულებიდან
გამოსაყენებელი მინიატურები. სნოდგრასს მიაჩნია, რომ ჰერცპრუნგის ფარი
წარმოშობით კვიპროსია და 700-ით გავრცელდა ეგეოსამდე. იგი უფრო დიდი გახდა,
ვიდრე ომფალოსის ფარი; Idalion– ის მაგალითია 83 სმ დიამეტრი და, შესაბამისად,
ისეთივე დიდია, როგორც ზოგიერთი ჰოპლიტის ფარი, რომელიც შეიძლება მისგან
იყოს მიღებული. ჰერცპრუნგის ფარი ჩრდილოეთისკენ გავრცელდა და პოპულარული
გახდა ევროპაში, მაგრამ საბერძნეთში ჰოპლიტის ფარმა ჩაანაცვლა გ. 675.
Depictions of the Dipylon shield also vary in size, from ones almost as big as body shields
to those barely reaching below the waist (Ahlberg 1971, p. 59). Something like a metre in
height would seem about right to me (Sekunda 1999, plate A gets it about right).
From about 650 onwards, and particularly in the sixth and fifth centuries, a large oval
shield with very small cut-outs at the sides features on vases. This is the Boeotian shield,
which also features on coins of Thebes and its allies, and later as a shield blazon. It is
always featured in heroic scenes, never in those of real life, and it seems to be a poor
remembering of the Dipylon shield (Ahlberg 1971, p. 63). It is often shown fitted with a
central elbow grip, or porpax, and a handgrip, or antilabe, at the edge, like a hoplite
shield. In battle this would have brought the shield up horizontally, which is clearly
incorrect. In fact there is no evidence for such a shield being in use at such a time, and it
is generally agreed to be an artistic invention (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 58; Greenhalgh 1973, p.
64).
Another shield type which is occasionally represented in Geometric art of the eighth
century is the square or slightly rectangular shield. If the Dipylon shield is descended
from the figure-of-eight shield, then Snodgrass (1965a, p. 61) suggests this square shield
may be a descendant of the Mycenaean tower shield. There is even less evidence for this,
however, than for the Dipylon. The square shield seems to appear only for this short
period in the eighth century, and might even be considered simply as an artistic device to
show two different sides in the depiction of a battle (Boardman 1998, p. 38, no. 50).
However, Olympia has occasionally turned up strips of bronze with guilloche decoration
which are straight, rather than curved. These may be the edging from straight-sided
shields.
All these shield types were gradually ousted by the hoplite shield, which in turn led to the
hoplite warfare of the phalanx (Jarva 1995, p. 122). The hoplite shield was round with an
offset rim, which could rest on the shoulder to help with the weight. The main
distinguishing feature is the way it was carried. It has a central arm-band, called the
porpax, through which the left arm was passed up to the elbow. There is then a grip at the
edge of the shield called the antilabe, which the left hand gripped. When these features
are shown in art, we know we are dealing with a hoplite shield; but when the shield is
shown face on, it becomes harder to distinguish it from single-grip round shields like the
Herzsprung. This two-handed grip system seems to have been a Greek invention, and may
be behind Herodotus’s story of shield grips and blazons being invented by the Carians
(Herodotus I, 171). From just before 700, shield blazons are shown on some round shields.
These are designs that need to be held the right way up, and it is generally accepted that
this works only with the two-handed hoplite grip (Snodgrass 1965a, pp. 61–2; Jarva 1995,
pp. 121–2). Far more common than these blazons at this time were circle and spiral
designs, which are not subject to a right-way-up rule and which appeared as early as c.
750 on vases with Dipylon and square shields. A series of other non-blazon designs have
recently come to light on a late eighth-century vase from Paros. This shows a line of
warriors in Kegelhelms carrying large, round shields decorated with a large cross or with
chequerboard designs (Zapheiropoulou 2001, p. 289). Such shields are also sometimes
shown with a telamon, showing that they are single-grip-type shields.
When the first blazon shields appeared in c. 700, they were not shown on the same vases
as spiral-patterned shields; but in the seventh century both shields were shown together
and it is clear that the spiral patterns carried on to be used on hoplite shields. Ueda-Sarson
(2000; see website listed in References) has compiled illustrations of dozens of shield
blazons from c. 700 to the Macedonian period, and spiral patterns continued to be shown
until about 550, while other symmetrical abstract designs continued up to the Persian
Wars. Only after c. 500 did nearly all shields carry blazons. Spartan bronze figures carry
spiral designs down to the third century, but this is probably an artistic convention
(Snodgrass 1965a, p. 62).
These designs were mostly painted onto the shield, which was of wood covered with
leather and with a bronze rim, the latter usually decorated with a guilloche pattern. The
Chigi Vase suggests that the earliest shields may have been of wickerwork or ply, like the
Dipylon shield. Many fragments of the bronze rims have been found at Olympia, and
some bronze blazons have also been found. Snodgrass illustrates (1967, plate 22) a
particularly impressive winged horse and Connolly (1998, p. 54) a gorgon. A cockerel, and
a right arm with clenched fist have also been discovered (Olympia Bericht, vol. I, plate 12
and vol. V, plate 32). Connolly (1998, p. 54) thinks that these are too delicate to have been
used on shields in battle, and must have been made specially to be dedicated. Most arms
and armour dedicated in sanctuaries were, however, precisely that captured from the
enemy, and so I am sure these bronze blazons were used in battle (Jackson, in Hanson,
1991, p. 230). Shields completely faced with bronze have also been found at Olympia, and
it would have been much easier to paint (and repaint) designs onto these. They also give
us the size of hoplite shields, which usually varies from 80cm to 100cm, although one
example is 120cm (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 64). Sekunda (2000, p. 10) suggests that bronze-
faced shields did not appear until c. 500, judging by the colours used on vase paintings,
but the prior existence of the Herzsprung shield shows that the Greeks were capable of
producing thin bronze sheet at a much earlier period. Examples of bronze hoplite shield
facings from Olympia can be dated to as early as c. 625 (Bol 1989, p. 683). The antilabe
handgrip was presumably made of leather, but the porpax was bronze, often highly
decorated, and the survival of large numbers of these, more than bronze facings or
blazons, shows that most shields were just fronted with leather or some other perishable
material. The interiors of the shields also seem sometimes to have been painted (Sekunda
1999, p. 53 and plate C1), and from c. 550 are sometimes decorated with separate tassels
(Boardman 1980a, nos 64.2; 73).
როდესაც პირველი ბლაზონის ფარები გამოჩნდა ჩვ. 700 წელს, ისინი არ იყო
ნაჩვენები იმავე ვაზებზე, როგორც სპირალური ფორმის ფარები; მაგრამ მეშვიდე
საუკუნეში ორივე ფარი ერთად იყო ნაჩვენები და ნათელია, რომ სპირალური
ნიმუშები გამოიყენებოდა ჰოპლიტის ფარებზე. უედა-სარსონმა (2000; იხილეთ
ვებგვერდები, მითითებული წყაროებში) შეადგინა ათობით ფარის ბლაზონის
ილუსტრაციები გ. 700 – დან მაკედონიის პერიოდამდე, ხოლო სპირალური
ნიმუშების ჩვენება დაახლოებით 550 წლამდე გაგრძელდა, ხოლო სხვა
სიმეტრიული აბსტრაქტული ნიმუშები სპარსეთის ომებამდე გაგრძელდა.
მხოლოდ მას შემდეგ, რაც გ. 500-მა თითქმის ყველა ფარად აიღო ბლაზონები.
სპარტანული ბრინჯაოს ფიგურები სპირალურ ნიმუშებს მესამე საუკუნემდე
ატარებს, მაგრამ ეს ალბათ მხატვრული კონვენციაა (Snodgrass 1965a, გვ. 62).
Spearheads from the Dark Age and Geometric period are fairly plentiful finds in Greece;
Snodgrass devoted many pages (1965a, pp. 116–32) to a listing of different types, and his
list tells us that iron replaced bronze for use in spearheads in the eleventh century. An
anomaly, however, is that there are many spear finds from Olympia that must be from the
eighth century or later, but which are made of bronze. As has been mentioned earlier,
iron is much more efficient than bronze for use as a spearhead, and it was also more
readily available. It is, however, harder to work and was therefore more expensive as a
finished product. Iron might also be considered less aesthetically pleasing. Bronze
spearheads seem to have retained their popularity in south Italy and Sicily until the eighth
century, and in Crete for even longer; but there is a probability that bronze was
reintroduced as a metal for spearheads in mainland Greece at some point in the sixth
century (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 134). This may have had something to do with the expansion
of hoplite forces. Where spear butts are known, these also tend to be of bronze.
გ. 675 ჰოპლიტის ფარმა საბერძნეთის უმეტეს ნაწილში განდევნა ფარის ყველა სხვა
ფორმა და მისი გამოყენება მეოთხე საუკუნემდე გაგრძელდა. ნაქსოვი ნაწარმის
დიპილონთან შედარებით, ჰოპლიტის ფარი გაცილებით მძიმე და ძლიერი იყო და
ეს მოხდა ახალი porpax / antilabe ძალაუფლების სისტემის გამო. ეს ნიშნავდა, რომ
მარცხენა მკლავზე მეტი წონის ტარება შეიძლებოდა. ფარის ჩამოსასხმელი რგოლი
ნიშნავდა, რომ გარკვეული წონის გადატანა მარცხენა მხარზეც შეიძლებოდა,
განსაკუთრებით მაშინ, როდესაც ისვენებდა. ასეთი მძიმე ფარი საბრძოლო
მოქმედებებში ძნელად ტრიალებდა და ეს იყო კიდევ ერთი მიზეზი, მძიმე
ბრინჯაოს ჯავშანტექნიკასთან ერთად, საბრძოლო სიცხეების დროს თქვენს
თანამოძმეებთან ახლოს ყოფნისთვის. ჰოპლიტის ომის ფალანგა სწორედ აქედან
განვითარდა, მამაკაცები მჭიდრო წესრიგში იყვნენ, როგორც წესი, რვა რიგის
სიღრმეში. ამან რთული გახადა შუბების სროლა, რომელიც, როგორც ჩანს, ომის
პოპულარული ფორმა იყო 900 – დან 700 წლამდე და შემდეგ, და გამოიწვია ბიძგის
შუბის ექსკლუზიურ გამოყენებას, როგორც აღწერილია ქვემოთ.
სპირტები და მახვილები
The spearhead of the ninth and eighth centuries was 30cm to 50cm long but was certainly
part of a throwing spear, as is depicted in Homer (Lorimer 1950, p. 257). It is difficult to
find any artistic evidence of its use as a thrusting weapon (Jarva 1995, p. 123). Spears
found in graves are often in pairs of the same size, and it is possible that both were thrown
before close combat was joined with the sword. Late eighth-century vases frequently
show pairs of spears being carried; most warriors are also shown carrying swords. In the
seventh century the sword is depicted less, and one spear was used for thrusting in the
new tactics of the hoplite phalanx.
As mentioned above, a second spear for throwing was kept by these early hoplites. A ‘still
life’ aryballos of c. 680 shows a thrusting spear paired with a throwing spear, its throwing
loop clearly visible. The Chigi Vase seems to show hoplites with more than one spear and,
in the arming scene to one side, two spears – one long and one short – are shown waiting
to be collected for battle. An anomaly here is that both spears have throwing loops, but
this is perhaps an artistic error (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 138; Jarva 1995, p. 123). Both these
depictions make it more likely that the second spears were for thrusting, rather than
being an extra throwing spear (Snodgrass 1967, pp. 57–8).
Although the use of two spears, one for throwing, seems to have died out by c. 640, there
are a few later depictions. These often show warriors on horseback, and date from the
middle of the sixth century. They cannot all be explained away as being ‘heroic’
depictions, or cavalry rather than mounted hoplites (Boardman 1979, nos 2.1, 2.2; 1998,
nos 375, 464). It seems that on occasion some hoplites still carried a throwing spear into
battle, but that it really did go out of use by the 520s and, in most states, probably a lot
earlier. The problem with the throwing spear was that, for throwing it, a lot of space and
movement was needed, which was entirely incompatible with the close phalanx
formation. Once this was discovered, hoplites were encouraged more and more to rely on
the single thrusting spear. With the introduction of more solid hoplite shields and bronze
armour, it is likely that thrown spears were becoming less effective anyway. Tyrtaeus
urged the Spartan hoplites not to stand out of the range of missiles, but to ignore them
and close with the enemy (Tyrtaeus: fragment 11, in Sage 1996, p. 28).
მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ ორი შუბის გამოყენება, ერთი სროლისთვის, როგორც ჩანს,
გარდაიცვალა გ. 640, აქ რამდენიმე მოგვიანებით გამოსახულია. ეს ხშირად ცხენზე
ამხედრებული მეომრები აჩვენებს და VI საუკუნის შუა ხანებით თარიღდება. ყველა
მათგანის ახსნა შეუძლებელია, როგორც "გმირული" გამოსახულებები, ან ცხენოსანი ჯარი,
ვიდრე დამონტაჟებული ჰოპლიტები (Boardman 1979, Nos 2.1, 2.2; 1998, Nos 375, 464).
როგორც ჩანს, ზოგჯერ ზოგიერთმა ჰოპლიტმა ბრძოლაში ცეცხლი ისროლა, მაგრამ ეს
მართლაც გამოვიდა ხმარებიდან 520-იანი წლებისთვის და, უმეტეს შტატებში, ალბათ
ბევრად უფრო ადრე. სროლის შუბის პრობლემა ის იყო, რომ მის გადასაგდებად დიდი
სივრცე და მოძრაობა იყო საჭირო, რაც სრულიად შეუთავსებელი იყო ახლო ფალანგის
ფორმირებასთან. ამის აღმოჩენისთანავე, ჰოპლიტები უფრო და უფრო მეტჯერ ითხოვდნენ
დაეყრდნონ ერთ შუბს. უფრო მყარი ჰოპლიტის ფარებისა და ბრინჯაოს ჯავშნების
შემოღებით, სავარაუდოდ, გადაყრილი შუბები მაინც ნაკლებად ეფექტური ხდებოდა.
ტირტაუსმა მოუწოდა სპარტელ ჰოპლიტებს, რომ არ გამოირჩეოდნენ რაკეტების
სპექტრიდან, მაგრამ მათი იგნორირება და მტერთან დახურვა (ტირტაუსი: ფრაგმენტი 11,
Sage 1996, გვ. 28).
The sword retained its importance in the ninth and eighth centuries and was invariably
still the cut-and-thrust, Naue II Type sword introduced in the thirteenth century. It
continued in use right through the Archaic period to c. 520, although later examples are
rare (Snodgrass 1965a, pp. 93–4; Kilian-Dirlmeier 1993, plates 41–54). They vary from
50cm to 70cm in length and have half-moon pommels, clearly depicted in Late Geometric
art where the sword is the commonest weapon shown. Since we have seen that spears
were thrown in this early period (900 to c. 650), it is natural that all warriors would also
have needed a sword for hand-to-hand combat. Greenhalgh (1973, p. 73) suggests that the
early phalanx in some states, such as Euboea, may have been composed of men who threw
spears or javelins first and then closed with the sword in a phalanx formation. A fragment
from Archilochus, who talks of javelin warfare on Naxos and Paros, mentions that
Euboeans spurned the bow and sling, and fought close up with the sword, although he
also calls them ‘Spear-famed’, indicating that they had this weapon at their disposal as
well (Greenhalgh 1973, p. 90). Archilochus was writing in the seventh century, when
hoplite warfare was becoming the norm, and he seems to be talking about places that
were still fighting in an earlier style.
The introduction of the phalanx certainly undermined the sword’s previous prestige.
After 700, weapons were shorter and stubbier, but they were frequently left out of artistic
depictions altogether. Some examples have been found at Olympia of a single-edged,
straight slashing sword, of a type known from Macedonia, Thrace and Thessaly (Snodgrass
1965a, p. 100). These seem to be mostly from the eighth century, although the type is seen
in use later (Sekunda 2002, pp. 16, 29). It was probably from this sword that the kopis or
machaira developed. This is a curved sword with the sharp edge on the inside (recurved),
like a Gurkha kukri – which indeed is descended from it (Snodgrass 1967, plate 50). An
example dating to about 650 is known from Crete (Snodgrass 1965a, p. 100), and one is
illustrated on an alabastron from Syracuse of about the same date. This geographical
difference has led Sekunda (2000, p. 16) to suggest that they came from the Near East, and
Connolly (1998, p. 63) to suggest that they were an Etruscan development. I think, like
Snodgrass, that a Thracian origin is the most likely. They do not appear to have become
common until the end of the sixth century and were not as popular as the straight sword
until perhaps the fourth century.
Nearly all the evidence we have discussed refers to infantry developing from lightly
armoured skirmishers into the heavily armoured hoplite phalanx. There is, however,
evidence for a few other troop types. Although Greeks for the most part abandoned the
chariot for the riding horse during the tenth century, the existence of Greek cavalry is not
certain before the Peloponnesian War. There are plenty of vase illustrations of armoured
warriors on horseback but, as Greenhalgh shows (1973, passim), these are hoplites on
horses, who would have dismounted to fight in battle. This is certain because the warriors
carry hoplite shields, which cannot be used on a horse; and also they are invariably
accompanied by a squire, who would hold the horses while the battle raged and be ready
for a quick getaway if necessary. The horses were in fact being used in the same way as
chariots were used earlier, as a taxi service to and from battle.
Two questions arise from this. Did all hoplites ride into battle, and did the squires fight as
light troops, whether mounted or not? The first question is likely to be answered with a
‘no’. It takes a lot of land and money to look after horses (and to own a squire), and so
only a small percentage of hoplites could have afforded to ride to battle. We see a
reminder of this when just 300 Spartans were present for the Battle of Thermopylae in
480. These men were the personal bodyguard of King Leonidas, called the Hippeis, or
‘Horsemen’. They suggest the number of hoplites that might have ridden to battle in an
earlier period – a small number, that could sometimes be sent on ahead as an advance unit
or for small actions. The Theban Sacred Band of 300 may have had a similar origin, or
may indeed be copied from the Spartans.
As for squires taking part in the battle, this is certainly what Herodotus suggests at a later
period, at the Battle of Plataea in 479, when the Spartan squires (all 35,000 of them!) were
supposed to have fought as light troops, along with 34,500 from the other Greek states!
However, he fails to then mention any role they played in the battle itself (Herodotus IX,
29). In the sixth century there are certainly signs of light cavalry use, which may have
come about from the squires of hoplites joining the fight. Greenhalgh shows many
illustrations (1973, pp. 112, 114, 115, etc.), which seem to depict light cavalry fighting
with javelins in battle, as opposed to hunting scenes.
Literary evidence is more scant. Athens seems to have had just ninety-six horsemen for
coastal patrols organised under the reforms of Solon in 594 (Bugh 1988, p. 5). In the
Persian Wars of the early fifth century, no cavalry fought on the Greek side at all,
although this may be because it seemed pointless to use a small force that would be so
heavily outnumbered by the Persian cavalry (Bugh 1988, pp. 10–11). Finally, we know for
a fact that the Spartans did not raise a cavalry force until 424 (Bugh 1988, p. 24). In
northern Greece, the situation was somewhat different. The wide plains of Macedonia,
Thessaly and, to some extent, Boeotia meant that these states were provided with cavalry.
Indeed, Thessalian cavalry was often used by Athens and other states as a mercenary
cavalry. They seem to have used javelins and not to have been armoured at all at this
period (Snodgrass 1967, p. 86). The Greeks of south Italy and Sicily also developed a true
cavalry before 500, some of whom may have been armoured (Snodgrass 1967, p. 87).
There are vase illustrations of what appears to be true cavalry from c. 580 (Greenhalgh
1973, pp. 96 ff.) but, as the literary evidence shows, it was very much a small part of the
military scene until the Peloponnesian War.
Similarly, the use of light troops is elusive. In the late eighth century they are clearly very
common, especially archers, and appear frequently on the Late Geometric vases of the
Dipylon Master and his followers (Ahlberg 1971, p. 44). This was the skirmishing warfare
which preceded the hoplite phalanx and, for a brief period, the archer had a central role
in warfare. Pausanias, writing much later, mentions their use by Spartans in the
Messenian Wars of the eighth and seventh centuries (Snodgrass 1967, p. 81), but by the
time of the introduction of the hoplite phalanx in c. 650 the archer, slinger and javelin
thrower had mostly disappeared. As we have seen, the phalanx did not appear overnight,
however, and there are some interesting pieces of evidence showing the transition.
Greenhalgh (1973, p. 99) illustrates a vase showing early hoplites possibly fighting in a
phalanx formation but, in between them, there is an archer also taking part in the battle.
Tyrtaeus, a mid-seventh-century poet, after he talks about the phalanx standing shoulder
to shoulder, exhorts the light-armed troops to hide behind the shields of the hoplites and
then hurl their stones at the enemy (Sage 1996, p. 29). This last quote seems to refer to
ordinary rocks rather than sling stones, for which the evidence is very thin at this period.
There is plenty of other evidence for archery in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries,
but much is concerned with hunting and, once the phalanx was in place, only Crete
supplies evidence for the use of the bow in combat. Indeed, just as Thessalian cavalry was
used by other states, so Cretan archers were used as mercenary troops.
Evidence for javelin throwers is also thin after the introduction of the phalanx, although
they are again mentioned by Tyrtaeus in the mid-seventh century (Snodgrass 1967, p. 79).
Otherwise they too did not resurface until the Persian Wars of the early fifth century. The
widespread adoption of the phalanx seems to have developed into a semi-ritualised sort of
warfare between Greek states. The heavily-armed phalanx would have been very
vulnerable to missile troops, and could have been devastated (once defeated) by a cavalry
force, but these troops seem to have simply not been used (Hanson 1991, p. 232). It is
unfortunate that we have no reliable accounts of hoplite battles in the seventh and sixth
centuries, which might have told us more about the use of missile troops.
Only when the threat of the Persian Empire grew, and the Greek states knew that they
would have to fight a non-Greek enemy who had thousands of cavalry and missile troops,
did they start to adapt the phalanx, and also to introduce or reintroduce cavalry and
missile troops.
But let's look at the evidence (such that it is) and relevant historical data from the
Greek Dark Age to the ascendance of Macedon some 450 years later, much of it
pictorial and conjectural until the 6th Century BC
Combat in the latter stages of the Dark Age was predominantly with javelin or
light spear based with soldiers fighting in a relatively loose formation, supported
by light troops. From this period we start to see the military ascendance of Sparta,
though not as the super troops they were to become.
Soldiers & commanders were as able then as the modern soldier of today (we
should remember all the other developments by the Greeks in this period that
shows they were quite a capable & forward-thinking people). What they often did
not have was technology but even so tactical finesse, though constrained until
the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) did undoubtedly continue to develop.
Unlike the other races, which were generally run in the nude,
the hoplitodromos required competitors to run wearing the helmet and greaves of
the hoplite from which the race took its name. Runners also carried the hoplites'
bronze-covered wood shield, bringing the total encumbrance to at least 50 pounds.
After 450 BC, the use of greaves was abandoned (presumably because they had
already lost their military worth).
We should not look at the Hoplite Phalanx as a simple formation that was created
at some point in early Greek history but that it was an unstructured series of
natural developments by different City States that complimented the societies that
the citizens (and sometimes slaves) of each of the City States fought to protect.
Indeed it could be said that Alexander's Army, albeit non-Greek, was the epitome
of this principle & development.
დადგენილი თეორიები:
გრადუალისტური თეორია
ენტონი სნოდგრასის მიერ შემუშავებულ გრადუალისტ თეორიაში
ნათქვამია, რომ ჰოპლიტური ბრძოლის სტილი შეიქმნა მთელი რიგი
ნაბიჯებით, ჯავშანტექნიკისა და შეიარაღების ინოვაციების შედეგად.
ქრონოლოგიურად დათარიღებულია ჰოპლიტის ჯავშნის არქეოლოგიური
მიგნებები და მიგნებულია ფალანგის წარმონაქმნის განვითარების
მიახლოებით, სნოდგრასი ამტკიცებს, რომ გარდამავალ პერიოდს ძვ. ეს ჯერ
კიდევ სწრაფი ტრანსფორმაციაა, რომელიც დაფუძნებულია როგორც
ფორმალური ომის საწყისი სიხშირეზე და საჭირო იყო მტრების სხვადასხვა
კომბინაციის შესაფერისი კომბინაცია მთელი პერიოდის განმავლობაში
(ჩრდილოეთის ქალაქები უდავოდ არ გადაკეთებულა ამ პერიოდში), ასევე
აღჭურვილობის წარმოება. და პროგრესული ხელმძღვანელობა და ნება.
სწრაფი მიღების თეორია
სწრაფი შვილად აყვანის თეორია შეიმუშავეს ისტორიკოსებმა პოლ
კარტლეჯმა და ვიქტორ ჰანსონმა. ისტორიკოსებს მიაჩნიათ, რომ ფალანგა
ინდივიდუალურად შეიქმნა სამხედრო ძალების მიერ, მაგრამ იმდენად
ეფექტური იყო, რომ სხვებს დაუყოვნებლივ მოუხდათ ომის საკუთარი
ფორმის ადაპტირება ფორმირებასთან საბრძოლველად. ფალანგა შესაძლოა
შექმნილიყო, თუმცა ალბათობა, რომ იგი ფორმით იყო წარმოდგენილი
wargames მაგიდაზე, ყველაზე უკეთეს შემთხვევაში ნაკლებად სავარაუდოა
ძვ. წ. V საუკუნის შუა ხანებამდე. ზემოთ მოცემული კომენტარები ასევე
ვრცელდება.
გაფართოებული თანდათანობითი თეორია
ჰანს ვან ვესის მიერ შემუშავებული, გაფართოებული თანდათანობით
თეორია ყველაზე პოპულარული გარდამავალი სამი თეორიიდან ყველაზე
გრძელია. ვან ვეზი ასახავს იკონოგრაფიას, რომელიც ნაპოვნია ბნელი ხანის
ქოთნებში, რადგან მიაჩნია, რომ ამ დროს ფალანგის წარმონაქმნის
საფუძველი დაიბადა. კერძოდ, ის იყენებს Chigi Vase- ის მაგალითს იმის
აღნიშვნაზე, რომ ჰოპლიტ ჯარისკაცებს ზურგზე ატარებდნენ ჩვეულებრივ
შუბებს, ასევე ჯავლებს. ჰოპლიტებს, როგორც ისინი ზოგადად
გამოსახულია ომის თამაშების მაგიდაზე, არ ატარებდნენ გრძელი
მანძილის იარაღს, მათ შორის ჯაველინებს და, დამატებით, wargame
ენთუზიასტისთვის ხელმისაწვდომი ტაქტიკური დოქტრინის დიდი
ნაწილი არ არის ხელმისაწვდომი (მარათონის ბრძოლაში სწრაფი წინსვლა
ერთ-ერთი ცნობილი მაგალითია
t is likely that individual City States gradually developed their warring bands of
Infantry from ill-equipped light troops combined with small groups of noble
warriors (able to buy some or all of what became a full panoply of armour) and
armed with spear and/or javelin and sword to larger trained bands of lesser
equipped but still moderately-well armoured 'Heavy Infantry' that could still fight
aggressively as well as defend themselves through forming close order and
even locking shields....
When the javelin was removed from general use is debatable but it was probably
either during the later stages of the Lelantine War or more likely some time after
when it was realised that in the formalised style of warfare javelins were
inefficient in that Units would fail to close with their opponent and the battle
would develop into an inefficient firefight and/or broke up the 'Phalanx' and
which ultimately prolonged the result of the battle and only increased logistical
issues. It is likely that the more progressive (at this point) Spartans were the first to
discard the javelin in Heavy Infantry formations.
It is also possible that due to the nature of the terrain in Greece that different
types of Hoplite appeared, providing additional tactical potential on the battlefield
(though this is likely to be solely reflected in lesser armour). These difference
could alude to both Ekdromos and Promachos units which may have fought
between or within existing units and ordered to deploy as and when the need
arose.
Certainly there was a higher degree of tactical finesse only marred by technical
ability of the troops under command, something that the Spartans would have
mitigated earlier than most. Formal training will ensure better discipline and
cooperation between units and significantly this will have only been available to
the Spartans, retained units, formations on campaign and mercenary units.
The military development of the hoplite, and the phalanx, was once thought to
have hadimmediate political consequences in connection with the emergence of
Tyranny in theGreek world.
6
However, the integration of hoplites and the phalanx militarily into the polis
oued oe a log peiod of tie, hee the polis had tie to aept
ad itegate
hoplite warfare as they sa
fit. This ioed
the goth of the hoplite lasss
politicalconsciousness and power; it did not result in an immediate wholesale
revolution that wasdriven either militarily or politically by the demands of the
hoplite class, indeed the direct
oseuees felt ithi Geek soiet ee
oespodigl
slight.
7
The political consciousness and involvement of the hoplite class in assisting the
rise oftyrants to power is a subject of debate amongst scholars.
Befoe Atho “odgasss
TheHoplite Reform
(1965), it was largely held that, when the farmer-hoplite found himselffighting
side by side with a similarly equipped aristocrat, he began to develop the
notionthat he was just as important as the aristocrat, and thus began to
conceive of his ownpolitical identity.
8
It cannot be overlooked that the hoplite class did eventually acquiretangible
political power however, like the phalanx they fought in; hoplite
consciousnessdeveloped in a piecemeal way over a long period of time.The
emergence of the hoplite class did not immediately bring about a democratic
agendafrom the non-aristocrats. The feature that immediately defined Greek
politicaldevelopments that corresponded with emergence of the hoplite class
was the rise ofTyranny. However the actual role of the hoplite class in the
support and establishment ofGreek Tyrannies has split the o
piio of sholas. Jaes Hollada states that the oetioade
etee hoplites ad the ise of ta is ild.
9
George L. Calkwell sees noconnection between the Tyranny of Peisistratus at
Athens, and the hoplite class.
10
Hedisagrees with
Aistotles
account
that Peisistatus as a etee
advocate of the people
(
Politics
.28.2) rather postulating that Peisistratus
as i No se se popula a d that the
people were not involved with his rise to power.
11
Anthony Snodgrass finds it difficult to
ie the hoplite lass as a diig foe fo ilita o politial
ioatio, let aloeeolutio.
12
He furthers his argument by illustrating that, as a result of the adoption of thephalanx;
the aristocrats were joined in the ra
ks su s ta t ial lad oes
who werecompelled to adhere to the military changes in order to effectively defend their
land, notbecause of their desire to obtain political power.
13
Snodgrass summarises that it is difficultto believe that the hoplite reform had any
immediate political consequences.
14
Finally JohnSalmon states
that the epliit eidee
we possess pertaining to the motives behind thepolitical changes in the seventh century
relates to factors which directly affected the hopliteclass. He then argues a moderate line,
that the establishment of tyrannies in the start of theseventh century were possible due to
the support of hoplites, not because they were drivenby them.
15
There is additional collaborating evidence that, in some cases, the Hoplite class may
nothave assisted the tyrants rise to power at all. Cylon
s failed attempt to seize power in Athens(632 BC) was not supported by the hoplite class;
in fact they are likely to have saved Athensfrom his Tyranny by arming themselves and
ejecting him.
16
Thucydides records the seminalmoment,
they came in full force against him from the fie
lds
... The the
Thucydides is referring is very likely to have been populated in some percentage by
hoplites,as the farmer-soldiers were dispersed outside of the city on their farms.
Furthermore the
Atheia a as a soial goup osistig of the uppe ad iddle
lasses, thus
, if thepeople Thucydides made reference to, did march armed to oust Cylon they must
haveincluded a significant number of hoplite-farmers.
17
Ronald Ridley adds that in the classical
sste ol itizes ith the eas to a theseles ould e hoplites"
18
‘idles
statement did not preclude the lower classes such as the non-land owning inhabitants
(
thetes
) of the city-state, but it would be very unlikely that the
thetes,
who stood no betterchance at gaining political rights under an aristocratic tyrant, would
then lend them armedsupport. Furthermore tyrants were aware that those who were not
hoplites counted fornothing, so they were forced to find support with those citizens of the
Polis who did.
19
The sixth century tyrant Peisistratus was likely to have had as many hoplites opposed
tohim, as there were in support of him.
20
Holladay supports this view stating that the hopliteclass is likely to have been opposed to
Peisistratus, and that this is illustrated by hissuggested need to
by-pass the council of 400 and make an appeal directly to theassembly.
21
If, indeed Peisistratus had been supported by the hoplites, there would havebeen no need
for him to subvert the council of 400 to get what he wanted.
22
The Tyrants
apparent lack of need for large numerical support from amongst the hoplites is
also echoedby Herodotus in his account of Polycrates seizure of power at Samos,
recording that hemade his bid for power with the help of only fifteen hoplites
(3.120.3). On the other handCypselus, Pheidon, and Orthagoras all installed themselves as
tyrants with considerablemilitary support.
23
Certainly the potential tyrant had to have recruited at least some form ofmilitary support
to counter-balance the established power of the aristocrats, and thenmaintain it.
24
However it is unclear whether they were supported by other disgruntledaristocrats or
hoplite-farmers.The assistance that tyrants received from the hoplite class, and equally the
armed resistancethey provided, such as in Cylon
s failed attempt in Athens, raise some interesting, seeminglycounter-productive questions
about their involvement. For example, the tyrants evolved outof aristocratic rivalries, not
the grievances of the hoplite class.
25
Aristotle
(
Pol.
1310b)remarks that the vast majority of emerged out of the ruling classes. Indeed, the
primarycontributing factor in the rise of t
ats as the olatile i
-fighting among the aristocratic
(
თემები
) ქალაქ-სახელმწიფოს, მაგრამ ძალიან ნაკლებად სავარაუდოა, რომ
თემები,
რომლებიც უკეთეს მდგომარეობაში არ აღმოჩნდნენ არისტოკრატული ტირანის
დროს პოლიტიკური უფლებების მოპოვებაში, შემდეგ მათ იარაღის მხარდაჭერას
მისცემდა. გარდა ამისა, ტირანებმა იცოდნენ, რომ ისინი, ვინც არ იყვნენ
ჰოპლიტები, სიძვას ითვლიდნენ, ამიტომ ისინი იძულებულნი გახდნენ,
პოლიციის იმ მოქალაქეებს ეხმარებოდნენ, ვინც ეს გააკეთეს.
19
მეექვსე საუკუნის ტირან პეისტისტრატეს ალბათ იმდენი ჰოპლიტი ჰყავდა, ვინც
მას ეწინააღმდეგებოდა.
20
ჰოლადეი მხარს უჭერს ამ მოსაზრებას, სადაც ნათქვამია, რომ ჰოპლიტეკლასი,
სავარაუდოდ, ეწინააღმდეგებოდა პეიისტრატეს, და ამის ილუსტრირებულია მისი
შემოთავაზებული საჭიროება
გაივლის 400-კაციან საბჭოს და მიმართავს უშუალოდ შეკრებას.
21
თუკი მართლაც მხარს უჭერდნენ პეისისტრატეს ჰოპლიტები, აღარ იქნებოდა
საჭირო 400 კაციანი საბჭოს შეცვლა იმისთვის, რაც მიიღო.
22
ტირანები
ჰოპოტუსის გამოთქმას ჰპოვებს ჰოროდოტეს პოლიტიკაში ძალაუფლების ხელში
ჩაგდების შესახებ, როგორც აღნიშნავს ჰოლოდოტს, სადაც აღწერილია, რომ იგი
ხელისუფლებას ითხოვს მხოლოდ თხუთმეტი ჰოპლიტის დახმარებით (3.120.3).
მეორეს მხრივ, კიპსელუსმა, ფეიდონმა და ორთაგორამ თავი დაიმკვიდრეს
ტირანებად, მნიშვნელოვანი სამხედრო მხარდაჭერით.
23
რა თქმა უნდა, პოტენციურ ტირანს უნდა დაკომპლექტებული ჰქონოდა მინიმუმ
რაიმე ფორმა სამხედრო მხარდაჭერა, რომ არისტოკრატთა დამკვიდრებული ძალა
გაეწონასწორებინა და შემდეგ შეენარჩუნებინა იგი.
24
თუმცა გაუგებარია, მათ მხარი დაუჭირეს სხვა უკმაყოფილო სარისტოკრატებმა
თუ ჰოპლიტ ფერმერებმა. დახმარება, რომელსაც ტირანები იღებდნენ ჰოპლიტის
კლასისგან და თანაბრად შეიარაღებული წინააღმდეგობის გაწევა, მაგალითად,
ცილონში
წარუმატებელი მცდელობა ათენში, წამოჭრი რამდენიმე საინტერესო, როგორც
ჩანს, კონტრპროდუქტიული კითხვები მათ მონაწილეობასთან დაკავშირებით.
მაგალითად, ტირანები არისტოკრატიული მეტოქეობიდან გამომდინარე
განვითარდნენ და არა ჰოპლიტური კლასის საჩივრებიდან.
25
არისტოტელე
(
პოლ
1310 ბ) აღნიშნავს, რომ აბსოლუტური უმრავლესობა მმართველი კლასებიდან
გამოვიდა. მართლაც, პირველადი ხელშემწყობი ფაქტორია თ
ats როგორც ელასტიური i
არისტოკრატიული ბრძოლა
specifically in the seventh century the physical and political roles that the non-
aristocratichoplites played in the rise of Greek Tyrants was minimal.Salmon proposes that
the rise of the Greek Tyrants duriing the seventh century were theresult of hoplite
support but not driven by them.
31
The independent farmer-hoplites(
zuegitai
)
,
who accounted for a third or more of the population and military power ofAthens, were
denied appointment to all major political offices regardless of their militarynecessity until
c.456 BC where they first became eligible for the archonship.
32
The situationin Athens, the Greek state that first established democracy, illustrates that
the hoplite classwould not have been the driving mechanism behind the establishment of
tyranny. Thehoplite class possessed no real motive to support a singular aristocrat seizing
power in theform of a Tyrant from Monarchs, or other aristocratic families which
continued to keepthem in the a frozen political state.It is important to note that there are
a number of scholars that view the hoplite class ashaving, at least in some way, assisted
the rise of Tyranny. Kurt Raaflaub argues that
hoplites are
elated to ta,
and, that through this relationship, tyrants rose to powerby promoting the interests of
the hoplite class, thus gaining their popular support.
33
He doesconcede however, that the farmers who qualified economically and fought
militarily as
hoplites ee ot iediatel a osious o uified lass i
eooi o politial tes
and that the role of this class in the political evolution of the polis developed over a
longperiod of time.
34
Oswyn Murray believes that the military developments with regards tobattlefield tactics,
weaponry and personnel that began to occur in the seventh centuryconsequently resulted
in far reaching changes in the Greek political system, but refrainsfrom attributing it
specifically to the sixth and seventh centuries.
35
The tyrannies of Cypselus, Theagenes, Orthagoras, and Pheidon (Argos) provide
evidencethat the hoplite class could either be actively or passively involved in the
establishment andmaintenance of their respective tyrannies. In order for a Tyrant to
seize power they required
the support of armed men, and although the number of armed supporters was small as
inthe case of Peisistratus and Polycrates, this was not always the case. For example
Pheidonacquired power in Argos by harnessing the support of armed hoplites.
36
Cypselus, as Tyrantof Corinth, did not require an armed bodyguard to protect him, which
illustrates that he hadsecured the political and military support of a large percentage of
both aristocrats andhoplites. Certainly a number of Greek Tyrants utilised their roles as
military leaders to gainthe support of hoplites in the political sphere proving that, in
the hands of the right leader,the hoplite class could in the seventh century be successfully
mobilized militarily in order toforce a political regime change.
37
If the hoplite class were assisting aristocrats into powerduring this period they were
doing so in a supporting role, rather than to fulfil their ownpolitical goals.Theagenes and
Lygdamis are both portrayed as having become tyrants by possessing thepower and
confidence of the people.
38
However it is difficult to determine the actual
peetage of the people
whose support they both came to power with. Certainly, thecases of Peisistratus and
Polycrates illustrate that a potential tyrant did not necessarilyrequire the support of the
people. All they required, in some instances, was a committedand armed band of
followers, and the ruthlessness to dispatch the former government intoexile or murder.
Thus, as the armed support for tyrants need not have been specificallydrawn from the
hoplite class; aristocratic families had just as much, if not more incentive, tosupport
a tyrant. In Corinth for example,
pio to Cpselus
seizure of power the Bacchiadfamily consisting of 200 male members, had held exclusive
political power within theirfamily for a ninety years.
39
Paul Cartledge argues that the role of the non-aristocratic hoplite class in assisting
theestablishment of tyrants need not have been that of active participation; rather it is
possiblethat they assisted the tyrants by their non-interference.
40
It is certainly possible that such alarge group of men equipped and trained in melee
warfare could have, if they had wanted
to rouse themselves to action, as they did with the case of Cylon. Thus it is equally
possiblethat a non-aristocratic class of farmer-soldiers with no real political unity or
consciousnesswould not have found it possible to unite themselves against the
establishment of atyranny. In order for a Tyrant to successfully remove the ruling elite,
they merely requiredthe non-aristocratic hoplites to passively refuse to defend the ruling
party. It would not havebeen feasible to overthrow any oligarchy or monarchy, or
maintain their grip on power ifthe established ruling-elite had retained the loyalty of the
armed non-aristocratic hopliteclass.
41
In conclusion, by 500 BC the hoplite class had developed unity and political
consciousness.However, this was a gradual process that had not materialized in time to be
the major factorthat assisted the establishment of the earliest Greek tyrants. Indeed
careful examination ofthe evidence reveals that no Greek Tyrant seized power at the head
of a hoplite army.
42
Ifthe hoplite class were involved with the establishment of tyrannies it never took the
form ofa unified class movement seeking political privileges and increased political
participation.There were times when some hoplites assisted tyrants such as, Cypselus,
Pheidon, andPolycrates, but at times they also defended the status quo as was the case
with Cylon. Atother times the hoplites
had o ioleet hatsoee as as the ase ith Peisistatus
tyranny in Athens.
43
It was ultimately the passive inaction of the hoplite class to mobilizethemselves in
defence of the existing governments that was the largest contributing factorin the rise of
the early Greek Tyrants.As self-equipped heavily armed infantrymen they most certainly
could have come to thedefence of the government if they had wanted to. Therefore it is
difficult to conceive thathoplite class acted as the decisive factor in the implementation
of the early Greek Tyrants.
Let’s get to the non-methodological stuff. The leisured, propertied class (almost
entirely landed property)—a tiny minority—of course was differentiated into the
more
or less wealthy, those who owned more or less property and therefore slaves.
Some
examples: “the owner of a large or even medium-sized farm, worked by slaves
under a
slave bailiff, or leased out at a rent; the proprietor of a workshop of, say, 20–50
slaves,
supervised by a slave manager; the lessee of mines in the Laurium district of
Attica,
worked by slaves, and similarly supervised by a manager who would himself be a
slave; the owner of a merchant ship or two which he hired out to traders or used
for
trading himself, manning them with slaves…” Lots of slaves. Though also other
kinds
of unfree labor, as Ste. Croix emphasizes. Greece was actually rather poor, though,
as
were its great landowners, compared to Persia and later Rome. The great Roman
senators of the Empire were astoundingly wealthy; next to them, Greece’s
aristocrats
were petty stuff. The Roman Empire, or rather its ruling class, swam in wealth.
As in many later societies, the landed aristocracy sneered at people who had
gained their wealth from trade or manufactures. Leisure was the mark of the
gentleman. And these value-judgments were to some degree shared by most of the
population: “the ideas of a dominant class (at least if it is not a conquering, alien
race)
მოდით გავეცნოთ არა მეთოდოლოგიურ ნივთებს. იჯარით აღებული,
საკუთრებაში მყოფი კლასი (თითქმის
მთლიანად მიწის ნაკვეთი) - მცირე უმცირესობა - რა თქმა უნდა უფრო
დიფერენცირებული იყო
ან ნაკლებად შეძლებული, ისინი, ვინც მეტ-ნაკლებად ქონებას ფლობდნენ და,
შესაბამისად, მონებიც. Ზოგიერთი
მაგალითები: ”დიდი ან თუნდაც საშუალო მეურნეობის მეპატრონე, რომელსაც
მონები მუშაობდნენ ა
მონა აღმასრულებელი, ან ქირავდება იჯარით; ვთქვათ, 20–50 მონის სახელოსნოს
მფლობელი,
ზედამხედველობას უწევს მონა მენეჯერს; მაღაროელთა მოიჯარე ატიკის
ლაურიუმის რაიონში,
მუშაობდნენ მონები და ანალოგიურად ხელმძღვანელობდა მენეჯერი, რომელიც
თავად იქნებოდა ა
მონა; ერთი ან ორი სავაჭრო გემის მფლობელი, რომელიც მან დაქირავებული
მოვაჭრეებისთვის მიიღო ან გამოიყენა
თვითონ ვაჭრობა, მონებთან დაპატიმრება… ”უამრავი მონა. თუმცა ასევე სხვა
სახის
თავისუფალი შრომის, როგორც სტ. კრუაკი ხაზს უსვამს. საბერძნეთი
სინამდვილეში საკმაოდ ღარიბი იყო
იყვნენ მისი დიდი მიწათმფლობელები, სპარსეთთან და შემდეგ რომთან
შედარებით. დიდი რომაელი
იმპერიის სენატორები საოცრად მდიდარი იყვნენ; მათ გვერდით, საბერძნეთის
არისტოკრატები
წვრილმანი იყო. რომის იმპერია, უფრო სწორად მისი მმართველი კლასი,
სიმდიდრით ცურავდა.
ისევე როგორც ბევრ შემდგომ საზოგადოებაში, მიწის ნაკვეთებიც ეცინებოდა
ხალხს, ვისაც ეს ჰქონდა
თავიანთი სიმდიდრე მიიღეს ვაჭრობით ან წარმოებით. დასვენება იყო ნიშანი
ჯენტლმენი. და ამ ღირებულებით შეფასებებს გარკვეულწილად იზიარებდა
უმეტესობა
მოსახლეობა: ”დომინანტური კლასის იდეები (ყოველ შემთხვევაში, თუ ეს არ არის
დამპყრობლური, უცხო რასა)
are always accepted in some measure by those it exploits, and most of all (as
modern
experience shows) by those who are near the top level of the exploited and see
themselves as about to rise into the ruling class. And most of the words used in
Greek
to express social qualities and distinctions were heavily loaded with the moral
overtones that had always been associated with them [e.g., that being a tradesman
was
demeaning], so that the poorer Greek would find it hard to avoid expressing
himself in
the very terms that proclaimed his unworthiness.” The very vocabulary that
societies
use is inflected with class, partly determined by it.
Slavery and forced labor, serfdom, and debt bondage were widespread in the
ancient world, the former three usually resulting from conquest (except in the
later
Roman empire, when serfdom emerged more organically). Athens was unusual in
at
least one respect: Solon abolished debt bondage in 594 B.C., a truly radical reform.
The
ancients themselves divided mankind into only two categories, slave and free, but
there
were in fact many intermediate statuses. Athens made especially intense use of
slavery,
despite—but also because of—its democracy. That’s ironic, but it was because of
democracy that the upper class couldn’t exploit the humbler citizens to the degree
it
could in other places, so it had to rely exceptionally on rights-less slaves. 5 “This
[class
based hypothesis] explains ‘the advance, hand in hand, of freedom and slavery’ in
the
Greek world, noted by Finley but left by him as a kind of paradox, entirely
without
explanation” (because Finley doesn’t like to invoke class). Democracy can cause
the
intensification of slavery, and slavery can help make possible democracy—for
some
people. Fascinating!
Why weren’t there more slave revolts, if there were so many slaves? Mainly
because slaves in each city, and often even in single families and farms and
workshops,
were largely imported “barbarians” and very heterogeneous in character, coming
from
South Russia, Thrace, Lydia, parts of Asia Minor, Egypt, Sicily, Libya, etc. They
didn’t
have a common language or culture. “The desirability of choosing slaves of
different
nationalities and languages was well recognized in antiquity, and it is stressed by
several Greek and Roman writers as an indispensable means of preventing
revolts.”
Yes, the old trick of divide-and-conquer, used to fantastic effect by modern
capitalists
when trying to maintain control over their work force. Most techniques of power
are
timeless.
Serfdom was much less common than slavery in the Greek world: before the late
Roman empire there were only isolated local forms of it, for instance the Helots of
Sparta, and on temple estates in Hellenistic Asia Minor. (This serfdom on sacred
land
was probably a residue of forms of serfdom that had earlier been widespread in Asia.)
“It is essential to realize, however, that these [west Asian] forms of serfdom tended to
dissolve as a result of contact with the more advanced Greek and Roman economy
(above all, no doubt, when the land came into the ownership or under the control of
Greeks or hellenized natives or of Romans), and after a few generations virtually
ceased
to exist, except as part of very conservative complexes such as temple estates… Until
the introduction of the Later Roman colonate, serfdom failed to maintain itself in the
Greek world (or in the rest of the Roman empire), and when it disappeared in a
particular area, there is no sign that it was re-established.” But in various places, like
Ptolemaic Egypt, even some non-serf peasants (who weren’t tied to the land) were
subject to very strict controls and supervision. In cases where serfdom disappeared
after
coming into contact with Greeks and Romans, some of the peasants sank even further,
into slavery, whereas in other places they became freer, like if their territory was
incorporated into a city.
“It was only at the end of the third century A.D. that legislation began to be
introduced, subjecting to forms of legal serfdom the whole working agricultural
population of the Graeco-Roman world. In outline, leasehold tenants (coloni) became
serfs, bound either to their actual farms or plots or to their villages and almost as
much
subject to their landlords as were slaves to their masters, even though they remained
technically ingenui, free men rather than slaves; working peasant freeholders too were
tied, to their villages.” Later in the book he’ll give explanations for this and other
changes from the Archaic Age to the late Empire. For now, he’s just describing the
whole socioeconomic framework.
As for debt bondage, it is “virtually certain that forms of [it] existed at all times in
the great majority of Greek cities.” David Graeber demonstrates the profound
significance of debt to the ancient world in his book Debt: The First 5000 Years (on
which
I’ve commented in Finding Our Compass: Reflections on a World in Crisis). The
consequence of defaulting on a debt in Greek cities might be enslavement or the sale
of
one’s children. “In Ptolemaic Egypt, there is clear evidence both for outright
enslavement for debt and for debt bondage; but in the Roman period the latter seems
to
have replaced the former. It is difficult to generalize about Greek cities, but it does
look
as if debt bondage largely superseded outright enslavement for debt during the
Hellenistic period.” In early Roman law, the position of the defaulting debtor was
even
worse. “His creditors might keep him in chains; and ultimately…they might cut his
body in pieces and divide the parts among themselves.” Lovely. It was clearly a rosy
time to live. “The wealthy Roman regarded a defaulting debtor who had been driven
to
borrow because of dire need, rather than for some speculative or luxurious purpose,
almost as a kind of criminal.” What a surprise, this class prejudice against the poor. In
general, the Roman state and its law, like all states (to greater or lesser degrees), was
“an instrument of the propertied classes; for the propertyless, the state ‘couldn’t care
less.’”
Hired labor was less common than both slavery and, surely, debt bondage; its
first major appearance in antiquity was in the form of mercenaries, though it was
probably common at the peak periods of agricultural activity (harvesting, vintage,
olive-picking) and may have been used for public works in Greek cities. Artisans,
contractors, shopkeepers, and others must have occasionally hired workers too. The
position of these wage-earners was considered contemptible. Plato and Aristotle
placed
them at the bottom of the social scale, and their attitude was shared by pretty much
the
whole propertied class. For Aristotle, “there could be no civilized existence for men
who did not have leisure, which was a necessary condition (though not of course a
sufficient condition) for becoming a good and competent citizen, and indeed was the
goal (telos) of labor, as peace was of war… The overriding necessity for leisure
excludes
the citizens of Aristotle’s ideal State from all forms of work, even farming, not to
mention craftsmanship… The essential fact which, in Aristotle’s eyes, makes the
hired
man a less worthy figure than the ordinary artisan is not so much his comparative
poverty (for many independent artisans are likely to be poor too) but his ‘slavish’
dependence upon his employer.” This attitude has been shared by many elites
throughout history, for instance eighteenth-century aristocrats like Thomas Jefferson
and all his fellow republicans. The propertyless were supposed to be excluded from
voting because of their lack of independence and consequent inability to act and think
in a properly “disinterested,” public-spirited republican way. They were essentially
appendages of their employer. Interestingly, the “labor republicanism” exemplified by
the Knights of Labor in the 1880s (in the U.S.) had a similar outlook, considering
wage
labor (“wage-slavery”) to be undignified, unmanly, a kind of degradation that
interfered with the rights and duties of citizenship. The conclusion they drew, though,
as did many other workers before them, was quite different from that of the classical
republicans: wage-labor had to be abolished and a cooperative commonwealth
established. “There is an inevitable conflict between the wage-system of labor and the
republican system of government,” as one of them said. It seems that only in the
twentieth century, when the wage-system had finally unequivocally conquered the
Western world, was wage-labor, for the first time ever, seen to be necessary and even
good, not degrading. An idea that would have been utterly incomprehensible to all
previous ruling classes and most of their subordinates.6
payments on debt to the rich, corporate welfare, etc. rather than to improvements in
public education and transportation, roads, environmental protection (for their children
at least), social insurance and so forth amounts to a kind of exploitation. It is indirect,
publicly sanctioned, collective exploitation.
Taxation in Greek cities before the Hellenistic period may often have been quite
light, “if only because the lack of anything resembling a modern civil service made it
difficult if not impossible to collect small sums in taxes profitably from poor people
(that is to say, from the great majority of the population), without the intervention of tax
farmers, who seem to have been very unpopular with all classes… The total burden of
taxation certainly increased in the Hellenistic and Roman periods,” especially in the
Later Roman empire, when it fell most heavily on the peasantry, who had least power
to resist. As in our own day and throughout history, the rich had a much greater chance
of escaping or minimizing payment than the poor.
So, what was the situation of the peasantry? Before delving into it Ste. Croix
gives a beautiful tribute to these poor people, the vast majority of humanity in most
periods of history, that I can’t help quoting:
To my mind, the most profound and moving representation in art of “the
peasant” is Vincent Van Gogh’s The Potato Eaters… As Vincent himself said, in a
letter to his brother Theo, written while the picture was still being painted, “I
have tried to emphasize that those people, eating their potatoes in the lamplight,
have dug the earth with those very hands they put in the dish, and so it speaks of
manual labor, and how they have honestly earned their food. I have wanted to
give the impression of a way of life quite different from that of us civilized
people.” …The quality that impresses one most about Van Gogh’s peasants is
their endurance, their solidity, like that of the earth from which they draw just
sufficient sustenance to maintain life… The Potato Eaters are poor, but they are
not evidently miserable: even if the artist shows infinite sympathy with them, he
depicts in them no trace of self-pity. These are the voiceless toilers, the great
majority—let us not forget it—of the population of the Greek and Roman world,
upon whom was built a great civilization that despised them and did all it could
to forget them.
The lot of the ancient peasant wasn’t much more pleasant than it’s been at any other
time in history. I won’t go into detail, but some indication is given by the fact that,
similar to the case in medieval Europe (regarding the protection afforded by exploiting
lords), being subject to a landlord could actually be preferable to owning land if the
landlord could provide protection against the depredations of officials and soldiers—
“always a terror to the peasantry in the Roman empire.” Rents were paid in money or
in kind, though sometimes in labor services, which were in addition to the irregular
an age at which they could give a good day’s work would be a dead loss to the master.
For other reasons too, masters had preferred simply to buy new slaves coming in from
foreign wars and discourage their breeding. But with fewer such imported slaves
during the Principate (and the greater cost of those who were imported), slaveowners
now resorted to breeding them, which had momentous consequences for the economy:
in brief, it imposed a greater burden on the economy, because of the lower rate of
profit
from slave labor. This, in turn, would be likely to cause the propertied class to
increase the
rate of exploitation of the humbler free population—as the Roman ruling class now
did, by
degrees.
Hitherto slaves had frequently been housed in sex-segregated barracks, but now,
to encourage them to breed, it was desirable to establish them in conditions conducive
to the rearing of families (which itself made it harder to exploit them). It’s not
surprising, therefore, that as early as the last century B.C. we find evidence of slaves
settled as virtual tenants of agricultural plots, with their own families. They were still
technically slaves, but from the economic point of view they were tenants and could
even own slaves of their own. Gradually slavery declined in such ways as these.
Leasing lands as opposed to managing them oneself (overseeing one’s slaves, etc.)
became more common, in part because large landowners after the Republic were
more
likely to own widely diffused plots of land all of which they could hardly manage
themselves. But even if they didn’t own so many plots, it was still easier and less time
consuming simply to lease land to tenants (sometimes thousands of them) who would
do the necessary productive work. These tenants were most often coloni, tied down by
debts to their landlords, such as rent in arrear that gave an excuse for the landlord to
make the conditions under which the tenant used his land more burdensome (which
the
tenant would still find preferable to being hauled off to debtor’s prison). So, on the
whole, the condition of slaves gradually improved somewhat and that of peasants
throughout much of the Roman empire declined (at different rates). Finally towards
the
end of the third century A.D., “as part of the great reform of the system of regular
taxation introduced by Diocletian,” these agricultural workers became legally bound
to
the soil. In fact, not only leasehold tenants but virtually the whole of the agricultural
population in the Roman empire was tied to the land on a hereditary basis and thus
entered into serfdom (or quasi-serfdom in the case of peasant freeholders, who were
tied not to a particular farm or plot but to their village). The reason for these legal
changes was to facilitate the increased exploitation of the peasantry, primarily through
taxation but also forced services and military conscription.
This legal reorganization “was of course seen by its authors as necessary, in the
common interest of all, for the very preservation of the empire, imperiled as it was
now,
as never before, by ‘barbarian’ threats, by the increased power of Persia under the
Sassanids, and by internally destructive rivalries for control of the imperial power.
However, the propertied classes were determined to maintain, and were able to
maintain, their dominance and their economically privileged situation… The great
reorganization was therefore primarily for the benefit of the propertied classes as a
whole; and for them, or at any rate their upper crust, it worked wonders for a time.”
He’ll return to these topics later in the book, when he discusses the decline of the
Empire.
As all this was going on, barbarians were settling the empire to an enormous
extent, a fact that from a cultural point of view may have contributed to the decline of
Rome but from an economic point of view must have helped preserve it for a while.
Those who were brought in after capture by or surrender to Roman generals probably
became mere tenants or coloni (often of imperial estates), whereas most who entered
the
empire by voluntary compact got to own their own land. The beneficial economic
effect
of these barbarian settlements “becomes immediately obvious when we realize that all
those in which the settlers became mere tenants, and (if to a less extent) the majority
of
those involving freeholders, provided both recruits for the army and an adult
workforce, the
cost of producing which had not fallen upon the Graeco-Roman economy.” The
barbarian
settlers therefore helped compensate for the lower profits from slavery.
Despite the decline of slavery, it’s necessary to emphasize “the universal and
unquestioning acceptance of slavery as part of the natural order of things, which
during
the Principate still pervaded the whole of Greek and Roman society—and of course
continued in the Christian empire just as in earlier times. Slavery continued to play a
central role in the psychology of the propertied class. [As Marx said, ideologies tend
to
linger long after the social conditions that birthed them have evolved to new ones.]
And
here I would refer again to what I said earlier about debt bondage: every humble free
man must always have been haunted by fear of the coercion, amounting to slavery in
all
but name, to which he might be subjected if he ever defaulted on a debt to a rich man
—
including the payment of rent, of course.”
Ste. Croix’s comments on “the military factor” in the Roman empire are worth
quoting, at least some of them. Needless to say, military considerations were highly
relevant to Rome’s downfall. Here are a few salient points:
1. From the second quarter of the third century onwards pressure on the frontiers of
the Roman empire became much greater and tended to go on increasing, and the
defense of the frontiers therefore became a matter on which the empire’s survival
rested.
2. In the circumstances of the time, the necessary standing army had to be raised
largely from the peasantry.
3. In order to provide sufficient recruits of strong physique and potentially good
morale, it was therefore essential to maintain a reasonably prosperous and vigorous
peasantry
. On the contrary, as land, during the early centuries of the Christian era, became
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few owners (throughout most of the
West and also, to a less extent, over a large part of the Greek East), the condition of a
substantial proportion of the agricultural population became more and more
depressed, until before the end of the third century most working peasants were
subjected to forms of serfdom or quasi-serfdom…
5. Socially and militarily, this process was very harmful, since the peasants became
increasingly indifferent towards the maintenance of the whole imperial system, most
of the burden of which fell heavily upon them; and the morale (and probably the
physique) of the army deteriorated, with the result that much of the empire
disintegrated by stages between the early fifth century and the mid-seventh.
6. The maintenance of a relatively prosperous peasantry, sufficiently numerous to
provide the large number of recruits needed for the army and willing to fight to the
death in defense of their way of life (as the free Greeks and the early Romans had
been), might have made all the difference and might have preserved the unity of the
empire very much longer.
As he says, “the attitude of the peasantry in both Eastern and Western parts of the
Roman world during the Later Empire was extraordinarily passive and indifferent.”
Sometimes peasants even joined the barbarian invaders. Karma, Rome.
We’ll return to the fall of Rome later on, at the end of the book.
Now for Part 2, which is less descriptive and more explanatory. He begins with
“the age of the tyrants” in Greece, between the mid-seventh century B.C. and the late
sixth. Many Greek cities, which had been dominated until then by hereditary
aristocracies, experienced a new form of personal dictatorial rule, by the so-called
tyrants. “When the rule of the Greek tyrants ended, as it usually did after quite a short
period, of a generation or two, hereditary aristocratic dominance had disappeared,
except in a few places, and had been succeeded by a much more ‘open’ society:
political
power no longer rested on descent, on blue blood, but was mainly dependent on the
possession of property (this now became the standard form of Greek oligarchy), and
in
many cities, such as Athens, it was later extended in theory to all citizens, in a
democracy.” A fundamental change, which isn’t hard to explain in terms of class
struggle. The classes at issue were, on the one side, the hereditary ruling aristocrats,
who were mainly the principal landowners and entirely monopolized political power;
on the other side, at first, everyone else, the “demos.” Some of the latter were quite
prosperous, but more common were the well-to-do and middling peasants, who are
often called “the hoplite class” because they provided the heavy-armed infantry of the
Greek citizen armies. They owned a moderate amount of property. Below them were
poor peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, petty traders, and wage-laborers.
What happened, then, is typically that the demos or some section of it revolted
against oppression and exploitation. At some point a capable leader emerged who
seized the semi-crisis for his own benefit, and after whom the old secure days of
aristocracy were over. Solon and Peisistratus were good examples of tyrants, in
Athens.
A considerable proportion of the hoplite class must have given support to the tyrants,
but they also came to power by means of mercenary forces or outside intervention
(e.g.,
by Persia or some other Greek city-state). –Once again, Aristotle understands the
significance of the class struggle. He contrasts traditional kingship with tyranny: the
former “came into existence for the purpose of helping the better classes against the
demos,” whereas tyrants arose “from among the common people and the masses, in
opposition to the notables, so that the demos should not suffer injustice at their
hands…
The great majority of the tyrants began as demagogues, so to speak, and won
confidence by calumniating the notables.” Good old-fashioned materialist common
sense, depressingly opposed to the current postmodern obsession among historians
with “complicating old narratives” etc., an obsession they don't realize is only an aid
and comfort to the ruling class and is so widespread just because it can get through
institutional filters by distracting from class struggle. If intellectuals are successful,
it’s
because they don’t challenge the powerful. (There are always a few exceptions, like
Howard Zinn—people who bypass the approved channels and speak directly to the
public.)
After the tyrants came the great age of Greek democracy in the fifth and fourth
centuries B.C. Ste. Croix actually says that so-called tyranny was a necessary phase in
the development of many Greek states, because “institutions suited to maintaining in
power even a non-hereditary ruling class, let alone a democracy, did not exist (they
had
never existed) and had to be created, painfully and by experience, over the years”—
and
so in this sense “tyranny” helped pave the way for democracy, a new phenomenon on
the world stage (at least among thoroughly civilized societies). Democracy came to
exist
in scores of city-states, not only Athens; it involved majority vote of all male citizens,
even the propertyless—an extraordinary fact. Recall that even in the U.S. it took until
the mid-nineteenth century for such democracy to be well established. “The great aim
of democrats was that their society should achieve as much freedom (eleutheria) as
possible… Since public debate was an essential part of the democratic process, an
important ingredient in democratic eleutheria was freedom of speech.” Of course
there
was also equality before the law.
As in modern times, democracy was born through struggle on the part of the
unpropertied or less propertied. For centuries, “economic distress often drove the
impoverished to attempt revolution, with the aim both of capturing control of the state
and of effecting some kind of reallocation of property—most frequently in the form of
a
redistribution of land or the cancellation of debts.” The propertied, too, were wont to
attempt revolution, on the side of oligarchy. These “revolutions” were most likely to
be
successful when an outside power was called in by the revolutionaries, such as Athens
(to help install democracy) or Sparta (to install oligarchy).7 It seems, incidentally, that
Athens in the fifth century was possibly the only example in history of an imperial
power that sought to create or strengthen democracy in the areas it dominated, and
allied
not with the upper class but the middle and lower. Athens suffered from less overt
class
warfare in this period than many other poleis did because of its stable and secure
democracy; but you can see how bitterly the rich resented democracy and its leaders
(whom they often called “demagogues”) in the writings of Plato, Isocrates, Xenophon,
and others.
“In the political sphere, democracy barely held its own in the fourth century [the
300s B.C.], and in many cities outside Athens the class warfare which had already
become widespread in the last quarter of the fifth century became more acute…
Oligarchic and democratic leaders had no hesitation in calling on outside powers to
help them gain the upper hand over their adversaries.” That’s incredible: the fiercely
independent Greeks were willing to subordinate their independence to class
advantage!
Violent civil strife sometimes broke out between the classes. Tyranny, which had
become rare, began to occur again, suggesting an intensification of class strife. “Rich
and poor would regard each other with bitter hatred, and when a revolution succeeded
there would be wholesale executions and banishments, and confiscation of the
property
of at least the leaders of the opposite party.” Many among the propertied classes
wanted there to be a Greek crusade against Persia, since they thought this might
provide land and a new hope for people who could no longer make a living at home. –
This reminds me of what U.S. historians like Frederick Jackson Turner have argued:
the
vast, relatively empty Western lands in nineteenth-century America alleviated class
tensions in the East, by drawing away millions of potentially rebellious immigrants
and
giving them new opportunities. Apparently the same useful function of land was
recognized in ancient Greece. (And think of the Nazi obsession with Lebensraum.
Again,
it could lessen class conflict: one shouldn’t have oppressed and oppressors packed
together too tightly.)
By the time of Philip II of Macedon, Alexander the Great’s father, the
oligarchically minded all over Greece gave (treasonous) support to his conquest of
their
cities, because they understood he would be much more sympathetic to oligarchy than
democracy. And indeed, the League of Corinth that he and Alexander organized
prohibited redistribution of land, the cancellation of debts, the confiscation of
property,
and the altering of city constitutions. (America’s Founding Fathers, likewise, did what
7“In the early fourth century, Xenophon in particular always takes it for granted that when
there is a division within a city on class lines, the rich will naturally turn to Sparta, the demos to
Athens.
they could to prevent their elitist and rich-coddling Constitution from being altered,
by
making the process of amendment extremely cumbersome.)
So, the Hellenistic era. And then the suzerainty of Rome. In the early Hellenistic
period the lower classes (especially among the city-dwellers, less so the peasants)
may
still have played an important part in the life of their polis, but very soon “there
developed all over the Greek world a tendency for political power to become entirely
concentrated in the hands of the propertied class. This development, or rather
retrogression, was still by no means complete when the Romans took over, in the
second century B.C. The Romans, whose governing class always detested democracy,
intensified and accelerated the process; and by the third century of the Christian era
the
last remnants of the original democratic institutions of the Greek poleis had mostly
ceased to exist for all practical purposes.” Athenian democracy was effectively
destroyed by the Macedonian Antipater in 322/1 B.C. after Athens had risen up
against
Macedon’s rule and been defeated. The next fifty years were full of oligarchies,
uprisings, blockades, and constitutional changes; after further vicissitudes the Roman
general Sulla sacked Athens in 86 B.C., against “heroic and futile resistance” by the
demos. In general, though, the Romans and the Hellenistic kings didn’t treat the
Greek
cities they dominated in an overly oppressive manner. The kings, at least, rarely even
formally limited political power to a small class, feeling obliged to support democracy
because it was so well established by tradition.
Nevertheless, after the fourth century B.C. there were several common oligarchic
methods of subverting democracy. The first entailed control of the city Assembly by
royal officials, magistrates, and the like. Another, from a more long-term perspective,
was the gradual abolition of the popular courts (like the one that convicted Socrates),
on
which in a full Greek democracy all citizens were entitled to serve. The Romans
sometimes made constitutional changes to limit democracy, but more often simply
supported the local rich and encouraged them to take control of political life. As they
were only too happy to do. As usual, therefore, it was the rich who were most inclined
to be traitors or semi-quislings, or to cooperate in the subordination of their land to an
overlord, because that was a way to protect their property and power.
Ste. Croix anticipates a later discussion when he says, “The most significant
result of the destruction of Greek democracy was the complete disappearance of the
limited measure of political protection afforded to the lower class against exploitation
by the propertied, which became intensified in the early centuries of the Christian era
and was one of the prime causes of the disintegration of a large part of the Roman
empire between the fifth and seventh centuries [A.D.].” He also remarks that “modern
historians [characteristically] have shown little concern with this aspect of the
disappearance of democracy; and when they have noticed the disappearance at all,
their
interest in it has usually been submerged by attention to the supersession of ‘city-
state’
or ‘republican’ forms of government (which of course may be either democratic o
more on wealth rather than their status as patricians. It’s clear, in any case, that Rome
was never anything like a democracy.
As you know, the Republic succumbed to civil wars and Julius Caesar and finally
the Empire. How can all this be explained? Ste. Croix starts by mentioning the
populares,
like the Gracchi, Catiline, Codius, and Caesar, who were opposed by the optimates,
like
Cicero. The latter, of course, favored oligarchy and didn’t want concessions made to
the
“starving, contemptible rabble,” the “dregs of the city,” the “indigent and unwashed,”
the “dirt and filth” (as Cicero said). The former, while not really democrats, took a
more
populist stance, advocating debt relief, distribution of grain to the poor, agrarian
abolition of prerogative courts), and removed all impediments to the triumph of the ideology of
the men of property—the protestant ethic. There was, however, another revolution which never
happened, though from time to time it threatened. This might have established communal
property, a far wider democracy in political and legal institutions, might have disestablished
the state church and rejected the protestant ethic.’ The Levellers, the Seekers, the Ranters, the
Diggers, and other such radical groups represented the revolution that might have happened.
Similarly, in revolutionary France after 1788 a tension continually displayed itself between
radical democracy and ‘responsible’ representative government. The same conflict flared up in
1848, when the French workers and bourgeoisie fought together against the monarchy—
although, more accurately, it’s always the workers (and petty-bourgeois) who do the actual
fighting—only to part months later, when the bourgeoisie allied itself with the aristocracy in
crushing a threatened popular revolution. A similar phenomenon was evident in Russia in 1905,
with the workers fighting alongside the bourgeoisie though each distrusted the other. And in
1917, first the bourgeois revolution—exemplified by the establishment of the Provisional
Government—triumphed, and then the popular revolution did, exemplified by the events of
Red October, which were supposed by millions to have finally established the principle of
soviet democracy. [They didn’t; the Bolsheviks turned out to be just another elite that
suppressed economic democracy, this time in the name of ‘socialism.’ Stalinism was the long
term consequence.] Generalizing, it’s evident that in some cases the popular revolution fails,
which may result in a narrow parliamentary government, limited suffrage, and a liberal social
order conducive to the development of capitalism, while in other cases (e.g., Russia in late 1917,
China in 1949, and perhaps certain Latin American countries for a few years before the return of
capital-based authoritarianism), the popular revolution ‘succeeds’—at least it appears to,
temporarily—resulting in the suppression of landowners and capitalists. In 1917, the masses
had the resources, the numbers, the circumstances, and the (ultimately traitorous) leaders to
succeed, whereas in France in the 1790s they didn’t (because industrialization had not yet
begun, urbanization was in its infancy, etc.).” See, among many others, Christopher Read, From
Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution, 1917–21 (New York: Oxford
University
Press, 1996); Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution (New
York:
Viking, 1996); and Roy Medvedev, The October Revolution (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1979).
reform, and defense of democratic elements in the constitution. “The populares, then,
served as leaders of what was in a very real sense a political class struggle: a blind,
spasmodic, uninformed, often misdirected and always easily confused movement, but
a
movement with deep roots, proceeding from men whose interests were fundamentally
opposed to those of the ruling oligarchy…” Also relevant to the class struggle and
civil
wars was the fact that Rome was a great imperial power. Enormous wealth flowed to
Rome’s elite as a result of its rapacity and plundering abroad. As with modern
imperialism,9 the majority of the population received little direct benefit from the
conquests, and in some cases was harmed. As one historian says, in the Late Republic
the senators and equestrians—i.e., the nobility—who profited from the empire
did not use their newly acquired wealth for any economically productive
purpose; they spent it either on luxury goods or on the acquisition of land. Their
demand for luxuries encouraged a one-way traffic of imports into Italy, which
provided employment for provincial craftsmen and profits to merchants both
provincial and Italian. Their acquisition of land led to the pauperization of many
of the Italian peasantry. The Italian lower classes lost rather than gained by the
empire. Many of them lost their land and were recompensed only by cheap corn
if they migrated to Rome, or meager pay in the army.
Much of the Italian peasantry in this era was impoverished by military conscription,
which took them away from their productive activities; at the same time, the rich were
getting richer and dispossessing the poor from their land. Discharged veterans had
little
or no property to support them when they returned home. Being as short-sighted as
the
oligarchs of the twenty-first century—who are only destroying their power in the long
run by increasing it in the short run—the senatorial government refused to give even
the poorer legionaries land. “Consequently the loyalty of discharged veterans, and of
soldiers who knew they would otherwise be left without means on discharge, was
deeply engaged to commanders [like Marius and, later, Caesar] who could be relied
upon, in the teeth of senatorial opposition, to make land grants available to their
veterans… This gave the commanders irresistible strength.” (It was Augustus who
finally prepared the ground for a permanent standing army; and he and Tiberius ended
conscription, though it returned later.) What happened, then, were the civil wars,
between generals each with his own private army. Octavian—Augustus—was the
final
victor.
This is the kind of thing that happens when the rich get too rich and are given
too much license to do as they want. They dismantle or ignore rules that aren’t in their
universal one, from antiquity up to the twentieth century and our own day, is the
Platonic argument that only those people intellectually qualified and trained for ruling
should have power; others, while doubtless performing essential social and economic
functions, should stick to their (subordinate) calling, so to speak, and not irresponsibly
interfere with governance. As Noam Chomsky likes to remind us, this ideology was
shared by liberal American intellectuals like Walter Lippmann and Edward Bernays,
who helped found the public-relations industry (a euphemism for the propaganda
industry, as it was more honestly called in the early twentieth century). “The
bewildered herd” should stay out of the way and consent to being governed by “a
specialized class whose interests reach beyond the locality” (Lippmann). These ideas
aren’t always articulated, because they don’t sound very democratic, but of course
nearly everyone who participates in governing believes them. Their plausibility is
another question entirely, which at least partly has to be answered in the negative.
Certainly some training is required to govern, in some cases some specialized
knowledge, etc.; but when you reflect on how well and “disinterestedly” the powerful
in history have carried out their “sacred obligation” to rule benevolently, you begin to
doubt the soundness of the argument. If anything, the powerful have usually been
more
self-interested and short-sighted than their subjects, who, when they get the chance—
as
with the contemporary movement called “participatory budgeting”—regularly
determine the proper priorities of government far more effectively than the rich and/or
powerful do.
The Greek notion of natural slavery wouldn’t be accepted by most of the elite
now, at least not without modification, but it isn’t far from the Social Darwinism that
the rich love. It’s hard to imagine many of the privileged not agreeing with Plato that
“those who wallow in great ignorance and baseness” belong as slaves, or rather as the
lower classes. (Ironic that the great ignorance and baseness has usually been on the
side
of those who call others ignorant and base.) “Some people are born weak,” etc. Class
privilege manufactures such ways of thinking, because people are born to rationalize.
While the idea of natural slavery wasn’t widely accepted for very long, slavery itself
was rarely questioned in antiquity—at least according to surviving records. Even
Christians didn’t question it, with a few marginal exceptions. (As always, an ideology
is
adapted to material realities. It would have been odd if most Christians had questioned
such fundamental institutions as slavery and serfdom.)
Nor were the ancients (at least the “respectable” ones whose writings survive)
prone to questioning the rights of property. “It is property that confers rank,” Ovid
said. The Elder Seneca said, “It is property that raises to the rank of senator, property
that differentiates the Roman eques from the plebs, property that brings promotion in
the army, property that provides the qualification for judges in the forum.” Cicero
thought the primary function of a state was to protect private property rights. And
there are other examples. The Jews were different, because of their different
new set of social and juridical distinctions had arisen that were more important; and
these distinctions were, on the whole, class distinctions. “For all practical purposes
the
constitutional rights to which an inhabitant of the Graeco-Roman world was entitled
by
at any rate the early third century depended hardly at all upon whether he was a
Roman citizen, but, broadly speaking, on whether he was a member of what I shall
call
‘the privileged groups’: namely, senatorial, equestrian and curial families,10 veterans
and their children, and (for some purposes) serving soldiers.” The people below the
privileged groups were the lower classes, who possessed little or no property; and,
except for veterans and soldiers, who were of unique importance to the empire (its
ruling class) and so were worth protecting, the privileged groups had by the third
century become almost identical with the propertied class, i.e., those who could live in
relative leisure off the proceeds of their property.
There were several differences between the two groups. For one thing, according
to the “dual penalty system” the privileged received lighter punishments, for example
decapitation instead of crucifixion, burning to death, or being eaten by animals. They
were exempt from flogging and from torture (which was frequently used in court),
and
it was easier for them to avoid imprisonment pending trial. Evidence given in court by
members of the lower classes was accorded less weight than that of their social
superiors. And so on. These kinds of inequalities are of course almost universal in
history, and very much present in our own society. (Higher rates of incarceration of
black males for nonviolent crimes than white males, etc.) More pertinently, the legal
differences mentioned show it was becoming easier to exploit the humbler free people
than it had been in the past—and, again, exploiting them was also more necessary,
because the elite was becoming more directly dependent for its surplus on the free or
quasi-free people than the (diminishing number of) slaves.
It was expedient to develop these new, largely class-determined distinctions
because Roman citizenship, on which earlier privileges had been based, had, by its
gradual extension, long ceased to be a class-specific thing.
The fiscal burdens of the Roman state began to get severe in the reign of Marcus
Aurelius, between 161 and 180 A.D., because of ever more barbarian irruptions and
the
necessity to defend Rome. It was around this time that financial pressures on the
curial
order—to which belonged smaller landowners than senators—began to ruin some of
its
lower members. Public services of all kinds were demanded of them, which they
couldn’t afford. Their decline is shown by the fact that in the late fourth century the
emperors even made it permissible to flog them mercilessly, sometimes to death. The
richer ones might be able to finagle their way into the senatorial ranks—in part to
avoid