Katharina Bluhm, Mihai Varga - New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe

New Conservatives in Russia and East
Central Europe
This book explores the emergence, and in Poland, Hungary, and Russia the
coming to power, of politicians and political parties rejecting the consensus
around market reforms, democratization, and rule of law that has characterized
moves toward an “open society” from the 1990s. It discusses how over the last
decade these political actors, together with various think tanks, intellectual
circles, and religious actors, have increasingly presented themselves as “conser-
vatives,” and outlines how these actors are developing a new local brand of con-
servatism as a full-fledged ideology that counters the perceived liberal
overemphasis on individual rights and freedom, and differs from the ideology of
the established, present-day conservative parties of Western Europe. Overall, the
book argues that the “renaissance of conservatism” in these countries represents
variations on a new, illiberal conservatism that aims to re-establish a strong state
sovereignty defining and pursuing a national path of development.
Katharina Bluhm is Professor of Sociology at the Freie Universität, Berlin.
Mihai Varga is Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Institute for East Euro-
pean Studies at the Freie Universität, Berlin.
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New Conservatives in Russia
and East Central Europe
Edited by Katharina Bluhm and

Mihai Varga
First published 2019
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Contents
List of illustrations vii

Notes on contributors viii
Acknowledgments xii
1 Introduction: toward a new illiberal conservatism in Russia

and East Central Europe 1
K atharina B luhm and M ihai V arga
Part I
Genealogies 23
2 Russia’s conservative counter-movement: genesis, actors,

and core concepts 25
K atharina B luhm
3 The universal and the particular in Russian conservatism 54

P aul R obinson
4 Against “post-communism”: the conservative dawn in

Hungary 70
A ron B u z og á ny and M ihai V arga
5 New conservatism in Poland: the discourse coalition around

Law and Justice 92
Ewa Dąbrowska
6 The national conservative parties in Poland and Hungary

and their core supporters compared: values and
socio-structural background 113
J ochen R oose and I reneus z P awel K arolewski
vi Contents
7 “Conservative modernization” and the rise of Law and
Justice in Poland 130
K r z ys z tof J asiecki
Part II
Translations 155
8 The limits of conservative influence on economic policy in

Russia 157
I rina B usygina and M ikhail F ilippov
9 The “Budapest–Warsaw Express”: conservatism and the

diffusion of economic policies in Poland and Hungary 178
Ewa Dąbrowska, Aron Buzogány, and Mihai Varga
10 Gender in the resurgent Polish conservatism 198

A gnies z ka W ier z cholska
11 “Traditional values” unleashed: the ultraconservative

influence on Russian family policy 223
K atharina B luhm and M artin B rand
12 Religious conservatism in post-Soviet Russia and its relation

to politics: empirical findings from ethnographic fieldwork 245
T obias K ö llner
13 Ready for diffusion? Russia’s “cultural turn” and the

post-Soviet space 260
S ebastian S C H I E K and A z am I sabaev
14 The emergence and propagation of new conservatism in

post-communist countries: systematization and outlook 280
K atharina B luhm and M ihai V arga
Index 296
Illustrations
Figures
8.1 Growth rates of GDP and household consumption 164
8.2 Russia’s economic power is shrinking (GDP constant 2010
US$) 168
Tables
6.1 Socio-economic differences among party identifiers of the
two largest parties: Poland and Hungary 119
6.2 Differences in attitudes and values among party identifiers of
the two largest parties: Poland and Hungary 120
6.3 Average probability of closeness to party for voters of parties 123
13.1 Politicization of moral conservatism and need of power
consolidation 261
14.1 Similarities and differences of new conservative thinking in
the three countries summarized 288
Contributors
Editors
Katharina Bluhm is Professor of Sociology with a focus on Eastern Europe and

Russia at the Freie Universität Berlin. She has published widely on the trans-
ition from communism to a market economy from a comparative perspective.
Among her recent books is a joint volume titled Business Elites and New
Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Europe (Routledge, 2014), in
which attitudes and normative ideas already play an important role. She has
also edited a book for Palgrave (2007) and regularly publishes in peer-
reviewed journals.
Mihai Varga is Senior Researcher at the Institute for East European Studies at
the Freie Universität Berlin and holds a PhD from the University of Amster-
dam. He works on the liberalization of post-communist economies and the
societal response to liberalism. His work has appeared in journals such as the
Journal for Development Studies, Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Nationalities Papers, and Journal of Rural Studies. He has also published a
monograph with Manchester University Press (2014) dedicated to labor’s
response to the privatization of the metal industry in Romania and Ukraine.
Contributors
Irina Busygina is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Higher

School of Economics in St. Petersburg. Her research interests include Russia–
EU relations, Russian politics, Russian foreign policy, comparative fed-
eralism, and regionalism. Her recent books include Political Modernization
of the State in Russia: Necessity, Directions, Costs and Risks, Moscow:
“Liberal Mission” Foundation (2012, co-author Mikhail Filippov), and
Russia–EU Relations and the Common Neighborhood; Coercion vs. Author-
ity, UK and New York: Routledge (2017).
Aron Buzogány is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of
Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life
Contributors ix
Sciences, Vienna, Austria, and holds a PhD from the Freie Universität Berlin.
His research focuses on comparative politics and policymaking in East
Central Europe. His publications have appeared in journals such as Demo-
cratization, Journal of Legislative Studies, Acta Politica, Journal of Common
Market Studies, and Europe-Asia Studies.
Martin Brand is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Sociology at the University
of Bielefeld, writing on welfare production in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
He studied political science at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Freie Universität
Berlin. Among other positions held, he has taught at the Institute of East
European Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin and edited the e-journal
Russland-Analysen.
Ewa Dąbrowska is a PhD candidate in the research group “Political Economy
and Transnational Governance” at the University of Amsterdam and the coor-
dinator of the research network “Prisma Ukraina” at the Forum Transregion-
ale Studien in Berlin. She holds a Bachelor of Arts and a Master of Arts in
cultural studies, and a Bachelor of Science in economics from the European
University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). She works on Russian political
economy, the new conservatism and economic nationalism in Poland and
Russia, and the role of money and finance in patrimonial capitalism.
Mikhail Filippov is Associate Professor of Political Science at Binghamton
University (SUNY, USA). He holds a PhD from the California Institute of
Technology. His research focuses on comparative politics, political economy,
and human rights. His publications have appeared in journals such as Journal
of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, Public Choice, Constitutional
Political Economy, and Europe-Asia Studies.
Azam Isabaev is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Peace Research and
Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). He studied Inter-
national Relations at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Before starting doctoral studies in Hamburg, he
worked as a researcher at the Center for Political Studies in Tashkent. His
dissertation is devoted to comparative research on Central Asian states’
politics toward Afghanistan. Among his publications are: Uzbekistan and
Afghanistan: Security Challenges Post-2014 (2014), and The Afghan Threat
to the Security of the Central Asian Nations: Myth or Reality? (forthcoming
in 2018), in Quenzer, Syed, and Yarbakhsh (eds.), On the Periphery: Emerg-
ing Scholarship on the Middle East and Central Asia (Lanham, MD: Lexing-
ton Books).
Krzysztof Jasiecki is Professor of Sociology at the Centre for Europe, Univer-
sity of Warsaw. His primary research interests include economic sociology,
political and business elites, lobbying and economic interest groups, social
dialogue and European integration. His publications include the co-edited
volume Reprezentacja interesów ekonomicznych i społecznych w Unii
x Contributors
Europejskiej (“Representation of Economic and Social Interests in the Euro-
pean Union,” Warsaw University Press, 2017) and Kapitalizm po polsku.
Między modernizacją a peryferiami Unii Europejskiej (“Capitalism Polish
Style: Between Modernization and the Periphery of the European Union,”
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2013).
Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski holds the Chair of Political Science at the Willy
Brandt Centre for German and European Studies, University of Wroclaw
(Poland). His main areas of research are European integration, EU foreign
policy, collective identity, as well as nationalism in Europe. His book publi-
cations include European Identity Revisited (Routledge, 2016), New
Approaches to EU Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2014), Civic Resources and
the Future of the European Union (Routledge, 2012), The Nation and Nation-
alism in Europe (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), and Citizenship and
Collective Identity in Europe (Routledge, 2010).
Tobias Köllner received his PhD in social anthropology in 2011 from the
University of Leipzig, with research on Russian entrepreneurs and their rela-
tions to Russian Orthodoxy. In 2006–09 he was a member of the research
group “Religion and Morality in European Russia” at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Social Anthropology. He is currently based at the Witten/Herdecke
University and a member of the Centre for Research on Transformation at
Otto von Guericke University in Magdeburg. He is the author of Practising
without Belonging? Entrepreneurship, Morality, and Religion in Con-
temporary Russia (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012) and has published in the Journal
of Religion, State and Society, Europe-Asia Studies, Archives de sciences
sociales des religions, Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropol-
ogy, and Anthropology Today.
Paul Robinson is Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International
Affairs the University of Ottawa. He is the author and editor of numerous
books on Russian and Soviet history, including The White Russian Army in
Exile, 1920–1941 (Oxford University Press, 2002), Aiding Afghanistan: A
History of Soviet Assistance to a Developing Country (Hurst, 2013), and
Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army
(Northern Illinois University Press, 2014). He is currently writing a history of
Russian conservatism.
Jochen Roose is a researcher at the German Institute for Urban Affairs in Berlin.
He holds a doctoral degree with habilitation from the Freie Universität Berlin.
His research interests are participation in social movements and other forms
of politics, political attitudes, volunteering, Europeanization, and research
methods. Recent publications are Social Movements and Social Theory:
Mutual Inspirations (2016, Wiesbaden, edited with Hella Dietz), Empirische
Sozialforschung (2016, Konstanz, with Helmut Kromrey and Jörg Strübing),
“How European is European Identification?” (2013, Journal of Common
Market Studies, 51(2)), “National Anti-austerity Protests in a European
Contributors xi
Crisis” (2016, with Kostas Kanellopoulos, and Moritz Sommer, Journal of
Civil Society, 3(13)). Other research has appeared in West European Politics,
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Zeitschrift für Sozi-
ologie, and the Greek Sociological Review.
Sebastian Schiek is Research Associate at the German Institute for International
and Security Affairs. Previously he was researcher at the Institute for Peace
Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. He studied Polit-
ical Science at the Freie Universität Berlin and received his PhD degree from
the University of Hamburg. His research interests are the dynamics of states
and regimes in Central Asia, state–society relations, and the role of external
actors in the region. Relevant publications include the monograph Contra-
dictory State Formation: Kazakhstan’s Conservative Modernization (2014, in
German, Baden-Baden: Nomos) and “Movement on the Silk Road: China’s
‘Belt and Road’ Initiative as an Incentive for Intergovernmental Cooperation
and Reforms at Central Asia’s Borders” (2017, SWP Research Paper 12).
Agnieszka Wierzcholska holds a teaching and research position at the Institute
for East European Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin. She studied history,
communication science, and French at the Freie Universität and at the École
normale supérieure in Paris. She is currently finishing her PhD on “Relations
between Jews and non-Jews in Poland: Microstudies on Tarnów, 1918–1956.”
Her academic interests are East European Jewish history, nation-building pro-
cesses in multi-ethnic regions, as well as current and historical debates on
gender. Her writings (both published and forthcoming) have appeared in
Holocaust Studies, Osteuropa, as well as in an edited volume published by
Palgrave (2016).
Acknowledgments
This book has grown out of a conference on “Eastern Europe’s New Conserva
tives: Varieties and Explanations from Poland to Russia” held at the Institute for
East European Studies of the Freie Universität in Berlin. The funding by the
German Research Foundation (DFG) made the inspiring gathering of scholars
from Central East, Southern East and Russia possible. After the conference, we
decided to concentrate on three central cases—Russia, Poland, and Hungary—in
order to study the frontrunners of the new phenomenon in more detail. Many
thanks to those authors of the book who did not participate in the conference but
were ready to agree to write a contribution within our conceptual framework.
We would like to record our thanks to all participants of the conference and
for supporting its organization, to Nadja Sieffert and Ina Mischke in particular.
The book would not have been possible without the substantial help from our
language editors Franz Zurbrugg and Alexander Locascio. Our thanks also go to
Lennart Jürgensen, Elena Reck, and Natalia Zhebrak, who did a great job in pre-
paring the texts for the publishing house.
Katharina Bluhm
Mihai Varga
1 Introduction
Toward a new illiberal conservatism in
Russia and East Central Europe
Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga
The return of conservatism

The western-driven wave of globalization that began with the liberalization of
financial markets from the 1970s onward, and strengthened even further with the
collapse of the Eastern bloc, has come to an end. It is widely acknowledged that
the financial crisis of 2007–09 represents the tipping point, even though it
seemed at first that the architecture of the financial markets—with economic lib-
eralism as its ideological frame—had survived largely unquestioned (Crouch
2011). It accelerated the much discussed “crisis of democracy,” becoming mani-
fest in a deteriorating relationship between what were once mass political parties
and their supporters. The further rise of China; Russia’s return to the table of
global powers; the unsolved crisis of the Eurozone: all indicate the tectonic shifts
that are well under way. The struggle over the future of existing institutional
arrangements has also become an ideological battlefield, seeing increasingly
developed arguments formulated by right-wing or even far-right forces.
This departure from the recent liberal vision of the polity as well as criticism
of market economies are often characterized as illiberalism, nationalism, and
populism. While these concepts highlight important commonalities, they do not
capture the sweeping contestation that liberalism now has to face. A central
thesis of this book is that we are witnessing a “renaissance of conservatism,” an
attempt to create a new, illiberal, and activating conservatism aiming to change
the status quo from within the capitalist order and the traditional cleavage
between left and right. This holds especially for East Central Europe (ECE),
where communism interrupted the conservative tradition of thought, and where
conservatism is being redeployed against communism and liberalism. The liter-
ature on Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (“Law and Justice,” PiS) and Fidesz (Fiatal
Demokraták Szövetsége, “Alliance of Young Democrats”), the right-wing parties
in power in Poland and Hungary, stresses that the agenda of these parties is more
systematic and comprehensive than the concept of “populism” would suggest.
However, there has been little research done so far to study the genesis of these
parties’ agendas and the conservative milieus and intellectual circles that have
given the political turn in Poland and Hungary its intellectual foundation and
legitimacy.
2 Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga
This is even more the case for Russia, where no populist party conquered
power in order to change the track of development. Many scholars have concep-
tualized Vladimir Putin’s official turn toward conservatism during the period
2011–13 in the context of the mass protests against his third presidency and acts
of election fraud as a cynical, eclectic, and populist attempt of an “authoritarian
kleptocracy” to stay in power at any cost (Casula 2017; Rodkiewicz and Rogoża
2015; Shekhovtsov 2017). In fact, Russia’s state-owned media and presidential
administration play quite skillfully with different narratives and identity con-
cepts such as “one-country-civilization,” “Russian World,” anti-Westernism,
nationalism, or traditional (conservative) values. Yet the focus on the official
turn to conservatism underestimates the groundwork carried out by conservative
milieus and intellectuals, and the discursive power conservative views have
developed in Russia.
The declared goal of the conservative intellectual circles in this region is to
challenge today’s Western economic and cultural liberalism while at the same
time opposing communism. This goes beyond a diffuse “sliding back” toward
authoritarian structures and mentalities. More than elsewhere, intellectuals and
moral and political activists involved are purposely re-inventing conservatism
and trying to determine the political agenda.
With Karl Mannheim (1955 [1936]) and Michael Freeden (2006 [1996]), we
argue that the new conservative thought has themes, ideas, and core concepts in
common that are related to its communist and post-communist past and reflect
severe disappointment with the results of the transition and the manner in which
Western integration took place. The references to neo-colonial theories, from
which new conservatives in Hungary, Poland, and Russia draw, can only be
understood in this context. At the same time their history, different geopolitical
positions, and weight have also produced decisive differences. Polish and Hun-
garian conservatives search for ideational alliances within Central and Western
Europe rather than further to the east.
This introduction proceeds as follows. The next subsection reviews major
explanations of the rise of illiberalism in the post-communist region and asks
why it is that illiberalism, in its conservative expression, emerged in Poland,
Hungary, and Russia and not elsewhere. We also clarify our focus on actors, net-
works, and key concepts of the new conservatism. We then argue why we think
that it is conservatism—rather than other conceptual alternatives—that more
plausibly captures illiberalism in these three countries and introduce our
approach, combining insights from the sociology of knowledge with scholarship
on social movements. We then end the chapter by presenting the outline of
the book.
Explanations for the rise of illiberalism

The dominance of liberal and neoliberal ideas throughout post-communist
Europe was formidable by all accounts: all countries but one (Belarus) sooner or
later in their transitional path implemented neoliberal ideas such as “increasing
Introduction 3
national competiveness” through the pursuit of “fiscal discipline,” an outward
economic orientation, and reliance upon markets for the allocation of goods and
resources (Ban 2016). Most countries also pursued the liberal political agenda of
ensuring free elections, strengthening civil society (initially with external,
Western support), building checks and balances around governments, and
passing legislation to protect minorities. In the words of one observer: “Liberal-
ism in this part of the world became an obligatory syntax of political thought”
(Trencsényi 2014, 136, citing political theorist Aurelian Crăiuțu).
Neoliberalism—understood as an approach to government claiming that
“unhindered markets are best able to generate economic growth and social
welfare” (Bockman 2013, 14)—boils down to an “identifiable set of economic
theories such as monetarism, rational expectations, public choice, and supply-
side economics” (Blyth 1999; Ban 2016, 10). It represents more than just a
“revived version of classical liberal economics” (Ban 2016, 9), since in contrast
to classical laissez-faire liberalism and later libertarianism, it does support the
continued existence and relevance of a minimal state that “would protect private
property, maintain order, and provide some protection for the poor. In spite of its
anti-state rhetoric, neoliberal policies were not meant to eradicate the state, but
rather to have forged a new kind of state” (Bockman 2013, 14). Variations
existed in the extent to which post-communist countries “embedded” neoliberal
policies through welfare spending, with the Baltic and Balkan EU member coun-
tries pursuing what was called a “disembedded neoliberalism,” while the Vise
grad countries generally followed an approach that combined neoliberalism
with—at least until EU accession—relatively generous welfare schemes (Bohle
and Greskovits 2012).
Several explanations have been advanced for understanding neoliberalism’s
rise to dominance in the region. First, post-communist countries started their
transition when neoliberalism was reaching its ascendancy (Appel and Orenstein
2016). Ideas of different inspiration were far less present and absent from the
advice extended by international organizations and in particular the Western
advisors that did extensive counselling of the post-communist reformers.1 Fur-
thermore, proponents of neoliberalism framed it as a promise not just about eco-
nomic well-being, but also about democracy and the rule of law (Crawford and
Lijphart 1995; Shields 2008), leading to the conceptual “great merging” (Ban
2014) of free market and democracy in the 1990s.2 Following a communist state
that had attempted to control all spheres of social activity, mistrust toward the
state was widespread and the large-scale retreat of the state a priority for the
reformers.
Second, Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1998, 73) document how neoliberal
reformers strengthened their position and isolated themselves from potential
challengers, most importantly by forging an alliance with the new managerial
class (in the case of Russia with the young oligarchs) around the “new ideology
of managerialism, monetarism,” and also by the means of selective welfare
spending in order to contain collective action (Vanhuysse 2006; Greskovits
1998). It has also been noted that neoliberalism bore a certain resemblance to
Marxism-Leninism, being a “holistic,” “revolutionary,” and “universalistic”
world view claiming to affect all spheres of life, and promising that, if adminis-
tered in the right dose, it would spur the growth that would trickle down to all
(Eyal et al. 1998, 74); it should therefore not come as a surprise that, as Eyal et
al. have claimed, there was a certain “overlap in personnel” between the “high
priests” of communism and those of post-communism. And precisely this view
is shared by new conservatives in the region.
Third, further contributions have emphasized that neoliberalism advanced not
so much through sheer coercion, but rather that its success throughout the region
was largely due to the existence of transnational academic networks that paved
the way for neoliberalism while rejecting other approaches, to “the hybrid and
dialogic origins of neoliberalism, rather than the arrogance and might of a
Western monologue” (Bockman and Eyal 2002, 336). While this process is
referred to as diffusion or translation (Ban 2016), Bockmann and Eyal followed
Bruno Latour’s criticism of diffusion and proposed instead the notion of “length-
ening networks” as a better metaphor for understanding the advancement of
neoliberalism.
How then could alternative ideas—openly challenging neoliberal tenets, and
often referred to as the illiberal backlash in post-communist Europe—emerge
and, in the case Poland and Hungary, win the support of major political forces?
Arguably, this is not just a matter of the extent to which liberalism was embed-
ded (Bohle and Greskovits 2012), as the embedding of liberalism hardly approx-
imates the contours of illiberal conservatism. First, illiberalism is actually quite
widespread, irrespective of whether or not the country in question belonged to
those countries in which reformers mitigated the impact of neoliberal reforms
through welfare spending. Second, even though power holders critical of liberal
tenets are present in several post-communist countries (Dawson and Hanley
2016), it is mainly in Poland and Hungary that they invested considerable efforts
in developing such criticism into a full-fledged ideological contestation of liber-
alism (and we would also add Russia to this group). Hence, the strength of con-
servatism cannot be simply seen in inverse correlation to the amount of
liberalism experienced by society. Poland as well as Hungary belonged to the
group that actually attempted to “mitigate and embed” reforms (although admit-
tedly not as much as the Czech Republic, as discussed further below). Conserva-
tism, on the other hand, is virtually absent from those countries that did the least
embedding of economic liberalism and saw extensive austerity programs follow-
ing the financial crises, such as Romania (Ban 2016), Bulgaria (Adascalitei
2017) and the Baltic states (Sommers 2014), notwithstanding the signs of illiber-
alism manifest in the political arenas of these countries (Greskovits 2015).
The weak institutionalization of political systems

Another approach in answering the question about the emergence of illiberalism
has been to reconsider the effects of transition and in particular the eastern
enlargement of the European Union. Thus illiberalism appears as the result of
Introduction 5
the lack of institutionalization of established political parties, showing that the
parties in power throughout transition failed to ensure the representation of
popular interests. This happened because post-communist political party systems
have been hardly structured by cleavages and barely enjoy legitimacy, and since
political party organizations have tended to be highly unstable (Powell and
Tucker 2014). Dissatisfaction with political elites and perceived corruption also
tended to be far higher in East Central Europe than in Western Europe (Dahlberg
et al. 2013), although the data suggests that if dissatisfaction alone were to
explain the rise of illiberal conservatism, it should have emerged in Romania
and Bulgaria, not Poland and Hungary.
Furthermore, while the European Union has initially been seen as having
made a crucial contribution to the spread of liberal democracy in the post-
communist area (Vachudová 2005), more recent contributions have doubted the
lasting impact of “Europeanization” (Coman 2014, 920). Rather than “Europe-
anization,” they document “concentration and abuse of executive power, a sys-
tematic political patronage and a plebiscitary interpretation of democracy”
(Tomini 2014), although until 2015 liberal democracy was perceived to be far
more “resilient” in Poland than in other countries (Tomini 2014; Brusis 2016).
Simply put, it was perhaps just a matter of time until the weak institutionaliza-
tion, deep divisions and volatility of political party landscapes would turn out to
be an opportunity for one “political partisan player […] to cement its predomi-
nance by degrading democratic competition,” as happened in Hungary from
2010 onwards (Kitschelt 2015; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). This expla-
nation, however, raises the question of what drives that “political partisan
player” and why such a player would attempt to do more than simply reverse the
liberal transition agenda by attempting to form a new national and international
model of political economy. Explanations stressing the weak institutionalization
of party systems also fail to address variation across the region: why are conser-
vatives politically successful in Poland and Hungary, pledging to pursue nothing
less than a “national-conservative revolution” in those countries while hardly
even present in the parliaments of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania or
Bulgaria?
The political economy of market reforms and transition

A broad comparative literature on political–economic transition and the different
ways in which post-communist countries mastered the economic transition from
plan to market suggests that the answer might reside partly in the extent to which
post-communist politicians could “embed” the market economy in the wider
society, and in which way they managed to integrate their economies.
In the Variety of Capitalism literature (VoC), the Visegrad countries—Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia—are sometimes called “dependent
market economies,” characterized by fast integration into Western and inter-
national value chains during the 1990s and an ensuing strong presence of
Western capital in key sectors such as manufacturing, banks, or media (Nölke
and Vliegenthart 2009; King and Szelényi 2005; Bluhm et al. 2014). Manufac-
turing investment in the four countries compensated for the deindustrialization
that took place in almost all post-communist countries after the breakdown of
the Soviet-led international economic system with semi-tech and semi-skilled
manufacturing jobs in highly modernized and productive subsidiaries of Western
companies. In Poland and Hungary, the strong presence of Western capital
sparked calls for something coming close to the re-nationalization of key indus-
tries, an idea later adopted by “national-conservatives” around the Kaczyński
brothers and Viktor Orbán. In the Czech Republic, such debates over the
Western presence in national markets have been under way since the Vaclav
Klaus-led government of the 1990s. However, this criticism then fused with
otherwise neoliberal ideas on social welfare, and Klaus could not realize his
version of a market economy “without social adjectives” because of resistance in
the former dissident elite and in the population, favoring a “social liberal”
approach to reforms (Orenstein 2001). In contrast to Poland and Hungary, Czech
conservatives largely excluded social protection from their agenda.
While the VoC approach might offer a hint about what facilitated the counter-
movement precisely among the leading transition countries Poland and Hungary,
the concept of “embedded neoliberalism” gives another. Many countries in the
post-communist region witnessed liberalism without embedding that is a com-
prehensive social policy aiming to mitigate the social impact of economic
reforms. For instance, in the Baltic countries reformers simply framed market
reforms as a matter of national survival (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). In
Romania, neoliberalism in the form of wide-ranging privatizations only reached
the country in the 2000s (Ban 2016), and only after an initial period of “embed-
ding,” meaning significant concessions to militant and vocal trade unions (Varga
2015; Varga and Freyberg-Inan 2015).
In contrast, Visegrad countries—including Poland and Hungary—witnessed
more “embedding” of market reforms, meaning higher levels of social and
welfare spending than other countries of the post-communist region, at least
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. For instance, in the Czech Republic such
“embedding” mitigated the impact of reforms by incorporating popular demands
for social protection into policymaking from the onset of transition (Sil 2013;
Orenstein 2001). However, Poland and Hungary could not reach similar levels
of embedded liberalism as the Czech Republic, simply because they did not
share with the Czech Republic a powerful left-wing trade union with strong
political support from left-wing parties without a communist past (Sil 2017;
Varga 2015). In Poland and Hungary, political forces on the left and right and
trade unions participated in liberalization and market reforms, while conserva
tives could largely dissociate themselves from the large welfare cuts and reforms
of the 1990s and 2000s. As a consequence, they developed an agenda around
defending national sovereignty from perceived Western economic and political
domination, recuperating the welfare state, and eliminating all traces of “com-
munism” (as outlined in the next subsection, this insistence upon “anti-
communism” is a further difference from the Czech Republic).
Introduction 7
To conclude, the rise of conservatism is largely an effect of how post-
communist countries embedded their respective market economies. However,
despite the political economy literature’s contribution to understanding the con-
tours of illiberalism, it shares with the “weak institutionalization” literature a
focus on variables mainly concerned with the actions of political parties. Yet, as
argued throughout this book, the emergence of a new illiberal conservatism is a
broader phenomenon, and specific conservative ideas do not simply emerge
within certain political forces, but rather within broader discursive fields, and
from the interaction between politicians, think tanks, intellectual circles, non-
governmental organizations close to the various churches, and the influence of
mobilization efforts or conservative civil society actors.
Civil society in ECE

Much of the literature on the sources of illiberalism studies these at the level of
political parties and of the institutionalization of a certain degree of representa-
tion of popular interests. A different and growing literature suggests that illiber-
alism might owe its rise not only to the dynamics of political systems, but also to
developments in civil society and the agency of social movements. Long before
the return to power of Fidesz and PiS in the 2010s, civil society in these coun-
tries showed a strong presence of what were referred to even then—at the begin-
ning of the 2000s—as “conservative” forces. Human rights advocate and scholar
Wiktor Osiatyński, for instance, referred to the network of organizations and
initiatives around Radio Maryja in Poland as the largest formation of Polish civil
society, “capable of engaging the commitment of millions” (Graff 2008). In
Hungary, the conservative “Citizens’ Circles” developed from 2002 onwards as
a reaction to the electoral victory of Socialists and Liberals (Molnár 2016);
already by that time, right-wing and conservative civil society forces showed the
strongest street presence in protests and demonstrations in Hungary (Greskovits
and Wittenberg 2013). It is important to note that a crucial point around which
illiberal conservatism organized in Poland and Hungary has been the defense of
the Catholic Church and the relevance of Christian precepts for their respective
societies. We would also add Russia to this group of countries, as the importance
of its Orthodox Church to conservatives can hardly be understated (see Bluhm
and Brand; Köllner; and Wierzcholska in this volume). Church and religious
organizations play a major role in all three countries in fostering a conservative
civil society that aims to counterbalance the idea of civil society in the 1990s as
a Western-financed lever for promoting democracy (Saxonberg 2016; Köllner
this volume; Graff and Korolczuk 2017).
One further major position around which these forces coalesced in Poland
and Hungary was the perception that liberalism, with its focus upon markets and
political institutions, ignores or even obscures problems that conservatives
deemed as important as political–economic ones, allegedly interfering with
liberal reforms: most importantly, issues of “transitional justice” (Stan 2009), of
how to deal with the communist past. Conservatives in general argued for
harsher and broader prosecution of former communist officials and secret service
personnel. While the Czech Republic quickly moved beyond this debate by
adopting a radical “lustration law” that was heavily criticized internationally at
the time, Poland, Hungary, and many other countries were far less resolute in
this respect, finding ways to “accommodate” past elites rather than preventing
them from holding public office. Consequently, the conflict over the culpability
and influence of former communists raged on in Poland and Hungary, “escalat-
ing mutual accusations and deepen[ing] mistrust among people” (David 2006,
365). These conflicts “eroded the post-1989 consensus politics,” led to the first
formulations of conservatism not just among politicians but also among intellec-
tuals, and even turned against former dissidents, accused of having had “aban-
doned the anti-communist platform” (Trencsényi 2014, 137).
To summarize, research into the causes of illiberalism and more broadly the
shape of democracy in ECE has either traced it back to structural factors such as
weak political party institutionalization, the path of economic integration after
the fall of communism and the conditions of EU enlargement, or to voter prefer-
ences and ideologies espoused by parties (Rovny 2015). It has generally
explored illiberalism as a phenomenon characterizing political parties and has
rarely focused on illiberalism within other social formations, such as civil society
and social movements. While the literature on civil society in post-communist
countries has documented the growing contestation of liberalism well ahead
of—or parallel to—the rise to power of illiberal politicians such as Viktor
Orbán and Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński, we still know little about the wider
discursive field that has facilitated conservatism, something explored throughout
this book.
How does Russia fit in? The re-ideologization of Russia’s

increasingly authoritarian regime
At first glance, the Russian turn to conservatism appeared to be triggered by a
completely different set of reasons. Russia’s “slide back” toward authoritarian
structures and thought occurred much earlier than in Poland and Hungary, and
well before opponents of liberal reforms united under the flag of conservatism.
The liberal system of checks and balances never really took off, and the window
of opportunity for a competitive party system—even a weak one—ended when
Putin took office as president in 2000. The neoliberal economic reforms were
contested from the beginning by greater sections of the elite, in particular during
the constitutional crisis of 1993, when President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the
country’s parliament by force. In the ensuing State Duma, the Communist Party
and the Far Right had the upper hand over pro-presidential forces. The sub-
sequent strengthening of the president’s power ended the experiment of intro-
ducing a liberal checks-and-balances system and stopped further reforms, while
the social situation of most of the Russian population did not recover from the
initial shock. Since then, the identification of liberalism with pure market liberal-
ism as the cause of the socio-economic disaster in the 1990s, along with the
Introduction 9
notion of the decay of statehood, have turned into strong narratives in Russia.
They incorporate diagnoses about the neoliberal reform agenda that are not so
different from what can be heard in Poland or Hungary.
Nevertheless, the ideology of managerialism and monetarism, as Eyal et al.
put it (1998, 74), continued to influence Russia’s hybrid regime. One of the most
important lessons Putin took from the volatile 1990s is that stable rule requires
macro-economic stability, limiting inflation through a strict control of the money
supply. That is why the Putin regime refrained from interfering with the restric-
tive monetary policy of the central bank despite ongoing criticism from conser-
vatives and communists. In his first term as president, Putin pushed through
neoliberal-inspired welfare reforms that had already been prepared under Yeltsin
(e.g. Cook 2007). Despite the Russian elite’s strong anti-Western sentiments,
since the mid-2000s the administration has increasingly turned to “neoliberal”
administrative techniques such as New Public Management or public–private
partnerships (Bikbov 2018).
The new “party of power” “United Russia” (Edinaya Rossiya), created in a
top–down manner in 2003, started with a strong anti-ideological attitude (Bluhm
in this volume) that allowed different approaches to economic policy. This atti-
tude fits the literature on modern authoritarian regimes that sees the lack—or
even avoidance—of a particular ideology as a key feature of such regimes
(Krastev 2011; Hale 2010). Hence, the emergence of conservatism as an active
opposition to the liberal reform project raises the question of why this kind of
“re-ideologization” has happened.
The literature offers two sets of explanations for this phenomenon—both are
related to the thesis of a pure instrumental use of ideology mentioned above.
First, the “re-ideologization” is supposed to compensate for the increasing uncer-
tainty of Putin’s regime after the financial crisis, the drop in the oil price, and the
colored revolutions that during 2011–12 even seemed to have reached Russia. It
was also supposed to compensate for Dmitry Medvedev’s failure to break out of
the development trap with liberal-inspired ideas about “conservative moderniza-
tion” (Trenin 2010; Shekhovtsov 2017, 80; see also Busygina and Filippov in
this volume). Second, Shekovstov (2017, 84) and others argue that “Russian
conservatism” became a starting point for seeking legitimation for Putin’s
regime in certain political camps in the West, including the Far Right. However,
this understanding acknowledges the conservative turn only when Putin offi-
cially referred to it in 2013; it tends to reduce the role of conservative intellectu-
als, norm entrepreneurs, and political activists to “ideologues for hire” or
believers that can be perfectly controlled from above. This view ignores the
emerging discursive field of Russia’s new conservatism: although supported by
the administration from the beginning of the 2000s (with ups and downs), it
became strongly connected to the fights within the Russian elite over Russia’s
future, and became rooted in an active conservative civic society and backed by
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) (see Köllner; Bluhm and Brand in this
volume). Despite the fact that attempts to make a stringent “quasi-state” ideo-
logy out of conservatism have failed, and that Putin himself still claims to be a
“pragmatist with a conservative bent” (Putin 2013), the creation of a conser-
vative infrastructure, networks and influence channels has had an impact on Rus-
sia’s foreign and domestic politics.
Defining conservatism
Modern political conservatism is a reflexive political ideology that distinguishes
itself from a conservative habitus or everyday mindset. The constructed nature
of modern political conservatism is apparent more than elsewhere in the post-
communist context. Western Europe conservatism was re-established as part of a
liberal order after the Second World War and is—although challenged by the
New Right—still deeply rooted within the West European party systems. This is
not the case in post-communist Europe. Although conservative thinking was not
totally absent during the period of state socialism, it was unreflectively embed-
ded in revolutionary rhetoric and could not distance itself from communist
ideology. The return of conservatism as an ideology in the region—or its “resur-
rection,” as some Russian authors put it (Makarenko 2016, 286)—since the
2000s is the result of intellectual work and political self-identification that also
allows the formation of alliances with other “conservatives” within and between
countries, and thus a highly reflexive process from the beginning. Its promoters
operate at different levels of ideas: at the level of analytical and ideational reflec-
tions on current situation and crises, the level of historical–philosophical tradi-
tion and identity construction, as well as on a quasi-scientific level of (self )
research into the phenomenon in the context of other conservatisms. It is often
authors who identify themselves as conservative that carry out research on new
conservatism in post-communist countries.
The first analysis of conservative styles of thinking provided by the well-
known sociologist of knowledge, Karl Mannheim in the mid-1920s, is an estab-
lished reference point for these authors. So is Samuel Huntington’s work on
modern conservatism (1957), stressing the situational and positional character of
conservatism as a counter-ideology to the “progressive” ideologies of
modernity—liberalism and socialism. This idea of conservatism as an intellec-
tual and political counter-movement to liberalism and socialism forms a key
frame for the new conservatism in the region.
The main criticism of new conservatives is directed against Western neo-
liberalism and the idea that political models can travel between regions and
countries. Furthermore, they also question an alleged alliance between neo-
liberalism and the political and cultural agenda of the so-called New Left: they
accuse this alliance of forgetting the old social questions in favor of identity
politics and the protection of minority rights. It is important to note that the
conservative response to liberalism and socialism does not exclude the incor-
poration of “progressive” ideas (Huntington 1957; Freeden 2006 [1996]). For
instance, the new conservatives in the three countries share with the Left the
conviction about the need of state redistribution. Orbán directs his notion of
“illiberal democracy” primarily against recent models of liberalism that have
Introduction 11
supposedly turned into the opposite of an original liberalism that truly
defended “freedom.”
Despite their positional and situational character, all versions of modern polit-
ical conservatism have some elements, themes, and motives in common that
form a specific “style of thought” (Mannheim 1955 [1936]) of conservatism and
that allow conservatives to identify themselves as such. In their perspective,
conservatives often stress the existence of national specificities, which they con-
trast with the universalist claims of liberalism and socialism. However, in order
to become a true counter-movement with mobilizing power across countries,
they need constitutive elements that overcome particularism. Melvin Thorne has
argued that all conservatives share a certain “intellectual core” around notions of
“human nature” as “unalterable and unchanging” and of an “objective moral
order” that is “real, immutable and eternal” (Thorne 1990, 8). George Lakoff has
shown that conservatives share a type of thinking around a “central model,”
allowing them to recognize themselves as conservatives despite tremendous
divisions among them. This model consists of a deeply moralizing approach to
politics, seeing only those social institutions as necessary that act as “strict
fathers,” disciplining individuals toward more autonomy rather than cultivating
their dependence (Lakoff 2010 [1996]). Michael Freeden (2006 [1996]) has
argued that modern conservatism possesses—like the “progressive” ideologies—
a set of ideas or “core concepts” (“natural order,” “tradition”) which varies in
terms of precise content but generally remains stable. These core concepts are
surrounded by other, more situational concepts, themes, and motives that help
create the impression of conservatism’s high level of heterogeneity. Three core
concepts stand out in particular: the concepts of change, natural order, and tradi-
tion. Conservatives share the idea that change is problematic if it does not aim to
restore or move closer to the “natural order.” The understanding of “natural
order” has varied tremendously, including diverse concepts as “God, history,
biology, and science” as the “anchor of social order” (Freeden 2006
[1996], 334).
Sociologists have criticized approaches to conservatism that stress the exist-
ence of “intellectual cores” (Thorne), a “central model” (Lakoff ) or “core con-
cepts” (Freeden) for assuming the “intellectual coherence” of the conservative
project rather than treating such coherence as something in need of explanation
(Gross et al. 2011, 329). We agree with this contention, but point to one major
explanation of such coherence, namely the efforts of conservatives themselves,
often sustained over decades. Lakoff for instance has argued that US conserva
tives have been working on achieving internal coherence, expanding networks
and influence, and developing ways to reach the wider population ever since the
1970s (Azab Powell 2003). Similarly, the intellectual coherence of conservatism
in ECE and Russia is the outcome of the conservatives’ sustained efforts at
expanding networks and disseminating their ideas.
There are many qualifiers for conservatism in the post-communist context,
such as “national,” “social,” “left” or “right,” “enlightened” or “responsible”
conservatism. What they share—although with varying emphasis—is the concept
of a “strong state,” meaning a high power concentration at the level of govern-
ment to the detriment of the checks-and-balances system of modern liberal
democracy. The preoccupation with state strength is the key to understanding
why the new conservatism is illiberal and authoritarian at its core (despite the
opposite claims heard from new conservative ideologists and politicians). The
notion of a strong state goes hand in hand with a deep skepticism toward liberal
laissez-faire. The new conservatives propose Karl Polanyi’s idea of a global
counter-movement against globalization that “re-embeds markets” into national
states and societies through national re-regulation and state-driven development.
The economy is therefore a major playground for the new conservatives,
although concrete economic approaches often differ. In contrast to the Gemein-
schaft (community)-romance on the far-right periphery in Europe and Russia,
conservatives accept the market economy and private property. They regard the
introduction of a market economy as a major achievement of transition, but one
that has to be better related to national values and standards, and which should
serve the overarching goals of the state and society (which are usually perceived
as identical). “Tradition” thus provides precisely the cultural program that guides
the perception of morally proper and socially acceptable behavior.
Conservatism versus populism and nationalism

The recent literature on the rise of illiberal thinking in post-communist Europe
and elsewhere depicts some of the concepts, themes, and motives of the new
conservatism using terms such as “populism” or “neo-nationalism.” There are
two reasons why we do not follow this path. First, “populism,” as well as
“nationalism” or “neo-nationalism” to some extent, are not self-designations, but
concepts coming from outside of the new conservatism. In contrast, the “resur-
rection” of conservatism in the region is a self-perception and should be taken
seriously as such, in the sense that it is worth looking into what these actors
understand by it. Populism in particular has become a highly politicized term
used by different sides in recent political battles, something that makes the use
of the term more difficult.3
Second, despite certain overlaps, populism and nationalism do not cover all
aspects relevant to grasping the new phenomenon. Populism is understood as “a
moralistic imagination of politics […] which opposes a morally pure and fully
unified, but ultimately functional, people, to small minorities” (Müller 2014,
485). While some see in it a mere “communication strategy” (Aalberg et al.
2017), it is nevertheless decidedly illiberal “because of its rejection of intermedi-
aries and institutions as well as the political discourse fostered by them”
(Aalberg et al. 2017, 12). Populism and nationalism are sometimes regarded as
“thin-centered” ideologies (Mudde 2004, 544)4, as “discursive” frames rather
than ideologies (Aslanidis 2016). Most importantly, nationalism and populism
both need “thicker” or “full” ideologies in order to achieve concrete political
goals and take the shape of concrete policies (Stanley 2008). What the concept
of populism therefore misses (to the extent that it fails to take into account more
Introduction 13
specific ideological formulations) is that the actors usually associated with
“populism” in post-communist Europe and Russia have a specific agenda, spe-
cific contents or concepts that go beyond the people–elite contradiction.
Furthermore, populism is almost exclusively applied to political parties: the
term is never used to denote think tanks, foundations, or any other organizations
or groups beyond political parties that do the groundwork for the new conserva-
tism. We therefore need a frame that captures illiberalism beyond the electoral
arena. “Illiberalism” per se is hardly a candidate: “illiberals” do not just reject
liberalism, but actively seek alternatives (which we intend to investigate). And
illiberalism can also characterize forces in the post-communist area that are not
conservative by self-definition, or that fall under the term of the Far Right. Thus,
while illiberalism seems to feature widely throughout the region, conservatism is
a particular contestation of liberalism.
Terms such as right-wing nationalism or neo-nationalism also feature heavily
in the description of post-communist illiberalism (Gingrich and Banks 2006).
“Economic nationalism” seems to have become an important answer worldwide
to the unsolved questions that the financial crisis left behind. A flurry of studies
dedicated to economic policies pursued in ECE demonstrates the relevance of
this analytical frame, even though some countries stick more to a neoliberal path
than others (Johnson and Barnes 2015; Ban 2016). The term “nationalism” is
often close but not exclusively related to conservative, right or far-right thought,
and is reconcilable with economic liberalism: the Baltic States, for instance, fol-
lowed a path of far-reaching economic liberalization in the 1990s precisely under
the slogan of national survival (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Yet conservatism
includes ideas about social order that go beyond the notions of national identity,
history, and solidarity that nationalism usually praises. Moreover, nationalism is
primarily particularist and fosters rivalry between nations. Conservatives who
want to mobilize beyond their own national community often distance them-
selves from a “chauvinistic” nationalism of the Far Right, and pledge their dedi-
cation to a “healthy” and “tolerant” version of nationalism open to other national
identities.
Our approach
We see new conservatism as part of an expanding discursive field in which liber-
alism, at least in the 1990s, played the role of the “incumbent,” or dominant,
ideology. A “field” is a “space of conflict and competition” (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant 1992) and “consists of relationships between different ‘positions,’ with
various types of ‘resources,’ economic, symbolic, etc., flowing between them”
(Crossley 2003, 59). Discursive fields are “discursive terrain(s) in which
meaning contests occur” (Spillman 1995, 140) and that focus our attention not
only on the competing ideas and discourses, but also on the actors engaged in
their production and dissemination. We approach the discursive field of liberal-
ism and new conservatism as structured not so much by isolated actors and
organizations, but by “knowledge networks” (Stone 2005), understood as loose
groups of think thanks, media outlets, politicians or factions within political
parties, and university departments or holders of single university chairs that
engage in the production and dissemination of ideology, that is of a “political
conception of the world” (Mannheim 1955 [1936]).5 We are particularly inter-
ested in the role played in such networks by conceptual or “conceptive ideolo-
gists” (Marx and Engels 2010 [1845]), the intellectuals that have the capacity
and skills to take on the task of bringing together the disparate strands of criti-
cism vis-à-vis the present situation into ideologies, political conceptions of the
world.
Mannheim wrote of groups engaging in the production of knowledge as
“communities of knowing” and emphasized the importance of shared experi-
ences and the “rootedness of knowledge in the social texture” for the emergence
of such communities: political knowledge is not just a reflection upon (or “con-
templation” of ) distant events, but often emerges from concrete and often
resented collective experiences. The spread of neoliberalism among Central and
East European intellectuals, and in particular economists, harks back to their
resentment over communist state bureaucracies (Bockman and Eyal 2002).
Similarly, conservatism has re-emerged as an intellectual and political current
out of experiences such as Russia’s loss of international influence and prestige
following the fall of the Soviet Union. In the case of conservatives in Poland
and Hungary, it has emerged out of the resentment over the liberals’ failure
to do justice to post-communist societies by pursuing a thorough condemnation
of communism and of what conservatives perceived as its internationalist
legacy.
In such processes of knowledge production and reflection upon collective
experiences, societal actors actually do more than simply collect and reflect upon
the information and events around them: they also develop frames, that is “inter-
pretive schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences
of action in one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137).
For Mannheim, the development of ideologies such as conservatism start from
“definitions of the situation,” that is “meaning-giving, evaluating definition[s]”
producing “situation[s] where activity and counter-activity are distinguishable,
and the totality of events are articulated into a process” (Mannheim 1955 [1936],
21). We take frames or “situational definitions” as a starting point in our empiri-
cal analyses, helping us to structure the empirical material and the various “posi-
tions” that conservative actors take in their discursive field. We thus ask what
the starting point is in conservative criticisms of the post-communist period, how
these conservative critiques define the situation of their group and country, and
to which problems and actors they trace back their specific situations.6
In the context of the American conservative movement, George Lakoff has
argued that US neocons have mastered framing far better than their political
opponents, at least since the 1970s—for instance by framing taxes as an
encroachment on individual freedoms, a frame Lakoff considers more powerful
than the frame used by liberals that presents the payment of taxes as an issue of
Introduction 15
patriotism (Azab Powell 2003; Lakoff 2010 [1996]). Similarly, in ECE, the new
illiberal conservative framing of transition as a missed opportunity to undo an
unjust past eventually trumped the neoliberal framing of transition as an oppor-
tunity to catch up with the West (Trencsényi 2014). Furthermore, we refer to this
new conservatism in ECE and Russia as activating, because it challenges the
established post-1989 order, including the countries’ positioning in the inter-
national labor division.
To summarize, in this book we aim to research how conservatives develop,
recombine and adapt concepts under a broader frame of conservatism, and how
they struggle to achieve conceptual coherence in their positions. We build on the
notion of frame from the field of social movements research and pay attention
not just to the contents of discourses, but also to the networks in which they
emerge and which then circulate them. This focus opens up the ground for con-
ceptualizing the contested nature of conservatism. Thus, even though conserva-
tism has emerged in each of the countries we study as an important diagnostic
and moralizing frame, different groups and circles often disagree over important
aspects of conservatism, and have produced a heterogeneity of conservative
“positions” within the wider discursive field, making conservatism anything but
a monolithic ideology.
Chapter synopsis
Part I
Our book proceeds as follows. Russia is a key case for the rise and conceptual
development of the new illiberal conservatism, which is far from being the same
as “Putinism.” Hence, two chapters in this section are devoted to the Russian
case. In Chapter 2, Katharina Bluhm analyzes the emergence of a conservative
discursive field of think tanks, foundations, and media, and the core concepts of
the new Russian conservatism, which has become the dominant frame for
different groups and circles since 2003. She argues that the new illiberal con-
servatism emerges from two directions: first, from Putin’s administration and the
“party of power,” which was searching for an ideological label after the victory
in the 2003 elections. The second side—encouraged by the first one—consists of
ideologists and political activists who were concerned by the road Russia had
taken not only in the 1990s but also since Putin’s ascension to power. Putin’s
return to presidential office in 2012 led to a further expansion of conservative
infrastructure, which, however, did not pacify the internal elite conflicts about
economic models, the state’s role, and the concept of tradition.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that conservatism in general has a binary nature: it
can be seen as proposing a set of absolute, sometimes religiously derived values,
which are applicable to all people at all times; and it can be seen as promoting
the concept of organic development, which implies that there are no absolute
values and that each society should develop according to its own nature. Con-
servatism is therefore simultaneously both universalist and particularist. Paul
Robinson charts these two trends in Russian conservative thought. He argues
that Russian conservatives from the Slavophiles onwards have taken two
approaches to reconciling the universal and the particular. One has claimed that
Russia’s particularity is that it is the repository of universal truth, and has there-
fore insisted that Russia must defend its separate identity for the benefit of
mankind as a whole. The second has identified the universal good with the pro-
motion of national diversity. This second approach has therefore rejected uni-
versalism while at the same time preserved the idea that Russia has a universal
mission. In line with this logic, many Russian conservatives in the modern era
claim that the development of a multipolar world, in which nations protect their
sovereignty and defend their right to a separate path of development, serves not
only Russian interests, but also those of humanity as a whole.
In Chapter 4, Aron Buzogány and Mihai Varga take interest in the intellectual
contours of the illiberal project in Hungary and explore the writings and core
concepts of major intellectual figures associated with Viktor Orbán. They find
that what is central for Hungarian conservatives is the restoration of state author-
ity to define and pursue “national interests.” Focusing on the core elements of
the illiberal agenda and the main intellectual figures that formulated it, Buzogány
and Varga find that these elements were manifest long before the 2010 electoral
victory of Fidesz, and were heavily influenced by the Hungarian reception of
Western conservative writers. Ewa Dąbrowska reaches similar conclusions in
Chapter 5, in which she details the complex scene of Polish think tanks and
intellectual circles that formulated conservative ideas long before the rise to
power of Law and Justice in 2015, and examines their discourse. Using the
concept of a discursive coalition, she shows how conservatives formed such a
coalition following the electoral victories and corruption scandals of the post-
communist social-democrats. In response, they developed the positive vision of
a new, fourth republic featuring a strong state that is able to act and follow
national interest. She interprets the institutional changes enacted by PiS as con-
sistent with the conservative discourse, yet following a more narrow political
ideology.
It is important to note that much of what conservatives articulate in terms of
ideas is reflected at the level of the core electorates of PiS and Fidesz. This issue
is explored in Chapter 6 by Jochen Roose and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski with
the help of European Social Survey data. While religious orientation and a belief
in one’s own low political efficacy are common for both parties’ core supporters,
a strong valuation of tradition and homophobia are typical for Polish PiS sup-
porters but less so for Hungarian Fidesz supporters. Roose and Karolewski
further argue that both parties built their electoral success on problems of trans-
formative governance, such as high social costs for some social strata, a perfo-
rated welfare state, and the corruption of elites in connection with specific
scandals of previous governments. Krzysztof Jasiecki further develops the focus
on the PiS agenda in Chapter 7, taking particular interest in what the PiS means
with its “conservative modernization” strategy. Jasiecki sees in it an attempt to
respond to the “dependent market economy” that has emerged as a result of the
Introduction 17
transition and European integration. He explores how PiS politicians want to
overcome Poland’s semi-peripheral position within Europe by “strategic
coordination,” and explains the fundamental controversies surrounding its imple-
mentation and consequences.
Part II
The book’s second part focuses on the translation of conservative ideas into eco-
nomic and social political action, as well as across borders, between national set-
tings. Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov argue that despite the intellectual
build-up in the conservative camp, the conservative influence over Russian eco-
nomic policy remains limited, as Putin and liberal economists deem their pro-
posals unacceptable. The only exception—albeit a significant one—is increased
military spending, with the ambition of Russian military dominance in the world.
In contrast, Dąbrowska, Buzogány, and Varga observe that Polish conservatives
found considerable inspiration in the rise to power of Viktor Orbán in 2010 and
his use of heterodox economic policy. Examining contacts between Polish and
Hungarian conservatives and the reception of Hungarian ideas and policies by
Polish experts related to PiS, the authors conclude that Polish conservative
economic ideas in the 2010s were heavily influenced by Orbán’s policy
experiments.
Returning to Russia, Katharina Bluhm and Martin Brand also find consider-
able influence exerted by the new Russian conservatism over family policy.
Their focus is on an ultraconservative coalition of the Russian Orthodox Church,
civic organizations, and experts and politicians, demanding a return to a multi-
child family as social norm and the strengthening of the family as a fundamental
institution, against the individual rights of its members and the state. Despite
their growing influence, ultraconservatives are far from determining family
policy in Russia. Agnieszka Wierzcholska examines the Polish conservative
actors’ approach to gender roles and reproductive rights, and discusses how
Polish society has been polarized and mobilized over gender issues since PiS
came to power in November 2015. The author shows how a “war on gender”
became the “glue” that helped bring together various conservative actors. Here
too, the Church played a decisive role, opposing “gender-ideology,” targeting
sex education in schools, and calling for the strengthening of the traditional roles
of men and women.
Drawing on an ethnographic study, Tobias Köllner offers a bottom–up per-
spective on conservatism in contemporary Russia. In particular, he draws atten-
tion to notions of conservatism within Russian Orthodoxy and related activities
at the local level. In this way, he, too, rejects conceptualizations of conservatism
as being exclusively introduced and cultivated from above by Putin’s adminis-
tration. In contrast, the relation between the state and the Russian Orthodox
Church in contemporary Russia is perceived and described as a complex inter-
play of two powerful institutions that are engaged in both cooperation and
conflict.
Sebastian Schiek and Azam Isabaev further develop the prospects of conser-
vative transfers between post-communist countries by studying conservative
“transfers” from Russia to some of its neighboring countries in the Common-
wealth of Independent States. Their focus is the law “against homosexual propa-
ganda amongst minors” adopted by the State Duma in 2013, which they see as
an instance of “moral conservatism,” an ideological predisposition widespread in
the post-Soviet space. The chapter addresses the question of why the Russian
law and the existing links between Russia and its neighbors did not lead to a
domino effect, causing neighbors to adopt similar laws. Although moral con-
servatism is dominant in all former republics, its politicization and the interests
of political actors are crucial to grasping the diffusion process.
The last chapter concludes this volume by systematizing the key similarities
and differences found between the Polish, Hungarian, and Russian cases. Bluhm
and Varga argue that the broad picture emerging from the volume is that conser-
vatives contest liberalism not just in terms of rejecting economic liberalism, but
struggle to reaffirm and reorient state policies across a wide range of domains
from the perspective of national traditions. This has the effect of paradoxically
limiting alliances between Russian conservatives and their Polish and Hungarian
counterparts, who see their traditions as deeply rooted in the Western world. For
Russia’s new conservatives, the proclaimed distancing from Europe goes hand
in hand with an attempt to maintain and develop an ideational influence over
those actors in Europe who are perceived as potential allies. These, however, are
likely to be found more on the Far Right than among fellow conservatives in
East Central Europe.
Notes
1 For comparison, in the case of earlier transitions such as the Spanish one—Spanish
economists and reformers participated not only in networks imbued with neoliberal
ideas, but also German ordoliberal ones, at that time emphasizing relatively progres-
sive approaches to redistribution (Ban 2016, 23).
2 Before that decade, the dominant conviction was that democracy and free market were
not mutually reinforcing, but that instead there is a need to reconcile the two (Blyth
1999).
3 See for example Mouffe, who demands a new Left “populist” strategy to counter the
“populism” of the nationalist Right (Mouffe 2013). See also Müller (2015) for a dis-
cussion of the dangers of conceptional overstretch in the case of populism.
4 Mudde paraphrases the terminology used by Freeden in discussing nationalism
(Freeden 1998).
5 Similarly, Marlene Laruelle conceptualizes the “Kremlin” as competing networks of
knowledge production she refers to as “ideological ecosystems,” “each of which con-
sists of specific institutions, funders, patrons, identifiable symbolic references, ideo-
logical entrepreneurs, and media platforms” (Laruelle 2017).
6 See Varga (2014) for an analysis of social movement strategies with the help of “defi-
nitions of situations” in the context of post-communist worker protests.
Introduction 19
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Part I
Genealogies
2 Russia’s conservative
counter-movement
Genesis, actors, and core concepts
Katharina Bluhm
Introduction
The formation of a new illiberal conservatism in Russia represents a central—
and at the same time special—case. As in Poland and Hungary, this process was
already under way in the first half of the 2000s, and took shape with consider-
able intellectual dedication. The new Russian conservatives do not confront con-
temporary liberalism with “the truth” or the “general will” of the people, as
populists do, but intend to establish one ideology against another. Conservatism
and ideology are self-chosen terms. Conservatives nowadays in Russia, to the
extent that they refer to the classics of modern conservative research, place
themselves within the tradition of heterogeneous conservative thought that, as in
the work of Karl Mannheim, is characterized by a high degree of reflexivity, and,
as in Samuel Huntington’s work, constitutes a situational and positional counter-
movement to the great “progressive ideologies”—socialism and liberalism
(Averyanov 2006; Benediktov et al. 2014; Remizov 2006).
In this chapter the genesis, actors, and concepts of the new Russian conserva-
tism are analyzed. It originated from two sides which do not act without
evidencing some relation of tension with the other. On the one hand, the conser-
vative turnaround in Russia was initiated and supported “from above”—from the
center of power around the new president Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, it
is the result of a movement by intellectuals, political and moral activists who
often started from outside the political establishment, or even in opposition to it.
“The Kremlin” has co-opted some of these intellectuals and activists into the
elite, providing them with high and comfortable positions in think tanks, founda-
tions, and media, to work as “conceptive,” or conceptual, ideologists. According
to Marx and Engels “conceptive ideologists” make “the formation of the illusion
of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood” (Marx and Engels 2010
[1845], 60). The term works well in grasping the role of intellectuals in the
knowledge network of the new conservatism in Russia—even though ideology
represents more than just a cover for interests.
I use the terms “ideology” and conservatism as analytical tools and to refer to
the self-descriptions of promoters of the new conservatism. According to
Michael Freeden, ideologies are strategies for managing the underlying pluralism
26 Katharina Bluhm
of political ideas in all societies (Freeden 2013, 117). In this sense, they come
close to what the research on social movements calls “meta-frames,” a concept
originally developed in distinction to the traditional understanding of an ideology
as a class-based and coherent Weltanschauung (Benford and Snow 2000). Meta-
or master-frames are interpretative schemes that simplify the “world out there,”
combining diagnostic statements, prognoses and imperatives for collective action
(Snow and Benford 1992, 137; Della Porta 1999, 68). Meta-frames do not neces-
sarily refer to abstract political ideas, as ideologies do, but the framing concept
helps to understand the rise of conservatism as an influential interpretive schema
in Russia that was gradually enriched with ideational content.
I want to pursue three arguments. My first argument is that, since the 2000s,
conservatism has become the ideological meta-frame on the Russian political
and intellectual scene that—officially promoted—has unfolded its ideational and
organizing power in political discourses step by step. My second argument is
that the new Russian conservatism shows context-specific peculiarities but wants
to be attractive abroad. Its conceptual ideologists are contributing to the contours
of a new, more comprehensive illiberal conservatism that aspires to mobilize to
change the international order. This implies a strong sense of mission for Russia,
which has been frequent in its history (see Robinson in this volume). Leonid
Polyakov, a self-professed and rather “moderate” conservative political scientist
(Melville 2017) sees the country’s mission strongly related to the conservative
turn: “the fate of the world depends on the fate of conservatism in Russia”
(Polyakov 2014, 130). The growing influence of conservatism and its ideologists
has not, however—thus my third argument—led to a pacifying of the internal
elite disputes over Russia’s future path of development. Rather, the battles have
been drawn into the vortex of the new conservatism, which is far from being
monolithic.
At the center of this analysis are the conceptual ideologists and their position-
ing in the conservative field of the production of political ideas. The organiza-
tional activities and publications of these intellectuals form the basis for my
reconstruction of the core concepts of the new Russian conservatism. First, I
sketch the rise of the new conservative meta-frame and the institutionalization of
the conservative production of ideas in Russia. Then I analyze core concepts of
the Russian conservatives and the main variations on these. I conclude with a
brief summary.
From communism to conservatism: the production of a new

meta-frame
The “resurrection of conservatism” in Russia can be understood both as a con-
tinuous process and as a gradual development. According to the first reading,
conservatism was never completely gone. At the latest since Stalin, the Commu-
nist Party had continually been a “patriotic,” national-imperial party that linked
its progressive rhetoric to conservative values and cultural ideals. This legacy
prepared the ground for a new illiberal conservatism, but does not explain its
Russia’s conservative counter-movement 27
character. The second reading better reveals what is the new in the new Russian
conservatism. Its genesis is the result of an interaction between the ruling polit-
ical elite and conservative intellectuals and milieus. Political parties, especially
the new “party of power,” United Russia, and other parties supporting President
Vladimir Putin, are relevant. However, because in Russia party competition does
not work as a recruitment mechanism for political leaders, members of the
Russian elite also have other forms of organized influence and support, such as
think tanks, foundations, media platforms and journals, and political “clubs,” in
which conceptual ideologists, policy advisors, and moral and political activists
combine their analytical and discursive power. The number of such clubs, espe-
cially in Moscow, is a striking feature of Russia’s political-ideological scene and
is often part of the “para-political practices” (Sakwa 2010, 196) of the elite
circles. Elite members support or even create this kind of infrastructure in order
to gain public attention and influence the very top of government hierarchy. Yet
in doing so they have also provided the conservative knowledge network with
room and resources to continue and intensify its ideational and organizational
activities.
In turning conservatism into a new meta-frame we can identify the following
four key processes: (1) the return of the self-identity problem and thoughts about
geopolitical space; (2) the separation of statists from communism; (3) the forma-
tion and institutionalization of a discursive field of conservative ideology
production; (4) regroupings, radicalization, and counterbalancing within the field
of conservative ideologists that has gained greater influence over politics
since 2012.
National identity and space

The former, banned Communist Party and the new Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (CPRF ), which was re-established in 1991, were the strong-
holds of patriotic and nationalist forces in the 1990s (Reddaway and Glinski
2001, 31). Neo-Eurasians, Neo-Slavophiles, or Orthodox monarchists on the
other hand constituted only marginal phenomena on the political spectrum, and
not infrequently were on the side of the Communist Party against Yeltsin’s
reform course. Yet through them, a specific combination of geopolitical and
identity discourses re-entered the public debate. Central intellectual figures here
are the Eurasians Aleksandr Panarin (1940–2003) and Aleksandr Dugin (b.
1961), as well as the lesser-known Vadim Tsymbursky (1957–2009). In a pro-
grammatic essay after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tsymbursky proposes
considering Russia as an “island” which should develop in all its parts (not only
in its European part but mainly in the South and the East). In contrast to the Eur-
asians, he rejects a vision of Russia as the “heartland” of the entire Eurasian con-
tinent (Tsymbursky 1993). Conservatism plays an important role for all three
authors, but it is subordinated to geopolitical thinking.
Panarin, whose writing is clearly superior in intellectual quality to Dugin’s, is
the best-known representative of the New Eurasianism of the 1990s and early
28 Katharina Bluhm
2000s (Laruelle 2008). Many of his arguments are integrated into the new
Russian conservatism. The philosopher first supported Gorbachev’s perestroika,
but then, disappointed by Boris Yeltsin’s political and economic reforms, turned
to the Eurasian exiles of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as to the works of Lev
Gumilyov, which in the Soviet era formed a kind of bridge to post-revolutionary
Eurasian thinking.1 Panarin adopts the essentialist idea of Russia as a civilization
of its own, an idea that Neo-Eurasians share with Neo-Slavophiles and apply to
the new post-Soviet circumstances. Already in the 1990s he rejected Western
universalism as an illegitimate claim to hegemony and saw, after the breakup of
Yugoslavia and the Second Chechen War, “Russia’s salvation” only in a strong
presidential regime with authoritarian features (ibid., 88). He criticizes the global
division of labor, which post-Soviet Russia has entered, as “modern feudalism.”
Panarin defines the term “globalism,” often used in the conservative discourse,
as “democracy for a privileged extraterritorial few” who enjoy all the democratic
rights without “taking responsibility for the indigenous population” (Panarin
2014, 113, 745). He sharply criticizes liberalism as a system that tends to dis-
mantle the defense of the weak, referring in particular to neoliberalism and
liberal democracy, in which nihilism, consumerism, and hedonism rule, while
faithfulness, sacrifice, and dedication have no place (ibid., 113, 201). Panarin
does not entirely oppose capitalism (preferring a conservative, national capit-
alism) or modernity. On the contrary, he envisages the return to the “Enlighten-
ment on a new basis” that interprets humanity not according to a “Malthusian
model,” but as “creative producer” (ibid., 1095).
Unlike Panarin and Tsymbursky, Dugin was a political activist from the
outset. His close contacts with the European New Right, in particular in France
and Italy, date back to the 1980s and helped shape his Eurasianism (Umland
2009). From 1993–94 he moved out of the context of the Communist Party and
became chief ideologist of the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) until he broke
with it in 1998 (Laruelle 2008, 109). After several attempts to attain a place as
party politician in the Kremlin orbit during Putin’s first term, Dugin founded the
International Eurasian Movement in 2003 calling for “freedom and independ-
ence of Eurasia” from the West. In 2005 a Eurasian “youth organization” fol-
lowed. At the height of his academic career (2008–14) Dugin headed the Center
for Conservative Research at the sociology faculty of the Lomonosov Moscow
State University (MGU), where he also published his book The Fourth Political
Theory: Russia and the Political Ideas of the 21st Century (2009), which was to
give Eurasianism an explicitly conservative, anti-Western and anti-liberal
foundation. At the beginning of the 2000s Dugin not only managed to dominate
the newly awakening geopolitical Eurasianism, but could also build a bridge to
neo-Keynesian economists, who in the 1990s held positions in the Yeltsin
administration while growing increasingly dissatisfied with his reform course.
This was especially true of Mikhail Khazin, who joined the International
Eurasian Movement and made a name for himself in Russia in 2003 with a book
on the “end of the Pax Americana” that predicted a global financial crisis.
The separation of statism from communism
In the rise of conservatism to a dominant meta-frame, the separation of statism
from communism by the end of the 1990s was a decisive step. Though the deep
economic crisis of 1998 weakened the power of the oligarchs and again intensi-
fied the debate about the direction of economic policy (see Yakovlev 2014),
Yeltsin’s legitimation strategies remained within the anti-communist frame until
the end, while opponents more or less closely gathered around the new Commu-
nist Party.2 The mentioned separation occurred mainly during and after the battle
over the next presidential term in 2000, in which the alliance Fatherland—All
Russia (Otechestvo—Vsya Rossiya, OVR) emerged as a new challenger to the
Kremlin’s candidate Vladimir Putin over the succession to Yeltsin. Behind the
OVR there was a union of members of the elite that stood for a national path of
development outside the Communist umbrella. After their defeat, part of the
OVR joined the Putin-supporters’ party Unity (Edinstvo). This step has had two
outcomes: first, the fusion cleared the way to set up a hegemonic party, United
Russia (Edinaya Rossiya), and second, it led to a precarious alliance between
market-oriented liberals and statists within the newly founded official “party of
power.” As a result, United Russia received two-thirds of the votes in the parlia-
mentary elections of 2003, while the Communist Party lost its position as the
strongest party in parliament. In addition, the Kremlin privileged carefully
selected smaller parties as a “system opposition.” While Dugin could not
succeed with his project of a Eurasian party in this orbit, Sergey Glazyev, Sergey
Baburin, and Dimitry Rogozin fulfilled the mission of capturing the electoral
potential of leftist and rightist nationalist forces surrounding the Communist
Party and the National Bolsheviks with their newly created party Motherland
(Rodina) almost too well (Politkovskaya 2007).3 In the precarious alliance
between the different camps, Putin himself was perceived as a “liberal conser-
vative” linking a strong state and conservative values with an open market
economy (Polyakov 2000; Prozorov 2005, 135). Over the next almost two
decades of Putin’s rule, and in spite of the growing state control of large com-
panies and crucial sectors, key positions concerning economic policy remained
occupied by market liberals, that is, the ministries of economy and finance as
well as the central bank, which has become a point of permanent friction
between the various camps.
Time of manifestos: the emergence of a conservative ideological field

The new majority party United Russia was conceived with the intention of
reaching the widest possible voter constituencies in order to secure power per-
manently, and it therefore attempted to establish itself as a centrist or “catch-all”
party aiming at “transcending ideological myths” (Casula 2013, 5). The first
manifesto, “Path towards National Success” from United Russia, published in
April 2003, called for an “ideology of consolidation and solidarity” (United
Russia 2003), but the party presented itself as pragmatic-technocratic and
30 Katharina Bluhm
anti-ideological. At the same time, numerous political clubs, internet platforms,
magazines, and publishers sprang up that started to work on a new political-
ideological frame that they began to call “conservative.” Many intellectuals of
this new type, anti-communist as well as anti-liberal, were born in the 1970s and
therefore were too young to have held political office during Gorbachev’s per-
estroika. They quickly received indirect support from the presidential adminis-
tration, satellite parties, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
The new constellation of parties after the parliamentary elections of 2004, and
the success of Putin’s administration in strengthening the state against the
regions and oligarchs, triggered a broad debate in elite and intellectual circles
about the future path of Russia and the political identity of the centrist party of
power. This debate went far beyond United Russia. The writing of manifestos
for a new conservative agenda began with the “Memorandum: From the Policy
of Fear to the Politics of Growth” of the Seraphim Club in 2003 and was pub-
lished by the former editor-in-chief of the economic journal Ekspert, Valery
Fadeev, and the journalist Aleksandr Privalov. Ekspert was close to Vladislav
Surkov, the former PR chief of Yukos and then deputy head of the presidential
administration, who two years later formed a think tank around the journal, the
Institute for Social Projecting (Institut obshchestvennogo proektirovanniya)
headed by Fadeev. The Memorandum shares key demands with other opponents
of the free-market liberal course, which the authors would later frame as “liberal-
conservative”: the state has to engage in industrial policy and should employ an
intelligent protectionism and a favorable loan policy to promote home-based
industries and the new (bourgeois) middle class (Leontyev et al. 2003). These
themes are also found in subsequent conservative manifestos. The club quickly
disappeared because of incompatible positions among its members, whereupon
Fadeev and Privalov founded the Fourth of November, a better-known club
which was integrated as the “liberal-conservative platform” into United Russia.
Fadeev and Privalov later distanced themselves from the new conservative meta-
frame by trying to differentiate an “authentic liberalism” from the “false neo-
liberalism” of the 1990s, and by renaming the liberal-conservative platform a
“liberal platform,” without, however, gaining much success in internal party
battles (Dąbrowska 2017, 183).
The major wave of conservative manifestos appeared in the context of the
next parliamentary election of 2006. United Russia founded a second official
wing under Andrey Isayev that the party called the “social-conservative plat-
form.” In 2005 Isayev and other politicians of the party first founded a Center
for Social-Conservative Policy (Tsentr sotsial’no-konservativnoy politiki). In
2010 he published ideas for an “ideology of social conservatism.” Two years
later he brought out a document, “Program Theses for a Russian Social-
Conservative Union,” from which the social-conservative wing within United
Russia emerged (Isayev 2010; Tsentr sotsial’no-konservativnoy politiki 2012).
Isayev’s claim to the term “social conservatism” did not imply a carefully
drafted agenda in social policy but rather a quite general definition of conserva-
tism as the protection of values such as “freedom and responsibility,” “morality,
solidarity and justice” (Tsentr sotsial’no-konservativnoy politiki 2012). The core
ideas of the manifesto refer to a strong state as a developmental agent within a
market economy, which in consequence produces a greater social balance. The
social conservatives also advocated a speedy integration of Eurasia with Russia
“as its heart.”
Not only intellectuals and politicians from the immediate vicinity of the party
of power participated in the programmatic competition. As early as the spring of
2006, the young right-wing Orthodox intellectuals Egor Kholmogorov and
Arkady Maler, together with other journalists from the internet-project pravaya.
ru, composed a “Manifesto of Russian Conservatives. Imperatives of a National
Rebirth.” In seven points, they called for the formation of a National Conser-
vative Union. Initiating this call was the Rodina founder and member of Parlia-
ment Baburin, who after the dissolution of Rodina worked on the creation of a
new national-conservative party. In 2006 yet another manifesto appeared,
“Russian Political Conservatism,” by the political scientists Mikhail Remizov
and Boris Mezhuev, who also belong to the new generation of conservatives
(Brazhnikov 2006; Militarev 2006). This manifesto, published by the conser-
vative news agency APN, was not directly linked to party activities. Both authors
were editors at the influential internet journal founded in the early 2000s.
Kholmogorov and Remizov introduced themselves within the emerging field
of conservative ideological production in the early 2000s with a Conservative
Press Club, which published the journal Conservative that quickly disappeared
because of a lack of funding. Kholmogorov had then worked many years at the
Foundation for Effective Politics of the Putin supporter Gleb Pavlovsky, while
Remizov became an editor at Pavlovsky’s Russian Journal.4 In contrast to Khol-
mogorov, who propagates a “political Orthodoxy” as political religion (Knorre
2016, 22–6), Remizov (together with Mezhuev) pursues the idea of re-
establishing conservatism as a modern political ideology. The American conser-
vative tradition was an important reference here. At first, they were oriented after
the US “neocons” (neoconservatives), whose concept of market globalization
and US global leadership, however, they soon rejected. Today, Remizov and
Mezhuev acknowledge their affinity with the American “paleoconservatives”
who unite Christian opposition to abortion and homosexuality with a defense of
the market and a call for protectionist policies (Remizov 2006; Mezhuev 2007,
2014; O’Sullivan 2013, 306).
The most comprehensive program design, which completely breaks with the
character of a manifesto, is from the pen of the Center, later the Institute of
Dynamic Conservatism, founded in 2005 and located rather remotely from the
Kremlin. Between 2005 and 2007 a group of intellectuals, activists and church
representatives elaborated and discussed the text of “Russian Doctrine—a
Weapon of Consciousness,” which the authors understood as a key document in
the formation of a “new generation of conservatives.” Among them are the
founders of the Center, philosopher Vitaly Averyanov, publicist and economist
Andrey Kobyakov (co-author of Khazin’s book on the end of the Pax Americana
and lecturer at Lomonosov University), and the journalist Vladimir Kucherenko,
32 Katharina Bluhm
who under the pseudonym Maksim Kalashnikov produces at rapid-fire speed
extremely contentious literature. Averyanov, like Kalashnikov, was born in the
1970s and considers liberalism and conservatism to be fundamentally incompat-
ible (Averyanov 2006). Kholmogorov, Khazin, Remizov, and the well-known
TV moderator Mikhail Leontyev have contributed to the doctrine. The latter was
also involved in other manifestos. These authors note that Putin has not broken
the power of the oligarchs, so that the degenerating state is still a “committee of
oligarchical clans” (Russkaya Doktrina 2005, Part IV, Chapter 3, 9; see more in
detail Bluhm 2016a).
Significantly more supportive of the state is “Right and Truth: Manifesto for
an Enlightened Conservatism” by Nikita Mikhalkov, a well-known filmmaker,
actor, self-proclaimed monarchist, and Putin adherent. This manifesto first
appeared in 2010. The online publication was preceded by several years of
debate in a “conservative seminar” sponsored by the state Russian Cultural
Fund. It was published for the first time in book form in early 2017. In the fore-
word (2017, 6) Mikhalkov commemorates the revolutionary year 1917, saying
that after all of the national tragedies, “we have finally begun to live according
to the laws of normal human logic, without revolution and counter-revolution.”
None of these manifestos were embraced by United Russia or the ruling elite.
They could more easily agree with what Surkov proposed to the party. In Novem-
ber 2006 the journal Ekspert published the text from a speech entitled “Nationali-
zation of the Future” given in 2005 (Laruelle 2009, 145–8). In it Surkov famously
formulated the phrase “sovereign democracy,” which was included in the United
Russia party agenda of 2007. Interesting is what does not appear in his text.
Surkov, for example, does not use the word “conservative” or “conservatism,” nor
does he speak of “traditional values.” He stresses the need for an “open economy”
to make Russia competitive and strengthen its influence again in the world, and
warns against defining Russia outside of Europe (Surkov 2006). Only at its IXth
Party Congress in 2009 did United Russia officially adopt the political label
“conservative,” without, however, specifying a particular program.
Regrouping, radicalization, and counterbalancing

In Western perception, the new Russian conservatism is linked above all to
Putin’s open confession of “conservative values” in 2013 and his recommenda-
tion of selected Russian pre-communist conservative thinkers as required reading
for the Russian elite (Putin 2013a, 2013b). Putin has thereby placed himself rather
at the forefront of a movement. Nevertheless, his confession represents a qual-
itative leap. While before, the conservative political identity of United Russia was
formally and symbolically separate from the president, conservatism had now
received “a stamp of approval from the very top of the Russian government”
(Polyakov 2015, 6). At the same time, Surkov lost his position in the presidential
administration and, with that, the “liberal conservatives” lost a strong supporter.
Even if Putin still defines himself as a “pragmatist with a conservative bent,” he
has now publicly tied himself to conservatism (Putin 2013c). Since then, the
attempts by conservative circles and Duma MPs to throw out the “pseudo-liberal”
and “neocolonial” Russian constitution have been intensifying. An important
point of criticism is Article 13.2 of the Constitution, according to which “no ideo-
logy may be established as a state or obligatory one.”
The impression of a conservative “symphony” of the Russian elites and the
population in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation of 2014 (Melville 2017,
30–31) can, however, scarcely conceal the ongoing conflicts over the interpre-
tive prerogative of the new conservatism and its practical political consequences.
Though the Kremlin continues to invest in the conservative ideologists and
milieus, it also tries to keep them in check, especially since the patriotic mood in
the population has begun to cool down.
A regrouping of the Russian conservatives

After 2012 two new hubs of ideological production and dissemination were
founded around which different groups with few overlaps gathered. The first of
these hubs is the Izborsk Club, founded in September 2012. The founding mem-
orandum, Mobilization Project, Key Prerequisite for a “Major Breakthrough”
Strategy, sees Russia in a hybrid war with the West that will soon turn in an
open battle (Averyanov et al. 2012; see Bluhm 2016a). From this statement, the
authors deduce the need for a new national economic model, at the center of
which is the military–industrial complex. The prerequisite for the successful
geopolitical positioning of Russia should be a vast replacement of elites and a
patriotic mobilization ideology. The club was a strong supporter of the project
New Russia (Novorossiya), and has branches in several locations, among them
Crimea, Donetsk, and Moldova. Despite a basic loyalty to Putin, its criticism
of the elite is still massive. Its positions are regarded as particularly radical
by many observers of the new Russian conservatism (see Melville 2017, 31;
Laruelle 2017).
The Foundation – Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research
(Foundation ISEPR) forms the second hub.5 The ISEPR was established in 2012
out of an initiative of the presidential administration as a new analytical center
and promoter of civic projects, but also involves conservative manifesto-writers
who do not share the militancy of the “Izborskians.” The Essays on Conserva-
tism, published by ISEPR since 2014, are mainly concerned with the creation of
a classic canon of Russian conservatism, which is supposed to keep it compat-
ible with conservative thought in the West. Even if the editors and authors of the
Essays appear less radical, they see their potential allies in Western Europe not
in the established conservative parties, but in the New European Right and the
anti-EU left.
The Izborsk Club—nexus of radical ideologists and political activists

The Izborsk Club was established by the nationalist writer and political activist
Aleksandr Prokhanov, and the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, which
34 Katharina Bluhm
merged with the club. The founder of that Institute, Vitaly Averyanov (b. 1973),
has since then been one of Prokhanov’s two vice chairmen. The club has incon-
spicuous office spaces in Moscow, but an opulent website, a journal, and book
series, and is well connected with state and conservative private media.6 An
informal supporter is Rogozin, one of the founders of the first Motherland party
(Rodina) in 2003. After Rodina’s failure, he represented Russia at the NATO
headquarters and in 2011 became the first deputy prime minister in charge of the
defense industry – a position that he again had to leave with the new government
in 2018. In the autumn of 2012, Rogozin initiated a new Rodina in the Kremlin’s
orbit, but without assuming a leadership role in it. The club has also had the
benevolence of the Minister of Culture (since 2012), Vladimir Medinsky (b.
1970), who since 2017 has been a member of the Supreme Council of the United
Russia party.
The Izborsk Club represents the hitherto widest alliance of conceptual ideolo-
gists and political activists in the new illiberal conservatism. Although
Prokhanov and club member Dugin are sometimes excluded from the conser-
vative field as only “fellow travelers in modern Russian conservatism”
(Makarenko 2016, 258), the common ground on which the Izborsk Club unifies
its diverse members is “social conservatism.” “Social conservatism” they define
as an ideal “synthesis” of Russian statists (gosudarstvenniki) ranging from
“socialists and Soviet patriots to monarchists and Orthodox conservatives”
(Izborsk Club 2017). Prokhanov himself was born in 1938, yet the majority of
permanent members belong to the last “Soviet generation” born in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, and to the new conservative generation born in the 1970s.
Some of the club members hold distinguished positions within parties, gov-
ernment bodies, and in other organizational structures within the same or related
conservative knowledge networks. The economist Khazin (b. 1962), for
example, serves as chairman of the Economic Council of the newly founded
Rodina. In 2016 he was unsuccessfully proposed by the party as successor to the
deposed Minister for Economic Affairs, Aleksey Ulyukaev.
Glazyev (b. 1961), briefly a member of the Communist Party and one of the
founders of the first Rodina party, has been advising Putin on questions of
Eurasian integration since 2012 and is a member of the President’s Economic
Council, in which, however, the “system-liberals” have with the inclusion of the
former finance minister and their front figure again got the upper hand since
2016.7 After Putin rejected Glazyev’s attempt to become the next Chair of the
Central Bank of Russia (Ǻslund 2013, 383), he joined the National Financial
Board of the Bank. Glazyev is an initiator of the Stolypin Club, an assembly of
economists and business representatives calling for a “turnaround in economic
policy”– in line with the famous conservative reformer of the last Tsar and mer-
cantilist, Pyotr Stolypin. The Stolypin Club has turned into a new think tank
assigned by the presidential administration the task of developing an alternative
to the economic agenda of the Kudrin think tank, in support for Putin’s fourth
presidential term in 2018. They are trying to maneuver along a middle way
between Glazyev’s statists and Kudrin’s market liberals.8
Also belonging to the Izbork Club are several heads of established academic
institutions, above all the Moscow State University (MGU) and the Academy of
Science (RAN), of which Glayzev has been a permanent member since 2008.
The RAN has lost influence significantly since 1990, especially after organiza-
tional reforms of 2013 that eventually took away its formal independence. Still,
it has a relatively high reputation in society, with its economic and social science
sections often positioned in opposition to market liberalism.
For a long time, the only woman in this circle was Natalya Narochnitskaya, a
historian, former diplomat and Duma MP, now member of the new Rodina.
Since 2004 she has headed the Foundation for Historical Perspectives (FIP),
which follows the “principles of a nationally oriented conservatism” (Fond
Istoricheskoy Perspektivy 2017). In 2007 she founded the EU-hostile European
Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) in Paris.9 She receives funding
from, among other sources, the Russian President’s Foundation for her project
the Other Europe, which regularly holds contests for European and Russian
youth, calling its “partners” those from the Identitarian Movement and others
representative of the new European right. Further, she sits on the political
advisory council to the foundation Russian World initiated by Putin in 2007.
The think tank Katehon, founded in 2015, is also associated with the Izborsk
Club. Its founder is the former investment banker, billionaire, and TV station
owner Konstantin Malofeev (b. 1974), who conceived a role for Russia in
Europe modeled after the Vienna Congress of 1840. The militant-apocalyptic
figure of Katekhon, the “keeper” of the catastrophe or “world evil,” appears
repeatedly in Russian conservative-orthodox discourse.10 Glazyev and Dugin
serve on the board of the think tank, which promotes the “principles of a multi-
polar world” and a “Conservative Internationale.”11
The “moderate” counterweight

The Foundation – Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR)
is much more part of the government structure and therefore might rely less on
the kind of personal networking we see in the Izborsk Club. Its head is not an
ideologist, but a public administrator: Dimitry Badovsky (b. 1973), a political
scientist up until 2011 at MGU before being appointed to a position in the
Russian presidential administration, from where he moved on to the foundation’s
board of directors. He also served as a member of the Civic Chamber of the
Russian Federation (Obshchestvennaya palata Rossiyskoy Federatsii) and the
Russian National Front (Obshcherossiyskiy narodnyy front, ONF ), created in
2011 by the decision of United Russia in addition to the already existing Civic
Chamber, in order to support Putin for re-election. These structures supported
each other: the Foundation ISEPR initially got funding from the ONF and the
Civil Society Development Foundation, which was also created in 2012 and on
the board of which Badovsky sits as well, while the ISEPR itself funded research
and other projects. Over the years it has developed into a more analytical
think tank to monitor the realization of socio-economic strategies and initiate
36 Katharina Bluhm
“professional discussions” (see Institute for Socio-Economic and Political
Research 2017). The ISEPR’s board of trustees consists of the Minister for the
Development of the Russian Far East and other top officials from politics, soci-
etal associations, including the head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs and the Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions
of Russia, research institutes and others. Among them are Ekaterina Lakhova
from United Russia, who is the head of the Association of Russian Women and
hated by the ultraconservative family politicians for her support of sexual educa-
tion in schools and the protection of children’s rights in Russia (see Bluhm and
Brand in this volume).
One can only presume why the ISEPR began to publish the journal Essays on
Conservatism, concerned with the history of Russian conservatism. It is likely
that the state authorities did not want to leave the definition of “Russian conserv-
atism” to the Izborsk Club. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that for
two years the journal had organized a competition entitled “The Heritage of
Russian Thought—N. A. Berdyaev” (on the occasion of the philosopher’s 140th
birthday), one of the authors Putin advised the elite to read, but who was largely
ignored by the radical and Orthodox conservatives.12 The editorial board of the
Essays on Conservatism includes two manifesto writers of the younger genera-
tion: Mikhail Remizov (b. 1978) and Boris Mezhuev (b. 1970).13 Remizov, who
has been running the think tank Institute of National Strategy (INS) since 2006,
is by now a political advisor active on various expert committees close to the
government. Particularly noteworthy is his recent position as chair of the expert
council of the Military-Industrial Commission Board under the Russian govern-
ment, an important link between the administration and the military-industrial
complex.14 Under Remizov’s direction, the INS produced Conservatism as Rus-
sia’s “Soft Power,” a study financed by the ISEPR. Mezhuev, who teaches at
MGU, briefly became the deputy chief editor of the famous newspaper Izvestia,
which has been part of Gazprom-Media since 2008. In addition to his work as
editor of the Essays and as a university lecturer, he runs a website called “The
Russian Idea: A Website of Conservative Political Thought,” for which Remizov
also writes. Shortly after the US presidential elections, Remizov (2016a) was
quoted there as saying that Moscow has become the “capital of the Conservative
Internationale” and that the division of the world is less geopolitical than ideo-
logical in nature.
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the field of conservative

ideology production
The ROC, far from being a unified body, has not embraced the conservative
frame without internal battles. Yet under the Patriarchate of Alexy II and the
Moscow Metropolitan Kirill I, who became the next Patriarch in 2009, “tradi-
tionalists,” in terms of ideas and liturgy, clearly got the upper hand (Papkova
2011, 44). Already by 1997, they successfully lobbied for the principle of
the “four traditional religions of Russia” (Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and
Buddhism), by which the church managed to impose significant restrictions on
“non-traditional” religions and sects operating on Russian territory (Marsh
2013). Some observers interpret the appearance of the “Rodina” electoral bloc
on the political stage in 2003 as a result of the close collaboration between its
political leaders and the ROC (Papkova 2011, 163). However, the church has
carefully distanced itself from the idea of a political Orthodoxy, and concentrates
on its role as a conservative “moral norm entrepreneur” (Stoeckl 2016; see
Bluhm and Brand in this volume).
Nevertheless, the ROC’s authorities engaged in the institutionalization and
legitimization of the emerging field of conservative ideology production. High-
ranked representatives participated at least in the debates on the Russian Doc-
trine of the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism and Mikhalkov’s “Manifesto for
an Enlightened Conservatism.” The filmmaker has long been a member of the
presidium of the World Russian People’s Council (WRPC) founded in 1993 by
the then-officiating Patriarch of Moscow Alexy II. While a state foundation sup-
ported Mikhalkov’s initiative, the 800-page “Russian Doctrine” got its main
funding from sources close to the ROC.15
In addition, the publishing house of the Sretensky monastery in Moscow runs
an online journal, pravoslavie.ru, which was founded by Averyanov and, espe-
cially in the early 2000s, represented an important platform for the “new genera-
tion of conservatives.” The Sretensky monastery headed by Bishop Tikhon
(Georgy Shevkunov) is an influential center of ultraconservatism within the
ROC (Laruelle 2016). Tikhon—a famous filmmaker, bestselling author, and
Putin’s spiritual guide—is one of the two Orthodox bishops who joined the
Izborsk Club as permanent members. As a member of the Supreme Church
Council of the ROC he also has a seat on the Presidential Council for Art and
Culture (Papkova 2011, 48). Tikhon advocates the idea of a pravoslavnaya
derzhavnost’, sometimes translated as “Orthodox statism” (Hagemeister 2016,
6), but—as Irina Papkova points out—the term refers more exactly to Russia as
a great power, “with the renewal of Orthodox values as the source of the coun-
try’s strength” (Papkova 2011, 47). Neither the Patriarch Kirill nor Bishop
Tikhon promote the idea of a state church that would imply a subordination of
the church to the state, with consequences that they know only too well.
The linkage between the Izborsk Club and the ROC, however, exists not only
via personal ties, but is mediated by conservative non-profit organizations. The
Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, for example, not only authored the Doctrine
but also the program of another People’s Council (Narodnyy Sobor), which was
established in 2005, apart from the already existing WRPC of the Patriarchate.
Averyanov is still in the governing body of this “decentralized, grass-roots
citizens’ initiative and movement.” The new People’s Council unites more than
250 different organizations and has its own flag as well as a TV channel.16 The
Patriarch’s WRPC and Narodnyy Sobor collaborate from time to time with the
Union of Orthodox Citizens (Soyuz pravoslavnykh grazhdan) that Glazyev
helped to create during his first Duma term, 1994–95. The founders of the Union
of Orthodox Citizens espouse a rebirth of Russian statehood on the basis of a
38 Katharina Bluhm
united Russian Orthodoxy, with the intended inclusion of Belarus and Ukraine.
Even though Glazyev himself is no longer active in the Union, its chairman, the
publicist Valentin Lebedev, belongs to the group of experts in the Izborsk Club.
The “moderate” conservatives surrounding the ISEPR Foundation have less
notable links to Orthodoxy. There are no high-ranking church officials on its
advisory board. The sociologist of religion Aleksandr Tsipko is the board member
closest to the ROC. Tsipko is an associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences
and at the same time a state adviser to the Russian Federation for the Relationship
between Church and State. Since 2015 he has also assumed similar responsibil-
ities in the Synod’s department for state–church affairs of the Moscow Patriar-
chate. He is also an author and editor of the Essays on Conservatism.
Core concepts in the new Russian conservatism

According to Karl Mannheim and Michael Freeden, modern conservatism does
not restrict itself to a situational and positional counter-movement to the “pro-
gressive” ideologies, but is constituted by “thought styles” of its own (Mann
heim 1954; Mannheim et al. 1984), or by a set of concepts which vary with the
context and are combined with other ideas (also “progressive” ones). Freeden’s
(1996, 2013) three “core concepts” are of particular importance: the concepts of
change, order, and tradition. Modern conservatism is not about a return to a
romantic-transfigured place we long for, or the preservation of a status quo, but
about an organic, or natural, and controlled change that does not jeopardize order
and respects tradition (Freeden 1996, 344).
The linkage between ordered change and the renewal of tradition can be
found in many texts of the new Russian conservatism, and it seems to corres-
pond to Putin’s claimed “conservative formula (development on the back of
national traditions)” (Polyakov 2015, 19). Clear differences appear in the formu-
lation of this basic consensus, however, both in terms of what the current ruling
political elite is ready to implement, and in terms of differences among the con-
ceptive ideologists of the new illiberal conservatism in Russia.
“Conservatism for development”

“Conservatism for development”—thus the title of the book by Makarenko
(2016)—essentially means the return of the interventionist state as an economic
actor and the limitation of self-regulating markets. The state cannot be a “night-
watchman”—as is said time and again (see, among others, Avdeev 2014, 67;
Delyagin 2016, 261). Neither private property nor the capitalist market economy
are questioned here, to the extent that they are (nationally) embedded in the state.
What role the state should have in the economy, however, is controversial.
In 2005 the “liberal-conservative” political club the Fourth of November pub-
lished in Ekspert an “economic doctrine” for Russia, called “Return to Leader-
ship,” which sees its development opportunities linked to the global financial
markets and proposes the privatization of scientific and technical facilities, while
at the same time giving the state an important role in the redistribution of the
petroleum and gas industries’ profits to the high-tech sector (Gurova and Fadeev
2006). The program of a “conservative modernization” by the interim President
Dimitry Medvedev takes this line (see Lesnikova 2012; Samarina 2013). Though
today the Moscow journal Ekspert sounds much more patriotic than 10 years
ago, the skepticism of the “liberals” or “liberal conservatives” within United
Russia over state “dirigisme” remains (Kudrin 2017). For the “radical” as well
as “moderate” new conservatives, in contrast, “conservatism for development”
includes the return of a mercantilist state as a driver of economic development.
“Developmental states” in Japan, East Asia (in the 1980s) and China are seen as
role models. At the same time, attention is drawn to the development of state
capitalism at the end of the tsarist empire (for example, after Stolypin’s reforms)
(see, among others, Mikhalkov 2017; Remizov 2016b; Glazyev 2016; Cheban
kova 2016).
In their fight for the “developmental state” the new conservatives make use of
argumentative figures similar to those of the left- and right-wing moral anti-
globalization discourse (see Münnich 2017). A sharp boundary is drawn between
insiders and outsiders in the national community, understood both ethically and
socio-structurally. Outsiders are transnational corporations and “global financial
capital” as well as their so-called “compradors” within Russia who block a
promising national development model and do everything to degrade Russia
(Averyanov et al. 2012, 2014; Delyagin 2016; Glazyev 2016; Starikov 2011).
The domestic compradors include not only potential counter-elites such as the
assassinated Boris Nemzov and the lawyer and corruption fighter Aleksey
Navalny, but also parts of the ruling elite. The outsider–insider dichotomy also
allows the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate profit-making, i.e.
between irresponsible, exploitative financial capital on the one hand, and pro-
ductive, value-creating, (national) responsibly-minded entrepreneurship and the
“middle class” on the other. The new conservatives see themselves allied with
the latter. As in the “new moral economy” that Russian conservatives share with
other new anti-globalist movements, they argue expressly not primordially, i.e.
the transnational class is not equated with the globally acting Jewish financial
class as in the 1930s (see Giesen 1999, 397). Even though the epithet of “cosmo-
politanism” was synonymous with an anti-Semitic stance in the Soviet Union
and plays a role in Orthodox fundamentalism (Papkova 2011, 60–67), the major
focus of the conservatives is on a theoretical distinction of class. The new “trans-
national class” is formed by the quite heterogeneous social strata of the suppos-
edly ruling global financial elite, the management of transnational (American/
Western) corporations, the domestic “offshore oligarchs” and the “system-
liberals” around Kudrin. This class also includes the “creative class” that has lost
its roots in the national community, as well as the activists and professionals in
transnational organizations, including left-wing, globalization-critical “cosmo-
politans” such as human rights organizations and other NGOs. According to the
conservatives, such international activists and professionals support neo-
liberalism “culturally” and push forward a unilateral agenda of Western norm
40 Katharina Bluhm
transfer to Russia (Averyanov et al. 2012; Remizov et al. 2014; Glazyev 2016).
For the political debate within Russia, this claim makes liberal positions per se
illegitimate.
The sharpness of the polemics varies between the “radical” and “moderate”
conservatives. However, they agree that Russia’s unprepared opening-up to
global markets and the attachment of the state to the doctrine of the “Washington
consensus” is the primary problem of post-Soviet failure. In the study of “Con-
servatism as Russia’s ‘Soft Power’ ,” Remizov et al. (2014, 26) state that in all
countries “without exception” economic development and modernization were
preceded by a “long period of intensive protectionism,” and that they “only after
that began to move towards the liberalization of their commodity relations with
the outside world.” Today—not only for Russia but also for other countries that
are striving for development—it is not the liberalization of trade that has priority
but protectionism and the support for national business (ibid.). In addition, the
authors note that large countries (in contrast to small ones) tend to be “quasi-
self-sufficient” and avoid a narrow specialization which brings too much depend-
ence on external volatility (ibid., 27). “Modernization of the economy and
society”—thus Remizov (2016b, 107) continues the idea—“has never been and
will never be realized under conditions of a complete economic, political, social
and cultural opening to more developed markets.”
Conservative neo-nationalism in economic policy prioritizes state investment
in the domestic market, a targeted industrial and innovation policy, systematic
capital controls such as in Europe as part of the Bretton Woods monetary system
of 1944–73, as well as a growth-oriented monetary, fiscal, and credit policy
which lowers interest rates on loans to domestic enterprises. The core of the
dispute with economic liberalism is macroeconomic policy and the role of the
central bank, which, according to Glazyev (2016, 52), during the entire post-
Soviet period was governed by the monetarism of the “Chicago School.” Its
recipe for successful economic development—reducing inflation by limiting the
money supply, replacing government intervention with self-regulating markets,
and monitoring financial stability to uphold international creditworthiness and
the trust of foreign investors—is considered to have led to the “degradation” of
the country (ibid., 42, 260).
With regard to innovation policy, Glazyev proposes a comprehensive, cen-
trally organized corporatist system headed by the Russian President and ranging
from basic and applied research institutes to companies, regional authorities, and
non-profit organizations (e.g. for consumer protection), aiming to develop com-
petition as well as to monitor prices (ibid., 414) While Glazyev (2017) stresses
the need for a “harmonization of two principles”—“indicative planning” and
“self-organization of the market”—other Izborskians contemplate the need for a
(temporarily) militant “developmental dictatorship” in the lineage of Stalin (Sta-
rikov 2017) or Ivan the Terrible (Averyanov 2010), in order to overcome the
lack of state capacity and corruption that blocks economic and technological
modernization.17 Such ideas crop up even more suspiciously not only among
“liberals,” but also among “moderate” conservatives.
The neo-nationalist development program of the new Russian conservatives
does not mean isolationism. Remizov et al. (2014, 27) see Russia as an important
factor “in the struggle for just economic relations which respond to the true
national interests of the majority of countries.” Glazyev envisions a new global
“social-conservative synthesis,” that is, a just international financial and eco-
nomic system based on national sovereignty and reciprocally advantageous
trade. This would require a substantial limitation of the scope of action of market
forces (Glazyev 2016, 255). Both authors see the new international order based
on a few macro-regions. Theoretically, they refer to Wallerstein’s World-System
Theory, Friedrich List, and the French economic historian Ferdinand Braudel.
Russia should, according to Remizov et al., again create its own “world
economy” (Braudel), as an economically self-reliant part of the world capable of
a certain degree of internal self-sufficiency (2014, 28).
The sovereign state as nation or civilization-builder

The idea of an interventionist state is not necessarily an element of modern
conservatism. Conservatism can also, as in the United States, be accompanied
by a pronounced anti-statist sentiment, or even combine both at the same time.
Russian conservatives perceive themselves as gosudarstvenniki (“pro-state”),
as the “natural party of power” supposed to guarantee order and state-led eco-
nomic development (Makarenko 2016, 17, 245). With this, today’s Russian
conservatives are updating a well-known pattern of Russian thought when they
demand restoration of the “full”—economic, political, cultural—sovereignty
of the state and a return to a mythologized, pre-global Westphalian system
of co-existing sovereign states based on constitutional separateness
(Coward 2005, 858; Casula 2013). New is the link to the “neo-colonial” dis-
course. Development after 1989 is interpreted as “colonization by the West,”
from which Russia must free itself by re-inventing its own identity. The
“Russian idea” becomes in this regard an “anticolonial political practice”
(Markov 2014, 41).18
Yet, the state is more than a political, administrative, and military system. It
is elevated into a “central value” of Russian conservatism, even to the “highest
spiritual and moral value” (Makarenko 2016, 17, 245) or expression of the
fundamental value of Russian culture itself (Delyagin 2016, 261), which stands
in striking contrast to these authors’ assessment of the existing state administra-
tion. The Izborskian Delyagin, for example, criticizes “the ruling kleptocracy”
on the one hand, but on the other hand calls the state the only source of social
guarantees and justice, the security and unity of the country, the “organizer of
technological progress,” and even the “modern existential form of the essence of
the Russian people” (ibid.). The State means here first of all executive power
embodied by a strong leading personality (Remizov et al. 2014, 22). Their
Western references include Carl Schmitt’s “Leviathan” as well as the current
rightist and leftist criticism of post-democracy and post-liberalism (in the West),
but they have no sophisticated state theory.
42 Katharina Bluhm
An important line of differentiation within illiberal Russian conservatism
stands out with regard to the imperial tradition. Conceptive ideologists who
emphasize the imperial tradition of the Russian state also mostly see Russia as
an independent civilization that should form a new geopolitical axis with
Beijing, Delhi, and Tehran (see Russkaya Doktrina 2005; Averyanov 2016;
Dugin 2009). They consider Lenin’s nationality policy a severe mistake because
it introduced ethnic principles into the territorial organization of the multi-ethnic
empire and laid the ground for the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the
beginning of the 1990s. In a new book Doctrine of the Russian World, published
by the Izborsk Club in 2016, the authors demand the restoration of the Russian
state of the “imperial type,” i.e. the state should give culturally defined Russians
the status of a state-constituting people, and recognize its significance as the
“marker of civilizing identity” of the whole country (Averyanov 2016, 96–101;
2017a). At the same time their high esteem of the “symphony of cultures” within
the Russian civilization-empire refers mainly to the historic presence of Islam
and the other “traditional religions” in Russia (Izborsk Club 2017). The authors
distinguish this imperial concept of civilization from the “racist and chauvinist
nationalism” of Europe that promotes “separatism” (Averyanov 2016, 96–101).
The emphasis on the concept of civilization does not automatically lead to a
departure from the Roman Catholic legal tradition, as the differences between
Panarin and Dugin show (Laruelle 2008; see Dugin 2009). But in most cases the
image of a separate civilization includes the assumption of a fundamentally
different legal tradition. In the Russian Doctrine of 2005, the authors argue, for
example, that the “Russian model of statehood” should be built on the Greco-
Byzantine legal tradition (Russkaya Doktrina 2005, introduction, section 7, part
II). The head of the Russian World Foundation, Vyacheslav Nikonov (2016,
293), sees Byzantine law and the rejection of Western natural law as elements of
the “genetic code” of Russian civilization, which lends it its uniqueness.
The counter-design to the concept of civilization is less prominent in the
public discourses up to now, but can be found in Remizov’s work, who argues in
favor of a non-imperial Russian nationalism. Remizov considers the disinteg-
ration of the Soviet Union a “geopolitical opportunity” to stabilize the “Russian
space on a national basis” (Remizov et al. 2014, 119). Remizov understands
Russia as part of Europe, albeit as a particular or “other” Europe (ibid., 32;
Remizov 2016b, 120). Russian nationalism is fighting on two fronts, he argues:
against the “coming empires of the global world order of Antonio Negri and
Michael Hardt,” and also against the “phantom of its own past empire” (Remizov
2016b, 121). The conservative, non-revolutionary nationalism he demands is a
“developmental model,” combining cultural “holism” and sovereignty of the
nation, “national solidarity” (based on horizontal brotherhood, communitarian-
ism, and corporatism) with “national egoism in industrial policy.” He, too,
makes Lenin’s nationality policy responsible for the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, demanding a completion of Russian nation by a “standardization of
society based on the national (Russian) high culture” and through mass educa-
tion (Remizov 2016b, 106; Remizov et al. 2014, 20).
The understanding of Russia as a nation state within Europe, however, has
far-reaching implications for the legal system. Remizov and other “moderate”
conservatives see Russia explicitly committed to the European legal tradition
and thus, fundamentally, to the rule of law (see Tsipko 2014, 31; Makarenko
2016). This legal understanding, however, is by no means liberal, but is based on
republican and European conservative ideas. In this way he can reject the liberal
concept of contract law and natural law as “facade ideologies” of “political cor-
rectness,” which serve only minorities, without completely breaking with the
European and Western legal tradition (Remizov 2016b, 103; Delyagin 2016).
Normative unilateralism is thereby rejected less by reference to the distinctive-
ness of civilizations than as a violation of national sovereignty, because the West
had ceased to be the “driver of modernization” and is therefore no longer the
main role model anyway (Remizov et al. 2014, 16).
Karl Mannheim, in his analysis of the conservative style of thought in the
1920s, elaborated the thesis that the conservative understanding of order is com-
plemented by a “qualitative concept” of freedom that is different from the
“revolutionary-egalitarian” concept of liberty in liberalism (Mannheim et al.
1984, 114; Mannheim 1954). While liberalism propagates the economic detach-
ment of the individual from the state and social bonds, and sees the freedom of
the individual only limited politically by the “freedom and equality of the other
fellow citizens,” the conservative detaches the concept of freedom from the indi-
vidual and makes “comprehensive collective structures” and “organic com-
munities” the “true agency” (Mannheim et al. 1984, 116). The new Russian
conservative frame contrasts this in the opposition between freedom and eman-
cipation. For Remizov (2012, 74), freedom is participation in power and the
public sphere, that is, the “freedom of bonds,” and not the “freedom of emanci-
pation” (ibid.). Averyanov et al. (2014) similarly formulate, in a supposed
“reversal of the neo-liberal doctrine,” a differentiation of freedom from (indi-
vidual) emancipation:
1 instead of human rights: the righteousness (pravda) of ‘man’

2 instead of equating freedom with emancipation: freedom as sovereignty
3 instead of the personality of individualism: the personality of solidarity
4 instead of democratization: the real power of the people (majority rule and
freedom of peoples).
Despite the shared “qualitative concept of freedom,” the two authors differ with
regard to the relationship between individual and collective rights. While
Remizov emphasizes participation, Averyanov et al. shift the emphasis from the
level of the individual to the level of the collective that has to come first. The
necessity of a developmental dictatorship cannot be justified otherwise. This
position also applies to the Izborskians such as Dugin and Starikov. Arguing
against the Stalin-cult of Starikov, the Essays on Conservatism co-editor Tsipko
feels the need to recall the “intrinsic value of human life.” Tsipko regards the re-
interpretation of human rights as the “right of the people” a “fatal result of the
44 Katharina Bluhm
flourishing civilization discourse,” since it tries to subordinate individual
freedom entirely to the interests of the state, rather than seek a balance between
them. Worried by this development, he points to a strand of Russian conserva-
tism ignored by the “radicals”:
Either we take this liberal conservatism [from Berdyaev, Frank and Struve]
[…] and will have the power to recognize our problems, to find the forces in
ourselves for a moral renewal, and (at the same time) become western, but
with a better spirituality. Or we will again come up with the idea of a special
Russian civilization, close ourselves off from the West and die slowly this
time—completely.
(Tsipko 2014, 41)
Tradition between cultural constants and modernity

The latent tension within the conservative camp, between the representatives of
Russia as an Orthodox or Eurasian civilization on the one hand, and those
conservatives who see Russia as a (special) part of Europe on the other hand, is
reflected in the concept of “tradition.” In both versions, “tradition” draws from
the past a normative point of reference for social criticism in the present, of both
its own post-transformation society as well as the decadent West. The criticism
is concentrated in the concept of postmodernity as an exaggerated and degener-
ate Western modernity (see Averyanov et al. 2014; Dugin 2009; Remizov et al.
2014). However, what exactly “tradition” means differs considerably.
In their understanding of tradition, civilization theorists tend toward an essen-
tialist concept of an unchanged cultural core (a “genetic code”) that works in the
past, present, and future. In this sense, Dugin (2009, 20) defines tradition as
“religion, hierarchy, empires and family,” which he turns against both postmo-
dernity and the European Enlightenment as the basis of the first period of
Western modernity. While the (first) modernity was marked by increasing
tension vis-à-vis religious beliefs, the postmodernists face religion with indiffer-
ence. This makes it possible, Dugin suggests in his “Fourth Theory,” to ignore
both positions: “We believe in God, ignoring those who teach his death, just as
we ignore the statements of fools” (ibid., 22).19
Change is by no means excluded. For Averyanov (2006) the “dynamic
silence” is the “innermost essence of the conservative idea,” which cannot be
equated with “inertia” or “putting on the brakes.” The conservative became the
brakeman only when “traditional society was attacked by the virus of mod-
ernity,” which he had to face. He further argues: while Western Christianity
came to the “bourgeois phase of development” only after a “radical break with
its dogmatic and scholastic traditions,” Russian Orthodoxy is held to have been
always open to constant “socio-economic, political and cultural modernization”
(Russkaya Doktrina, 2005, Part 2, Chapter 1.3), which makes it even compatible
with the “Soviet tradition” at least since 1943 (Izborsk Club 2017). This combi-
nation of tradition and modernization allows the authors to predict a great
upheaval toward a new “high modernity,” which will leave behind the stages of
postmodernism and postindustrialism. However, a prerequisite for this is a
“transition from a compromise political ideology to the ideology of national
development and growth.”
While Dugin and Averyanov see postmodernity as an exaggeration of mod-
ernity and argue that the European Enlightenment has destroyed itself, the
authors of “Conservatism as the ‘Soft Power’ of Russia” emphasize rather a dia-
lectical break between modernity and postmodernity (Remizov et al. 2014, 8).
Remizov (2012, 71) speaks of the “re-actualization of the values of traditional
societies in modernity,” a “productive revenge-taking by the Counter-
Enlightenment” within modernity, which is, as it were, the “mission” of con-
servatism. But he and his co-authors stress the need of a new “successful
synthesis” of conservatism and the Enlightenment that restores legitimacy to the
modern concept of progress (Remizov et al. 2014, 8, 45). Traditions are there-
fore not just some eternal “constants” of a particular culture, but also what I call
“imagined classical modernity”—a normative starting point from which postmo-
dernity as a social and ideational process deviates.
The way, however, the two conservative camps criticize postmodernism is
quite similar and partly resembles what Ulrich Beck has called “components of a
traditionality inherent in industrialism” within the “first modernity” (Beck 1992,
14). The elements of the imaginary classic era of modernity include the tradition
of a normed family, the appreciation of hierarchy and religion, and an unques-
tioned belonging to larger collectives (class, nation), industrialism, scientific and
technological progress. The Russian conservatives regularly fall back on the
French structuralists in their criticism of postmodernism, but also on the post-
modern critique by Zygmunt Bauman, and Daniel Bell’s criticism of the decay
of “traditional work and family ethics,” who Remizov et al. (2014, 10) imagine
to be the “opponents of the New Left” of post-1968 and “their ideologists” such
as Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. Only this understanding of tradi-
tion explains why the Russian conservatives (and here they agree completely
with the illiberal conservatives in East and West Europe) combine such (at first
glance) different issues as “hyper-feminism,” biopolitics, the current human
rights discourse, globalism and environmentalism, consumerism or the
“McDonaldization” of education and culture (Remizov et al. 2014; Avdeev
2014; Averyanov et al. 2014; see Bluhm 2016b). Remizov et al. (2014, 11–19)
bring this to a point in a few pages where they distinguish three ideological and
societal transformations. First, postmodernity started a process of dehumaniza-
tion by transcending the boundaries of the “natural order” (as in LGBT rights,
transgender, pregnancy termination, genetic engineering and reproductive
technologies). Moreover, under the guise of “self-realization” and “self-
determination” (of women), the commodification of labor becomes total coer-
cion. Globalism, environmentalism, and human rights discourses aim to
de-sovereignize states, whereby environmentalism is not meant to deal with
the cautious use of natural resources, but is a Western ideology that functions
as a perfidious means of de-legitimizing the catch-up modernization of the
46 Katharina Bluhm
developing world. The concentration of the New Left on individual rights and
the identity problems of minorities ultimately led to the neglect of the social
interests of the majority of the population and thus to their de-socialization. Le
Pen’s “leftist conservatism” can thus be regarded as the main defender of the
social interests of the majority in today’s France (Benediktov et al. 2014, 84).
Conclusions
Richard Sakwa (2010) has described the Russian state as a “dual state” consist-
ing of the authority of a formal constitutional state and the actual administrative
regime permeated by diverse para-political practices and informal networks, and
in which “power” derives from the capacity to balance the strength of the two
pillars of authority, and keep different elite groups in check. For reasons of prag-
matic flexibility and inclusiveness, many scholars until recently regarded the
“lack of a real ideology” as a crucial feature of the rising new competitive
authoritarianism and Putinism (see Krastev 2011, 13). While some observers
notice the rise of the “state ideology” of a “Soviet Union 2.0” (Laqueur 2015),
others see the “conservative elite turn” as just a cynical facade adopted in order
to stabilize power (Rodkiewicz and Rogoźa 2015). In this case, the conservative
turn of Russia’s elite appears to be a populist exploitation and reinforcement of
growing patriotic sentiments in the population. Both views fit together, but
underestimate the importance of the fact that the Russian new conservatism is
the result of a broader movement of intellectuals and moral and political activists
who use the increasing room for maneuver and official support to further develop
their infrastructure, networks, and discursive dominance.
The new illiberal conservatism is far from being as official and coherent a
Weltanschauung as communism was, nor is it just a “Potemkin village” that can
be quickly dismantled (Rodkiewicz and Rogoźa 2015). The facade thesis under-
estimates three things: first, the seriousness of the intra-elite disputes over the
best path of development for Russia, in which a decisive group grew less and
less convinced that Western liberalism and integration was the right recipe for
Russia’s socio-economic modernization and for regaining its greatness. Second,
it overlooks the changes in ideology and knowledge production that cannot be
reduced to the musings of spin doctors or demagogues who have the ear of the
president. The development of conservatism as a new meta-frame that organizes
political ideas, discourses, and alliances rests on the creation and expansion of a
considerable infrastructure of think tanks, foundations, publishing and media
outlets that today outweighs the infrastructure of the Russian liberals. In addi-
tion, there has been an increasing presence of representatives of the first and
second generations of the new conservatives in the public and political adminis-
tration, and their backing by civic organizations. Third, the thesis does not take
the positional shifts within the Russian elite and Putin’s self-commitment to the
new conservatism seriously.
The new illiberal conservatism works as an effective meta-frame that struc-
tures political ideas, discourses, and knowledge networks not only in the narrow
group of the political elite, but also for the broader civil society. New Russian
conservatives combine a modernization discourse with ideas about the national
state’s “full” sovereignty, unconstrained by transnational agents enforcing roles
and norms, and cultural and moral conservatism relying on constant “traditional
values” and/or an “updated” notion of modernity. They intertwine the key
conservative concepts of change, order, and tradition in a new way. It is only
through the cultural and social underpinnings of political conservatism that it
turned toward what Freeden calls a “thick-centered ideology.” Yet in spite of
their growing influence and Putin’s commitment to conservative values, they are
still far away from determining the core elements of Russia’s economic and
social policy, which makes the ideological fight between the different groups
even more vicious.
The new Russian conservatives see themselves as part of an illiberal “Conser-
vative Internationale.” They promote the idea of a multi-polar world on the basis
of an imaginary sovereignty and cultural plurality, which includes an alleged tol-
erance of the other without “mixing and interference.” These components can
also be found in protagonists of a new illiberal conservatism in Eastern and
Western Europe. The peculiarity of the Russian conservatives, however, lies not
only in the way in which this particularism is culturally constructed, but in the
geopolitical mission the conservatives and large sections of the Russian elite
attribute to their country as a key player in establishing an equilibrium in the
new multi-polar world (Robinson, this volume). This role is not sustainable
without socio-economic development, so that the conflict over the “develop-
mental state” which permeates Russian history is just as bitter as the missionary
consciousness, especially toward Europe, which persists. And here all the differ-
ences between the conservative camps narrow down to almost the same thing:
Russia has the task of helping continental “post-Europe” rid itself of trans-
national structures, return to its roots, and find itself again.
Notes
1 Panarin taught in the 1990s at the Moscow State University. Shortly before his death
he received the Solzhenitsyn Prize for his book Orthodox Civilization in a Global
World (2002).
2 Malinova (2016, 146) gives 2003 as the year of this shift.
3 Although they were quite successful in that mission, the alliance of the three did not
last long and the party merged, after the re-election of Putin in 2004, with a new
Kremlin party—Just Russia.
4 The Foundation for Effective Politics was involved in Yeltsin’s (1996) and Putin’s
(2000) presidential election campaigns, and contributed significantly to the takeoff of
conservative projects in the early 2000s. Gleb Pavlovsky, one of its founders, also estab-
lished the Russian Journal, one of the early journalistic crystallizations of the new
Russian conservatism. Pavlovsky has become increasingly critical of Putin’s regime.
5 The foundation has representatives in Vladivostok, Kaliningrad, and Crimea.
6 The most prominent media representative in the club is journalist Mikhail Leontyev
(b. 1958), who since joining United Russia in the early 2000s has become a leading
political and economic commentator on First Channel TV, and has been, since 2014,
Vice-President for PR at Rosneft, today the biggest oil company in Russia.
48 Katharina Bluhm
7 The term “system-liberals” is often used in the Russian debate and stresses their
endeavor to reform the system from within, in contrast to an opposition from without
as a potential counter-elite. System-liberals are not necessarily proponents of a repre-
sentative democracy, as Busygina and Fillipov argue in this volume.
8 The economic-political wing of the Izborsk Club is also represented by the eco-
nomist and political scientist Mikhail Delyagin (b. 1968), who heads a one-man Insti-
tute for Problems of Globalization as well as the publicist Nikolai Starikov (b. 1970),
who is commercial director of the First Channel of Russian State TV in St.
Petersburg.
9 See www.idc-europe.org/ (accessed 5 December 2017). The IDC was founded with
another headquarters in New York that was closed in 2015 by the US authorities.
10 Dugin as a National Bolshevik in 1997 had already written a book entitled
Katechon and Revolution. His former adherent Arcady Maler founded a club at the
end of the 1990s which he called the Byzantine Club Katechon and the above-
mentioned Philosophical-Political Center Northern Katechon. The difference was
intentional.
11 See for example: http://katehon.com/de/agenda/konservative-international-le-pen-
besuchte-die-residenz-von-trump (accessed 5 December 2017).
12 Berdyaev, together with other famous Russian intellectuals, published the Vekhi
(Landmarks) essays on the revolutionary intelligentsia in the wake of the failed 1905
revolution. He was not radically “anti-Western,” and excluded two key references to
authors among the new conservative civilization theorists, Konstantin Leontyev and
Nikolay Danilevsky, from the canon of Russian conservatism.
13 Chairman of the editorial board is the above mentioned Leonid Polyakov (b. 1950),
from the Higher School of Economics (HSE).
14 Further, Remizov is member of the government Council of Experts of the Russian
Federation, as well as of the Commission of Experts on the Exploitation of
Antarctica.
15 The doctrine and the two-year discussion surrounding it was financed by the Founda-
tion of Russian Entrepreneurs, which, according to its own data, achieved this through
voluntary donations to social charity activities. Among the founders and owners of
this NGO is the eparchy of ROC in Yekaterinburg.
16 The Sobor advocates “for a healthy way of life and military-patriotic education of
youth,” and opposes “uncontrolled immigration, totalitarian sects, lawlessness and
corruption,” as well as any other action aimed at undermining the country, its
spiritual-moral values and culture” (see Kurtov 2010).
17 However, the veneration felt for Ivan the Terrible and Stalin as modernizers is similar
(see Averyanov 2010, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).
18 The concept of full sovereignty on the other hand, upon a closer look, refers only to
the centers of the “world economies,” which peripheral states join out of well-founded
personal interest or cultural proximity (Remizov et al. 2014, 35–43).
19 Since the early 2000s Dugin has presented his thoughts on postmodernity and post-
modernism in many lectures, talks, and texts. His views might therefore have had a
heavy influence on the way the concept is discussed in conservative circles. In a short
version he speaks of postmodernism as a “kind of freemasonry of the 21st century”
(Dugin 2007).
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3 The universal and the particular
in Russian conservatism
Paul Robinson
Introduction
In a lecture delivered in 1893, entitled “The Decay of Slavophilism,” Russian
historian and liberal politician Pavel Milyukov remarked that “[a]t the founda-
tion of old Slavophilism were two indissolubly connected ideas: the idea of
nationality, and the idea of its universal-historic destiny” (Milyukov 1893, 5).
The early Slavophiles of the 1840s and 1850s had developed a form of what is
sometimes called “conservative utopianism” (Leatherbarrow 2010, 111), which
was to have a significant influence on later Russian conservative thought. On the
one hand, they stressed the uniqueness of Russia’s development, its difference
from the West; on the other hand, they wrote of Russia’s mission to bring to the
rest of the world certain universal truths which Western Europeans had ignored.
In the Slavophiles’ minds, these two aspects of their beliefs were intimately
connected.
According to Milyukov, this attempt to mix the universal and the particular
failed. As a result, Slavophilism decayed, and in the second half of the nine-
teenth century “among the school’s successors, these two ideas went separate
ways,” producing on the one hand the universalism of Vladimir Solovyov and
on the other hand the extreme particularism, verging on moral relativism, of
Nikolai Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontyev. Russian conservatism became
associated with the second of these two trends, and thus became more and more
a matter of narrow Russian nationalism (Milyukov 1893, 5).
Milyukov’s lecture correctly highlighted the apparently contradictory
impulses toward the universal and the particular in Russian conservatism. But
his conclusion that the two parted company in the second half of the nineteenth
century is highly questionable. As this chapter will show, a belief in Russia’s
universal mission remained closely connected to ideas of Russia’s distinctive-
ness throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and remains so today.
This chapter examines the relationship between the universal and the par-
ticular in Russian conservatism from the time of the early Slavophiles through to
the present day. In the process, it shows how Russian conservatives have sought
to reconcile the two. It posits that Russian conservatives from the Slavophiles
onwards have taken two approaches. One has claimed that Russia’s particularity
The universal and the particular 55
is that it is the repository of the universal truth, and has therefore insisted that
Russia must defend its separate identity for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
The second has identified the universal good with the promotion of national
diversity. This second approach has thereby rejected universalism while at the
same time preserving the idea that Russia has a universal mission. In line with
this logic, many Russian conservatives in the modern era argue that the develop-
ment of a multipolar world, in which nations protect their sovereignty and
defend their right to a separate path of development, serves not only Russian
interests, but also those of humanity as a whole.
Conservatism’s binary nature

Conservatism is notoriously difficult to define, in part because it has what
Russian scholar Andrey A. Gorokhov calls a “binary nature” (Gorokhov 2016,
145). Broadly speaking, says Gorokhov, there are two primary ways of looking
at conservatism: “as a political-ideological phenomenon and as a cultural world-
view” (ibid.). Other authors have also described conservatives in a binary
fashion, albeit using different terms. Michael Freeden, for instance, identifies
two main elements of conservative ideology: (1) an “understanding of organic
change,” and (2) “a belief in the extra-human origins of the social order”
(Freeden 1996, 333–4). And Samuel Huntington distinguishes between conser
vatism as “an autonomous system of ideas […] defined in terms of universal
values such as justice, order, balance, moderation,” and conservatism as a “situ-
ational” or “positional” ideology “arising out of a distinct but recurring type of
historical situation in which a fundamental challenge is directed at established
institutions” (Huntington 1957, 455).
Gorokhov’s, Freeden’s, and Huntington’s definitions of conservatism are not
identical, but together do reveal a fundamental tension within conservatism
between two main strands of thought. The first strand regards conservatism as
resting on certain core, universal values, often seen as religiously based. The
second views conservatism as what Russell Kirk’s called “a way of looking at
the civil social order” (Kirk 1986, 25–8). The latter is most commonly associ-
ated with a belief in organic development, for instance, a belief that nations
should develop in a manner which accords with their own nature.
The first strands marks conservatism out as universalistic—the core values
apply to all people, at all times, and in all places. In the second strand, however,
there are no universal conservative values. Rather, as Kieron O’Hara puts it:
“The conservative wishes to preserve different things depending on where she is
located” (O’Hara 2011, 92). Or as Konstantin Leontyev wrote, “every nation’s
conservatism is its own: the Turks’ is Turkish; the English—English; the
Russian—Russian” (Chestneyshin 2006, 4). This strand is therefore particularis-
tic, as it suggests that each nation’s values are different.
To summarize, conservatism can be seen either as a set of universal values or
as a belief in organic development. Conservatism of the first sort is universalis-
tic, but conservatism of the second sort is particularistic. Yet the two types of
56 Paul Robinson
conservatism are often not clearly distinguished, and they are so wrapped up in
one another that it is impossible to say which is the “true” conservatism. The
binary nature of conservatism thus creates an almost inevitable tension between
universalism and particularism.
The Russian case
This tension is inherent to conservatism everywhere. Yet, there are some grounds
for considering that it may be especially pronounced in the Russian case. Con-
servatism is often viewed as having arisen in response to the French Revolution.
Russian conservatism, though, has a cultural as well as a political element, and
can be seen as a reaction not just to the French Revolution but also to the process
of Westernization launched by Peter the Great and to the gallomaniya (love of
all things French) so prevalent in the Russian upper classes in the late eighteenth
century. Russian conservatism has always been concerned with protecting
Russian national identity, and so has always had a strong anti-Western element.
To justify this, it has had to develop a philosophy which asserts Russia’s right to
a separate path of development. Particularism is thus inherent in Russian
conservatism.
At the same time, the particular feature, which Russian conservatives have
generally identified as distinguishing Russia from the West, and so justifying its
separate path, is Orthodox Christianity—in other words, a religion claiming to
represent universal truth. In this way, Russia’s particularism is founded upon a
universalistic claim.
Freeden remarks that reconciling “the fixed-core list approach to conservative
ideology with the positional one […] is the core challenge facing the student of
conservative ideology, as distinct from the conservative ideologue” (Freeden
1996, 335). Another way of saying this would be that the “core challenge” is
reconciling the particular and universal elements of conservative ideology. In the
Russian case, though, the tensions between the two are sufficiently strong that
the need for such reconciliation has extended beyond students of conservatism to
the ideologues themselves. Attempts to reconcile the particular and the universal
have, therefore, been a key element of Russian conservatism for at least the last
150 years.
Universalism in Russian conservatism

As mentioned above, universalism in Russian conservatism derives in the main
from Russian Orthodoxy. Christianity is by nature a universalistic religion, and
Orthodoxy considers itself to be the bearer of the true form of Christianity. As a
modern textbook on Orthodoxy says:
Papacy changed Christianity in many of its dogmas and teachings. It filled

it with human injunctions and errors, and false teachings and heresies.
[…] Orthodoxy is […] the Church which possesses Christianity in its
original form; her worship is unadulterated and genuine, and her teaching
unchanged.
(Tyneh 2003, 98)
Given that Russia is the most powerful Orthodox country in the world, it has, in
the eyes of some, a holy mission to preserve the true Christianity and in due time
bring enlightenment to the rest of humanity. Russian conservatism has therefore
sometimes acquired a messianic tinge. This can be seen by examining the trajec-
tory of universalistic thought in Russian conservatism from the time of the early
Slavophiles onwards.
The idea that Russia was the preserver of key universal values was an
important part of the initial Slavophile “conservative utopianism” in the 1840s
and 1850s. Through the Slavophiles this idea influenced Russian conservatives
thereafter. According to the Slavophiles, Western thinking was “one-sided”—by
which they meant that it had become overly rationalistic. It was felt that with the
works of Hegel in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Western
philosophy had reached its climax. Thereafter, it lost its ability to contribute
further to the development of history. By contrast, Russia had preserved “whole-
ness of spirit,” which “embraced reason and feeling, will and imagination into
something unitary, whole” (Brodsky 1910, xliv).
In addition, the Slavophiles believed that the West had become too individu-
alistic. Russia, in contrast, retained the spirit of sobornost’, which has been
described as “the ‘togetherness’ and ‘oneness’ of Christian believers, the collec-
tivity and unity which [the Slavophiles] believed could be found only in the
Orthodox Church” (Duncan 2000, 22), and which the Slavophiles felt was
embodied in the Russian peasant commune.
Through the example of its “wholeness of spirit” and sobornost’, Russia
would, the Slavophiles held, save the Western world from itself. As Aleksey
Khomyakov put it:
The West did great and glorious things. But […] the edifice of your faith is
crumbling and sinking. We do not bring you new materials to restore this
edifice. No! We do no more than return to you the cornerstone rejected by
your ancestors […]. Put back the cornerstone of this building and […] this
building will rise in all the grandeur of its sublime proportions to be the sal-
vation, happiness, and glory of all future generations.
(Khomyakov and Kireyevsky 1998, 114–15)
In this scheme, values are universal, and Russia’s mission is to enlighten Europe
with those values and so contribute to universal progress. “History is calling
Russia to take its place in the forefront of universal enlightenment,” Khomyakov
wrote (Christoff 1961, 198).
Similar views were held by the so-called pochvenniki (native soil conserva
tives) such as Fyodor Dostoevsky, who derived their name from their belief that
Russia’s ruling elite needed to re-establish its links with the Russian people and
58 Paul Robinson
their native soil (pochva). In writings from the 1860s onwards, the pochvenniki
argued that the West could not justifiably claim to be the bearer of universal
values. But at the same time they expressed the belief that such values existed
and were to be found among the Russian people. As Shatov says in Dostoevsky’s
novel Besy (variously translated as The Devils, Demons, or The Possessed):
Every people is a people only as long as it has its own particular god and
excludes all other gods in the world without any attempts at reconciliation;
so long as it believes that by its own god it will conquer and banish all the
other gods from the world. […] But there is only one truth, and therefore
there is only one nation among all the nations that can have the true God
[…] and the only “god-bearing” people is the Russian people.
(Dostoevsky 1953, 257–8)
In the Soviet period, similar sentiments could be found in the writings of émigré
Eurasianists. The foundational Eurasianist volume, Exodus to the East, stated
that the Russian Revolution had brought to light the “salvatory power of Reli-
gion” (Savitsky et al. 1996, 3). Through “its immeasurable sufferings and depri-
vations,” said Petr Savitsky in Exodus to the East, “Russia took upon herself the
burden of searching for truth, on behalf of herself and for the benefit of all”
(ibid., 6–7). Co-author Petr Suvchinsky also noted that:
Perhaps the Russian revolution, by its outcome, is even destined to redeem

all the blind, cruel, and presumptuous actions and acts, all the unpreced-
ented sins of the European war. […] The burning Russian flame is rising up
over the whole world […] every Russian, without exception, is infecting
peoples and lands […] and preparing unprecedented glory in the
coming age.
(Ibid., 28–9)
The writings and speeches of Russian thinkers and politicians of the post-Soviet
era contain similar claims about Russia’s messianic purpose. For instance, in a
1995 statement owing far more to nineteenth-century Russian conservatism than
to communism, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation,
Gennady Zyuganov, wrote: “Russia is the bearer of an ancient spiritual tradition,
the fundamental values of which are sobornost’ (collectivism), derzhavnost’
(state self-sufficiency), and the striving to incarnate the highest ‘heavenly’ ideals
of justice and brotherhood in reality on Earth” (Duncan 2000, 136).
Zyuganov is sometimes described as a “left conservative” (implying a combi-
nation of social conservatism and left-wing economics), but he has much in
common with “right conservatives” (who are strongly nationalistic) and “social
conservatives” (who champion “traditional values,” especially “family values”).
All of these, but especially the social conservatives, also share some of the mes-
sianic tendencies of the Slavophiles and the pochvenniki. According to Christo-
pher Stroop, “the Russian discourse of moral mission and the superiority of
Christian values to those of the ‘decadent’ West has played a key role in the
resurgence of social conservatism in post-Soviet Russia,” and is “bound up with
considerations of the role that Russia should play in the wider world” (Stroop
2016, 6). This social conservatism draws on earlier Russian thinkers’ ideas “that
absent absolute values grounded in unchanging religious truth, human morality
will decay and society will descend into chaos,” and that “Russia has a spiritual
mission to enlighten other nations” (ibid., 5–6). “This right wing iteration of
moral exceptionalism,” concludes Stroop, “entails a belief that Russia was given
a providential calling to revive the Christian root of European, or more broadly
Western, civilization” (ibid., 10). Connected with this is the idea of Russia as the
leader of a “Conservative Internationale,” promoting fundamental values
throughout the world. In a 2013 speech, Vladimir Putin remarked that “[w]ithout
the values embedded in Christianity and other world religions, with the
moral norms formed over thousands of years, people naturally lose their human
dignity. And we consider it natural and right to defend these values” (Putin
2013). Putin’s statement assumes that there are values which are held across cul-
tures. It therefore affirms the relevance of the universal in modern Russian
conservatism.
Particularism in Russian conservatism

The messianic, universalistic strand in Russian conservatism contrasts with an
equally strong particularistic strand, which has been in evidence since at least
the mid-eighteenth century. An early example of this came in the work of the
eighteenth-century Russian historian Vasily Tatishchev. Tatishchev set the tone
for much of what would follow, writing:
It is impossible to say which [form of] government would be better and

most useful to every society, but one must look on the status and condition
of each, such as the location of its territory, the spaciousness of its regions,
and the conditions of its people. […] In single cities and on small territories
[…] democracy is able to preserve well-being in peace. […] But spacious
territories with open borders and, in particular, those whose people are not
enlightened by learning and reason […] there [democracy and aristocracy]
are unsuitable; here there must be monarchy.
(Pipes 2005, 56–7)
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Slavophiles picked up on this theme. Aleksey

Khomyakov wrote that:
You must not graft foreign life on your own because thus you will graft not
foreign health but foreign disease […] that which for another people is not
only harmless but beneficial will become for you an evil and ruinous prin-
ciple. Every living creature has its own laws of existence, its own order and
harmony on which are based its very existence. […] But that which is
60 Paul Robinson
orderly and harmonious […] becomes a principle of disorder and discord
when it is grafted on another creature whose substance is based upon a
different law.
(Christoff 1961, 258)
Russia, according to the Slavophiles, was inherently different from the West.
Ivan Kireyevsky wrote: “The principles of basic Russian culture are characteris-
tically different from the Western because they are completely different” (Christ-
off 1972, 323). Because of this difference, Russia should not, according to the
organic principle, imitate Western institutions and models of development.
Later conservative thinkers agreed. For instance, in his 1869 book Russia and
Europe, Nikolay Danilevsky developed the idea that human history did not
follow a single trajectory of progress, common to all civilizations, or “cultural-
historical types” as he called them. Rather each civilization developed in its own
way, and different civilizations could not properly be measured against one
another. “The principles of civilization for one cultural-historical type are not
transferable to the peoples of another type,” he wrote (Danilevsky 2013, 76).
“To solve a problem of some sort,” Danilevsky added, “one civilization cannot
have another’s social principles in mind, so that its solution will be individual-
ized, sufficient for it alone, not universally applicable” (ibid., 83). “Never can a
political or economic phenomenon observed among one people, for whom it is
appropriate and beneficial, be automatically considered appropriate and bene-
ficial for another,” he concluded (ibid., 134). Similarly, Konstantin Leontyev
wrote in his 1875 book Byzantism and Slavdom:
Nobody knows under which form of government people live best […].
There are no statistics which confirm that it is better for individuals to live
in a republic than in a monarchy, in a limited monarchy better than in an
unlimited one, in an egalitarian state better than in one based on estates, in a
rich one better than in a poor one […]. In order to know what suits an organ-
ism, one must, above all, understand the organism.
(Leontyev 1876, 81)
Unlike the Slavophiles, Leontyev went so far as to deny the idea of universal
values and the “universal good.” According to Leontyev:
The idea of a general human good, the religion of the universal benefit, is
the coldest, most prosaic, and also the most improbable and unfounded of
all religions. […] There is nothing real in the idea of the universal good.
[…] It is a dry, good for nothing, even intangible abstraction, and nothing
more. One person thinks that the universal good is suffering and constant
rest and praying to God; another thinks that the common good is now work,
now pleasure, and not believing in any ideal; and a third thinks that it is
pleasure alone. How can one reconcile this, so that it’s of use to everybody?
(Ibid., 29–30)
Particularist views did not disappear with the Russian Revolution. Conservative
thinkers in emigration continued to express similar opinions. A notable example
is the philosopher Ivan Ilyin. In a collection of essays written in the late 1940s
and early 1950s for émigré military veterans, Ilyin repeated the same theme
again and again, saying:
There is no single, life-saving recipe for all times and all peoples. […] There
isn’t and cannot be constitutions which are equally suitable for different
peoples. […] Justice in one country could be unjust in another. […] In order
to find Russia’s true path, Russian political thought must above all else free
itself from formalism and a doctrinaire attitude and become grounded,
organic, and national-historical. The state system is not an empty and dead
“form”; it is connected to the life of the people, to its nature, climate, the
dimensions of the country, its historical fate, and—more deeply—its charac-
ter. […] It is foolish to think of the form of the state as a particularly absurd
fancy dress costume, which fits men and women, old and young, tall and
short, fat and thin, equally.
(Ilyin 1956, 128, 166–7, 180, 186)
Ilyin claimed that “[t]here is no single universally obligatory ‘Western culture’

compared with which everything else is ‘darkness’ or ‘barbarianism.’ […] The
West has its own errors, ailments, weakness, and dangers,” he added, “[o]ur sal-
vation does not lie in Westernism. We have our own path and our own tasks”
(ibid., 317–18). Each nation did things its own way, Ilyin noted: “And in this all
things, all people, and all nations are right” (ibid., 271).
Post-Soviet conservative thinkers repeat these particularist claims. “One of
the principles of conservatism [is that] it is impossible to transfer social norms,
cultural traditions, the hierarchy of values from one cultural society to another,”
says Leonid Polyakov for example (2014, 44). “Our conflict is one against uni-
versalism,” says the conservative nationalist thinker Mikhail Remizov (Robinson
2017). This is an attitude shared by many modern Eurasianists such as Aleksandr
Dugin, who have further developed the idea proposed by Danilevsky in his book
Russia and Europe, that the world is divided up into distinct civilizations, and
that Russia should be considered a separate civilization to Western Europe. This
concept has acquired considerable support in modern Russia, even beyond
Eurasianist circles, and has found its way into government policy. According to
the Foundations of State Cultural Policy published by the Russian Ministry of
Culture in 2015:
[…] advocates [of Western liberalism] postulate a single path of develop-

ment for all races, nations, and other social organisms. Supporters of this
tendency, as a rule, look on the “Western” way of development as ideal, and
all others as deviations from the one correct design. […] In contrast to this
approach are the works of a whole series of thinkers (N.Ia. Danilevsky, A.
Toynbee, L.N. Gumilyov, S. Huntington), based on another, civilizational
62 Paul Robinson
principle. Mankind is the sum total of many communities, distinguished
from one another by their attitude to the surrounding world, their systems of
values and, correspondingly, their culture. […] In this framework, Russia is
seen as a unique and independent civilization. […] In the Foundations of
State Cultural Policy, guaranteeing the country’s civilizational independ-
ence is defined as one of the priorities of cultural and humanitarian
development.
(Ministerstvo Kul’tury Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2015, 29–30)
Particularism thus remains alive and well alongside universalism in con-

temporary Russian conservatism.
Reconciling the universal and the particular

Defining Russian conservatism as either universalist or particularist is difficult,
not only because the two elements exist side by side, but also because, as will be
shown, conservative thought which appears on the surface to be especially par-
ticularist can be seen, on closer examination, also to have universalistic ele-
ments, and vice versa. The question therefore arises of how the two elements are
reconciled.
Two main methods can be seen. The first presents Russia as being unique in
preserving in its culture certain universally valid truths. Protecting Russia’s par-
ticular identity from the forces of Westernization, and in the modern era of glo-
balization, is therefore a necessary prerequisite for Russia to fulfill its mission of
presenting these truths to the rest of the world. The second method rejects uni-
versalism and instead celebrates the value of cultural diversity. At the same time,
however, it presents diversity as being of universal benefit. While repudiating
universalism, this approach thereby still makes a claim to universality.
The early Slavophiles combined both methods in their thinking. On the one
hand, while presenting ideas such as sobornost’ as particularly Russian charac-
teristics, they regarded these ideas as having universal value. Russia was not
meant just to keep these values for itself, but to give them back to the West. This
explains Khomyakov’s statement, cited above, that “We do no more than return
to you [the West] the cornerstone rejected by your ancestors.” On the other hand,
the Slavophiles also took from German Romanticism the concept that each
nation contributed to human progress by developing what was unique and best
about its own culture. The universal good was thus served by the promotion of
diversity. Susannah Rabow-Edling comments:
The central aim of the Slavophile critique of imitation was to show how
Russia could contribute to universal progress. […] The national contribution
to, and participation in, a universal development was closely connected to
the nation’s originality and uniqueness. Russia had to be original precisely
in order to make a contribution to humanity and in order to be part of
universal progress. […] the universal development of history demanded of
Russia that she now expressed her national foundations […] thereby creat-
ing a national culture, Russia could make an imprint on universal history.
(Rabow-Edling 2006, 46, 55)
In this scheme, the common good is served not by homogenization in the form
of universal Westernization, but rather by diversity. As Konstantin Aksakov
wrote in the 1850s:
Exceptionalism is an abuse. To avoid national exceptionalism, one does not

need to destroy one’s own nationality, but one must recognize all nationali-
ties. […] Yes, one must recognize every nationality, from the sum-total of
which the general human choir is formed. […] Let every people preserve its
national appearance (physiognomy), only then will it have human expres-
sion. Surely one would not want to make out of humanity some kind of
abstract phenomenon where there are no living, individual national features?
If you remove individual and national colors from humanity, it will be a
colorless phenomenon. […] No, let all nationalities in the human world
freely and clearly flower; only they will activate and energize the common
labor of peoples. Long live every nationality!
(Brodsky 1910, 110)
In his 1893 lecture, Milyukov considered the Slavophile way of thinking unsus-
tainable, and felt that later Russian conservatives had abandoned it in favor of
crude nationalism. In fact it continued to exert a powerful influence on Russian
conservative thought. Aksakov’s statement introduced an esthetic element—
universalism would be “colorless.” This was also Leontyev’s view. Although
Leontyev denied the existence of the “universal good,” it is clear from his writ-
ings that he regarded cultural, social, and political homogenization as a bad thing
per se, and as esthetically displeasing. Instead, he cherished the concept of
“flowering complexity.” In this sense, he did identify a universal good, associ-
ated with diversity. And, like the Slavophiles, he felt that by promoting such
diversity Russia could save Europe from itself. As he wrote:
Do we want, according to the ideal of our nihilists, to find our vocation in a

destructive role, to outstrip everyone and everything in the field of
barbarism, animal cosmopolitanism; or do we prefer […] to turn this
strength when the great and terrible hour, known to all, strikes, to the service
of the best and most noble principles of European life, to the service of this
very great, old Europe, to which we owe so much?
(Leontyev 1876, 66)
Danilevsky expressed very similar views, saying that, “[p]rogress consists not
of everything going in one direction […] but of pursuing the whole realm
of humanity’s historical activity in all directions” (Danilevsky 2013, 91). He
wrote:
64 Paul Robinson
The actual, profound danger consists of the completion of the very order of
things our Westernizers hold as their ideal: the genuine, not phony, reign of
the all-human civilization they so admire. This would be the same as ending
the whole possibility of any further success or progress in history, such as the
introduction of a new worldview, new goals, and new aspirations. […] [F]or
cultural-breeding forces not to dry up in the human race in general, it is neces-
sary for new agents, new peoples bearing these forces, to appear, with a
different mental framework, different enlightening principles, a different
historical upbringing. […] It is not a question of whether the world is control-
led by a republic or a monarchy, but whether it is controlled by a single civili-
zation, a single culture, since this would deprive the human race of one of the
necessary conditions for success and perfection: the element of diversity.
(Ibid., 366–7)
The universal and the particular were also linked by the late-nineteenth-century
Russian Orthodox Church, which promoted the concept of “Orthodox patriot-
ism.” This returned to the first method of reconciling the universal and the
particular—stressing the existence of universal truths but seeing them as being
preserved in Russia’s particular culture. According to John Strickland, Orthodox
patriotism “suffered from a weakness embodied in the tension between Church
universalism and national particularism,” and there was “a difficult, sometimes
inconsistent, and even painful effort to fuse these two elements” (Strickland
2013, xix). Proponents of Orthodox patriotism argued that “[t]he universal
Church […] though by definition not limited to a particular nationality, was
nevertheless centered upon the experience of particular peoples” (ibid., 9). As
Archbishop Nikanor of Kherson said in a sermon in 1860:
[God] values the means of salvation, the right faith, more than we can. Yet
he has assured that in a particular people it is preserved for all the world.
Here is your world purpose, Orthodox Rus’—the preservation of your
Orthodoxy for the whole world.
(Ibid., 72)
Vladimir Skortsov, editor of Missionerskoe obozrenie, argued in the first decade

of the twentieth century that the universal must come before the national. But he
wrote: “This universal human ideal cannot carry a denial of nationality. Nation-
ality is the necessary form by which particular peoples travel toward a universal
human ideal” (ibid., 141).
Many others have expressed the same idea. Ivan Ilyin, for instance, declared
that “[o]ne can create something beautiful and perfect for all peoples only by
confirming the creative act of one’s own people. The ‘world genius’ is always
and above all a national genius” (Ilyin 1956, 273). Perhaps the clearest expres-
sion of this concept was a letter written by Fyodor Dostoevsky to the heir to the
Russian throne, Grand Duke Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (later Tsar Aleksandr
III) in February 1880. Dostoevsky wrote:
Embarrassed and afraid that we have fallen so far behind Europe in our
intellectual and scientific development, we have forgotten that we ourselves,
in the depth and tasks of the Russian soul, contain in ourselves as Russians
the capacity perhaps to bring new light to the world, on the condition that
our development is independent. […] Without such an arrogance concerning
our importance to the world as a nation, we will never be able to be a great
nation and leave behind anything distinctive for mankind’s benefit. We have
forgotten that all great nations displayed their great powers only to the
extent that they were arrogant in their assessment of themselves, and pre-
cisely in this way they have benefited the world, and each of them has
brought something into it, be it only a single ray of light, because they have
remained themselves, proud and steady, arrogantly independent.
(Dostoevsky 1986, 260)
Attempts to reconcile the universal and the particular remain an important part
of Russian thought today, as can be seen for instance in the Basis of the Social
Concept, which was published by the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000. This
states that “[t]he universal nature of the Church does not mean that Christians
should have no right to national identity and national self-expression. On the
contrary, the Church unites in herself the universal with the national” (Russian
Orthodox Church 2000, II.2). The Church in essence follows the line of late-
nineteenth-century Orthodox patriotism, stressing the universal nature of Christi-
anity while seeing the Russian nation as being the particular carrier of the
Orthodox truth. Associated with this is the idea of katechon, described by Egor
Kholmogorov as “that which stands on the bridge between the Antichrist and the
world and which does not let the Antichrist into the world” (Engström 2014,
368). Russia saved Europe from the forces of Satan during the Second World
War, the theory goes; now its task is to save Europe in a cultural sense, from the
forces of globalization, liberalism, and post-modernism. In effect, Russia is
Europe’s katechon. As a conservative manifesto entitled The Russian Doctrine
puts it:
The defense of civilization from barbarism, its assimilation, this is the first
function of katechon. […] The katechon as an Orthodox kingdom defends
Christians against forces hostile to the salvation of the soul. […] It is clear
that the crisis of the Western project inevitably gives rise to the question of
a new world leader. The integrationist potential of Russian civilization […]
is once again demanded by history.
(Russkaya doktrina 2016, 70–71, 78)
Russia, according to this theory, has a mission to serve the world as a whole by
maintaining the universal truths of Orthodoxy against the forces of evil. This is,
however, not the only approach. Some modern Russian conservatives instead
return to Danilevsky’s approach and argue against universalism while contend-
ing that in doing so Russia serves the universal good.
66 Paul Robinson
Many (although not all) contemporary Russian conservatives are highly crit-
ical of globalization, which they equate with efforts by the United States to
impose what they consider a destructive neoliberal economic agenda on the rest
of the world. The struggle against neoliberal globalization is said to require indi-
vidual nations to reassert their sovereignty and their right to separate paths of
development. The creation thereby of a more multipolar, “polycentric,” or “plu-
ricultural” world will ultimately benefit everybody. In this way, the particular
and the universal come together. As one of Russia’s leading conservative intel-
lectuals, Mikhail Remizov, says, “Russian nationalism must grow up into a
fully-fledged political ideology. […] We must clearly define Russian interests,
and secondly, be able to make them universally significant” (Remizov
2007, 200).
Remizov draws a distinction between “universalism” and “universality.” The
former is undesirable, the latter not. As he says: “I associate conservatism with
an anti-universalistic scheme of projecting values. And the fact that this type of
projection of values can be done successfully in different countries doesn’t
contradict this. Anti-universalistic thought can be universally accepted” (Robin-
son 2017). Conservatism, in effect, promotes the anti-universalist value of diver-
sity and the right to be different, both of which can be accepted by all. To put it
another way, anti-universalism is an idea which possesses universality.
In practical terms, this means that by resisting the universalistic claims of
modern Western globalism, and by being “arrogantly independent,” as Dosto-
evsky put it, Russia serves the world as a whole. According to this logic, the
imposition of a Western version of universalism is actually harming humanity.
The latter would better be served by promoting diverse forms of development. A
multipolar balance of power, involving a stronger, more independent, Russia,
would help to preserve international peace and stability. It follows from this that
promotion of the common good requires the West to recognize Russia’s separate-
ness. Another leading conservative intellectual, Boris Mezhuev, therefore says:
Either a new American administration will regard Russia as a distinct civili-

zation marked by its own value code and special rights sanctified by history,
or it will treat Russia as just a target. Today both Americans and Russians
need to refrain from inane theorizing and debating about social and cultural
advantages of our country to be regarded as a distinct civilization. We both
need to understand that the language of civilizational geopolitics guarantees
Europe’s survival.
(Mezhuev 2016)
The two methods of reconciling the particular and the universal mentioned above
are not always clearly distinguished. Some conservatives contrive to follow both
lines of argument at the same time. It is not always obvious in the case of
Eurasianist thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin which line they truly believe in,
whether they think that Russia is the bearer of some universal truth or that uni-
versal truths do not exist. This indicates that the efforts to reconcile the universal
and the particular are not always completely successful. However, Russian
conservatives approach the problem, Mezhuev’s last sentence above neatly sum-
marizes a view which most Russian conservatives have in common: defending
national particularities serves the universal good.
Conclusion
The French philosopher of the New Right, Alain de Benoist, who is said to have
exerted an important influence on modern Russian neo-Eurasianists, remarked in
1986 that:
Already on the international level the major contradiction is no longer

between right and left, liberalism and socialism, fascism and communism,
“totalitarianism” and “democracy,” it is between those who want the world
to be one dimensional and those who support a plural world grounded in the
diversity of cultures.
(Clover 2016, 176)
The current tensions between Russia and the West are sometimes described as
being a conflict between democracy and authoritarianism, or between liberalism
and conservatism. The analysis above suggests that de Benoist’s framework
might be more accurate. As Nicolai Petro writes:
The moral contours of the present East-West conflict should now be readily
apparent. Russia opposes the adoption of any single set of cultural values as
the standard for international behavior. Many in the West counter that
Western values are not just a lone cultural standard, but the de facto uni-
versal standard. Russia labels this unilateralism and advocates a multipolar
world order based on pluriculturalism as a better alternative. Pluricultural-
ism argues that there is an inherent (“God-given,” according to Vladimir
Putin) value to diversity among nations. […] By contrast, Western states
more typically prize diversity within nations (the rights of the individual),
whereas among nations they seek to subordinate national cultural differ-
ences to standards, such as human rights, that express modern Western
values.
(Petro 2015)
In an article published in March 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

wrote that:
There are many development models—which rules out the monotony of exist-
ence within the uniform Western frame of reference. […] [L]ong-term success
can only be achieved on the basis of movement to the partnership of civiliza-
tions based on respectful interaction of diverse cultures and religions.
(Lavrov 2016)
68 Paul Robinson
This is a classic conservative repudiation of universalism in favor of national
particularism.
However, Lavrov then added that “[w]e believe that human solidarity must
have a moral basis formed by traditional values that are largely shared by the
world’s leading religions” (ibid.). This points in a different direction—toward
the existence of universal truths.
To reconcile the apparent contradiction, Lavrov ended his article by citing the
following words from Ilyin: “A great power is the one which, asserting its exist-
ence and its interest […], introduces a creative and meaningful legal idea to the
entire assembly of the nations, the entire ‘concert’ of the peoples and states”
(ibid.). Contrary to Milyukov, the synthesizing of the universal and the particular
remains alive and well in the modern era.
This should come as no surprise. Returning to Freeden’s definition of
conservatism, it is clear that a tension between the universal and the particular
is inherent within conservative ideology. Reconciling the two is thus an
essential task not just for those who study conservatives, as Freeden says,
but also for conservatives themselves, wherever and whenever they may be
found.
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4 Against “post-communism”
The conservative dawn in Hungary
Aron Buzogány and Mihai Varga
Introduction
In August 2014 news of Viktor Orbán’s “secret Bible” made headlines in the
Hungarian media. Journalists claimed that the “political science gossip” was true
and that the “Orbán system” closely followed the ideas of Tilo Schabert’s 1989
book Boston Politics: The creativity of power (Tóth 2014). In this book Schabert
presents the approach to politics of Kevin White, the mayor of Boston from
1968–84, to support his own theory of the “primacy of persons”—and not of
institutions—in politics (Gontier 2015). The information that Viktor Orbán could
be the follower of a Western (German) political theorist was, to say the least,
sensational: earlier analyses concluded that Orbán and his party Fidesz were
rather opportunistic and idiosyncratic in their political choices and cannot be
easily pinned down to any political current. These analyses referred to Orbán
and Fidesz as following a loosely defined form of “socially conservative” (Kiss
2002, 745) populism (Egedy 2009). The information also turned out to be
grossly inaccurate and exaggerated: not only was it difficult to verify what books
Orbán “kept on his bedside table,” it also turned out that Boston Politics was not
so much Orbán’s favorite, but rather a book (along with works of Eric Voegelin
and Leo Strauss) that some of his aides read and considered the best description
of the prime minister’s approach to politics. The story about Schabert’s 1989
book connection to Hungary is nevertheless far from trivial: it helped draw atten-
tion to the political ideas supported by leading figures at the Fidesz-allied “Szá-
zadvég” think tank, who had been trying since the 2000s to formulate the key
ideas driving the Fidesz agenda in the case of a return to power.
After eight years as the leader of the opposition, former (1998–2002) Hungar-
ian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán returned to power with a sweeping victory in
2010. Not only did this victory earn, for the pre-electoral coalition between
Fidesz and the small Christian-democratic party KDNP, the “supermajority”
needed for constitutional changes, the entire Hungarian party system, which was
regarded as one of the few consolidated ones in East Central Europe, collapsed
as a result. The main opposition party, the post-communist “Hungarian Socialist
Party,” in power between 2002 and 2010, lost more than half its voters and
earned a historical low of 21 percent of the vote. Orbán won with the promise of
Against “post-communism” 71
a new social contract that emphasized populist paternalism, national sovereignty,
and economic nationalism. The landslide victory of 2010 gave Orbán the oppor-
tunity to realize this vision. Backed by a constitutional majority during its first
term (2010–14), Fidesz passed a new constitution, eliminated a large part of
checks and balances, weakened the parliament’s prerogatives (and halved its
size), challenged the independence of the judiciary (Halmai 2015), and installed
a new, controversial media oversight authority (Kornai 2015). Adding to this, a
new electoral code was introduced which included heavily gerrymandered voting
districts and voting rights for Hungarians abroad. Following these changes,
Hungary took a deep dive in all measurable and quantifiable indicators of
democracy. As Kim Scheppele argues, though many of the new institutional
arrangements—media authorities, high courts, or electoral systems—are not
untypical for established democracies, it is the combination of these that
makes Hungary into what she terms a “Frankenstate” (a pun on “Frankenstein,”
Scheppele 2013).
In this chapter we introduce the main center-right intellectuals or “conceptive
ideologists” (Marx and Engels 2010 [1845]) lending support to Viktor Orbán,
either as his personal advisors or via the Századvég think tank. These “ideolo-
gists” either directly engage in constructing the ideology of Fidesz or—in the
case of Századvég—lead the process of spelling out conservatism, and empha-
sizing its relevance for Hungary. We present their ideas and place them in the
wider context of conservative thinkers in Hungary (not all of whom actually
support Orbán). In the next part, we discuss the main contributions in the liter-
ature on the nature of the Orbán regime, and delineate our own approach of
looking, not so much at what Fidesz politicians say and write, but at how intel-
lectuals close to Fidesz define and seek to address the problems of Hungarian
politics and society. Our argument is that one main common denominator in the
position of these intellectuals is their focus on the post-communist “political
elite” and “institutional arrangements” as deeply problematic and illegitimate,
elements that they want to be replaced by those of a state that is first and fore-
most “normative,” that is, capable of recognizing and pursuing national interests
(a state referred to by two of these intellectuals as “neo-Weberian”). These
ideas—and in particular those they claim to be the very essence of politics—
occur in parallel with and help us to understand the essence of the Fidesz polit-
ical project.
Interpreting the Orbán project: the role of ideational

foundations
For a relatively long time, post-communist Hungary was considered a success
story of democratic consolidation. It featured a stable party system and strong
governments; it was the leading country in the region in attracting foreign direct
investments and eventually became one of the front-runners considered for EU
membership. However, shortly after EU accession in 2004, Hungary entered into
a spiral of interlinked crises which in effect reshaped the political system to a
72 Aron Buzogány and Mihai Varga
large extent. The landslide electoral victory of Fidesz1 under Viktor Orbán in
2010 was followed by constitutional changes which have moved the initially
consensual system toward a strongly majoritarian one. This development was
sharply criticized by the European Parliament as a departure from democracy
toward authoritarian rule (Tavares 2013). After a second sweeping electoral
victory of Fidesz in 2014, the democratic rollback became even more accentu-
ated and was complemented by strong anti-EU rhetoric and closer ties to global
and regional authoritarian powers.
In a public speech at a summer university in Transylvania in 2014, Orbán
praised “illiberal democracy” and declared the Western economic model dead.
Tracing economic success to illiberal political systems, he cited the authoritarian
regimes of Russia, China, Turkey, and Singapore as templates to follow for
Hungary, declaring that “We have to abandon liberal methods and principles of
organizing a society. The new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a
non-liberal state.”2 Speeches held before the 2010 elections also foreshadowed
the political system that Orbán envisioned. The emerging system he referred to
in 2009 as the “central field of power” (centrális erőtér) places Fidesz at the
center of the political system, and cements its position for a longer period of
time, making “unproductive” political debates unnecessary (Bátory 2015). The
emphasis on power in Orbán’s statements has been a recurring theme:
Cooperation is a question of force, not of intention. Perhaps there are coun-

tries where things don’t work that way, for example in the Scandinavian
countries, but such a half-Asiatic rag-tag people as we are can unite only if
there is force.3
Such claims—declaring Western liberalism and individualism alien to a country

with an authoritarian history—can be seen as the call for a centralized, strong,
and paternalist state. The new government followed the (self-termed) ideal of a
“neo-Weberian” state to replace the “sell-out” of public assets and excessive
embracement of the ideas of “new public management” by previous socialist
governments. Instead of a market-oriented, “lean” government, which was seen
by Fidesz to have served foreign business interests to the detriment of the public
good, a new, centralized core executive was installed, halving the number of
ministerial departments, replacing ministry staff with Fidesz loyalists, and
strengthening the prime minister’s office (Gallai and Molnár 2012). Regional
decentralization efforts carried out during the last decade to accommodate EU
regional policy demands were also largely reversed (Buzogány and Korkut
2013).
The literature has mostly focused on determining what enabling factors paved
the way for the backlash against democracy in Hungary. Such explanations
range from problems related to institutional engineering in 1989/90, including
overly strong checks and balances, the lack of “lustration” and a real exchange
of elites (Pridham 2014), the dynamics of the party system (Enyedi 2016a,
2016b), political polarization (Palonen 2009, 2012; Buzogány 2011), elite
populism (Korkut 2012; Palonen 2009; Enyedi 2016a, 2016b), negative effects
of patrimonial capitalism (Csillag and Szelényi 2015), democracy’s lack of soci-
etal support (Herman 2015), to the weakness of external support for democracy
(Sedelmeier 2014; Müller 2015).
Yet, capturing the essence of Orbán’s “revolution” is a more difficult exercise
than establishing the factors behind Orbán’s 2010 return to power. The usual
interpretation ignores the self-positioning of Orbán and Fidesz as conservative,
and treats the “Orbán project” as a “populist” undertaking. Nevertheless, many
authors feel the need to further qualify populism. Zsolt Enyedi, for instance,
writes of “paternalistic populism” in Hungary, that is, a populism that, although
claiming to be on the side of “the people,” criticizes “the lack of self-discipline
in the lower classes” in order to cut welfare spending (Enyedi 2016a, 15). Agnes
Bátory also argues that the populism of Fidesz is directed toward changing the
country and its inhabitants fundamentally, and qualifies it as “nationalistic,”
“Christian conservative” and, after the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union, increasingly “Eurosceptic” (Bátory 2015, 286).
What is less known is how Orbán and Fidesz came to position themselves as
Hungary’s main conservative right-wing formation. Csilla Kiss traces this devel-
opment back to how Viktor Orbán and Fidesz “read” the actions of other parties,
most notably the “Hungarian Democratic Forum” (MDF ) of József Antall and
the alliance between liberals and socialists, Orbán’s main political opponents
(Kiss 2002). Thus, Orbán interpreted the defeat and demise of the MDF in the
early 1990s as an appropriate reminder of the dangers of a conciliatory style of
politics, and he perceived the socialist-liberal governments as betraying national
interests. Viktor Orbán appears as an opportunistic actor who learned from his
defeat in the 1994 elections on a liberal agenda that liberalism has to make way
for a “national-conservative catch-all party” (Lang 2005). The weaknesses and
conflicts on the spectrum of conservative parties provided the opportunity to
rebrand Fidesz from a liberal-alternative party into a conservative one and win
subsequent elections (Szabó 2011; Machos 1993; Fowler 2004; Egedy 2009).
Thus, Orbán’s political ideas are best understood as “strategic choices” in reac-
tion to the political environment around him (Bátory 2015).
We argue that Orbán’s political ideas should be seen in a wider context of an
anti-liberal milieu that became visible around 2002 to 2006 (when Fidesz lost
parliamentary elections). Although playing a leading role in this milieu, Orbán
was by far not the only one to grow disillusioned with liberalism. In what
follows we map the relevant thinkers and in particular the “conceptive ideolo-
gists,” non-party organizations (such as think tanks), and publications that have
provided a background to the intensifying criticism and rejection of liberalism in
Hungary and the ideational foundations of the “Orbán project.” Building on the
work of Karl Mannheim, we see the rise of conservatism (a current to which
Fidesz and Orbán claim to belong), not just as a strategic re-positioning in the
political field, but as a social current developing in opposition to and with
growing irritation over the perceived dominance of liberalism. It is through
common experiences—a “community of experience”—that intellectual currents
take shape (Mannheim 1955 [1936], 31). In Hungary a key unifying or crystal-
lizing experience for conservatives (whether they used this term then or not) was
the 1994 political alliance between liberals and post-communists that conserva
tives perceived as a liberal betrayal of the central unifying right-wing principle
of anti-communism.
Intellectuals, “individuals whose only capital consisted in their education,”
play a central part in processes of “ideology production” (Mannheim 1955
[1936], 156). In Hungary this is perhaps best documented by the intellectuals’
relevance to the 1989 regime change and transition period (Bozóki 2007). More
recently there has been increased interest in the intellectual traditions of Hungar-
ian liberalism (Korkut 2012) and the radical right, with social scientists asking
about the role of political ideas in the making of the Hungarian radical right, and
in particular in the “Movement for a Better Hungary,” also known as “Jobbik”
(Gyurgyák 2007; Paksa 2012). In the meantime we are also witnessing a growing
interest in the political and intellectual history of Hungarian conservative tradi-
tions (more generally and including pre-war times; see Csizmadia 2013; Wéber
2010; Enyedi 2016a, 2016b).
What is lacking, however, is not only an engagement with the ideas of the
intellectuals, but also with the field in which they have developed and circulated
their ideas: while most of the actors we study in this chapter had turned to con-
servatism already by the early 1990s, that which has intensified since then is the
network of venues in which they develop and circulate conservative ideas—from
university departments to think tanks, institutes, and a growing number of publi-
cations. In other words, what has changed over the last decades is the conser-
vative “knowledge network” (Bluhm and Varga in this volume), understood as
loose groups of conservative intellectuals, think thanks, media outlets, politicians
or factions within political parties, university departments or holders of single
university chairs, who engage in the production and dissemination of ideology—
a “political conception of the world” (Mannheim 1955 [1936]). In Hungary, this
has developed from a first generation of university-based scholars into a second
generation with numerous and active publishing outlets, as well as important
public positions in think tanks, universities, media, and research institutes.
Although Hungary’s well-developed “knowledge network” is far from unitary,
we present its different facets by focusing on the main figures, think tanks, and
publications who share as a common denominator the conviction that the post-
communist, constitutional-institutional arrangements were deeply problematic,
and who yet differ in the solutions envisaged as well as in the causes identified
behind the “dysfunctional” post-communist institutions.
We distinguish between two positions that have been highly active in shaping
Hungary’s conservatism and that welcomed Fidesz’ 2010 return to and record in
power. The positions are each embodied by a key figure in Viktor Orbán’s
1998–2002 prime ministerial office. The first position is composed of intellectu-
als often pursuing university careers devoted to the study and dissemination of
conservatism. It is best represented by the former minister and head of the prime
ministerial office István Stumpf, who traces problems of post-communism to
“flaws” in European thinking about institutions, in particular in liberal thinking,
and envisages solutions in the realm of what he calls neo-Weberian thinking
about the state. Others who could be included in this position are most notably
the political theorists András Lánczi and Gábor G. Fodor, who added to it cri-
tiques of European modernity based on the writings of Carl Schmitt, Eric Voege-
lin, and Leo Strauss. The second position is composed of intellectuals holding
Fidesz membership or government jobs as early as 1998, best characterized by
Gyula Tellér, the head of the “internal affairs” political analysis unit of the prime
ministerial office in 1998–2002, and who would later become chief policy
advisor to Viktor Orbán from 2010 onwards. Tellér approaches problems of
post-communist institutions in Hungary as the outcome of direct, unfriendly
actions of external powers, going back to at least the 1970s, when Hungary fell
into the “debt trap.” Privatization processes unleashed throughout the 1990s only
deepened the dependency on external powers and robbed the Hungarian state of
the material means needed for pursuing autonomous action. Before going into a
more detailed discussion of these ideas, we first explain the wider conservative
context from which these positions, particularly the first one, emerged.
A conservative network of knowledge

During the early 1980s, an underground opposition scene was thriving in Buda-
pest and became influential after regime change (Szabó 2010). The intellectual
debates taking place during this period had important implications for the future
of Hungarian political development after the fall of communism (Falk 2003).
One of the most important groups in the democratic opposition was the “samiz-
dat” movement of the liberal intelligentsia that published the underground
journal Beszélő. This samizdat journal brought together intellectuals of different
political leanings, many of whom still regarded themselves as leftists, while
others were in the process of re-defining themselves as “liberals.” The Beszélő
circle continuously tested the limits of state oppression not only by publishing a
journal without the consent and censorship of the ruling party, but also by engag-
ing in several initiatives that directly or indirectly called for more democracy
(Bozóki 2007). Along with Adam Michnik in Poland and Václav Havel in
Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian writer and sociologist György Konrád became of
one of the most well-regarded dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe during
the late 1980s. His essays centered on utopian ideals of democracy and the role
of civil society, which he regarded as being largely non-political (Konrád 1989).
At the same time his political philosophy was built on the idea of “anti-politics”
that defined civil society in terms of resistance to an oppressive state. His “ideo-
logy of civil society” became an instrument for 1980s’ dissidents propagating an
alternative to both communism and Western capitalism.
This “anti-political” tradition of the Hungarian and ECE liberal intelligentsia
became the dominant discourse of regime change in 1989. Political discourse
strongly influenced by liberalism was converging with the global liberal dis-
course of that time, with a strong emphasis on checks and balances, individual
rights, and judicialization (Mándi 2015). These directions had important implica-
tions in the founding years of the new Hungarian state, in preferring for example
a consensus versus majoritarian model of democracy (Ágh 2001), a strong and
independent constitutional court (Sólyom 2003; Scheppele 1999), and the chosen
liberal economic transition model (Stark and Bruszt 1998).
It was in this intellectual climate—one of a later felt liberal domination—that
the first conservative intellectuals appeared in Hungary in the early 1990s. This
“first generation” hardly used the term “conservative,” but nevertheless focused
on the dissemination of Western conservative thinking through translations of
Leo Strauss, Edmund Burke, and Michael Oakeshott, as well as its own theoret-
ical work in political philosophy, studying and developing conservative ideas.
During the early 1990s, the members of the “first generation” secured teaching
positions at the larger universities in Budapest. András Lánczi, perhaps the most
prolific intellectual figure of conservative convictions and the author of the
“Conservative Manifesto” (2002), began teaching at the university later named
“Corvinus” from 1991, heading the political science department there from 2002
and becoming rector of Corvinus in 2016. Lánczi wrote his dissertation on Leo
Strauss in 1993. Throughout the 1990s, Tibor Navracsics, another key conser-
vative figure, who would later introduce Lánczi to Orbán, also taught at Corvi-
nus in the 1990s and, according to Teczár (2016), worked closely with Lánczi to
further refine their common ideas.
Navracsics later worked at the Political Science Institute of Budapest’s largest
university, ELTE. At this institute there was a slow strengthening of positions
critical of liberalism around figures such as István Stumpf and István Schlett.
Some staff members there have since been connected with Fidesz directly as
politicians: Navracsics served as department head in the Prime Minister’s Office
(1998/99), as Minister of Justice (2010–14) and of Foreign Affairs (2014–16)
under the second and third Orbán government before he went on to become
European Commissioner for Culture and Education. Another prominent figure,
Orbán’s professor at the Bibó Kollégium, István Stumpf, served as head of the
Prime Minister’s Office under the first Orbán cabinet (1997–2001) and since
2010 has been the Fidesz-appointed member of the Hungarian Constitutional
Court. András Körösényi was another scholar, teaching at ELTE in the 1990s,
and one of Hungary’s best-known political scientists abroad, interested in Hun-
garian conservatism, and at least until 2010 often described as close to Fidesz.
After the Fidesz victory in 2010 he became the head of the Political Science
Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, but, in a way similar to Stumpf,
became increasingly disillusioned by the Orbán regime.
At the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest, another member of
the “first generation” and ELTE graduate in sociology and history, Attila Károly
Molnár, worked on the writings of Edmund Burke and other conservatives and
defended there his habilitation in 2005. Molnár issued in 2004 together with
Lánczi another programmatic statement of Hungarian conservatism, entitled
Hungarian Conservative Speculations: Against Post-Communism (Lánczi et al.
2004). In 2012 he became director of the newly created Thomas Molnar Institute
at the National Public Service University established by Fidesz in 2011 (appar-
ently on the initiative of then-minister Navracsics).4
The 2000s saw the gradual rise of a “second generation” of conservative
authors who had been students of the first generation, but it is fair to say that
what caused their adoption of conservatism was not just the influence of teachers
such as Lánczi or Molnár, but also their collective political experiences during
the decade’s two major events: the 2002 and 2006 electoral defeats of Fidesz.
According to Rényi and Vári (2011), most of the second-generation members
share features such as: being predominantly born in the 1980s; studying under
members of the first generation; holding membership in the Fidesz youth organ-
ization “Fidelitas”; writing for UFI5 (the organization’s publication); and sharing
a deep resentment over the course of events in their country, in particular after
the electoral defeats of Fidesz and the leak of socialist prime minister Ferenc
Gyürcsányi’s 2006 admission of lying to the public over the country’s finances.
The activities of the second generation materialized in an active blogosphere and
multiplied the number of conservative periodical publications. During the 1990s
the publication landscape was restricted to Konzervatív Szemle (which folded in
1994), Magyar Szemle, and the homonymous publication of the Századvég
foundation (which in fact dedicated a fair amount of space also to liberal posi-
tions). The 2000s brought UFI, which later changed into the Reakció blog and
then to the Mandiner blog and news portal; the Navracsics-close Jobbklikk blog
and news portal; the blog (and later journal) entitled Kommentár; the konzerva-
torium blog (its authors acknowledged Molnár as their mentor; established in
2007, inactive since 2015, its editor-in-chief Gergely Szilvay moved to Mand-
iner); the newsportal 888; and a new journal issued by Századvég, entitled
Nemzeti Érdek (National Interests).
Though the members of the first generation published only occasionally in the
blogosphere, it later spawned a host of prolific young authors who also gained
access to institutional positions. Most central was Gábor G. Fodor, a graduate of
two political science institutes at ELTE and Corvinus, and who came to symbol-
ize the success of the second generation: after completing a PhD on early
twentieth-century Hungarian critiques of liberalism with István Schlett, he pro-
ceeded to work on the history of political ideas focusing on Voegelin. He was
regarded as one of the most original and promising political scientists of his gen-
eration (winning several awards, including the prestigious Hungarian Science
Academy Youth Prize in 2005). Fodor, a co-author with Lánczi, served as the
Századvég director for research (until 2010) and then for strategy, and estab-
lished the 888 news portal. Other well-known representatives of the second gen-
eration include Tamás Lánczi from the Jobbklikk blog (the son of András
Lánczi), later to serve under Navracsics, and Márton Békés (also from the Jobb-
klikk and konzervatorium blogs) to become the head of research at the Terror
Haza Museum (the museum for the victims of “20th-century dictatorships,”
established by the Fidesz government in 2002), and the journalist Bálint
Ablonczi, one of the editors of the Fidesz-close Heti Válasz (a weekly publica-
tion established by the Fidesz government in the early 2000s).
Over a period of two-and-a-half decades the conservative milieu has grown
diverse with a strong presence at universities but also in the form of think tanks,
foundations, and media outlets. Some of the most important manifestations in
terms of continued visibility in public life have emerged in close relationships
with political parties: Századvég with Fidesz, and the Batthyány Lajos Founda-
tion with the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Others have been rather short-lived,
such as the Hayek Society established in 1999, of classical, laissez-faire liberal
leanings (this initiative was brought back to life in 2014 as the fiercely anti-
Fidesz Hayek Club). The 2000s also brought the more loosely-knit intellectual
circles of the second generation, such as those that run different blogs: Mand-
iner, Jobbklikk or Konzervatorium. A recent addition is the Danube Institute
founded in 2013 by the conservative Batthyány Foundation, which has had
unprecedented success, mainly on issues relating to regional cooperation. It
openly subscribes to classic liberal and conservative ideas, and is producing a
blog which surveys international theoretical literature in this field. The institute
is also closely connected with the Hungarian Review, which together with US
and UK conservative think tanks with Thatcherite and Reaganite leanings, such
as the Centre for Policy Studies or the Social Affairs Unit (London), try to
counter the massive critiques that Orbán’s reforms have received in the Western
world. To be mentioned is also the Common Sense Society, which organizes
regular events and regularly invites Western speakers to Hungary such as the
British conservative thinker Roger Scruton of the American Enterprise Institute
and Tilo Schabert, author of Boston Politics.
In what follows we study the ideas developed around two positions of central
importance to Fidesz and its political project; the first one is relatively easy to
identify, as it emerged from around the Századvég (Hungarian for “fin-de-
siècle”) think tank and traces the problems of the country back to flaws in Euro-
pean, “institutionalist” thinking. The second position is hardly traceable to any
organization and consists of intellectuals who joined Fidesz out of disillusion-
ment with the liberal SZDSZ party (Alliance of Free Democrats) and its political
alliance with the post-communist MSZP. The most prominent exponent of this
second position, Gyula Tellér, sees Hungary’s problems not as having arisen
from Western-influenced thinking, but from the outright enmity of international
forces vis-à-vis the country.
The Századvég group
Századvég was founded in the early 1990s and earned the reputation of a
respected think tank, initially only loosely affiliated with conservative politics.
At the same time, its links with Fidesz have been intimate. Fidesz was founded
in the dormitory of the University of Budapest’s elite graduate law school, which
established the social science journal Századvég that was highly critical of the
communist regime. During the late 1990s, when Fidesz first came to power, this
collaboration became more obvious. The think tank offered various consultancy-
related work and started a postgraduate program in political management
intended to be mainly a conservative recruiting pool—even if its graduates were
employed also by other parties (László 2012). During most of the 2000s, Száza-
dvég remained critical of Fidesz’ political activities, but after the 2010 Fidesz
landslide election victory it became a major co-producer of governmental pol-
icies on the basis of consultancy contracts of close to 5 billion forints.6
The founder of the Századvég think tank, István Stumpf, was the head of
the prime minister’s office from 1998–2002. In 2010 he left his position as
head of Századvég to become the Fidesz appointee to the Constitutional Court.
Stumpf was followed as head of Századvég by András Lánczi, a political
science professor at the Corvinus University in Budapest (Lánczi became
rector there in 2016). Lánczi dedicated an important part of his academic
career to the study and dissemination of the work of Leo Strauss, defending his
dissertation on Strauss in 1993 in Budapest and publishing it as a monograph
in 1999, under the title Modernity and Crisis. In 2002, already as head of the
political science department at Corvinus, he published his Konzervatív
Kiáltvány (conservative manifesto or proclamation), one of the few program-
matic statements of Hungarian conservatism, and perhaps the only one written
by a figure of Lánczi’s public standing. The reception in Hungary’s intellectual
circles was wide, with numerous reviews and comments in leading journals,
most importantly in Hungary’s Élet és Irodalom (2002), the most prolific
liberal weekly.
Lánczi’s most important connection with Fidesz prior to 2010 was to Tibor
Navracsics, currently Hungary’s European Commissioner, himself a political
scientist at Corvinus University in the 1990s who served in the first Orbán gov-
ernment as head of the communications department in the prime minister’s office
(under Stumpf again). Depicted as “the Right’s spiritual leader” (Teczár 2016)
during Fidesz’ opposition years (2002–2010), Lánczi claims that he only met
Orbán once, in 2002, in Navracsics’ Fidesz office, when after an hour-long con-
versation Lánczi came to believe that Orbán was a person who was “sad in light
of the 2002 electoral defeat, but implacably eager to understand” (Teczár 2016).
In 2007, Lánczi established the Center for European Renewal, a pan-European
organization of academics and politicians publishing the journal The European
Conservative. Lánczi currently chairs the Amsterdam-based organization that
includes members such as Roger Scruton and former university professor and
current MEP representing the Polish party PiS, Ryszard Legutko.7
As head of Századvég, Lánczi was joined by another political scientist with
an interest in political philosophy, his former student and colleague Gábor G.
Fodor. Together they published in 2009 an edited volume entitled A Dolgok Ter-
mészete (The Nature of Things, 2009), which attracted the participation of the
most important names associated in Hungary with intellectual conservatism (not
necessarily, however, also with Fidesz), such as Ferenc Horkay Hörcher, András
Karácsony, Gergely Egedy, István Schlett, Márton Békés, and Balázs Ablonczy.
Since 2010 Fodor has led the Századvég think tank as its strategy director; he is
also in charge of the newly issued Századvég journal National Interests (a bi-
annual publication, supplementing the Századvég think tank’s decades-old
homonymous publication). Fodor’s social and political theory interest lies espe-
cially in the work of Eric Voegelin, an interest he shares with Lánczi.
Stumpf, Lánczi, and Fodor (the Századvég group) are perhaps the most
important names associated with efforts to give the Orbán project a theoretical
footing since the early 2000s. Far more than Tellér, who mainly published in a
Hungarian-language journal, the Századvég group published widely (also in
English) long before the 2010 elections. In what follows, we offer a summary of
their ideas, arguing that there is a difference between Stumpf on the one hand,
and conceptive ideologists Lánczi and Fodor on the other. The difference con-
cerns how radical their critique of liberalism is, and whether they spell out their
preferred alternative, conservatism. Stumpf ’s articles (including the ones he co-
wrote with Fodor) are still reconcilable with the broad and diverse set of ideas
on institutional reforms present in West European academic scholarship. In con-
trast, Lánczi and later also Fodor explicitly reject “institutionalist” solutions
which they see as an ineffective approach to politics, not just in the case of
Hungary, but also in Europe, and openly advocate for a different ideology,
conservatism.
The “normative” state
Stumpf approaches the Hungarian state as an organization that has lost its
“normative” credibility and is incapable of tackling problems such as corruption
and poverty because the wider public deems it incompetent and immoral, which
undermines its efforts. This reading of the state applies to the time periods when
Fidesz was in opposition and the country was run by the “left-liberal” coalition
between the liberal SZDSZ and the post-communist MSZP. One project in par-
ticular that these parties pursued and that Stumpf considers harmful was the con-
centration of power around the Ministry of Finance, leading to a situation of a
“two-headed” government, that is, led by the prime minister and the finance
minister. In contrast, Stumpf claims that the first Orbán government (1998–2002)
tried to counter this situation by strengthening the prime-ministerial office—at
that time, under the leadership of Stumpf himself—to become the real and single
center of government (Stumpf 2009). After their return to power in 2002, the
left-liberals again reversed these efforts, much to the disdain of Stumpf, who, in
writings authored together with G. Fodor, calls his conception of the state “neo-
Weberian,” and further states that the concern with “normativity” is crucial to
his approach, to be differentiated from and contrasted to that of New Public
Management (NPM), which was strongly supported by the left-liberal Gyurc-
sány government (Fodor and Stumpf 2007).
This “neo-Weberian” conception is largely in line with mainstream develop-
ments in contemporary Western public administration scholarship emphasizing
the necessity of a post-NPM paradigm (Ongaro 2015; Pollitt and Bouckaert
2011; Dunn and Miller 2007; Randma-Liiv 2008). If this were the only idea-
tional footing of the Orbán project, it could hardly explain the Fidesz preoccupa-
tion with power that is evident in the notion of the “central field of power” and,
in particular, notions about the place, role, and legitimacy of the opposition. It
should also not come as a surprise that Stumpf, despite being appointed by
Fidesz to the Constitutional Court, grew increasingly critical of Orbán, often
giving his support to the Court’s indictments of Fidesz-initiated legislation.
Against post-communism’s “flawed” modernity

Lánczi introduces a far more critical discussion of the political forces opposed to
Fidesz. Stumpf ’s critique of the left-liberals basically consists of mismanage-
ment accusations, and he traces the negative record of left-liberals back to the
institutional arrangements reached in the “Round Table” negotiations of 1989.
For Lánczi, the left-liberals not only mismanaged the country but are also wrong
in principle. Their negative record cannot be explained by references to the
Round Table accords but should be traced back to the problematic aspects of
these forces’ ideological underpinnings—liberalism and socialism (in its sof-
tened, social-democratic version). For Lánczi, these are political projects without
moral guidance, but with ambitions of changing the world, and therefore are,
unsurprisingly, bound to fail. Lánczi’s proposed solutions go in the direction of
returning politics to its moral grounding, to be sought in “rules of custom, tradi-
tion, and authority” (Lánczi 2013). The country’s problems can be solved by
such a reorientation, rather than by “institutionalist” projects, an approach he
criticizes at length. Both Lánczi and Fodor have worked on placing these ideas
in politico-philosophical contexts—that of the Straussian and especially Voege-
linian critique of modernity and “modern” political projects such as, most impor-
tantly, liberalism, communism, and national-socialism, all projects promising
and trying to achieve “paradise on earth.” “Modernity,” as manifested in the
“twin projects” of liberalism and communism, becomes the central frame for
condensing everything that for these conservatives is wrong about the present
day in Hungary and Europe.
Radical critique and rejection of the Hungarian version of modernity can also
be found in the writings of Fodor, the Századvég director for strategy, who wrote
his PhD thesis on early twentieth-century Hungarian critiques of liberalism and
went on to work on the history of political ideas, focusing on Voegelin while
also addressing state theory and questions relating to political power (Fodor
2008). Together with István Stumpf and András Lánczi, he authored a series of
articles describing the “strong state paradigm,” or the concept of “hard govern-
ment.” A common denominator here is the critique of the “governance” para-
digm of the West, which diffuses power and depoliticizes what are essentially
political decisions. In contrast to the governance paradigm, G. Fodor proposes
redefining the state around a moral, political leader, acting as a self-secure, mas-
culine “Prince of Chaosmos.” A central concern—the same as for Lánczi and
Molnár—is post-communism. In the 2009 volume co-edited with Lánczi, G.
Fodor argues that post-communism is best understood as the continuation of
communism (an idea previously shared and formulated by Lánczi, also in
English), using Marxism to depict the commonalities of the two periods—before
and after 1989. Thus, what is Marxist about the twin liberal projects of demo-
cratization and marketization is the almost religious belief in the power of
reforms and progress (Fodor 2009); instead of “reforming” the state, G. Fodor
argues for “renovating” and returning to the “ancient” meaning and responsib-
ility of politics: government, a responsibility that he argues is increasingly
diminished or even negated in liberal thinking.
Importantly, there are notable commonalities between many of the ideas of
Századvég intellectuals and the content of the “National Cooperation Proclama-
tion” and the “National Cooperation Regime,” two programmatic Fidesz docu-
ments adopted by the newly elected, conservative-dominated Hungarian
Parliament in 2010. The “Proclamation,” requiring its mandatory display on the
walls of institutions such as military barracks, clearly distinguishes the period
that started in 2010 from previous decades, the 45 years of communism and the
“tumultuous” transition years (1989–2010). The result of the 2010 elections is
praised as yet another “revolution,” comparable to 1956. The “National
Cooperation Regime” makes repeated use of such concepts as “bad government
[or governance]” to describe the years of liberal and socialist rule, a key concept
in the 2007/08 writings of Fodor and Stumpf. The parallels between “National
Cooperation” documents and Századvég writings (including a defense of these
documents by Fodor and other authors on the Századvég website, entitled “The
End of Ideologies”) lead some commentators to talk of the Századvég group as
the “theorists” of the National Cooperation Regime (Böcskei 2013), although the
authorship of the National Cooperation documents remains unclear.
Right-wing advisors
While G. Fodor’s media presence and provocative verve has earned him a
cynical Machiavellist reputation, newspaper reports suggest that his or Lánczi’s
personal influence over or appeal to Viktor Orbán are difficult to support with
evidence. Although Századvég clearly provides important consultancy services
to the government, the closeness of Orbán’s positions to some of Lánczi and
Fodor’s ideas are possibly more an instance of ideational alignment than of influ-
ence of the latter over the former. This seems to be different in the case of Gyula
Tellér, a sociologist and renowned poetry translator. As Orbán’s “chief ideo-
logue” (Enyedi 2016a), Fidesz’s “main ideologue” (Mándi 2015), the “grey emi-
nence” behind the prime minister (Ripp 2010), Tellér clearly stands out as a
prominent conceptive ideologue and as the most experienced figure among the
prime minister’s five chief advisors and closest advisor from the mid-1990s on.
Tellér served as the head of the political analysis department of the Stumpf-
led prime minister’s office during Orbán’s first (1998–2002) term in office and
was a Fidesz MP in 2006–10. His conception of a “civic Hungary,” of central
importance to Fidesz’ success in 1998, is still considered important by members
of the Orbán government as it is a unique amalgam of classic liberalism and
conservative thought (Mándi 2015, 29). This system defines the citizen as a self-
responsible, but socially empathetic person striving for the common public good
in a way very much in line with classic liberalism. Tellér rarely labels his polit-
ical positions and more often uses the term “right-wing” rather than “conser-
vative.” He perceives Hungary, before the return to power of Fidesz, to have
been the victim of international forces, from the US to Russia, the World
Bank and the EU, and in particular what he sees as these forces’ local
representatives—the communists and the liberals. Tellér’s analyses are imbued
with mythical elements, as he sees such forces responsible for “centuries- or
even millennia-old” subordination of local communities (such as “nations”).
Tellér, though exceptional in terms of his personal influence on Orbán, is far
from alone in his positions and is part of a wider current of intellectuals who
joined the first Orbán cabinet as advisors.
For these intellectuals, the formation of a coalition government between lib-
erals and post-communists in 1994 represents a key formative (but negative)
experience; following the formation of that coalition, they either joined Fidesz or
extended it their support, as they perceived it as the main “anti-communist”
force. Key exponents of this group are Mária Schmidt, a historian based at the
Pázmány Catholic University who also served as main advisor to Orbán in
1998–2002; or László Tóth (another Orbán advisor during the same years),
author of numerous books taking issue with the continued presence in public life
of figures close to or participating in the pre-1989 regime.8 Only few share
Tellér’s mythical approach to world politics, tracing international conflicts back
to millennia-old conflicts between good and evil, but one prolific author popular-
izing similar views is economist László Bogár, yet another former colleague of
Tellér in the 1998–2002 Orbán cabinet.9
In fact, Schmidt and Tóth in 1998 published a volume, which Tellér also con-
tributed to, that offers a good overview of the contours of this group (Schmidt
and Tóth 1998). The unifying theme for the authors of the 1998 volume is the
preoccupation with the “survival” of communism (that is, the continued public
and political involvement of former communist officials) and the “anti-national”
bent of the communists’ and liberals’ policies ranging from the economy to
education.10 Tellér’s analysis in 1998 stands out for its radicality about the post-
communist regime, accusing it of being even more successful than Stalinist com-
munists of the 1950s in “breaking the nation’s back.”
Tellér’s later political writings have been increasingly radical critiques of lib-
eralism, which he calls either “(neo)liberalism” or even “SZDSZ liberalism”
(using the pejorative Hungarian formulation szadesz). In a 2014 pamphlet, Tellér
provides an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian political development of the last
two decades, which he describes as a fight between “post-communism” and
“regime change.” At Orbán’s request, Tellér’s pamphlet was distributed to
Fidesz MPs as a hands-on vademecum to help them make sense of the allegedly
numerous accomplishments in Orbán’s project of recent years (Tellér 2014).
Tellér’s 2014 essay was intensively discussed in the Hungarian press as the
inspiration for and even the source (Csuhaj 2014) of Viktor Orbán’s famous
speech about the desirability of an “illiberal state.” The claim that Orbán took
inspiration from Tellér’s essay seems to be true: Orbán’s June 2014 speech
indeed takes an entire passage from Tellér’s March 2014 essay. This passage is
also what caused the international media’s initial attention to Orbán’s speech,
namely the critique of the liberal vision of society, as a reductionist vision that
celebrates the individual and limits all individual duties to the sole one of
respecting other individuals’ freedom. For Tellér, individuals should act out of
“deeper motivations” such as, most importantly, obligations toward the
community.
In real societies [author’s note: for Tellér, liberalism abolishes the notion of
society] such motivations commit since ancient times the members of the
community to [positively] relating to life, children, the elderly, property,
neighbors, the opposite sex, and to truth.
(2014, 358)
Tellér’s conception combines a quasi-Marxist perspective on structures such

as the class of “large estate owners,” with a focus on strengthening the middle
classes that is congruent with classical liberal conceptions. Marxism neverthe-
less is guilty of undermining the moral foundations of the country: Tellér sees in
Marxism—particularly the “Frankfurt postmarxist philosophical school” (Tellér
2014, 352)—a destructive and still relevant intellectual force. In contrast to
Fodor, he does not trace the workings of “postmarxism” to flawed ideas of
“reforms” and “progress,” but instead discusses at length its destructive effects
on society. As Enyedi notes, for Tellér “Globalization, neoliberalism, consumer-
ism, privatization to foreign investors and cosmopolitanism” are all “interrelated
and carefully managed processes aimed at establishing the world dominance of
certain economic and political powers” (Enyedi 2016a, 11).
Yet in his 2009 text Tellér is quite explicit about these “certain external
forces”: “Israel, USA, EU, Russia, ‘The Symbolical Investor’ and ‘his’ inter-
national organizations: WB [World Bank], IMF [International Monetary Fund],
WTO [World Trade Organization] and so on” (Tellér 2009, 984). Tellér adopts a
mythical perspective, from which an ideal-typical actor—the “Symbolic
Investor”—moves history over “hundreds, perhaps even better to say thousands
of years” (Tellér 2009, 987). History thus becomes a mythical battle between the
good (i.e. “national communities”) and the evil deeds of the “Symbolic Investor”
and the forces that represent him and enslave countries by using, in particular,
the tool of the “debt trap,” put to use against Hungary from the 1970s (Tellér
2009, 987; 2014). In an almost textbook example of anti-Semitism, another 2009
text depicts “Jews” as playing a central part in this conflict by bringing Stalinist
communism to Hungary, and then “reforming it” against János Kádár (Tellér
2009, 349; 2014). His analysis recalls the almost century-old debate between
cosmopolitan urbanists and populists in Hungary of the 1930s (Körösényi 1991)
but extends it by applying the same categories of analysis also to the communist
and post-communist periods and by framing “Jews” as an “anti-national” pres-
ence undertaking to enslave the country.11
Conclusions
In this chapter we have portrayed two intellectual positions that strove to formu-
late the ideational and ideological footing of the Orbán regime. On the one hand,
there is what we called the “Századvég group,” a group that is well anchored in
the wider “conservative” scene in Hungary and partly also internationally and
has attempted roughly since 2002 in a long series of publications to formulate
new political ideas for influencing the decades to come. On the other hand, more
right-wing intellectuals, serving in the first Fidesz cabinet as advisors to the
prime minister, represent the other pole of Fidesz-aligned right-wing thinking.
Tellér, Orbán’s main advisor since 2010 and a key figure for the Fidesz program
also before 2010, best represents this latter position that features no common
formal affiliation except for Fidesz membership. Tellér seems to have less
interest in influencing public or academic debates than does the Századvég group
but is all the same credited with considerable influence over Orbán.
These two positions share one important feature: their point of departure is
“post-communism,” understood as a deeply problematic political system or
regime. The authors of these two positions differ in their explanations of how far
back and how deeply the roots of post-communism go: Stumpf only dates them
back to the actual start of the post-communist period—the “Roundtable
Accords.” Lánczi and Fodor dig deeper and trace them to the very beginnings of
“modernity.” Going even further, Tellér sees post-communism as one side in an
eternal battle between good and evil. The latter three intellectuals all emphasize
that the liberal celebration of individual rights and freedom needs to be replaced
by an order that commits individuals to community-based virtues, be they of
Christian (Lánczi, Fodor) or more “ancient” (Tellér) origins. In this sense, these
positions are indeed conservative and similar to those of authors elsewhere in
Europe who seek to formulate a conservative consensus (see for instance the
paleoconservative thinking of Roger Scruton, Goss 2006). And similar to conser-
vative positions elsewhere, at least in this respect (Lakoff 2010 [1996]), the Hun-
garian conservatives’ attack on “post-communism” is basically a moralizing
frame: liberals and post-communists are guilty not so much of designing faulty
interventions with false aims, but of ignoring questions of the morality of such
interventions, and about the character of the interventionist design itself. Only a
“normative” state, willing to and capable of recognizing and formulating norm-
ative issues, can deal with the country’s problems. Tellér and the associated
wider group of right-wing advisors and intellectuals disillusioned with liberalism
go further, to make the nation into the central victim of dangerous liberalism.
It is striking that Századvég intellectuals’ discourses mainly feature Western
references. In contrast to the claims made about the “Eastern roots” of Hunga-
ry’s illiberal democracy, as defined in Orbán’s infamous illiberalism speech
(Müller 2014; Simonyi 2014; Zakaria 2014), there is no evidence of an Eastern
imprint on the ideational foundations of the new Hungarian regime. The refer-
ence sources of the Századvég group, consisting mostly of lawyers, historians,
and political theorists, exhibit Western, conservative-leaning influences more
than even autochthonous Hungarian sources. Many of these influences relate to
questions about the “quality of democracy” and the necessity of a “hard govern-
ment” (Fodor and Stumpf 2007). Another interesting, often-cited reference is
Norwegian sociologist Stein Ringen’s work that develops an outcome-focused
definition of democracy versus a procedural or liberal one (Ringen 2009). In this
way, the mentioned Hungarian positions might in fact be seen as part of an inter-
national debate on the role of the state and contemporary representative demo-
cracy in the Western world.
Yet the Western conservative lineage that Hungarian intellectuals seek is a
special one. With Leo Strauss and especially Eric Voegelin and Thomas Molnar,
a lineage is constructed that allows Hungarian conservatives to critically distance
themselves from conservatism in the form of classical, laissez-faire liberalism
that in Hungary is best embodied by the Hayek Society (currently the Hayek
Club that claims to be the right-wing “capitalist” opposition to the ruling Fidesz).
Their preoccupation is not so much with the founding father of capitalist laissez-
faire thought (Adam Smith) and its later advocates (Friedrich Hayek, Milton
Friedman), but, in line with Strauss, Voegelin, and Molnar, with the legacy of
ancient Greek statecraft and in particular the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.
This preoccupation translates into a rejection of “modernity” understood as the
Enlightenment challenging central political and religious authorities and culmi-
nating in the 1789 Revolution. Given this approach, it is no wonder that their
writings are particularly at odds with the idea of an “open society” as posited by
Karl Popper, that is, as an achievement to be defended precisely against the
“Spell of Plato” (the subtitle of Popper’s first volume of The Open Society and
its Enemies). From this perspective, the Századvég intellectuals’ unequivocal
support for an “active” state looks less reconcilable with (Western) conservative
ideas highly skeptical of strong states. Yet importantly here, the debate is not so
much about the limits of the state, but about addressing a problematic situation
in which the liberal state was very far from the conservative intellectuals’ notion
of the public good, and incapable of giving society a normative orientation. In
contrast to such a situation, conservative intellectuals portray the ideal Hungar-
ian state as a “neo-Weberian” state model thought best to replace the “wholesale
sell-out” of public assets and the excessive embracement of the ideas of “new
public management” by previous (socialist) governments (Stumpf 2009). Instead
of a market-oriented, “lean” government, espoused but never really implemented
by the socialists, which was seen to have served foreign business interests to the
detriment of public good, Hungarian conservatives envision a new, centralized
state which should follow the ideal of an effective, “hard government.”
Notes
1 Fidesz is the acronym for Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, which translates as the
“Alliance of Young Democrats.”
2 For a full English transcript of the speech, see http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/
full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592.
3 For a discussion of the context in which Orbán made this statement, see Balogh
(2012).
4 Thomas Molnar (1921–2010), a Hungarian-born American conservative and Catholic
philosopher, friend of Russell Kirk and admirer of Eric Voegelin, was as committed
to criticizing liberalism as he was to taking issue with socialism. Perhaps most inter-
estingly for the Hungarian conservatives studied here who generally oppose liberal-
ism, Molnar also criticized American conservatism of the “optimist[ic]”—the
“what-can-we-do-about-it…” type—as being just “an updated copy of nineteenth-
century liberalism,” and basically committing the same error of “assum[ing] that man
is free to shape [his] destiny”; Molnar argued that Voegelin shared exactly the same
positions (Molnar 1981, 383).
5 Short for Utolsó Figyelmeztetés (“The Final Warning”).
6 The governmental contracts with Századvég in 2016 were valued at 38 million euro in
total and were shrouded in mystery. It took a lengthy trial for the press to get a glimpse
into the 77,000 pages delivered by Századvég to the government in 2012–14 for
12 million euro; see Erdélyi (2016) and http://index.hu/belfold/2012/04/02/a_bizalmas_
think_tank/; http://valasz.hu/itthon/az-onmerseklet-mindig-nagyon-jo-tanacsado-44957/.
7 For more information see the Center’s webpage at www.europeanrenewal.org/main/
page.php?page_id=1.
8 Another well-known politician disillusioned with the liberals’ decision to form a gov-
ernment with the former communists is Péter Tölgyessy, a leader of the liberal
SZDSZ party and of the parliamentary group, who, in a way similar to Tellér,
switched from SZDSZ to Fidesz while a member of the 1998–2002 parliament.
9 Bogár often publishes in “traditionalist” outlets of the far right, promoting a vision of
society uncorrupted by “modernity” and the return to an allegedly original religion of
humanity, and praising such far-right thinkers as Julius Evola (a chief reference for
Italian rightist terror groups of the 1970s). Yet long before the rise of the far-right
party “Jobbik” and its traditionalist publication “Magyar Hüperión,” it was Fidesz that
backed the creation of an institute dedicated to Bélá Hamvas, Hungary’s key exponent
of traditionalism. The institute, which still exists today, is headed by Fidesz politician
Ágnes Hankiss and sees its central mission in researching the potential of “modern
conservatism.”
10 For a sympathetic review of the book see Posá (1998).
11 For the framing of “Jews” as an anti-national force, which characterizes much of anti-
Semitic discourse, see Weyand (2016).
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5 New conservatism in Poland
The discourse coalition around Law
and Justice
Ewa Dąbrowska
Introduction
With the victory of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in
both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015, Polish liberal media,
among them Gazeta Wyborcza, turned their attention to the milieu of conser-
vative intellectuals (Majcherek 2015; Czupryn 2016). These had discursively
supported Jarosław Kaczyński’s party during the election and provided it with
some crucial concepts. Among them were: “subjectivity” (podmiotowość),
meaning capability of the subject to act and develop and implying that the
Polish nation should become a subject of its own history, “Fourth Republic,” a
conservative alternative to the post-communist Third Republic, or “pedagogy of
shame” (pedagogika wstydu), denoting post-communist liberals’ alleged policy
to educate the society by imbuing it with shame for the nation’s crimes and its
backwardness. Until then, this milieu had attracted little interest in the main-
stream media. The Law and Justice party and especially its chairman Jarosław
Kaczyński were presented in it as a danger to democracy—not as a constructive
political force with a set of ideas as to how to reform the Polish Third Republic,
which was how Polish conservatives, the majority of whom supported
Kaczyński politically, viewed themselves. Since the mid-1990s they were busy
criticizing the form the Polish liberal democracy had taken and the particular
kind of “political capitalism” and “post-communism” that had emerged in the
early years of transformation. This initially small circle of intellectuals grew
substantially during the 2000s, integrating a younger generation and developing
a full-fledged political ideology of alternative conservative modernization that
Poland should embrace, in their view. This ideology stood in opposition to the
dominant narrative that Poland should catch up with the West by means of neo-
liberal reforms.
This chapter turns to questions of the role of discursive organizations of con-
servatism in post-1989 Poland, how they were connected to political parties, in
particular to PiS, and how they contributed to political change under PiS, both in
2005–07 and after 2015. It describes its organizational infrastructure, introduces
its main concepts and storylines, and connects the latter to actual political and
economic developments of the 1990s and 2000s.
New conservatism in Poland 93
By pointing to the elaborate discursive strategies of Polish conservatives, I
argue that conservative intellectuals paved the way for the “conservative revolu-
tion” effected by Law and Justice. The former greatly contributed to recent polit-
ical change by establishing a conservative discourse that was an alternative to
the dominant neoliberalism in its post-communist variety. To enhance this argu-
ment, I elaborate on the conservatives’ links to PiS and to Kaczyński himself,
emphasizing however that the conservative milieu should not be equated with
the intellectual base of PiS, because it was split over the question of the legiti-
macy of Kaczyński-led institutional change since 2015, and in particular the dis-
mantling of the independent Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, there is
substantial overlap between Kaczyński’s political ideology and the broader dis-
course of Polish conservatives.
There is scant academic literature on the ideas behind the political change
realized by PiS since 2015. The most popular explanation for the coming to
power of PiS is populism and populist politics. Shields (2012, 2015) sees popu-
lism as a reaction to the neoliberalization of the Polish economy and society, a
pattern that is common to all capitalist societies, and in particular peripheral
ones. For Shields (2012, 360), Polish populism is based on the same rhetorical
figure of thought as occurs elsewhere: a juxtaposition of the “corrupt elite”
versus the “pure people.” Furthermore, Shields (ibid., 363) argues that populism
tends to contain contradictory ideas (conservative and revolutionary at the same
time) because its actual content is less relevant than its function in a “neoliberal-
ized” society. However, while Polish conservatives like to refer to the juxta-
position of “elite” versus “people” or “nation,” this does not comprise their
entire argument as to why an overwhelming political transformation of the post-
1989 order is necessary. The conservatives’ search for meaning and moral
renewal encompasses more than a wish for replacing the post-communist elite
and catering to the demands of the people (Kofta et al. 2016). Their ideational
proposition is comprehensive, structured, and sufficiently well argued to be
taken seriously. Below I explain the “added value” of the concept of conserva-
tism vis-à-vis one of populism for enabling us to explain the radical change in
Polish politics in more detail.
A further tentative explanation for the growing popularity of PiS and its elect-
oral victory is in terms of an alternative or parallel civil society (Peto et al. 2016;
Ekiert 2017). Accordingly, the Church, right-wing discursive agencies, and polit-
ical organizations established a dense network of non-governmental organiza-
tions capable of mobilizing supporters of rightist politics. Until 2015 scholars of
civil society tended to overlook those organizations and instead to focus on
“liberal” civil society. The PiS electoral victory made them turn their attention to
those overlooked structures. My explanation, in terms of conservative discourse
and organizations producing it, relates to this tentative argument that could be
framed as “an alternative civil society.” Indeed, conservative think tanks and
research institutes do constitute a pro-PiS civil society that challenges the liberal
concept of it. However, the focus here is on discourse-producing organizations
and their relations to structures of power and omits the Church on the one hand
94 Ewa Dąbrowska
and nationalist and proto-fascist organizations on the other. While all of them
share elements of a conservative discourse, the latter two kinds of organizations
engage much less in intellectual production than think tanks and research insti-
tutes and are therefore outside of the scope of this chapter.
Bucholc (2016) and Bucholc and Komornik (2016) turn to ideas of Polish
conservatives when explaining the crisis around the Polish Constitutional Court
which has led to an exchange of judges and politicization of this institution.
They refer to these ideas as “the conservative utopia” that wants to replace the
society (the demos) by the nation. This nation—that the government claims to
represent—rejects procedural democracy, behind which there is supposedly no
substance. While Bucholc (2016) and Bucholc and Komornik (2016) describe
well this utopia and its function in justifying the anti-democratic turn of the PiS
government, they do not trace its discursive origins. The current chapter intends
to fill this gap.
To explain the coming to power of PiS and its aftermath, this chapter argues
that conservatism is the discourse informing politics and policymaking under
PiS, and providing this party with a specific political ideology. Conservative dis-
cursive actors have been working on this ideology already since the mid-1990s.
This does not imply a teleological vision of the world, according to which con-
servatism had to become a dominant political ideology through the discursive
efforts of conservatism. A change in politics and policymaking did not need to
happen: conservatism could have stayed just an alternative discourse to neo-
liberalism and socialism, with its own believers and organizations, but without
much affecting Polish politics. Nevertheless, the discursive efforts of conserva
tives contributed to the popularity of criticism of the Third Republic and with
that, the notion of a “Fourth Republic” in 2005, making the electoral victory of
Law and Justice more probable. In 2015 voters once again gave a chance to the
set of ideas associated with conservatism, which was because of their disappoint-
ment with the performance of the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (Platforma
Obywatelska, PO) that had been in power in 2007–15. Yet, here again, such a
political development was contingent on many factors, not just on the production
of conservative discourse.
In treating Kaczyński’s political ideology as an undercurrent of general Polish
post-1989 conservatism, I argue that the latter is a much larger discourse and
that the two should not be equated. Nevertheless, PiS chairman Kaczyński integ-
rated many elements of the conservative discourse into his political ideology;
especially criticism of the democratic-liberal Third Republic—as benefiting
former communists and a part of the Solidarność elite that allied with them—
was an element common both to PiS and to the larger conservative movement.
Furthermore, both the narrower ideology of Kaczyński and PiS, and the larger
conservative discourse, have implied that the state should be strong, sovereign
and capable of pursuing national interest, not least in terms of the economy.
Accordingly, the legal structures of the state, social and economic policy, but
also the “politics of memory,” should all be subordinated to this interest, defined
as if the nation were an all-encompassing entity.
Opting for the term “conservatism” and emphasizing conservatives’ search
for meaning and morality in the social order does not mean that I doubt there is
an authoritarian dimension to Polish politics under PiS. Indeed, I recognize an
illiberal and even authoritarian character of the political solutions that PiS has
been implementing since its victory in late 2015. This authoritarian drive is not
least based on a sense of moral superiority that the Kaczyński faction feels vis-à-
vis the remaining political elite. The conservative revolution à la Kaczyński does
aim in essence at moral renewal and that is why its representatives feel entitled
to an authoritarian turn. Those dimensions of Kaczyński’s rule not only do not
contradict each other, they constitute two sides of the same coin.
In this chapter, I follow the theoretical-methodological approach of discourse
analysis proposed by Hajer (2006). His clear and practical concepts help to struc-
ture Polish political debates of the 1990s and 2000s around a few main issues
and to examine both debates and organizations at the same time. Thus, to follow
Hajer (2006, 71), Polish conservatism can be defined as a discourse coalition.
This term implies not only actors sharing a certain discourse, but also the dis-
course itself—a set of “ideas, categories and concepts,” as well as the social
practices and institutions sustaining it. After Eggertsson (1990, 70), institutions
are sets of “political and organizational” practices that are guided by cognitive
schemata. Hajer’s definition of discourse coalition implies that there are com-
peting coalitions representing different discourses. Since this is a chapter on
Polish conservatism, other coalitions are mentioned only indirectly. The dis-
course itself is organized around “emblematic issues” that represent larger prob-
lems, but also “narratives” or “storylines” having a beginning, middle and an
end, though these are not always formulated at length in a conversation or in a
text, but sometimes just hinted at. Using cues instead of full story lines may risk
actors’ being unaware that they are not always understanding them the way they
are intended to be. Because of a variety of discourses in a certain society, an
emblematic issue may mean different things to different actors. Even within the
same speech, different discourses may come up. The following only deals with
conservatives’ responses to “emblematic issues” discussed in Polish society in
the 1990s and 2000s and the storylines they came up with, while paying little
attention to other discourse coalitions. Related to this are instances of “discourse
structuration”—identifiable moments when a particular discourse becomes
dominant in the society. There occasionally also follows “discourse institutional-
ization” when discourses become ingrained in social practices and institutions
and thus even more powerful (Hajer 2006, 70).
As concerns conservatism as such, it is discourse containing both universal
and nationally specific elements. This means that Russian, Hungarian, and Polish
conservatism should share a number of features but differ with respect to spe-
cific national traditions and values. The general features of conservatism
(Freeden 1996) understands as not just glorifying tradition and rejecting change,
but as accepting only a particular kind of change: one re-establishing the “natural
order” that at the same time is a moral one. As if echoing Freeden’s specifica-
tions, Polish conservatives extensively discuss their attitude toward change in
96 Ewa Dąbrowska
their internal debates. Having faced first the communist system and then the
post-communist Third Republic, they obviously demand changes, even major
ones. As historical reference points they use the First Polish Republic
(1454–1795), a romantic epoch extending from the late eighteenth to the mid-
nineteenth century, during which Poland was divided between Prussia, Austria,
and Russia, as well as the early Solidarność period (1980–81). Referring to those
periods in Polish history as well as to the national tradition in general, they con-
struct a modern conservative order to be established in place of the post-
communist one. Therefore, Polish conservatives’ attitude to change is a
counter-intuitive one. When the contemporary epoch is structured by institutions
that conservatives deem unnatural and running counter to relevant traditions, a
change or even a revolution in the name of conservatism is legitimate, in their
worldview. And Polish conservatives certainly view communism and post-
communism as unnatural and detrimental to the nation.
Development of conservatism as an alternative to liberalism

and social democracy
The following shows how conservatism developed as a discursive alternative to
liberalism and socialism over the last two decades of communism and in the
post-communist period in Poland. This continuity of an intellectual and political
current of conservatism strengthens the main argument of this book: that the
dominating political alternative to neoliberalism in Poland, Hungary, and Russia
is not populism or nationalism, but conservatism. Conservative actors in Poland,
beginning in the late 1970s and acting with much more resolve in the 1990s and
2000s, developed an intellectual and political infrastructure featuring cultural
magazines, publishing houses, political clubs, and parties, and vigorously engag-
ing in major political debates. These organizations existed parallel to liberal,
liberal-conservative and social-democratic ones and were part of the organiza-
tional landscape of the Polish democracy. Conservative organizations inter-
mingled to some degree with structures of the state as well as with those of the
Church, but constituted at the same time a certain niche, since they promoted
storylines about the post-1989 political and social order that were not reflected in
mainstream media. This order was constituted by neoliberal political and eco-
nomic ideology, and remnants of communist institutions and practices, therefore,
conservative discursive organizations and their storylines were not much known
to the general public. Polish conservatism was largely an intellectual phenom-
enon, and only gained larger attention in Polish society thanks to its occasional
links with politics and the Church. Its impact on Polish politics was a discursive
one. The following describes the intellectual infrastructure of conservatism in
Poland and how it responded to major political developments of the 1990s and
2000s.
Polish post-war conservatism has its origins in the late 1970s and is partly
connected with the opposition movement. The best-known conservative organ-
ization of that time was the Young Poland Movement (Ruch Młodej Polski) led
by Aleksander Hall, who later became an important Polish politician. Hall tried
to politically resurrect the concept of the nation and rethink the state, not as
opposing the nation, but as realizing national interest, referring thereby to the
non-radical part of the legacy of Roman Dmowski (1864–1939), a Polish nation-
alist thinker and politician of the interwar period (Matyja 2015, 207). Such polit-
ical ideas were ahead of their time; however, they were to some degree realized
in the early Solidarność movement, which had a strong Christian and national
component. In post-1989 Poland, the traditionalist legacy of the early Solidarity
was one of the motives conservatives referred to in their discourse.
After the transition to liberal democracy, the intellectual milieu of conserva
tives began to form itself in the mid-1990s. This period of time was not acciden-
tal. The election of a post-communist candidate to the presidency in 1995,
following the victory of post-communists in the parliamentary election of 1993,
deeply troubled conservative-minded Poles. This double victory can count as
emblematic for the society’s disappointment with liberal democracy and with the
liberal and conservative politicians that were responsible for the shape this
democracy took. In particular, economic decisions of the former Solidarność
camp led to high unemployment and institutionalized insecurity.
Following the shock of the victory of post-communists, conservatives decided
to engage in discursive work to elaborate Polish conservatism as a full-fledged
alternative to liberalism and socialism, and to promote their values in Polish
society. The circle of the Warsaw Club of Political Critique organized regular
readings of the classics of Western conservatism as well as of Greek philo-
sophers, in order to refine its political philosophy. Conservatives from this circle
wanted to “educate the children of those who took over the banks” in order to
engender a change in the dominant cultural and political discourse in the future
(Janek 2007, quoted in Stefanek 2013, 22). The circle met in the apartment of
Marek Cichocki, who later became a consultant to President Lech Kaczyński.
Tomasz Merta also belonged, a future undersecretary in the Ministry of Culture
(2005–10) and consultant to PiS in cultural affairs and the project of the
Fourth Republic. Kwartalnik Polityczny (Political Quarterly) was their main
publication.
Another conservative milieu that emerged in 1993 in Cracow had ambitions
similar to those of the Warsaw Club of Political Critique. It set out to offer an
intellectual alternative to post-communism and liberalism and to mobilize those
“25 percent of Polish society” representing conservative values who were out-
raged over the political comeback of the post-communists (Nowak [1996] 2005).
Conservatives related to Arcana, a cultural magazine founded by Ryszard
Legutko, perceived it as a strategic task to change the dominant political ideo-
logy in Poland and to imbue the new Polish democracy with their values (ibid.).
The Center of Political Thought (Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej) that had been estab-
lished in 1992, supported Arcana in this goal, attracting not only Andrzej Nowak
and Ryszard Legutko, but also Rafał Matyja, Kazimierz Ujazdowski, Bronisław
Wildstein, and Zdzisław Krasnodębski, all of whom were important figures in
orchestrating the conservative-populist turns in Polish politics in 2005 and 2015.
98 Ewa Dąbrowska
Next to Arcana, a publication of younger conservatives with the title Fronda,
represented by a generation of conservatives born in the 1950s and 1960s,
emerged in 1994. Fronda was published by two charismatic editors-in-chief,
Rafał Smoczyński and Grzegorz Górny, who made it a place of vigorous debate.
According to conservative insiders such as Filip Memches, the years 1994–2001
represented a golden age in the history of Fronda, during which young Polish
conservatism was still in the process of defining itself (Memches 2013). After
2001, when Smoczyński left its editorship, Fronda turned to the fight with “the
civilization of death,” waging a campaign against abortion, homosexuality, and
left-liberalism and losing its intellectual niveau, according to Memches.
Another milieu within the conservative discourse coalition that emerged in
reaction to political and economic developments of the 1990s was related to the
magazine Debata, published by Waldemar Gasper, in which the concept of
“political capitalism” was formulated for the first time as a diagnosis of the
malaise of the post-1989 political-economic system. The concept referred to
elaborate links between business and politics in Poland and in particular to the
post-communist political elite’s prominent role in the post-1989 economy. A
local Warsaw newspaper, Życie Warszawy, employing many journalists with
conservative views, described those links in 1995 as a “red cobweb” (Zaremba
2010, 182).
Criticism of “political capitalism” led conservative thinkers to propose a
strategy for the renewal of the Polish state. A conservative magazine, The New
State, which emerged in 1997, published shortly thereafter an analysis by Rafał
Matyja in which the author demanded a break with the post-communist order
and the introduction of a new one that he proposed to call the “Fourth Republic.”
This discourse criticizing the post-communist elites for misusing their political
position to take control of state enterprises and to establish companies likely to
receive public contracts also appeared in the mainstream media. Gazeta
Wyborcza still legitimized the “grey” system of post-communism, but the newly
established conservative newspaper Życie published a series of articles in 1997
criticizing both the post-communist elite’s excessive involvement in big business
and the lack of will on the part of the more general political elite, including the
conservative milieu, to correct this state of affairs (ibid., 182–3). A similar turn
to the right took place in public television, which employed in the mid-1990s
several young journalists with conservative views, the so-called pampersy
(“pampers wearers”). This changed the media discourse and paved the way for
the victory of the Solidarność political elites unified in the party AWS (Akcja
Wyborcza Solidarność, “Solidarity Electoral Action”) under the leadership of
Marian Krzaklewski.
A further push was given to the discursive coalition of Polish conservatives
by the Rywin affair in 2002. It related to an offer made by the Polish film pro-
ducer Lew Rywin to the editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, Adam Michnik.
The offer concerned a potential adjustment to the law on public television in the
interest of the publishing house behind Gazeta Wyborcza, if the latter paid a
bribe to the SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, “Democratic Left Alliance”),
the post-communist party in power. The affair was an emblematic issue in the
Polish political debate as it exposed connections between business, politics, and
media in Poland and hinted at the existence of a “group holding power,” an
expression that Rywin used in his conversation with Michnik. Conservative poli-
ticians have subsequently long tried to identify members of this group. The affair
popularized conservative criticism of the Third Republic, making the period
2003–05 an apogee of conservative influence, according to one notable conser-
vative, Rafał Matyja (2015). During this period, the Jagielloński Club (Klub
Jagielloński) from Cracow, established already in 1994, became known for its
fresh political perspectives in the style of an “avant-garde” or “revolutionary”
conservatism (Rojek 2016). Most members of the Club were in their twenties
and thirties. Since 2002 the Club has been publishing a magazine, Pressje, that
offers deep and thorough analyses of the topics dear to Polish conservatives,
such as Catholic political thought, Catholic social ethic, nationalism, the politics
of submission and subjectivity, and others.
Also in 2002 the conservative St. Nicholas Foundation (Fundacja Świętego
Mikołaja) emerged, establishing the magazine Teologia Polityczna (Political Theo-
logy). While Polish conservatism as a whole is devoted to the promotion of Chris-
tian values, a few publishing initiatives have been particularly close to the Polish
Catholic Church and have engaged in the elaboration of a Polish political theology
and a Polish version of messianism. Among these, Teologia Polityczna, Christian-
itas, and 44/Czterdzieści i Cztery (44/Forty and Four) stand out as the most
important and ambitious. Christianitas was established in 1999 and was published
initially by the Club of the Catholic Book and from 2005 by the St. Benedict
Foundation. 44/Czterdzieści i Cztery was initiated almost a decade later (2008) by
journalists related previously to Fronda. All these cultural magazines are devoted
to political and religious philosophers such as Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948), Eric
Voegelin (1901–85), Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874–1936), and to elaborating the
spiritual foundations of a new political and social order for Poland.
Conservative discursive organizations did not cease to emerge after 2005.
With the coming to power of PiS following the 2005 election, conservative think
tanks, discussion clubs, and other organizations mobilized to accompany the
emerging Fourth Republic. The Sobieski Institute (Instytut Sobieskiego) was
established to advise the government on political and economic matters. While
initially striving to unite conservatism and liberalism, this institute was more and
more inspired by ideas of a strong and efficient state, and effective and elaborate
social and economic policies, and turned away from the idea of deregulation. Its
director, Paweł Szałamacha, wrote four years later a book called The Fourth
Republic and in 2015 took a post in the PiS government. But even after the re-
election in 2007 of the opposition party PO, conservative discursive organiza-
tions continued to develop and refine their arguments. In 2007 the discussion
platform Ronin’s Club” (Klub Ronina) was established, and in 2009 the Repub-
lican Foundation (Fundacja Republikańska).
The following are the main tenets of the conservative discourse, which
show how Polish conservatives have reflected real experience of the post-1989
100 Ewa Dąbrowska
transformation, and what positive vision of Polish modernization they have since
had in mind, also with reference to Christianity.
The conservative discourse

Polish conservatives felt unease with respect to the emerging Third Republic
from 1989 onward. According to them, the democratic-liberal order was not
based on values and tradition, but instead, selected elements of tradition were
used in it instrumentally with the purpose of legitimating the status quo
(Cichocki 2013, 9; Gawin 2013, 18). There was no grand project behind the
Third Republic that would draw on the Polish tradition of “Sarmatian Republi-
canism,” romanticism, and the early Solidarność movement, references that
conservatives would have wished for (Mazur and Rojek 2012; Stefanek 2013,
54). The Sarmatian Republic, sometimes called the “First Polish Republic,” was
a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth featuring proto-democratic institutions
governed by nobility. For conservatives, all those periods in Polish history
were characterized by a strong value-orientation that they missed in post-1989
Poland. Instead, in their view, the new order was “post-communist” above all.
Here follow the main weaknesses of the post-1989 order according to Polish
conservatives.
Criticism of the Third Republic

The conservatives’ main criticism of the Third Republic is the continuity they
see between the elites of the old and the new system. The new elites were to a
large degree people who had already held high positions in political, military,
and secret service structures in communist times. This new-old elite entered a
pact with a part of Solidarność elites to keep an order in place that served their
interests. Jarosław Kaczyński often uses the catchword układ, meaning an
arrangement between former communists and left-liberal Solidarność elites that
covers politics and business. This arrangement served in reality as a sort of polit-
ical strategy on the part of selected Solidarność members to persuade commu-
nists to share power with the opposition. The policy of drawing a line under the
communist period by renouncing on the prosecution of communist political
elites was considered a realist strategy to be able to transition to democracy at
all. This strategy was discussed in Solidarność circles already in the early 1980s
and found its expression in the roundtable negotiations from 6 February to 5
April 1989, as well as in the first democratic election on 4 June 1989, followed
by the second round on 18 June 1989. According to the conservative historian
Andrzej Nowak ([1996] 2005), both the communists themselves as well as the
part of the Solidarność elite that was in favor of the arrangement were surprised
by the smashing victory of the Solidarność camp, which they saw as a certain
break with the arrangement. For Nowak and other conservatives, the non-
communist part of the emerging political elite ignored the voice of the nation
as expressed in the election on 4 June on the grounds that it did not fit the
arrangement. That is why they decided in favor of a second round of elections
designed in a way to assure the communists of more seats in the Parliament than
they would have had following the first round (ibid.).
While the układ argument resembles the populist juxtaposition of “corrupt
elite” versus “pure people,” it refers to a very particular kind of corruption—a
supposedly morally doubtful collusion between a part of the Solidarność elite
and communists/post-communists that inhibited a true de-communization of
the Polish society and politics in supposedly free Poland. This failed de-
communization had consequences for the quality of the system that was built
after 1989, transforming what was thought to be a new order of liberal demo-
cracy into “post-communism.”
The essence of this collusion was—according to the conservative narrative—
the choice of a procedural legal structure that supposedly inhibited the effective-
ness of the state and comprehensive political action. “Procedural” means in this
context that democracy is defined by procedures making up a system of checks
and balances and separation of powers between the parliament, government, and
courts. The preference of the post-communist elite for procedural structures of
checks and balances in a liberal democracy was explained by Kaczyński as being
in this elite’s alleged interest in weakening the state. The inefficiency of the post-
communist state was thus regarded by this political formation not just as a struc-
tural problem inherited from communism, but as the result of a lack of political
will on the part of the post-communist elite to reform it, which was related to
this elite’s interest in keeping both political and economic power in the new
order. That is why conservatives demanded a break with the Third Republic and
the establishment of the Fourth Republic. They criticize the (present) 1997
constitution, which was approved as a compromise between the dominant polit-
ical forces of that period, with the post-communist president Aleksander
Kwaśniewski setting the conciliatory tone of this highest state document.
Kwaśniewski was (and is) one of the figures most hated by the conservative
milieu. He represented for conservatives a lack of values and an exclusive
interest orientation that they saw as typical of post-communist politicians.
Anyone who pursued a political career during communism becoming a liberal
democrat after 1989 was for conservatives highly suspicious. Consequently, a
constitution that is made in the spirit of the post-communist period would not be
of any value to conservatives. From the early 1990s they called for a moral
renewal and rejection of post-communist values and practices, which would cul-
minate later in their notion of the Fourth Republic.
The most salient aspect of the storyline about elite continuity between com-
munist and post-communist times that supposedly resulted in the moral decay of
the early post-communist period was the alleged crucial role of secret services in
orchestrating the political and economic transformation and in securing the
(post-)communist elites’ interests in the new order. One of the most important
conservative intellectuals—Andrzej Zybertowicz—wrote already in 1993 a book
suggesting that a major role was being played by these secret services in realiz-
ing the transition to democracy and capitalism (Zybertowicz 1993). Zybertowicz
102 Ewa Dąbrowska
works today as a consultant to President Andrzej Duda and discursively
accompanies the PiS-made “good change” agenda with his commentaries in the
media. According to Zybertowicz, there was a conspiracy among the ruling elite of
communist times—including a consensus with a part of the Solidarność elite—to
share the spoils gained with the new economic system. This argument captured a
feeling of frustration with the results of economic reforms of the early 1990s that
stole the promise of prosperity that democratic capitalism had supposedly offered.
The narrative of post-communism as affected by the disease of communism
because of the continuity of the elite between two epochs was told not only by
the political scientist Zybertowicz, but also by the sociologist Jadwiga Stanisz-
kis, who also initially supported the rise of Law and Justice in becoming a major
political force, but dared to criticize its authoritarian style in the post-2015
period. Staniszkis’s theory of post-communism equally implied that employees
of the communist secret services had anticipated a system change in the 1980s,
and were clever enough to materially secure their survival in the new system
(Staniszkis 1999). With their institutional privileges, they could gain the most
profitable assets of the state enterprises that underwent first spontaneous, and
then regulated privatization. While this theory is based on some evidence, it can
nevertheless be challenged. The argument of the excessive role of former secret
service members in the early transformation can be weakened by pointing to the
fact that the Ministry of Domestic Affairs had only 24,000 employees on the eve
of transformation. These were just a drop in the sea of newly emerged Polish
entrepreneurs and owners and could have hardly collected all the rents generated
by the economy of that time.
Rejection of post-communism was not just based on economic frustration
and envy. Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński were a part of a milieu that offered a
moral perspective on communism. They fought it on moral grounds and could
not tolerate remnants of it being incarnated into a new system that was sup-
posed to be more just and free. In their narrative, widely shared in Polish
society and even in milieus not related to PiS, communism is on the one hand
responsible for Poland’s backwardness.1 On the other hand, as in Andrzej
Nowak’s account, conservatives treat communism as a disease that is deterio-
rating social life and undermining civilization. Communism implies the absence
of respect for private property and is driven by anarchic and destructive forces,
as Nowak and colleagues argue. They would never forgive a Polish intellectual
who flirted with communism in the interwar period or in the 1940s and 1950s.
Such intellectuals’ contribution to Polish culture after their defection from com-
munism is not valued by conservatives, as they perceive such intellectuals’
oeuvre as irreversibly contaminated by communism. For the Kaczyńskis and
their supporters, only an authentic moral renewal would bring the communist
epoch to an actual end.
Yet, these conservatives criticized not only remnants of communism in the
new political and socio-economic system. They were equally against the neolib-
eral model of the economy. As Andrzej Nowak ([1996] 2005, 35) put it in his
programmatic text “Our principles, our nation”:
Poland is not […] a barbaric community, on which socio-economic reforms
following models elaborated at the interface between the ‘Institute for Basic
Problems of Marxism Leninism’ and the ‘Harvard University School of
Economics’ should be tried out. Poland is grounded in a mature national
culture, with particular principles of social life that are anchored in history,
tradition, culture and prejudices.
This quotation summarizes conservatives’ perspective on an appropriate polit-

ical, social, and economic order. Such an order should emerge from within a
nation and be consistent with this nation’s values and not be imposed from above
with reference to supposedly universal principles and procedures. Thus, a neo-
liberal approach to economics ignores the essential needs and potential of the
Polish economy.
A neoliberal model of economic policy, as was dominant in the 1990s and
2000s, implied for instance that capital has no nationality. In line with this
model, a specific industrial policy in support of the national economy was not
necessary. Such a policy would only have inhibited the dynamics of the market
that yield the most efficient allocation of resources. As the Polish Minister of
Industry in the years 1989–91, Tadeusz Syryjczyk, said, “the best industrial
policy is none at all.” Accordingly, no government support was given to numer-
ous state enterprises, including shipyards, the workers in which particularly
opposed communism and participated in strikes and in the Solidarność move-
ment of the 1970s and 1980s. Even relatively prosperous enterprises were denied
preferential credit and subsidies in the early 1990s, which would have given
them necessary time to adjust to market conditions (Wójcik 2015). Big enter-
prises of the early transition period were either forced to go bankrupt or taken
over by foreign investors, many of whom forced those companies to produce
minor elements in their production chain or go bankrupt (ibid.). Thus, economic
foundations of the new Polish democracy were politically highly controversial, a
fact that especially young conservatives used to their advantage by capitalizing
on discontent with neoliberal reforms in Polish society.
On the whole, within Polish conservatism there was an equally strong pro-
market and anti-state current that, however, gradually faded away in the after-
math of the global financial crisis (2008–09), even though the Polish economy
proved surprisingly resilient in the face of that crisis. Polish conservatives were
not against liberalism as such, since they value private property and economic
freedom, but grew disappointed with the economic model that offered countries
on the economic periphery or semi-periphery little room for bending the rules of
the market, supporting national companies and redistributing national wealth.
Growing to value the market and the state simultaneously, conservatives of both
the younger and the older generations increasingly turned to heterodox economic
theories. For older conservatives, however, non-economic topics such as state
reform or the “politics of memory” have always had ideological priority.
In the view of a younger generation of conservatives associated with Pressje
and Nowa Konfederacja, the absence of support to the domestic economy during
104 Ewa Dąbrowska
the years of economic transformation—and reliance on foreign investors
instead—led to the Polish economy’s “neo-colonial” dependence on the West.
This argument significantly grew in force during the 2000s, when Poland entered
the EU, as the dependent status of the Polish economy became more visible after
accession, though it was present in the debate already before. Polish conserva
tives bemoaned the lack of sovereignty of the Polish economy, which they saw
as subordinated to foreign companies, many of which used price transfers, which
is when enterprises manipulate prices in transactions between companies belong-
ing to the same holding, and other accounting tricks to evade Polish taxes (Wójcik
2015). As concerns the level of Polish salaries, they were kept artificially low
and did not reflect the dynamics of productivity gains, which conservatives also
interpreted as characteristic for a neo-colonial economic arrangement (ibid.).
Conservatives equally criticized the general model behind liberal economics,
according to which Poland should “catch up with the West” (Nowak [1996]
2005). In their perception, the main neoliberal storyline of the 1990s and 2000s
was that Poland should compete with Western economies by keeping its labor
costs low in order to create economic growth and eventually catch up with the
West. Conservatives treated this exclusive orientation to the West as unworthy
of Polish culture, which they considered rich enough to deliver its own political
and economic templates. Furthermore, conservatives saw the idea of having to
catch up as humiliating and preferred instead a value-orientation for the
economy. In their narrative, the economy is moral, too, alongside the state and
the law, and so should be subordinated to considerations of what is just.
The post-communist period was, according to conservatives, based on a
wrong political and economic model and suffered from the persistence of
morally doubtful, “communist” practices such as corruption and collusion
between political and business elites. Those features were not the only ones criti-
cized by conservative intellectuals, who were equally concerned with the sym-
bolic dimension of the post-1989 order. In their view, the politics of memory
chosen by the post-communists amounted to the propagation of shame and guilt
over Polish crimes and Poland’s supposed backwardness, while it denied Poles
the right to national pride. In particular the debate over events in the town of
Jedwabne in northeast Poland, where Poles killed Jews during the last world
war, led to a discursive division over the question of remembering Polish war
crimes. Jedwabne became a further emblematic issue in the Polish debate.
Conservatives have shown a tendency to see uncovering such historical truth as
an anti-Polish act, since it challenges the representation of Second World War
Polish victimhood. In his 2001 essay “Westerplatte or Jedwabne” in the conser-
vative newspaper Rzeczpospolita, Andrzej Nowak criticizes the preoccupation of
the Institute of National Remembrance of that time with Polish crimes during the
Second World War, such as Jedwabne, and argues for a policy of promoting
Poles’ heroism, such as at the battle of Westerplatte or in the Warsaw Uprising.
Nowak’s and his supporters’ storyline is that highlighting heroic parts of Polish
history gives the society a sense of pride in belonging to the Polish nation. In the
supposed emphasis on deeds of the other kind, Nowak sees a political choice
intended to instill in Poles a “culture of shame” that is overall consistent with the
pitiful social order that emerged under post-communism. In the domain of
historical memory, as in other policy areas, a reorientation toward the moral
education of the nation is needed, in the conservatives’ view.
The positive political theology of the new conservatism

Having examined conservatives’ main storylines with respect to the Polish Third
Republic, I now turn to their positive vision of the social order. This vision has
been constructed not only in response to existing problems of the post-1989
political and socio-economic system, but also with reference to the Polish and
international classics of conservative thought. At the bottom of it is the concept
of “conservative modernization,” understood as a project to liberate the Polish
nation and to enable its self-determination and capability of action. Psycho-
logical vocabulary, in particular terms such as “subjectivity” (podmiotowość)
and “agency” (sprawczość), intermingles in descriptions of this modernization
with references to Christianity. Christianity is proposed to be considered the
actual source of agency of the Polish nation, as in the philosophy of the Russian
philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev or in the late work of the Polish philosopher Stan-
islaw Brzozowski (1878–1911), who turned from humanism to religiosity. The
reference to Berdyaev and representatives of Russian messianism is not as sur-
prising as it seems—Polish conservatives actually share with their Russian coun-
terparts a number of values and a desire to proselytize other nations (Herman
2014). Besides, as an author of the conservative magazine Pressje, Jan Macie-
jewski (2015) points out, Berdyaev was popular among Polish nationalists of
Christian and messianic orientation in the interwar period as well. According to
this worldview, the social order and the state need to be constructed on Christian
values and resemble thereby the “Christianitas” order of the Middle Ages. At the
same time, the new order should include freedom and not oppose modernization
but foster a specific form of modernization that serves Christian values and does
not challenge them.
An emancipated nation that is able to modernize the state and the economy on
its own terms is at the center of the conservative construction of the social world.
It is the nation that determines the law and institutions of the state, so that they
best serve its interest. The procedural understanding of the law is to be replaced
with a substantive one. In the conservatives’ view, a procedural order of demo-
cracy can by definition not be a carrier of values that are dear to the nation.
Democracy is defined, in their worldview, by its orientation to the public good,
and not by a system of checks and balances.
The draft of the constitution of the Fourth Republic is a surprisingly close
realization of principles dear to Polish conservatives. First formulated as a
concept in 1997 by a moderate conservative writer, Rafał Matyja, it was exten-
sively discussed within the conservative, but also the liberal-conservative, milieu
following the Rywin affair in 2002. Jarosław Kaczyński was not the first who
reacted enthusiastically to it, yet he managed to appropriate the concept and the
106 Ewa Dąbrowska
idea behind it shortly before the election in 2005. Pushed by Kaczyński, an
actual project for the constitution of the Fourth Republic was worked out in 2004
by the Polish conservative politician Kazimierz Ujazdowski (Zaremba 2010,
230). This actually existing constitution project was not per se anti-democratic,
as pointed out by the Polish journalist Piotr Zaremba, an author of Kaczyński’s
political biography, but it might well have heralded such a turn. First of all, this
constitution project invoked God in its preamble. Second, it contained stipula-
tions concerning lustration and de-communization, for which the state Institute
of National Remembrance would have been responsible. Third, it intended to
establish a “Commission for Truth and Justice,” a peculiar invention in a
presumably secular and pluralist state. The intention to set up such an institution
shows thus the Kaczyński camp’s opposition to democratic values of secularism
and pluralism. The constitution project conveyed this camp’s disdain for proced-
ural democracy and its preference for a “value-based” order, supposedly better
catering to the needs of the nation.
The subjectivity of the Polish nation that the new legal order should secure is
to be realized in the economic realm as well. Thus the Polish economy should
not be a mere colony of Western countries, but be able to develop independently.
Mistakes that were made during the privatization period cannot be easily cor-
rected, but a well-conceived economic policy could make a difference in the
Polish economy in the course of one or two decades. Support for both producing
and financial capital is a part of the program, as well as the readjustment of
social and housing policy to the actual needs of the nation. In general, the eco-
nomic part of the conservative political vision is the least developed, and conser-
vative thinkers still discuss which economic institutions and instruments are in
the spirit of “Christianitas” (Kędzierski 2012). Rafał Łętocha recalls, in his con-
tributions to Teologia Polityczna as well as the progressive Nowy Obywatel
(New Citizen), some of the forgotten classics of Catholic social teaching, in par-
ticular, works by Leopold Caro (1864–1939), a founder of the economic school
of “solidarism” (Łętocha 2010, 2012). Kędzierski and Łętocha’s arguments
partly intersect with progressive ones, for instance where they see social cooper-
atives as an embodiment of a just economic order. In sum, economic reflection is
an emerging part of conservatives’ philosophy and theology. However, given
that the Catholic religion has an extensive tradition of social ethics, conserva
tives have a lot of material to refer to.
The psychology of subjectivity finds its expression not least on the level of
meanings and sense-making. Conservatives reject the supposed discourse of the
left-liberal elites, who are ashamed of Poland’s institutional and economic back-
wardness and traditional Polish mentality (Nowak [1996] 2005; Nowicka 2015).
Furthermore, those elites present their shame over Poland and disdain for the
Polish people as a sign of good taste—in the perception of conservatives
(Nowicka 2015). The latter call it the “pedagogy of shame” and prefer instead to
be proud of Poland and its traditions. Conservative thinkers emphasize instead
Poland’s heroic deeds and the achievements of its culture as a more effective
type of patriotic education, than the critical approach to Polish history espoused
by the camp close to Gazeta Wyborcza. Conservatives perceive their approach
not least as more consistent with promoting the sense of Poland as acting in
history (Nowak 2014). Conservatives strive to eliminate the supposed Polish
tendency to subordinate itself to more mighty neighbors, to the EU, the US, or
the West. The Cracow magazine Pressje devoted a whole issue (number 43) to
this Polish “sin” of “submission” and promoted “subjectivity” and “agency”
instead. A discourse on this theme in the media took form just before the 2015
election (an example of Hajer’s “discourse structuration”), making the PiS polit-
ical message more convincing.
Conservatism and the rise of Law and Justice

Having presented the main tenets of the new Polish conservatism, I now turn to
the question of the relation between brothers Kaczyński and the political parties
set up by them, first the Center Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum, PC),
1990–2001, and Law and Justice from 2001 on the one hand, and the broader
discourse coalition of conservatism on the other hand. Related to this is whether
and how discursive efforts of conservative actors paved the way for the PiS
victory in both 2005 and 2015.
During the 1990s, when Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński were the leaders of the
Center Agreement party, they represented a peculiar position within Polish con-
servatism, and did not yet even identify with a particularly virulent conservative
political current (Matyja 2015). At that time, they avoided nationalist and Chris-
tian rhetoric, and their main political idea was a rejection of post-communism
and reform of the state. Already then, they identified with the “sanation”
(sanacja) tradition of the interwar period, as represented by Józef Piłsudski
(1867–1935), a Polish field marshal and statesman who staged a coup-d’état in
1926, introducing an authoritarian regime to supposedly morally heal the Polish
state. Among the multiple right-wing parties of the 1990s, PC did not have a
strong position. However, the message of Jarosław Kaczyński was always recog-
nizable and sometimes included by other parties in their programs. Both
Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński were known politicians; however, Jarosław had a
reputation as a difficult person, both among colleagues and the electorate. Both
belonged to the conservative milieu, but were somehow at the fringes of it. They
contributed to the establishment of the magazine The New State and tried to pop-
ularize the idea of a moral renewal of the state, but the Polish Right was initially
too fragmented and conflictual to pay heed to it. Later, the political formation of
the Kaczyński brothers played a minor role in the unified rightist party AWS.
The decline of AWS after four years of rule (1997–2001) gave the Kaczyński
brothers a chance to reconstitute their political project under the designation
of PiS.
Both PiS and PO—the other party that emerged in the wake of the AWS
demise—represented the conservative milieu. They had many programmatic
similarities in the initial period of their existence. As already outlined in
the section on the organization of conservatism, both parties became popular
108 Ewa Dąbrowska
following the Rywin affair in 2002. To investigate that affair, a parliamentary
commission was set up in which representatives of both PiS and PO played an
important role, in particular Zbigniew Ziobro from PiS and Jan Maria Rokita
from PO. In the years 2001–05, a period of the rule of the post-communist party
SLD, the idea of a moral renewal of the state order, framed as the establishment
of a Fourth Republic, became relevant yet again. However, the debates in the
election runup were less about intellectual issues than carrying on the political
fight between PiS and PO. It is true that the catchword “Fourth Republic” might
have had some influence on the election campaign, but so did mutual accusations
and PR tricks on the part of both parties. Nevertheless, it was clearly PiS that
emerged as an idea-driven party, in spite of its populism, and not PO. A further
difference between these parties was that PO clearly embraced economic liberal-
ism, whereas PiS—having however liberal members in its ranks as well—began
to experiment discursively with the idea of solidarity as the opposite of
liberalism.
During its period of rule in 2005–07, PiS implemented a few policy solutions
related to their idea of the renewal of the state, especially as concerned anti-
corruption policies and institutions. During that period, PiS was supported by
conservative intellectuals such as Ryszard Legutko, Jadwiga Staniszkis, Jarosław
Rymkiewicz, Andrzej Nowak, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, and others, who believed
that PiS was introducing an authentic “change of climate” in Polish politics
(Krasnodębski 2006). However, its coalition with the populist parties Samoob-
rona (“Self-Defense”) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin)
led this party away from conservatism and in the direction of nationalist popu-
lism. It was equally during that time that Jarosław Kaczyński allied PiS with the
Catholic cleric Tadeusz Rydzyk, who runs an influential Catholic media empire
including the infamous ultra-Catholic radio station “Radio Maryja.” This polit-
ical turn by PiS made it easier for liberals in the media and politics to mobilize
against the party, which led to the electoral victory of PO in 2007. There fol-
lowed eight years of PO rule during which PiS, and conservative think tanks
supporting it (out of the lack of another conservative party but also their opposi-
tion to PO, and because PiS genuinely represented some conservative ideas), had
time to elaborate fresh policy programs.
The process of further development of conservative thought went in parallel
with the radicalization of the Polish political debate, which soon became known
as the “Polish-Polish war.” From the perspective of the left-liberal camp,
Kaczyński’s party represented right-wing populism, Catholic fundamentalism,
and had authoritarian tendencies. While PiS surely had its radical aspects and
forged alliances with radicals during its brief period of rule, those diagnoses
missed the constructive part of the PiS political ideology, inspired by the wider
conservative current of thought. However, the PiS milieu radicalized even
further after 2010, when in the Smoleńsk jet catastrophe many renowned conser-
vatives, including then-president Lech Kaczyński and Tomasz Merta, died, pro-
foundly shocking the conservative milieu and especially people closer to PiS.
The air crash became a sort of tipping point that led to a political and discursive
mobilization of both supporters of PiS and representatives of the conservative
discourse coalition, who had often stood behind the party. However, even in the
polarized political situation that followed, conservatism was still a variegated
phenomenon in Polish society that could not be unequivocally equated with
nationalism or populism and was not in its entirety radical.
Conservatism and the post-2015 “good change”

After the parliamentary victory in 2015, PiS set out to implement the conserva
tives’ positive vision of the social order. This does not mean that conservative
think tanks provided PiS with elaborate policy programs. Rather, writings of
conservative intellectuals provided PiS with grand narratives on which this party
could structure its approach to policy. Some of those intellectuals, such as Prof.
Andrzej Zybertowicz from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań or
Krzysztof Mazur from the Jagielloński Club, became consultants to the new
political team and legitimated PiS politics with their very presence in those con-
sultative bodies. Others, such as Paweł Szałamacha, author of the book on the
Fourth Republic, even temporarily entered the government. Having ideologically
paved the way for the victory of Law and Justice in the 2015 elections, think
tank conservatives have since then engaged in legitimating the PiS government’s
actions.
Even though they do not unequivocally support the anti-democratic posture
of PiS, in particular its measures affecting the Constitutional Court and the judi-
ciary, a large number of conservative ideologues nevertheless provide justifica-
tions for such policies. In line with the general ideology of Polish conservatives,
Krzysztof Mazur of the Jagielloński Club justifies the PiS policy of reducing the
power of the Constitutional Court by pointing to the Court’s role in consolidat-
ing the post-communist Third Republic (Mazur and Puchejda 2017). For Mazur,
judges secured the interests of the post-communist elites, and if one wants to
break with post-communism, “post-communist” judges should be replaced by
new ones. At the same time, he criticizes the policy of completely disempower-
ing the Court. In the same vein, conservatives comment on other policy meas-
ures in support of the PiS government.
Some conservatives of the older and younger generation, however, do criti-
cize PiS politics, and even substantially. The famous conservative politician and
thinker Aleksander Hall published a book entitled A Bad Change, referring to
the PiS election slogan (Hall 2016a). In that, as well as in his journalistic contri-
butions, Hall describes the PiS political stance as “national-revolutionary” and
criticizes in particular the dismantlement of democratic institutions (Hall 2016b).
Hall represents an undercurrent within Polish conservatism that does value pro-
cedural democracy, perceiving the political order that PiS strives to establish as
illiberal. Similarly, Staniszkis, who in the past strongly approved Kaczyński’s
political arguments, shows herself disappointed with the style of post-2015 polit-
ical change. Being in favor of PiS in principle, she stresses that democracy not
only requires a system of checks and balances, but also a certain style of political
110 Ewa Dąbrowska
culture that PiS does not represent (Staniszkis 2016). Younger conservatives
from Nowa Konfederacja have dared to criticize Kaczyński as well, losing in
this way their budget support (Grzesiczak and Nurek 2017). Similarly, conser-
vatives from Klub Jagielloński criticize selected aspects of PiS policy or dis-
course, or the discourse of its supporters. In particular, Jagielloński members
have condemned hate speeches directed at refugees (Mazur and Puchejda 2017).
Even with the change in the dominant political ideology following the election
of PiS and its candidate for president, Andrzej Duda, and the subsequent oppor-
tunity to realize a conservative program of reforms, the conservative milieu is
divided.
Conclusion
This chapter traces the development of the conservative discourse coalition in
Poland after 1989, and how the Kaczyńskis’ political party Law and Justice
relates to it. My argument is that the main theoretical tenet of Polish conserva-
tism is criticism of the phenomena of post-communism and political capitalism.2
Major events of the Polish transformation such as the political victories of post-
communists of 1993 and 1995, or the Rywin affair in 2002, which exposed
corrupt connections between Polish politics, business, and media, led to
reinforced conservative criticism of the Polish Third Republic. Demonstrating
the development of the conservative discourse, I have shown how changes in the
organizational infrastructure of conservatism have affected it, and in two sub-
sequent sections, elaborated on conservative criticism of the post-communist
order and analyzed what positive vision of a social order emerges from the writ-
ings of Polish conservatives. Those intellectuals propose a fairly consistent
vision of an order based on Christian values, in which both the market and the
state assume important roles. Though this serves as an inspiration for Law and
Justice and the government, both of these are also eagerly integrating nationalist
and illiberal elements into their policies and political actions, and challenging by
the same token the worldview of those conservatives who still value freedom.
Importantly, conservative think tanks are still “allowed” to criticize the current
positions of the government under PiS rule, and emphasize that they are not just
serving as an “intellectual back office” for PiS (Trudnowski 2015).
Notes
1 What is omitted is that Poland used to be a peripheral country before communism and
that the latter significantly modernized Polish society and the economy. Contrary to the
evidence, the interwar period is constructed in this narrative as a golden epoch, which
ignores the grave socio-economic problems of that time.
2 It is still a major element of the political agenda of PiS, justifying dismantling the inde-
pendent Constitutional Court on the grounds that it has served post-communist
interests.
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6 The national conservative parties
in Poland and Hungary and their
core supporters compared
Values and socio-structural
background
Jochen Roose and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski
Introduction
The world seems to be experiencing a political turning of the tide. National
conservative forces have become increasingly influential in the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Often, they appear
as populist parties or movements, condemning the formerly governing political
elite and claiming to give political power to the people or to the “real people”
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 2017; Müller 2017). They tend to receive an
increasing number of votes in elections or even gain power directly by taking
over the government, sometimes forming single-party governments as in
Hungary and Poland. The temporal proximity of these changes points to
common causes and diffusion effects, and thus invites a broad perspective
analyzing the developments in various countries in a comparison (Brubaker
2017; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Wodak et al. 2013).
Unquestionably, such a perspective is necessary and fruitful. However, it is in
the nature of broad perspectives to focus on common influences and trends,
leaving aside variety and more specific constellations. It therefore remains
important to consider specificities as well as to take different backgrounds and
developments into account which are otherwise overlooked. Regions and coun-
tries might differ considerably from each other, even though they are subject to
similar trends. In this chapter, we focus on two East Central European countries
in which national conservative parties came to power in 2010 and 2015 respec-
tively: Hungary and Poland.
These two countries are valuable cases for a comparison, since in both coun-
tries national conservative parties came into government only recently, with
Hungary being the forerunner of the development. Also, both countries have
been heavily criticized for political measures damaging the rule of law character
of the political system (Ágh 2016; Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016; Buzogány
2017). They are prominent in the EU’s debate on how to react to rule of law vio-
lations and the so-called other democratic deficit of the EU, that is, the demo-
cratic deficit in the individual EU member states (Kelemen 2017). Our aim is to
understand the character and support basis of two national conservative parties
114 Jochen Roose and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski
in comparison, namely Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (“Law and Justice,” PiS) in
Poland and Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége—Magyar Polgári Szövetség,
“Alliance of Young Democrats—Hungarian Civic Alliance”) in Hungary. For
this purpose, we combine a qualitative assessment with quantitative data on their
respective core supporters and electorates. This analysis provides information
concerning the respective parties’ political approaches and ideologies not only
based on their public statements, but also on the socio-structural background and
orientation of the people supporting them. With this combination, we sketch a
more nuanced picture which shows the similarities and differences of the two
parties and their rise to power.
The political turn in Hungary and Poland

The political victories of the national conservative Fidesz in Hungary in 2010
and 2014 as well as the PiS in 2015 in both the presidential and parliamentary
elections in Poland have raised the question of a more general political turn in
East Central Europe toward not only conservative, but also anti-liberal politics.
Some observers point to the right-wing populist nature of both Fidesz and PiS,
in particular in light of institutional changes introduced by both parties once in
power (Foa and Mounk 2017; Arato 2017; Sadurski 2018). In Hungary, the
Fidesz won the 2010 elections with 52.7 percent of votes, which gave the party a
constitutional majority in the parliament allowing it to change the constitution,
carry out controversial Constitutional Court appointments, and change electoral
laws. In particular, the so-called fourth amendment to the constitution provoked
international criticism. According to some observers this amendment limited the
independence of the judiciary, brought universities under governmental control
and opened the door to political prosecutions while weakening human rights
guarantees (Scheppele 2013; Pech and Schepple 2017). Heavy criticism was also
expressed by the European Union, in particular the European Parliament
(Tavares and Engel 2012) as well as the Venice Commission (Grabenwarter et
al. 2011). The 2013 report of the European Commission (Tavares 2013) admon-
ished the Hungarian government
to implement as swiftly as possible all the measures the European Commis-

sion as the guardian of the treaties deems necessary in order to fully comply
with EU law […] [and with] the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional
Court and […] the recommendations of the Venice Commission, the
Council of Europe and other international bodies.
(Tavares 2013)
Despite the international criticism, Fidesz won the parliamentary elections with
44.9 percent in 2014, this time missing the constitutional majority. At the same
time, the Fidesz government introduced a number of social measures aimed
at improving living standards for average citizens. The government resorted
to taxing banks, retail sales networks, and energy and telecommunication
Conservative parties in Poland and Hungary 115
companies on an equal and proportional footing, while increasing family support
and introducing a flat income tax. More generous welfare benefits followed suit.
In 2013, electricity, gas, and central heating prices were reduced by 20 percent,
and the energy price reduction has become the leitmotiv in Fidesz’s campaign
ahead of the election in April 2014 (Benczes 2016; Enyedi 2016).
In Poland, the PiS’s candidate, Andrzej Duda, unexpectedly won the Polish
presidential elections in May 2015 against the incumbent President Bronisław
Komorowski with 51.6 percent. This electoral success was repeated in the fol-
lowing parliamentary elections. The PiS won in October 2015 with 37.6 percent
and was able to form a one-party government (which happened for the first time
since 1989 in Poland, given that the electoral law and rather fluid party system
favors multi-party governments) but missed the constitutional majority. Shortly
after the government was formed, a series of political measures were hastily
pushed through the parliament, including the controversial media law and the
counterterrorism law. New controversial appointments at the Constitutional
Court also followed, leading to a paralysis of the institution. A new law from
December 2015 changed the set-up of the Constitutional Court and its decision-
making rules, forcing it, among other things, to make decisions exclusively by a
two-thirds majority (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017a). Some observers argued
that this made it de facto difficult for the court to act at all, which amounted to
disempowerment of the checks-and-balances principle vital to democratic plur-
alism (Sadurski 2018; Freudenstein and Niklewicz 2016). In 2016, the Constitu-
tional Court had been functionally disabled, as the PiS was able to put party
loyalists on the bench. Against this background, newer PiS reforms of the
Supreme Court and the lower courts in 2017 have been viewed by critics as the
next stage in the suspension of the rule of law (e.g. Łazowski 2017; Sadurski
2018).
Like the Fidesz, the PiS came to power with promises of new welfare benefits
and support for the economically disadvantaged. In 2016, a new instrument of
child support was introduced while the medication refunding scheme for senior
citizens was activated in the second half of 2016 (Karolewski and Benedikter
2017b). In addition, a state-sponsored program for apartment construction aimed
at young families started in 2016. In order to finance these expenditures, a new
banking tax was established and new measures to reduce VAT fraud were intro-
duced (Benedikter and Karolewski 2016).
On 13 January 2016, for the first time in its history since the founding treaty
of Rome in 1958, the European Union initiated a formal investigation against
one of its member states: Poland. The investigation was intended to question
whether new laws introduced by the PiS government are violating the rules of
EU democracy, and whether these laws are in accordance with the rule of law
and fundamental democratic values. With this, Poland became the second of the
East Central European (ECE) countries after Hungary to raise fears of an
authoritarian backslide in the region (Ágh 2015; Berend and Bugaric 2015).
Some outside observers have offered pessimistic readings of the situation at
hand. For example, Kelemen and Orenstein (2016; Kelemen 2016) are counting
the days of democracy in Poland, while Kornai (2015) sees a clear retreating
from democracy in Hungary.
Why did Fidesz and PiS succeed?

One explanation for the political turn toward Fidesz and PiS is based on the spe-
cific socio-economic problems in Poland and Hungary. It refers to flaws in the
transition to capitalism that was introduced in both countries at the historical
peak of the neoliberal interpretation of governance in 1989–91. After two
decades of neoliberalism, this led on the one hand to positive effects, including
robust economic growth and an increase of average living standards. On the
other hand, non-transparent privatization processes and lagging reforms of
crucial sectors of productivity manifested specific governance pathologies in
Poland, Hungary, and other ECE countries (Bruszt 1994; O’Neil 1996; Nölke
and Vliegenthart 2009).
This hypothesis suggests that after 20–25 years, the ECE version of govern-
ance still remained problematic in many ways, showing serious limitations in
responding to the social needs of the region’s transforming societies. For
instance, despite positive macroeconomic development, both young people and
senior citizens in ECE countries have lived under existential pressure for many
years with governments unable (and partly unwilling) to strengthen welfare
systems and balance growing social inequality (Nesvetailova 2004; Milanovic
1993; Ost et al. 1992).
As a result, in the past 10 years more than 2.3 million Poles decided to emig-
rate to the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Germany (The Eco-
nomist 2013). Today, the majority of Polish pensioners have to live on 500 EUR
per month and must pay for their medicine in full (OECD 2017). In addition,
Polish pensioners are heavily indebted; their accumulated debt burden was
roughly equal to 1.5 billion euros in 2018 (Business Insider Polska 2018). The
public health system operates at a low level due to chronic underfunding. Con-
sequently, the majority of Polish citizens have to use private medical services,
despite the fact that the average Polish household’s net financial wealth is 10,919
US dollars, while the OECD average is close to 67,000 US dollars (Karolewski
and Benedikter 2017a).
In 2010, Fidesz took power in Hungary at a time when the country plunged
into a deep political and economic crisis. Hungary had fallen into its deepest
recession of the previous decade just one year earlier (its GDP fell by 6.8 percent
in 2009). An agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) was
strongly criticized by Fidesz, which during its election campaign was making
promises to end the austerity policy and make a new beginning in economic
policy. Both the Fidesz and the PiS won elections shortly after a period of finan-
cial turmoil. In 2015, Poland’s currency lost its value drastically against the
Swiss Franc (CHF ) in 2015. While the economic situation was quite good in
Poland, the so-called Swiss Franc shock squeezed homeowners who held CHF
denominated mortgages (around 565,000 households), which played a role in the
PiS winning the elections, as the party promised to support the Swiss Franc
losers (Ahlquist et al. 2018).
In both Poland and Hungary, broader parts of society shared the sentiment
that numerous governments after 1989 used state agencies and enterprises for
cronyism and politico-economic clientelism, draining financial resources from
the state budget that otherwise could have been invested into higher education,
research, health, and pension systems. Secret tape scandals documenting high
levels of cynicism among ruling elites (in Hungary in 2006 and in Poland in
2014) precipitated the political change in both countries.
At the same time, foreign capital has not only been unable to substitute for
many of these structural difficulties and for the chronic problem of the misman-
agement of public funds, but also has produced its own problems, such as real-
estate bubbles and problematic mortgages (Standing 1996; Orenstein 1995).
According to some critics, while international corporations, banks, and consul-
tancies have mushroomed all over Poland and Hungary (and other ECE coun-
tries), ECE countries have become virtual assembly lines for foreign producers
that do not hold their research and development departments in these nations
and, in many cases, pay their taxes in other EU countries because of a lower
value-added tax (VAT). For instance, in Poland, 70 percent of the entire tax
burden is carried not by European or transnational enterprises, but by small and
medium-sized firms of local origin (Czerniak and Stefanski 2017).
Both the PiS and Fidesz came to power by criticizing previous governments
as complicit in this unbalanced development, widely independent of their leftist
or rightist inclinations, dragging their feet for decades on the necessary reforms
of the health care, higher education, labor market, and pension systems.
The socio-economic background of supporters for PiS and

Fidesz in comparison
In order to explore the socio-economic and cultural orientation of a party, we
can build on various sources. Some scholars have used party programs (e.g.
Klingemann et al. 2006) or public statements of the party leaders or front people
(Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2009) to map out the ideological orientation of a
party. In contrast, we take a different approach by focusing on the supporters of
the parties. We expect a close link between publicly stated party positions and
preferences by supporters. However, we assume that the supporters tend to focus
on specific aspects they favor while leaving other parts aside. Thus, choosing
supporters as the source of information places emphasis on those aspects of party
positions which are particularly valued by supporters and thus informs us about
the social and cultural basis of the parties.
To have comparable results, we rely on a European comparative survey, the
European Social Survey,1 of which we use the 2014 wave. Actual fieldwork was
carried out in Hungary between 24 April 2015 and 26 June 2015 and in Poland
between 17 April 2015 and 14 September 2015. The data thus covers the time
period shortly after the election in Hungary (the date of the election was 6 April
2014), while in Poland the field work mainly took place between the presidential
election (10–24 May 2015) and the parliamentary election (25 October 2015).
We consider the timing appropriate for covering the social structure and the atti-
tudes held by supporters of the respective parties.
In a first step, we look at the core of the parties’ supporters who declare a
feeling of close proximity to the respective party, and compare them with the
supporters of the largest competing party (the PO, Platforma Obywatelska,
“Civic Platform,” in Poland and the MSZP, Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata
Párt, “Hungarian Socialist Party,” in Hungary). This kind of analysis focuses on
the politically most committed people, who are a comparatively small minority
of the population.
The comparison of the two largest parties with the largest number of strong
supporters shows various remarkable findings concerning their respective sup-
porters (Table 6.1). We start with Poland and the comparison between the
national conservative PiS and the liberal conservative PO. The most striking
finding is that the socio-demographic differences between both party supporters
are not overly large here. The binary-logistic regression identifies only very few
significant differences. However, the low N has to be considered for this finding,
thus potentially clouding the differences.
People feeling close to the PiS are slightly younger, less educated, live less
often in families, and are found more in rural areas. They are less often unem-
ployed or retired. Most striking is the difference in income. People feeling close
to the PiS are found on average below the middle of the income hierarchy, while
people attached to the PO are on average in the sixth decile of the income strati-
fication. This difference is remarkably large.2 The very highly educated indi-
viduals with a university master’s degree and higher are much more frequently
attached to the PO than to the PiS, but the number of respondents in this cat-
egory is quite small.
The differences concerning the socio-economic background of people
attached to the two largest parties in Hungary are somewhat different. The sup-
porters of the national conservative Fidesz are also more often women than men
and are more likely to not have children in their household. This tendency is
identical to Poland but the income differences are negligible, contrary to the
picture in Poland.
The difference in educational background that we spotted in Poland is practi-
cally non-existent in Hungary. In accordance with the lower age of the com-
mitted Fidesz supporters as compared with the MSZP supporters, the share of
retired people is also significantly lower. Again, this is similar to Poland. The
most obvious similarity between the two countries is the center periphery
pattern. The national conservative parties gain more support in rural areas than
larger cities.
The differences between committed supporters of the national conservative
parties compared with their largest more moderate counterpart are similar in
Hungary and Poland with regard to their socio-economic background. Com-
mitted supporters of the national conservative parties are slightly more often
Table 6.1 Socio-economic differences among party identifiers of the two largest parties:
Poland and Hungary
Poland Hungary
PO (%) PiS (%) (a) MSZP (%) Fidesz (%) (a)
Male 53.1 49.6 46.2 44.1 +

Lives with partner 75.4 71.8 56.7 66.0 +
Child in household 89.9 79.9 80.6 70.2
Education
Less than lower secondary 2.1 1.1 3.1 3.9
Lower secondary 29.4 49.0 18.7 21.1
Lower tier upper secondary 10.4 14.2 31.0 27.3
Upper tier upper secondary 15.9 20.4 26.4 23.6
Advanced vocational, sub-degree 8.1 3.0 3.9 5.1
Lower tertiary education, 5.7 4.2 11.2 12.7
BA level
Higher tertiary education, 28.4 8.1 5.7 6.3
>= MA level
Main activity
Paid work 46.6 47.8 40.0 56.6
Education 1.5 2.7 1.0 4.5
Unemployed 5.2 3.0 * 4.8 1.9 **
Retired 42.0 36.5 + 50.4 26.7 *
Housework 2.6 9.4 0.0 4.8
Other 5.7 4.2 + 3.7 5.5
Domicile
Big city, incl. outskirts 28.8 19.9 41.7 25.1
Town, small city 35.8 30.0 39.4 37.1
Country village 35.4 50.1 18.8 37.8 **
Age in years 55.36 52.58 58.54 49.72 *
Income deciles 6.18 4.93 *** 6.59 6.67
N (max) 145 186 118 265
Source: European Social Survey, Round 7, 2014, own calculation, with post-stratification weights.
Notes
(a) significance in binary-logistic regression. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
women without children in the household; they are younger, less frequently
unemployed and most strikingly they live in small rural areas. The most
important difference between the two countries is the comparatively lower
education level among PiS supporters which is not found among Fidesz sup-
porters, both in comparison with the next largest party in the country.
Values and attitudes of the neo-conservative parties’

supporters
Considering the potentially different situation and the varying cultural traditions
in both countries, similar attitudes and values on the part of national conservative
parties’ supporters are not the only option. We could also assume that the parties
are grounded in quite different value systems with only a small amount of
overlap. In particular, their populist character, often associated with a “thin ideo-
logy” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Stanley 2008), would suggest a high level
of flexibility with respect to value attachments. We will now consider this ques-
tion in more detail.
The most obvious difference between the PiS supporters and the PO sup-
porters in Poland is the different level of attachment to religion. Supporters of
Table 6.2 Differences in attitudes and values among party identifiers of the two largest
parties: Poland and Hungary
Poland Hungary
PO (%) PiS (%) (b) MSZP (%) Fidesz (%) (b)
Values and attitudes

National identification 30.7 29.7 30.4 29.2
Religion
How religious (1–10) 5.93 7.64 + 3.09 4.31 *
Religious attendance 4.21 3.17 * 5.90 5.54
Praying frequency 3.11 1.96 * 5.48 4.71
How happy 7.45 6.98 + 6.25 6.88
Trust people (10 steps) 4.22 3.97 3.80 4.58 *
Meet socially 3.87 3.86 3.20 3.56
Social interaction (5 steps) 2.57 2.56 2.31 2.46
Political interest (4 steps) 2.30 2.41 2.61 2.61
Able to be politically active 4.02 3.33 3.06 2.56 ***
(10 steps)
Satisfied democracy (10 steps) 6.30 3.73 ** 3.42 6.23 ***
Satisfied economy (10 steps) 5.50 3.34 * 3.23 5.39
People have say in government 5.71 3.44 *** 2.20 3.56
(10 steps)
Reduce income differences 2.16 1.71 * 1.51 1.72
government (5 steps)
Tolerance homosexuals (5 steps) 2.17 3.28 ** 2.91 2.69 ***
More EU integration (10 steps) 6.29 5.31 4.67 4.17
Schwartz values
Independence 0.20 0.17 –0.08 0.23
Hedonism –1.09 –1.35 –0.07 0.09
Success –0.39 –0.58 * 0.23 –0.24
Power –0.76 –0.58 0.38 –0.44
Security 0.80 0.84 –0.39 0.62 +
Conformity 0.45 0.51 0.18 –0.27
Tradition 0.20 0.54 * –0.11 0.02
N (max) 145 186 118 265
Source: European Social Survey, Round 7, 2014, own calculation, with post-stratification weights.
Notes
(b) significance in binary-logistic regression, including also the socio-economic variables listed in
Table 6.1. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
the PiS declare a considerably stronger religiosity. Church attendance and fre-
quency of prayer also differ significantly. Religiosity is a crucial factor for dis-
tinguishing the committed supporters of the two parties. The PiS supporters are a
little less happy and trust other people less than the PO supporters. However,
they do not differ in their level of social inclusion, measured by meeting other
people or being socially active.
But the supporters of the PiS are less politically interested. This difference is
remarkable, as the comparison only includes people who declare that they feel
close to one party and thereby already indicate a political interest. Still, the polit-
ical efficacy of the PiS supporters and their self-confidence in handling political
matters is lower. In addition, they are less satisfied with democracy and the state
of the economy. Additionally, the PiS supporters are more often convinced that
they have no influence on government matters. With regard to this finding, we
have to keep in mind that people were asked shortly before PiS came to power,
so the response could have changed afterwards.
Two general political positions are covered in the European Social Survey
(ESS) to mirror fundamentally different political approaches: the attitude toward
state intervention with regard to income inequality and tolerance toward homo-
sexuals. Both attitudes differ fundamentally between the PiS supporters and the
PO supporters. People feeling attachment toward the PiS also support govern-
ment intervention with regard to income inequality and reject homosexuality
even more strongly.
Finally, the attitudes toward European integration differ, though not overly
strongly. Even though the PiS favors less further integration, supporters of both
parties are on average closer to the support of further steps toward integration
than to the devolution of competences away from the EU.
Coming to Hungary, religiosity is also a factor clearly dividing the two con-
tending parties, that is, the Fidesz and the MSZP. However, the difference is not
as large as in Poland when it comes to self-assessed religiosity, religious attend-
ance, or frequency of prayer. Fidesz supporters are a little happier and consider-
ably more trusting than MSZP supporters, differences not found between PiS
and PO supporters in Poland. The lower political efficacy among supporters of
right populist parties also appears in Hungary. However, Fidesz supporters are
happier with democracy, the economic situation, and their influence on the gov-
ernment. The four years of Fidesz government prior to the survey led to a firm
belief in adequate representation among the strong supporters of the party. This
is not self-evident, especially for populist parties. The reduction of income
differences is not a specific concern of Fidesz supporters, while PiS supporters
in Poland have an interest in such a government intervention. Finally, support
for the EU is lower among Fidesz supporters than among MSZP supporters.
However, both support EU integration less than the supporters of the two Polish
parties.
The comparison of general attitudes leads to some similarities between the
two countries. The importance of religiosity, low political efficacy, more skepti-
cism with regard to the EU, and strong rejection of homosexuality are found in
both countries. In Hungary, the Fidesz government apparently produced satisfac-
tion with democracy and the economy among its committed supporters. The link
shows that the actual political action of the government complies with the expec-
tations of its firm supporters. This effect is also possible in Poland after the PiS
ascendancy to government, and is even to be expected.
Shalom Schwartz suggests a general configuration of fundamental values
which are supposed to cover general human values across cultures (Schwartz
and Bardi 2001; Schwartz 2007; Schwartz and Bilsky 1990). These values can
also be compared for the parties’ committed supporters in both countries.
These values show considerable differences between the two right populist
parties. Hedonism tends to be rejected by PiS supporters, whereas Fidesz sup-
porters are neutral on this value. Conformity is favored among PiS supporters,
while Fidesz supporters reject it. Following traditions is regarded as positive by
PiS supporters, while Fidesz supporters are indifferent in this regard. Further-
more, the differences between supporters of the two parties compared in each
country mostly do not have the same direction. Only for the values “success”
and “tradition” do the differences show the same direction; for the other five
values, the direction of difference between the compared parties are different in
the two countries. A general value basis among supporters of right populist
parties in Poland and Hungary, indicating a broad consistent worldview, is not
found. Against this backdrop, the assumption of a national conservative popu-
lism as a comparatively “thin ideology” can be supported by this analysis.
Committed party supporters as the core?

Our empirical analysis is based on the positions of those people who say they
feel close to the respective parties. Therefore, the analysis is focused on a com-
paratively small number of people who identify with a given party. We sus-
pected among these people a core of those who most purely mirror the perception
of the parties’ political leaning. In this step, we want to test this assumption.
Based on the binary logistic regression using the socio-economic background
as well as the attitudes and values assembled in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, we estimated
the probability of supporting either the right populist party or the second largest
more centrist party (PiS versus PO and Fidesz versus MSZP respectively). This
probability is now compared with the actual vote in the last national election as
reported by the respondent.
Our expectation is that the calculated probabilities should not only predict the
vote by the identifiers, but that the model should also predict the vote by people
who did not indicate an identification with a party. Furthermore, the other parties
should indicate by the average probability of their voters a relative closeness to
or distance from the two respective anchor parties, described by the committed
supporters.
Table 6.3 shows the result for both countries. First, based on the information
taken from committed supporters of the respective parties, we can correctly
predict the voting behavior of the analyzed parties’ voters. On average, the
Table 6.3 Average probability of closeness to party for voters of parties
Party Average probability N
Poland
Law and Justice (PiS) 0.83 261
Poland Comes First 0.72 2
Congress of the New Right 0.68 17
Non-voters 0.64 588
Polish Peasants Party 0.62 47
Civic Platform (PO) 0.38 382
Democratic Left Alliance 0.26 48
Palikot Movement 0.25 16
Other 0.25 5
Polish Labour Party—August 1980 0.07 1
Hungary
FIDESZ—KDNP 0.79 416
Non-voters 0.55 508
Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) 0.48 159
LMP (Lehet Más A Politika) 0.44 48
MSZP-Együtt-DK-PM-MLP (Kormányváltók) 0.27 223
Munkáspárt (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt) 0.24 6
Other 0.00 3
Source: European Social Survey, wave 7, 2014.

Note
Prediction of party closeness based on a binary logistic regression, using all variables included in
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.
voters of the PiS and the Fidesz have a comparatively high probability of voting
for their respective parties. An average probability of 0.83 and 0.79 is quite a
clear indication that the core factors have been correctly identified by looking at
the parties’ supporters. This applies also to the counterparts. Voters of the PO
and the MSZP are on average correctly predicted (0.38 and 0.27).
Interestingly, the prediction for the respective counterparts, the conservative
liberal PO in Poland and the social democratic MSZP in Hungary, are less
precise than for the right populist parties. Also, the right populist parties are at
the outer poles of a spectrum. The PO and the MSZP are surrounded by other
parties with similar prediction values. This indicates that the PiS and the Fidesz
are polarizing parties with a relatively clearly identifiable electorate. In par-
ticular, for these two parties the most committed supporters describe quite
clearly what also attracts the wider electorate.
Finally, in both countries the non-voters are closer to the right populist party
than to the more centrist party. This finding is of course strongly influenced by
the relative attractiveness of the two parties for people with low political effi-
cacy. However, with respect as well to other attitudes, values, and aspects of the
socio-economic background, the supporters of right populist parties tend to
mirror the non-voters as well.
How similar are PiS and Fidesz?
There are numerous ideological affinities between the Hungarian governing
party Fidesz and the Polish PiS, mainly with regard to their blend of national
conservatism and proactive social policies. Also, the heads of both parties,
Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński, have already met twice since the PiS
came to power, in January and in August 2016. There was also the constitutional
crisis in Poland in 2015–16 as well as further controversies surrounding the
reform of the legal system—including the Supreme Court—in 2017, which
raises questions about a concentration of power in Poland not dissimilar to the
development in Hungary.
At the same time, the case of Hungary might be different from Poland despite
some ideological commonalities and the joint initial focus on constitutional
change, which the Orbán government introduced in 2010–14. Hungary’s polit-
ical turn under Viktor Orbán could be viewed as more populist and authoritarian
than the one in Poland since 2015. In 2010, the Orbán government had a con-
stitutional majority at its disposal allowing for direct changes to the Hungarian
constitution with regard to the Constitutional Court, both public and private
media, limitations upon freedom of speech, as well as problematic changes to
the electoral law favoring large parties such as Orbán’s own Fidesz party. Fidesz
changed the constitution in many ways, but one of the key new provisions was
the aforementioned “fourth amendment.” This is not the case in Poland (or not
yet the case, as pessimists like to predict), as there is a free press (entirely private
and largely international), substantially free TV and free radio outlets (with the
exception of state media that have always been up for grabs after each and every
election) and no limitations to civil liberties.
Furthermore, Orbán has not only heavily meddled with the constitution—in
contrast to the Polish PiS, which is using ordinary laws for their controversial
reforms— but also openly and actively advocated the term “illiberal state” as a
positive legitimation of his politics.
In addition, the Hungarian government put pressure on private media owners
to influence coverage through a new advertising tax that affected private tele-
vision stations significantly. That is why Hungary scores relatively low in the
Press Freedom Index of 2015 as only “partly free,” while Poland’s press
remained classified as “free” in 2015 and 2016 (Reporters Without Borders
2016). According to the Freedom House report 2015, “[in Hungary] [d]efama-
tion remains a criminal offense, and both defamation and related charges—for
example, breach of good repute and hooliganism—are regularly brought against
journalists and other writers” (Freedom House 2015). Again, this is not the case
in Poland, as journalists are free to work and both private and state media
compete against each other to attract as many viewers as possible. The leading
information channel in Poland is the private and government-critical TVN24 fol-
lowed by the state information channel TVP Info (Wirtualne Media 2016).
While following the path of populist nationalism, Orbán was able to establish
a constellation with a much narrower spectrum of independent media than the
PiS in Poland and to silence critical voices, which in Hungary for a couple of
years have seemed to be unable to present views different from the often-radical
positions of Orbán to a broader public. In 2011, Dániel Papp, co-founder of
Jobbik, the Hungarian radical nationalist political party, was installed as editor-
in-chief of television news, and in 2014, he was put in charge of all news content
on public media. All this is not the case in Poland, even though state media cer-
tainly became friendlier toward the government (as they often are after a change
of government) and conservative with regard to their content. However, there
has been increasing criticism in Poland about the fact that economic pressure on
opposition-friendly outlets has grown, as the Polish government has canceled
their subscriptions and state-owned companies have redirected advertising
money to pro-government outlets.
Outlook
Possible explanations for the success of the PiS and Fidesz are socio-economic
reasons. Both the Fidesz and PiS governments came into power by embracing
“neo-leftist” redistributive measures, common in Western welfare states such as
Germany and France, which were largely omitted by previous governments in the
ECE area. With this, to some extent the case of Hungary and Poland might con-
tinue one paradoxical mechanism of the late EU: the “leftist” governments seem
to usually make cuts to the social safety net in order to introduce liberalization,
competitiveness and efficiency reforms, and “rightist” governments then embrace
policies mitigating social differences and inequality in order to retain popular
consent and thus remain credible as “people’s parties.” An example for the first
mechanism was the German social democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s
“Agenda 2010” of 2005, which has been later imitated, with 10 years’ delay, by
the prime ministers of Italy (Matteo Renzi) and France (Manuel Valls). Both are
representatives of leftist parties and alliances, but de facto have to enact a center-
liberal program because of the needs of their countries, sometimes denominating
it a contemporary neo-European “Third Way” approach. The Polish PiS and the
Hungarian Fidesz are examples of the opposite: a conservative party that in many
ways pursues a clear “socialist” agenda (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017a).
The picture that unfolds from this analysis of the electorate is ambivalent. In
some respects, the electorate of the right populist parties is very similar, with
regard to the orientation to the rural population, religiosity of the electorate, a
strong security orientation, a low political efficacy, and a rejection of homo-
sexuality. On the other hand, we find fundamental differences. The PiS elect-
orate has a relatively lower level of income, while for Fidesz the opposite
applies. The PiS electorate strongly favors tradition, while the Fidesz electorate
is not overly committed to it. Especially with regard to fundamental values, the
orientations of the PiS and Fidesz electorates seem to differ considerably, and
this may also guide both parties in somewhat different directions beyond their
similarities, which are time and again highlighted by distant observers and the
parties themselves.
Notes
1 For the data and detailed information on the method see: www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
2 If we leave this difference aside, also the gender difference and the difference in having
children in the household become significant in the binary-logistic regression.
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Wirtualne Media. 2016. “TVN24 na czele oglądalności kanałów tematycznych, TVP
ABC z największym wzrostem (Top 25).” accessed 23 February 2018. www.wirtualne
media.pl/artykul/tvn24-na-c zele-ogladalnosci-k analow-tematycznych-t vp-abc-z -
najwiekszym-wzrostem-top-25#.
Wodak, Ruth, Brigitte Mral, and Majid KhosraviNik. 2013. Right-wing populism in
Europe: politics and discourse. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
7 “Conservative modernization”
and the rise of Law and Justice
in Poland
Krzysztof Jasiecki
Introduction
This chapter intends to characterize the ruling Law and Justice (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party’s “conservative modernization” strategy as an
attempt to respond to the new challenges facing Poland since late 2015 in the
wake of the global finance crisis and its impact on East Central Europe (ECE).
The chapter consists of four parts. The first presents the self-definition of the PiS
government and its political roots, including the different terms used to describe
this party by its leaders, the party’s main program, symbolic and identity-related
references, essential elements of the party’s history, and specific patterns of its
political activity. The second part characterizes the genesis of and main ideas in
the PiS “conservative modernization” strategy, as presented as an alternative to
the strategy of “modernization by Europeanization” of the previous Polish gov-
ernments. The third part analyzes the new socio-economic policy and the institu-
tional changes in the light of the varieties of capitalism approach (VoC) and its
dimensions: the rules of economic governance, welfare state, corporate govern-
ance, and industrial relations. The fourth part outlines the major currents in the
controversy over the “conservative modernization” strategy in Poland, especially
in relation to its political, institutional, and economic consequences, and the
internal contradictions of this strategy. The chapter concludes that the new Polish
version of “state capitalism,” in spite of its short-term successes, is more likely
to harden the semi-peripheral position of Poland than to change it.
The self-definition of the PiS government and its

political roots
PiS was established as a party in 2001 as an outgrowth of the Center Alliance
party (Porozumienie Centrum, PC) which had been operating from the early
1990s and had plans to build a Polish Christian Democracy party based on the
tradition of the Solidarity movement. Among PC’s founding members were also
representatives of the Liberal-Democratic Congress party (Kongres Liberalno-
Demokratyczny, KLD), whose two leaders were the later prime ministers Jan
Krzysztof Bielecki and Donald Tusk. In combining these different structures, the
“Conservative modernization” in Poland 131
PC included Christian Democratic, neoliberal, and trade-unionist factions. The
main slogan of the PC was the idea of an “acceleration” of political changes in
Poland that had already begun with General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s stepping
down, the holding of presidential elections, and the “de-communizing” of the
state. PC activists ran the presidential campaign of Lech Wałęsa, and after his
victory, the Kaczyński brothers took ministerial posts in the presidential chan-
cellery (Słodkowska 1995). At the same time, an oppositional, post-Solidarity
liberal-left camp was being built around Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
the Democratic Union party (Unia Demokratyczna, UD) and the newspaper
Gazeta Wyborcza. After the liberals (KLD) and the smaller popular factions left
the PC, the party collaborated with Solidarity unionists to criticize the economic
reforms of Leszek Balcerowicz. Its position combined
the criticism of the state’s liberalism (a night-watchman state) with the

concept of the state as an institution of widely understood security and,
simultaneously, […] of a moral quality […] closely associated with a strong
embeddedness in the national tradition.
(Kaczyński 2016, 311)
However, according to liberal critics, in the 1990s the PC did not significantly
differ from the main pro-Western political currents in ECE aiming to secure
market reforms, representative democracy, and a secular state (Smolar 2016).
Regardless of later changes of position on many issues, several permanent tend-
encies can be observed in the political milieu of the PC that also characterize
PiS. These concern mainly the party leadership, style of operation, confron
tational attitude, tendency to escalate conflicts, moral rigor in the assessment
of opponents, nostalgia for the “good old days” (pre-war Poland), anti-
intellectualism, a tendency toward isolationism, an appeal to frustrated indi-
viduals, and treating democracy as majority rule not bound by procedural and
institutional constraints.1 Intellectuals identifying themselves with the party
explain the political approach of PiS as necessitated by the dynamics of change
and their resentments toward those holding power. In the words of one such
intellectual, Marek Cichocki, an adviser to the late President Lech Kaczyński,
PiS “got everything there was to gain. Nevertheless, it is still driven by a sense
of injustice and exclusion which it previously experienced, even during the
transformation period” (Cichocki 2016). The Polish combination of populism
and conservatism is distinguished by the “national character,” rooted in the spe-
cifics of the local cultural background, the heritage of communism, and the
weakness of democratic institutions. In turn, major changes in PiS, apart from
the question of political tactics, occurred in the area of its ideological profile,
intellectual basis, and theoretical inspirations.2
Representatives of the PiS government emphasize that they are part of the
international trend of shifting public sentiment toward right-wing parties, and
consider themselves defenders of Western traditions of culture and civilization,
especially Christian values. PiS leaders refer to themselves as the “patriotic and
132 Krzysztof Jasiecki
national camp,” the “independence” or “anti-system right” (Zybertowicz 2013),
as well as the “social right,” along the lines of the British Conservatives after
Brexit, Donald Trump, and the critique of liberal democracy by the German
right-wing political theorist Carl Schmitt.3 (Apart from Schmitt, the circles sur-
rounding PiS regard the British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton as one
of their intellectual influences.4) More concretely, they see PiS policies as an
attempt to counter the globalization process, growing inequalities, and ideo-
logical threats, and party politicians often stress that they want to build relations
with foreign partners on equal terms.
This new Polish mission in foreign policy rests on the idea that Poland—
along with Hungary—can be at the forefront of activities enriching the EU with
the greater participation of the countries located between Germany and Russia.
One aspect of this concept is the reorientation of Polish foreign policy toward
cooperation with the UK and the creation of an ECE alliance within the Euro-
pean Union as a counterweight to the domination of Germany and France. The
core of this alliance is suggested to be the Visegrad Group (V4) and the Three
Seas Initiative.5 Moreover, as a eurosceptic party, PiS supports the concept of a
“Europe of homelands” and opposes Poland’s membership in the Eurozone.6
They want to enrich European policy through the paradigm of national sover-
eignty and “a model of community based on greater diversity” (Szymański 2016,
1–6). A symbolic reflection of the changes in Poland’s European policy was the
decision by the first PiS Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, to remove the EU flag
from the background at her press conferences.7 In reaction to the dispute with
the Venice Commission and other EU institutions, the Polish parliament adopted
on 21 May 2016 a resolution defining the EU as a threat to the sovereignty of the
national state. In this interpretation, the myths and the consensus on which the
neoliberal order in Poland had been built since the early 1990s, no longer
applied, and a return to the previous status quo, sought after by the liberal elites,
would no longer be possible (Cichocki 2016).
The chairman of the PiS parliamentary club regards the rule of his party as
the most serious attempt to strengthen the Polish state in many years. He con-
siders the long-running dispute over the Constitutional Court as a struggle for
state sovereignty against an alliance of judges, political opponents, and Brussels.
It is believed that the media in Western countries usually present a distorted
picture of events taking place in Poland, equating the rise of PiS with the deteri-
oration of democracy: “When the power goes to the conservative camp, the end
of democracy is announced [by Western media]. There can be no approval of
this” (Terlecki 2016).
The PiS emphasis on national sovereignty in foreign policy is combined with
a different perception of the state–economy relationship and a refocus on
national identity. The PiS-led government perceives the state mainly as an
important tool for intervention in the economy and labor markets, for more redis-
tributive power, and a reset of national self-awareness. The declared goal is to
create more “comprehensive justice.” The most positive results of the govern-
ment reforms so far they regard to be the introduction of patriotic education to
promote a “national vision” of the Polish past, the extension of redistribution
mechanisms, and the open discussion about constitutional changes. In the words
of Cichocki (2016),
a few years ago the question whether our constitutional order was correct,
was a faux pas of the same type as criticizing the Balcerowicz plan at the
beginning of the 1990s. […] Sooner or later, we will have to construct a
new system of our state.
The PiS proposals for institutional transformation are moving toward changing the
entire political system of the country. The first unsuccessful attempt at this took
place during the PiS-led coalition government of 2005–07. The core concept then
was the appeal to create Poland’s Fourth Republic, justifying the creation of a series
of new state institutions such as the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Insti-
tute of National Remembrance, the takeover of civil service positions by PiS-
connected personnel, as well as reforms of the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office,
which were to facilitate the exchange of the ruling elites and change the system
rules. The term “impossibilism,” introduced then by right-wing politicians, was
their popular critique of the legal and institutional constraints encountered by the
PiS government in conflict with the Constitutional Court, the Polish National Bank,
and most of the media. The current political and constitutional changes, including
the conflict over the Court, the judiciary, and prosecutors, can be regarded as a con-
tinuation of the aborted reforms of that period (Kolarska-Bobińska 2017).8
The role model chosen by PiS for their national state rebuilding is de Gaulle’s
early Fifth French Republic (Kaczyński et al. 2014). A consistent re-
centralization of power and its concentration in the executive is regarded as a
prerequisite for improving the quality of state institutions and democracy. PiS
leaders also have two other role models in mind: Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s coup
d’etat of May 1926, which established in interwar Poland a semi-dictatorship
and the authoritarian regime of sanacja (regenerative purge),9 as well as Viktor
Orbán’s government in Hungary from 2010, which often serves directly as a
roadmap for Poland (see Dąbrowska et al. in this volume). In 2011, Jarosław
Kaczyński stated that he is “deeply convinced that the day will come when we
will have Budapest in Warsaw” (Góralczyk 2017, 93).
PiS leaders and supporters think that the previous governments pursued an
anti-national policy which led to the Polish economy being controlled by foreign
capital, large segments of the society being impoverished, the development pro-
spects of youth being blocked by adverse changes in employment contracts, and
the emigration of 2 million Poles. Reversing these anti-national measures, they
say, justifies the use of forceful measures and the deterioration of democracy.
The Constitutional Court, which in its unchanged form could block any laws
passed by the new government, will serve as an example. “In order to implement
reforms, the rulers must have their Court” (Kik 2016). PiS perceives itself as a
party of protest—against the new political and economic system of Poland and
especially against the Constitution of 1997.
Because of the dominance of its charismatic leader, its radical language criti-
cizing the corruption of political elites, and the pathologies of the state as institu-
tion, as well as its animosity toward civil society, NGOs, and the like, this party
should be described as authoritarian and populist in the area of political
methods.10 Its nationalist and xenophobic attitude toward immigrants, and the
well-known patterns of sociocultural behavior rejecting the axiology of liberal,
“cosmopolitan,” and left-wing elites, evidently bring PiS closer to the radical
New Right parties of Western countries. Its strong conservative identity accentu-
ating the close ties with most of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, advocacy
of more religious education in schools, the radical criticism of “gender ideo-
logy,” the strengthened criminalization of abortion, and opposition to in vitro
fertilization, prenatal testing, and the legalization of homosexual marriage (see
Wierzcholska in this volume) are unmistakable indicators of the PiS govern-
ment’s ideology. And as the PiS replacement PM Mateusz Morawiecki in
December 2017 was interviewed on the conservative Catholic TV station Trwam
(“I endure”), he already underscored the need to “re-Christianize” a Europe that
has betrayed its traditional values (Lipiński 2018).
At the same time, a critical attitude toward the neoliberal strategy of the post-
communist transformation gives this party a certain left-wing appearance on the
social and economic dimension. In the classification of 268 parties in 31 Euro-
pean countries by Inglehart and Norris (2016, 44), PiS is ranked as an economic
left-wing party, similar to Orbán’s Hungarian Fidesz. The basis for this categor-
ization is these parties’ focus on market regulation, state intervention in the
economy, the expansion of the welfare state, and wealth redistribution.11 As in
many ECE countries, such drifting to the left on the economy is combined with a
critique of the ruling elites and the liberal system. According to PiS leaders, the
state is viewed primarily as an instrument or lever for political change and for
redistributing wealth to the lower classes. With the level of national income
lower than that usual in the West, and with the redistribution model that has been
adopted, the PiS government has also taken on more pronounced class contours,
finding expression in the mobilization of (and support from) the lower or
working classes, small business, the poor, the excluded, and the inhabitants of
rural areas, small towns, and provincial regions.
The “conservative modernization” strategy: genesis and

main ideas
Various circumstances have contributed to the rise of conservatism, populism,
and rightist radicalism in Poland. On the cultural dimension, the patterns of
behavior of the new conservatives and right-wing populist attitudes favor the
marginalization of institutions in political life, and appeal to the values embodied
in the general watchwords of the “anti-political” philosophy of dissidents and
the Solidarity movement in the period of communist rule. These patterns are
manifested in the radically instrumental treatment of the principles of the rule of
law and disregard for democratic norms and procedures presented by politicians
of different political orientations. The consequence of such attitudes is conduct-
ing politics as a struggle against something, not for something, a Manichean
battle between good and evil which does not accept compromise. The resulting
atmosphere of polarization and conspiracy favors the rhetoric of the “stolen
revolution” of 1989, seized by former or imagined communists and secret
service agents (Mudde 2002), as well as by interest groups in a system of “multi-
level clientelism” (Zybertowicz 2013).
Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU became a catalyst for the right-
wing criticism of the neoliberal strategy of economic development. This strategy
of “modernization through integration” with the West (Przeworski 1995)
assumed that, because of the weakness of the development stimuli from the
internal market, state, and middle class, the main driver of change in Poland
should come from the outside, mainly the EU and its institutions, and foreign
investors. However, the resulting “fast Europeanization” process created an
atmosphere favorable to various fears (loss of cultural identity, or the “coloniza-
tion” of the economy by foreign capital), as well as to the radicalization of the
political scene. Institutional compulsion to implement the acquis communautaire
formed a new matrix of interests and thereby, new terrain for ideological divi-
sion. In Poland, this “EU effect” was strongest in the area of institutional adapta-
tion and regulations supporting democratic procedures, but weaker in the
normative area and in political culture. However, with the structural predomi-
nance of the EU, Poland was “Europeanized” primarily in its role as the recipi-
ent of EU policy (policy-taker) and not as one of its creators (policy-maker).
This situation confirmed the thesis about the place of Poland on the “internal
periphery” of the Union (Jasiecki 2008, 2013). Even before accession, right-
wing elites began to see “potential long-term hazards which would transform
Poland into a supply base of raw materials and cheap labor for the EU countries”
(Rządowe Centrum Studiów Strategicznych 1998, 231).
Among right-wing politicians and experts, concerns were also raised about
further reproducing Poland’s peripheral position in its relations with the “old” EU
states. These concerns were expressed through critical references to theories of
“modernization,” “dependency,” “world-system” and “regionalism” (Szczepański
2006; Zarycki 2016). Since the late 1990s some observers of political change
have pointed out the difficult circumstances of European integration and the
global capitalist system experienced by Poland and other countries of the region.
Sociologists for example compared it to a greater-than-zero-sum game in which
some (the “center states”) gain more and strengthen their advantage, and the
“periphery states” gain less or lose out (Wnuk-Lipiński and Ziółkowski 2001,
34–5). Poland, like most ECE countries with a relatively low level of develop-
ment and limited development potential for relations with Western states,
entered a “semi-periphery,” similar to its situation before the Second World War
(Berend 1996; Krasnodębski 2003; Kochanowicz 2006). Referring to depend-
ency theory, PiS representatives argue that when public institutions, the
economy, and civil society are weak, elites easily become structurally alienated
and work as compradors for external headquarters (Szczepański 2006).
Some of these arguments are taken from international research on the emerg-
ing new versions of capitalism in ECE. In applying and modifying the varieties
of capitalism approach of Hall and Soskice (2001), the political economy liter-
ature studying post-communist Europe has coined varying terms: foreign-led
capitalism (Myant and Drahokoupil 2011), dependent market economy (Nölke
and Vliegenthart 2009), or dependent liberal capitalism (King and Szelenyi
2005). Although also stressing the success of the foreign-led catch-up strategy,
this literature points to the extremely high degree of transnationalization of the
economy that appeared as foreign investors took over the largest Polish com-
panies and core sectors, particularly in the financial, telecommunications, retail,
and export sectors, as well as in the automotive industry. One key argument in
this literature is that the fast integration into transnational value chains has
limited the opportunities of Polish firms to upgrade their skills and technology,
and to innovate (see Bluhm et al. 2014; Jasiecki 2013).
Tomasz Żukowski (2005), a sociologist who advised the PiS leadership for
many years, distinguished already in the mid-2000s two strategies for the devel-
opment of Poland that represent two competing systems of values and economic
interests. He termed the first one—dominant in the 1990s—“imported moderni-
zation,” carried out by the liberal and center-left groups including the majority
of the intellectual elite, businesses that serve as intermediaries between the polit-
ical class and foreign capital, the intelligentsia, most then government officials,
and young professionals, all of whom are concentrated mainly in the larger
cities. These elites aimed at combining Western values—individualism and
liberalism—with values from the period of communist rule. This paradigm of
modernization accepted only Western countries as the frame of reference (Offe
1996; Przeworski 1995). Designing and creating new institutions was considered
primarily the transfer of existing Western solutions; a highly developed market
society became the model of change.
The second strategy, crystallizing during the final stages of EU accession,
rejects the strategy of an “imported modernization”; Żukowski calls it the
“Polish road to modernization.” Within this framework, attempts are made to
modernize the conservative identity and values of the indigenous cultural code
and republican tradition, including the Solidarity movement. Its main proponents
are leaders of rightist parties and intelligentsia rooted in the anti-communist and
patriotic traditions, most of the hierarchs of the Roman Catholic Church, busi-
nesses fighting for their position in the domestic market (especially state-owned
companies and small enterprises), the pro-family lobby, large parts of rural areas
and small towns, and conservative youth. This mode of modernization not only
intends to subordinate the domestic elites under national goals, but also to give
the death blow to the spiritual and institutional legacy of communism (see
Dąbrowska in this volume).
For the success of the new conservative model of modernization, its adherents
see the urgent need for a new sense of loyalty toward the state. That is why they
see the need for renewing the elite by changing its behavior and establishing new
recruitment mechanisms, as well as reforms to the law and diligence in its
application, and the strengthening of the society’s normative structure including
national remembrance structures and ceremonies (Krasnodębski 2005, 22–6;
Gawin 2005, 34–5). With the global financial crisis, the influence has also
increased of conservative concepts for strengthening domestic public institutions
and businesses as important factors limiting the risks associated with turbulence
on international markets. Therefore, PiS adherents see the new approach to eco-
nomic development as a response to the crisis of neoliberalism itself. After the
experiences of the first PiS government in the years 2005–07, the party presented
voters with a new version of the “Polish road to modernization” in the two elec-
tions of 2015.
Mateusz Morawiecki, previously deputy prime minister and the most
important person managing the economy in the PiS-led government, set forth the
core idea of the new program even before he replaced Beata Szydło as prime
minister on 11 December 2017:
[…] a sort of binary approach to economic theories, with total antagonism

between centrally planned and neoliberal economies, resulted in the uncriti-
cal adoption, in Poland, of a development model which originated in
Western European countries, with no account taken of historical and social
specificity of Central and Eastern Europe. The fundament upon which we
used to develop Polish capitalism and welfare until recently consisted of set
of rules known as the Washington Consensus. The weakness of this model
was that it seriously underrated the nature […] of the post-communist
reality. This classic neoliberal theory failed to really work in countries of
our region. […] The economic crises of 2009 became [the] occasion to
revise all commonly recognized theories. I believe the 21st-century Poland
should rely […] upon a solid and sustainable economic growth achieved
through re-industrialization of the economy and healthy development of
innovative small and middle-sized enterprises, accompanied by socially-
sensitive and territorially balanced development, as well as upon an efficient
state and its institutions. All these things and intents assume an active role
played by the state administration—in far-reaching opposition to laissez-
faire concepts. […] One of the most serious weaknesses of political
economy in Poland after the transformation was the lack of synchronization
between the growth of GDP and the growth of wealth of all social groups in
the country. Economic growth, high as it was, was not adequately experi-
enced by families and households, thus resulting in the sense of disappoint-
ment, frustration and hostile attitudes toward political elites. It was a
mistake to believe, following the statements of the Washington Consensus,
that [a] neoliberal economy would lead to alleviation of differences in the
level of development.
(Morawiecki 2017b, 15–16)
Among the theoretical inspirations Morawiecki refers to are the Chinese eco-
nomist Justin Yifu Lin, Mariana Mazzucato (author of The Entrepreneurial
State), and Thomas Piketty. “The myths have fallen […] that capital has no
nationality, that inequalities are good, that […] industry is a relic of the 19th or
20th century, […] [and] that the state is no longer needed by anyone” (Moraw-
iecki 2017a, 11). The above quotations can be regarded as the ideological credo
of the PiS government’s economic and social policy. However, their implemen-
tation is closely linked to the radical political and institutional changes charac-
terized earlier, such as the reform or even dismantling of the checks-and-balances
system, public media autonomy, civil service, prosecutors and judiciary, and
even local governments and NGOs in the spirit of anti-liberal backlash, national-
istic populism, and centralization of power in a single decisional center
(Chapman 2017; Pakulski 2016).
The PiS government approach to socio-economic policy

The institutional expression of the new economic policy was the act of subordi-
nating the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the largest
state-controlled banks and insurance companies under the then-cabinet minister
Morawiecki. This restructuring was inspired by the idea that public institutions
have the major task of stimulating innovation and that large companies are the
most efficient type for accumulating capital and triggering technological pro-
gress, as was once seen in France or South Korea. The inspiration stems from
Justin Yifu Lin (2012), a former chief economist and senior vice-president of the
World Bank. The Polish response to his conception of the “New Structural Eco-
nomics” can be found in the government position paper Strategy for Responsible
Development (SRD), adopted officially by the government in February 2016
(Morawiecki 2017b, 16). SRD defines the state as the crucial agent in economic
development, with a role going beyond that of regulation and supervision, and
commits the government to greater support of large-scale infrastructure projects
and selected industry sectors such as aviation, automotive, rail vehicles, and
shipbuilding. Other important elements in the SRD are its flagship programs,
such as “Electromobility,” “Polish Industry Platform 4.0,” and the “Capital
Building Platform,” which are to include new employee pension funds.
A body that plays a major role in the implementation of the SRD is the Polish
Development Fund (Polski Fundusz Rozwoju, PFR), which integrates many
state-owned financial institutions such as the Industrial Development Agency
(Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu, ARP), the National Development Bank (Bank
Gospodarstwa Krajowego, BGK), the Export Credit Insurance Corporation
(Korporacja Ubezpieczeń Kredytów Eksportowych, KUKE), the Polish Invest-
ment and Trade Agency (Polska Agencja Inwestycji i Handlu, PAIH), and
the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (Polska Agencja Rozwoju
Przedsiębiorczości, PARP). Among the development tools they have at hand are
financial guarantees, insurances, export credits, a fund for investments outside of
Poland, and others. The priorities of the PFR group include infrastructure invest-
ments, innovations, development of entrepreneurship within Poland as well as
the diversification of export destinations (away from Germany and the EU),
foreign expansion of Polish businesses, as well as handling foreign investments
in Poland. For their implementation was earmarked in all about 60 billion Złoty
(PLN). The focus, however, lies on the extension of support to export-oriented
companies, so-called “national champions,” and large, state-initiated projects. A
spectacular example of this ambitious development plan of the PiS-led govern-
ment is the announced creation of the so-called Central Communication Port
near Warsaw to be operational in 2027. The project comprises the construction
of a new hub for intercontinental airlines and a railway center to facilitate the
creation of a global metropolis, the Warsaw-Łódź binary city of 5 million resi-
dents. The cost of this public–private partnership—estimated at 30 billion PLN
(7.5 billion euro)—indicates the inclination of the PiS toward large projects.12
Another important task of the PFR is its active participation in the “re-
polonization” of strategic industries of the Polish economy such as financial ser-
vices and the energy sector. PFR has already invested nearly 10 billion PLN in
the Polish economy. The Ministry of Development also initiated a program of
investment projects located outside larger agglomerations: 85 percent of the stra-
tegic investments supported by the government were made in Poland’s small and
medium-sized towns. The same ministry has prepared a comprehensive reform
of Polish economic law, a Business Constitution (a catalog of principles for
running businesses, as well as rules that regulate the relationship between an
entrepreneur and state bodies), and took steps to eliminate barriers to investment.
The Ministry of Finance introduced a reform of the state treasury administration
and is preparing, for the near future, a simple and transparent tax system to
restore fair competition and marginalize the gray economic zone.
From the VoC perspective, it is still too early for an assessment of the out-
comes of this new economic policy and the accompanying institutional changes,
partly because they vary in pace and nature. In the economy, many processes are
delayed and cumulative. Their impact is, therefore, hard to project. The inter-
action of different measurements in particular requires substantial research.
However, after two years of rule by the PiS-led government, I can identify some
major changes of the Polish capitalism. They mainly apply to: (1) the rules of
economic coordination; (2) corporate governance; (3) the welfare state; and
(4) industrial relations. In terms of economic coordination, there is a strengthen-
ing of the role of the state in the economy similar to that of other former com-
munist countries like Hungary, Croatia, and Estonia (Voszka 2016, 620).
The rules of economic coordination

Many right-wing politicians believe that Poland will gain with a better coordin-
ation of market actors a new tool for raising the country’s position in the inter-
national division of labor, while reducing dependence on and costs of foreign
capital (like the cost of servicing investors).13 They hope to achieve stronger
cooperation among indigenous companies and sectors that can add more value
nationally, develop new ways of domestic capital accumulation and financing
innovation.
A more effective and intense coordination of economic activities can be
reached in different ways. Liberal economies focus on the improvement of the
quality of institutions and on organizational innovations. Coordinated market
economies seek social dialogue, workers’ participation, and collective agree-
ments on a more consensual road to development (Williamson 1985; Hicks and
Kenworthy 2003). A characteristic feature of the PiS government policy is, in
contrast, the acquisition, centralization, and consolidation of the state’s eco-
nomic power. Poland has a strong tradition of statism and economic nationalism,
resulting from both the period of the communist system and the reconstruction
of the country after the partitions and the First World War. Despite its anti-
communism, PiS favors a model of “state capitalism” based on a high proportion
of state ownership and vertical, state-centered coordination of the economy and
other spheres of social life (such as social policy, housing, civil society, local
government, or media) in the hands of central government executives.
A manifestation of this development is the recentralization of state power and
the partial reversal of privatization, which significantly reduces horizontal
coordination among economic actors. Following the idea of a unitary state,
central authorities cut back competences of regional and local bodies, as for
example with the central takeover of voivodship environmental protection funds
(in large part EU-sourced), and government opposition to regionalism (such as
in Upper Silesia).
Poland already has a large state-owned sector, among the largest in post-
communist ECE.14 Yet, the government introduced additional restrictions on the
sale of publicly owned assets (companies, health care, land, water, etc.). For
instance, having taken over the Alior Bank from French owners and Bank PKO
SA from the Italian Credit Union Group, domestic capital (controlled mainly by
the government) now owns more than 52 percent of the banking sector.15 Also,
over 60 percent of electricity in Poland is currently produced by the state energy
sector (Błaszczyk 2016, 536). In addition, state-owned companies often serve as
a means to buy other business entities in order to promote “national champions.”
Large state-owned energy companies finance the start-ups with seed money
coordinated from within the government.
Corporate governance
Poland’s state-owned companies are small in number but large in size. State-
owned companies dominate the “Top 100” list of national companies. As a con-
sequence, the government’s involvement in price determination, and its
involvement in network sectors (banking, energy, railways), has also had a
growing impact in the operation of private companies. State-owned companies
are “islands” that serve—as the governments in Poland and Hungary have
recently suggested—“as models for expanding the state’s role in the economy”
(Pula 2017, 23).16 An important dimension of the new economic policy is corpo-
rate governance. The government’s new regulatory and ownership policies
change corporate governance rules, adversely affecting the entire economy,
including the private sector. The right-wing parties have set out to fill positions
not only in state-owned companies and civil service with political loyalists, but
also in state economic administrations and business institutions (government
agencies, economic diplomacy, etc.).
There has been an increase in the politicization of the public sector, weaken-
ing the role of meritocratic and market criteria in the decisions of economic
actors. Such a government policy led by a party can introduce great chaos and
confusion into the economy (Błaszczyk 2016; Kozarzewski 2016). Large state
monopolies, as legacies of state socialist industrialization, are being rebuilt with
unclear interdependencies, thereby increasing the uncertainty of business con-
ditions. The importance of meritocracy is declining, and the role of political rent
and the influence of business interest groups that take advantage of companies
for the benefit of the political elite and the creation of clientele relationships are
increasing (Błaszczyk 2016, 550–51). The government prefers state-owned
companies—not the private sector (Gomułka 2017, 5). A manifestation of this
phenomenon are regulations that have blocked the development of wind farms
by state-owned energy companies.
Welfare state
PiS won two elections in 2015, which is mainly attributable to its promise of a
planned radical change in social policy—the largest social transfers since 1989.
A social policy focused on providing support to large families (in the form of
monthly financial allowances for a second and each subsequent child in the
family, approximately 125 euro or 135 dollars) became a priority for the govern-
ment. It also restored the possibility of early retirement (back to 60 years for
women and 65 for men), raised the minimum wage and minimum pensions,
introduced free medications for people over 75, and initiated a program of low-
cost social housing. The PiS-led government has confirmed the thesis of Tavits
and Letki (2009) that right-wing governments in the ECE engage in greater
social spending than left-wing and liberal parties. These policies are being
implemented by the government with the support of trade unions (especially
Solidarity), who have approved the changes undertaken by the government and
the parliamentary majority. According to liberal critics, the government is trying
to enlarge the PiS electorate through social transfers, an electorate seen as made
up mainly of the “losers” in the transformation—the lower social classes, labor-
ers and farmers, residents of rural areas, small towns and villages, who are the
government’s main base of social support.
However, even left-wing critics of PiS admit that the social policy of the gov-
ernment is a clear step toward reducing income disparities and equalizing pro-
spects and opportunities for all Poles, especially children (Jarosz and Kozak
2016).17 The index of financial inequalities within Polish society has decreased.
“[…] [C]ompared to September 2015, by April 2017 the difference between the
wealthiest 25 percent and the least well-off 25 percent people in Poland fell from
a level of 5.9 to 4.4!” (Morawiecki 2017b). Polls show that over 40 percent of
Polish people evaluate the country’s current economic situation as good, and
recent economic data indicate economic growth above 4 percent GDP per
annum, wage increases, a drop in unemployment to 5–6 percent, and a more
effective value-added tax (VAT) collection policy producing 28 percent more
budget revenue than in 2016. Most Poles support the active role of the state in
both the economy (including public ownership) and social policy. PiS emerged
as the largest political party after opposing PO’s liberal economic reform
program and presenting the first, seemingly alternative “anti-reform” govern-
ment program since the beginning of the post-socialist transition (Rae 2015). Its
implementation to date is yet another attempt to redirect the path of dependence
shaped by the recent history of Poland.
Industrial relations
The Eurofound (2016) report depicts Poland as having a fragmented and state-
centered industrial relations (IR) regime of increasing government unilateralism,
a leading role for the state in IR, and an irregular and politicized role for social
partners in public policy. Polish business associations and trade unions are
regarded as weak because of their pluralist mode of interest-group/government
interaction in addition to industrial fragmentation, which makes it difficult to
reach common positions. Employer associations’ density rates have been below
20 percent and trade union density rates at around 15 percent—among the lowest
in the EU. Collective bargaining coverage in Poland is at 15 percent, while the
EU average is 60 percent (see Wenzel 2016; Trappmann et al. 2014). The weak-
ness of social and civil dialogue facilitates the implementation of the PiS neo-
etatist policy. The close coalition of PiS with Solidarity suggests that the
processes of politicization and neo-etatization of IR are likely to continue. The
PiS government has seized on the earlier institutional “abandonment of
employees” (porzucenie pracowników) by companies and power elites to now
claim to be the “protector” of the working world, showing that it “does not like
to share power on key issues” (Gardawski 2016; Mrozowicki et al. 2015). The
government has increased the minimum wage (exceeding the demands of trade
unions), restored the former retirement age, reduced the scope of the interim
agreements and flexible job contracts (“junk” jobs), and begun a gradual reduc-
tion of retail commerce on Sundays. Under such circumstances, the government
aims to gain significant employee support, while the tripartite Social Dialogue
Council has been marginalized, and unions and business associations, ideologic-
ally and politically divided, are weak.
The fundamental controversy over the “conservative

modernization” strategy
The ideology, objectives, and methods of PiS leaders have caused major tensions
and conflicts in Polish society among elites and experts, as well as with some
member states and EU institutions. The fundamental dispute about the model of
the state seems to apply not only to the specific institutional solutions, but also to
the two visions of democracy. The first one is liberal democracy, covering issues
such as the protection of individual rights, the protection of minorities against
arbitrary domination of the majority, the principle of the rule of law, and the
system of restrictions on arbitrary power. The second vision is associated with
the statist concept of the state, whose representatives, chosen in general elec-
tions, are given the legitimacy to carry out autonomously the implementation of
their policies, and are only to a small extent subject to social control (Hausner et
al. 2015, 118–19). The exercise of PiS authority vis-à-vis state institutions, and
in its economic policy, follows the second vision. The main declared economic
goal of the PiS government is to overcome the peripheral dependence of the
Polish economy on Western countries and thereby avoid a stagnating “middle-
income trap.”
Some economists and business circles believe that the diagnoses and goals of
the government’s Responsible Development Strategy largely correspond to the
needs of the current stage of Poland’s development. It is an ambitious, innov-
ative concept, partly corresponding to the methods of stimulating economic initi-
atives by means of EU funds (Nowak 2017; Ryć 2017). The arguments against
the concept of “conservative modernization” mainly find fault with the role of
the state and the choice of role models for development. Comparison with the
examples set by developing Asian states, or the Hungarian government of Viktor
Orbán, raises many doubts. The Asian model, based on the strong role of the
state and its active industrial policy, is rooted in a different system of values and
in the authoritarian institutions of those political systems. It has a specific char-
acter that would be difficult to apply in Poland. The distinguishing features of
this successful model are an efficient and substantially adjusted state administra-
tion, a society not having strong democratic aspirations (at least initially), and
widespread agreement over the direction of modernization activities. None of
these distinguishing features are found in Poland (Góralczyk 2017; Jędrzejczak
and Sterniczuk 2017).
Similarly, attempts to transfer Hungary’s established patterns of autocratic
state governance (Mihályi 2016; Voszka 2016) to Poland will continue to
generate political and social conflicts, often threatening government plans. An
example is the arbitrary exchange of personnel in the public sector, as well as
the social protests erupting in reaction to PiS policies on the judiciary and
women’s rights (Wierzcholska in this volume). Hungarian–Polish comparisons
indicate a similar growing role of political rent and business groups taking
advantage of companies for the benefit of the political elite, and an increase in
the creation of clientele relationships. Regulatory actions strengthening the state
weaken the capital market, diminishing the role of minority shareholders in
state-owned companies and leading to the hybridization of ownership, fuzzy
ownership structures and unclear interdependencies between state-owned sub-
sidiaries. Such changes worsen the quality of institutions, manifested in the
emergence of cronyism, state capture, and systemic corruption (Martin 2017;
Błaszczyk 2016).
Even conservatives who previously supported PiS argue that the strategy and
mode of operation adopted by party leaders after the elections will make it
impossible for the government to reach the declared objectives, while the escala-
tion of conflicts leads to drastic social divisions, raises legal uncertainty, and
lowers the guarantee of citizens’ rights. They too conclude that this kind of gov-
ernment policy, together with distrust toward independent institutions, reduces
the chances for modernizing the state and impairs the position of Poland in the
international arena (Ujazdowski 2017).18
The PiS mode of operation centers around two poles of authority: a non-
constitutional political headquarters with the PiS leader in charge, and the gov-
ernment, headed by the prime minister with a limited “personal decision-making
ability.” Such a duality weakens the efficiency of coordination of the state
administration, which is important under conditions of high political tension in
the country and in international relations. There are also conflicts among interest
groups within the government, as well as tensions between Poland’s president
and some ministers in the government. PiS politicians already demonstrated, in
the years 2005–07, the limited efficiency of such a model of a governing party’s
new version of a nomenclature system (Szałamacha 2009).
Other controversies result from the methods of implementing the PiS “conser-
vative modernization” and from tensions between its short- and long-term con-
sequences. Morawiecki’s development plan is formulated at a strategic level, but
so far the government has not presented instruments suitable to achieve the
announced goals (Gomułka 2017; Wojtyna 2017; Czerniak and Rapacki 2017).19
Few elements have been implemented because of insufficient means of finance.
Moreover, the government’s top priority is social and political goals, while eco-
nomic policy mainly targets consumption and is treated as an instrument for
changing the state institutions, not for upgrading the economy.20 The recent growth
in spending and consumption has been favored by a continued good economic
situation, a housing boom, high consumer optimism, rising employment and
wages, and a drop in unemployment. Large social transfers put into effect since
2016 have brought PiS public support of about 40 percent of respondents in polls.
The boost in consumption triggered a short-term GDP growth (probably until
around 2019), but many economists and business associations criticize the exces-
sive redistributive public spending at the expense of development. Stimulating
household consumption by significantly increased budget outlays has created a
strategic contradiction between social policy and an increase in the rate of domestic
savings on the one hand, and the announced investment in economic development,
national innovation capacity, and domestic capital rates on the other.
Government actions to stimulate private investment are not statistically
noticeable. Scholars trace the lack of success in this regard to numerous regu-
latory changes (Osiatyński 2017) and political uncertainty (Gomułka 2017;
Jasiecki 2017). The two most important government social programs—the
“500+” program and lowering the retirement age—will have significant eco-
nomic consequences in the longer term. The “500+” program supports current
economic growth, but its pro-development role will decrease. Lowering the
pension age already has caused a rapid increase in budget expenditure and has a
negative effect on the labor market. The programs limit investment opportunities
in Poland, especially with the prospect of the economic slowdown forecasted by
international economic organizations and reductions in EU funds in the coming
years. They will permanently deplete the rate of domestic savings and will
necessitate more borrowing abroad or tax increases. In turn, higher tax revenues
resulting from an increase of over 4 percent in GDP in 2017 and VAT receipts,
do not eliminate the medium- and long-term need to limit public finances (espe-
cially with the needed increased spending on pensions and health care in an
aging society).21
The future of the Polish energy industry is also controversial, particularly as
analyzed in the context of climate policy. The government has not presented a
coherent vision of the development of the Polish energy sector. It is unknown
what the structure of the energy mix after 2030 and later will be. The construc-
tion of nuclear power plants has been announced, while there has been a simul-
taneous distancing of policy from the promotion of diversified and renewable
energy sources. The government declares that future energy production will be
based mainly on Poland’s hard coal reserves (Ruszkowski 2018).
The main challenge for the strategy of “conservative modernization” is,
however, the new Poland–EU relationship, both in political and economic terms.
According to government estimates, half of the investments in Morawiecki’s
plan are to be financed from EU structural funds. It is unknown whether and how
the political problems between Poland and the EU concerning the EU’s stand-
ards on the rule of law in member states may affect foreign investment in Poland,
as well as the size of the EU budget after 2020 (the European Commission’s
future payment of structural funds may depend on Poland’s compliance with
rule-of-law standards). Brexit, too, may cause a significant reduction in the EU
budget, including money for Poland.
Concluding remarks
Many researchers point out that the success of PiS is based on the (often)
accurate diagnoses of weaknesses in Poland’s development, especially in social
policy. But also, the global financial crisis, Eurozone crisis, Russian military
expansion, and the massive influx of migrants into the EU have increased the
importance of such issues as national sovereignty, constitutionalism, and self-
determination, which are usually characteristic of the ideology of right-wing
parties, including PiS. These coincided with the erosion and ideological empti-
ness of the liberal elites, the disintegration of the Left, as well as a wave of social
protest of patriotic-nationalist and religious-conservative nature. The effects are
a growing anti-liberal, euroskeptical, and nationalistic movement in Polish
society, with catchy slogans—such as “good change” (dobra zmiana)—calling
for the defense of national interests and continued “conservative modernization.”
Supporters believe that, in strengthening the state, a new social community can
be forged based on a traditional Polish identity and the mobilization of domestic
capital. PiS has proved itself the most influential faction in this movement, with
the results of the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections (and subsequent
opinion polls) giving it still more momentum.
PiS leaders believe that under the conditions of the global crisis of capitalism
(including the Eurozone and EU institutions), the concentration of political and
economic power around the leadership of the ruling party gives greater oppor-
tunities for the country’s development than market liberalism. The “conservative
modernization” strategy (or the “Polish road to modernization”) is meant as a
“grand plan” to break out of the “dependent market economy,” the middle-
income trap, and Poland’s position on only the “inner periphery” of the EU,
which the PiS government fears will be a lasting threat without a radical shift in
politics. This shift they perceive will be even more needed in order to prepare
for a new “Europe of homelands” (Europa ojczyzn) in which they would like to
see Poland play a crucial and not just peripheral role.
“Conservative modernization” means, in Poland as in Hungary, that the
central state administration becomes the major agent in coordinating economic
interaction and development, which includes the renationalization of private
property in areas crucial to the “national interest.” Thus, Poland is moving
toward a model of “state capitalism” that combines an intervening central state
in the economy (based on extended state ownership) with an expansion of the
redistributive state. This has made PiS—along with the nationalist Fidesz in
Hungary—one of “the most popular ruling parties in Europe” (The Economist
2017).
From the perspective of historical sociology, Polish “conservative moderniza-
tion” represents part of an international counter-movement to market fundament-
alism characterized, in Karl Polanyi’s analysis, by xenophobia, nationalism, and
the spectacular rise of radical right-wing populist parties, as in the “fascist situ-
ation” of the 1930s (Bohle and Greskovits 2012, 270–71). PiS leaders have an
anachronistic vision of the state. In many policy fields, they look backwards: in
environmental and climate policy, women’s rights and education. They under-
rate the importance of the quality of institutions, dismantle autonomous institu-
tions, degrade (or radically modify) the established checks-and-balances system,
the rule of law, and minority rights. Trusting only in itself, PiS weakens capabil-
ities in society that are developing toward the horizontal coordination of eco-
nomic, civil, and political actors and the participation of social partners (unions,
employer associations) in the regulation of labor markets and conditions, while
escalating conflicts. At the same time, it feeds the formation of clientelistic net-
works and patronage. The PiS leadership cares little about the tensions between
economic and social policy, nor whether their methods of implementation fit
their ambitious goal of innovation and a fast upgrade of the economy. Contrary
to their intentions, therefore, they are putting Poland in danger of sinking even
deeper into the middle-income trap and of losing the development and position
the country has already achieved, while exacerbating the social anomia they
have allegedly been trying to overcome through their notions of conservative
morality and social justice.
Notes
1 Referring to PiS, its leader compares it to a Leninist party of a new type, composed
“of people prepared, proven, capable of disciplined action” (Kaczyński 2016, 382).
As pointed out by one of the former associates and competitors of Jaroslaw
Kaczyński, in his political activity he is “a kind of romantic and populist tout court.”
However,
Kaczyński has decided that he must expose to the people yet another enemy […]
feeding the low passions of the masses became a new way of doing politics […]
which is ready to sacrifice everything else, including the state, in order to mobilize
the[ir] collective passions.
(Rokita and Krasowski 2013, 272–8)
2 The new shift toward populism, conservatism, and rightist radicalism among young
people in V4 countries is described in the Aspen Review Central Europe (no.
02/2017).
3 Not coincidentally, the conservative philosophical yearbook Teologia Polityczna
(Political Theology) refers with its title to one of Carl Schmitt’s most famous books.
This yearbook focuses on well-known figures in the academic world and societal
groups, some of whom have become part of the new political elites and media (see
Dąbrowska, this volume).
4 On 21 June 2016 at the “Congress Poland—Great Project,” organized under the
patronage of President Andrzej Duda, Roger Scruton received an honorary prize
named after President Lech Kaczyński.
5 The Three Seas Initiative is the joint Polish–Croatian political and economic project
representing 12 EU member states located between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas
(Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) which cooperate in the field of transport
infrastructure, energy security, roads, and railways. This initiative was supported by the
Donald Trump administration during his visit to Warsaw on 6 July 2017.
6 In 2017 public opinion polls, the largest part of Polish respondents (32 percent) agrees
that PiS aims to reduce integration and increase the role of nation states in the EU.
The belief that the ruling party wants Poland to leave the EU is expressed by
17 percent of respondents (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 2017).
7 PiS politicians justified this decision by the failure to officially establish the flag and
the anthem of the EU as a result of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Ryszard
Legutko, chairman of the PiS delegation to the European Parliament, has consistently
refused to rise during Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, considered to be the anthem of
the EU (Legutko 2015).
8 “In order to reform the Polish judiciary, it is necessary to change the constitution.”
For more on the demands for political and system changes in Poland according to the
PiS concept, see Kaczyński (2011).
9 Piłsudski’s new Polish constitution (1935) provided for the massive extension of
presidential powers, including a suspensive veto, dissolution of the legislature, dis-
missal of the cabinet and of individual ministers, the authority to issue ordinances
with the force of law, and the appointment of one-third of all senators. This was to
become a partial model for Gaullist France’s charter of 1958 (Rothschild 1998, 69).
The official motto of the PiS government’s economic strategy quotes Piłsudski’s
words—“Poland will be great, or it will not be at all.”
10 The rhetoric of PiS politicians reminds one of the concept of the “leader democracy”
or “electoral autocracy,” which marginalizes the separation of powers, rule of law, the
right to opposition and minority rights. Ágh (2015) shows, on the example of
Hungary, the establishment of such a system with a reference to the concept of the
Führerdemokratie of Max Weber. See also Lengyel and Ilonszki (2016).
11 For Poland and Hungary’s similarities and differences in their political situation and
institutional changes, see Chapman (2017), Pakulski (2016) and Błaszczyk (2016).
12 The initiative “Central Communication Port” refers back to the construction of the
port and city of Gdynia, one of the largest Polish investments of the 1920s and 1930s.
The development of Gdynia became the symbol of a new Poland, revived after the
First World War.
13 According to Morawiecki (2017a, 8), annually around 4.5 percent of Poland’s GDP is
revenue accruing to foreign capital interests.
14 In various estimates, the state’s share in all sectors of the Polish economy ranges from
16 to 25 percent (Kozarzewski 2016, 559). Of all ECE countries Poland has the great-
est number (15) of state-owned firms in the top 100 firms by country. On the role and
scope of state ownership in ECE, see Pula (2017).
15 Proposals to “repolonize” financial institutions purchased by foreign investors in the
framework of privatization began being put forward and implemented by the PiS gov-
ernment from 2015. The dominance of foreign investors brought about the transfer of
costs of stabilization by the global banks to their subsidiaries by reducing those banks’
capital, increasing dividends, or transferring deposits to the parent companies. Busi-
ness models of foreign capitalization proved in many cases unsuitable to the needs of
Polish economic policy (Jasiecki 2013, 289–309).
16 See the results of a joint project of the Polish and the Hungarian Academies of Sci-
ences, Development pattern of CE countries after the 2007–2009 crises, on the
example of Poland and Hungary, Economic Studies no. 4 (XCI) 2016.
17 From 1 April 2016 the government introduced the family program “500+” (a
500-PLN child benefit). By July 2017, 3.8 million children were enrolled in this
program. All parents, regardless of income, receive it for a second and subsequent
children—benefit is provided to over 57 percent of children under 18 years of age. In
the countryside it is 64 percent of children, in urban communes, up to 51 percent of
children, and in urban-rural communes, 60 percent of children (Raport 2017).
18 Some sociologists have defined the behavior of PiS as “anti-communist Bolshevism”
for replacing the law with the political will of the ruling party which seeks the
depreciation and later arrogation of the autonomous institutions of the system of
balance of powers. One of them calls the party’s actions
an attempt to carry out a revolution in the majesty of law through taking advantage
of legal loopholes […], reinterpreting the regulations and taking over the compe-
tences of some bodies by others. All this to carry out something that could not be
done through abiding by the rules, that is, to control or to depreciate the Constitu-
tional Court.
(Staniszkis 2016)
19 Poland has the lowest propensity to save and the lowest investment rate of the ECE
countries. Contrary to the government’s announcements that the share of investments
in GDP would increase from 18 to 25 percent, this share in the last two years has
decreased to around 17 percent (Gomułka 2017, 6).
20 The PiS economic policy resembles the rule of Edward Gierek in the early 1970s,
when the investment development was largely financed by foreign debt (Gomułka
2017, 9). This similarity of the PiS economic policy to that of the early 1970s is also
underscored by the former head of E. Gierek’s economic advisors, Paweł Bozyk. He
cites the centralization of economic management, and authorities who ignored the
opinions of experts (Bozyk 2017).
21 According to the European Commission, the structural deficit in Poland is expected to
reach 3.3 percent of GDP in 2018 (compared with 2.3 percent in 2015), which will be
one of the worst results throughout the EU (Czerniak and Rapacki 2017, 114).
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Part II
Translations
8 The limits of conservative
influence on economic policy
in Russia
Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov
Introduction
This volume argues that in recent years “conservatism” has become a new meta-
frame and an “ideology” for those who challenge the liberal order. As Katharina
Bluhm shows in her chapter, the conservative turnaround in Russia has two main
sources: the first is the support for conservatism “from above”—from the centers
of power around President Putin; and the second source is the conservative
movement by intellectuals and political activists who do not belong to Russia’s
political establishment. For both groups, a “conservative” view on economics
and economic policy is an important element. In our chapter, we will focus on
the economic and public policy positions of Russian conservatives. Analyzing
the ideas of several of the most influential groups and individuals, we label them
“Russian conservative economists,” though not all of them are economists by
education or occupation. We also use the term “conservative” in the sense of a
self-definition by these actors; that is to say, Russian “conservative economists”
are those who publicly identify themselves as supporting anti-liberal principles
and propose alternative economic and public policy programs. The self-
identification criterion leaves many prominent individuals outside the camp of
conservative thinkers even if their views are very similar to the views of self-
proclaimed supporters of “Russian-style” conservatism. Still, in Russia the camp
of self-identified conservatives unites not only ideologists of the extreme right or
left, but many mainstream public figures and well-known intellectuals seeking to
influence public policies.
Most importantly, Russian President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev
belong to the self-proclaimed “conservatives.” Thus, in fall 2009, Vladimir
Putin’s United Russia party held its convention in St. Petersburg, where “Russian
Conservatism” was declared to be the party’s official motto. The party declared
its intention of combining conservatism with a program of economic moderniza-
tion, while the party’s principal task, as both Putin and Medvedev told conven-
tion delegates in St. Petersburg, was to bring about Russia’s economic and
technological modernization without tampering with the country’s political
regime (Trenin 2010). In a 2013 interview Vladimir Putin (2013) described
himself as a “pragmatist with a conservative bent.” In Putin’s view,
158 Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov
conservatism certainly does not mean stagnation. Conservatism means reli-
ance upon traditional values, but with a necessary additional element aimed
at development. It seems to me that this is an absolutely essential thing.
In 2018, the year of Putin’s re-election to another six-year term, practically all
Russian conservatives publicly supported (and increasingly so over time) his
incumbency.1 None of them was in open opposition to Putin. Even those belong-
ing to communist groups claimed that there was no alternative to Putin as the
political leader of Russia. However, at the same time it was quite common to
criticize the Putin government and, in particular, to blame some officials for the
neoliberal economic course promoted by the pro-Western economic block of the
government. While the political leaders of Russia are self-proclaimed conserva
tives, since the 1990s the official economic course had been largely determined
and implemented by a group of “liberal” economists. These economists were
strongly influenced by the ideas of neoliberal economics, political science, and
development studies.
Thus, while supporting Putin as the political leader and rejecting liberalism in
politics, Russian conservatives have proposed a variety of alternative economic
programs. The alternatives advocated by them have been aimed at persuading
Putin to change official economic policies, as all of them insist that their altern-
atives are fully consistent with Putin’s conservative political agenda, but could
serve it better than the current status-quo economic course.
In this chapter our main claim is that the influence of conservative ideology
on economics in Russia is likely to remain limited. The liberal economists have
gradually accepted and adopted conservative political ideas, but continue to
promote liberal economic policies. The conservative politicians and public intel-
lectuals are increasingly interested in developing “conservative” alternatives to
liberal economic policies, but their proposals are unlikely to be acceptable to
Putin. At most, Putin could adopt some elements of the alternative economic
politics offered by the conservatives. The status quo in economic policies is
therefore likely to prevail as long as Putin’s regime is relatively stable.
There is significant heterogeneity of economic platforms within the Russian
conservative camp. One segment of this camp advocates conservative anti-liberal
ideas in political, social, and cultural life while continuing to support “liberal”
economic policies. Most importantly, they argue in favor of a limited economic
role for the state. In that respect, the Russian “liberal” conservative economists
share the economic views of their conservative counterparts in Europe and
the US.
Another group of conservatives advocates a more consistent combination—
anti-liberalism in all spheres of social life, including economics. They all favor a
greater role of the state in the economy, though disagree concerning the specific
economic priorities of the state. In this respect, some differences between social-
ists and nationalists are noticeable.
Yet another small (though often quite vocal) segment of conservatives
in modern Russia presents itself as seeking an economic alternative to both
The limits of conservative influence in Russia 159
socialism and liberalism (belonging to this segment in particular are Dugin and
Prokhanov). These claim to promote the “third” or even the “fourth” economic
alternative to capitalism, socialism, and all their various combinations. For
instance, Dugin presents his agenda as
radical de-urbanization and a return to agricultural practice, to the creation

of sovereign farmers’ communities […]. This isn’t about the building of a
system of economics that is more effective than liberalism […] but a reli-
gious, eschatological battle against death.
(Dugin 2012)2
Overall there is a very significant variety of positions among the economists with
anti-liberal political views—from those promoting the neoliberal economic prin-
ciples of “liberal conservatism” and “liberal empire” to the advocates of protect-
ing the Russian economy from global competition and the supporters of the
“Fortress Russia” model. It is also worth noting that the diversity of economic
views among Russian conservatives largely reflects (though not exclusively)
their differences regarding the evaluation of the Soviet and post-Soviet experi-
ences. This diversity also reflects the instrumental, “catch-all” character of con-
servatism for Putin’s administration (Laruelle 2017).
Despite many differences and disagreements among them, practically all self-
identified Russian anti-liberals share the view that Russia urgently needs eco-
nomic and technological modernization, economic reforms being crucial to
restore Russia’s geopolitical status and military capability, as well as strengthen-
ing state capacity. Thus, all Russian conservatives are in favor of economic
reforms and modernization.3 Their particular concern, however, is the choice of
an appropriate economic model that would serve as a basis for economic mod-
ernization. They all advocate some form of unique or special “Russian path” of
economic modernization that would not provoke a transition to liberal demo-
cracy in Russia. Thus, rejection of liberal democracy is the marker of all conser-
vatives in Russia. Specific segments inside the conservative camp would also
like to avoid many other “by-products” of economic modernization—for
example increasing Western cultural influence or challenges to the influence of
the Orthodox religion. More generally, as Chebankova noted: “conservative
thinkers do not reject modernity as a project, but rather propose to develop a
culturally specific Russian version” (Chebankova 2013, 287).
For some conservatives, Russia is not yet ready for liberal democracy; yet
most conservatives would prefer to avoid liberal democracy in Russia forever.
All of them emphasize various shortcomings of liberal democracy and, espe-
cially, the risks of transition to democracy. In the view of Russian conservatives,
liberal democracy is inconsistent with: (1) unpopular but necessary measures of
economic reform; (2) political stability; (3) a strong state; (4) territorial integrity;
(5) measures necessary to upgrade Russia’s geopolitical status; (6) military
buildup; (7) Russian culture; (8) family values; (9) the values of the Orthodox
religion.
At the official level, the search for a special model of economic and technolo-
gical modernization that would not lead to liberal democracy began with the pro-
motion of the concept of “sovereign democracy” in 2006 (Krastev 2006). The
concept had to shield Russia from the influence of Western political models
(Krastev 2006; Okara 2007; Hassner 2008). It became an official position by the
end of the second constitutional term of president Putin (2004–08).
According to Urnov (2012), the first version of conservative modernization
ideology had already been presented in the 2008 government’s “Strategic
Concept 2020” and in Putin’s speech of the same year, on which it has been
based (Putin 2008). In November 2009, United Russia has described itself as a
“conservative force” promoting economic and technological “modernization” in
Russia. “Conservative modernization […] has become the leitmotiv of the Krem-
lin’s policy agenda” and the key element of such a conservative modernization
was the preservation of the existing political model (Trenin 2010).
Since 2008, two distinct stages in the development of Russian conservative
economic programs have been observable—a stage before and a stage after the
drop in world energy prices. While these prices remained high, it was theoretic-
ally possible for the Russian government to implement economic and technolo-
gical modernization in an orderly way using billions in revenue from energy
exports. So it is no wonder that during that period the debates among Russian
conservatives focused mostly on how much export revenue could be spent
without losing macroeconomic stability (for example by provoking inflation).
After the collapse in energy prices the main focus has shifted to the issue of
where to get money, how much to borrow, and whether it would be possible to
further lower the living standards of some sectors of the population. In the
second period, options for economic and technological modernization that do not
risk provoking political reforms have become much more restricted. In fact, the
primary focus now is on alternative models of state-led technological develop-
ment, which is arguably still feasible under a federal budget deficit and increas-
ing military spending. The alternative conservative programs promise to provide
successful development of military-related technologies with the limited
resources available.
In the next section, we review theoretical explanations of the reasons why
authoritarian regimes such as Russia seek models of economic modernization
that avoid the development of liberal democracy in their nations. We then detail
the conservative economic modernization that has been implemented by Putin’s
regime. Finally, we consider some details of major economic alternatives offered
by conservatives in Russia.
Theory: instrumental value of conservatism for authoritarian

regimes
As stated above, from an economic perspective, Russian-style conservatism is
essentially an attempt to launch economic and technological modernization
without liberal democracy. The most important constraints of such a type of
modernization lie in the question of how to avoid developments that would
provoke societal demand for democratization. Russia is not unique in this
respect—in fact, from Belarus to Kazakhstan, non-democratic regimes across the
post-Soviet space practice various models of such modernization. A comparative
study of the literature provides several complementary theoretical explanations
as to why many authoritarian regimes have to promote economic modernization
while trying to avoid liberal democracy. For instance, Samuel Huntington pre-
dicted that “non-Western civilizations will continue attempts to acquire the
wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern”
(Huntington 1993, 49). They will also attempt to “modernize but not to Western-
ize” their political systems and societies (ibid., 41).
The major risk of economic modernization for authoritarian leaders is that
modernization could change the balance of power in society and create demand
for democracy. As Lipset (1959) has pointed out, democracy requires certain
societal preconditions, and economic modernization helps to develop them. In
particular, if economic growth leads to economic prosperity, it could then
promote the demands of the middle class for the institutional protection of
property rights and more opportunities for participation in public affairs.
A popular version of this argument emphasizes the increasing role of taxation
in economic development and stresses that taxation leads to demands for
political representation. To summarize, economic growth and technological
development are likely to provoke societal calls for political reforms toward
democracy.
In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that strategic
authoritarian leaders are likely to accept only a limited choice of methods for
promoting economic prosperity, excluding most alternatives as being unaccepta-
bly risky to their political status. Most importantly, authoritarian leaders have to
maintain control over how that increased prosperity is distributed, and who has
economic and political power. Otherwise, economic progress may redistribute
income and power in such a way that an authoritarian leader and his political
supporters might become worse off. Economic growth and technological change
are accompanied by what Joseph Schumpeter called creative destruction. The
process of economic growth creates losers as well as winners in the economic
marketplace and the political arena. Fear of losing the status of political incum-
bency often lies at the root of the resistance to creating opportunities for eco-
nomic development (ibid., 84).
Furthermore, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (ibid.), economic and
technological development in authoritarian regimes is possible as long as it does
not challenge the power of incumbency. For example, growth is possible “when
elites can directly allocate resources to high-productivity activities that they
themselves control” (ibid., 91). Therefore, political centralization becomes the
key to promoting growth under authoritarian regimes. However, even though
such regimes “can generate some growth, they will usually not generate sus-
tained economic growth, and certainly not the type of growth that is accompanied
by creative destruction” (ibid., 94).
Schlumberger (2008) has defined the prevailing model of economic develop-
ment in non-democratic countries (including Russia) as “patrimonial
capitalism”—an economic order that is strongly shaped by the political order
and informal power relations. “Non-democratic governance is a necessary con-
dition for patrimonial capitalism to emerge and survive over time” (ibid., 635).
On the other hand, “the selective enforcement of closely interwoven formal and
informal institutions enables rulers to maintain power” (ibid., 638). Developing
Schlumberger’s ideas, Robinson (2013) has provided detailed analysis of the
operation of “patrimonial capitalism” in the post-Soviet space, focusing on
Russia. He has argued that in the post-Soviet region, patrimonial capitalism
developed as a means of coping with exogenous pressure to modernize the
economy while preserving the political power of elite groups. Robinson (2012,
191–7) has predicted that “the political dysfunctions of Russian capitalism” will
allow Moscow to avoid democratic reforms for the foreseeable future.
Studying the cases of China and Russia, Bueno de Mesquita and George
Downs have concluded that significant economic development will not lead to
democracy (De Mesquita and Downs 2005). These authoritarian regimes (as
well as many other autocracies around the world) might have learned how to
sustain economic development on the one hand and avoid political liberalization
on the other. De Mesquita and Downs use the concept of “strategic coordination”
to explain how authoritarianism can avoid democratization. Strategic coordin-
ation refers to
the set of activities that people must engage in to win political power in a
given situation. Such activities include disseminating information, recruiting
and organizing opposition members, choosing leaders, and developing a
viable strategy to increase the group’s power and to influence policy.
(Ibid., 80)
If autocrats can weaken the strategic coordination of their political challengers,

they can also avoid the emergence of democratization. The fundamental problem
is how to “raise the costs of political coordination among the opposition without
also raising the costs of economic coordination too dramatically” (ibid.).
In the Russian case, the ideology of conservatism (especially when mixed
with “patriotism”) serves as an effective instrument for weakening opportunities
for “strategic coordination” among those who could potentially demand demo-
cratization. According to Stanovaya (2015), the return of Crimea proved to be a
particularly powerful and successful instrument to split the pro-democratic
opposition. Conservatism serves as a part of Putin’s Code4 (Taylor 2015) or a
marker of loyalty that helps to identify and punish potential critics and political
opponents. Interestingly, the presence of conservative ideology is most signi-
ficant in social media and online sources. Overall, the promotion of “conserva-
tism” is aimed at presenting the political status quo of the Putin regime as the
best possible choice for the country, and to delegitimize the liberal opposition
and Western influences.
Second, the rise of conservatism in Russia scares many potential supporters
of democracy more than the shortcomings of Putin’s regime. To them, Putin is
less of a threat than the conservative masses, in particular those outside the
major cities. Indeed, if, as Lesley Chamberlain (2015) argues, the vast majority
of Russians “are intensely conservative,” there is little hope to benefit from
democratization. Perhaps such critics should recognize that the Russian people
are not prepared to accept a fully-fledged democracy in the true sense of the
word. They are not ready to fully experience democracy and gain a sense of
involvement in and responsibility for the political processes.
(Medvedev 2010)
Finally, the ideology of conservativism also serves as an instrument uniting

potential supporters of the incumbent regime, while liberal democracy is associ-
ated with those to whom Russia and its people are deeply alien. The Western
liberal democracies are blamed for their apparent attempts to promote liberal
democracy, and by doing so to weaken Russia domestically and internationally.
Russia’s dominant conservatism seeks to strengthen itself by appealing to

the tradition of a strong, essentially unitary state led by a strong leader,
where all nominal branches of power are in fact departments of the supreme
authority.
(Trenin 2010)
The political conservatism of the Russian government has

limited the choice of economic policies
As stated above, the specifics of economic development in authoritarian political
systems limit the choice of economic policies. Chris Miller labeled the choice of
specific economic policies aimed at preserving Putin’s political power as Puti-
nomics and summarized Putinomics as: “growth is good, but retaining power is
better” (Miller 2018).
In Putin’s Russia, political constraints dictated the choice in favor of public
policies with significant economic inefficiencies. First, economic policies aimed
to increase political support for the incumbent president. There was increasing
dependence of citizens upon the state, most importantly in terms of employment
opportunities. Wages, pensions, and other sources of personal income of politi-
cally important groups of citizens were growing faster than the economy.
Second, it was crucial for the Kremlin to limit the opportunities for successful
businesses to influence politics and support potential opposition. Third, the eco-
nomic prosperity of regions continued to depend upon the Kremlin. At the
macro-level those and other economic inefficiencies were compensated by high
energy prices. In fact, the economy and the federal budget depended more and
more on the high level of energy prices.
A social contract to keep Putin in power
Since Vladimir Putin came to power in the Kremlin in fall 1999, the government
followed an implicit social contract based on a trade-off between economic pros-
perity and political liberties: the government provides steady improvements in
living standards and, in turn, citizens refrain from political demands. As Cook
and Dimitrov (2017, 10) explain:
the terms of the contract were dictated by the state, not bargained with
society; […] these terms nevertheless imposed constraints on both parties:
the regime acted as if it had to deliver these policy goods and allocational
outcomes in order to maintain political and social stability; the population
had to receive them in order to remain quiescent and conformist.
In terms of macroeconomic policies, such a contract was based on a substantially

higher growth in per capita consumption than the rate of growth in per capita
GDP (see Figure 8.1). In other words, the living standards of Russian citizens
were improving faster than the economy. The accelerated growth in consump-
tion became possible thanks to steadily increasing energy prices. Yet, because in
most sectors of the Russian economy labor productivity failed to follow the
growth in wages, the Russian economy suffered from a significant increase in
labor costs.
Cook and Dimitrov (ibid., 18) have argued that the Putin-era social contract
has been maintained through the 2008–09 recession and the first three years of
the current economic downturn, but “at great costs in both budget expenditures
and market inefficiencies.” Thus, the government has continued to maintain
pension income stability, industrial employment protections, and health care
20
15
10
–5
–10
–15
2000 2005 2010 2015
GDP (annual % growth)
Household final consumption expenditure, etc. (annual % growth)
Figure 8.1 Growth rates of GDP and household consumption.

guarantees, and Putin’s government justified these policies with the rhetoric of
state responsibility for society’s well-being and the maintenance of social
stability. Before the elections in 2012, Putin, forgetting about the modernization
agenda, made extensive spending promises, including raising pensions and
public sector salaries and massive new investment in the military-industrial
complex. As Johnson (2012) has shown, Putin himself estimated that the social
spending commitments would cost 3 percent of GDP per year, while in other
estimates this was as high as 8 percent.
As Treisman (2014) has demonstrated, until 2014 Putin’s approval ratings
closely correlated with economic performance. After the 2014 annexation of
Crimea, the nature of Putin’s popularity has fundamentally changed: his social
contract with the population was no longer about economics but rather Russia’s
geopolitical status (Guriev 2016). Despite the economic recession, Putin’s popu-
larity has remained at a level above 80 percent.
State–business relations limit business opportunities to

influence politics
As the economic situation in Russia has started to gradually improve since Putin
came to power, so has his public approval rating. While citizens demonstrated an
increasing willingness to support Putin’s regime, a growing economy meant
increasing economic power for private businesses. This power of businesses
could present a threat to political incumbency.
In mid-2003 Putin began redefining business–state relations. However, as
William Tompson (2005) has pointed out, a frontal assault on the owners of the
largest businesses as a group “would have led to falling tax revenues and rising
capital flight, putting at risk both the economic recovery that was getting under
way and Putin’s own consolidation of power.” Instead Putin targeted selected
“oligarchs,” most notably, the owners of Yukos, which at the time was the
largest oil company in Russia. In the Kremlin-controlled media, Yukos was
blamed for the provision of financial support to several opposition parties,
including Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces and the Communists. Moreover,
apparently, the largest shareholder of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, had pub-
licly announced his political ambitions and perhaps even wished to succeed
Putin. Khodorkovsky was arrested in 2003 and after a show trial was sentenced
to a long prison term. The Yukos case became the most important turning point
in the development of business–state relations in Russia, as the case sent a clear
signal to the “oligarchs” about the “red line” that they should never cross in
dealing with the state if they valued their businesses and freedom. In fact, two
options were left for Russian big business: accepting the new reality or urgently
leaving the country.
The combination of measures reducing the opportunities for businesses
to influence politics had significant negative consequences for economic devel-
opment in Russia. Most disturbingly, it created a problem for the Russian
government’s reputation and scared potential foreign and domestic investors.
It demonstrated that the Kremlin cannot credibly commit to respecting and sus-
taining the rules of the game which it itself promises to investors (ibid.), so
Russia has been losing the competition for foreign direct investment in modern
sectors of the economy. Russian businesses also became reluctant to invest in
new technologies domestically, preferring to invest elsewhere. As Aven (2010)
has explained: “there are so many emerging economies where people believe
there is huge potential for growth, and the problem is Russia is not regarded as
one of them by investors.”
According to a survey by the Higher School of Economics, a leading Russian
University, in 2010 natural resource extraction was the most active area of
investment. The survey revealed the tendency to invest not in new technologies,
but rather in repair and maintenance of old, obsolete equipment. The equipment
in use had become so old that it was now necessary to divert much of available
investments just to keep it running. Almost 60 percent of all businesses reported
that their key technological equipment was more than 10 years old, while almost
20 percent reported that it was more than 20 years old.5
Economic centralization has limited the influence of regions

From the very beginning of his rule Putin had the clear intention to neutralize
alternative sources of political power in the country, in particular, the power of
regional executives. Prior to the elections of March 2000, Putin stated in an
interview that “from the very beginning, Russia was created as a super-
centralized state. That’s practically laid down in its genetic code, its traditions,
and the mentality of its people” (quoted in Brown 2001, 51). The president
solved the problem of the political autonomy of the regional executives, and
their disproportionate influence on the national decision-making process, by
introducing several reforms. In the summer of 2000, seven new federal districts
ruled by Putin’s representatives were created. After that the governors lost the
opportunity of direct contact with the president, as a new administrative layer
was formed between the Kremlin and the regions. Governors were also deprived
of their right to serve as deputies in the upper chamber of the parliament—
the Federation Council. As Kryshtanovskaya concludes, “with these reforms,
the governors were transformed from independent politicians with their own
power bases into executives who were fully dependent on Moscow’s favor”
(Kryshtanovskaya 2009, 28).
In 2004 the institution of the election of regional governors had been replaced
by their nomination. This turn has massively suppressed political competition
and made regional executives the agents of the federal executive. Indeed, in the
new system the governors were subordinated to federal authorities and acted on
their behalf, while the latter had at their disposal the instruments to punish or
reward the governors. In 2012 the procedure of the election of governors was
restored in Russia; however, this did not bring fundamental changes to the nature
of center–region relations. The candidates for election must undergo a process of
municipal scrutiny (the so-called municipal filter), and this condition makes it
possible to get rid of candidates that are objectionable to the federal center in
advance.
From the beginning of Putin’s rule, political centralization has been
accompanied by economic centralization: from 2000 to 2003, the share of con-
solidated regional budgets in the consolidated budget of Russia decreased from
45.2 percent to 40.5 percent (Klimanov and Lavrov 2004, 113). Moreover, as
Goncharov and Shirikov have shown,
the current highly centralized taxation system does not allow most of Rus-
sia’s regions and municipalities to balance their budgets without external
assistance. They are dependent on transfers from federal budget or regional
budgets, respectively, and in many cases these transfers are the main sources
of funding. These transfers reached 35% of federal budget expenses in 2008,
36% in 2009, and 38% in 2010.
(Goncharov and Shirikov 2013, 34)
To the end of 2017, more than 40 of Russia’s regions had a growing budget
deficit.6 There is every reason to assert that economic centralization is inefficient
from the point of view of economic growth, since it substantially constrains it. In
Russia’s system only a few regions have sufficiently strong local competitive
advantages and are able to cope with globalization pressures—these were the
capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, regions with abundant natural
resources, as well as some border regions. Almost all other regions are not com-
petitive enough, and do not provide economic growth.
Alternative economic models of conservative modernization

For centuries, Russian rulers have attempted to implement reforms to reach a
similar level of economic, technological, and military development as Russia’s
European counterparts (Gerschenkron 1962). In modern Russian debates, the
term economic “modernization” most often stands for a “catching-up” plan, that
is, an economic program “aimed at bridging the gap between Russia and the
most developed countries” (Urnov 2012, 38). On 30 December 1999, then-Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin stated,
it will take us about 15 years and an annual growth of our gross domestic
product by 8% a year to reach the per capita GDP level of present-day Por-
tugal or Spain, which are not among the world’s industrial leaders.
(Putin 1999)
Since 1999 the Russian economy grew about 7 percent annually and by 2007
restored the GDP level of 1990. According to IMF data, in 2011 Russia overtook
Portugal’s 2000 per capita GDP in US-dollar terms.7 However, in 2016, Russia’s
per capita GDP was still below 50 percent of Portugal’s (just below 9,000 dollars
in Russia and 19,800 in Portugal).8 The gaps between Russia and the US both in
terms of total size of the economy and per capita have been increasing since
1990 (see Figure 8.2).
Various groups of Russian economists blame government policies for the
failure to promote necessary rates of economic growth, for the accumulation of
economic imbalances (e.g. the growing gap between wages and labor productiv-
ity), and for the high level of economic inequality. They often emphasize that
the current rate of economic development is not sufficient for Russia to sustain
the status of a great power. For example, in January 2018 a group of experts
working for Aleksey Kudrin stated that:
Russia is one of the most prominent powers in the world today. […] At the
same time, Russia is lagging behind in a number of critical areas. […] The
underdevelopment of the Russian economy and its governance institutions
poses a much more significant threat to the country’s sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity than realistic military threats that Russia is already well
protected from.
(Kortunov et al. 2017)
For critics it would be natural to emphasize the connection between the failures
of economic policies and the shortcomings of the non-democratic political
regime in Russia. However, below we only focus on the views of the “conser-
vative” critics—those who argued that it would be possible to achieve greater
economic success without changes to the political system. There is no consensus
among them on what could be a more appropriate economic strategy for Russia
without political modernization; conservative agendas are conflicting. Thus, the
most important dividing line is between “liberal” and “statist” alternatives.
The “liberal” camp among Russian conservatives sees the main shortcoming of
the current economic model in excessive government involvement in the
$20,000
$18,000
$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$0
1989 1996 2003 2010 2017
Russian Federation China United States
Figure 8.2 Russia’s economic power is shrinking (GDP constant 2010 US$).
economy. The “statist” conservatives, in contrast, argue for a greater role for the
state. However, none of them propose to restrict the state by the means of demo-
cratic political competition and accountability. Generally speaking, all Russian
conservatives are looking for a way to improve the economy without taking the
risk of democratic transition.
“Liberal” economics and conservative politics

In modern Russia, among the most influential critics of the economic policies of
Putin’s government are economists who support conservative ideas in political,
social, and cultural areas but who also advocate “liberal” economic policies.
Many of them share the economic views of their conservative counterparts in
Europe and the US. Almost all of them have worked in the government at some
point in their professional careers and were a part of what is known as the group
of “liberal reformers.” The two most important premises of Russian liberal eco-
nomic thought are: opposition to state involvement in the market and opposition
to income redistribution.
In fact, the liberal reformers were among the first to use conservative ideas in
mainstream Russian politics. Since the late 1990s, they sought to use claims
about the uniqueness of the “Russian path” and destiny as an instrument to gain
political legitimacy for liberal market reforms. Because of the lack of financial
resources and because of domestic political competitiveness, the Russian reform-
ers had to balance the divergent objectives of multiple players—from the
military, to the regional bosses in the Council of Federation, and to the commu-
nist and nationalist Duma majority. Particularly binding were the constraints set
by the need to appease the military and to limit the popular appeal of the com-
munists and the nationalists. When the government was at its “weakest,” as for
example during electoral seasons, these influences pushed it to resort to its own
populist rhetoric on the issue of Russia’s immediate (and not so immediate)
neighbors. Recall Primakov’s famous “plane U-turn” when on his way to the
United States in March 1999, in response to the commencement of the NATO
bombing of Yugoslavia.
In summer 1999, Aleksey Ulyukaev,9 a long-term friend and, at that moment,
the first deputy of Egor Gaidar presented a book, Right Turn (Pravyy povorot). It
was first published before Putin came to power and even before the start of the
second Chechen campaign.10 At the time of the first printing, the ideas expressed
in the book seemed controversial and risky, as it called on democratic and liberal
activists to adopt the nationalist rhetoric of rebuilding the Russian Empire when
campaigning for the December 1999 Duma elections: “[t]radition must be our
backbone, while our actions focus on renewal” (Ulyukaev 1999). Later, the infa-
mous Russian nationalist and open xenophobe Egor Kholmogorov claimed that
he was the ghost-writer of Ulyukaev’s book.
In 2003, another leading spokesman of Russian “liberals,” Anatoly Chubais
(who had brought to life Russia’s privatization program), published an essay on
foreign policy offering a new vision of Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space.
He argued in particular that Russia’s mission was to integrate the former Soviet
republics into a “liberal empire,” while the key role in building this new empire
was given to the conditional supply of energy to the post-Soviet countries
(Papava 2007). Chubais wrote that Russia was a “natural and unique leader” and
that Russia’s “mission” should be to promote Russian culture and protect
Russian populations in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Only through
“liberal empire,” by combining market liberalism and imperial principles,
Chubais argued, “can Russia occupy its natural place alongside the United
States, the European Union and Japan, the place designated for it by history” (as
cited in Wenger et al. 2006, 219).
According to Trenin (2011, 148), Chubais was neither nationalist nor imperi-
alist; rather, he attempted to gain more public legitimacy for economic reforms
and, thus, “sought to marry liberal capitalism and imperial tradition in Russia.”
As a result, however, the ideas of Chubais’s “liberal empire” proved to be strik-
ingly similar to the ideas of “sovereign democracy” proposed by the Kremlin’s
chief political manager Vladislav Surkov in 2005. As Skidelsky (2007) has
observed:
Surkov’s world view points to the same conclusion as Chubais’s. Russia is

one of the world’s natural “great powers.” Greatness is defined by sover-
eignty. Sovereignty is conferred by history, geography, and the will to
power. Some countries are destined to be sovereign, others to be subjects.
Though Chubais publicly criticized the idea of “sovereign democracy,” as

Artemy Magun (2010) pointed out, the thesis of “liberal empire” also meant the
combination of liberal economic institutions with isolationism in politics. As
Maler (2007) concludes, overall the position of Russian liberal reformers could
be described as “liberal conservatism.”
Liberals after the Crimea annexation

The Crimea has split liberal critics of Putin. Most of those who earlier advocated
the movement of the country toward the development of liberal democracy sup-
ported the annexation of Crimea. For instance, in December 2017 a group of
experts working for Aleksey Kudrin explained the annexation of Crimea thus:
“in the course of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia reunited with Crimea, solved the
Black Sea Fleet problem, and put a long-term block on Ukraine’s membership in
NATO” (Kortunov et al. 2017). After the annexation of Crimea it became hardly
possible in Russia to maintain one’s status as a mainstream public figure while
at the same time advocating liberal democracy for Russia. As for Kudrin, his
disagreement with the Kremlin’s position regarding Crimea would mean auto-
matically losing any chance of ever entering any government under Putin. As
Stanovaya (2017) has stated, although there is no official state ideology in
Russia,
there is a reality in which professors are fired for taking an unpatriotic stance
and victimized for “wrong” interpretations of historical events. A politically
incorrect tweet or blog post can result in search and seizure.11
Facing the reality of the political climate in Russia, “liberal” economists now
argue that, though in theory liberal democracy could provide the best conditions
for economic development, Russia is not yet ready for democratic transition.
Today, the practical alternative is the “second-best solution”—economic liberal-
ism but without democracy. In 2017, as the leading liberal economists were pre-
paring proposals for a new economic program for Putin, “Strategy 2035” (Jacobs
2014), one of them, Aleksandr Auzan, wrote in the Russian edition of Forbes:
Before trying to build a democracy from which a modern, innovative

economy should emerge, one must understand that certain cultural conditions
are needed for this […]. In Russia in the 1990s, democratization brought con-
troversial economic results, the same thing happened in Ukraine.
(Auzan 2017)
In practical terms the most recent idea—the “second best solution”—of “liberal
conservatives” relates to non-political institutions like social networks, big data,
digital platforms for crowdsourcing, and improving government services via the
Internet. Apolitical technocratism, managerial effectiveness—“all this could
become a basis for the formation of new institutions that can compensate for the
weaknesses of traditional democracies” and contribute to “communicational
democracy” (Stanovaya 2017). In essence, this is a technocratic approach that
opposes itself to the political one and is not based on the protection of the inter-
ests of certain socio-political strata, but rather on addressing specific managerial
tasks.
“More state control” alternatives

For the supporters of the “more state control” option, the main problem lies in
the wrong priorities of economic development set by the liberal economists. For
them, the economy is an instrument of the state, and economic policies should
focus not on economic stability, low inflation, or a balanced budget, but on
national priorities. Most argue that “political will” has to prevail and to move
economic reality in the desirable direction. For example, the status of great
military power could be sustained with a relatively modest level of economic
development, but requires keeping up with advances in military technology.
Thus, the focus of economic development has to be on an acceleration of
Russian technological and military capacities, even if such an approach would
limit resources available to other sectors of the economy.
Broadly speaking, there are two sets of policy proposals connected to the
conservative ideas that advocate a greater role of the state in economic develop-
ment. One group is based on more or less rational principles and assumptions:
for instance, there are specific proposals aimed at protecting national industries
from global competition or allocating parts of the federal budget to the develop-
ment of technological innovation centers across Russia. Among these, one can
distinguish two extremes: right-wing and left-wing conservatisms. Right-wing
conservatism supports a free domestic market with state regulation of foreign
economic activity in the interests of domestic entrepreneurship. The economic
view of left-wing conservatives conforms to the “third way” model of eco-
nomics, that is, to a set of economic theories which combine the market approach
with the concept of a regulated economy on the basis of supra-economic criteria
and priorities. Thus, the free market approach has to be combined with control
over the strategic sectors of the economy while the redistribution of profits needs
to be controlled according to the national and social needs of society as a whole.
At minimum it requires nationalizing companies engaged in the export of natural
resources, while the state controls domestic energy production, transport, and
communications.
The second set of economic policy proposals by Russian conservatives is
based mostly on wishful thinking—on the hope of finding a magic shortcut, a
“unique path” that would have an “explosive effect” and give sudden and signi-
ficant economic advantage to Russia. For example, Dugin (2014, 65–7) proposes
subordinating the economy to “higher civilizational spiritual values”; spiritual
development has to become “the main priority of life, which cannot be replaced
by any economic or social benefits.” Another illustration here would be the pro-
posal by Dmitry Rogozin (2012), who has suggested defining the “points of
development of the scientific technical progress,” without losing time to develop
those technologies that will be required in 30–50 years. It is theoretically pos-
sible that there are people who truly believe in such ideas, though most likely
these proposals are aimed at helping various specific interests to lobby the
Kremlin.
Indeed, various groups in Russia lobby on behalf of the interests of certain
segments of the economy. For example, Russian business ombudsman Boris
Titov is running for president in the 2018 election. His team has presented the
“Growth Strategy” program developed by the Stolypin Club (Dumes 2017).12 It
proposes increasing state lending to the real sector of the economy—that is,
primarily large state-owned enterprises with low or non-existent profitability;
this would supposedly yield economic growth of 5–7 percent per year (Titov
2017). The competing team of Konstantin Babkin, leader of the Party of Busi-
ness, has developed its “Strategy for the Economic Development of Russia until
2030” (Babkin 2017). According to this document, the policy of economic
nationalism should replace the liberal model. At the same time, as a practical
measure of Strategy 2030, Babkin proposes starting a policy of increasing the
competitiveness of the agro-industrial complex by changing the principles of
taxation and regulating foreign economic activity.
The most serious person to influence the Kremlin’s choices, however, is
Sergey Glazyev. In 2017 in the newspaper Zavtra, he published an article with
the title: “What ideology will raise Russia” (Kakaya ideologia podnimet Rossiyu)
(Glazyev 2018). Glazyev proposes combining “good elements of the capitalist
and socialist systems, and abandoning the bad.” Such synthesis, in his opinion,
was carried out by the Chinese, “having built a socialist market economy.” Its
essence is in the synthesis of centralized planning and market competition, state
ownership in the basic sectors of the economy with private entrepreneurship in
the rest. In the capitalist system, explained Glazyev, the main criterion of eco-
nomic activity is profit. In the Soviet system it was the growth of production,
which raises the standard of living of the population. All in all, as this brief
review shows, conservative politicians have very little to offer Putin in terms of
alternative (and at the same time reasonable) economic policies.
Conclusion
In modern Russia economic policies are highly centralized and defined by the
presidential administration, and this means that any publicly relevant economic
program has to obtain the approval of the presidential administration. But there
are several contradictory constraints on obtaining this approval. First, President
Putin is reluctant to implement unpopular policies, and this means that it is
necessary to frame economic changes in a form acceptable to the majority of
voters. Second, Russia’s foreign policy priorities are not subject to alteration.
For example, no alternative program could venture to propose an elimination of
state expenses in Syria, or whatever foreign military campaign Putin chooses to
be involved in. Another “red line” is unconditional support for the annexation of
Crimea, with all financial burdens that this has caused. Thus, according to some
estimates, in 2017 Crimea received up to 20 percent of total financial assistance
allocated to all Russian regions from federal budget. But no conservative would
dare to challenge significant state expenses for developing Crimea, or North
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Third, alternative programs cannot discuss cuts to federal
budget expenditures on military buildup, security forces, and the secret services.
As a result of such multiple constraints, alternative economic policies publicly
advocated by conservatives are necessarily eclectic, combining various populist
appeals and contradictory policy recommendations.
In general, it is to be expected that “conservatives in power” (that is, in the
government) will continue to use conservative ideas for politics, while at the
same time promoting liberal economic policies. The perspective of more radical
conservatives for influencing current economic policies in Russia is limited, no
matter how much they wish otherwise, by the need to obtain and sustain broad
electoral support. In modern Russia it is practically impossible to build a coali-
tion in favor of any economic reforms, conservative or liberal, so that the relat-
ively liberal status quo is likely to prevail in economics. As clearly follows from
Putin’s message to the Federal Assembly on 1 March 2018, increasing budgetary
expenditures on defense and security forces with the ambition of Russian
military domination in the world (Zheleznova et al. 2018) will be the only—
although very significant—exception.
Notes
1 More precisely, some conservatives dared to challenge Putin, but they were quickly
charged and convicted as “extremists” in criminal court.
2 www.4pt.su/en/content/economic-personality.
3 Aleksandr Dugin with his idea of rural life as an ideal for Russia is the exception.
4 Taylor has argued that political loyalty to Putin is based on Putin’s Code, which is
“both more and less than an ideology; more, because it involves not just ideas but
other stimuli for action, and less, because it is not a coherent and encompassing
system of thought.”
5 www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/251692/ne_do_investicij.
6 www.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/27/12/2017/5a438d209a79474d024dd2a8.
7 https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-overtakes-portugal-and-spain-is-next-18420.
8 https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/portugal?sc=XE15.
9 Aleksey Ulyukaev served as First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federa-
tion in 2000–04, First Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia in 2004–13 and held
the office of Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation between
2013 and 2016. On 15 December 2017, Ulyukaev was found guilty of corruption and
sentenced to eight years in a strict-regime labor colony and fined 130 million rubles
(2 million US dollars).
10 An abridged version was also published in the daily Izvestia shortly before the
December parliamentary elections—at that time Putin was prime minister (Izvestia, 6
December 1999).
11 Translated by Eugene Bai (2015), see www.russia-direct.org/analysis/real-reason-
why-resurgence-conservatism-russia-dangerous#.
12 Besides Titov, the Stolypin Club includes many of Russia’s well-known public
figures, such as presidential adviser Sergey Glazyev, Deputy Chairman of
Vnesheconombank Andrey Klepach, and the deputy chairman of the Duma committee
on economic policy Victor Zvagelski.
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9 The “Budapest–Warsaw Express”
Conservatism and the diffusion of
economic policies in Poland and
Hungary
Ewa Dąbrowska, Aron Buzogány, and Mihai Varga
Introduction
This chapter is about how conservative governments learn from each other in
Eastern Europe with a focus on Hungary and Poland, widely regarded as the
leading torchbearers of illiberalism in the EU. For a long time both Hungary and
Poland were often considered to be the East Central European (ECE) avant-
garde in terms of embracing liberal democratic values and economic liberalism.
Analysts and policymakers have often noted the pendular historical swings
between the two countries and referred to the “Budapest Express” and the
“Warsaw Express” to describe these convergences (Lipovecz 2007). Two-and-a-
half decades after the fall of communism there are, again, striking similarities in
the policies they follow, a process that can be described as “policy learning.” A
few years after Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, “Alliance of Young
Democrats”) secured its grip on power in Hungary, PiS (Law and Justice) won
the 2015 elections with a similar agenda. Not only political goals, but Polish
economic policies resemble in many ways the policies of the Hungarian blue-
print. The “Budapest Express” has evidently arrived again in Warsaw.
There is a wide literature on how policies diffuse themselves across national
and other administrative borders and how this process relates to policy change.
The literature on policy diffusion and policy learning in East Central European
(ECE) countries has largely focused on the diffusion of “liberal” ideas (Simmons
and Elkins 2004): the ECE countries were considered to be at the receiving end
of the diffusion process while the policies were designed in Western Europe or
North America. Detailed studies have analyzed the diffusion of economic policy
reforms in the ECE countries in complex fields ranging from pensions (Oren-
stein 2008) and taxation (Appel 2011; Evans and Aligică 2008) to central
banking (Epstein 2008; Johnson 2016; Ban 2016). International financial institu-
tions (IFIs) and the European Union (EU) have strengthened these diffusion
waves, with particularly EU enlargement regarded as a “transformative power”
in the region (Jacoby 2006).
This chapter takes a different perspective. We explore the diffusion of ideas
and policies horizontally—between countries which are largely seen in the liter-
ature as being located at the receiving end of diffusion processes. Our focus is
The “Budapest–Warsaw Express” 179
on the diffusion of conservative ideas in economic policymaking in Poland and
Hungary. We examine how the coming to power of Viktor Orbán in 2010 and
his use of heterodox financial and pension policies inspired the Polish
conservative-populist party Law and Justice to rethink its economic program.
We argue in line with the existing literature that Orbán’s policies represent a
policy mix that is hardly attributable to conservative ideas only, and still allows
a certain dose of economic liberalism. However, what has changed is that the
government is now definitely in a situation of power to decide in which sectors
and to what extent it allows liberalism. This “selective liberalization” can be
traced back to policy- and state organization-related ideas that key Orbán advi-
sors advocated early on, such as a “Neo-Weberian” state that not only pursues
but also defines national interests, including economic ones. Economic policy
was up to that time largely permeated by liberal economic ideas. Examining con-
tacts between Polish and Hungarian politicians and the reception of Hungarian
ideas and policies by Polish experts associated with Law and Justice and by
party members themselves, we conclude that the Polish political and economic
discourse in the 2010s was heavily influenced by Orbán’s policy experiments.
We argue that the Hungarian policy after the coming to power of Fidesz in 2010
provided an inspiration for PiS politicians in their search for a new template for
economic policy. The reason for this is that Hungary was the only country in
East Central Europe that explicitly turned to unorthodox economic policy after
the crisis. Hungary thus functioned as a critical test-case proving the potential
and limitations of such unorthodox policies.
Our chapter conceptually builds on theories of “policy diffusion” and “policy
learning” (Benson and Jordan 2011). In most diffusion studies, the emphasis is
on the mechanisms of diffusion: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation
are usually identified as the central mechanisms that underpin diffusion
(Simmons and Elkins 2004). It is helpful to differentiate these mechanisms
further as to whether they provide direct or indirect channels of influence. While
direct influence is promoted actively by an actor (“the sender”) either through
coercion, by providing incentives, or through socialization, indirect leverage
emphasizes the attractiveness of the model used, as seen by a “receiving” actor.
Applying foreign models to domestic policy problems can be tempting, simply
by using the positive experiences from elsewhere. Indirect diffusion can be
based either on rational interest calculations (lesson-drawing) or on ideational
grounds (imitation), when actors appropriate institutional models out of a sense
of belonging to a certain community or sharing similar values or worldviews.
Whether diffusion between sender and receiver states is based on interest-
oriented or ideational appeal can make a difference in the outcome of the diffu-
sion process. Perceiving sender states as motivated by interests or ideologies
might have an influence on the reactions of receiver governments. At the same
time, the decisions of receiving governments are also influenced by their
motivations.
More recently, traditional approaches to policy diffusion have been subject to
criticism (Peck 2011). Some of the main shortcomings that are pointed out
180 Ewa Dąbrowska et al.
concern the focus on vertical diffusion, and that they do not pay necessary atten-
tion to unsuccessful cases of “non-diffusion” (Löblová 2018). For Eastern
Europe, scholars have recently noted “counter-waves” taking place in the region,
indicating policy flows in the opposite direction to the liberal norms that have
been analyzed previously (Sokhey 2017). Some of these counter-waves have
overlapped with what the literature has described as “authoritarian diffusion”
(Bank 2017; Hall and Ambrosio 2017). This chapter addresses these concerns by
providing a case study of “horizontal” policy diffusion and learning taking place
between Hungary and Poland as a mixture of interest-based and ideology-driven
processes. Horizontal diffusion has rarely been addressed in the region and
neighborhood effects have mainly been regarded as “filters” of larger, vertical
emulations (Adascalitei and Domonkos 2018; Korkut and Buzogány 2015).
Our analysis of policy learning is based on constructivist assumptions in that
it underscores the role of ideas and knowledge production regimes (Campbell
and Pedersen 2014) in the spread of policies. We build on the argument that
policy learning often takes place among similar countries in terms of history,
language, or legal tradition. Similarities between Poland and Hungary can be
found on three levels. First, there is a longue durée perception of a historical
Polish–Hungarian friendship reaching back to the Middle Ages. Second, and
regarding the post-communist decades, numerous studies treat the transition path
followed by Poland and Hungary as broadly similar, either by grouping them
together under the heading “Visegrad countries” with the Czech Republic and
Slovakia (Bohle and Greskovits 2012), or by contrasting the market economies
of Poland and Hungary with the Czech Republic (Vanhuysse 2006; Orenstein
2001). And third, there is also the similarity between Fidesz and PiS party ideo-
logies, often championed by the leaders of the two parties through repeated
public statements (such as Jarosław Kaczyński’s 2011 statement of soon having
“Budapest in Warsaw”), mutual visits, and declarations of solidarity.
This chapter pays particular attention to knowledge networks—the expert
groups that theorize new developments and distill them into succinct, easy-to-
follow “models” for politicians to keep in mind, orienting them in their decision-
making. To paraphrase Mark Blyth, the political and economic objectives of
politicians “do not come with instruction sheets” (Blyth 2003). We focus on
those actors that pull together the disparate facts into “instruction sheets”: the
economists, policy experts, and economic think tanks that—to the extent they
gain access to or influence over public institutions—have received increasing
recognition as important shapers of economic policies, together with political
parties and production regimes (Christensen 2017; Ban 2016; Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Babb 2002).
The chapter is organized as follows. The next part introduces some of the
most important elements of the economic approach pursued by Fidesz. It also
presents the key experts involved in drawing up that economic policy, their
background, as well as their most important ideas. The chapter then proceeds to
detailing how Polish economic experts of conservative leanings adopt and adapt
the elements of Hungarian economic policy that they favor, in order to enable or
prepare the change[s] in economic policy introduced by PiS since its return
to power in 2015. The chapter concludes by treating the Polish reception of
Hungary’s economic policy as a case of ideational imitation—facilitated by the
similar views of Polish and Hungarian conservative experts and politicians—but
filtered through the need to adapt the lessons from Hungary to a better perform-
ing Polish economy.
Hungary as the avant-garde of heterodox economic policies

in ECE
Like Poland, Hungary embarked on a foreign direct investment-led pathway to
economic growth, accumulating large private and public debts in the course of
the 1990s and early 2000s (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). The model collapsed
with the global financial crisis, and the anti-austerity protests helped Fidesz
secure an absolute majority and return to government in 2010, when it was deter-
mined to promote “national interests” by reducing the dominance of foreign
capital and strengthening domestic actors. Although the nationalist turn in
Hungary has attracted attention, scholars have attributed it mainly to the far-right
Jobbik party (Pirro 2017; Varga 2014). Others have noted a turn toward eco-
nomic nationalism (Johnson and Barnes 2015). However, the policy change from
neoliberal to heterodox or unorthodox economics was propagated by Fidesz
already during the 2000s and began to get increased attention in its own intellec-
tual backyard.
The new economic model that was installed is characterized by “selective
economic nationalism” (Tóth 2016) and combines the protection and promotion
of domestic companies and the establishment of a “workfare regime”—the
increased conditionality attached to the social safety net (Szikra 2014). At the
same time, important foreign direct investments in productive sectors are nur-
tured, while the government has helped highly indebted middle classes settle
their massive debts with foreign banks. In a highly popular move, over 1 million
debtors were saved from the mortgage crisis by introducing an exchange rate cap
on Swiss francs, in which the majority of the mortgages were taken (Palonen
2012; Bohle 2014). The government introduced high taxes on foreign banks
operating in Hungary and forced them to convert forex loans to Hungarian cur-
rency at government-set rates. Adding to this, the Fidesz government has fol-
lowed a determined anti-privatization policy directed against the excesses during
the heydays of neoliberalism in the 1990s. Thus pension privatization, in which
Hungary was a forerunner, was reversed (Naczyk and Domonkos 2016) and the
privatization of public utilities was continuously pushed back (Voszka 2016).
Since the Fidesz victory in the 2010 elections, the government has used various
methods to bring public utilities back under state control. To buy back assets, the
government forced regulators to push down prices by using various policy meas-
ures, price caps and special taxes (Keller-Alánt 2016; Szabó and Quesada 2017;
Horváth 2016). During the electoral campaign of 2013 the main Fidesz electoral
promise was to reduce household utility prices (rezsicsökkentés). As part of this
policy, household water prices were reduced by 10 percent, which diminished
the profits of the water providers (Index.hu 2013). This has not only forced most
of the profit-oriented foreign investors to leave the Hungarian market, but has
also increased the centralization of public utilities, limiting the possibilities of
smaller companies to operate. A similar centralization and renationalization has
taken place in the waste management sector.
The self-termed “unorthodox” economic policy of the government has often
evoked the term “freedom fight” (szabadságharc) when it aimed at reducing
foreign involvement and strengthening the domestic middle class. This went
together with a strong orientation toward economic nationalism, with Viktor
Orbán declaring his intention to “build a country in which foreign banks and
bureaucrats are not telling us what to do” (MTI EcoNews 2013). The Hungarian
government re-acquired shares lost during the privatization rounds of the 1990s
in the sensitive banking, telecommunication, public utilities, and energy sectors,
and introduced “crisis taxes” for the mostly foreign-owned major retailers and
financial services (Johnson and Barnes 2015). In the banking sector large
foreign-owned banks which became unprofitable because of the bank taxes, like
GE Capital’s Budapest Bank and Bayerische Landesbank’s MKB Bank, were
sold to the government (Dönmez and Zemandl 2018; Méró and Piroska 2016).
Epistemic community
The change in economic policymaking was based on alterations of the epistemic
communities involved in designing these policies. While during the 1990s and
2000s neoliberals of different leanings maintained the upper hand, the Fidesz
government offered privileged access to policymaking to self-termed heterodox
economists.
Interestingly, both neoliberal and heterodox groups have their historical roots
in the reform economist movement centered around the Financial Research Insti-
tute (FRI), a ministry-sponsored think tank. While most FRI economists sup-
ported the neoliberal consensus in 1989 (Fábry 2017; Sebők 2016, 2017; Gagyi
2015, 2016; Szelényi et al. 1995), some reform economists abandoned the neo-
liberal path during the transition years. Most important here is György Matolcsy,
one of the key architects of the post-2010 Hungarian economic model. Before
1990 he worked for the Ministry of Finance and the FRI (Sebők 2017). He
became state secretary for privatization in the first democratically elected cabinet
under the first conservative Prime Minister József Antall in 1990, but switched
six months later to become Hungary’s representative at the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London. After his stint in London,
Matolcsy led different economic research institutes during the 1990s and
authored the Fidesz economic program in the late 1990s. He became the Fidesz
Minister of Economics in 2000. In 2006 he was elected to parliament as Fidesz
MP, authored the party’s second influential (economic) policy blueprint (Matol-
csy and Cséfalvy 2008), and in 2010 became Minister of National Economy
again when Fidesz came back into power. He stepped down in 2013 to assume
the position of Governor of the Hungarian National Bank, playing an important
role in repoliticizing the once-independent central bank.
Matolcsy is said to have inherited his unorthodox/heterodox views from his
academic mentor at the FRI, Sándor Kopátsy. Kopátsy’s approach is character-
ized by an encompassing historical and culturalist perspective—and the rejection
of modern economics as an exact science. Similarly, Matolcsy’s academic inter-
ests combined an early interest in Keynesianism with speculative historical
work. In a 2004 monograph on the “American Empire,” he analyses the histor-
ical development of US power. One of the important conclusions is that a strong
economy cannot function without a unified nation having a stable national iden-
tity. He also cherishes the top–down creation of a middle class and regards the
conservatism of the US (in terms of traditional values, religion, and so on) as an
important explanation for its success. This resonated with an outmoded tradition
in Hungarian economic thinking reaching back to the mid-nineteenth century
and the iconic national liberal István Széchenyi, who was critical of foreign
capital, supported domestic production, and later embraced agrarian nationalism
(Maxwell and Campbell 2014; Dénes 2009).
The new heterodox epistemic community includes academics at the main
think tank Századvég, such as László György, who was interviewed extensively
by Marcin Piasecki, the future PiS-appointed vice-president of Poland’s National
Development Fund (Piasecki 2015a); and university-based academics such as
Csaba Lentner, professor of economics at the National Civil Service University.
Lentner has worked as an economic adviser to the Smallholder Party and the far-
right Justice and Life Party, served as an MP for the latter (1998–2002) and as
Fidesz economic advisor since 2004 (Lentner 2015). The essence of conservative
heterodox economic policy can be summarized as based on several characteris-
tics of the “Hungarian model” (György and Veress 2016). Its main overarching
idea is that of a “new equilibrium” that increases employment while reducing the
unduly high influence of foreign capital on the Hungarian economy (György
2017).
Policy mixes
Several policy aspects can be identified at the core of the Hungarian model. First,
there is the conservatives’ conviction of the failure of neoliberal solutions in eco-
nomics. Many of them believe that this calls for experimentalism and creativity in
a way that often transcends traditional left–right cleavages. Thus, the Fidesz gov-
ernment introduced wide-ranging family-support policies, and it limited, via direct
intervention, price rises for households. These interventionist policies have been
flanked by the introduction of clearly neoliberal policies such as the flat income
tax, which replaced progressive taxation reaching up to 32 percent with a
16 percent flat tax from 2012 onward. At the same time, this policy mix was com-
bined with a workfare regime (Szikra 2014), which aims to increase the active
workforce. In general, heterodox economists are also critical of GDP-focused eco-
nomic growth—noting that while between 1980 and 2010 Hungarian GDP
doubled, wages increased only by 7 percent (György 2017). They advocate instead
pragmatic solutions, and not “market fundamentalisms.” Another of the important
criticisms of neoliberal economic policies was the neglect of job creation during
the heyday of privatization. Economists such as György and Matolcsy have
emphasized the need for job creation policies, even if they are of low efficacy.
Hungarian heterodox economics is based on the recognition that Western
templates do not apply to countries on the semi-periphery of the global economy.
While many of the above policies—family support, flat tax, support for Hungar-
ian businesses—were discussed already in the 2000s, a new element that came
after 2010 was the orientation toward countries to the East of the European
Union. Conservative economists embraced the argument about the decline of the
West and the rise of countries like China, Singapore, or India. This rhetorical
reorientation has led to the initiation of the “Eastern Opening”—a new,
eastwards-oriented economic foreign policy (Buzogány 2017).
Finally, a direct implication of the above is the redefinition of the role of the
state. The emphasis on a strong state has been a recurring idea of conservatism
in Hungary. Fidesz embraced the ideal of a “neo-Weberian” state which was
thought should replace the “sell-out” of public assets (privatization) and the
excessive embracement of “new public management” (NPM) ideas by previous
socialist governments. Instead of a market-oriented, “lean” government, which
was seen by Fidesz to have served foreign interests to the detriment of the public
good, a new, centralized core executive was installed, following the ideal of an
effective “hard government.” One of the most influential theorists of state activ-
ity, a former professor of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz founding member, István
Stumpf, calls the conception of the state he favors “neo-Weberian” (see
Buzogány and Varga, this volume). For such a state, the concern with “norma-
tivity” is crucial, and is to be contrasted with NPM, which was strongly sup-
ported by the left-liberal Gyurcsány government. In practice, state reform after
2010 consisted mainly of recentralization. Decentralization efforts carried out
during the last decade to accommodate EU regional policy demands were also
largely taken back (Korkut and Buzogány 2015). The new governments halved
the number of ministerial departments, replaced ministerial staff with staff loyal
to Fidesz, and decidedly strengthened the prime minister’s office.
Liberal critics of Fidesz summarized one problematic aspect of Orbán’s
reforms under the heading “mafia state” (Magyar 2016). The Hungarian state “is
a mafia state by the nature of its organization, built on the network of contacts
grounded in family, or sealed up by businesses with interests in common”
(Grzymala-Busse 2017). They charge Orbán and Fidesz not just with corruption,
but, with engendering, through state capture, a return to authoritarianism. Empir-
ical research on corruption has partly confirmed these claims: since 2010 public
procurement has become more centralized, less transparent, and more corrupt, to
such an extent that researchers refer to the Hungarian economy as “crony capit-
alism” (Fazekas and Tóth 2016; Tóth and Hajdu 2016).
The heterodox economic policy has had ambivalent results, but some suc-
cesses need to be mentioned as these are relevant for the potential diffusion of
the model. First, Hungary’s example showed that relatively radical moves
against foreign capital could be carried out in the EU. While the neo-Keynesian
turn with fiscal stimuli was countered by reference to the EU’s deficit spending
rules, the Fidesz government has embarked on experimentation, such as by
taxing foreign banks or reversing pension privatization. Some of these economic
policies proved successful. Economic growth seemed to recover slowly after the
crisis—which is rather a regional phenomenon than a Hungarian specificity. In
case of the flat tax, Hungary also seems to have been relatively successful
(Mostafa 2017). Second, foreign capital did not leave Hungary (Rugraff and
Sass 2016), as expected by the critics.
In contrast to Fidesz’ concrete plans for shaping the economy, economic
policy has long constituted a weakness of the PiS political program. In 2005,
after PiS won the parliamentary election by promising a “solidary Poland”
(Polska solidarna), it turned to neoliberal reforms (Zaremba 2010; Woś 2017). It
supported, among other things, foreign-currency loans that later brought sys-
temic risk to Central European economies. Back then, economics was the
domain of neoliberal economic experts. Even a party promising the establish-
ment of a new republic would continue the status quo economic policy, as there
was no alternative to it. The situation changed after the global financial crisis of
2008–09, after which PiS started to question extensively the dominant economic
thinking (Gromada 2017).
We argue that the Hungarian policy after Fidesz took power in 2010 provided
inspiration for PiS politicians in their search for a new template of economic
policy. The reason for this is that Hungary was the only country in East Central
Europe that explicitly turned to unorthodox economic policy after the crisis.
Hungary was thus a test whether this policy could work. For PiS representatives,
the example of Hungary was important for a few reasons. First, Hungarian and
Polish economies share many similarities: both are middle-income, post-socialist
economies. Second, both economies were regarded as successful ones, into
which foreign investors eagerly put their money. The third reason why Hungary
inspired PiS is that PiS and Fidesz share many ideological tenets and perceive
themselves as agents of a new conservatism. Thus, if ever PiS wanted to realize
comprehensively its conservative program, it needed only take inspiration from
the Hungarian case. Hungary constituted a conservative avant-garde, and Poland
under PiS intended to emulate many political and economic solutions imple-
mented by Orbán. As Orbán himself commented, PiS was moving much quicker
after its victory in 2015 than Fidesz after 2010. Below we analyze what PiS poli-
ticians and experts made of the Hungarian experience in the domain of economic
policy.
The 2015 turn in Polish politics and the search for a new
policy model
Before they turned to Orbán’s economic policy, Polish conservative intellectu-
als, experts, and journalists familiarized themselves with Fidesz’ political
ideology and strategy. One important actor to do this was Igor Janke, a journalist
at the major conservative newspaper Rzeczpospolita. In a 2007 article, Janke
wrote about how Polish conservatives sought in the mid-1990s to educate the
children of the winners of the capitalist transformation in order to engender a
change in the dominant political ideology in the future. In 2012, Janke wrote a
book about Viktor Orbán called “The Attacker” (Napastnik) (Janke 2007, 2012).
In it, Janke described Orbán’s political ideology, centered on the notion of the
citizen (polgár). Furthermore, Janke showed how Orbán cooperated with conser-
vative intellectuals to develop a convincing political message and strategy.
Polish conservatives, including Janke himself, had a similar vision of an alliance
between intellectuals and experts on the one hand, and politicians on the other.
In the Polish context, this alliance served not least to assess the Hungarian
experience in order to learn how a “conservative revolution,” Polish style, could
unfold. The Jagiellonski Club in Cracow devoted several articles and studies to
understanding the polgár ideology and its implementation, as well as to distilling
from it lessons for Polish conservatives (Bieliszczuk 2015; Grosse 2013;
Kołtuniak 2016; Wójcik 2015).
Hungarian economic policy in the Polish conservative perspective

The next step in evaluating the Hungarian experience was for Polish conservat-
ives to turn to concrete policy steps undertaken by Orbán, especially in the eco-
nomic domain (Bieliszczuk 2015; Wójcik 2015). Polish conservative think tanks
examined Hungarian economic policy under Fidesz quite thoroughly in order to
assess that policy’s effectiveness in fostering investment and growth. They also
wanted to test that policy’s consistency with conservative ideology. Ideological
consistency would have been one criterion for assessing this policy positively
from the Polish perspective, but its actual effectiveness would have much
improved its chances of being transferred to Poland. The Jagiellonski Club
focused on understanding the rationale behind Orbán’s approach to economics,
whereas think tanks with more economic expertise—the Freedom Institute and
the Sobieski Institute—conducted empirical analyses of specific policies under-
taken by Orbán and his team.
An expert of the Freedom Institute, Marcin A. Piasecki, the Polish Develop-
ment Fund vice-president responsible for investments from 2016, conducted a
comprehensive study of Hungarian economic policy in 2014–15 (Piasecki 2015a,
2015b). The Institute itself was set up by a few important figures in the conser-
vative milieu—Dariusz Gawin, a deputy director of the Warsaw Uprising
Museum and an intellectual related to the journal Teologia Polityczna (“Political
Theology”), Jan Ołdakowski, the director of the Museum, and Igor Janke,
the Rzeczpospolita journalist and author of Orbán’s above-mentioned Polish
biography. In the preface to his study, Piasecki mentions that Janke introduced
him to Hungarian experts able to gather data and opinions for the study. Among
the experts he met in August and November 2014 were representatives of
the Hungarian government, experts from the Századvég Foundation that he
acknowledges is related to Fidesz, and economists from the University of Tech-
nology and Economics in Budapest (among which was the aforementioned
László György). Piasecki also took into account views of experts from Hungary
and abroad critical of Orbán’s economic policy.
Piasecki’s general assessment of Hungarian economic policy is that it proved
effective in leading the country out of the economic slump of the mid-2000s.
Even if the investment level was still below 25 percent in 2014, it had been
growing successively from 2010. Growth showed remarkable dynamics as well,
reaching 3.6 percent in 2014. Piasecki saw in these figures evidence of effective-
ness of this policy, especially in light of Hungary’s poor finances during the
crisis and even before. He pointed to differences between Poland and Hungary
in this regard, as Poland’s budget deficit and public debt were far lower than
Hungary’s. The general economic and financial situation of Hungary before the
advent of Fidesz was far worse than Poland’s during the same time. Therefore
Poland did not need quite the same solutions to cure public finances and to spur
growth.
In general, Piasecki did not directly formulate recommendations for Poland,
but his analysis contained an implicit comparison between the two economies.
For instance, Piasecki debunked the “myth” shared, according to him, with Hun-
garian economists, that early-1990s privatizations were more painful in Hungary
than in other post-communist countries. Nevertheless, citing heterodox econo-
mists Eric Reiner and Ha-Joon Chang, Piasecki made clear which school of eco-
nomic thought he approves of. Thus he also assessed favorably Orbán’s
heterodox policies, such as the return of state ownership of the economy, and
disregarded potentially negative consequences for it. Yet, as other studies and
critical newspaper articles reveal, corruption in the Hungarian economy is
growing and the structure of ownership resembles increasingly that of an oli-
garchy (Góralczyk 2015).
The Sobieski Institute also devoted a study to Hungarian economic policy in
2014, posing more explicitly the question of what Poland can learn from
Hungary. The study was financed by the Institute’s director, Paweł Szałamacha,
who wrote in 2009 a book on the Fourth Republic and entered the PiS govern-
ment in 2015 as Minister of Finance, only to be dismissed in 2016. Cezary
Mech, an economist associated with PiS, and Paweł Pelc, a jurist, analyzed Hun-
garian financial and industrial policy and asked to what extent this policy pro-
vides a template that could be copied in Poland. They favored in particular the
tax on hypermarkets, as according to them foreign hypermarkets in Poland tend
to avoid paying taxes (Mech and Pelc 2014, 64). However, they criticized the tax
on the banking sector, saying it incentivizes banks to limit lending and makes
bank clients pay more for loans. According to Mech and Pelc, the Polish govern-
ment should turn state banks and investment funds into instruments of its invest-
ment policy, and avoid influencing the lending behavior of private banks (ibid.).
Both experts favored the general direction of economic policy in Hungary
that eliminated the negative tendencies of the first two decades of post-
communism. Deregulation and an ideology of a “lean state” should be replaced
by a smart industrial policy supporting companies that engage in research and
development, accompanied by infrastructural policy. Unlike Hungary, however,
Poland should not focus on developing the automobile sector, but instead on the
energy sector. They do not specify what energy sector they mean, but hint at
removing limits on CO2 emissions, which makes them likely supporters of coal-
mining. Finally, Mech and Pelc favor treating certain kinds of social expendi-
tures as investments, and call for the state to engage more in alleviating
demographic problems, and improving the situation of the healthcare and educa-
tion sectors (ibid.).
Conservative experts in Polish policymaking under PiS

Since its establishment in 2001, PiS has been a party that relies heavily on
support from intellectuals and experts. On the one hand, a political party preach-
ing moral renewal and rejection of post-communism needs intellectuals and
experts to legitimate its political ideology. On the other hand, PiS needs policy
advisors, as its ideology is vague on many issues. Economic policy is one of
them. As initially it still included many members with liberal views on the
economy, PiS was not ready to completely abandon the neoliberal economic
thinking that dominated Polish politics in the first half of the 2000s. However,
PiS also intended to rehabilitate the state, strengthen state structures, and make
the economy serve society. Finding a set of economic policies that serve those
purposes poses a challenge that should be better taken up with the help of
experts.
The role of conservative experts forming economic policy

The economic ideas of PiS have been evolving since the party’s formation in
2001 and more intensely since the election campaign of 2004–05, during which
PiS opposed the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, or PO). Committed
initially to a certain degree to liberal values on the one hand, and to social justice
and solidarity on the other, PiS was looking for a set of economic policy solu-
tions that would best express its political and economic ideology. Collaboration
with conservative think tanks was helpful in this process. In the mid-2000s the
Sobieski Institute obtained a reputation for acting as the PiS economic think
tank. Through the personal relation between the Institute’s founder Szałamacha
and the prime minister in the PiS-led government, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz
(with both coming from the town of Gorzów Wielkopolski), the Sobieski Insti-
tute was increasingly integrated into the PiS political circle (Szałamacha 2015;
Węglewski and Ćwiklak 2016). This connection between the Institute and the
government became even stronger when Szałamacha assumed the position of
state secretary in the Ministry of Finance (2005–07). Szałamacha himself was in
the past associated with the Adam Smith Center, but his economic views
changed gradually from neoliberal to liberal-conservative ones (Szałamacha
2015; Miączyński and Popiołek 2016; Węglewski and Ćwiklak 2016). An
important concern throughout his career was family policy, but he paid equal
attention to redesigning financial and pension policies.
The Sobieski Institute became particularly active in the runup to the 2015
election. Szałamacha had been anticipating the PiS victory already for a few
years and was busy working out the party’s economic program, inspired to a
large extent by Hungarian experiments. It was especially the new taxes on banks
and hypermarkets that Sobieski Institute experts observed with great interest.
The tax on banks was an expression of an underlying economic ideology accord-
ing to which banks should primarily give loans to the real economy and engage
less in financial speculation. But the Polish conservatives anticipated its potential
consequence—that the banks would transfer the costs of the new tax to clients.
As for the tax on hypermarkets, the idea behind it was to indirectly support
domestic trading companies, given that foreign-owned hypermarkets frequently
evaded taxes, which domestic traders could not do as easily as did subsidiaries
of international holdings. For both the Hungarian government and for PiS,
domestic small and middle-sized business was more valuable than foreign inves-
tors, especially of the kind prone to avoiding domestic taxes.
Beside the Sobieski Institute, the Freedom Institute emerged as a further
conservative think tank focusing on socio-economic policy and state reform. It
equally served the PiS government as a source of expert knowledge after 2015.
Furthermore, it transferred its experts to institutions of the newly emerging eco-
nomic governance under PiS. An example of this tendency is the above-
mentioned economist Piasecki. As vice-president of the Polish Development
Fund (Polski Fundusz Rozwoju,), Piasecki is responsible for investment policy,
in itself a new instrument of government industrial policy. Having an extensive
background in project finance and a good knowledge of heterodox economics
including Hungarian practices, Piasecki clearly intends to pursue a full-fledged
industrial policy. Invited to the conservative television station Republika (estab-
lished in 2012 by conservative public figures such as Bronisław Wildstein,
Cezary Gmyz, and Rafał Ziemkiewicz), Piasecki expressed a wish to support
especially middle-size companies by helping them to finance or insure their
exports (Republika 2016).
A change of economic policy under PiS: an unorthodox turn?

Economic policy under PiS has been the object of many analyses and commen-
taries in the Polish press since the beginning of this party’s rule. PiS dared to
question the neoliberal economic thinking that had shaped the Polish transforma-
tion from communism to liberal democracy, provoking much criticism
from economists who had participated in this transformation (Gadomski
2016; Wielowieyska 2017). Especially the first reform enacted by the PiS
government—the introduction of a family allowance for families with two or
more children—was expected to quickly bring the government into financial dif-
ficulties and to diminish the population’s incentive to work (Morawski 2016).
Other reforms that were arguably inspired by the Hungarian case, such as the tax
on the banking sector, the tax on hypermarkets, or rejection of the neoliberal
pension reform, were widely regarded as equally irresponsible or unrealistic,
given the likely opposition of the European Commission, and the Polish demo-
graphic situation (Wójcik 2015). A favorite assessment of PiS economic reforms
by adherents to the neoliberal economic school, such as the architect of Polish
reforms in the early 1990s Leszek Balcerowicz, was that PiS only copies Viktor
Orbán’s bad ideas (Gadomski 2016; Niedziński 2016; Wielowieyska 2017).
Some conservatives share this opinion, too. In the following we analyze the
changes PiS introduced into government economic policy, and which of them
likely resulted from Polish conservatives’ perception of the Hungarian
experience.
The budget situation in Poland at the moment of the Law and Justice acces-
sion to power differed from that obtaining in Hungary in 2010. Poland had no
history of excessive budget deficits; on the contrary, budgetary discipline was
good under the Civic Platform. Yet, financial policy under PiS changed in com-
parison with that of the years of the PO government in two aspects that suggest
an affinity between the budget approach of PiS and that of Fidesz.
First, PiS is concerned with budgetary loopholes and improving budget rev-
enues by the same token, for instance by improving regulations concerning col-
lection of the value-added tax (Kuzińska 2017; Sąsiada 2018). PO tolerated the
loopholes and VAT avoidance. This policy step was consistent with the conser-
vative party’s ideology of a strong state and a strong budget. Equally, Fidesz
attempted to make the budget an effective instrument of state economic policy.
Budgetary discipline thus has a different meaning for liberals and for conserva
tives. The former have a preference for a lean state and a balanced minimal
budget fostering stable expectations for inflation and growth. For conservatives,
a balanced budget means a more effective instrument of state policy.
The second difference between the liberal and conservative approaches to
budget policy concerns their attitude to social spending. While liberals are suspi-
cious of any kind of social policy, East European conservatives tend to regard
elements of this policy as an investment. This concerns in particular family policy
(see Bluhm and Brand in this volume). Fidesz was the first East Central European
party to make family policy its priority by introducing substantial tax exemptions
for families with children, especially those with three children; given that it oper-
ated through tax breaks rather than direct financial transfers, in Hungary this
policy was specifically targeted to the middle class and not the poorest strata
(Szikra 2014). Since Poland has demographic issues as well, PiS politicians and
experts were likely to observe the Hungarian experiment quite closely. Hungary’s
stress on family policy gave PiS politicians an additional impetus for pursuing the
“Family 500+” program, even though they opted for financial transfers rather than
tax cuts, by giving 500 PLN (Złoty) monthly for every second (and further) child.
Despite this difference, the essence of the reform [in both countries] is neverthe-
less similar (Kołtuniak 2016; Kuzińska 2017).
As concerns pensions, which may count as an aspect of social policy, the
approach of the Hungarian government here again inspired PiS. The actual
policy steps differed, as the Hungarian government increased the pension age
from 60 to 62, whereas the Polish government lowered it from 67 to 65 for men
and to 60 for women. Nevertheless, the tendency to act against the “neoliberal”
imperative of raising the pension age, and of privatizing at least a part of the
pension system, was visible in both cases. The government of Fidesz even
nationalized private pension funds, a fairly radical step going against neoliberal
tenets. The government of PiS did not go quite as far, but it clearly favors state
pensions more than private savings pension schemes. It has not found ways to
make the state pension system more sustainable—given the structural asym-
metry in the Polish demography—but it has turned more attention to this system
in comparison with the private pension funds that notoriously underachieved in
the Polish context. At the same time, PiS intends to keep pension funds in place
as a part of the plan to further develop the domestic financial market (Oręziak
2017). This shows that economic policy of East European conservatives is not
per se anti-liberal, but constitutes a synthesis of liberal and statist solutions to be
able to pursue “national interests” more effectively.
The return of industrial policy?

In Hungary, financial policy is not least a means of fostering investment, that is,
an instance of industrial policy. Accordingly, companies that invest have to pay
much lower taxes than non-investing ones. Furthermore, producing companies
have an advantage tax-wise over companies from the service sector. Banking,
trade, energy, and telecommunication sectors are even exposed to new taxes.
The idea to give companies tax incentives to invest was practiced within the
neoliberal paradigm as well, but less radically. Foreign companies were often
given tax privileges when investing in special economic zones; however, they
rarely had to pay taxes as high as those imposed by Fidesz (reaching 50 percent)
when functioning outside those zones. In fact, Fidesz forces companies to invest
and punishes them for not investing. Polish conservatives have observed those
efforts with great attention, but they have not yet dared to copy them. The
Polish banking tax is an element of the policy of subordinating this sector to the
will of the government, but not yet a part of a comprehensive strategy to make
the tax system more just and promotive of investment. PiS is promoting nation-
alization of the banking sector and its general ideology includes implicit aver-
sion vis-à-vis speculative capital, but the actual policy is not nearly as
comprehensive as the Hungarian one (Konopczyński 2017; Morawski 2017;
Sutowski 2017).
Conclusion
In this chapter we argue that the transfer of economic ideas from Hungary to
Poland is a case of ideational imitation, but that the copying of specific economic
policy solutions has only followed a rational analysis of the Hungarian experi-
ence by Polish experts. Hungary was the first country in East Central Europe that
experimented massively with so-called unorthodox economic policy. This policy
largely followed Fidesz’ ideological break with liberalism. Having considerable
ideological commonalities with Fidesz, the Polish political party Law and
Justice was naturally interested in the performance of the Hungarian state and
economy under the rule of Viktor Orbán. In this respect, experts in think tanks
and universities played a fundamental role. In both countries, these experts
worked on producing and organizing the knowledge—the arguments and the
evidence—supporting the rediscovery by Fidesz and PiS of the state’s import-
ance to the economy. The knowledge produced by conservative experts was
crucial for these political parties’ break with the legacy of liberal economic
reformers (such as Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland or Lajos Bokros in Hungary).
Both Fidesz and PiS counted on the efforts and advice of experts to challenge
neoliberal policies, and actively recruited such experts into governmental posi-
tions or government-inclined think tanks. Prominent examples in Poland include
Paweł Szałamacha, and the Deputy Minister of Finance, Minister of Finance and
Development (2015–17) and (from December 2017) Prime Minister Mateusz
Morawiecki. In Hungary, the rapprochement between the conservative political
party and experts began already in the 1990s when economist György Matolcsy
joined Fidesz. Matolcsy already then held views that prioritized national over
private interests (Sebők 2018), and he would go on to directly shape or influence
all major economic policies of Fidesz, either as minister or as author of eco-
nomic programs.
Many conservative experts in Poland turned to the economic policies devised
by Matolcsy under Orbán both for inspiration and to evaluate them critically. In
advising PiS, conservative experts did not intend to copy all Hungarian policies
for several different reasons. First, the state of the Hungarian economy in 2010
differed from that of the Polish economy in 2015. The Hungarian crisis was
much deeper. Second, Orbán’s economic reforms are not uncontroversial. The
main criticism in the eyes of Polish observers is that Orbán’s reforms have con-
tributed to the establishment of a Hungarian oligarchy or a “mafia state” (Góral-
czyk 2015). Furthermore, reforms are seen as having worsened the investment
climate in Hungary and led generally to the politicization of the economy
(Gadomski 2016; Wojciechowski 2016). Since the conservative experts associ-
ated with PiS have economic expertise, they could not automatically adopt an
uncritical approach to Hungarian economic experiments. Rather, they recom-
mended following selected, though crucial, policies that were both consistent
with the overall conservative ideology of both Viktor Orbán and Jarosław
Kaczyński, and promised to improve the situation of public finance, of small and
middle-sized business, and of the society as a whole. In the domains of financial,
social, and industrial policy, the Hungarian experience has helped the Polish
government to specify its policy approach.
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10 Gender in the resurgent Polish
conservatism
Agnieszka Wierzcholska
Introduction
Ever since the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) came to
power in Poland, women’s rights and reproductive rights in particular have
caused heated debates, protest movements and have in effect polarized society.
The “Black Protest” in October 2016 mobilized over 100,000 people in marches
all over Poland against the new conservative government’s project to restrict the
existing abortion laws. “PiS hates women,” said an MP from the opposition
party.1 “This government will be overthrown by women,” read one of the slogans
in the protest.2 Polish society has been polarized and mobilized on the grounds
of gender issues from the moment the Law and Justice party came to power in
November 2015. Yet, women’s and reproductive rights caused sharp controver-
sies even before PiS won the parliamentary election. Different protagonists such
as the Catholic Church, various parties and lobby groups had for years been
shaping a conservative agenda and public opinion. The conservative outlook on
gender has thus a longer tradition in Poland.
This chapter gives an overview of recent discussions on women’s rights and
roles. It asks what constitutes the conservative agenda on gender issues. How
does it translate into laws and decision-making? Who are the actors advocating
it? It also sketches how feminists and women’s rights activists react to the
endeavor to implement the conservative ideology in law and in public opinion.
How do they interpret the current situation in Poland against a broader back-
ground? In a first step, this chapter summarizes recent developments since the
Law and Justice party has been in power. It will discuss reproductive health
issues under the PiS government and the ideological foundations of political
decisions. Domestic violence and family policies are also discussed in a first
step. Recent initiatives under the Law and Justice party have to be contextual-
ized though in a broader perspective, in order to observe long-term continuities.
In a second step, I focus on three major issues and the debates that have sur-
rounded them. The discussion over abortion laws (1) and the anti-“gender ideo-
logy” campaign (2) both give us insights into the argumentation, lobby groups,
and actors that effectively shape public opinion. They also display the frame in
Polish society within which these debates take place. I also outline traditional
Gender in the resurgent Polish conservatism 199
and national patterns of gender roles in Poland (3) that have shaped a canon of
values—a gender norm—for generations. This chapter does not pretend to be an
in-depth analysis of the current situation, nor does it claim to discuss the topic in
its totality. Rather, it endeavors to outline tendencies in current politics and the
long-term legacies that have shaped gender relations in Poland and sketch some
of the ways feminists, scholars, and women’s rights activists have challenged
these.
Women’s rights and reproductive health under the PiS

government since 2015
In November 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party gained the
absolute majority of seats in the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament.
In May of the same year, Andrzej Duda of PiS won the presidential elections.
Thus, since the end of 2015 nothing seemed to stand in the way of the “good
change”—as PiS politicians like to call their political agenda. This “good
change” is a narrative code for reshaping the state and society according to PiS
beliefs. Observers have criticized how the Constitutional Tribunal was de facto
blocked, the state media taken over by PiS adherents, and the judicial system put
under control of the ruling party (Osteuropa 2016; Pilawski and Politt 2016).
Some Polish intellectuals have publicly called Poland’s regime an illiberal
democracy, an authoritarian regime, or a return of Bolshevik-style governance.
Because of the non-observance of rule of law by the PiS government, the Euro-
pean Union has initiated proceedings against Poland according to Article 7 of
the Treaty on European Union—for the first time in the Union’s history.
Dismantling democracy is just one side of the “good change”; the other,
closely interwoven, is a fundamental shift of values toward conservative norms
within society. The roles of women and family are central in this consolidating
of conservative societal norms. With the Law and Justice party in power,
women’s rights and especially reproductive health issues have been called into
question, which has caused heated debates and reactions. The scholar, feminist
activist, and journalist Agnieszka Graff warns that gender issues should not be
perceived solely as a “diversionary tactic” from “real” political problems, or
treated just as a side matter. In fact, gender issues should be at the center of our
attention: what is at stake, argues Graff, are issues of equality and core values of
democracy (Graff 2014b, 434). Fundamentally, the conservative anti-gender turn
undermines liberal democracy. The debates over gender equality also show the
place of the Catholic Church within political decision-making in Poland. Graff
emphasizes, “What is at stake is the (increasingly blurred) boundary between
Church and State” (ibid.). We thus cannot view gender as a side effect of the
“good change”: rather, gender issues are at the core of the contestation over the
direction Poland is taking.
200 Agnieszka Wierzcholska
Reproductive health
Women’s rights activists condemn the fact that in Poland the promise of rights
“to access to sexual education, contraception, termination of pregnancy and in-
vitro fertilization have been notoriously broken” (Nowicka 2016). This is the
case not only since Law and Justice has come to power, but ever since reproduc-
tive and women’s rights have been increasingly curtailed and political leaders
have invoked arguments based not on scientific evidence but rather on ideo-
logical convictions. Propagating conservative ideological beliefs has a vast
impact on women’s political and reproductive rights—they shift accepted norms
within society, affect political decision-making, legislative initiatives, and public
discourse.
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines reproductive health as
follows,
Reproductive health, therefore, implies that people are able to have a

responsible, satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to
reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so.
Implicit in this area [is] the right of men and women to be informed of and
to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of fertil-
ity regulation of their choice, and the right of access to appropriate health
care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and
childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy
infant.
(WHO 2010)
I discuss the topic of abortion rights in Poland in a longer perspective in the

second part of the chapter, but in talking here about reproductive health it must
already be cursorily mentioned. Since 1993 Poland has had one of the most
restrictive abortion laws in Europe. It allows termination of pregnancy only in
three cases: when the pregnancy occurs as a consequence of a criminal act (rape,
incest), when the fetus is damaged, and when the health or life of the mother is
endangered. In 2016, a legislative initiative to ban abortion totally in Poland trig-
gered mass protest all over the country. There is also the aggravating circum-
stance that emergency contraceptives (the morning-after pill) are available only
on prescription. The former government, formed by the coalition of the Civic
Platform (Platforma obywatelska, PO) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie
Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), was in power from 2007 to 2015. This government
released the pill from compulsory prescription only in 2015, after eight years in
power and shortly before the next elections. For a short time, women could buy
the pill in pharmacies without a doctor’s prescription. However, the PiS govern-
ment reintroduced the doctor’s prescription for the morning-after pill, creating a
critical situation for women in cases of need.
The lack of knowledge about this pill and wrong assumptions stigmatize
emergency contraception additionally. Many believe the pill functions as an
abortive medicine leading to the termination of a pregnancy (Dłużewska 2017;
Kacpura and Grzywacz 2016), which impedes women’s access to emergency
contraceptives. The PiS Minister of Health Konstanty Radziwiłł declared in a
radio interview on 23 February 2017 that as a doctor he would not prescribe the
morning-after pill even if a raped woman asked him for it. That is, he would use
his right to invoke the conscience clause (Radio Zet 2017). Doctors have the
right to do this when they choose not to terminate a pregnancy (even if legally in
any of the three cases mentioned above) or to prescribe contraceptives. Until
October 2015, doctors were obliged to redirect the patient to another physician
who would agree, but they were disengaged from that duty with the decision of
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2015, that is, even before the PiS
government came to power (Nowicka 2016, 52).
This means, effectively, that women are not always able to exercise their
(already limited) rights because of this legal loophole. Increasingly also pharma-
cists invoke the conscience clause when they refuse to sell contraceptives (ibid.,
51). There are also whole regions in Poland where women who fulfill one of the
criteria for legal termination of pregnancy have trouble finding a consenting
doctor, where procedures in hospitals are delayed and complicated, thereby pro-
longing the crucial time factor for the women in need (Bielińska-Kowalewska
2017, 53). On 13 May 2016, the Sejm MP Robert Winnicki (first of the
“Kukiz’15” parliamentary fraction, later independent) and leader of the national-
ist All-Polish Youth, bragged during a Sejm session that in the region of Podkar-
pacie, there is not a single remaining clinic where “children are being killed,”
that is, where legal abortions take place. All doctors there have purportedly
signed the “conscience clause” (Sejm 2016).
PiS is not only concerned over abortion rights and contraception, but also
other areas of reproductive health. In-vitro fertilization and conditions in mater-
nity clinics were also on the agenda of this government’s healthcare activities.
As one of the first acts as Minister of Health, Konstanty Radziwiłł (PiS) can-
celled government subsidies for in-vitro fertilization procedures (Nowicka 2016,
49). This method to remedy infertility is highly criticized by the Catholic Church
and media close to the Church. Their stance affects the structure of the debate
within society, since no public protagonist can ignore the moral and religious
questions brought forth by Catholic voices in the discussion. Sociologist
Magdalena Kozub-Karkut has analyzed the debate on in-vitro fertilization in
Poland since 2007, often referred to as the “secondary abortion debate” (Kozub-
Karkut 2017, 247). According to the Catholic Church, human life starts at the
instant of fertilization and requires protection from that very moment. During the
in-vitro fertilization, humans can choose which fertilized ova will be implanted
into the mother’s womb, and which will be frozen or destroyed. This process
causes moral and ethical questions that need to be resolved. Many Western states
have introduced laws regulating the procedure. From the perspective of the Cath-
olic Church, the procedure is a “selection” of human life. Furthermore, already
the intervention of the doctor—a third party—in creating human life is incompat-
ible with the doctrines of the Church (ibid., 247–9; Znak 2008). Kozub-Karkut
shows moreover how children procreated in the in-vitro process have been stig-
matized in debates in the media, as well as by representatives of the Catholic
Church (Kozub-Karkut 2017, 250). Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek compared in-vitro
fertilization, in a statement in 2009, to the creation of Frankenstein (ibid., 251).
Kozub-Karkut depicts convincingly how the attitude of the Catholic Church
implies that such children are challenged in their personal identity, since they
have been selected at the expense of their siblings (ibid., 254). In addition, some
PiS representatives have repeated infamous verdicts about the psychological
well-being of children conceived thanks to in-vitro fertilization.
Since the Church has a vast impact on public opinion and Polish society, in-
vitro fertilization is a highly controversial issue. It was only in 2015 that the
previous PO-PSL government regulated parameters of the process by law. A
state-funded program in place in 2013–16 subsidized in-vitro fertilization for
married couples. However, the treatment was never put on the list of guaranteed
eligible medical benefits and thus it was easy for the new PiS government to
shorten the subsidies. To treat infertility PiS health minister Radziwiłł prefers to
promote “NaPro” technology based on “natural methods,” but scientists and
leading world health organizations question its effectiveness in helping couples
suffering from infertility (Nowicka 2016, 49).
After the reshaping of the PiS government in January 2018, the cardiologist
Łukasz Szumowski became the new Minister of Health, but it is too early to
assess his deeds in office. Yet, as we know from media coverage, he signed in
2014, along with 4,000 other Catholic physicians, the document “Declaration of
faith of Catholic doctors and students of medicine on the sexuality and fertility
of human beings.” Wanda Półtawska, herself a devout Catholic doctor, close
friend of Pope John Paul II, and survivor of the Ravensbrück concentration
camp, initiated this declaration. She herself suffered in pseudo-medical experi-
ments in Ravensbrück. The declaration places divine law over human law. It
condemns abortion, euthanasia, in-vitro fertilization, and contraception as trans-
gressions against the Ten Commandments and the divine order.
Maternity clinics and the conditions on the wards have also been on the
agenda of the PiS government. A few years ago in 2012, before the recent gov-
ernment came to power, the Ministry of Health introduced standards of birth
assistance based on the recommendations of the 1996-initiated foundation Give
Birth Humanely (Rodzić po ludzku). These instructions to medical personnel put
the mother in labor at the center of attention and decision-making. They were to
make sure she had all the information needed and provided her with generous
rights to influence her conditions and the labor process. But now, women’s rights
activists fear that these standards in maternity clinics may be curtailed at the
expense of the laboring mothers, since PiS Health Minister Radziwiłł has sum-
moned a committee of experts to reform birth-giving assistance. One of the
experts is the highly controversial gynecologist Bogdan Chazan, a declared
opponent of abortion (Pacewicz 2017; Szewczyk 2017) who was sued by a
former patient and had to explicate his decisions in court (Święchowicz 2017).
His critics call him a Catholic fundamentalist and a “women’s hangman.”
Women’s rights activists now fear that under the PiS government women will be
reduced to simple objects of reproduction, hampered in their rights and belittled
to mere “living incubators” (Barbara Nowacka). Thus, the debate over maternity
clinics has triggered the broader issue of the dignity of women on labor wards in
particular and the role of women in society as a whole.
Sex education and knowledge about sexuality are effective tools for reducing
the number of unwanted pregnancies (WHO 2010). Nevertheless, conservative
circles and the Catholic Church declare themselves against sex education in
public schools. No Polish government has yet introduced sex education in
schools. In the last legislation period, PO voted against a legislative initiative to
introduce the course into the school curriculum (Nowicka 2016, 48). Now, stu-
dents in the fourth grade or above can choose the optional subject “education for
family life.” With the PiS government in power, this course will be easily prone
to be used to propagate conservative ideology on the subject. Education minister
Anna Zalewska has asserted that she would not let “sex educators” into public
schools, since (she says) what they do is sexualize children. Furthermore, it
should be (in her view) the responsibility of parents to educate their children on
sexuality (Nowicka 2016, 53; Kacpura and Grzywacz 2016, 31). In 2016 she
summoned a team of advisors to revise the “education for family life” course.
One of the “experts” is Urszula Dudziak, a theologian appearing on Priest
Tadeusz Rydzyk’s TV station Trwam. She opposes all forms of contraception
and has made it into the wider media with statements about sperm’s positive
effects on women’s health versus contraception’s damaging effects (TVN24
2016; Żelazińska 2017; Chrzczonowicz 2017). Up to January 2018 the Ministry
of Education had authorized only one book for the above-mentioned course. It
reproduces gender stereotypes, teaches little on contraception, but rather offers
arguments for why sex only after marriage seems to be the best solution. Another
advisor in the matter of the book is the aforementioned, highly controversial
Bogdan Chazan (Nowicka 2016, 53). Many fear that Catholic-conservative ideo-
logy will bias sex education with information on reproductive health and sexual-
ity that lags far behind contemporary scientific standards on the subject.
As a reaction to these developments, Anja Rubik, a successful model, initi-
ated the campaign “#sexedpl” in autumn 2017. Under the slogan “All of Poland
is talking about sex” she gathered famous personalities from show business to
help educate viewers on certain topics concerning sexuality in short clips on
YouTube. For example, Małgorzata Szumowska, award-winning film director,
introduces diverse forms of contraception. Popular actor Maciej Stuhr explains
to his daughter that she has the right to “say no” at any given moment. Singer
Mary Komasa persuades girls to visit the gynecologist regularly. Słupsk city
mayor Robert Biedroń talks about his homosexuality. The clips were seen on
the internet site of Wysokie Obcasy (“High Heels”), a women’s magazine, and
YouTube. Initiatives by civil society are taking a stand against the narrow
vision of gender roles promoted by the ruling government party. On social
media, grassroots projects are offering an alternative to the conservative
narrative.
In conclusion, reproductive health issues are prone to be influenced rather by
ideological convictions than by scientific data. Women’s rights in this arena are
limited and moreover easily ignored and made difficult to access (by the doctors’
“conscience clause,” which also pharmacists apply, and ostracism in society). As
sexual education in schools will evidently not be introduced, the spread of know-
ledge on the topic is hampered even further. Convictions seem to be more
important than knowledge. Grassroots initiatives offer an alternative to conser-
vative worldviews and are extremely valuable, yet they cannot effectively
counterbalance the policies propagated by the PiS government and the Church.
Domestic violence
Domestic violence remains a major challenge in Poland. In 2017 the police
registered 950,000 cases of domestic violence, with 88 percent of the victims
being women and children (Statystyka Policja 2017). The number of unreported
cases is certainly much higher. The estimated number of fatalities is 150 to
400–500 victims per year (Chrzczonowicz 2016; Dominiczak 2013, 14). At the
same time, the family is valued as a highly respected institution in this Catholic
country. However, real problems within families such as domestic violence are
obscured by the shining ideal. In 2015, the former PO-PSL government of
Poland signed the “Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence” (Istanbul 2011), but the PiS government has
threatened to withdraw from the Convention, because, they argue, it promotes
unnatural gender roles. Since May 2016 the PiS government has cut funding to
several organizations helping victims of domestic violence such as the Center
for Women’s Rights or the domestic violence emergency hotline Blue Line. This
was a serious error, judged Małgorzata Fuszara in an interview on 18 May 2016
(Tok FM 2016). Fuszara is professor of sociology specializing in gender studies
among others, and in 2014–15 was the government’s advisor on gender equality.
The new government’s policy gives a signal, Fuszara says, that domestic abuse
victims should remain with the perpetrators. The dictum of holding the family
together, no matter what, is thereby elevated above other considerations and
above the rights of the victims, Fuszara says (ibid.). In October 2017 police
searched the rooms of several women’s rights organizations, confiscating docu-
ments and computers. Commentators in the press judged this incident as planned
intimidation. The operation took place just one day after the anniversary of the
“Black Protest.”
Magdalena Środa, professor of philosophy and ethics and leading Polish fem-
inist, states that PiS ennobles collective entities as the organizing principle in the
hierarchy of society (Środa 2016). Family, community, and nation have become
the relevant entities in society. Individual rights must thus lose out in a conflict
with the values of the collective. Women’s rights are subordinated to family
values. PiS representatives, argues Środa, strive after an idealized conception of a
seemingly “golden age” in which families have strong bonds over generations, in
which women take over all the care work, and in which the nation is proud (ibid.).
The program “Family 500 Plus” (“500+”)
During the 2015 election campaign, a major PiS promise was to introduce a
child benefit amounting to 500 PLN monthly for the second and each following
child. This benefit would be paid to all families independent of income. After the
election, the program was quickly introduced and has been in effect since April
2016. The following short sketch of family policies in Poland since 1989 will
show, on the one hand, that PiS engaged hereby in an arena of politics—family
policy—that post-socialist Polish governments had neglected for years. On the
other hand, the aims and limitations of the 500+ program are such that the
program is based on a conservative model of the family in which mothers shoul-
der the major burden of care work.
After the transformation of 1989, Polish politics at large neglected invest-
ments in family and social welfare. Expenditures in social systems were cur-
tailed; the budget spent on families was one of the lowest in Europe (in 2011,
1.76 percent of GNP) (Rumińska-Zimny and Przyborowska 2016), and childcare
facilities were closed. Though Poland was economically growing and prospering
and its GNP rising, many families, especially those with three children or more,
as well as single parents, did not benefit from the changes as much as other seg-
ments of society. The authors of a report on women’s rights in Poland, published
by the Women’s Congress, Ewa Rumińska-Zimny and Katarzyna Przyborowska,
argue that, albeit the government was investing then in infrastructure, large parts
of society faced (and still face) economic instability due to short-term contracts,
poor conditions of employment, low benefits, or simply unemployment. These
people felt excluded from participation in society (ibid., 25). At the same time,
the birth rate sank from 2.1 in 1989 to 1.3 in 2012 (ibid., 26). The authors
Rumińska-Zimny and Przyborowska propose a correlation between sinking birth
rates and the troubles undergone by people during transformation. “The drop in
birth rates that occurred in Poland and other countries of the region was in large
part the answer of women to the difficult process of transformation and the lack
of support from the state” (ibid., 31).
The demographic change caused major problems such as the aging of society
and a diminishing number of inhabitants, which social systems can solve only
with increasing difficulty. From 2007 the PO-PSL government engaged in a
family agenda, actively promoting family policies and gender equality. In its last
years (2013–15) it intensified these endeavors since gender equality between
parents in Poland lags severely behind. Nevertheless, the authors of the report on
women’s rights point out that these family policies came too late, aimed too low,
and were inconsistent (ibid., 30). In its report on the reconciliation between work
and family life, published in 2015 by the Commissioner for Human Rights in
Poland, the authors conclude that women still shoulder the major load of child-
care and household chores, whereas men only “help” occasionally (Błaszczak et
al. 2015, 60). This state of affairs is due to the lack of childcare facilities, the
gender pay gap, and the state of the role of mothers within society. According to
Eurostat, only 5 percent of children under age three had a place in childcare
facilities in 2013, and still only 38 percent of children aged three to five had a
childcare spot (ibid., 69). In 2012, women in Poland earned on average
20 percent less than men did (ibid., 63). Fathers are now also eligible to take
parental leave, but in 2014 a mere 1.65 percent of those parents who actually did
take leave were men (ibid., 60). In 2012 surveys, 46.4 percent of Poland’s popu-
lation believes that it has a negative effect on children if mothers work
(Rumińska-Zimny and Przyborowska 2016, 31). Rumińska-Zimny and Przy-
borowska argue that the best policies to slow the drop in the birthrate—as shown
in international comparative studies—have two ingredients: increase government
expenditures on the family and, simultaneously, promote gender equality. These
are two things which can better enable women to have real choices in their
concept of life, family, and work (ibid., 26).
The PiS government’s Family Ministry also aims to fight the country’s
sinking birthrates. Vice Minister Bartosz Marczuk has called the public’s atten-
tion in the media to the fact that Poland is literally “becoming extinct”
(Naprawdę wymieramy. In: Rzeczpospolita 29.1.2016) (ibid., 25). The program
500+, in effect since 2016, is directed at altering the demographic change of the
last decades. For many families neglected by policies for a long time, the extra
amount paid into the family budget was significant. The Ministry assumes that
the risk of poverty for families will be thereby lowered from 23 to 11 percent
(ibid., 35), but to date we cannot yet observe a substantial effect on the birthrate.
The Ministry reports, however, that in 2016 the number of childbirths was higher
by 13,000 over the preceding year (Ministerstwo Rodziny 2017).
Yet, the program has earned much critique. The objections go in two direc-
tions but complement one another. For one, there is the high cost of the program,
yet simultaneously predictions of little effect on the birth rate. The other point
focuses on the program’s ideological premise. The authors of the report on
women’s rights argue that the program 500+ is founded on a conservative model
of the family. It discourages a dual-parenting/-earner model where both parents
have the same rights and burdens (Rumińska-Zimny and Przyborowska 2016,
36–9). The assumption is that mothers will shoulder the major portion of the
family care work. Their freedom of choice will thereby be even more limited,
causing more and more women to drop out of the labor market. Poverty among
elderly women, as an effect, seems inevitable. However, women in Poland do
wish to have more children, according to surveys (ibid., 27), but poor employ-
ment conditions, the difficult reconciliation of family and working life, and poor
childcare facilities are impeding factors. The conservative model, argue women’s
rights activists, will not much alter birth rates positively, although expenditures
on family policies have increased enormously (ibid., 36).
Gender issues in a longer perspective
Abortion in Poland—laws, debates, protagonists

This part discusses what patterns of argumentation various pressure groups use
to manifest their ideological convictions in debates over the right to terminate
pregnancy in Poland: it asks about the framing of these debates, about accepted
societal norms, the perceived transgressions, and the wording used in talking
about the issue.
The law on abortion in effect until now (March 2018) dates back to the so-
called compromise of 1993. During the Polish People’s Republic, abortion on
social grounds was legal and was de facto practiced whenever a patient wished
to terminate her pregnancy. After transformation, conservative circles and espe-
cially the Catholic Church put pressure on politicians to prohibit abortion. In
January 1993, the Sejm finally passed a law that was considered a compromise
with the Church (Bielińska-Kowalewska 2017, 53–4). The law allows terminat-
ing pregnancy in three cases: when the fetus is seriously damaged, the health of
the mother is endangered, or when the pregnancy results from a crime. In 1996,
the Sejm amended this law to allow abortion also on social grounds, but the
Constitutional Tribunal canceled the amendment in 1997.
Many women’s rights activists criticize the “compromise.” This law and the
decision-making process that preceded it show very clearly how strongly the
Catholic Church has a say in lawmaking and the authority it has over the ruling
parties (Federa 2018). To date, no liberal or leftist government has dared to chal-
lenge the “compromise” fundamentally. In consequence, an “abortion under-
ground” has developed in the last 25 years (Bielińska-Kowalewska 2017, 53–4).
The Federation for Women’s Rights and Family Planning declares on its website
(and under the hashtag “#25latpiekłakobiet”) that over the intervening 25 years
Poland has become a “women’s hell” (Federa 2018). They are alluding thereby
to the text “Women’s Hell” written by the Polish poet and writer Tadeusz Boy-
Żeleński, who advocated for the right to abortion already in the 1930s by
showing the damaging effects of the prohibition on women. The Federation as
well as other NGOs estimate that Polish women are performing around 100,000
to 150,000 illegal abortions per year (ibid.). In 2013, the pollster CBOS con-
ducted a survey on abortions. According to this survey around 4.1 to 5.8 million
Polish women had had an abortion, which would amount to 25–33 percent of
Polish women—in spite of the strict abortion law (Nowicka 2016, 52). There are
underground clinics performing illegal abortions, and sometimes, as Katarzyna
Bielińska-Kowalewska shows, carried out by the same physicians who have
signed a “conscience clause” in public hospitals (Bielińska-Kowalewska 2017,
53). There are organizations selling abortion pills and a black market for these
products. Outside Poland, some clinics focus on “abortion-tourism” from Poland
(ibid.). Women who cannot afford to go abroad may resort to dangerous “home
methods” (ibid.). Nevertheless, since the year 2000 there have been several
legislative initiatives aiming at restricting even further the existing abortion law.
Every endeavor to change the law on abortion triggers strong reactions within
society. Wanda Nowicka, former Sejm MP and co-founder of the Federation for
Women’s Rights, as well as long-time combatant for the liberalization of the
abortion law, has drawn attention to how the discourse on abortion has shifted
over time (Nowicka 2016, 48). From the beginning, the words and language
accompanying the abortion debate have been problematic. Already in the 1990s,
argues Nowicka, the Catholic Church and conservative circles used a highly
ideological terminology and thus acquired an interpretive hegemony in the war
of words over abortion (ibid.). The word “fetus” was substituted with the term
“unborn child” or sometimes merely “child” (ibid.). The effect of this was that
abortion was discursively equated with the “murder of the child.” This incrimi-
nating terminology has gradually reshaped the way some parts of society per-
ceive abortion.
This discursive battleground has been illustrated by visual statements in regu-
larly appearing billboard campaigns by anti-abortion organizations. Most of
these call themselves “pro-life” whereas their adversaries label them “anti-
choice” (an example of the semantic contestation that takes place on various
levels simultaneously). The foundation Pro-prawo do życia (“For the right to
life”) displays its “Choose Life” exhibition in public spaces regularly.3 Their
billboards show fully developed fetuses full of blood, sometimes dismembered,
outside the womb. A billboard in 2010 featured Adolf Hitler next to a fetus,
informing the viewer that Hitler legalized abortions for Polish women on 9
March 1943 (TVN24 2010). This juxtaposition, ahistorical and taken totally out
of context as it is, would suggest that those who pronounce themselves for the
right to abortion, are comparable to Adolf Hitler—mass murderer and foe of the
Polish nation, responsible for decimating the Polish population. Abortion is thus
put into a national and martyrological perspective. The phrase “holocaust of
unborn children” also puts abortion into the context of genocide and civiliza-
tional breach (Wolna Polska 2017). In addition, state representatives and the
media today widely use the wording “eugenic abortion” to refer to abortions of
malformed fetuses, an expression highly suggestive of the National Socialists’
eugenics program in the service of their ideology. “Eugenic abortion” thus
demands a priori a negative moral judgment. Today, prominent PiS politicians
including President Andrzej Duda and many journalists use the wording as if it
were a self-evident. Those who advocate the liberalization of the abortion law
are also sometimes labeled “abortionists” by their adversaries—as if they were
propagating abortion instead of women’s rights to choose. Language affects, as
we know, the perception of reality, with a vast impact on what society perceives
as the acceptable norm.
From the beginning of this century, civic organizations have submitted legis-
lative initiatives to restrict the law on abortion, but the Sejm has always declined
the drafts. In 2014, the majority of the PiS parliamentary faction, at that time
still an opposition party, voted in favor of the restrictions (Kacpura and Grzy-
wacz 2016, 31). After the parliamentary elections of 2015, majorities had
shifted. Since then PiS has held an absolute majority in the Sejm, and the overall
political climate has changed. Those advocating further restrictions on abortion
in the law now saw a suitable opportunity to push their agenda forward. In 2016
the group Stop Aborcji (“Stop Abortion”), primarily driven by the Catholic
organization Ordo Iuris, introduced a citizens’ legislative initiative aiming at a
total ban on abortion. The draft law proposed prison sentences of up to five years
for all those who performed or contributed to an abortion—including the expect-
ant woman.4 Lawyers warned that the new law might result in attorneys—or the
police—examining each miscarriage and incriminating the miscarrying women.
Doctors would fear performing certain prenatal diagnostics when there is any
chance causing miscarriage (Bielińska-Kowalewska 2017, 54). Katarzyna
Kacpura, head of the Federation for Women’s Rights and Family Planning,
summed up the possible result:
Carrying the child to term and giving birth will be mandatory. Even if a
woman is 11 years old. Even if the pregnancy results from a crime and the
perpetrator is her own father. Women will be forced to give birth to severely
ill children with fatal conditions, or the children will die in tremendous pain,
over several hours, days or months after birth.
(Kacpura and Grzywacz 2016, 32)
At first, leading PiS politicians and the Catholic Church supported the initiative.
The Catholic Episcopal Conference spoke out in favor of the total ban on abor-
tion and stressed that the “compromise” in effect to date was insufficient. The
Conference’s communiqué was read in parishes all over Poland during Sunday
Mass on 3 April 2016 (Bielińska-Kowalewska 2017, 54–5).
Quickly, hundreds of thousands of people, especially women, voiced their
concern and protest against the draft law. In April 2016, the Facebook group
Dziewuchy Dziewuchom (“Girls for Girls”) was initiated and gained 100,000 fol-
lowers within 48 hours (Korolczuk 2017, 96). Soon, women (and men) demon-
strated their opposition in various forms and ways—such as by street protests
and sending messages to the prime minister on social media.5 The protest move-
ment created its own new symbols and reinterpreted old ones. A simple wire
coat hanger symbolized the dangerous DIY methods to which women could
resort because of the lack of access to legal abortions. Women dressed in
black—hence the name “Black Protest”—in order to express their state of
mourning for women’s rights in Poland. In this way they also alluded to an
older, patriotic tradition. During the times of the partitions of Poland in the nine-
teenth century, when the January Uprising of 1863 was repressed and demon-
strators in Warsaw killed, women dressed in black in mourning for their killed
husbands, fathers, and sons, and to show their solidarity with the national cause.
Black dresses (also brides wore black) were an open expression of (female)
protest against the repressive politics of the Russian Empire. Other national and
patriotic symbols were turned into signs of female protest in 2016: the national
anthem, Jeszcze Polska nie zgineła (“Poland is Not Yet Lost”) was transformed
into Jeszcze Polka nie zgineła (“the Polish woman is not yet lost”). The anchor,
the sign of the Polish underground during Nazi occupation Polska walcząca
(“Fighting Poland”), became Polka walcząca (“The fighting Polish woman”)
with nipples added to the anchor.
In May 2016, Barbara Nowacka, representative of the leftist extra-
parliamentary opposition, co-founded the committee Ratujmy kobiety (“Save
Women”). It introduced its own draft law aimed at liberalizing the abortion law,
and at providing broader access to contraception and sexual education
(Bielińska-Kowalewska 2017, 55). In order to submit a civil legislative initiative
to parliament, the organizations must collect at least 100,000 signatures. The
project Stop Aborcji gathered around 450,000 signatures, whereas Ratujmy
kobiety around 215,000 (ibid., 55). At first reading in September 2016, the Sejm
accepted the motion of the Stop Aborcji initiative and the draft law was dele-
gated to further debates in a parliamentary committee. The Sejm denied the
motion of the liberalizing law project. With a PiS majority in parliament, the
total ban on abortion, including prison terms, had realistic prospects of passing
parliament at subsequent readings.
In reaction to the decisions of parliament, the protests against the restrictive
abortion law draft culminated in October 2016. On 1 October a demonstration
outside parliament took place, and a general women’s strike was scheduled for
Monday, 3 October (modeled on the women’s strike in Iceland in 1975). On that
day, women all over Poland did not go to work, and gathered in rallies in 143
cities. In Warsaw alone, tens of thousands of women (and men) gathered for the
demonstration. The number of those who came together surprised even the
organizers. It was a rainy day, and the streets leading to the main assembly point
at the King’s Palace were flooded with umbrellas. Thereby the umbrella became
a new symbol of the protest movement. An estimated number of around 100,000
people took part in demonstrations, but other forms of protest were significant as
well, and made the “Black Monday” of 3 October 2016 a success. Katarzyna
Bielińska-Kowalewska describes how many women who feared losing their jobs
by going on strike, went to work, but dressed in black. Others limited their duties
at work, for example by refusing to answer the telephone. Administrations in
town halls were paralyzed. Some companies with female staff in the majority
had to shut down. Teachers at universities did not write absence notes (ibid.).
The protest delivered success: PiS abandoned the initiative of the total ban on
abortions; particularly, even the Catholic Church eventually also distanced itself
from the project, criticizing the prospect of prison terms for the women.
Although the protest had a favorable outcome, the conservative agenda on
reproductive health is still accepted by many, and the controversy over the “com-
promise” lingers on. By the end of 2017, the organization Life and Family pro-
posed yet another new legislative initiative to restrict abortion. This time, the
project did not aim at prohibiting abortion entirely, but rather, the abortion of
malformed fetuses was to be prohibited. Again, the committee Ratujmy kobiety
(“Save Women”) simultaneously initiated a draft for a new law aiming at liberal-
izing abortion. While the latter collected around 200,000 citizen signatures, the
abortion adversaries mobilized around 800,000 people to endorse their project,
according to their website. In January 2018 the project of Life and Family was
accepted at first reading, and again, parliamentary committees were to work on
the draft bill.
PiS earlier had promised to allow more direct democracy and reassured
citizens that it would accept all motions coming from citizens’ legislative initi-
atives at first reading. In spite of that promise, PiS rejected in September 2016
the draft of the law submitted by Ratujmy kobiety, and the parliamentary opposi-
tion criticized the ruling party for not keeping its own promises. In January 2018,
the situation was not to repeat itself: even some prominent PiS members such as
Jarosław Kaczyński and Krystyna Pawłowicz voted in favor of the liberalizing
project at first reading. The Sejm rejected the project of Ratujmy kobiety never-
theless. It failed mainly because of the voting behavior of the parliamentary
opposition: 39 deputies from the opposition either voted against it or were absent
during the ballot. If the project had acquired merely seven more votes, the
project would have passed at first reading. Some journalists viewed this vote on
the liberalization project—as it had no real chance to pass ultimately into law
anyway—as a tactic of the extra-parliamentary opposition to drive a wedge
between the opposition parties within the Sejm. In the end, the outcome of the
vote discredited the opposition on the issue. However, these press commentaries
show how reproductive health issues are often interpreted as a political tool for
something else, a game of interests rather than a core issue. We await the further
outcome on the abortion issue.
In the debates over abortion, different pressure groups are presenting their
overall worldviews and visions of the society they want to live in. Thus it is
important to analyze how different groups within society negotiate conflicting
interests. One of the most important players in this debate in Poland are different
factions within the Catholic Church who try to actively shape public opinion. As
shown earlier, priests in Poland regularly do take a stance on ideological debates
from the pulpit or in the media. The Church, as a well-respected authority,
affects large segments of the population. Furthermore, the upper hierarchy of the
church communicates with the faithful through communiqués of the Bishops’
Conference or pastoral letters read out during Sunday Mass. Catholic moral con-
cepts thus cannot be ignored in any public debate since they effectively shape
majority opinions and accepted norms.
The Catholic Church as player and pressure group influences political
decision-making. Magdalena Środa, professor of ethics and philosophy and
engaged feminist, views also the liberal PO as being “kept on a leash by the
church” (Kubica 2018). This is one of the main reasons why the “compromise”
on abortion has not been altered for 25 years. It was only in 2015 that the
PO-PSL government regulated in-vitro fertilization and allowed the sale of
the “morning-after” pill without a doctor’s prescription. However, in 2015 the
PO-PSL government, having been in power for eight years, was already anticip-
ating parliamentary elections. PO also voted against sexual education in public
schools. Rightist political parties such as the Liga Polskich Rodzin (“League of
Polish Families”) have repeatedly propagated a conservative canon of values in
politics and society, but none has been as successful as that of PiS. The latter is a
natural ally of the Church on the political stage, and in return counts on Church
support and mobilizing potential. Independent media reported in 2017 how the
PiS government subsidized a Catholic foundation, headed by the priest Tadeusz
Rydzyk, who holds ultraconservative and anti-Semitic views and is the founder
of Catholic radio and TV stations (TVN24 2017; Gmiterek-Zabłocka 2017). We
can observe synergy effects between the parliamentary majority of PiS and the
mobilizing potential of the Church, resulting in the successful representation of
its ideological agenda on the political scene. Środa thus comes to the following
conclusion: “Any political revolution in this country must begin in the church.
God is everywhere, but in the churches, we find only PiS. If people don’t start
leaving the churches, nothing will change” (Kubica 2018).
The authority of the Church in society, and the synergy effects with a conser-
vative party in power have provoked a major shift to the right in public opinion
and in accepted societal norms. As a result, organizations on the right part of the
political spectrum have gained momentum. Adversaries of abortion, gathered in
anti-choice NGOs, are supported in part by Catholic organizations. The founda-
tion Life and Family triumphed over the fact that the Federation of Catholic
Family Associations in Europe (FAFCE) supported their draft law to curtail the
right to abortion in 2017–18 (Łońska 2017). FAFCE is a Brussels-based NGO
with participatory status in the Council of Europe.6 It unites several Catholic
organizations in different European countries. Transnational networks have
become increasingly important for conservative organizations. In 2016 Ordo
Iuris achieved some notoriety in Poland as the NGO that agitated for the total
ban of abortion and drafted the legislation that was motioned in the Sejm. This
ultraconservative foundation, of which most members are lawyers, analyzes pre-
vailing legal norms and drafts new laws, aiming to turn its conservative world-
view into reality.7 It also organizes lectures at universities and supports PiS. In
this way such ultraconservative pressure groups agitate on gender issues from
the Right, and PiS has to react to them.
Gender—the plague from Brussels, or on international networking

Around the end of 2013 and in early 2014 the term “gender” in Poland gained
notoriety in the public sphere, conquering the headlines of important newspapers
and the attention of TV journalists and parliamentarians—much to the surprise of
those engaged in gender studies. Until then, most Poles probably would have had
difficulty in spelling the word, not to mention explaining what “gender” meant.
But since 2013 the term has resounded throughout the land, with the political
Right demonizing it as “gender-ideology”—a thing worse than Communism and
Nazism put together, as Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek claimed in the summer of 2013
publicly (Graff 2014b, 432). At the same time, in autumn 2013, the Catholic
Church in Poland faced severe accusations of pedophilic crimes within its ranks.
In this context, Archbishop Michalik earned much critique for his extremely blunt
“victim-blaming” strategy that he voiced in October 2013. His line of reasoning
was that the involved children would cling physically to the priests and simply
draw the clergymen into cooperating with their perverse behavior. Pedophilia
would be, thus explained, the result of the effect on the children of pornography,
lack of love in broken families, and—of “gender-ideology” (ibid.). At first, com-
mentators interpreted the emerging “war on gender” to be a cover-up strategy to
divert from the accusations of pedophilia against the Church. Yet, more and more
scholars have come to view the mobilization against gender in a broader context,
concerning not only Poland, but in a transnational dimension (Graff and Korolc-
zuk 2018). So, what does this contestation of gender consist of? And what
purpose does it serve within Polish society and beyond it?
In December 2013 a pastoral letter broached the gender issue. The letter was
read during Sunday Mass all around Poland. Gender, supposedly an ideology
rooted in Marxism, feminism, and the sexual revolution, endangered the “natural
order” of the sexes—so the line of argument in the letter. Thus, so-called “gender-
ideology” was demonized as a threat to the family. In this Manichean vision of
the world, family and traditional gender roles appear as a safe haven threatened
by evil ideas coming from the decaying West, such as sexual freedom and fem-
inism that would lead to the “sexualization” of children and a “moral chaos.”
What followed after 2013–14, as Agnieszka Graff puts it, was a “brilliantly
orchestrated mobilization on the right” (Graff 2014b, 432). In a very short time,
anti-gender groups became active. For example, they threw smoke bombs at panel
discussions with feminists. A parliamentary commission labeled “Stop gender
ideology!” headed by Beata Kempa (PiS) was formed. The ultraconservative cler-
gyman Dariusz Oko held a speech in the Sejm about the “damaging effects of
gender-ideology” (ibid., 432–3). In 2015, during a large anti-sex education rally
in Warsaw, one of the slogans compared gender to “Ebola from Brussels”: a dan-
gerous disease and a threat spreading from the seat of EU institutions and imperil-
ing Poland (Graff and Korolczuk 2018). Agnieszka Graff comments:
The word “gender” is being used strategically as a catch-all word which

signifies the chaos supposedly caused by women’s rights, sexual freedom
and gender equality policies, while the “child in danger” figure is used—
with great success—to mobilize parents.
(Graff 2014b, 434)
Whereas the anti-gender campaign was first perceived by many as specific to

Poland, many scholars can now depict its international dimension and the net-
works behind it (Graff and Korolczuk 2018). By comparing figures of speech,
monitoring transnational organizations and publications, they discovered strik-
ing parallels and interconnectedness. The Polish debate relates well to other
phenomena occurring elsewhere: Vladimir Putin’s anti-LGBT activist policy,
the French movement “La Manif pour tous,” warnings from the Vatican
about “gender-ideology.” As Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk reveal,
ultraconservative coalitions have been organizing themselves worldwide, for
example through the World Congress of Families, or the international website
“Citizen.Go” with over 4 million subscribers. Transnational networking and
mobilization of grassroots activists are two sides of the same coin. The organi-
zations described by Graff and Korolczuk use strikingly similar rhetoric and
figures of thought, amplifying one another.
Some scholars analyzing “gender” posit that gender is a “symbolic glue”
which unites diverse and loosely connected conservative, right-wing populist
and nationalistic protagonists (ibid.). The common line of attack against gender
promotes a cohesiveness of the diverse groups and enables international net-
works to flourish (Kováts and Põim 2015). Graff and Korolczuk stress the “anti-
colonial frame” of the anti-gender movement: Western organizations such as the
EU, UN, UNICEF, WHO, World Bank but also feminists, homosexuals, etc., are
portrayed as colonizers (Graff and Korolczuk 2018) spreading a dangerous ideo-
logy against which the local, national, “primal” community must defend itself.
The figure of speech “Ebola from Brussels” is emblematic: just as the conter-
minous disease, gender threatens to decimate the population. Graff and Korolc-
zuk argue that the anti-genderism movement is a cohesive worldview, organized
transnationally but also working in local communities. The movement sees itself
as “a resistance to colonialism and neoliberal exploitation” (ibid., 807). They
also underscore the new forms of cultural conservative disenchantment with neo-
liberalism, that is, the “undervaluing of care, the dismantling of welfare provi-
sions and the effects of these trends on women and families” (ibid., 814).
The family appears here as the ultimate battleground in this ideological con-
frontation. Therefore the issues of family, sexuality, reproductive health, and
sexual education are such important assets in this ideological warfare. To win
this “war on gender,” conservative parties take on the above-mentioned issues
actively and push their agenda. Graff and Korolczuk see the family as the funda-
mental battleground, a “nature/culture frontier.” In that sense, we have been wit-
nessing in recent years how anti-gender activists are creating a universally
coherent worldview, with followers highly mobilized, internationally organized
and thus able to effectively promote an alternative civil society (Graff and Korol-
czuk 2018, 802–16). Graff and Korolczuk sum up: “Relying on an anticolonial
frame, the Right has undermined the left-wing monopoly on voicing critiques of
capitalism and has offered a new version of cultural universalism, an illiberal
one.” (ibid., 816). Feminists and activists argue that this interconnectedness and
activation should not be ignored. There can be no going back to a “business-as-
usual” stance. They are convinced that fundamental values of equality and diver-
sity are at stake and that liberal democracies are being undermined by democratic
means (ibid.). As Graff again sums up:
We are facing a powerful transnational effort of religious fundamentalists

and right-wing radicals to discredit gender equality, and more broadly—to
undermine liberal democracy. This growing social movement draws its
power from collective anxieties produced by neoliberalism and globalization.
(Graff 2014b, 434)
Matka Polka—the traditional values and real problems of
Polish women
Traditional female roles were shaped in the course of turbulent Polish history
and are up to today strongly intertwined with Polish nationhood. The gender
norm that was passed on through generations is the background to the recent
developments and must be sketched in this overview, for it still has repercus-
sions for today’s perceptions of female and male roles. The process of modern
nation-building by the Poles was deeply impacted by the partitions of the nine-
teenth century when Poland was divided among three empires and no sovereign
Polish state existed. The struggle against foreign rule was a central element of
the “imagined community” (Benedict Anderson) of the Poles as a nation.
Another important pillar was the messianic, martyrological pattern, deeply
rooted in Polish romanticism, ennobling sacrifices for the national cause. Adam
Mickiewicz, the Polish poet, conceived the image of the Poles as the “Christ of
the nations”—crucified in order to be resurrected (Mickiewicz [1832] 1956,
27–8). Romanticism and its martyrological current are important ingredients in
the Polish national imagery, and still relevant today for constructing a national
identity discourse.
In this notion of the subjugated nation that has to rise from oppression,
women were delegated a specific role. Gertrud Pickhan, a professor of East
European history, depicts Polish women on the one hand engaged in the common
battle alongside the men against foreign rule, and on the other hand, bound by a
societal contract based on gender difference (Pickhan 2006, 7–17). During the
partitions, women—who traditionally took care of the children—became the
“keepers of national family traditions, which were indispensable for the survival
of the nation. Motherhood was thus politically loaded” (ibid., 8). Especially the
sons were to be raised in a patriotic spirit, and this was in the hands of the
mothers. Ultimately, the mothers had to be prepared to sacrifice their sons at “the
altar of the nation” (ibid., 9). The most famous literary depiction of the prover-
bial Matka Polka stems from the aforementioned Adam Mickiewicz in his poem
“To Matka-Polka,” in which Pickhan discerns “the symbiosis of motherhood and
nation” (ibid., 8). The readiness of women to make sacrifices for the national
cause is strictly inscribed in this imagery.
At the same time, the engaged resistance against foreign rule was an
important female activity, in the active fight for the nation, patriotic upbringing
of children, and educational work. In the second half of the nineteenth century,
educated women earned a living as (private) teachers—but also worked in the
underground, offering alternative education that would hamper the Russification
of the next generation. All of these realms of activity shaped the contours of
what would become the notion of traditional female roles within Polish society.
The historian Pietrow-Ennker writes:
The reconfiguration of the woman [during the partitions] conveyed strength

in the national struggle on the one hand, but on the other it wove family and
nation together so strongly, that emancipation from the family ties seemed
almost like a betrayal of the fatherland.
(Pietrow-Ennker 2000, 129)
In her groundbreaking book Ladies, Knights and Feminists: The discourse on

women’s rights in Poland, Sławomira Walczewska portrays the “story of
protest,” as she calls it, against the prevalent attitude that women should find ful-
fillment in marriage and motherhood only. Walczewska thus writes about the
other side of the story—the history of women’s rights activists and their eman-
cipatory struggle. She assesses the myth of Matka Polka as follows:
Matka Polka is the formula for women to become part of the national Polish
community. Polish women buy themselves into the community with mother-
hood. Ideally, motherhood will be brought to completion by bringing a son
into the world and educating him in a patriotic spirit. The Matka Polka
myth, by its anti-emancipatory character, represents a challenge for today’s
women’s rights movements.
(Walczewska 2015, 49)
In partitioned Poland, family and church were, as Pickhan writes, the two
“arenas in which a national-Polish consciousness under the condition of foreign
rule” was shaped (Pickhan 2006, 11). These two strongholds of the nation have
been effective until today. Feminists and women’s rights activists who struggle
for gender equality, self-determination, and emancipation can easily be excluded
from the national community by the conservative discourse. In effect, the afore-
mentioned “war” on gender reveals how different groups have repelled the claim
to gender equality and discredited it as an attack on the nation and the family.
Agnieszka Graff states in an interview that women are no longer willing to post-
pone their demands in order to redeem Poland (Graff and Korolczuk 2017,
182–3). She alludes here to the romantic canon of gender roles. It functions as a
code immediately understood by her (Polish) readers. In an unspoken societal
contract, it is expected of women to make a sacrifice for Poland willingly and it
is anticipated that they naturally put their own interests last. The wording
“to redeem Poland” implies a sacred dimension of the sacrifice which is also
inherent in the martyrological myth. Should women choose not to follow this
predetermined pattern, they can be easily defamed as deserting the national
community.
The myth of Matka Polka has been challenged repeatedly. Scholars and fem-
inists criticize this romanticized ideal that veils the real problems of women and
mothers in post-socialist Poland. In 2012, Elżbieta Korolczuk and Renata
Hryciuk published a volume with the programmatic title: “A Farewell to Matka
Polka?” (Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2012). The authors point out that cultural
studies scholars and anthropologists concentrate on the representations of
women, and the myths affecting female roles in society. Yet, analyses of the
structural problems that mothers struggle with every day lag behind. In the book,
the authors analyze the role of the mother in Polish society, including aspects of
intersectionality, ethnicity, and social status. According to Agnieszka Graff, the
book reveals a rift within society between two canons of values existing simul-
taneously yet contradicting one another. On the one hand, the idealized role of
mothers and motherhood still affects powerfully the perception of gender roles
within society. Mothers are expected to willingly make sacrifices and put indi-
vidual interests last, but in return, they possess an unquestioned position within
the (national) community. On the other hand, the reality of life in neoliberal
Poland after 1989 transformed motherhood and families deeply. Agnieszka Graff
has devoted many articles to this topic, some of which have been published in
her book (note the allusion in the title) Matka Feministka (Graff 2014a). She
argues that the neoliberal state with its market-oriented principles views the
woman as an autonomous entity, her motherhood as a conscious decision, a
“project” that she is supposed to manage successfully (ibid., 59). Should she fail
to combine care work and working life, she alone will be responsible, whereas
the community and the state withdraw from their share of the responsibility—
thus Graff ’s argument (ibid.). Graff shows convincingly how in the 1990s child-
care facilities were being shut down en masse. The scholar concludes that in the
neoliberal world, sacrifices are still demanded of women, yet now the support of
the community is no longer certain. Graff sees the major problems in the crisis
of care work and its devaluation: they are the cause of such phenomena as the
disappearance of women from the labor market, lack of opportunities for the
advancement of women, and low birth rates (although women declare in surveys
that they wish to have more children) (ibid., 67–74). Those diverse and simulta-
neous processes within society, and the long-term gender norms passed down
through generations, are pointed out sharply in a short quotation from Agnieszka
Graff:
[reproductive health] is a core issue for the dignity of women, for their treat-
ment as agents in society, and simply for their security. This issue is closely
connected with such major issues as the crisis of care work and the fact that
the neoliberal state has deserted women. We are no longer willing to again
postpone our demands, in order to redeem Poland. I’ll put it this way: either
the Left and liberal Center will learn, as the Right did already in the 1990s,
to take gender issues dead seriously and treat these questions with respect
and use them in their struggle to rule the people—then, they will have a
chance to win against PiS. Or they will not and will fail.
(Graff and Korolczuk 2017, 182–3)
Conclusion
This chapter sketches the role of gender in the resurgent Polish conservatism. It
depicts recent developments since PiS came to power in 2015 and focuses on
reproductive health issues, domestic violence, and family policies. In a second
part, it draws on long-term developments that have affected societal norms such
as the debates on abortion, the “war” against gender, and the myth of the Matka
Polka. It gives an overview of tendencies, political players, and reactions, as
well as interpretations of scholars and feminists.
The Polish conservative agenda stresses the role of the woman as a mother.
Motherhood is understood as the primary societal function of the woman, and to
the benefit of the family, the community, and the nation. Reproductive health
issues as well as family policies are oriented toward this understanding of
women as mothers. Women are supposed to shoulder the major burden of family
care work. The state in its conservative outlook under the PiS administration
supports mothers in enlarging the family—but not in combining work and family
life. Emancipation from the family and the fight for gender equality are attacked
as damaging to the community. The ideal of the mother is elevated to a sacred
dimension, strongly infused with the national myth of the Matka Polka. Often
the real problems of mothers tend to be ignored. As the family is idealized,
violence within families as a widespread societal problem is largely neglected.
Organizations see their funding curtailed, their activities reduced or closed down,
while the government threatens to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention
against domestic violence, with the claim it propagates the wrong gender roles.
In this idealized vision of Polish society—such as we can make out from the PiS
party rhetoric, their decision-making and policies—the family, nation, and parish
offer Poles a cohesive community valued above individual rights. Among the
societal players that pursue this conservative agenda, the Catholic Church plays
a key role. It is an authority within society and has the power to reach out to and
mobilize many people. Ideological and political questions are discussed during
Sunday Mass and the hierarchy communicates with the faithful through pastoral
letters, communiqués, and sermons. Some Catholic factions, such as the fol-
lowers of the ultraconservative priest Rydzyk, communicate through their own
TV and radio stations. The Church actively structures the debate on reproductive
health issues since its voice cannot be ignored. Its powerful position affects the
political parties, and many feminist observers argue that the boundary between
the Church and the state is increasingly blurred, which has a negative effect on
women’s rights. Also, conservative NGOs play an important role in pushing the
agenda, gaining momentum while the PiS party is in power. Often these NGOs
are backed by Catholic organizations and they network internationally.
On the other hand, NGOs advocating for female rights such as the Federation
for Family Planning and Women’s Rights, the Women’s Congress, Manifa, and
others, mobilize against the conservative backlash—as observed after the “Black
Protest.” Grassroots initiatives such as Dziewuchy Dziewuchom have achieved
successes and present an alternative vision of gender norms in Polish society.
In a broader perspective, many scholars see the difficulties of the transforma-
tion process as a major cause for the conservative turn. State socialism was
quickly replaced by a neoliberal market economy, and in consequence society
had to adjust to it. Decades after the transformation, the feeling of “relative dep-
rivation” still has trenchant effects. Women found themselves in a difficult posi-
tion as the state cut costs on social welfare and childcare facilities, mothers had
to shoulder the bulk of carework and were expected to make sacrifices for the
family and community. As Graff sharply puts it, the neoliberal state produced a
crisis of care work and abandoned mothers. Rumińska-Zimny and Przyborowska
view the sinking birth rates in Poland as the answer of women to the problems of
the transformation process.
Apparently, after the transformation of 1989 the problem of how a sovereign,
democratic Poland should be oriented seems not to have been solved, and this is
now being contested by PiS, which offers its “remedy”—consolidating a conser-
vative model of the family, gender roles, and the nation. Yet, this model ser-
iously hinders gender equality and women’s emancipation. Graff and Korolczuk
argue that the “war on gender”—also in its international dimension—is the
conservative answer to the insecurities people face from “neoliberalization and
globalization.” Gender issues are thus not merely a side effect of general
politics—they are a core issue. What is at stake is equality, diversity, freedom of
choice, and individual rights. Moreover, gender issues have a great mobilizing
power (which is effectively instrumentalized by the Right). In the contestation of
diverse worldviews (conservative, liberal, pluralistic), and on the question of
how democracy in Poland should be formed, gender and the family are central
themes and one of the battlegrounds in a fundamental Richtungsstreit, a dispute
over the direction of society and polity.
Notes
1 Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus has stated this several times, e.g. in a press commentary con-
cerning the statement of the Minister of Health Konstanty Radziwiłł, who declared that
as a doctor he would not prescribe the “morning-after pill” to a woman, even if she had
been raped. https://nowoczesna.org/poslanki-nowoczesnej-oburzone-slowami-ministra-
zdrowia-o-pigulce-dzien-po-dla-zgwalconej-kobiety/ (accessed 15 January 2018).
2 In Polish, the verse has a rhyme: Beata niestety, ten rząd obalą kobiety, see www.
tvn24.pl/wideo/z-anteny/beata-niestety-ten-rzad-obala-kobiety,1568213.html?playlist_
id=24746 (accessed 23 March 2018).
3 For a virtual gallery of the billboards: https://stopaborcji.pl/wystawa-wybierz-zycie/
(accessed 18 January 2017).
4 The draft law on the website of the foundation: www.stopaborcji.pl/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/projekt_2016.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018).
5 For the role of social media in the Black Protest, see Korolczuk, Elżbieta “Explaining
‘black protests’ against abortion ban in Poland: the power of connective action,” Zoon
Politikon Journal 7 (2016): 91–113.
6 www.fafce.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121&Itemid=218&l
ang=de (accessed 24 January 2018).
7 Homepage of Ordo Iuris: www.ordoiuris.pl/kim-jestesmy (accessed 23 March 2018).
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11 “Traditional values” unleashed
The ultraconservative influence on
Russian family policy
Katharina Bluhm and Martin Brand
Introduction
The various new Russian conservatives see their unifying bond in a “social con-
servatism.” Nevertheless, the conceptual ideologists elaborate little on what a
conservative social policy might mean that could cover all welfare-state aspects in
today’s Russia. Social conservatism results, for them, rather from the recovery of
economic and political “sovereignty” and a strong developmental state which will
defend the interests of the locally bound “majority” and national real economy,
over the irresponsible transnational class of “liberal financialists” (Khazin 2017).
It’s about restoring the distributive power of the state through economic growth
and a return to a progressive income-tax regime (Glazyev 2015). Labor participa-
tion, if mentioned at all, is conceptualized as state-led corporatism.
One field of social policy, however, has the utmost attention of the new
Russian conservatives: family policy. Family policy is supposed to translate “tra-
ditional values” into practice, to represent the backbone of national security, sup-
porting the envisioned recovery of Russia as global power. This recovery is
pictured as heavily jeopardized by a severe “demographic crisis” caused by the
withdrawal of the state from economic and social policy since the breakdown of
the Soviet Union. Hence, a pronatalist family policy has become the focal point
of conservative social policy and a major battlefield for conservative “moral
norm entrepreneurs” (Stoeckl 2016).
At first glance, the conservative agenda in social policy has been more suc-
cessful than in economic politics (see Bluhm; Busygina and Filippov in this
volume). Already in 2006, the re-elected president Vladimir Putin activated a
pronatalist policy that departed from the logic of the “negotiated neo-liberal”
program, as Linda Cook put it in her seminal work on Russia’s welfare state
(2007). With the so-called “maternity” or “family capital” that was first intro-
duced in 2007 for a defined time span in order to stimulate an increase in the
birth rate, in family policy especially, Russia switched from a liberal-minimalist
approach focusing on the poor, back to state intervention that would cover all
strata of the society independent of need. However, as in the field of economic
politics, the new conservatives did not manage at that point to push through their
entire agenda.
224 Katharina Bluhm and Martin Brand
The arguments in this chapter are twofold. First, the conservative discourse
on family policy is dominated by an ultraconservative coalition surrounding the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) that is both anti-Soviet and anti-liberal. This
coalition has been quite successful in spelling out what “traditional family
values” are supposed to mean. However, even in this extreme version of new
conservatism, the ultraconservative re-invention of tradition does not simply
refresh pre-revolutionary values. Second, with the pronatalist turn of Putin’s
administration and particularly after the president’s official commitment to “tra-
ditional values” of 2013, ultraconservative positions and networks have gained
more and more influence and won important battles over family policy. Yet, the
implementation of their agenda has remained piecemeal, and contested within
the elite.
This chapter proceeds in four steps: in the first part, we analyze the ultracon-
servative coalition that focuses on family policy. Their networks overlap with
the knowledge networks of the conceptual ideologists of the new Russian con-
servatism, but are not identical (see Bluhm in this volume). In the second part,
we explore the ultraconservatives’ normative agenda and reform ideas and show
how they combine anti-Soviet and anti-liberal positions. The third part relates
the successes, failures, and compromises that have taken place in the translation
of the conservative normative agenda into family politics. The conclusion evalu-
ates the results of our inquiry.
Forging the ultraconservative coalition

The Russian Orthodox Church, which considers family issues part of its “canon-
ical territory” (ROC 2013), is a key moral norm entrepreneur in family policy
and traditional values, but also associates with a wider network of ultraconserva-
tive activists, experts in think tanks and universities, and politicians. We call
these “ultraconservative” because within the camp of the new conservatives they
are the most fundamentalist coalition. The Church organization and the regional
affiliations of ultraconservative civic associations have spread their roots widely
in local communities. At the same time there are close ultraconservative ties to
the Moscow elite.
The ROC already acted under the previous Patriarch Alexy II as a norm entre-
preneur, even when their ideas had not yet been bundled under the formula of
“traditional values” and their normative agenda was not yet fully developed. In
the 1990s the ROC and other “traditional religious communities” vigorously
opposed the application of family planning and reproductive rights concepts
propagated by the UN and other international organizations in Russia. They con-
tested the promotion of contraceptives with which the Yeltsin government hoped
to combat the high abortion rate in Russia, and the introduction of sex education
in Russian schools. Diverse congresses and committees, including those of other,
“traditional” religions, devoted themselves to the “protection of motherhood and
the family,” were already opposed to the “liberals,” and had an outspoken demo-
graphic emphasis. In the 2003–04 election campaign for Putin’s second term, the
“Traditional values” unleashed 225
ROC used the opportunity to promote a pronatalist turn, though it took the gov-
ernment until 2006 to take the first concrete steps in that direction. From that
point on, a coherent demographic and family-political discourse emerged that
before was dispersed among different political, ecclesiastical, and academic
circles.
A catalyst for the development and public visibility of the ultraconservative
coalition were several pro-family congresses, with international participation.
The year 2010 was decisive here. One year after the enthronement of the new
ROC Patriarch Kirill I, Russia’s first “National Congress on Demography—
Russia’s Sanctity of Motherhood” took place in the congress hall of Christ the
Savior Cathedral in Moscow. The congress was sponsored by the national
program, “The Sanctity of Motherhood” (Svyatost’ materinstva), of a Kremlin-
related foundation, and was organized by the ultraconservative coalition in close
collaboration with the World Congress of Families (WCF ), founded in 1995 by
rightist Christian activists in the US (Levintova 2014).1 The WCF sees itself as
part of an “emerging conservative movement” against the new “cultural imperi-
alism” that seeks to punish countries not embracing the redefinition of family.
That first national demographics congress in 2010 was followed one year later
by a first “World Demographic Summit: The Family and the Future of Human-
ity” of the WCF at the Lomonosov Moscow State University (MGU) in Moscow,
blessed by Kirill.2 In 2012, a second summit was held in Ulyanovsk. These two
summits were meant to test Russia’s bid to host the WCF World Congress held
annually at various venues.3 The World Congress was indeed scheduled to take
place in the Kremlin shortly after the Sochi Olympics in 2014, but had to be can-
celed under pressure from the US government after the Crimean annexation. The
largest congress sponsor was the investment banker and billionaire Konstantin
Malofeev, who was to assume two-thirds of the congress costs and had previ-
ously participated in financing the national summits.
With his close relationships to the highest ranks of the ROC, members of the
ruling elite and conservative ideologists, Malofeev is a key broker who bridges
different national and international networks, for which purpose he also uses his
business positions, charity activities, his TV channel Imperial City (Tsar’grad),
and the political-analytical think tank Katehon. In 2007 he founded the largest
Orthodox charity foundation St. Basil the Great (Fond svyatitelya Vasiliya
Velikogo), which supports conservative civil society and is an official partner of
the WCF. The supervisory board includes Bishop Tikhon (Georgy Shevkunov)
and the filmmaker Sergey Mikhalkov (see also Bluhm in this volume). In 2011,
the Saint Basil Foundation established the Safe Internet League—with support
of Igor Shchyogolev, at the time Minister of Telecoms and Mass Communica-
tions. Malofeev became a member of the board of trustees of the League, while
Shchyogolev headed the supervisory board of the League. At the end of 2011 the
League drafted the “Law to restrict the Internet” that was adopted by the State
Duma in 2012 (Shekhovtsov 2018, 182).
Malofeev was also named to the expert council of the Patriarch’s Commis-
sion on “Family Matters, Protection of Motherhood and Childhood” (in the
following: “Family Commission”) that Kirill created in 2011. The Family Com-
mission became a major player in the conservative pro-family network when the
Holy Synod appointed Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov as its chairman two years
later.4 Smirnov previously headed the Synodal Military Cooperation Division
and has worked for the patriarch’s TV channel Savior (SPAS TV) (founded in
2005 in response to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution), and in church educational
institutions.
A key academic expert in the coalition is the demographer and sociologist
Anatoly Antonov, professor at MGU. In the 1990s, Antonov reached out to
American pro-family activists and—according to self-reports—jointly founded
with them the WCF. One of his allies is the Russian Institute for Strategic
Studies (RISS), the famous think tank of the Russian president. In 2003, RISS
founded the Institute for Demographic Research, whose director became the
young conservative, close to the ROC, Igor Beloborodov. The two experts
created in 2006 the research network demographia.ru that named as partner the
Patriarch’s Family Commission. Conservative child and family psychologists
who infuse pedagogical language into the ultraconservative discourses have
joined the demographers. For a wider public, well known in this regard are Irina
Medvedeva and Tatyana Shishova—leading personnel in the Association of
Parental Committees and Societies (Assotsiatsiya roditel’skikh komitetov i soob-
shchestv, ARKS).5 The two pro-family activists have many other affiliations and
official positions. Medvedeva, for example, heads the Institute of Demographic
Security. In this function she is on the board of the Russian Children’s Founda-
tion and vice-president of the International Fund for Socio-Psychological
Support of Family and Child.6 At the same time she is a member of the Central
Committee of the civic movement Narodnyy Sobor—an important link to the
conservative ideologists (see Bluhm in this volume). The two Orthodox women
regularly publish together, on among others the ROC internet journal pravosla-
vie.ru.
One of Antonov’s busiest students is Aleksey Komov, who turned toward
conservatism and Orthodoxy after some career steps in the financial sector and
as a nightclub owner in the late 1990s. He wrote a doctoral thesis on the ideo-
logical roots of the anti-family worldview under Antonov’s supervision. Having
grown up in London and New York and being multilingual, he became a front
figure for the ultraconservative circles internationally, and in the creation of a
“Conservative Internationale.” According to Shekhovtsov (2018, 181), Komov
is the head of the international department of the Patriarch’s Family Commission
and, among other functions, is a member of the Board of Directors of the WCF,
where he is responsible for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and WCF ambassador to the UN.7 Komov collaborates with Malofeev as
a foreign projects manager of the Saint Basil the Great Foundation and sup-
ported, as a board member of the Safe Internet League, the censorship of the
internet according to Anton Shekhovtsov (ibid.).
Like Malofeev and Beloborodov, Komov, born in 1971, belongs to the
younger generation of Russian conservatives. With the support of the WCF and
Archpriest Smirnov, Komov set up in 2011 his own pro-family foundation (Fond
podderzhki sem‘i i demografii vo imya svyatykh Petra i Fevronii) and the Ana-
lytical Center Family Policy.ru. Later Komov launched together with a close col-
laborator from the Analytical Center an inter-regional NGO “For Family Rights”
(Za prava sem’i). Both are also activists in the Russian home-schooling move-
ment. Between 2011 and 2015 Komov’s think tank acted as an advisor to the
parliament’s committee on “Questions of Family, Women and Children” chaired
by Elena Mizulina.8
Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, Malofeev, Antonov and Komov, Elena
Mizulina, and the Yakunins constituted the Russian planning committee for the
2014 WCF World Congress that was supposed to take place in the Kremlin
(Levintova 2014).9 Vladimir Yakunin, close St. Petersburg confidant of Putin,
can be seen as an important political patron of the ultraconservative coalition.
Although he was at the time of the conference planning still the head of the
Russian railway company, he already headed the foundations Istoki and the
foundation St. Andrew the First-Called (Fond svyatogo vsekhval’nogo apostola
Andreya Pervozvannogo), which had existed since 1992. Since 2006, both
foundations have been active in supporting pro-family projects, anti-abortion
campaigns, and promotion of a “new father role” in families.10 Yakunin’s wife
runs the all-Russian program Sanctity of Motherhood, funded by both founda-
tions. Natalia Yakunina co-organized the national demographic congress in 2010
and regularly invites activists to international forums in close cooperation with
the ROC.11 Her political influence, however, she draws mainly from her position
in the governing body of the National Parenting Association for Social Family
Support and the Defense of Family Values (Natsional’naya roditel’skaya assot-
siatsiya sotsial’noy podderzhki sem’i i zashchity semeynykh tsennostey, NPA),
which has existed since 2013 and claims to be the largest Russian parents’
organization.
One of the most outspoken figureheads in the ultraconservative coalition in
Russian politics today is the Senator for the Omsk district Elena Mizulina, who
was in the State Duma for the pro-Kremlin center-left party A Just Russia
(Spravedlivaya Rossiya) from 2007 to 2015. The lawyer was and still is active in
several high-ranking committees for the family, children’s rights, and demo-
graphy. In 2008 she became the head of the State Duma Committee on Family,
Women and Children Issues, replacing the chair of the Association of Women of
Russia Ekaterina Lakhova (who conservatives regarded as one of the Yeltsin
liberal clan, and was attacked for pushing forward the introduction of “family
planning” lessons into Russian schools). Under the direction of Mizulina the
Duma Committee launched several legislative projects that aroused heated
public debate. When she became Senator in September 2015, more moderate
female politicians endorsed her positions. Two years later Mizulina left A Just
Russia. The party announced that it is a “secular party” that has long ceased to
support Mizulina’s initiatives.12 Yet she is still the head of the President’s Coord-
inating Council that Putin created in 2010 to implement the National Action
Program for Children 2012–2017.
The ultraconservative coalition was joined in 2011 by the former political
adviser and TV moderator Sergey Kurginyan and his wife Maria Mamikonyan,
although they are not close to Orthodoxy. Kurginyan advocated for Putin’s third
presidential term on his internet platform Essence of Time (Sut’ vremeni),
founded in 2011. Although Kurginyan’s ideas on state capitalism are close to the
ideas of the new Russian conservatives, he argues for a renewed communism,
which sets him apart from the intellectual movement we are dealing with in
this volume. The couple became influential norm entrepreneurs when they
founded their own parents’ association called All-Russian Parental Resistance
(Roditel’skoe vserossiyskoe soprotivlenie, RVS/PBC), which successfully
mobilized public outrage against the juvenile justice system in 2012 (see
below).13
The ultraconservative agenda

The major goal of the ultraconservatives is to reconstruct a “modernized tradi-
tional family” for ideological, moral, and geopolitical reasons. In recent years
two topics have preoccupied the norm entrepreneurs: (a) the large family as a
social norm and its support by the state; and (b) the legal status of the family and
the individual family member under the state. Both topics and the suggested
solutions are embedded in a diagnostic frame that equates the “demographic
crisis” to a crisis of the nation and of Russia as a superpower.
The fight against depopulation—large families as a new social norm

The ultraconservatives argue from a diagnosis of three types of crisis: the demo-
graphic crisis, the crisis of the family as an institution, and the national crisis. In
order to counter these three crises in Russia, a thus far disadvantaged family
type—the family with three or more children—must become again the social
norm. The demographers point out that over 50 percent of families should have
three or more children, and five as an ideal—an extremely ambitious goal, since
this type presently accounts for only 6 percent of Russian families, while
two-thirds raise just one child. For such a turnaround to succeed, the ultra
conservatives have demanded since the early 2000s extensive social policy
measures—subsidized housing, low-interest mortgage rates, tax relief, pension
amounts dependent on the number of children, and others.
However, all these measures will fail if the values of the younger generation
are not drastically altered. Of what use will even generous state support be, asks
Antonov, if the desire for offspring is already satisfied with one or two children?
That is why conservatives interpret the demographic crisis as the result of a pro-
found “crisis of the institution of the family.” In addition to social spending by
the state and pro-family propaganda in the mass media, the ultraconservatives
call for a major upgrade in the legal status and social prestige of large families,
such that only families of more than two children are viewed as “complete”
(Antonov and Borisov 2006; Antonov 2007, 2016; Smirnov 2014, 106).
Ultraconservatives see in the crisis of the institution of family a long-lasting
consequence of the destruction of the traditional Russian family by the Bolshe-
viks and the Soviet system, as the RISS-demographer Beloborodov (2009) states:
After all, it was the Soviet government that first legalized abortion, per-
verted the procedure for registering a marriage; a woman who had been cut
off from the family hearth was sent to work “in the name of a bright com-
munist future,” and a father’s role was reduced to that of an insect, which
completely deformed the family structure. In the reign of Tsar St. Nicholas
II, Russia’s population increased by 50 million, and in the Yeltsin and sub-
sequent periods decreased by more than 12 million. Are these figures not
convincing?14
Interestingly, the ultraconservatives blame Lenin and Trotsky for their liberali-
zation of abortion and divorce, while they paint an ambivalent picture of the
Stalinist period by suggesting that forced collectivization, industrialization,
and urbanization was the first major blow against the traditional (rural) family,
yet they do not criticize Stalin. Smirnov provides a typical argument in this
regard:
When the Bolsheviks set the task of destroying the peasantry precisely as a
class, they inflicted irreparable damage to the people. […] And this tragedy
of our people, we still cannot remedy even now. In the very short reign of
Emperor Nikolay Aleksandrovich (he was shot when he was 50, he could
have perhaps lived for another 20 years), the population of Russia increased
by six million people. And now there are exactly as many of us as under
Nikolay Aleksandrovich, that is, in 100 years we have not added anything to
the population, although we should be already six hundred million, and then
we could compete with such countries as India and China. And we would
have twice as many people as the United States, so then the conversation
would be quite different. But we do not now have enough labor in this
country because there was such a destructive policy.
In general, according to the plan of Lenin and Trotsky, the Russian
people were to serve as cannon fodder for the world revolution, they were to
become soldiers of the revolution, and for this it was necessary to change
their consciousness. But it was difficult to make the most conservative part
of the population, the peasantry, succumb to these liberal communist ideas;
they treated communism suspiciously and were therefore destroyed. This
was the first blow that was inflicted.
(Smirnov 2017a)
In the perception of the ultraconservatives, the triple crisis of demography,

family, and nation is not just driven by internal causes. The Western-inspired,
liberal reforms of the late 1980s entailed a second blow to the family institution,
bringing crass social inequality, mass consumption, and individualism to Russia,
including the “contraceptive revolution” of 1997 (ibid.). Russian ultraconserva-
tives reject the existence of world overpopulation as “nonsense” (Antonov 2014;
Beloborodov 2017), following the arguments of radical American pro-family
activists in this regard. Moreover, the conservative Russian norm entrepreneurs
and ideologists have argued repeatedly that family planning, as promoted by the
UN and other international organizations, serves to safeguard Western
supremacy over the global South (see Ivanov 2016; Remizov et al. 2014).
The ultraconservative discourse on the crisis of the “family institution”
includes an anti-capitalist notion. Antonov (2007) argues that capitalism is
“always against the family,” and, “[a]lready Adam Smith wrote that under capit-
alism an employee with one child and an employee with ten children will receive
the same salary.” This criticism repeats the widely used conservative argument,
by which the capitalist market economy rests on external sociocultural founda-
tions that it consumes without renewal (see Hirschman 1992), or as Antonov
again puts it:
The modern family is experiencing a serious crisis, and this is simultan-

eously a crisis of the social order itself and of the civilization. In the institu-
tional value aspect, this is the decrease in the mediatory role of the family in
the interaction of society and the individual (i.e. the weakening role of the
family as mediator in conflict between the disparate interests of the indi-
vidual and society, due to the contradictory nature of the market economy,
state and reproduction).
(Antonov 2014)15
Russian conservatives of all colors equate the crisis of the institution “family”—
the “reproduction apparatus of the nation”—with the crisis of the “classical mar-
riage” of man and woman, because only from this unification can arise offspring.
“Traditional family values” means, in essence, to cherish the marriage bond as
lifelong, child-rich, and officially sanctioned (not necessarily by the Church but
at least by the state). While in European comparison the readiness to marry
in Russia is still significantly higher than elsewhere in the post-communist
and Western Europe, the preference of young couples not to register their
relationship (this informal bond is called “civil marriage” in Russia), as well as
the high divorce rate in the country (above the EU average rate), alarms the
ultraconservatives.
With the promotion of the “classical marriage,” the idea of a “natural” labor
division between men and women is back, which goes hand in hand with the
rejection of the concept of gender as a postmodern, “radical-feminist” attack on
traditional values.16 Conservatives reject therefore the use of the term “gender”
in any Russian legislation (see e.g. FamilyPolicy.ru 2012, 4–8). In Komov’s
expert report for Mizulina’s Duma Committee, he neatly separates the “old” idea
of gender equality, which opposes negative discrimination, and the new “gender
equality,” which supports only the sexual preferences of a vocal minority and
ignores the social function of the male and female sex (ibid., 7).17 With the
argument of equality for both sexes, the ultracons also reject the positive dis-
crimination of women through “gender quotas” and other such measures (which
existed in Soviet times for the regional and national Soviets, though allowing
only a symbolic participation of women in political power).
Even if the suggested tie between the biological sex and social roles is limited
to a few basic tasks, the concept of the traditional (child-rich) family implies for
the ROC a longer or even permanent withdrawal of women from labor markets
in “service to the nation.” For example Kyrill I, through his chair of the Family
Commission, Archpriest Smirnov, has stated:
A woman should not be humiliated in society, but, at the same time, she
should not strive to imitate male aggression, to achieve success on the
professional front, to the detriment of her basic vocation—to be a wife and
mother.18
[…]
A woman is not meant for this. A woman is given the gift of giving birth
to children, the most important gift given to mankind on earth. And this is a
very responsible a very high ministry on earth. The Lord through the
Apostle Paul said that a woman is saved by childbirth, so sending a woman
to some distant wild countries would not be Christian. But such a question,
strange to me, is one posed by the Soviets, for whom a woman cosmonaut,
or woman hammer thrower, or a woman surgeon is a common phenomenon.
However, in fact it is a mockery of the female nature, a violation of it.
[…]
Responding to the remark that “women themselves want this” […] Father
Dmitry said: we must understand that […] women abandoned their fertility
quite recently. In our country, it’s only 100 years old. And there is very little
time left, until the entire Christian civilization will simply perish. There are
a few dozen years left, at most thirty, well, maybe in Russia it will last fifty,
no more.”
(Smirnov 2017a)
While Mizulina sees no problem in combining family and work if the husband
and the state are supportive,19 the demographers Antonov and Beloborodov share
the doubts of the ROC about its practicability for a child-rich family. They favor
the classic male breadwinner model or at least a modernized version of it, in
which the woman contributes to household income on a part-time basis. It is no
coincidence that the creation of a “family wage” as a norm is one of their key
reform proposals. The idea already emerged during Gorbachev’s perestroika but
was never realized. Antonov and others see in the breadwinner model even a
way to end the “crisis” of Russian men, whose life expectancy drastically fell
during the 1990s and has only slowly begun to recover:
First of all, raise the status of the housewife-mother. Confirm in the public
consciousness the image of a real Russian family in which only the income
of the father in the employment sector […] makes it possible to maintain
three or four children. Once a man feels that he is firmly on his feet, the
issue of alcohol abuse will disappear by itself. Stories about “Russian drunk-
enness,” in my opinion, are greatly exaggerated; these “reflections” have
turned into a kind of myth. I have been in many countries and am convinced
that our people do not drink any more than others.
(Antonov 2007)
On the other hand, Antonov does not at all ignore the employment orientation of
Russian women when he proposes to pay women for their reproductive
work—an old demand of Western feminism. However, he is quite alone with
this idea:
Three children is a mini-kindergarten […] and four or five, even more so.
With so many children, their mother does not “sit at home,” but works
intensively, educating the younger generation, forming souls. I propose to
recognize motherhood as a profession, and to pay mothers an average salary
of 30–40 thousand rubles.
(Antonov 2007)
The role of men in the family is, however, more ambitious than the quotations
suggest. Ultraconservatives regard the lack of responsibility of fathers for their
families as a problematic legacy of communism that focused on the working
mother. The upgrade of the father’s role in the family is not limited to the classic
breadwinner model in which the father operates mostly outside of home. The
new attention to families has triggered a debate on the place of fathers in the
education of children, especially of boys, as well. In January 2018 the first “All-
Russian Soviet of Fathers” took place, to provide mentoring and assistance in
the complex issues related to the well-being of families and children. Not acci-
dentally, the meeting was opened by the presidential Ombudsman for the Rights
of Children, Anna Kusnetsova.
The legal autonomy of the family and children’s rights

The ultraconservative idea of a modernized traditional family not only refers to
values and state assistance, but includes a new movement for family rights. The
key mobilizing dispute with the ultraconservatives arose around the juvenile
justice system (yuvenal‘naya yustitsiya), when President Medvedev launched
several legislative projects in order to adapt Russian family law to international
standards. With these projects the government agreed to implement some
basic norms of the UN Convention on the Rights of Children and the European
Social Charter beyond mere declarations (Höjdestrand 2016; Kravchuk
2009; Stoeckl 2016). Yet, the reforms also meant improving Russian child-
welfare policy, which had become a major concern since Putin’s pronatalist turn
in 2006 (Kulmala 2017). The ongoing reforms from 2010 provided the norm
entrepreneurs with the opportunity to form an “Anti-YuYu” movement that they
later attempted to export to Europe, for example to Germany. Three Russian
reform projects became major battlefields: a specialized court system for young
criminals; the criminalization and decriminalization of domestic violence
reforms; and the reform of the Russian system of social assistance and child pro-
tection (ongoing since 2013).
The arguments of the Anti-YuYu activists are in all three cases almost
identical. They reject not only the “Western” origin of the projects, but above all
oppose the violation of the “autonomy of the family” and parental rights. The
Russian conservative sociologist Leonid Ionin distilled the key arguments,
writing in Update Conservatism (2010). To paraphrase Ionin, the “children’s
rights” approach represents for Russia an entirely new definition of “the social
and legal status of the child” following a “radically individualistic approach.”
The doctrine knows only two agents: the child and the state, and assumes that
(again) the state knows better than the family what is best for the child (Ionin
2010, 205). The “artificial tension between the rights of children and of the
parents,” the undermining of the rights and authority of the parents, and the
already weak public image of the family institution are standard criticisms in
almost all conservative statements. There is even a call for a new family code
that re-establishes “the family” as a legal entity of its own (Smirnov 2016).
In one of the many statements of the Patriarch’s Family Commission,
Smirnov outlines the Church’s concerns as follows:
The modern approach of a number of countries to juvenile justice (which

includes law enforcement practice as well as the legal and social culture that
is being formed) is characterized by an artificial opposition of the parents’
rights to the rights of the child, giving the latter an unconditional priority,
which contradicts the biblical foundations of family relations, because the
rights of children cannot be broadened by narrowing their parents’ rights,
artificially contraposing the rights of some to the rights of others. Along with
the rights of children, their duties, including those in relation to parents and
family, must be recognized. There can be no rights of children to spiritually
and morally unjustified disobedience to their parents, to immoral actions and
sexual promiscuity, to disrespect toward elders and peers, or bad behavior.
(ROK 2013)
The question of the introduction and dissemination of a juvenile justice system

affects many countries located on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox
Church. In a number of these countries, the implementation of the juvenile
justice system is contrary to the basics of national law that equally guarantees
the protection of the family, motherhood, and childhood. Legal guarantees of the
rights of the child are based in these countries on the principle of supporting the
family in the upbringing of children and the protection of their rights. The family
laws of these states also result from the need to strengthen the family, and the
inadmissibility of arbitrary interference by anyone in its affairs. Moreover, even
if the juvenile justice system does not contradict national legal standards, it is
necessary to correlate its implementation with the traditional understanding of
family values, the positions of religious communities, and the opinions of the
population (ROC 2013).
The fight initiated by the ultraconservative coalition against the new foster-
care system in particular caught the Russian government off guard. In the 2008
document “The concept of long-term socio-economic development of the
Russian Federation for the period until 2020,” the Russian Federation announced
its intention to reduce the high number of institutionalized orphans, especially
“social orphans” who were being deprived of parental care (Kulmala 2017).
Many regional projects followed that would replace the Soviet system of state
custody by a system of paid foster families and professional social assistance
(Höjdestrand 2016). Moreover, the ban on adoption to the US (in 2012) and to
countries with legalized same-sex marriage laws met the patriotic mood of the
ultraconservatives. In Russia, gay couples are also explicitly excluded from the
simplified adoption rules and the foster-care regime. And yet, it was over
the same foster-care reforms that the conflict between the ultraconservatives and
the state administration escalated. Repeatedly, the ROC and its allies have criti-
cized on the one hand the vagueness of the criteria on which authorities can
remove children from their families of origin, which (they claim) opens the door
to corruption and child abuse.20 On the other hand, they demand that the money
the state spends on the professional foster-family system should go straight to
the children’s poor families of origin and their close relatives. In May 2017
Maria Mamikonyan in an open letter accused Anna Kuznetsova, the new
presidential Ombudsman for Children’s Rights, of not understanding the
issues—although Kuznetsova herself belongs to the ultraconservative camp:
Obviously, you absolutely do not understand the western model of “juvenile

justice,” what role interests play in its organization in private hands, you do
not understand the involvement of power structures. You are developing a
system of foster families, creating a demand for intervention in the families
of origin, and taking away their children—in favor of a financially motiv-
ated “paid parenting,” where the child receives dozens of times more money
than ordinary low-income families. That is, you are helping those whose
strange privilege—to educate children and not work anywhere else—is built
on other people’s misfortunes and is already becoming a cancerous tumor of
the budget of Russia and the regions. Nothing stops you on this path, not
even when the latest cases show that other people’s children have become a
business for many, and that the pathology of the “market” attitude toward
children is leading to severe mental pathologies and often to the death of
such children.21
It is difficult to assess how widespread the described abuse of the new child-
protection regulations is. Given the proliferation of corruption and arbitrariness
of the bureaucratic apparatus, concerns about the widening opportunities for
interference and exploitation in family affairs might have some truth. The
endemic distrust toward the state, but also misinterpretations and open falsifica-
tions in the media, may have contributed to the remarkable mobilization
achieved by the norm entrepreneurs (Höjdestrand 2016, 17–18). The core argu-
ment of the ultraconservatives, however, is not restricted to Russian particulari-
ties but can also be found in the West. They reject the extension of human rights
and a concept of child welfare that has developed over the last two or three
decades in the transnational community as state of the art. In doing so, the
Russian ultraconservatives refer to the Russian Constitution—otherwise not very
popular among them—and to the original UN Convention on Human Rights
from 1948, because both documents emphasize the autonomy of the family and
parents’ sovereignty over the education of children. As the Association of Paren-
tal Committees and Societies puts it: in solving its natural tasks, and in par-
ticular, issues of birth, upbringing, education, and protection of children’s health,
the family has priority over all other institutions, including the state.22
Translation into politics: successes and limits

The pronatalist turn in 2006 can be seen as a first important victory for the
conservative agenda against the “demographic crisis.” Already in his presiden-
tial address to the Federal Assembly in 2006, Vladimir Putin laid out the low
birth rate and the dominant one-child family type as a serious national challenge
to be overcome by raising the prestige of mother- and fatherhood (Putin 2006).
At the same time, he sees combatting the high mortality rate in Russia and sup-
porting migration as important countermeasures. In 2010 President Medvedev
pointed to expert opinions on the need for a “radical increase in the number of
families with three and more children” as the “main way to overcome the demo-
graphic crisis” (Medvedev 2010). In a similar vein, Putin emphasized in his
address of 2012 that in Russia the family with three children should become the
norm (2012). Despite these statements, conservative norm entrepreneurs have
not stopped criticizing the administration, as we have illustrated in the previous
section. Hence, we need to discuss in the final part of our chapter their actual
impact on family-related laws and state measures. For this we concentrate on
three major issues: (a) financial support to larger families; (b) reproduction rights
and gender equality; and (c) the need to maintain the autonomy of the family.
We chose these—aware that we can provide only a rough sketch—because the
government and the ultraconservative coalition devotes to them substantial atten-
tion, and evidence indicates that the growing ultraconservative influence on Rus-
sia’s family policy is not just rhetoric.
Conservative contributions to Russia’s turn toward the family

In the above-mentioned programmatic presidential address to the Federal
Assembly, Putin spelled out a range of measures to increase the birth rate.
Among them were a housing program for young families and a “maternity
(family) capital” benefit.23 With its implementation in January 2007, the two- or
more-child family became the state-supported ideal image of the family: the law
(which does not cover families with one child) assures women giving birth (or
adopting) a second or further child, a one-time benefit of currently 453,026
rubles (about 8,000 US dollars). Since 2007 the benefit amount of this maternity
(or family) capital has been slightly above the annual gross value added per
capita. In many Russian regions the payment even exceeds the annual regional
economic output per capita. In 2012 most of the Russian federal subjects intro-
duced a regional maternity (family) capital, which complements the federal
program.
In spite of the significant investment, ultraconservatives have often criticized
the measures as insufficient and half-hearted for two main reasons: first, because
these do not promise a long-term support for young couples and therefore will
hardly give them an incentive to start a large family with more than two chil-
dren. Until today Russia has provided no universal, monthly paid child allow-
ance such as for example Poland does, where since 2016 parents can get a
monthly child allowance for the second and further child up to age 18 regardless
of their income.24 Second, for ultracons the “maternity capital” resembles a
Soviet-style state paternalism over women and that furthermore mostly ignores
the fathers. The addition of the name “family” capital is merely symbolic.25
Beneficiaries are the mothers only, who have the right to decide how to use the
capital within a predetermined set of possibilities ranging from housing and
education to savings for the mother’s pension. One constant ultraconservative
demand has been, therefore, to transform the “mothers’ capital” into a true
“family capital”—but this has yet to happen.
However, since 2006 the range of possible fields in which the “material
(family) capital” can be invested has been extended, and in spite of the economic
crisis after 2013, the government has prolonged the program until 2021. Origin-
ally it was set to run for 10 years (2006–16). Besides the extensive but one-time
assistance of maternity capital, in Putin’s third term of presidency (2012–18)
additional means-tested monthly benefits for families with children were intro-
duced. In May 2012, the re-elected president issued a decree urging the heads of
the federal subjects to pay a monthly child benefit equal to the regional minimum
subsistence level for every third or further child up to age three, if the family is
in need. According to Labor and Social Affairs Minister Maksim Topilin, 60 of
the 85 Russian federal subjects had followed this request by the end of 2017. In
preparation for the presidential election in March 2018, the Russian government
has further expanded its support of poor families with children. From 2018
mothers in vulnerable families can get children’s allowances at the regional sub-
sistence level for the first and second child up to the age of 18 months. However,
while this children’s allowance for the first child is actually a new benefit, the
allowance for the second child is not an additional social benefit, since it is paid
out as part of the maternity capital.
Although the government had already provided some support to improve
housing for families since 2006, conservative criticism of these measures
prompted it in late 2017 to take a more decisive step. With the 2018 presidential
election in mind, the government passed a decree relieving two- and three-child
families of the high mortgage rates in Russia. That is, the state will take over
interest payments of more than 6 percent for up to three years together with the
second child, and for up to five years with the third child.26 Without changing the
high interest rates of banks in general (which face constant criticism from
the conservative ideologists and other groups), the government has decided to
subsidize selected types of bank customers also in order to stimulate building
investment.
Reproduction rights and gender equality

As the first country in the world, the Soviet Union legalized abortion in 1920 as
a cornerstone of women’s reproduction rights (though from 1936 to 1955 it
again penalized abortion). Because of the lack of contraceptives and liberal regu-
lations, the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia had one of the highest abortion
rates worldwide. Since 1993 the abortion rate has been continuously declining—
from 235 abortions per 100 births in 1993 down to 44.6 in 2016. Yet this number
is still high in international or European comparison and fuels the conservative
discourse about the demographic crisis.
Although the conservatives have thus far failed with their agenda on fully
delegitimizing abortion, the passed legislation has gradually set up new hurdles:
1 In 2011 the law “On the Foundations of the Health Protection of Citizens of
the RF ” introduced the so-called “Week of Silence.” Accordingly, there
must be at least seven days (from the 8th to 10th week of pregnancy) or 48
hours (in the 4th to 7th and 11th and 12th week of pregnancy) between the
first consultation with a doctor for the purpose of an abortion and the actual
surgery. Doctors received the right to refuse to perform an abortion.27 The
main demand of the conservatives—to exclude abortion costs from the
statutory health insurance coverage, or a ban on the sale of emergency
(“morning-after”) contraceptive pills without a doctor’s prescription—
became mired in the legislative process. The same fate has met the idea for
a law that a husband must agree to the wife’s abortion.28
2 Since 2012 the law requires women to consult a psychologist or social
worker before abortion. Furthermore, recently some—heretofore permitted
—social reasons for late termination of pregnancy (loss of child custody,
imprisonment, death or disability of the husband) have been abolished. Only
in case of pregnancy resulting from rape can abortions be procured up to the
22nd week of pregnancy.
3 In order to “protect pregnancy” and enhance “moral pressure” on pregnant
women, women have been required since 2016 to look at the ultrasound
image of the embryo and listen to its heartbeat before they can get permis-
sion to undergo abortion.
4 From late 2017 only specially licensed clinics may perform abortions.29
Closely linked to the debate on abortion is the question of “baby-hatches.” Ultra-
conservatives proposed a ban on these facilities where mothers can bring new-
borns and abandon them anonymously in a safe place to be cared for. Such a bill,
put forward by Senator Mizulina, did not get through parliament in 2017. There
is still no legal regulation on the baby-hatches, which have existed since 2011 in
some regions of Russia. The State Duma is currently debating whether to allow
the regions to regulate this, which could lead to baby-hatches being allowed in
some regions, while banned in others.
In the field of gender equality, a similarly indecisive picture emerges. While
ultracon demographers and the ROC conclude that the child-rich family as
dominant family type can best be restored when women return to their “natural
role” at home, the Russian government shows little intent to strengthen the
housewife status. It even has no problem in combining the propaganda for “tra-
ditional values” with extensive investments in public childcare. Since 2012 the
care of preschool children in kindergartens has been massively expanded.
According to vice minister-president Olga Golodets, from 2012 to 2014 the
Russian government spent 135 billion rubles (approximately US$2.4 billion) to
create 1.36 million additional kindergarten places.30 By 2021 the Russian gov-
ernment also intends to have created the presently lacking 272,000 nursery
places.31
The official strategy papers, however, lack a clear direction in gender-equality
policy. A draft law on gender equality has been stuck in the legislative process
since 2003. In 2017 the Russian government at least demonstrated concern for
how to better combine women’s career ambitions with family life. The National
Strategy of Actions in the Interests of Women addresses such problems of com-
patibility of family and career—if a bit vaguely.32 Despite the cautious formula-
tions and a lack of legal power for the National Strategy, the ultraconservative
parental association ARKS was outraged about the term “gender equality” alleg-
edly used in the paper. It considered it a first step toward the Western “ideolo-
gies” of homosexuality and transgender, failing to outline how to defend the
interests of pregnant women and mothers of small children.33 The term “gender,”
however, does not even appear in the strategy, only the notion of “equality
between men and women.” Parallel to the work on this Strategy, a “Concept
Paper of the State Family Policy in the Russian Federation until 2025” (initiated
by Mizulina) has been passed that emphasizes “traditional family values and the
traditional family way of life” as well as the “preservation of spiritual and moral
traditions in family relationships and family education” (Mizulina 2014).
Foster care and domestic violence: battlefields of family autonomy

As outlined above, the government and its experts scarcely foresaw the confron-
tation with the ultraconservative coalition. The latter stepped in as systemic
change was already well under way. While in the Soviet Union and through the
1990s orphans were primarily kept in institutions, by the mid-2000s the state had
started to promote family-based care in the form of both unpaid guardianship
and paid foster families. With this de-institutionalization of the foster care
system, Russia undertook a paradigm shift following an international trend
(Kulmala 2017; Biryukova et al. 2013).
The ultraconservatives reject this shift from state institutions to private fam-
ilies, in spite of the fact that it is supposed to ease the state’s interference in fam-
ilies, delegating state functions toward non-state actors. At first glance the data
indicate that the coalition mobilization efforts against removal of children from
parental custody seem to show some effect. The number of children whose
parental rights were terminated or limited has decreased by a third since 2007
(Biryukova and Sinyavskaya 2017, 373). This may be seen as a success of pre-
ventive social work within families, but also as a growing reluctance of the state
to meddle in parental rights as demanded by the ultracons.
Yet, from the legal perspective, the ultraconservative norm entrepreneurs
have not managed to restrict the range of criteria in the family codex justifying
state intervention in the autonomy of the family. They were also unable to cut
back the paid foster care. On the contrary, the number of children placed in
foster families has grown more than tenfold from the mid-2000s up to today
(while in 2005 only 2 percent of all children without parental care were placed in
foster families, in 2015 it was 24.4 percent). And the share of children returned
to their biological families has been steadily declining since 2011 (ibid., 378).
There are also few signs that the government administration plans to cut back
on the professional care system of state and non-commercial actors that super-
vises and accompanies the foster parents. Instead, in order to reduce social
spending and still increase the quality of social services, the Russian government
has announced a steady growth in third-sector non-private organizations and
private enterprises. In his presidential address of 2015 Putin asked the regions
and municipalities to gradually appropriate up to 10 percent of their social ser-
vices budgets to, among others, such non-profit organizations (Putin 2015).
In another field, the ultraconservatives were much more successful in their
struggle against the alleged crisis of the family. In February 2017 Putin signed a
law that decriminalizes some forms of domestic violence—which the coalition
had vehemently campaigned for—because the criminalization of domestic
violence is perceived as an inadmissible interference in family matters. Just
seven months earlier, this criminalization of domestic violence had found its way
into the Criminal Code on the initiative of NGOs and feminist activists. For the
first time in Russian history, battery—a lesser crime than assault—perpetrated
by family members became a more serious offence than it would be if committed
by strangers (Johnson 2017). This interim success of women’s rights activists
led to an outcry from the ultracons, who finally won the battle. The All-Russian
Parents Resistance in particular collected more than 213,000 signatures protest-
ing the “anti-family provision” of the 2016 reform.
Conclusion
Putin’s conservative turn from 2011–13 and the subsequent systematic suppres-
sion of liberal forces has unleashed an ultraconservative and in some regards
fundamentalist movement in Russia. Though this movement, including the ROC,
parents associations, and other civic organizations, has solid roots in the regions,
it can hardly be described as grassroots, since it essentially is rather a mobiliza-
tion from above (see Höjdestrand 2016). The mobilizing coalition of ultracon
norm entrepreneurs has close ties to the ruling elite and is involved in internal
elite battles. Its members show, in principle, loyalty to Putin and also play an
active part in promoting Russia’s “conservative soft power” abroad.
However, the ultracon movement is not directed by the Kremlin administra-
tion. The ROC and its associated experts, activists, and politicians already
formed their coalition before Putin’s third presidential term. They interpret and
translate the “traditional values” in their own, more radical way, which fuels
internal elite conflicts not only with the “system-liberals” but also with the social
and political technocrats whose ideas for solving the demographic crisis do not
always mix well with the ultracons’ agenda-setting. The ROC as a player in its
own right (see also Köllner in this volume) also cannot be underestimated here.
The ultraconservative translation of “traditional values” into politics is driven
by an authoritarian anti-liberalism and anti-communism (to an extent not shared
by other elite factions). Its anti-liberalism fits into the Russian discourses of the
new illiberal conservatism of the ideologists, favoring collective (family and
nation) rights over individual rights. Moreover, the norm entrepreneurs gave this
concept a more powerful voice in the wider public. The same holds true for
“anti-genderism.” To some extent, the ultracons are more coherent in their
agenda than the Russian government, as they detect liberal and neoliberal ele-
ments in Russia’s social policy even when those elements are no longer framed
as such. They deeply distrust the state’s overwhelming and corrupt bureaucracy
as well as its ongoing attempts to outsource state functions to a loyal third sector
and commercial actors. Many of the ultraconservative sociopolitical suggestions
tend to promote an increase in state paternalism. Yet, in their emphasis on the
autonomy of the family—sanctified as canonical territory of the Church—they
reject a Soviet-type liberation of women as working mothers, and the paternal-
ism of the Communist Party that allowed the party-state to intervene in families
and family-based education in order to create a “new man.” In this regard, they
resemble the Christian fundamentalist and right-wing pro-family movements in
the US to which their relations are well established in spite of the general anti-
Western, anti-American tone of the ultraconservative movement in Russia.
Despite the ultracons’ successes in dominating the Russian public (media)
discourse and in promoting their agenda in several legislative processes, they
can hardly be taken as the main agenda-setters in Russia’s social policy as a
whole. The reasons for this are threefold at least: first, because they are just one
player (though loud and powerful) among others. Second, their agenda as such is
restricted to a few well-worn topics around which they argue and mobilize.
Third, the academics engaged in and advisors to the coalition have not managed
to develop sufficient expertise for detail beyond the core topics of their camp.
Hence, the government administration still seems in many fields of social policy
to trust more its own pragmatic and technocratic advisors.
Notes
1 Medvedev’s wife, Svetlana Medvedeva, opened the conference, see: http://en.kremlin.
ru/misc/9621/photos, accessed 5 September 2017.
2 See more http://worldcongress.ru/демографическийсаммит/, accessed 4 September
2017.
3 The WCF also met in Western Europe and Latin America. The post-communist region
is well represented among its organizers of the annual international conferences. The
first took place in 1997 in Prague. The Czech capital was followed by conferences in
Warsaw (with an address by Polish President Lech Kaczyński), Tbilisi and Budapest,
where Viktor Orbán gave the opening speech.
4 Smirnov became also the deputy chairman of the Patriarch’s Bioethics Commission.
5 The head of the ARKS is Olga Letkova, who among her other functions is also dir-
ector of the ARKS Center for Legal Expertise and chairman of the ARKS Council for
the Protection of the Family and Traditional Family Values that acts as an advisory
working group to the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian
Federation. See: www.arks.org.ru, accessed 16 March 2018.
6 Irina Shishova is vice-president of the foundation Socio-Psychological Support of
Family and Children.
7 www.worldcongressoffamilies.org/directors.php. Komov is also honorary president of
the Lombardy-Russian Cultural Association and has close links to the Lega (Nord) in
Italy (Shekhovtsov 2018, 175–89).
8 Komov also founded a consulting company which offers a variety of services from
business development to market research. Larry Jacobs, once vice president of the
WCF, is a partner, though he says he draws no salary, describing the title as a flourish
to signal financial expertise when he and Komov consult with “family values” start-
ups outside of Russia (Levintova 2014).
9 Antonov, Komov and N. Yakunina had already organized the national summits in
2011 and 2012.
10 See http://istoki-foundation.org/en/program/all-russian-programme-sanctity-of-mother
hood/, accessed 16 March 2018.
11 See https://mospat.ru/en/2015/11/27/news125573/; www.motherjones.com/politics/
2014/02/world-congress-families-us-evangelical-russia-family-tree/, accessed 16 March
2018.
12 See www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5885a32b9a7947751b653476, accessed 16 March 2018.
13 See http://rvs.su/rvs, accessed 27 February 2018.
14 See also Beloborodov (2017).
15 Very similarly argues, for example, the parent association ARKS. See http://arks.org.ru/
index.php/deyatelnost-arks/nashi-proekty/108-proekt-vozrozhdenie-semi-v-rossii-na-
osnove-traditsionnykh-dukhovno-nravstvennykh-tsennostej, accessed 16 March 2018.
16 See, for example, http://arks.org.ru/index.php/zashchita-traditsionnykh-semejnykh-
tsennostej/natsionalnaya-strategiya-dejstvij-v-interesakh-zhenshchin-na-2017–2022-
gg/698-gendernye-teorii-kak-orudie-unichtozheniya-traditsionnykh-tsennostej, accessed
16 March 2018.
17 See http://familypolicy.ru/rep/rf-12–029, accessed 16 March 2018.
18 See http://demographia.ru/articles_N/index.html?idArt=1565, accessed 16 March
2018.
19 See interview with Mizulina https://iz.ru/news/556354, accessed 16 March 2018.
20 See, for example ROC (2013), http://arks.org.ru/index.php/yuvenalnaya-sistema-v-
rossii/iz-yatie-detej-iz-semi/802-nuzhdayushchimsya-semyam-nuzhno-pomogat-a-ne-
otbirat-u-nikh-detej. In expert opinions by “FamilyPolicy.ru” for the Duma Committee
on Children’s Rights, the experts argue that in foster families violence is employed
toward the foster children much more often than in families of origin. The “analytic
text” pleads then for the rejection of an introduction of broadened rights for the state
to intervene in the family (FamilyPolicy.ru 2011).
21 See http://rvs.su/statia/vremya-trebuet-otchyotlivosti, accessed 16 March 2018.
22 See http://arks.org.ru/index.php/deyatelnost-arks/nashi-proekty/108-proekt-vozrozhdenie-
semi-v-rossii-na-osnove-traditsionnykh-dukhovno-nravstvennykh-tsennostej, accessed
16 March 2018. (See also Smirnov 2017b).
23 Federal Law No. 256-FZ of 29 December 2006 “On Additional Measures of State
Support for Families with Children.”
24 However, the Russian government provides a subsidy of 40 percent of the monthly
salary of the childcarer, for children up to 1.5 years, if the carer was previously for-
mally employed. Furthermore, there are targeted monthly social benefits for families
with children (level and need criteria are determined regionally), as well as social
benefits related to childbirth.
25 Fathers are only entitled to maternity (family) capital benefits if they are the sole
adoptive parent, or if the mother dies or loses custody of her child.
26 Order of the Government of Russia No. 1711 of 30 December 2017.
27 Federal Law No. 323-FZ of 21 November 2011 “On Fundamentals of Protection of
Public Health in the Russian Federation.” Art. 56.2, and Art. 70.3.
28 See www.gazeta.ru/social/2011/06/01/3636057.shtml?updated, accessed 27 February
2018.
29 Order of the Ministry of Health No. 572n of 1 November 2012, paragraph 104, www.
rosminzdrav.ru/documents/5828-prikazminzdrava-rossii-ot-12-noyabrya-2012g-572n,
accessed 27 February 2018.
30 Transcript of the parliamentary session on 8 February 2017, http://transcript.duma.
gov.ru/node/4593/, accessed 27 February 2018.
31 See http://tass.ru/obschestvo/4892489, accessed 27 February 2018.
32 Resolution of the Government of Russia No. 410-r of 8 March 2017.
33 See http://arks.org.ru/index.php/zashchita-traditsionnykh-semejnykh-tsennostej/natsional
naya-strategiya-dejstvij-v-interesakh-zhenshchin-na-2017–2022-gg/705-za-chto-
borolis-premer-podpisal-natsionalnuyu-strategiyu-dejstvij-v-interesakh-zhenshchin,
accessed 27 February 2018.
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2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577.
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http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118.
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“Konservatizm kak faktor ‘myagkoy sily’ Rossii.” Institut natsionalnoy strategii,
accessed 20 November 2017. www.instrategy.ru/pdf/245.pdf.
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problemam yuvenal’noy yustitsii.” accessed 19 March 2018. www.patriarchia.ru/db/
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journal/34482/.
Religion, State and Society 44 (2):132−51.
12 Religious conservatism in
post-Soviet Russia and its
relation to politics
Empirical findings from ethnographic
fieldwork
Tobias Köllner1
Introduction
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2013 and 2016,2 my
research project analyzes the relationship between Orthodox religion and pol-
itics in contemporary Russia by looking at conservative ideas and practices.
Although Russian conservatism in its post-Soviet appearance is in itself hetero-
geneous, as Katharina Bluhm (2016, 1) rightly emphasizes, some topics, never-
theless, dominate the discussion: anti-liberalism and anti-Americanism as well
as a particularly strong emphasis on finding “the Russian way.” Thus con-
temporary Russian conservatism could be described as a historically embedded
counter-movement to other ideologies (Mannheim et al. 1984), and as a situ-
ational ideology (Freeden 1996) meant to provide the intellectual basis for
concrete action. In particular, this chapter examines Russian conservatism in
its close connections with religious actors and institutions. We must see these
efforts, I suggest, as attempts to introduce new “spiritual-moral values”
(dukhovno-nravstvennye tsennosti) into Russian society and to produce and
sustain the legitimacy of the state in order to govern the population (Rogers
2009, 8). These attempts, however, are intimately linked to Russian Orthodox
religion because “what is happening in post-Soviet Russia is thus part of a
more general shift of transformational hopes toward religious institutions”
(Luehrmann 2011, 16).
My description, however, differs from widespread notions that describe a
very dominant state in its relation to religious denominations on the national
level.3 Instead, my observations during long-term fieldwork show that this is not
equally true on the local level, where conflicts occur far more often and can have
different results. Here the dominance of the state administration is not as clear-
cut as it seems at first glance. For this reason I analyze the role of Russian Ortho-
doxy in its own right (see also Stoeckl 2016, 132 for the role of the ROC in the
international sphere). In so doing, I introduce the concept of “entangled authori-
ties” that offers a new perspective. Herewith I follow earlier attempts emphasiz-
ing the multitude of factions, discourses, and practices within Russian Orthodoxy
(Papkova 2011; Richters 2013; Stoeckl 2014; Verkhovsky 2003).
246 Tobias Köllner
The entanglements between Russian Orthodoxy and politics have been
described before, though their description has remained rather anecdotal. There-
fore I try here to examine these phenomena in more detail and to structure them
accordingly. A first finding draws attention to the fact that at least three ways of
entanglement have to be delineated: personal, ideological, and institutional. This
allows for a more precise description of the entanglements, and conclusions that
have relevance in a broader perspective. In addition, a second finding draws
attention to the misunderstandings, unintended consequences, and open conflicts
in the relation between Russian Orthodoxy and politics. This shows clearly that
despite their close cooperation, the interrelation between the two spheres is much
more complicated than seems at first glance.
Thus I cannot provide a simplified picture of Russian conservatism as a state
ideology, exclusively introduced from above. Instead I argue that the repertoire
of ingredients in Russian conservatism may vary, and includes a combination of
local cultural elements with more idealized and general connotations and ideas.
But for this it is necessary to analyze the interrelation between the federal
“center” and the local “periphery.” For a first analysis on this topic I draw on
Luehrmann (2011, 10), who analyzed political agitation in the Soviet Union and
its repercussions for the educational sector in post-Soviet Russia. In her percep-
tion, the impression of an all-encompassing Soviet state being able to provide
the resources and means for country-wide indoctrination is misleading. Instead,
the central authorities in the Politburo gave the initiative and incentives but, to a
large extent, drew on local cadres to implement the ideas.
Adapting these ideas to post-Soviet Russia allows for a similar reading of the
interrelation between central authorities and local elites, I suggest.4 Ideological
initiatives often originate in the “center” and proliferate into the “periphery”;
here the central authorities and President Putin, in particular, are very keen to set
the agenda and develop new ideas. But, in the process, these ideas change
significantly, are adapted to local situations and interpretations, and take on new,
unintended and sometimes even contradictory meanings. In addition, the efforts
to provide a new state ideology based on conservative thinking, paraphrased as
“drawing on genuine traditional moral values” (traditsionnye nravstvennye tsen-
nosti), receive only minimal central resources. Because of this, efforts at the
local level are centrally mandated but rarely completely prepared and spelled
out, and rely on local initiative and improvisation. This leads to considerable
variation across the Russian Federation when ideas originating at the federal
level are adapted to suit the local situation and interpretation. Here it becomes
clear that Russian conservatism is a complex and idiosyncratic phenomenon
based on entanglements between the local and the national level on the one hand,
and religion and politics on the other.
Accordingly, current state policies and many initiatives undertaken by conser-
vatives I interpret as attempts to actively regulate public discourses and attitudes
by propagating moralizing positions. To cite Pierre Bourdieu, we know that
“every established order tends to produce […] the naturalization of its own arbi-
trariness” (1977, 164). In Russia, however, this is of divisive contemporary
Religious conservatism in post-Soviet Russia 247
interest because its future is anything but “settled” and the official ideologies are
anything but uniformly distributed within the population. This point in a
different context has been expressed by Herzfeld, who cautions: “Even people
who talk as though they fully endorsed and agreed upon the ideals of national
unity do not necessarily mean the same things by it” (1987, 152). I emphasize
the role of Orthodox clergymen and lay activists in this moralizing discourse,
who often take very conservative positions but do not necessarily share the same
perceptions when talking about similar phenomena. To sum up, I argue that the
joint efforts of these religious and politically conservative circles are meant, first,
to counter more progressive strands in Russian society such as liberalism and
consumerism and, second, to rebuild regional identities and a meaningful world,
something Douglas Rogers calls the “post-Soviet cultural front” (2015, xiii).
Traditional moral values

For years, developments in the Russian Federation have borne witness to the
growing importance of the concept of “traditional moral values.” This is a case
in point for the ideological convergences and entanglements between Russian
Orthodoxy and politics which I have introduced above. Despite differences in
many details, the idea is broad enough to include many different issues that both
spheres are interested in. Following Kristina Stoeckl (2016), who draws on
earlier debates in international relations, this could be described as “norm entre-
preneurship” or “norm protagonism”:
Norm entrepreneurs “create” norms by calling attention to issues that hith-

erto have not been “named, interpreted and dramatized” (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 910) as norms. They construct cognitive frames, often in
opposition to rival frames, effectively causing a shift in public perceptions
of appropriateness.
(Stoeckl 2016, 133, emphasis in original)
This allows an interpretation of how norms are created by Orthodox clergy and
laymen in cooperation with the state administration in order to challenge vigor-
ously other notions of moral appropriateness.
Another important issue for traditional moral values in Russia are attempts to
enunciate the differences between “the West” and the Russian Federation. Quite
often these discourses essentialize the differences and propose that they are of a
qualitative kind. On a more practical level, traditional moral values can also be a
useful tool in the hands of the state or the church. These moral issues are polit-
ical insofar as “various parties seek to impose their understandings of proper
persons and relationships on one another” (Rogers 2009, 13f.). The Russian
Orthodox Church (ROC) and Orthodox activists are particularly active in this
respect since the amendment to the 1997 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Associations” that includes the concept of “traditional faith” and antic-
ipates many of the issues that have proven important later on (for more details
248 Tobias Köllner
on this law see Richters 2013, 38; Knox and Mitrofanova 2014, 58; Gerlach
2015, 105). The most obvious case in point of the use of politics as an instru-
ment in the moral sphere, however, is the anti-gay movement prominently sup-
ported by Orthodox activists and some clergymen (see Attwood 1996; Gal and
Kligman 2012 on gender and homosexuality in post-Soviet countries).
Yet another recent example is the protest surrounding the showing of the film
Matil’da by Aleksey Uchitel’ since late 2016 in Moscow, St. Petersburg,
Vladimir and other places (Shustrova 2017; Golovinov 2017). The film depicts
the pre-marital affair of Tsar Nicholas II with the Polish ballet dancer Matilda
Kshesinskaya. Conservative Orthodox believers declared the film “blasphe-
mous” because it showed sex scenes with the future saint (Tsar Nicholas II was
canonized in 2000 by the Russian Orthodox Church). In their protests these
Orthodox believers were supported by Natalia Poklonskaya, a young member of
the Russian Duma. She has declared the film an insult to the religious feelings of
Orthodox believers: “You can’t touch saints. You can’t show them having sex
because that offends the feelings of believers” (Rainsford 2017). She started
several initiatives to ban the showing of the film, drawing on Article 148 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on offences to the religious feelings of
others. Poklonskaya’s activism clearly shows the personal entanglements
between conservative groups in politics and Russian Orthodoxy. Despite her
efforts the film was not banned, and even Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev
publicly requested more tolerance and dialogue on the part of Orthodox activists
(Akimov et al. 2017; Kremlin 2017). In this case, activists were not able to
implement their ideas, but this was different in another case brought to my atten-
tion by an acquaintance during fieldwork.
In the Vladimir region, the small town of Bogolyubovo is famous for having
an important religious heritage relevant to the whole Russian Federation—the
Church of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin on the river Nerl’. In addition, the
town hosts a big monastery for women, of a particular conservative orientation,
which receives pilgrims from all over Russia. In May 2016, the pharmaceutical
company Bergus announced plans for the investment of about 40 million rubles
(about 500,000 euro) in the Vladimir region in order to produce sanitary goods
like nappies, bandages, and preservatives (condoms) (Khromova 2016). At the
time, the announcement received little attention because details of the place of
production were not announced. In late 2016, however, it emerged that the
company wanted to invest in the area of a former brick factory in Bogolyubovo,
an industrial zone where several other companies were located (Pressservice-33
2016; Portal-Credo 2016). Although the industrial zone is several hundred
meters away from the monastery and other religious sites, the plan to produce
preservatives “in the vicinity of church or monastic sites” was criticized by hier-
omonk (ieromonakh) Nikon (Levachev-Belavenets) of Moscow. He is an
important conservative thinker and monarchist in Russian Orthodoxy who was a
leader of the organization For Faith and Fatherland (Lenta 2016a) and one of
the editors of the monarchist newspaper Imperial Gazette (Tsarskiy vestnik)
(Obshchestvennyy Sovet 2018). His criticism was taken up by conservative
circles in the monastery and by its lay supporters, who wrote letters to Patriarch
Kirill, to the governor of the Vladimir region, Svetlana Orlova, to the public pro-
secutor, and to the media, demanding the investment be stopped and reminding
them that sinful behavior is punished “from above” (Lenta 2016b). As Nikon,
the Orthodox activists consider the use of preservatives regrettable but not sinful,
yet their production is “sinful” (grekhovnaya) from their perspective (Kolokol
Rossii 2016).
Bergus, however, declared that it could not stop the investment because
already a considerable amount of money had been spent and they had been
searching for such a location for more than a year before the site was approved
by the regional administration. Thereupon the Orthodox activists started to
organize public protests in November and December 2016. During a meeting of
the investors with the municipal administration, the activists arranged protests
on the street, voicing their objection to producing the articles near this “holy
place,” the monastery. They even criticized any production of these products at
all in Bogolyubovo, with its historic and religious importance. According to
Tatyana Borovikova, one of the leading protest organizers and the head of the
Association of Families with Many and Adopted Children, the site of the Church
of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin on the Nerl’ was selected by the Virgin
Mary herself, who appeared to Prince Andrey Bogolyubsky during a dream and
advised him to build a church there. Because of this, the existence of the church
makes Bogolyubovo a place of particular holy status, which should be kept in
mind in planning the production of such items as condoms.
The representatives of the company, irritated and overwhelmed by this unex-
pected protest, did not know how to react best. They claimed that they were
supporting the local community by creating new jobs, and that it was the
regional administration who had selected the site. In addition, one leading
company official felt obliged to declare: “I am an Orthodox believer, father of a
family with many children and adhere to traditional values as well” (see also
Kolokol Rossii 2016).5 Despite his attempt to associate himself with them, the
Orthodox activists challenged his position, attacking him personally by ques-
tioning the sincerity of his faith. The activists thus remained skeptical and con-
tinued to demand the end of the project. This, however, was no possibility for
the company, as its representative explained they had already made an invest-
ment of about 200 million rubles (ca. 300 million euros) (ibid.). In contrast to
the Orthodox activists, the Vladimir eparchy officially voiced no criticism of
the project because they “did not want to get involved in questions of economic
decisions” (Provladimir 2016). The eparchy secretary declared the position
taken by Nikon to be his personal opinion and not that of the ROC (Portal-
Credo 2016). The activists criticized this lack of support and intended to write
to Putin as well as involve UNESCO, because they felt the heritage of the town
was endangered.
Despite the company’s first attempts to secure its investments and continue
“business as usual,” it turned out that opposition continued. In December 2016
the Bergus company finally gave up and declared its intention to halt its plans
250 Tobias Köllner
for the production of condoms in Bogolyubovo (NTV 2016; Vedomosti 2016).
Meanwhile, the case had gained attention nationally and in Moscow. Certainly,
the fame of the religious sites in Bogolyubovo contributed to the growing atten-
tion to the conflict in the whole of Russia. Probably very relevant to the full
victory over the company, but scarcely visible, was the relation of the monastery
with conservative groups and important political actors on the federal level. This
shows the personal entanglements as introduced before. Nikon’s public recogni-
tion contributed substantially.
For the company, however, the episode turned out to be a success as well.
The resulting substantial attention in social media and support from young Rus-
sians helped sales to rise considerably thereafter, so that the company was able
to invest in another production plant outside Bogolyubovo. They were still able
to produce nappies and cosmetic products in Bogolyubovo, and the condoms in
the second location. Nevertheless, the affair demonstrates clearly the growing
importance and involvement in everyday life of conservative circles within
Russian Orthodoxy.
Religious conservatism and the re-emergence of Cossack

groups
Historically, Cossack groups emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and
were a typical border phenomenon in the Russian South, in the Ukrainian ter-
ritory, and in Siberia (Slezkine 1994, 194; Stammler 2005, 122). These groups
left the Russian Empire and tried to escape the reign of the tsar. From the six-
teenth century onwards, however, they sometimes aligned with the expanding
Russian Empire and the tsar. Cossack groups guarded the borders or penetrated
into new territories in search for resources (for example furs). As a result, forms
of direct or indirect rule were installed in these territories (see Golovnev and
Osherenko 1999, 44). In many cases, Cossack groups came into trouble with
other groups outside the Russian Empire that were of a different faith and
adhered to paganism (Siberia), Islam (Caucasus), or Catholicism (Ukraine). For
this reason, the Cossacks were described as “defenders of Orthodoxy.”
In contemporary Russia, however, recent years bear witness to a re-emergence
of Cossack groups and their spread over all of the Russian Federation. Here
strong ideological convergences between the Russian state and Orthodox groups
can be noticed. These ideological convergences are largely related to currents of
patriotism and militarism which attempt to actively rebuild the image of a strong
and internationally relevant Russian state. Especially addressed is the traditional
image of Cossacks as stout defenders of Orthodoxy that plays an important role
until today. A growing number of new Cossack organizations have been formed
with new personal and institutional entanglements. Many of the new Cossack
groups have connections with and are supported by Orthodox lay believers and
activists (ROC 2015). In 2010, the collaboration between Cossacks and the ROC
received official recognition when a Committee of the Holy Synod of the
ROC for the Cooperation with Cossacks was formed (Sinodal’nyy komitet po
vzaimodeystviyu c kazachestvom) (ROC 2010). Herewith all three forms of
entanglements (personal, ideological, and institutional) become visible. This
committee is headed by Mitropolit Stavropolsky and Nevinnomyssky Kirill
(Pokrovsky), who since 2012 has also been on the Council for Cossack Affairs
of the President of the Russian Federation (Sovet po delam kazachestva pri
Prezidente Rossii), which was formed in 2009 (ROC 2010, 2012). Accordingly, I
interpret this development to be part of a general rise of nationalism, patriotism,
and militarism in the Russian Federation. Although these trends became more
virulent after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, they build on previous develop-
ments such as the formation of officially recognized Cossack organizations and
the strong rhetoric of President Putin and Patriarch Kirill. Though events on the
local level follow federal trends, they give additional impetus to the emergence
of other bottom–up initiatives elsewhere, as I show in the following.
In the Vladimir region, so-called unregistered Cossack groups (nereestrovye
kazaki) had already existed for several years, whereas an officially “registered”
Cossack local group was only formed there in 2013 (Start-33 2013). Both forms
of group need to have a state registration as a nonprofit organization (nekom-
mercheskaya organizatsiya NKO) for their establishment. The main difference
between the two forms is the recognition by the official Cossack organization of
the Russian Federation. With this official recognition the registered Cossack
groups become part of state services, although most local groups do not receive
financial support from the federal budget (ibid.). Nevertheless, the general trend
in the region is sympathy toward the establishment of Cossack groups, and the
governor of the Vladimir region, Svetlana Orlova, became a Cossack herself in
August 2013 (ibid.). The Cossack movement was also reinterpreted to fit
important local history and figures such as Il’ya Muromets, to whom an official
connection was declared. This, however, is historically questionable and not ver-
ified by any archival sources. Despite this, the already well-known historic figure
of Il’ya Muromets has increased in popularity locally.
The Cossacks were not a mass phenomenon in the Vladimir region and up to
2013 only 297 persons were registered members of (“unregistered”) Cossack
groups (ibid.). Since then, however, the number must have risen considerably,
although no updated figures are available. They receive increasing attention in
the media, with reports of Cossacks patrolling several localities for drug traffick-
ing and undocumented persons, or on duty with fire fighters in forest-fire preven-
tion. The Cossacks’ self-understanding as a paramilitary group seems to
predominate, with a number of them having served in the Russian military or
participated in armed conflicts (ibid.). Drawing on these experiences, a number
of Cossack groups offer pre-military training to young people, which could
become part of a patriotic upbringing and education (see Benovska-Sabkova et
al. 2010; Köllner 2016). With such programs the Cossacks have been able to
considerably enhance their influence in Russian society.
During fieldwork I participated in a similar event where Cossacks were
involved. In consequence of a 2009 presidential directive, a new school subject
had been introduced into state schools from 2012, called Fundamentals of
252 Tobias Köllner
Religious Culture and Secular Ethic (Osnovy religioznykh kul’tur i svetskoy etiki,
ORKSE) (see for more details Köllner 2016; Willems 2010). Part of this subject
is one module called Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture, where pupils acquire
basic knowledge of Russian Orthodoxy in its secular aspects (history, dogma,
and culture). But at the time of my fieldwork (2013 to 2016) the content of the
subject varied to a great extent and largely depended on the attitude of the
teacher, who could be a convinced atheist or a devout Orthodox believer. In a
small town in the Vladimir region I was present at such lessons in Fundamentals
of Orthodox Culture. The teacher organized a class excursion to the parish com-
munity buildings where Cossacks were present, who together with some
Orthodox believers showed the pupils the church and surroundings. After that
the Cossacks ordered the pupils to line up in the yard and engage in different
sports activities. As the pupils were at first giggling at the Cossacks who were a
new experience for them, this soon came to an end, as these more loudly and
resolutely voiced their commands again, and very soon the pupils decided to
obey. The teacher and the church devotees seemed to appreciate this enforce-
ment of discipline and to be grateful to the Cossacks for it.
Celebration of the end of the “Great Patriotic War”

in Vladimir
In 2014, the sixty-ninth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany was
celebrated all over Russia. 9 May was one of the most important festive anniver-
saries in the Soviet Union and continues to play a role of distinction in post-
Soviet Russia up to today (see Gabowitsch et al. 2017). On that day,
commemoration festivities take place at monuments around the country, such as
at the Eternal Flame dedicated to the losses of human life suffered during the
Second World War. Another national focus is the military parade in Moscow
showing the current strength of the Russian Federation’s armed forces. Other
events take place naturally at the local level. In Vladimir, my main fieldwork site
at this time, a sports competition was held by the city administration in one of
the stadiums where the best pupils from different schools participated. More
pupils were brought in great numbers to attend the competition. The event,
however, was not observed by the pupils and their teachers alone—on hand were
local dignitaries and their families, politicians from the leading parties, com-
manding officers of the police, servicemen and women from the Russian Army,
and ROC clergy. Other schools and even children in daycare were required to
attend the event. The stadium was profusely decorated with Russian flags and
military equipment was on display too.
Before the sport competition a number of talks were given by the dignitaries.
All of them underscored the lasting importance of the war victory and the
strength of the Russian army still today. The most remarkable speech, however,
was given by a clergyman famous for his conservatism and his closeness to the
military even among other clergymen, as I was told. He praised the Russian
army and its military strength:
It is a holy duty [svyashchennyy dolg] for every one of us to defend the
Motherland! The Church supports this and blesses its defenders [osvyash-
chayut zashitnikov rodiny]. Russians have always been soldiers and trans-
ferred this from generation to generation [peredali eto ot pokoleniya v
pokolenie]!
With the Russian Army only recently having occupied Crimea and involved in a
more-or-less hidden conflict in Eastern Ukraine, this strong emphasis on the
defensive orientation of the Russian army is contradictory. In addition, the
speeches given during the event were couched in religious language and reli-
gious symbols were on display. In this way, the impression of a strong connec-
tion between the Russian army and Russian Orthodoxy was created and a
positive image of the army among the children and young adults was fostered.
For the small ones it was obviously fun to dress up like tank soldiers, attend the
competitions, and see the military vehicles. Moreover, I was told by attendees
that the sport competition was meant to find pupils suitable for a neighboring
sports school which was in close cooperation with the army administration on
the opposite side of the street (personal entanglements). Accordingly, the event
was not only indirectly meant to improve the image of the Russian army (ideo-
logical entanglements), but served it quite obviously to help establish contact
with athletic young people who could be recruited in the future. This is part of a
more general trend to institutionalize such contacts with different groups of the
population. An important success for the ROC in this respect has been the intro-
duction since 2009 of the chaplaincy into the Russian army (Richters 2013, 58).
The “Day of Mercy” at the Orthodox High School in

Vladimir6
The “Day of Mercy” was a project organized by the Orthodox High School in
Vladimir, a private institution closely related to the Russian Orthodox Church,
founded in 2001 under the auspices of the Vladimir Archbishop Evlogy. The
high school was also accredited by the state administration and thus gained in
prestige. In contrast to public schools, the Orthodox High School education has
a clear religious orientation including prayers, church singing, and Church Sla-
vonic language in the curriculum. In 2014 it had 12 classes and more than 160
pupils. The school is headed by Father Vladimir, who is about 60 years old and
serves in a parish as well. During visits to the Orthodox school I talked to teach-
ers and took part in lessons and other events. One important school event during
my fieldwork was the project “Day of Mercy,” which lasted from 2013 to early
2014. In the project, two classes from the Orthodox school and two classes from
a neighboring state school—all fourth-grade pupils (around the age of 10)
—commemorated the 100-year anniversary of the beginning of the First World
War. The idea was Father Vladimir’s, and so the preparation was mainly organ-
ized by the Orthodox school. Its pupils together with teachers prepared and
rehearsed a play complete with scenery and costumes.
254 Tobias Köllner
The culmination of the project was a war re-enactment event at the Orthodox
High School. For this all four classes met in the yard of the Orthodox school and
were divided into four teams (brigady). In addition to the teachers from the
Orthodox High School, staff from the Ministry for Emergency Situations (Minis-
terstvo po chrezvychaynym situatsiyam, MChS) took part. The head of the MChS
group was a man in his mid-forties with the rank of captain (mayor) and a close
acquaintance of Father Vladimir. Accordingly I perceive this to be a form of
entanglement that I have described as personal. After all pupils had gathered in
the yard, the captain and Father Vladimir explained the event, the rules of the
competition, and the historic importance of the First World War for Russia. Here
the ideological convergence between both dignitaries became obvious as they
highlighted the importance of Russian Orthodoxy for the defense of the mother-
land. After the speeches all the brigades received a plan of the different stations
in the competition, which the children were to visit in a certain order.
The stations, scattered within a nearby park, had been prepared by the teach-
ers beforehand, with names such as “hospital,” “war pharmacy,” “zone under
attack,” “Kiev,” or “zone under chemical attack.” In the “hospital” the children
had to take care of a person pretending to be wounded and in the pharmacy they
received information on emergency measures. At “Kiev,” a Second World War
veteran was waiting to tell them about his experiences on the battlefield. In the
“zone under attack” a woman gave signals to the children who had to follow her
instructions and crawl beneath an improvised shelter. At the last station, “zone
under chemical attack,” they received gasmasks and the MChS staff explained
their proper use. Then, they had to carry an injured person away from the zone
under attack. After all the teams had completed the stations, they needed to
return to the Orthodox High School as soon as possible, since the first brigade to
finish all stations successfully was the “winning” team.
Back at the school, everyone gathered in the assembly hall and the pupils of
the Orthodox High School performed their play, The Merciful Sister (miloserd-
naya sestra). The main actors portray a group of nurses in a Russian field hos-
pital at the German–Russian front during the First World War. The nurses take
care of Russian soldiers wounded in a German chlorine gas attack. Then, one of
the “merciful sisters” starts to pray for all the deceased on their way to heaven,
and for the prevention of further killing. She reads out the names of the fallen
Russian soldiers with their religious and ethnic affiliation, such as “Ivan Ivanov-
ich, Russian, Orthodox.” After the play, all the brigade members (pupils)
received diplomas for their successful participation in the “Day of Mercy” and
the “winning team” was especially praised.
Afterwards, all pupils, teachers, and guests went to the school yard again.
Together with the school staff, the MChS had prepared a traditional Russian
meal (kasha) in a big military field kitchen tent. Sweets were offered to the
schoolchildren. It was the last day before the school vacation and the children
played happily for a while, then left. After that we met together with teachers,
Father Vladimir, and his assistant priest in the principal’s office. Bottles of
liqueur and vodka circulated and the day’s events were discussed. The teachers
laughed about the children and the clumsy way they solved some of the tasks at
the stations. Father Vladimir was quite confident that everything had gone
smoothly. I was—despite this nice close to the day and all the hospitality—left
rather uneasy by the affair. The whole day was filled with images and slogans
from tsarist wartime Russia: “Iron in the hands—Christ in the heart!” (Zhelezo v
rukakh, Khristos v serdtse!) or, “War till a victorious end!” (Voyna do pobed-
nogo kontsa!), not to mention the barely disguised pre-military training. Again,
this was a demonstration of the ideological entanglement of Russian Orthodoxy
with the state administration, both of whom imagine and desire a strong and
militarily powerful Russia. Pre-military training in schools seems to be one of
the instruments conceived for implementing this vision. The implementation I
witnessed, however, was not organized or advised from above, but drew on local
initiative and local networks (personal entanglements). Nevertheless, it is evi-
dently the result of a more general trend toward conservatism in Russian society.
But an interpretation of the two levels as neatly interrelated seems misplaced, as
the ethnographic material presented shows.
Conclusion
In the Russian Federation recent years have witnessed both the re-emergence of
a liberal opposition connected with the protests against falsified elections, and
the opposite trend toward conservatism and authoritarian measures. At the
present time, the conservative trend seems to be prevailing in Russian society for
several reasons; one is the role of Russian Orthodoxy in this context. Although
there are different factions inside Russian Orthodoxy, the liberal position has
lost considerable ground and today nationalist and fundamentalist circles seem
to be prevailing (see Verkhovsky 2003 for more characteristics of these fac-
tions). Accordingly, most of the conservatives’ pressing issues are couched in
religious language, decorated with religious symbols and supported by clergy-
men or Orthodox activists. Because of the prominence of the ROC in Russian
society and the trust put into the institution, I interpret the support by conser-
vative Orthodox groups to be crucially important in the general trend toward
conservatism on the national and local levels. Here the general disappointment
with liberal thinking dating back to the permanent economic, political, and social
crises in the 1990s has to be kept in mind (Shevchenko 2009). As a result, many
people joined conservative movements and embraced conservative positions.
I have described as another reason for the success of conservatism the per-
sonal, ideological, and institutional entanglements between Russian Orthodoxy
and Russian politics. Up to now these different entanglements have not been
examined and analyzed separately. To do this I have introduced the concept of
“entangled authorities,” which I hope will also give a new impetus to further
theoretical approaches to the interplay between Orthodox religion and politics in
contemporary Russia. The concept challenges the widespread picture of an all-
powerful state using religious groups primarily for its own legitimation. Instead,
the relation church/state in contemporary Russia is a complex interplay between
256 Tobias Köllner
two powerful institutions characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Here-
with a biased picture is corrected in favor of one that emphasizes the oscillation
between instrumentalization, close cooperation, competition, and conflict.
In addition, the interplay between the local, regional, and national levels is
crucial. The examples show how conservative issues are stimulated from above
as well as from below, with the national and local levels tightly interconnected,
so that they have to be analyzed in relation to one another. Although conser-
vative actors close to Russian Orthodoxy do not always win (as in the “Matilda”
case), they quite often do exert influence through entangled channels, and it
becomes thereby obvious that they provide important ideological underpinnings
for institution- and nation-building. The Cossack groups and their spread all over
Russia, and the new ideological and religious trends in education, are also instru-
mental in this context. Herewith a more detailed description of the interplay
between Orthodox religion and politics becomes possible which avoids simplifi-
cations and allows for an analysis of both sides in their own right.
Notes
1 The current research is based on a grant from the German Research Foundation DFG
(KO 4652–1/1) and I am highly indebted to the DFG for the opportunity to conduct the
research. In addition, I thank Katharina Bluhm, Mihai Varga, Chris Hann, Detelina
Tocheva, Agata Ładykowska, Tatiana Golova, Jochen Roose, Pawel Karolewski, and
other participants for their comments on this chapter. Moreover, I am very grateful to
Tom Arne Rüsen, Heiko Kleve, Marcel Hülsbeck, Arist von Schlippe, and all my other
colleagues at the University of Witten/Herdecke for their warm welcome in Witten and
the insightful discussions.
2 The research draws on ethnographic fieldwork and largely follows the “ethnographic
research cycle” (Spradley 2005) and grounded theory approaches (Glaser and Strauss
2009; Strauss and Corbin 1998). As field site I chose the Vladimir region, where I had
already conducted other fieldwork where I was interested in the interrelation between
Russian Orthodoxy and Russian businessmen (Köllner 2012, 2013a, 2013b). In addi-
tion, I visited St. Petersburg to compare my findings from Vladimir to the situation
there. Nevertheless, it is not “multi-sited ethnography” because I almost exclusively
draw on ethnographic data from the Vladimir region. Vladimir is the capital of the
region of the same name and situated about 180 kilometers east of Moscow. This city
of about 380,000 inhabitants has been historically important up to today. In the elev-
enth and twelfth centuries the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal’ was an important power
in the northeast part of the Kievan Rus’ before the capital was moved to Moscow in the
fifteenth century. It is famous for architectural monuments dating back to the thirteenth
century, thus making the city one of the key locations in the so-called Golden Ring.
During the research, I conducted participant observation, 48 semi-structured recorded
interviews, and a number of conversations without recording. Among my interlocutors
were priests, monks, nuns, believers, politicians, teachers, journalists, scientists, and
people working in museums and planetariums.
3 Curanović, for example, describes the relationship between religion and the Russian
state in foreign policy as being guided by the principle to “grant freedom of conscience
‘by concession’, according to an institution’s ‘degree of loyalty’ ” (Curanović 2012,
242, see also 104f.).
4 Here I cite Gel’man (2002), who draws attention to the importance of the local govern-
ment, and Rogers (2015, 6), who argues that “the Russian state […] [is] constituted
along a center-region axis in which regions are just as often the driving force as the
federal center.” This means that there is a dominance of the center ever since President
Putin strengthened the federal authorities, e.g. in the Yukos affair, or when federal
inspectors were installed to monitor the governors of the regions. This does not mean,
however, that the decisions taken by the center are fulfilled in the way intended (see
also Gabowitsch 2016).
5 In recent years, fertility issues have received growing attention, leading to the (re-)
introduction of the title “Mother Heroine,” the “Order of Parental Glory,” and compen-
sation for giving birth and successfully raising many children (see Selezneva 2016 for
more details on the legal framework). Families with three or more children have a
special status in the Russian Federation.
6 In one of my recent articles (Köllner 2016), I draw on the same ethnographic material
but with more concern for religious education, whereas here the more important focus
is on conservatism among Orthodox clergymen.
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13 Ready for diffusion?
Russia’s “cultural turn” and the
post-Soviet space
Sebastian Schiek and Azam Isabaev
Introduction
From the perspective of regime stability, Russia’s “cultural turn” is most of all a
means of discursive legitimation in times of a fuzzy course of development and
contentious politics (e.g. Tsygankov 2016; Laruelle 2013). Self-legitimation and
mobilization of supporters can be relevant for post-Soviet autocratic leaders as
well as politicians in hybrid regimes. The question as to whether Russia’s “cul-
tural turn” is ready for export had already been raised some time ago (March
2012), but not yet answered from the perspective of recipient states. This chapter
is a contribution to the debate, studying the diffusion of Russia’s law against
“homosexual propaganda among minors” into former Soviet republics. Laws
and practices, which have traveled before around the post-Soviet space, usually
belonged to the sphere of “hard politics,” for example of constitutions and elect-
oral or media law. Post-Soviet republics learned from each other because of their
numerous linkages, such as a common history and a shared lingua franca, but
also because of similar problems, many of them connected to the authoritarian
nature of their regimes.
The Russian “anti-propaganda” law had a primarily symbolic function: spe-
cific politicians and eventually the regime wanted to legitimize themselves,
mobilize supporters, and delegitimize opponents in a time of an acute crisis. To
make self-legitimization work, the regime aimed to resonate with the attitudes of
moral conservatism, anti-homosexual resentments being among them. Moral
conservatism is not so much an explicit ideology; rather, it exhibits beliefs
shared among the majority of the society. It received its imprint during the
Soviet era. Moral conservatism is thus not only the dominant cultural predisposi-
tion in Russia, but in the whole post-Soviet space. Given this shared history and
cultural predispositions, and assuming a continuing need for self-legitimation in
post-Soviet republics as well, one could expect that the adjacent regimes regard
the Russian law as an example and copy its texts or ideas. Indeed, several former
Soviet republics announced similar laws shortly after the Russian law was regis-
tered in the Duma.1 Legislative procedure never got started in most of these
countries. Only in two countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, laws inspired by
Russia were debated in the national parliaments. In Kyrgyzstan only was the
Ready for diffusion? Russia’s “cultural turn” 261
topic supported by the president, leading legislative reforms. Kyrgyzstan ulti-
mately did not copy the specific Russian law, but emulated the idea: the parlia-
ment adopted a constitutional amendment which banned homosexual marriages
(although they have never been legal before).
How can we make sense of this diffusion process, which led to six announce-
ments, two draft laws, and eventually also to a constitutional amendment, sup-
ported by the head of state? Shared history, language, and proximity might
explain the initial intention to copy, but it remains unanswered why the vast
majority did not copy it, and why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are outliers. The
type of regime also does not provide a clear picture: Russia at the time of the
law’s adoption was an electoral autocracy. Among the countries that did not
copy it are both autocracies (for example Belarus) and hybrid regimes (for
instance Armenia). Kazakhstan is a fully consolidated autocracy, Kyrgyzstan is
an electoral democracy. Linkages with Russia or the West do not provide a
strong explanation either: Belarus and Armenia are financially dependent on
Russia, so is Kyrgyzstan, but Kazakhstan’s number one trade partner is the Euro-
pean Union. Russia is an important partner for Kazakhstan, but the latter also
continuously tries to keep its northern neighbor at arm’s length and rejects any
attempts to institutionalize shared identities.
In order to shed light on this puzzle, we open up the diffusion process, taking
into account structural factors as well as the interests of political actors. As
stated above, the cultural predisposition of moral conservatism is dominant in
the entire post-Soviet space. However, what matters for diffusion is the struc-
tural politicization of moral conservatism, which developed only in Russia and
Kyrgyzstan under the condition of hybrid or weak regimes, but not in other auto-
cratic states. Post-Soviet autocracies avoid politicization of any kind, sticking to
technocratic styles of government. Second, what matters at the level of actors is
the will to employ and thus enforce politicization, something even the Russian
leadership tried to avoid for a long time in the case of the “anti-propaganda” law.
In Russia and Kyrgyzstan, perceived internal weakness and the urgent need for
power consolidation or voter mobilization led state leaders to employ the already
politicized predisposition of moral conservatism. Only at first glance is this
understanding at odds with the case of Kazakhstan—a consolidated autocracy
with no politicization of moral conservatism. Although the law was adopted by
the parliament, the legislative process in Kazakhstan was at no time subject to
significant politicization with regard to the self-legitimization of “local import-
ers” or for regime stability. Rather, the Kazakhstani case can be described as
Table 13.1 Politicization of moral conservatism and need of power consolidation
Russia Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan
Politicization of moral conservatism Yes Yes No

Need of power consolidation/voter mobilization at Yes Yes No
the time of adoption/promotion
262 Sebastian Schiek and Azam Isabaev
technocratic emulation, not emulation for reasons of legitimation. The law was
rejected after international protest, but, as we argue, primarily to avoid domestic
politicization.
We develop our argument in the following way: the theoretical section con-
nects the concepts of legitimation and politicization, which are key to under-
standing the diffusion process. In the sections that follow we will elaborate on
today’s moral conservatism, its roots in Russia and Central Asia, and the diverg-
ing patterns of its politicization. The next two sections take a closer look at
Russia, and we argue that the adoption of the “anti-propaganda” law was tightly
connected to an acute power crisis. We also ask whether Russia promotes its
conservative ideology abroad. This will be followed by an analysis of the
“receiving” or “importing” side, where we pay attention to the domestic import-
ers and the role of the power centers.
Diffusion of moral conservatism

One of the main findings of diffusion theory is the fact that changes in one
country do not necessarily, or not only, depend on domestic factors, but on
factors outside the country. Diffusion is typically connected to structural factors,
for example it can be observed among countries, which share the same region,
have a common history, or face similar problems. But structure is not a sufficient
explanation; actors do play a role in the process too. For example, domestic
actors in “receiving countries” learn from other countries, how to solve prob-
lems, or they copy norms or laws from great powers, which they perceive to be
prestigious. The role and interests to adopt or reject imported laws or ideas can
differ between different actors in a country, for instance between the domestic
importers and the political power center (e.g. Weyland 2017).
Authoritarian cooperation and the diffusion of ideas, institutions, and laws,
which has been studied by scholars on post-Soviet affairs, took place to a large
extent as instrumental learning in the sphere of “hard politics,” such as authorit-
arian institutions (election fraud), repression, or the control of social media. The
law under study in this chapter diverges from these well-studied patterns of dif-
fusion. Its character is first and foremost of a symbolic nature and part of discur-
sive legitimation. Legitimation might be seen as a “soft” but no less important
mechanism of power consolidation. For some time, scholars assumed that auto
cracies do not need to legitimate themselves vis-á-vis their societies. In fact, dis-
cursive self-legitimation is omnipresent in autocratic regimes historically and in
the present (Schatz 2009; Gerschewski 2013). It becomes all the more important
when economic performance is weak and the level of dispute is high. Legitima-
tion also plays a role in hybrid regimes, for example in electoral democracies
such as Kyrgyzstan. Political actors engage in self-legitimation to mobilize
voters or supporters during and after elections.
There are different methods of discursive legitimation. One is to bring up
“reasonable” arguments (for example “autocratic stability is better than chaos”).
Politicians can also engage in wide-ranging discursive and symbolic action.
These can be public speeches and festivities, but also symbolic laws. Such
actions aim to resonate with cultural predispositions that are prevalent in their
societies. Predispositions, such as moral conservatism, which we will describe in
more detail below, are rather implicit cultural beliefs and practices, which are
“taken for granted so that they seem inevitable parts of life.”2 There are several
mechanisms politicians use in attempting to resonate with such beliefs. They can
stress commonalities and thus try to create positive feelings. They can also aim
to evoke negative feelings: widespread methods are self-victimization and
putting forward narratives of a common enemy (Benford and Snow 2000, 622).
The manner in which politicians engage in discursive legitimation depends
upon several factors. One of these factors is politicization. Cultural predisposi-
tions can exhibit passive beliefs that are resources for political actors to resonate
with. For instance, President Nazarbayev sometimes talks about being called
“Papa” by subordinates (Isaacs 2010). This can be seen as an attempt to generate
traditional legitimacy by trying to speak to the shared beliefs of Kazakhs, who
attach high importance to families and stick to the traditional role of the father as
the head of the family. However, most probably such attempts are barely noticed
consciously by society; it resembles more the touching of a chord (Benford and
Snow 2000).
By contrast, specific parts of cultural predispositions can be also more or less
politicized. Social issues “are politicized when they become the subject of delib-
eration, decision making and human agency where previously they were not”
(Hay 2007, 81). Usually, issues are purposely politicized by societal or political
actors. But not all decision-making involves politicization by default; it can be
beneficial for decision-makers to legislate in a technocratic style and keep issues
below the radar of the society. Politicization can evolve if a certain space of open
deliberation exists in a society, and if deliberation leads to public controversy.
Such a process can unfold into contingent political action, for instance street pro-
tests and other symbolic forms of discourse (ibid.).
But what is the impact of politicization for autocratic and hybrid regimes?
With regards to discursive legitimation, the meaning of politicization is ambiva-
lent for state leaders. It can be a resource and an instrument for legitimacy
claims. If specific political issues or part of cultural predispositions are already
politicized, regimes can try to make use of politicization. Politicization leads,
inter alia, to the increased salience of a topic and an increased polarization
between conflicting camps: “diametrically opposed coalitions of societal groups
at extreme position” (Wilde et al. 2015, 6). Fueling this conflict can be a strategy
to generate support of one of the sides, and marginalize the other. Politicization
can also be a threat to regime stability, because open deliberation in critical areas
can threaten the discursive hegemony of the regime. It can also lead to societal
conflicts, entailing the risk of developing into anti-regime conflict.
Under conditions of authoritarian control, open deliberation is much more
difficult or even impossible. Contingent political action, for example street pro-
tests or political violence, are harshly controlled or restrained. Thus, politiciza-
tion is more likely in hybrid regimes, where the state has reduced its grip on the
society or even lost control. Post-Soviet leaders, especially those in autocratic
states, avoid politicization of any kind. They fear that public controversy can
lead to social conflicts and societal “radicalization,” difficult to control.
Historically, according to Massad, the politicization of homosexuality in non-
European societies has often been linked to the import of the Western concept of
a “gay identity.” Speaking for the Arab world, Massad argues that same-sex love
was tolerated and conflict-free in many non-Western societies, but regarded as
an exclusively private topic, not meant to be deliberated in the public space.
When local or foreign actors imported the political idea of a “gay identity,” they
moved the issue to the political and thus public sphere, often against the will of
local homosexuals (Massad 2002). There is evidence that this holds true for the
post-Soviet space. In Russia, the politicization of specific issues took place in the
social arena during the hybrid phase of the late 1980s and the 1990s. Now an
autocracy, Russia under Putin is an exception amongst the post-Soviet non-
democratic states, as the regime “plays” with societal politicization, primarily in
the form of nationalism but also of moral conservatism (Kon 1997, 238).
Moral conservatism in the post-Soviet space

Moral conservatism received its specific imprint during the era of the Soviet
Union and is deeply embedded in the majority of its successor societies. When
we speak of moral conservatism as a cultural predisposition which is dominant
in the whole post-Soviet space, we do not intend to blur the differences between
the societies in the (post-)Soviet republics. The Soviet era did not extinguish
these differences; nonetheless, societies in the post-Soviet republics can be
treated “as forming a broad class of societies more similar to one another, in
certain organizational respects, than to other societies” (Verdery 1994, 229).
In the pre-Soviet phase, the existence of, perception of, and political approach
toward homosexuality differed between Russia and Central Asia. With regard to
Russia, scholars see a long history of same-sex love, which was viewed as
normal and was partly even tolerated by the Orthodox Church. Only in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries did homosexuality become incrementally delegit-
imized, partly because of cultural influence from Europe, when Russian “genteel
society began to feel uneasy about homosexuality” (Kon 1997, 222). Histor-
ically, Kazakh and Kyrgyz people on the Central Asian Steppes were nomads.
Little is known about homosexuality among these nomads. However, the avail-
able data suggest that the situation differed very much from Russia. Anthropolo-
gists believe that it only existed among the Sarts, the sedentary people in the
South of Central Asia, but not among the nomads.3
Family policy was an important issue in the Soviet Union and subject to
explicit ideologies. Verdery qualifies the specific connection between the family
and the state as the “zadruga-state”: “it was composed of individual nuclear fam-
ilies, but these were bound into a larger familial organization of patriarchal
authority with the Father-Party at its head” (Verdery 1994, 230). The central role
of the nuclear family was anchored in Article 53 of the 1977 constitution, in
which the family was put under the protection of the state. Socialism changed
male and female public and household roles and favored the nuclear or small
family. For instance, a special school course for pupils was not only intended to
make children become aware of their special male and female roles, but also to
instill the sense of the family as the basic cell of socialist society (Attwood
1990, 186).
The promotion of the Soviet family model included the promotion of the norm
of heterosexuality and the exclusion of other forms of relationships and sexuali-
ties. After an initial liberalization in revolutionary Russia, the Soviets began
strictly regulating sexuality, not only promoting the classic family model but also
fighting homosexuality (Bernstein 2007, 8, 59). From 1934 until the mid-1980s,
homosexuality was criminalized, prosecuted, and became an “unmentionable”
topic, while continuing to exist (Kon 1997, 223–5). Compared with Western
Europe, there are commonalities and differences. The role of women in society
significantly differed in socialist and emerging European capitalist societies. But
the emergence of the exclusivity of the nuclear family as the only model during
modernization in Western Europe had much in common with the Soviet Union.
The difference is that in Western societies, powerful movements effected pro-
found social change, which led to a strong pluralization of life models and, among
other developments, the emergence of LGBT activism. Similar movements
emerged in Russia after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which led to a politi-
cization of the issues. Yet these movements and associations never developed a
strong impact, comparable with European or North American societies.
Moral conservatism in Central Asia relates back to the Soviet Union. Pre-
Soviet Central Asian societies were conservative in the sense that they were non-
pluralistic. The new restrictive policies which came from the power center in
Moscow were also applied in the Soviet Republics and enforced by the Soviets.4
In today’s Central Asia, the Soviet cultural heritage is still pervasive and, on a
cultural level, the particular “Sovietness” transcends the Orthodox Christian–
Muslim division between Russia and Central Asia. This continuity cannot only be
found on the political stage, but “in literally every sphere of life […] [it means]
specific routines and identities that were instilled in the population in the Soviet
period, regardless of their religious or national affiliation” (Abashin 2014).
Both in Russia and Central Asia, moral conservatism is reflected in strong sen-
timents against homosexuals. There is a high level of societal disapproval of forms
of sexuality other than heterosexuality. This is partly fueled by the media, which
display homophobic attitudes. This is the case for Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani
media, but most importantly for Russian media, which is consumed all over the
former Soviet Union. Moral conservatism is also reflected in public opinion polls
on attitudes toward sexual minorities. In 2013 and 2015, 68 and 65 percent of
Russian respondents respectively expressed their negative attitude (in different
ways) toward homosexuals (Levada Center 2013, 2015). In Kazakhstan, according
to a survey, more than 60 percent of people were in support of the re-
criminalization of homosexuality and more than 97 percent think that homosexuals
should be isolated from the rest of the society (Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan
2009, 33; Umbetalieva et al. 2016, 107). However, although homosexuality is
disapproved of all over the former Soviet Union, there are differences between
countries with respect to whether the topic is perceived as a political or a private
issue.
Politicization of moral conservatism

Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have in common that the breakdown of the
Soviet Union led to a—narrow—societal pluralization and a liberalization of
sexual norms. This change resulted, to different degrees, in politicization and
social conflicts in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, but not in Kazakhstan.
Russia
As early as the mid-1980s, there were reports of initial signs of liberalization.
Homosexuality became more visible and public discourse began to take place
among experts. It became a “fashionable topic for newspapers, art, and salon
conversation” (Kon 1997, 236). There was also a growing local community of
pro-gay activists, which politicized the topic and employed “foreign” protest
repertoires. In 1991, one of the early gay organizations “decided to operate
through street meetings and protest demonstrations, employing trenchant polit-
ical slogans aimed more at the Western press than at Soviet citizens” (ibid., 229).
As a response, social groups started to openly oppose homosexuality and engage
in a “battle for ‘traditional’ values” (Sozayev 2012, 7–14). These rhetorical con-
troversies were accompanied by more and more visible street conflicts in Russia.
Since 2006, activists had tried to organize “gay pride marches” in several regions
of Russia. Although official permission for such events was regularly denied,
unauthorized demonstrations took place, which often led to clashes on the street,
caused by assaults from conservative and right-wing extremists as well as
ensuing police violence.
Politicization took place under conditions of Russia’s hybrid regime of the
1990s. Later, the political system transformed not only into a competitive but
eventually an electoral authoritarianism. The regime also started to make use of
moral conservatism and to deploy its politicized nature.5 On a discursive level,
as early as 2006, Putin introduced the term “traditional values” for the first time
(Erofeeva 2013, 1931; Wilkinson 2014, 367). In his pre-election speech in 2012,
in the midst of the crisis, he took up the widespread perception of a general
decline after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and linked it to an ostensible
moral decline due to the collapse of the Soviet values system (Muravyeva 2014,
635). At the policymaking level, regional politicians made use of—and thus also
promoted—moral conservatism with anti-homosexual law projects. Long before
2013, when the law was adopted at the national level, several federal regions
came up with laws, hinting at a symbolic or de facto discrimination against
homosexuality. We can speak of the politicization of moral conservatism and an
ongoing construction of explicit ideologies surrounding it.
Central Asia
In the early 1990s, Central Asia underwent a narrow liberalization of sexual
norms, noticeable, among other signs, in the decriminalization of homosexuality.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differ from each other to the extent that Kyrgyzstan
experienced a politicization of the issue. However, it was less polarized than in
Russia and the regime neither made use of politicization, nor did it construct
explicit conservative ideologies.
Political activism in Kyrgyzstan started in the 2000s and was tightly con-
nected to foreign activists. The beginning of a public debate was initiated by a
pro-homosexual article, published in 2000 in a university’s newspaper. The
author, a student from Ukraine, later started to organize LGBT activism in
Bishkek (Kirey 2007, 15–17). The activists founded the LGBT organization
Labrys, funded by donors from the Netherlands, organized public roundtables on
gay rights and homophobia in Kyrgyzstan (COC Netherlands et al. 2012; Kirey
2007). In 2004 and afterwards, international NGOs published several human
rights reports (Van der Veur 2004; Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan 2007; Human
Rights Watch 2008).
In contrast to Russia, politicization took place exclusively in the social arena.
Until 2010, the regime in Kyrgyzstan was authoritarian, but rather weak. There
were no attempts and probably no capability to interfere in these social conflicts
between gay activists and opponents of liberalization. Until the diffusion of
the law, authoritarian leaders or post-2010 politicians did not deploy moral
conservatism to generate legitimacy claims.
Kazakhstan received less attention from international activists. In 1995, a
Kazakhstani citizen founded the local NGO “Kontrast,” which, however, never
received international support comparable with that received by the activists in
Kyrgyzstan. It started some initiatives to debate the situation of homosexuals in
Kazakhstan, but never did so within the country, but rather at the international
level (Queer Resources Directory 1998). Some reports were published, but no
indigenous discourse evolved (Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan 2009). Despite
strong resentments against homosexuality, the topic continued to be considered
as a private, not public, issue. On a broader level, the Kazakhstani regime
strongly avoided politicization by societal actors and the outburst of social con-
flicts, most of all ethnic conflicts.6
Russia’s urgent need for power consolidation

As already mentioned, there were some state activities on moral conservatism
and discrimination of homosexuals in Russia. Local parliaments had already
adopted laws against the propaganda of homosexuality; Putin talked about “tra-
ditional values.”
However, the respective policies of the central state were on a liberal track,
decriminalizing homosexuality. The regime in Moscow hesitated in adopting
the anti-propaganda law for a very long time. Deputy Aleksander Chuev had
initiated laws against propaganda on behalf of homosexuality three times. Each
time, up through 2009, the initiative was rejected by the Duma (Human Rights
First 2013).
The Russian law was finally pushed through during and after the election and
anti-regime protests between 2011 and 2012. The protests, sometimes called the
“December movement,” which started in Russia in December 2011 as a response
to election fraud and quickly developed to anti-regime protests, were not the first
of the civil protests in Russia, but surpassed its predecessors in strength and the
perceived threat to the regime (Volkov 2012). The protests’ repertoire of protest
techniques as well as the goals had changed and were broadened when compared
for example with protests in the 1990s. An example of both aspects is the protest
group Pussy Riot. The group employed creative and new forms of protest and
strong visual symbols. It also combined their protest against Putin with advocacy
for minority rights, including the rights for LGBT people (Kontury 2011; Rob-
ertson 2013, 12). Western actors supported the protest groups in Russia (Brown
2012) and Western media were euphoric about the protest and expressed high
hopes for its potential outcomes.
Thus, the law can be read as part of the broader social and political conflict,
and promised to solve urgent power issues and ensure the survival of the regime
in Russia. The language of cultural conservatism deeply resonates with anti-
homosexual sentiments among the majority of the Russian society (Levada
Center 2013, 2015). In a time of social protest against Putin, the law could be
read as a counteraction to mobilize the conservative majority of society in the
support of the regime, including the Russian Orthodox Church as well as nation-
alist and other right-wing groups (Wilkinson 2014, 367; Engle 2013, 8). At the
same time, the law was a means to delegitimize protest groups, which advocated
gay rights and are perceived as Western rather than as local groups. Ultimately,
the topic also helped the regime to mobilize against the West.
Russia as a sender of moral conservatism?

One of the two main stances of the literature on authoritarian diffusion and
cooperation focused on the role of authoritarian great powers, Russia being
one of them (Bank 2017). There is some evidence for this at the regime level.
Russia does not generally prefer regime convergence in its neighboring coun-
tries. It can also give preference to pro-Russian state leaders, stability, or eco-
nomic considerations over regime (Tolstrup 2014; Bader et al. 2010; Way
2015; Obydenkova and Libman 2014). Russia has supported authoritarian
regimes to prevent the diffusion of revolutions and external democratization
(Jackson 2010; Cameron and Orenstein 2012; Melnykovska et al. 2012; Tol-
strup 2014) or supported authoritarian power consolidation after revolutions
(Bader et al. 2010). Russia and China are also objects of learning, for instance
in the field of election laws and the prevention of revolutionary diffusion
(Bader 2014; Jackson 2010; Koesel and Bunce 2013). However, neither of the
great powers have the mission of promoting their regime model (Tansey 2016),
nor is the Russian regime perceived as an attractive model, to be adopted or
emulated by the smaller states.
All these patterns of diffusion and cooperation, identified in the literature,
concern the level of regimes. The questions of whether Russia promotes its “cul-
tural turn” has not yet been addressed in a comprehensive manner. Various
Russian intellectuals have constructed concepts of Eurasianism, which differ
from each other. Some of these conceptualizations comprise the idea of “tradi-
tional values,” some also claim to be a valid ideology not only for Russia but for
all of its neighboring countries (see Bluhm’s chapter in this volume). The
Russian Orthodox Church also promotes concepts of traditional values, valid not
only for Christians but also for Muslims in the Russkiy Mir (the Russian sphere
of influence).
However, attempts to create ideologically charged institutions were rejected
by Russia’s neighbors. For instance, Russia tried to integrate post-Soviet repub-
lics within the framework of a Eurasian Union with a strong political character
and political symbols. Kazakhstan and Belarus, who joined this union, not only
deprived the union of Russia’s idea of its political character, making an eco-
nomic union out of it; they also prevented the creation of strong symbols for the
union (Libman 2018).
There is no evidence that Russia promotes its “cultural turn” in regions such
as Central Asia. Although there might be pull effects by domestic actors (Lewis
2015), it is more likely that the broader cultural camp of moral conservatism is
sometimes more implicitly, sometimes more explicitly, transmitted in Russian
media, which are still very popular in the post-Soviet space.
Diffusion in Kyrgyzstan
The import process of the Russian law took place against the background of two
dynamics: first, the issue of homosexuality was already politicized by a polariza-
tion of the public debate and open conflicts between proponents and opponents.
Second, the post-2010 political system in Kyrgyzstan changed political dynamics
in the country. It can be best described as an electoral democracy: effective elec-
tions take place and public space for social movements exist, but other typical
features of democracies are weak or absent (Schedler 2002, 37). The new system
enabled political actors independent of the government to engage in discursive
politicization for their own purposes.
In the first place, the anti-homosexual discourse was pushed forward by soci-
etal associations. As a response to a Human Rights Watch Report, the social
movement Kalys organized a gathering in front of the US Embassy in Bishkek
to protest against the US funding of non-governmental organizations, which
Kalys blamed for “promoting homosexuality” (Sheralieva 2014). Later it organ-
ized another protest in front of the Parliament, this time demanding a prohibition
of “gay-propaganda among minors” (Denisova 2014).
This was eventually taken up by political actors during the campaign for
the parliamentary elections, which took place on 4 October 2015. One of the
initiators and most visible promoters of the law was Kurmanbek Diykanbayev,
member of the parliamentary fraction of the party Republic. By the time of the
law’s registration in parliament, the group already consisted of 28 deputies from
all parties represented in the parliament (Kenesh 2015). Among them was also a
member of the Presidential Social Democratic Party (Sotsial-demokraticheskaya
partiya Kyrgyzstana, SDPK). However, there were no high-ranking politicians
in this group.
The Kyrgyz lawmakers continued politicization of the issue by pushing
forward polarization. They went far beyond just copying the law, and increased
the repressive character in the draft law. While Russia and Kazakhstan intro-
duced the clause into the administrative law, Kyrgyzstan criminalized the pro-
motion of homosexuality in the Criminal Code, stipulating punishments up to
imprisonment for 6 to 12 months (Tynaeva 2014). Second, the Kyrgyz draft
exceeded the Russian version, as it prohibited promotion completely and not just
that directed toward minors.
The lawmaking process was accompanied by a discourse which clearly
attempted to resonate with anti-homosexual sentiments and which also further
politicized the issue. One policymaker stated that
homosexuals try to achieve for themselves the same rights as in Europe, for
example, adoption of children or allowing same-sex marriages. But in Kyr-
gyzstan it is impossible. It is contrary to our traditions. I am against this and
I believe that any appearance of LGBT should be banned.
(Ibid.)
Complaints about violence and demands for nondiscrimination on the part of

LGBT were denounced as “gay propaganda” as well (ibid.).
To conclude, the import of the Russian law (or the idea of the law) took place
against the background of an already politicized environment, the ground was
“prepared” by social associations, and finally political actors took up the idea,
pursuing specific interests during the election campaign. Some of the importing
actors were not only seeking to mobilize domestic support and voters. More
speculatively, speaking the language of moral conservatism might have also
been a strategy to receive financial and political support from Russia. Since
2010, Russia has become the most important partner of Kyrgyzstan in terms of
trade and financial assistance (Lewis 2015), which was reinforced when Kyr-
gyzstan joined the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union. Specific
Kyrgyz businessmen benefited from this significantly and developed an interest
in close relations with Russia. The leader of the social movement Kalys, for
instance, later ran an unsuccessful election campaign for the party Zamandash,
which is organized around the Association of Compatriots Abroad (Radio
Azattyk 2015). The latter mainly consist of labor migrants in Russia and stand
for close relationships with Russia, specifically for the development of business
and cultural-societal relations with Russia.7
The president’s weakness
Despite the growing politicization by social and political actors of the topic,
Kyrgyzstan’s President Atambaev steered clear of the issue for a long time. The
shift came three months ahead of the election, when Atambaev took up the
public indignation about the movie “I’m Gay and Muslim,” which activists pre-
sented in Kyrgyzstan: “We have human rights defenders, who have come down
to promote the film ‘I’m gay and Muslim’. […] These people do not read the
Koran, but carry out [foreign] commands. We need to develop the country
without external pressure” (MSN 2015).
Thus, it is remarkable that Atambaev, at least indirectly, supported the law.
He became the first president in the post-Soviet space who spoke openly on the
issue and supported the adoption of the law inspired by Russia. The law was not
put on ice, further deepening the conflict with international and Western actors,
who protested against the initiative (Human Rights Watch 2015).
By default, the formal competencies and the overall power of the president
in Kyrgyzstan are much lower than in authoritarian states such as Kazakhstan.
The president’s power and his ability to implement policies depend on support
from parliament. From the perspective of Atambaev, his power and parlia-
mentary support were too weak to implement important reforms. His main
source of support was the SDPK. In December 2013 he publicly called the
SDPK party the “presidential one” and expressed his wish for this party to
have a stronger presence. During the pre-election campaign in 2015, he
directly and indirectly supported the SDPK (Ayyp 2015). As the pre-election
campaign did not yield the envisaged success, Atambaev finally changed his
strategy and took up anti-Western and anti-homosexual rhetoric. In the summer
of 2015, this was a promising strategy, because the social conflict over moral
values and external, most of all “Western,” interference was salient. By speak-
ing the language of moral conservatism and by supporting the law, Atambaev
was aiming to mobilize voters, but also to receive support from parliamentary
deputies.
Kyrgyzstan’s external weakness is tightly connected with its internal weak-
ness: besides Atambaev’s problems with implementing policies, Kyrgyzstan is
economically weak, with weak state capacity. From the very beginning, the
country was highly dependent on diverse external actors, including Russia and
Western countries. This changed in 2010, when Russia started to increase its grip
on the country. Parallel to this increasing dependency on Russia, there was a
significant deterioration of relations with the United States. Conflict between the
US and Kyrgyzstan took place against the background of general attitudes
that were pro-Russian and critical of the US amongst the majority of society
(Lewis 2015).
Kyrgyzstan ultimately did not copy the specific Russian law but emulated its
“idea.” In 2016, the parliament adopted a constitutional amendment which
banned homosexual marriages. The amendments were supported by a popular
referendum. According to the Central Election Commission, 80 percent of voters
backed the amendment. The fact that same-sex marriages have never been legal
before in Kyrgyzstan, underlines the symbolic intention of the lawmakers (Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty 2016).
Diffusion in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan differs from the Russian and Kyrgyzstani case significantly, because
the issues of moral conservatism and homosexuality were in no way politicized.
As argued above, the regime avoids politicization of any kind. It fears public
deliberation, public controversies, and social conflicts. Social actors who attempt
to politicize specific issues, such as nationalism, face harsh repression by the
state. Against this background, it is puzzling why and how the Russian law made
it to the Kazakhstani parliament.
A closer look at the process reveals two aspects. First, the domestic import-
ers, who were not part of the power center, did pursue individual interests. The
importers were members of the so-called Presidential Party “Nur Otan,” mostly
affiliated with the Parliamentary Committee on Social-cultural Development.
Even before the diffusion of the anti-propaganda clause, the deputies were moni-
toring Russian lawmaking. The Russian Child Protection Law from 2010 had
already been discussed by the Kazakh Parliamentary Committee. After Russian
lawmakers introduced the anti-propaganda clause into the Child Protection Law
(and some other relevant laws), their Kazakhstani counterparts followed at the
end of 2013 (zakon.kz 2015). Monitoring the Russian lawmaking process is not
unusual in Kazakhstan, but laws are not imported by default. One factor which
facilitated diffusion was the specific socialization of the members of the com-
mittee. The leading proponent of the draft law, Aldan Smayyl, has long been
known as a particularly Soviet-conservative and old-school lawmaker.8
Second, the import did not aim at a polarization of the issue of homosexuality.
This holds true for the law itself. Compared with Russia and Kyrgyzstan, the
Kazakhstani lawmakers literally hid the clause on “gay propaganda.” They did
not create a new paragraph but introduced this clause into an existing paragraph
on “information types prohibited for children.” The legislative process was
accompanied by statements by deputies, which were also published on a govern-
ment affiliated online platform. For example Deputy Kairbek Suleimenov stated
that “[t]he traditions of our people—Kazakh, Russian and the representatives of
all other nations who live on the territory of Kazakhstan—Kazakhstani ideology
and Kazakhstani psychology are alien to and against such tendencies that are
present in the West” (Tengrinews 2013). But these harsh statements never
became part of a broader regime-driven campaign to politicize and polarize the
issue. The same holds true for the group Bolashak, who started to support the
legislative initiative in September 2014 (Khegay 2014). Thus, the import of
the law remained under the radar of the country’s important media, all of them
under government control.
Avoiding politicization in a consolidated autocracy
In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev and the central government never publicly
supported the law. The law was adopted by the parliament, but finally dropped
by the constitutional court. Two reasons can be put forward. First, the govern-
ment did not want to risk domestic politicization of the issue. Moreover, by con-
trast to Russia and Kyrgyzstan, there was no urgent need to make use of it.
Kazakhstan was at this time (and still is) a consolidated autocracy with no poten-
tially dangerous protest movements. It was neither necessary to mobilize sup-
porters with risky methods, nor to delegitimize opponents.
The Second Chamber of the Parliament had already adopted the law, but only
three months later it was dropped: on 18 May 2015 the Constitutional Council
decided that it was unconstitutional.9 However, this was not a question of consti-
tutionality or unconstitutionality. Formally, the Constitutional Council verifies
the constitutionality of laws upon request. After both parliamentary chambers
had adopted the law and sent it to the president, they subsequently asked the
Constitutional Council for verification (Konstitutsionnyy Sovet 2015), which
rarely happens in Kazakhstan. According to an expert, “the Constitutional
Council is a very dependent structure, and it is very likely that the draft law was
sent to it from above.”10 Moreover, according to the same expert, the Council did
not provide substantive reasons for its decision.
Hence, the law was rejected because of interests and not because of constitu-
tional concerns. The lawmaking process purposefully did not lead to politiciza-
tion; there were no social conflicts or growing polarization. But the risk of
domestic politicization became real, when international organizations and
foreign states protested against the adoption of the law. The international actors
used Kazakhstan’s bid for the Olympic Games to exert pressure on Kazakhstan
not to adopt the law (International Partnership for Human Rights 2015). Of
course, there was also an interest in avoiding disadvantages, but in other cases,
Kazakhstan did not bow to international pressure.
Second, there was no serious threat to the regime caused by a protest move-
ment. Admittedly, the Kazakh regime was greatly concerned about a possible
spillover of revolutionary movements to the country during the Color Revolu-
tions, and thus implemented countermeasures (Jackson 2010, 106). At any rate,
the likelihood of a powerful protest movement was rather small in the country.
There were no organizations experienced with and capable of organizing pro-
tests, and the overall “protest culture” was rather low in Kazakhstan. Given the
fact that revolutionary movements must try several times until they succeed
(Bunce and Wolchik 2006) and that there had been no such attempts in the
country before, the risk of a successful revolution was very low.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have asked whether Russia’s “cultural turn” is ready for diffu-
sion to adjacent post-Soviet states, studying the diffusion of the Russian law that
prohibits “homosexual propaganda among minors.” Diffusion theory suggests
that geographical proximity, shared history and language, and previous cases of
learning or emulation make it likely that recipients continue to study the experi-
ence of others to learn from or to emulate. We posit that shared cultural predis-
positions might be another factor, generating diffusion in the field of symbolic
laws. This assumption was nurtured by the fact that several countries announced
similar laws. But then, legislative process only started in two countries, and only
in Kyrgyzstan was it followed by lasting (constitutional) amendments. We posit
two factors which make sense of this process: first, the politicization of moral
conservatism and especially the politicization of sexual norms, visible through
controversial deliberation, polarization, and contingent action. Second, it was
ultimately the urgent need of state leaders to consolidate their power or to
mobilize voters which made them adopt or support laws politicizing homo-
sexuality. Both factors were only given in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan is
an odd case. On the one hand, it represents those countries where neither factor
is present. Under the conditions of a full autocracy, politicization of specific
issues by societal actors was impossible; President Nazarbayev has preferred
technocratic styles of government and used non-politicizing methods of self-
legitimation. On the other hand, the clause on homosexual propaganda was
debated in the Kazak Parliament and, before being rejected by the Constitutional
Council, was even adopted by the Second Chamber. However, the whole process
was not subject to politicization; it remained under the radar of the public, and
resembled a kind of “technocratic emulation.”
What broader conclusion can be drawn from this analysis? The “anti-
propaganda” law, adopted in Russia and pending in Kyrgyzstan, should be seen
as part of broader social and political conflicts and as strategies for consolidating
power. From a normative and human rights perspective these laws are problem-
atic, because they contribute to the politicization and polarization of sexual
norms in an antagonistic way. Although they are not necessarily followed by dis-
criminatory measures by the state against homosexuals, they heat up the debate
and can generate hate and discriminatory action.
The fact that most state leaders in post-Soviet republics up to now have pre-
ferred de-politicized societies and hesitate to politicize cultural issues, such as
sexual norms, has prevented the spread of the “anti-propaganda” law. However,
if state leaders might feel threatened or undergo a phase of perceived or actual
weakness, they might be tempted to change their strategy and make use of this
instrument, tested in Russia and Kyrgyzstan before.
Notes
1 After registration at the Russian Duma in March 2012, in at least six other countries,
similar laws were announced: Ukraine (December 2012), Moldova (July 2013),
Armenia (August 2013), Kazakhstan (December 2013), Belarus (January 2014),
Kyrgyzstan (April 2014).
2 We follow Swidler’s definition of culture, which “consists of such symbolic vehicles
of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies as well as
informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life”
(Swidler 1986, 273). An example for an explicit political ideology (“highly articu-
lated, self-conscious belief and ritual system”) is the role of Islam in the political
system of Iran or the communist ideology in the Soviet Union or post-revolutionary
China.
3 According to anthropologists, homosexuality existed among the sedentary people in
Central Asia (e.g. in the Uzbek emirate of Bukhara). Social institutions, such as
Batsha in Uzbekistan, were explained by specific family structures with a rather iso-
lated social role for women (Baldauf 1988). Social structures and especially the role
of women in nomadic societies were very different from those of sedentary people.
Anthropologists believe that such institutions, such as the Uzbek Batsha, were either
very rare or non-existent among the nomads on the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Steppes
(Kushelevsky 1891).
4 Baldauf shows how Soviet policies terminated homosexuality in the Uzbek Soviet
Republic (Baldauf 1988).
5 For such attempts on the international level, see Wilkinson (2014); see also Laruelle
(2013).
6 On Nazarbayev’s modes of self-legitimation see Omelicheva (2016).
7 Telephone interview with Aliya Moldaliyeva, activist and former chief editor of Slovo
Kyrgyzstana, 1 September 2015.
8 Information based on a telephone interview with Olga Didenko, a Kazakhstani non-
governmental legal expert who participated in the lawmaking process, 1 September
2015.
9 Formally, the object of the verification process was the Law on Child Protection,
which contained the “anti-gay propaganda” clause.
10 Telephone interview with a Kazakhstani non-governmental legal expert who partici
pated in the lawmaking process, 1 September 2015.
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14 The emergence and propagation
of new conservatism in
post-communist countries
Systematization and outlook
Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga
Introduction
Back in the 2000s—and even more so in the 1990s—it hardly seemed possible
that the time would come when liberalism would seriously be challenged. Most
European countries still had political landscapes that encompassed many more
political currents, from social to Christian democracy, but the principles of
liberal democracy—building institutions to safeguard political, cultural, and reli-
gious pluralism—seemed to apply across the continent, or at least, those holding
power paid lip service to them. Liberal democracy most often went hand in hand
with a market economy: despite many differences between European countries
in their levels of welfare expenditure and the consultation of trade unions and
business associations in important decisions, market economies converged in
regarding private actors as the key actors of the economy, and in restricting the
state’s involvement in the economy to fiscal and monetary policy, abstaining
from industrial policy. However, this convergence is no longer taken for granted
and the Right is now virulently contesting liberal democracy and the market
economy. The concepts that scholars and the public media use for this new phe-
nomenon are “populism” and “nationalism.” In this volume, we have argued that
both concepts are insufficient for describing what the conflict is about not only
in post-communist Europe, but here in particular. Targeting the middle of
society, “the resurrection of conservatism” has developed into a battlefield for
the recombination of ideas and concepts against neoliberalism and the progres-
sive left. East Central Europe (ECE) and Russia are crucial in this respect, for
several reasons.
First, the reforms in post-communist countries were based on the neoliberal
script and loaded with high expectations and promises about the subsequent
welfare gains that would improve life for the vast majority. The famous dilemma
of simultaneity (Elster 1990; Offe 1991) was solved by an elite project that
pushed through these reforms without much democratic participation, and
without in the end delivering on its central promise of catching up with the West
in terms of living standards.
Second, in the transformation process, “the West” not only turned out to be
a moving target that could hardly be caught up with as quickly as hoped and
Emergence and propagation of new conservatism 281
promised (if at all), but it had also—within a relatively brief time span—lost its
appeal to the newcomers to the world of capitalism and liberal democracy. Disil-
lusionment on the part of Russia and the former pioneers of Western integration
(Poland and Hungary) has far-reaching consequences for the West itself and for
Europe in particular.
Third, in all three countries, the term “conservative” was not taken by other
political forces and represented a more or less unused ideational space that could
be occupied by the new conservatives and linked to their own country’s past for
the sake of societal and political renewal—a renewal supposed to better serve
common people and the nation. All three countries also have the intellectual and
organizational resources for creating new knowledge networks and discourses
in opposition to the global/European neoliberal mainstream and its domestic
representatives.
In this final chapter, we want to consolidate the findings in the different chap-
ters into one broader picture of conservatism in these three countries. We first
discuss the similarities and differences between the national variants of new
illiberal conservatism in the three countries. The key argument emerging from
this juxtaposition of similarities and differences is that conservatism contests
liberalism not just in terms of a critique of economic liberalism, but also con-
structs policies across a wide range of domains, from industrial to family policy,
corresponding to a core idea of development through tradition. The following
subsection shows how approaching conservatism as a multi-layered phenomenon
—involving intellectuals, state actors, NGOs, and Church actors—allows a more
precise tracing of the spread of conservatism and cooperation among conserva
tives more generally: cooperation, while highly unlikely at the top level of
conservative ideology production across all three countries because of the enmity
between Poland and Russia, becomes possible at what we refer to as the lower
level of ideology production. We end the chapter by discussing one particular
difference between Russia on the one hand and Hungary and Poland on the
other: namely, the relationship between political power and conservatives.
Conservative counter-movement: Similarities and differences

One common element on the agendas of post-communist conservatives is the
dissatisfaction with the results of transition, as well as with the legal and polit-
ical order that emerged with the fall of communism. Our contributors
emphasize how conservatives portray “post-communism” in a specific way,
namely as a deeply problematic, illegitimate political (and economic) system.
Liberalism has weak roots and was mainly experienced as market liberalism. It
had fewer buffers—“social embeddedness”—than in many parts of “old” con-
tinental Europe. Furthermore, conservatives credit liberalism with having
created an ownership structure that they consider illegitimate, either because
of the dominance of foreign investors and capital (Poland and Hungary), or
because it allowed a few people from the Soviet nomenclature to get very rich
in Russia.
While earlier comparative work has insisted upon presenting conservatism in
ECE as mainly concerned with historical memory, the contributions in this
volume show how contemporary conservatism in post-communist countries has
developed into a comprehensive agenda addressing various aspects of politics,
the economy, and society, united by a concern to ground change and develop-
ment in national traditions. A key interest of conservative thinkers is not just
defeating their opponents in debates about the communist and pre-communist
past, but also producing and transmitting knowledge that can challenge the per-
ceived intellectual domination of liberals and the Left (“left” and “liberal” are
almost indistinguishable categories for conservatives in all three countries).
In all three countries, the conservative intellectual current remains diverse, and
at least in the case of Poland and Hungary there is still a conservative under-
current that prioritizes, in a Thatcherite manner, a minimal state and free markets.
In Russia, too, there are “liberal-conservatives” who are deeply worried about the
return of state dirigisme and the extension of state ownership and want to cut
back the state. What “liberal” precisely means is highly disputed. The majority of
new active conservatives, however, is predominantly statist. It favors a strong
state that is at least capable of correcting market failures and of defining and pur-
suing its own interests in all areas of policy. The concept of “national interest” is
repeated emphatically in order to stress priorities. Concerns about the loss of state
sovereignty to the European Union are especially acute in the case of Polish and
Hungarian conservatives. But they are no less serious in Russia, where they are
linked more directly to vulnerability vis-à-vis global financial markets (exposed
to heavy crises in 1997–98 and 2007–09) and the global division of labor that had
a negative impact on Soviet-era industry. Against this background, conservatives
blame the liberal reform program for being a “great plan” to debilitate Russia’s
role as a world power through the agency of external transnational forces and
their internal “compradors.” That is why Russian ideologists and elites more
generally (not just the conservatives) have embraced a left-wing anti-colonial dis-
course that they combine with the concept of Russia as a center of its own in a
multipolar world. Conceptual ideologists elegantly bridge the latent conflict
between the ambition to form a Russian-centered “macro-region” and the concept
of classic national sovereignty as a foundation of a “new world order” by arguing
that smaller countries will join the macro-region according to their correctly
understood self-interest, as well as because of cultural proximity. It is important
to note that Polish conservatives actually share with their Russian counterparts
this highly emotional, anti-colonial, self-victimizing discourse, reflecting the dis-
satisfaction with their country’s position in Europe and the world.
With world power status out of reach, Polish and Hungarian conservatives
limit their ambitions to overcoming their countries’ semi-peripheral position
within Europe. But in all three countries, the urgent need to upgrade one’s posi-
tion in the international division of labor is a major driver and source of legiti-
macy for the conservative counter-movement against the ideas, concepts, and
actors that are made responsible for this position. To what extent this change is
called a revolutionary one varies between the countries. While in Russia many
conservatives avoid such phrasing, Hungarian and Polish intellectuals and politi-
cians do not mind speaking of a “conservative revolution,” or a “new republic.”
As in Russia, in Hungary and Poland this also includes the conviction that “the
West” no longer serves as a developmental model, and that repositioning
involves an opening toward the East. Polish conservatives see their chance in a
new European order open to Eastern Europe, but without Russia.
Polish, Hungarian, and Russian conservatives agree on the need for an
authoritarian “hard government” that is supposedly democratic because it claims
to serve the interest of the domestic working majority (Table 14.1). They reject
procedural democracy because of its lack of “substance” (Dąbrowska in this
volume), and regard institutionalized checks and balances as unnecessary restric-
tions on the efforts of new, morally upright ruling elites to overcome the stage of
“post-communism.” Their explicit statist version of economic neo-nationalism
can be traced back to historic legacies in the region; but legacies are defined in
the present, not in the past. The return to an authoritarian statism should be
understood—so a major claim of this book—as a search for a new, non-
neoliberal economic development model: a model that better serves the over-
arching goal of developmental catch-up, according to the new conservatives.
The renewal of the state and the elite is legitimated as necessary for a decisive
paradigm shift in political economy toward a heterodox economic model, com-
bining neo-Keynesianism with scholarship calling for an increased role of the
state not only in maintaining demand, but also in fostering and encouraging
innovation in particular among domestic, small, and medium-sized companies.
Furthermore, conservatives in all three countries strive for a developmental state
that generates more—or in the Russian case, less oil-and-gas-dependent—
domestic income by increasing the strategic coordination of the central executive
and by strengthening the redistributive capacities of the state. Supposedly, only a
sovereign national state is capable of pursuing this path. Such a path implies
“intelligent” protectionism for domestic business from outside competition, but
also goes beyond it. It includes a selective renationalization of formerly priva-
tized assets and concentrated investments by the state in infrastructure and
innovation; in Poland and Hungary, it involves increasing the tax burden on
sectors dominated by multinationals, and efforts to re-establish control over
national banks at the expense of European Union banking oversight institutions
(Dąbrowska, Buzogány and Varga in this volume; Sebők 2018; Méró and
Piroska 2016). This understanding of a developmental state is prone to “thinking
big”—projects realized by concerted action, directed from the center (Jasiecki in
this volume). Although the urgency and way this is spelled out varies across the
countries and in different conservative groups, this also represents a common
feature. It subordinates the economy to politics and weakens the autonomy of
socio-economic actors; as such, actors have to serve the public (national) good.
At the same time, the weak “middle class”—regarded as an important pillar for
domestic business that can be made responsible for national interests and
goals—is a major concern in all three countries, indicating the limits of the post-
communist development path and the failure to catch up.
The redistributive dimension is of great importance in all three countries. The
new conservatives regard themselves as “social conservatives”; this is a key
element in their counter-movement and not just a populist attempt to get votes
from the “losers” of globalization. However, their social conservatism is pater-
nalistic and selective: paternalistic, because the empowerment of non-state labor
representatives to improve their position vis-à-vis employers, in order to fight for
employees’ interests, is not part of the conservative agenda (on Poland, see Jas-
iecki in this volume); selective, because it prioritizes family policy and tries to
link other elements of social policy to it. Active family policy is perceived as a
crucial tool for restoring and strengthening the national community, and is even
regarded as an issue of national security. At the same time, family policy is also
seen as the basis for socio-economic development, for which liberals and the
Left did not provide any solutions, in particular with regard to solving the demo-
graphic crisis and, in Poland, the massive “youth export” to the low-paid job
market in Western Europe.
The new conservatives combine their social concerns with a pronounced
moral conservatism. In all three countries, “tradition” plays a twofold role:
restoration and reassertion of “national tradition” is necessary for (radically)
changing the path of development, and for overcoming the alleged social and
moral crisis. The traditional or “natural” family, ideas about restricting women’s
reproduction rights, anti-genderism, and state subsidies for families with many
children are all part of their agenda—as is the rejection of “externally imposed,”
“transnational” human rights. In all three countries, churches have been close to
nationalist and new conservative knowledge networks for a long time, and
(ultra-)conservative moral norm entrepreneurs have campaigned for restricting
reproductive rights and promoting “traditional” family values. And it is espe-
cially the case in Poland that an electorate particularly supportive of following
“traditions” has rallied around PiS, the main political party emphasizing con-
servatism (see Roose and Karolewski in this volume). The Polish Catholic
Church shares with the conservative ideologists its non-acceptance of the elite
compromise of 1989/90 that led the alleged “totalitarian merger of neoliberalism
and communism” under “post-communism.” With that, Church actors renounce
their earlier “contract” with transition elites to support democratization in
exchange for the further tightening of Europe’s most restrictive abortion law.
However, the harsh restrictions on reproduction rights in Poland caused massive
public protests in 2016. In Hungary the tightening of abortion legislation is even
rejected by the majority of Fidesz supporters, but Church actors and their polit-
ical allies have also had important successes, including the new constitution of
2010 passed by Fidesz, which states that “the life of the fetus shall be protected
from the moment of conception,” or the 2012 successful campaign against the
“abortion pill” mifepristone (Balogh 2017). In Russia, the Orthodox Church
(ROC) has become a key actor in an ultraconservative coalition since President
Putin acknowledged the need to fight the demographic crisis in 2006, and espe-
cially since 2010. Confronted with a strong societal and elite opposition to
banning abortion, the coalition has still managed to restrict the very liberal
Russian law and to place enormous moral pressure on women to serve the nation
with their “God-given gift.”
Despite striking similarities, the precise meaning of “tradition” varies between
the different conservative camps and between countries. Its concept depends
primarily upon how conservatives define the “nation.” Do conservatives follow a
classic way of understanding the nation and situate it within “Europe” (or “Euro-
pean civilization”), as in the case of conservatives in Poland and Hungary? Or
do they define their nation as a civilization of its own, as in the case of Russian
cultural sovereignty? In Poland and Hungary, “nation” is homogeneously under-
stood as an ethnic “community” (Gemeinschaft) of Poles and Hungarians. In
Russia, civilization implies a multi-ethnic concept of “nation” that is bound
together by a leading (Russian-Orthodox) culture and a sacralization of the state
as the power that constructs the nation. This sacralization stands in stark contrast
to the actual criticism of the neo-patrimonial state administration.
Second, tradition also varies with regard to the ideational canon to which
conservatives refer. In all three countries, the reference to some Western authors
is strong (e.g. Carl Schmitt but also Edmund Burke and US American conserva
tives of the twentieth century). However, Polish and Hungarian conservatives
see their ideational roots mainly in a joint Western European intellectual horizon,
while Russian ideologists are working on a re-invention of their own
conservative ideational classic period, which they merge with Western conser-
vative thought to varying extents. There is one Russian philosopher mentioned
in both the Russian and Polish conservative discourse—Nikolai Berdyaev
(1874–1948)—a decided anti-communist who saw in a vivid Christianity the
solution to restricting all types of totalitarianism. Yet in both conservative dis-
courses, he only plays a minor role. Despite Putin’s recommendation to read
Berdyaev’s work, many Russian conservatives consider him too liberal, while
among Polish new conservatives, the inclination toward European philosophy is
much stronger.
Third, the struggle with the tension between modernity and tradition varies
across the three countries. Interestingly, with their reference to the European
conservative philosophical tradition of the mid-twentieth century, Hungarian
conservative intellectuals resemble radical Russian anti-modernists such as
Aleksandr Dugin, as they reject even the first period of modernity and the Euro-
pean Enlightenment, with its rationalism and individualism, as the cause of later
decay. However, for most conservatives the rollback of modernity does not sit well
with an interest in fostering economic development, and in the case of Russia, with
a strong interest in securing “scientific technical progress,” a term openly used.
Not accidentally, in Russia we observe intellectual efforts to reconcile the concept
of rationality and notions of progress from the “first” organized and industrial era
of modernity with a reconstructed conservatism. This includes a rejection of
“environmentalism” as a Western, postmodern ideology that is imposed on the
developing world to block their catching up (see Bluhm in this volume).
Fourth, unlike in Russia, conservatives in Poland and Hungary are radically
anti-communist. Communism for them represents a model imposed from the
outside that froze the countries’ position as Europe’s semi-periphery. Similarly,
neoliberalism and liberal democracy are also perceived as having been forced
upon their countries by foreign powers and local representatives of those powers.
Furthermore, conservatives attack the compromise between the old and new
elites at the beginning of the transition toward a market economy that allowed a
peaceful transfer of power. At the heart of the criticism lies the accusation that
thanks to that compromise, former communists could retain their influence well
into the post-communist decades. Russian conservatives have to be more careful
with their anti-communist attitude if they want to reach the societal mainstream.
Their position toward communism is therefore more difficult and ambivalent. On
the one hand, they value the Soviet Union for its successful catch-up moderniza-
tion under Stalin and for regaining and extending the Russian sphere of influence
and its world power status, while post-communism is equated with the loss of
both. This does not exclude criticism of the methods behind such catching-up,
Stalin’s Terror, and the systemic flaws of the planning system. But they tend to
downplay these facts. On the other hand, Bolshevism as “liberal communism” is
blamed for its totalitarian progressivism, which devalued and destroyed tradition
and its fundamental institutions. Hence, the restoration of tradition mean neither
a return to a “Soviet Union 2.0,” nor to a pre-revolutionary idyll. Tradition
works as a kind of benchmark for a future-oriented renewal of society.
Russia’s entry into the European and world history of thought was, since the
nineteenth century, combined with a mission, as Paul Robinson reminds us in
this volume. The new version of this mission aims at changing the global order,
but also includes Europe. Russian conservatives offer to assist post-modern
Europe, or “Post”-Europe, in recalling its Christian roots and traditional values,
which in the Russian civilizational discourse is associated with the Catholic con-
fession as a related “Other” (e.g. as the foundation of another civilization not
belonging to the Russian “traditional religions”). In this ambition, they seem to
converge with Hungarian and Polish conservatives in particular, who call for a
similar return and claim to be leading forces in this respect as well. To that
extent, they are also prone to missionary thinking—a base that is open to both
collaboration and competition.
Table 14.1 summarizes the similarities and difficulties identified, and groups
them under four headings: heterodox economic policy, concept of tradition,
international orientation, and critique of “liberal democracy.” Although briefly
touched upon in this subsection, the remainder of this chapter discusses the latter
two headings, as the differences identified here deserve a separate discussion.
“Authoritarian diffusion” and Trojan horses?

The international orientation of new conservatives
Our volume also addresses the literature on authoritarian diffusion that has
researched the extent to which authoritarian regimes learn from one another, and
the extent to which autocratic practices spread across countries, most notably
from Russia and China throughout the post-communist region and beyond
(Ambrosio 2010; Melnykovska et al. 2012; Hall and Ambrosio 2017; Soest
2015). One claim arising in the context of authoritarian diffusion is that concern-
ing Moscow’s European “Trojan horses” (Orenstein and Kelemen 2017; Müller
2014), the idea that Russian authoritarianism might be spreading not only
throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but also to new member states of
the European Union; Hungary in particular is allegedly playing “a leading role in
a process of political backsliding in eastern Europe” (Müller 2014). Our volume
helps to add nuance this picture.
First, while “authoritarian learning” from Russia and cooperation with Russia
take place across the region, such cooperation has clear limits, and “receiving”
countries are very selective in what policies or laws they copy from Russia, even
if they come closest to Russia in terms of authoritarianism (Schiek and Isabaev
in this volume). Second, in the case of Hungary, where there are clearly identifi-
able cases of cooperation between Orbán’s government and Russia, there is
little evidence that such cooperation has an ideational basis (Buzogány 2017).
Quite to the contrary: rather than supporting any ideological defense of
cooperation with Russia, Hungarian conceptual ideologists work on strengthen-
ing cooperation with Poland and Western European conservatives (in this
volume: Buzogány and Varga; Dąbrowska, Buzogány, and Varga); and despite
his rants about Russia’s and other countries’ “illiberal” path also being the one
to follow for Hungary, Viktor Orbán did more to cultivate his relationship with
the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (a party he regularly visits) and the late
former chancellor Helmut Kohl than with Putin and Edinaya Rossiya.1
The basis for Hungarian–Polish cooperation is perceived identification with
“the West,” a “true Europe” around Western Christianity that clearly excludes
Russia. It is indeed between these two countries—Poland and Hungary—that we
find the strongest diffusion or collaboration on the basis of shared ideas and
ideology (in this volume: Buzogány and Varga; Dąbrowska, Buzogány, and
Varga). This cooperation became a starting point to strengthen contacts with
European conservatives, not Russians. For Polish conservatives, Russia is an
“other” that is rarely broached as a topic, and most often perceived as a menace;
after the Smolensk airplane crash, some of the most influential conservative
intellectuals—among them Legutko, Krasnodębski, Marek Cichocki, and
Dariusz Gawin—increasingly voiced their discontent vis-à-vis Russia’s conduct,
and in particular over the Russian presidency. Hungarian conservatives, most
active in shaping a pan-European conservative alliance around the Amsterdam-
based Center for European Renewal (CER), do not mention Russia (see
Buzogány and Varga in this volume). Issuing their biannual publication titled
The European Conservative in May 2017, the CER published a document enti-
tled The Paris Declaration: A Europe we can believe in, which provides a good
glimpse of the basis on which European conservatives cooperate across borders.
Written by 10 European conservative intellectuals, including Legutko and CER
chairman Lánczi, the document sees “Russian adventurism” and “Muslim immi-
gration” as threats to Europe, second to what they see as a far greater threat, “the
false Europe” of multiculturalism, reneging on its Christianity (“The universal
Table 14.1 Similarities and differences of new conservative thinking in the three countries summarized
Russia Poland Hungary
Heterodox economic policy

Restrictions on capital freedom, Capital control and restriction of Increased taxation of sectors dominated by foreign or multinational
aversion versus speculative capital capital outflow, restriction of companies; increasing state ownership in national banking sectors and
currency trade, control over central control over central banks
bank
Selective protection of domestic Yes No (tricky to pursue under EU legislation)
markets
Selective renationalization of key Yes (also by force: Khodorkovsky Yes (by means of buying shares)
sectors case)
State as development agent of the Present in all three cases
economy
Increase of wages as element of Present in all three cases
domestic market development
Positive attitude towards social Present in all three cases
spending
Tradition
Concept of national tradition Divided but mostly multi-ethnic National-homogeneous
civilization with Russian lead but part of a “threatened” Western Christianity
culture
Concept of “organic” change Hesitant to use the term revolution Can take the form of a “conservative revolution” in the name of tradition
Mission Global and European European
International orientation
Anti-colonial/question the recent Present in all three cases
global/European order from a
periphery/semi-periphery position
Pragmatic cooperation with Russia;
Solution to perceived decline of the Multipolar world Alliance of Eastern EU states and
principled alliance with Poland
West Ukraine (Intermarium)
Critique of “liberal democracy”
“Hard government”— Present in all three cases
recentralization of power and
strategic coordination from the top
Dismantle checks-and-balances in Present in all three cases although less pronounced in Poland
the name of the national majority
Tax breaks favored over subsidies
Direct state subsidies for child-rich Present in Russia and Poland
in Hungary
families based on “traditional
values,” anti-genderism, and
critique human rights as ideology
Equation of liberal left with Present in all three cases
neoliberalism as form of new
totalitarianism
Combined with strict anti- No Yes
communism
Liberals in their own country as Present in all three cases
“compradors” of foreign interests
spiritual empire of the Church brought cultural unity to Europe”). The document
is equally clear in seeking to distance itself from the Far Right, for instance by
means of numerous mentions of civicness or “civic loyalty” as a crucial “Euro-
pean tradition,” the importance of protecting “those who speak reasonably” of
“mortal threats,” praising the “vital democracies” of post-World-War-Two
Western Europe and their “civic vitality” (Center for European Renewal 2017).
Our volume thus explains why Russian new conservatives are more success-
ful in courting the European Far Right rather than fellow conservatives, despite
the many similar ideas that conservatives in Russia, Poland, and Hungary share.
Further complicating the prospects of conservative cooperation is the fact that
since 2012–13, conservatism in Russia has become a foreign policy tool to exert
“soft power” abroad, a counterweight to the liberal democratic soft power of the
West, which had reached Russia during perestroika.
This is where the multi-layered character of conservative ideology production
becomes clear, an aspect that we would like to highlight as a central conclusion
of the present volume. Multiple layers of ideology production participate in
enacting conservatism as “soft power” in Russia. An important presence in such
efforts is the knowledge network of those we have referred to as conceptual ide-
ologists: the conceptual ideologist Aleksandr Dugin is particularly well known
by Western media for his long-lasting connections to the West European Far
Right and the Orthodox Church in Southeast Europe. The ultraconservative phil-
anthropist and ideological networker Konstantin Malofeev plays at different
levels by supporting analytical think tanks, mass media, and a conservative civil
society. Another example is the former diplomat Natalia Narochnitskaya and her
EU-hostile, Paris-based European Institute of Democracy and Cooperation. She
is not only well connected in France, but also to the “national conservative” AfD
(Alternative für Deutschland, “Alternative for Germany”) and the journal
Compact. Magazine for Sovereignty, which is close to the party.
A further stratum is that of “the moral entrepreneurs” around the ROC, and
the ROC itself, which rejects the idea of a political religion as an abstract set of
ideas, but works as an ambassador on behalf of Russian civilization and culture,
as well as an ultraconservative moral norm entrepreneur within and outside
Russia (see Bluhm and Brand; Köllner in this volume). The ROC maintains
close relations with the US-based World Congress of Families (WCF ) and other
conservative pro-family organizations in the US. As argued by Bluhm and Brand
in this volume, this collaboration takes place at a lower level of ideology produc-
tion, defying the increasing anti-Americanism in Russia. The WCF further
represents an important, if not the main, venue facilitating contacts with Central-
and Eastern-European partners, including with Polish and Hungarian pro-life
activists (see Wierzcholska in this volume; Graff and Korolczuk 2017).
This cooperation is not an instance of the “diffusion” of the ideas of Russian
conservatives to other countries; it is more a reciprocal recognition of like-
mindedness which also allows some mutual inspiration and confirmation. At
times, this cooperation has even encouraged the Russian side to export its cam-
paigns, such as the highly successful mobilization against juvenile justice
(however, a demonstration held in 2013 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, which
only attracted a small crowd, confirmed the need for an interested internal
“recipient” in order to make authoritarian “diffusion” effective). Somewhat more
successful has been the cooperation with the American Christian Right, but in
the opposite direction. Larry Jacobs, a high-ranking WCF official, for example,
is proud to have advised Russian Orthodox leaders in drafting a new restrictive
abortion law and in advising on the law criminalizing “homosexual propaganda”
in Russia (Levintova 2014).2
In response to a Russian regime that they perceive as increasingly menacing,
Polish conservatives envisage a resurrection of Józef Piłsudski’s idea of the
“Intermarium” (Międzymorze), a military and political alliance of the countries
situated between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic, including
Ukraine. Long propagated by think tanks such as Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej
(“Center for Political Thinking,” see Dąbrowska in this volume), the idea
recently came closer to realization when Poland and Croatia announced the cre-
ation of the “Three Seas Initiative” in 2016, comprising 11 former communist
countries and Austria and aiming to foster cooperation in the fields of energy,
transport, and communications infrastructure.
A differing relationship between ideologists and state power

A central difference between Russia on the one hand and Poland and Hungary
on the other is the relationship of conservative ideologists with the inner circle
of the power elite. In Russia’s competitive authoritarianism, this relationship is
more complicated than in the other two cases. As Busygina und Filippov argue
in this volume, after 2012 conservatism became a political code in Russia,
helping to identify and punish potential critics and political opponents of Putin’s
rule. Conservatism did not, in this way, become an official “state” ideology, but
works as a central frame for all actors wishing to show their loyalty to the exist-
ing regime. The new conservatives played an important part in bringing about
this development, for which they were co-opted into elite positions in return.
This demonstrative loyalty, however, is combined with substantial criticism
“from within,” even though it is presented as aiming to improve the system. Rus-
sia’s conservative conceptual ideologists are not just “ideologues for hire”
(Shekhovtsov 2018, 80) but active participants in an internal elite struggle. Their
criticism is mainly addressed to other elite coalitions (the “system-liberals” and
liberal-conservatives), but also at Putin himself and his reluctance to fully adopt
their recipes and concepts while instead preferring to rely on liberals such as
Aleksey Kudrin, especially when it comes to macroeconomic policy. From their
perspective, Putin’s administration is doing too little to promote development
and achieve the status of not just a military, but also an economic, superpower.
The right development path for Russia is thus the topic of an ongoing heated
debate between different ideological and elite camps, and there are few signs
that Putin in this fourth term as president of the Russian Federation will clearly
decide for one side.
This relationship looks different in the case of Poland and Hungary. Conser-
vative intellectuals—of the type that we referred to as “conceptual ideologists”—
have stated their full support for the agendas of the ruling PiS and Fidesz. In
both countries the political parties in power today welcomed conservative politi-
cians into their ranks early on. Hungarian right-wing intellectuals, concerned
with what they perceived as the continuous influence of former communist offi-
cials in public life long after the demise of communism, joined Fidesz around
the mid-1990s and from then on have shaped its increasingly confrontational
course with liberalism. They have also shaped the party’s economic policy and
fully endorsed or defended Fidesz’ programmatic “National Cooperation” legis-
lation of 2010 (see Buzogány and Varga in this volume). Századvég, the think
tank close to Fidesz, has since the 2000s fostered a discourse around the import-
ance of “national interests” and “hard government” that has gained in strength;
this position is explicitly referred to as “conservative.” In Poland, conservatives
joined PiS as a platform in 2003, secured important ministerial and media posi-
tions in the first PiS government of 2005–07 and in the advisory team of presi-
dent Lech Kaczyński (see Dąbrowska, this volume). Prior to the elections in
2015, they participated in drawing up the electoral program of PiS. Under the
new government, they have accepted ambassadorial positions or joined the Euro-
pean parliamentary faction of PiS (Ryszard Legutko, Zdzisław Krasnodębski),
with one of them—Krasnodębski—currently serving as vice-president of the
European Parliament. Meanwhile, the public presence of conservative intellectu-
als has grown from a few university positions in Cracow and Warsaw to numer-
ous think tanks, foundations, and publications. Influential examples include the
Cracow-based Center for Political Thought, bringing together the articles and
books of the country’s most important conservative intellectuals, and Ordo Iuris,
the Warsaw-based organization of lawyers initiated to launch the 2016 campaign
for the total ban on abortion (see Wierzcholska in this volume).
Over the decades that have passed since the fall of communism, conservatism
has developed in all three countries into a complex network, spanning from
academia to the political parties in power, with a strong presence in media, and
with an interest in controlling the production of knowledge to guide the work of
politicians. To return to the point of conservatism’s multi-layered character, it is
important to note that as in Russia, in Poland and Hungary the production of
conservatism as an ideology has several sources, and spans two generations.
Next to academia, the Church—and a sentiment that the Church and religious
values also need to be defended after communism—represent an important point
around which conservative positions coalesce. The political sphere attracted
members from these milieus, or converged with think tanks and other organiza-
tions populating the academic and Church milieus. These individuals, and at
times their organizations, have formulated important concepts preparing the way
for the systemic critique of “post-communism” unleashed by PiS and Fidesz (see
Dąbrowska in this volume), and are formulating the programmatic documents of
the two parties, or publicly defending their programs. In Russia too, and roughly
at the same time as in Poland and Hungary, new intellectual circles and milieus
have emerged, perceiving themselves as conservative in a new way. They reject
Western “liberal-conservatism,” especially its “neoliberal” and “post-modern”
shift of the last three decades. Whether Vladimir Putin and the “party of power”
(United Russia) have an ideology—and even more importantly, follow one—is
heavily disputed. However, Putin’s openly conservative “turn” after 2011 grew
out of a longer development that also started in the early 2000s. Russian new
conservatives, like their Polish and Hungarian counterparts, today oversee an
impressive conservative infrastructure of think tanks, foundations, clubs and
publishing houses, partly supported and co-opted by the ruling elite, but in fierce
competition with other elite fractions over the way forward for their country.
The three post-communist countries we have focused on in this book can
easily be dismissed as too peculiar, too much shaped by the particularities of
transition to be relevant to understanding the increasingly virulent contestation
of liberalism. Quite often their illiberalism and statism is explained in terms of
peculiarities rooted entirely in the post-communist transition and commonalities
of the communist past, with little reference to broader trends, and their contain-
ment is commonly assumed to be a simple matter, if only the EU would do
something about them. However, it is striking that conservatives in these coun-
tries perceive themselves as an avant-garde, setting the trend for a European or
even worldwide contestation of liberalism. After the failure of the left-wing anti-
globalization movements to establish new global rules for financial markets and
capital transfers, the most virulent contestation of liberalism now comes from
the Right: the contestation is no longer just about the economy and the social
questions overlooked by market reforms; it also targets political liberalism. The
new activating conservatism proposes not just “economic nationalism”—a sub-
ordination of the economy to self-defined “national interests”—but ties eco-
nomic policy to social and family policy, seen as investment policy and not just
as measures mitigating the effects of markets; and it also involves a thorough
reform of the state, and a reorientation of international alliances. It does not just
question economic liberalism, but the struggle to reorient state action across a
wide range of domains from the perspective of national traditions.
While criticizing Russia’s “offshore oligarchs,” or Hungary and Poland’s
strong “dependence” on international capital, most new conservatives in the
three countries (and not only there) downplay any fears of authoritarianism—
and even regard the dismantling of institutions curbing the powers of rulers
(checks and balances) as an important prerequisite for development. In their
preference for leadership and for material over procedural justice, they are pro-
nouncedly anti-institutionalist. While careful to promote alternatives to eco-
nomic liberalism and construct policies across numerous domains, new
conservatives discard checks and balances and procedural democracy, notions
they vilify without offering replacements that could control the rulers that they
now so openly celebrate. The limits of the state in subordinating the economy
and society, counterbalances, and control over rulers are left to the moral integ-
rity of a new elite and to a patriotically awakening, but not independent, civil
society.
Notes
1 Orbán boasted with his close relationship to Kohl, even presenting himself as a “pupil”
of Kohl in 2016, in ways he never spoke of Putin; and despite the allegations that Putin
needs Hungary and other “Trojan horses” such as Cyprus or Greece in order to prevent
the prolongation of sanctions following the annexation of Crimea, Orbán declared that
he did not even think of using his country’s veto to stop the sanctions (Kaminski
2015).
2 The WCF together with five other US organizations also supported the law, collecting
the signatures of 100 groups from around the world on a statement endorsing the law
(Bluhm and Brand in this volume).
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Index
Page numbers in bold denote tables.

Abashin, Sergei 265 Alliance of Young Democrats—Hungarian
Abkhazia 173 Civic Alliance see Fidesz
abortion 31, 98, 134, 202, 207–12, 229, Ambrosio, Thomas 180, 287
237; adversaries 210, 212; banning of Anderson, Benedict 215
209–10, 212, 284, 292; costs 237; annexation of Crimea 165, 170, 173, 251
debates on 201, 208, 218, 238; anti-communism 6, 74, 140, 240
delegitimizing 237; legal 201, 209; anti-communist intellectuals 30, 136, 285
liberalizing 210; penalizing 237; pills anti-corruption 108, 133; and Aleksey
207, 284; prohibiting 210; propagating Navalny 39; policies 108
208; rates 224, 237; rights in Poland Antichrist 65
200–1; underground 207 Antonov, Anatoly 226–8, 230–2
abortion laws 198, 207–8, 210, 284; new Arcana (cultural magazine) 97–8
200, 284, 291; strict 207 Association of Women of Russia 227
“abortion-tourism” 207 Atambaev, Almazbek 271
abortionists 208 attitudes 9, 61–2, 95–6, 118–23, 135, 190,
abuse 5, 63, 234; alcohol 232; of executive 202, 246, 252, 260, 265; anti-communist
power 5 286; confrontational 131; critical 134;
activists 25, 31, 39, 214, 227, 240, 247–50, displaying homophobic 265; doctrinaire
266–7, 271; feminists and women’s 61; general 121, 271; hostile 137;
rights 198, 216; political 2, 9, 15, 27–8, negative 265; prevalent 216; strong anti-
33–4, 46, 157; ultraconservative 224 ideological 9; xenophobic 134
actors 2, 12–14, 18, 25, 32, 74, 95, 157, authoritarian 12, 95, 124, 134, 163, 267–8,
179–80, 198, 261–2, 282–3, 291; 283, 291; and anti-liberalism 240;
conservative civil society 7; character 95; control 263; cooperation
conservative discursive 94; economic 262; diffusion 180, 268, 286–7; features
38, 140–1; non-state 239; societal 14, 28; kleptocracy 2; leaders 161, 267;
267, 274 learning 287; measures 255; nature 260;
Aksakov, Konstantin 63 regimes 8–9, 72, 107, 133, 160–2, 199,
All-Russian Parents Resistance 268, 286; rule 72; statism 283; structures
Association 228, 239 2, 8; style 102; tendencies 108
alliance 3, 10, 34, 46, 73, 114, 125, 132, authoritarianism 67, 162, 184, 287, 293;
186, 289; between neoliberalism and the competitive 46, 291; electoral 266
political and cultural agenda of the New autocracies 162, 261–2, 264, 274;
Left 10; international 293; pan- consolidated 261, 273; electoral 261;
European conservative 287; political 74, Post-Soviet 261
78, 291; precarious 29 Averyanov, Vitaly 25, 32–3, 37, 39–40,
Alliance of Free Democrats 78 42–5
Index 297
Baltic States 4, 6, 13 against abortion 98; anti-”gender-
Ban, Cornel 3–4, 6, 13, 178, 180, 234, ideology” 198; pre-election 271
237–8, 248 camps 29, 107, 157–8, 224, 241, 263;
banks 5, 13, 34, 97, 117, 180, 189, 237, conservative 17, 44–5, 47, 132, 158–9,
268, 288; central 9, 29, 40, 178, 183, 285; cultural 269; elite 291; ideological
288; foreign 181–2, 185; state- 291; liberal 108, 131, 168; national 132;
controlled 138 political 9
Barnes, Andrew 13, 181–2 capital 36, 74, 103, 138, 146, 236, 281;
Bátory, Agnes 72–3 accumulating 138; domestic 140; flight
Belarus 2, 38, 161, 261, 269 165; foreign 117, 133, 135–6, 139, 181,
beliefs 16, 54–5, 57–9, 121, 260, 263; 183, 185; freedom 288; outflows 288;
conservative ideological 200; implicit speculative 191, 288; transfers 293
cultural 263; passive 263; PiS 199; capital markets 143
religious 44, 82; shared of Kazakhs 263 capitalism 28, 101, 136, 146, 159, 230,
Beloborodov, Igor 226, 230–1 281; approach to 130, 136; crony 184;
Benedikter, Roland 115–16, 125 democratic 102; foreign-led 136;
Benford, Robert D. 14, 26, 263 literature 5; national 28; patrimonial 73,
Berdyaev, Nikolai 36, 44, 99, 105, 285 162; political 92, 98, 110; transition to
Bielińska-Kowalewska, Katarzyna 201, 116
207, 209–10 capitalist 173; societies 93, 265; systems
binary-logistic regression 118–20 135, 173
birthrates 205–6, 223, 235 care work 204–5, 214–15, 217, 238–9,
Blaszczyk, Barbara 140–1, 143 254; crisis of 217, 219; family 206, 218;
blogs 77–8 and mothers shouldering the major
Bluhm, Katharina 1, 1–18, 25–6, 28, 30, portion of the family 206, 218
32–4, 36–8, 40, 42, 44–7, 74, 136, Catholic 7, 42, 76, 83, 99, 106, 108, 134,
223–41, 245, 280–94 136, 198–9, 201–4, 207–12, 218, 284,
boards 34–6, 38, 208, 225–6; supervisory 286; conservative ideology 203;
225; of the think-tanks 35, 225–6 organizations 212, 218; political thought
Bockman, Johanna 3–4, 14 99; social ethic 99
Bogolyubovo 248–50 Catholic Church 7, 99, 134, 136, 198–9,
Bohle, Dorothee 3–4, 6, 13, 146, 180–1 201–3, 207–12, 218, 284; in Poland
Bourdieu, Pierre 13, 246 212; using ideological terminology to
Brand, Martin 7, 9, 17, 36–7, 190, 223–41, reshape society’s view on abortion 208
290 Center Alliance party see PC
British conservative philosophers 132 Center for Conservative Research 28
Bucholc, Marta 94 Center for European Renewal 79, 287,
Budapest 75–6, 79, 133, 187 290
“Budapest Express” 178 Center for Social-Conservative Policy 30
budgets 145, 167, 190, 205, 234; federal Central Asia 262, 264–5, 267, 269, 287
163, 167, 172–3, 251; regional 167 Central Bank of Russia 34
Bulgaria 4–5 centralization 138, 140, 182; economic
Burke, Edmund 76, 285 166–7; political 161, 167
businesses 98–100, 110, 136–7, 165–6, CER see Center for European Renewal
172, 184, 203, 234, 270; domestic 283; Chamberlain, Lesley 163
Hungarian 184; middle-sized 189, 192; Chebankova, Elena 39, 159
national 40; Polish 139; private 165; children 118–19, 141, 186, 189–90, 202–6,
redefining 165; Russian 166; small 134; 208–9, 213, 215, 217, 226–8, 230–6,
successful 163 239, 252–5, 270, 272; allowances of
Busygina, Irina 9, 17, 157–73, 223, 291 236; education of 232, 235; health of
Buzogány, Aron 16–17, 70–86, 113, 235; illnesses 209; preschool 238; rights
178–92, 283, 287, 292 of 36, 227, 232–4; sexualizing 203;
small 238; and women 204, 227
campaigns 203, 269, 272, 290, 292; Christian values 59, 99, 105, 110, 131
298 Index
Christianity 56–7, 59, 65, 105, 287 social 145; Polish 216; primal 214;
Christians 65, 85, 105, 231, 269 transnational 235
Chrzczonowicz, Magdalena 203–4 companies 40, 98, 103–4, 115, 140–3, 182,
church 37–8, 65, 93, 96, 199, 201–2, 204, 188, 191, 210, 248–50, 288; domestic
207, 211–13, 216, 218, 247–9, 252–3, trading 181, 189; energy 141; export-
290, 292; actors 281, 284; affairs 38; oriented 139; foreign 104, 191;
attendance 121; devotees 252; and indigenous 139; insurance 138; largest
religious organizations 7, 224; and Polish 136; national 103, 140;
religious values 292; representatives 31; nationalizing 172; private 140; state-
singing 253; support of “League of owned 125, 136, 140–1, 143
Polish Families” 212; universal 64; competition 13, 36, 40, 166, 179, 252–4,
universalism 64–5 256, 283, 286, 293; degrading
Cichocki, Marek 100, 131–3 democratic 5; democratic political 169;
citizens 82, 144, 163–5, 186, 209, 211, 237; fair 139; global 159, 172; market 173;
fellow 43; grass-roots 37; Polish 116; programmatic 31; Russian party 27;
Russian 164; senior 115–16; Soviet 266 sporting 252–3; suppressed political 166
“Citizens Circles” 7 competitive authoritarianism 46, 291
Civic Platform 118, 123, 190, 200; liberal- conflicts 8, 13, 17, 61, 67, 73, 133, 142,
conservative 94; opposed by the 144, 230, 234, 245, 250, 256, 271; anti-
economic ideas of PiS 188 regime 263; armed 251; escalating 131,
Civic Platform Party see PO 146; internal elite 15, 240; open 246,
civil society 7–8, 47, 75, 93, 134–5, 140, 269; political 268, 274; social 143, 264,
203, 293; an alternative 93, 214; 266–7, 271–3
conservative 7, 225, 290; defined 75; conservatism 1–2, 7–15, 17, 25–7, 29–33,
ideology of 75; liberal 93; strengthening 55–6, 66–8, 73–4, 92–6, 107–10,
of 3 157–60, 162–3, 255, 281–2, 290–2;
clubs 27, 30, 33–4, 99, 293; Fourth of activating 1, 15, 293; contemporary 282;
November (liberal-conservative cultural 268; development of 46, 96;
political) 30, 38; parliamentary 132; dominant 163; enacting 290; facilitated
political 30, 96 8; illiberal 1, 4, 5, 7, 15, 25–6, 34, 38,
coalition 16, 83, 95, 108, 173, 200, 224, 46–7, 240, 281; intellectual 79; left-
226, 239–41, 263, 284; competing 95; wing 46, 172; liberal 44, 159, 170;
discursive 16, 98; fundamentalist 224; modern 10–11, 38, 41; national 124;
government 83; left-liberal 80; reconstructed 285; renaissance of 1;
mobilization efforts 239; mobilizing revolutionary 99; right-wing 172
240; of PiS with Solidarity 142; pre- conservative agenda 168, 198, 210, 218,
electoral 70; ultraconservative 17, 213, 223, 235, 284; new 30; shaped by the
224–5, 227–8, 234–5, 238, 284 Catholic Church and other lobby groups
collective bargaining 142 198; Orthodoxy 17, 36–8, 56, 226, 250;
Commissioner for Human Rights (Poland) stresses the role of the woman as a
205 mother 218
communism 1–2, 4, 6, 8, 26–7, 29, 75, conservative authors 77
81–3, 96, 101–2, 131, 281, 284–6, 289, conservative camps 17, 44–5, 47, 132,
292; liberal 286; opposition to 103; 158–9, 285
renewed 228; Stalinist 84 conservative circles 33, 203, 207–8,
Communist Party of the Russian 247–8, 250
Federation (CPRF) 8, 26–9, 34, 58, 240 conservative conceptual ideologists 291
communist past 6–7, 293 conservative counter-movement 25–47,
communists 2–3, 9, 83–4, 100–1, 165, 169, 281–2
282; former 8, 94, 100, 286; Stalinist 83 conservative criticism 110, 236; reinforced
community 12, 14, 62, 84, 132, 159, 179, 110
204, 216–19, 285; cohesive 218; conservative discourse 16, 28, 93–4,
epistemic 182–3; local 83, 214, 224, 99–100, 110, 216, 224, 237, 285;
249; national 13, 39, 84, 216, 284; new coalition 98, 109–10; established as an
Index 299
alternative to the dominant Cossack groups 250–2, 256
neoliberalism in its post-communist countries 2–8, 10–11, 14–15, 40–2, 72–3,
variety 93; organizations 96, 99 77–8, 113, 115–19, 121–3, 178–80,
conservative economic ideas 17, 160 184–5, 229–34, 260–2, 271–4, 281–93;
conservative economists 157, 184 developed 167; enslaves 84; non-
conservative ideologists 27, 33, 225–6, democratic 162; post-Soviet 170, 248
237, 291; new 12; and the Polish CPRF see Communist Party of the Russian
Catholic Church 284; and the Russian Federation
Orthodox Church 36–8 Cracow 97, 99, 186, 292
conservative intellectuals 9, 27, 74, 86, Crimea 33, 162, 165, 170, 173, 251;
92–3, 104, 108–9, 185–6, 285, 287, 292; annexation of 33, 165, 170, 173, 225,
and Andrzej Zybertowicz 101, 292; 251; developing 173; occupation of 253
appear in Hungary in the early 1990s culture 34, 37, 45, 59, 61–2, 67, 76, 97,
76; and the Cracow-based Center for 103, 106, 110, 122, 285, 288, 290;
Political Thought 292; portray the ideal national 63, 103; Polish 102, 104;
Hungarian state as a “neo-Weberian” political 135; Russian 41, 60, 159, 170;
state model 86 social 233; Western 61
conservative modernization 9, 39, 105, Czech Republic 4–6, 8, 180
130–1, 133, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143–6,
160, 167; alternative 92; ideology 160; Dąbrowska, Ewa 16–17, 30, 92, 92–110,
strategies 16, 130, 134, 142, 146 133, 136, 178–92, 283, 287, 291–2
conservative neo-nationalism in economic Dahlberg, Stefan 5
policy prioritizes state investment 40 Danilevsky, Nikolai 54, 60–1, 63
conservative parties 73, 108, 125, 212, decentralization, to accommodate EU
214; established 33; national 113, 118; regional policy demands 184
in Poland 115–25 Delyagin, Mikhail 38–9, 41, 43
conservative politicians 97, 99, 109, 158, democracy 3, 5, 7–8, 59, 67, 71–3, 75–6,
173, 292 100–1, 105, 115–16, 121–2, 131–3, 159,
conservative thinkers 60–1, 71, 98, 106, 161–3, 171; deterioration of 132–3;
157, 159, 282; British 78, 132; pre- electoral 261–2, 269; illiberal 10, 72,
communist 32 199; procedural 94, 106, 109, 283, 293;
conservative values 26, 29, 32, 47, 55, 97 sovereign 32, 160, 170
conservatives 5–7, 9–16, 32, 39, 74, 76, demonstrations 7, 210, 255, 291; protests
93–8, 100–7, 109–10, 157–60, 190, 266; unauthorized 266
227–8, 281–3, 285, 292–3; illiberal 15, development: conservatism for 38–41; of
48; left-wing 58, 172; liberal 32, 171; conservatism 96–100, 108, 110; model
moderate 38, 40, 43; new generation of 39, 42, 67, 137, 283; path 16, 26, 29, 46,
31, 37; Orthodox 34, 36; 55, 56, 61, 66, 283, 284, 291; state-
paleoconservatives 31; post-communist driven 12; track 2; trap 9
281; radical 173; self-proclaimed 158; discourses 13, 15–16, 46, 85, 93–5, 97–8,
social 31, 58, 70, 284 107, 110, 208, 216, 240, 245, 263, 270,
constitution 33, 61, 101, 105–6, 114, 124, 281; conservative-orthodox 35; political
133, 260, 264; made in the spirit of the 12, 75, 97; ultraconservative 226, 230
post-communist period 101; neocolonial domestic violence 204, 217–18, 238–9
Russian 33; new 71, 284 Dostoevsky, Fyodor 58, 64–6
Constitutional Council 273–4 Downs, George 162
Constitutional Court 79, 81, 109, 115, 124, Dugin, Aleksandr 27–9, 35, 42–5, 159,
132–3, 273; appointments 114; 172, 285
independent 76, 93; reducing the power
of 109 Eastern Europe 75, 137, 178, 180, 283,
Cook, Linda 9, 164, 223 287
corruption 16, 40, 80, 101, 104, 134, 184, EBRD see European Bank for
187, 234; perceived 5; scandals 16; Reconstruction and Development
systemic 143 ECE see East Central Europe
300 Index
ECE countries 116–17, 134–5, 178 tradition 43; parliamentary faction of
economic growth 3, 104, 137, 142, 161, PiS 292
167–8, 172, 181, 185, 223 European Bank for Reconstruction and
economic nationalism 13, 71, 140, 172, Development 182
181–2, 293 European Commission 114, 145, 190
economic policies 9, 13, 17, 29, 143–4, The European Conservative 79
157–8, 163, 168–9, 171, 173, 178–81, European Enlightenment 44–5, 285
183–92, 286, 288, 292–3; choices of European Parliament 72, 114, 292
163; liberal 158, 169, 173; new 138–40; European Social Survey 117, 119–21, 123
prioritizing state investment in the European Union 4–5, 73, 114–15, 132,
domestic market 40; unorthodox 179, 170, 178, 184, 199, 261, 282–3, 287
182, 185, 192 euros 116, 139, 141, 248–9
education 45, 74, 76, 83, 117, 119, 146, 157, Eurosceptics 73
203, 235–6, 251, 256; alternative 215; experts 17, 135, 142, 185–90, 192, 202–3,
family-based 240; mass 42; moral 105; 224, 226, 238, 266, 273; conservative
patriotic 106, 132; religious 134; sexual 181, 188, 192; economic 180, 185;
36, 200, 204, 210–11, 214; tertiary 119 groups of 38, 168, 170
elites 8, 16, 25, 29–30, 33, 36, 72, 93, Eyal, Gil 3–4, 9, 14
100–2, 106, 135–6, 142, 161, 224, 282–3;
business 104; communist 101; corrupt 93, FAFCE see Family Associations in Europe
101; dissident 6; domestic 136; global families 137, 141, 184, 189–90, 199,
financial 39; intellectual 136; left-wing 204–6, 210–14, 216–19, 224–36,
134; liberal 106, 132, 145; patriotic 46, 238–40, 249, 252, 263–5, 284, 289–90;
136; political 5, 27, 38, 47, 71, 95, 98, child-rich 231, 238; large 141, 228, 236;
100, 113, 134, 137, 141, 143; right-wing modern traditional 228, 232; of origin
135; ruling 32, 39, 102, 117, 133–4, 225, 234; Russian 229, 231; young 115, 235
240, 283, 293; transnational 39 Family Associations in Europe 212
Engels, Friedrich 14, 25, 71, 114 “family capital” 223, 236
entrepreneurs 36, 139, 233; Polish 102 family policies 17, 189–90, 198, 205–6,
entrepreneurship 138, 172–3 217–18, 223–4, 264, 281, 284, 293; and
Enyedi, Zsolt 72–4, 82, 84, 115 domestic violence 198; prioritizing 284;
ESS see European Social Survey pronatalist 223
Essays on Conservatism 36 Fatherland—All Russia Party 29
Eurasian 27–8, 31; civilization 44; Federation for Women’s Rights and
continent 27; exiles 28; integration 34; Family Planning 207, 209
thinkers 66 Federation of Independent Trade Unions
Eurasian Union 269 of Russia 36
Eurasianism 28, 269 female roles 213, 215–16, 265; intertwined
Eurofound Report 2016 142 with Polish nationhood 215; traditional
Europe 17–18, 32, 35, 40, 42–4, 47, 57, 215
60–1, 63, 65, 80–1, 85, 281–2, 284–7, feminists 198–9, 213–14, 216, 218
290; and the “Muslim immigration” fetuses 200, 207–8, 284; abortions of 208,
threat 287; post-modern 286; and 210; developed 208; malformed 208,
Russian youth 35; and the “threat of 210
multiculturalism” 287; and Western Fidesz 1, 16, 70–3, 76–83, 114–17,
legal tradition 43 119–25, 178–87, 190–2, 284, 292;
European 4–5, 35, 43–5, 75–6, 78–80, electoral defeats of 77; electoral
113–15, 117, 119–21, 132, 134–5, victories of 16, 72; electorates 125;
190–1, 264–5, 280–3, 285–90, 292–3; government 77, 114, 121–2, 181–3, 185,
conservative ideas 43; conservative 191; membership 75, 85; MPs 82–3,
intellectuals 287; conservative 182; national conservative 114, 118; and
philosophical traditions 285; PiS governments 125; return to power of
conservatives 79, 287; countries 134, 7, 83; supporters 119, 121–2, 284;
212, 280; integration 17, 121, 135; legal victories 76, 181
Index 301
Filippov, Mikhail 9, 17, 157–73, 223, 291 God 11, 44, 58, 60, 64, 212
films, and filmmakers 32, 37, 248, 271 governance 82, 116; autocratic state 143;
financial institutions (state-owned) 138 corporate 130, 139–40; paradigm 81;
financial markets 1, 293 paradigm of the West 81
Financial Research Institute 182–3 government 80, 82, 86, 99, 109–10,
First World War 140, 253–4 113–17, 120–2, 125, 138–45, 164,
Fodor, Gábor G. 75, 77, 79–82, 84–6 169–70, 181–2, 188–91, 235–8, 272–4;
forces 7–8, 13, 44, 62, 64–5, 72, 81, 83–4, conservative 178; forms of 60; leftist
104, 288; anti-communist 83; armed 125, 207; local 138, 140; new 34, 72,
252; conservative civil society 7; 133, 184, 292; opposition 140; people
constructive political 92; cultural- 60–1, 141, 144, 168; socialist 72, 184
breeding 64; far-right 1; intellectual 84; Graff, Agnieszka 7, 199, 212–14, 216–17,
liberal 240; market 41; security 173 219, 290
foreign investments 71, 166, 181 Greskovits, Béla 3–4, 6–7, 13, 146, 180–1
foreign rule (Polish struggle against) groups 4, 13–15, 31, 33, 47, 83, 85, 157–8,
215–16 168–9, 171–2, 214, 216, 250–1, 253–4,
Foundations of State Cultural Policy 61–2 270; conservative 248, 250, 283; local
Fourth Republic 92, 94, 97–9, 101, 105–6, 251, 268; societal 263
108–9, 187; emerging 99; and Poland Gyurcsány government 80, 184
133
France 28, 46, 125, 132, 138, 290 Hardt, Michael 42
Freeden, Michael 2, 10–11, 25–6, 38, 47, health, children’s 235
55–6, 68, 95, 245 Höjdestrand, Tova 232, 234–5, 240
freedom 11, 28, 43, 84–5, 105, 124, 165, “holocaust of unborn children” 208
200, 206, 219, 247; economic 103; Holy Virgin 248–9
qualitative concept of 43; and homosexuality 31, 98, 121, 125, 203, 238,
responsibility 30; sexual 213 248, 264–8, 270, 272
French Revolution 56 homosexuals 121, 214, 265, 267, 270,
FRI see Financial Research Institute 274
Friedman, Milton 86 hospitals 201, 254
Fronda 98–9 housing 140, 236
human rights 7, 43, 67, 114, 205, 235, 273,
Gadomski, Witold 189–90, 192 284, 289
“gay identity” 264, 271 Hungarian 18, 71, 74–5, 78, 81, 83, 124–5,
gender 198–9, 201, 203, 205, 207, 209, 180–3, 185–7, 189, 191–2, 283, 285,
211–19, 230, 238, 248; differences 215; 287, 292–3; businesses 184;
ideology 17, 134, 198, 212–13; issues conservatives 16–17, 76, 79, 85–6, 282,
17, 198–9, 207, 212–13, 217, 219; 285, 287; currency 181; economic
quotas 231; war on 17, 213–14, 219 experiments 189–90; economic policy
gender equality 199, 204–6, 216, 218, 230, and Fidesz 186; economic policy
235, 237–8; discrediting of 214; policies solutions 191; economy 183–4, 187,
213; and the problems of the 192; Fidesz Party supporters 16, 125;
transformation process 219 financial and industrial policies 187;
gender roles 17, 199, 203, 216–19; GDP 183; government 114, 124, 143,
traditional 213; unnatural 204 182, 186, 189–91; heterodox economics
generations 57, 77, 98, 103, 199, 204, 215, 184; intellectuals 86; liberalism 74;
217, 253, 292; first 74, 76–7; new market 182; media 70; oligarchy 192;
conservative 34; second 46, 74, 77–8; party system 70; policies 179, 185, 192;
younger 36, 92, 103, 109, 226, 228, 232 and Polish economies 185; and Polish
Germany 116, 125, 132, 138, 233, 291 intellectuals and politicians 283;
Glazyev, Sergey 34–5, 37–41, 173, 223 politicians 179; politics and society 71;
globalism 28, 45 press 83; Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
globalization 1, 12, 62, 65–6, 84, 214, 219, 70; pro-life activists 290; writer and
284 sociologist György Konrád 75
302 Index
Hungarian Conservative Speculations: Isabaev, Azam 18, 260, 260–74, 287
Against Post-Communism 76 ISEPR see Institute for Socio-Economic
Hungarian National Bank 183 and Political Research
Hungarian Socialist Party 70, 118–23 Ivanovich, Ivan 254
Hungary 1–2, 4–9, 70–6, 78–81, 83–6, Izborsk Club 33–4, 35–6, 37, 38
113–25, 132–3, 139–40, 146, 178–82,
184–5, 187–8, 190–2, 281–5, 287–93; Jacobs, Larry 171, 291
“civic” (Tellér) 82; emphasis on family The Jagiellonski Club (Cracow) 99, 109,
policy 190; illiberal democracy 85; 186
“Movement for a Better Hungary” Janke, Igor 186
(”Jobbik”) 74; and Poland 113–14, 118, Jasiecki, Krzysztof 16, 130–46, 283–4
125, 178, 180, 281, 283; post- Jews 84
Communist 71; transferring of Johnson, Juliet 13, 165, 178, 181–2, 239
autocratic state governance 143 journalists 31, 70, 98–9, 124, 185–6, 211
Huntington, Samuel 10, 55, 61, 161 journals 27, 30, 34, 36, 75, 77, 79, 290;
Beszélő 75; Essays on Conservatism 36;
ideologies 8–10, 12–14, 25–6, 29, 45–6, The European Conservative 79;
80, 82, 92, 94, 142, 162–3, 186–8, 287, Kommentár 77; leading 79; new 77;
289, 292–3; communist 10; conservative online 37; samizdat 75
party’s 190, 267; economic 96, 188–9; judiciary 71, 109, 114, 133, 138, 143
production and dissemination of 14, 74; A Just Russia Party 227
progressive 10–11, 25, 38; quasi-state 9;
thin 120, 122 Kacpura, Katarzyna 201, 203, 208–9
ideologists 25–6, 35, 71, 230, 240, 291; Kaczyński 6, 93–5, 101–2, 106–7, 109–10,
conceptive 14, 25, 38, 42, 71, 73; 131
conceptual 26–7, 34, 223–4, 282, 290, Karolewski, Ireneusz Pawel 16, 113–26,
292; and political activists 15 284
IFIs see international financial institutions Katehon 35, 48n11, 225
Ilyin, Ivan 61, 64, 68 Kazakhstan 161, 260–1, 265–7, 269–74;
IMF see International Monetary Fund citizens 267; ideology and Kazakhstani
importers 262, 272 psychology 272; lawmakers 272;
imports 264, 270, 272 parliament 272, 274; psychology 272;
infrastructure investments 138 regime 267
INS see Institute of National Strategy Khazin, Mikhail 28, 32, 223
Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 165, 288
Research 33, 35–6 Kholmogorov, Egor 31–2, 65, 169
Institute of Democracy and Cooperation Khomyakov, Aleksey 57, 59, 62
35, 290 Kireyevsky, Ivan 57, 60
Institute of Dynamic Conservatism 31, 33, Kirk, Russell 55
37 Köllner, Tobias 7, 9, 17, 240, 245–56, 290
Institute of National Strategy 36 Kommentár 77
institutions 12, 94–6, 105–6, 108, 131–2, Konopczyński, Filip 191
134–5, 137, 140, 142–3, 146, 228, 230, Konrád, György 75
235, 238, 255–6; authoritarian 143, 262; Korkut, Umut 72–4, 180, 184
democratic 109, 131; economic 106 Korolczuk, Elżbieta 7, 209, 213–14,
International Eurasian Movement 28 216–17, 219, 290
international financial institutions 178 Kremlin 29, 31, 33, 163–4, 166, 172, 225,
International Monetary Fund 84, 116 227, 248
investments 138–9, 144–5, 166, 186, 188, Krzaklewski, Marian 98
190–1, 236, 238, 248–9; concentrated Kuznetsova, Anna 232, 234
283; foreign 71, 139, 145, 166, 181; Kyrgyzstan 260–2, 265–7, 269–74; media
infrastructure 138; manufacturing 6; in in 265; moral conservatism and
Poland 139, 145; private 144; strategic homosexuality in 272; political activism
139 in 267; and President Atambaev 271
Index 303
Lakhova, Ekaterina 227 media 2, 5, 99, 102, 107–8, 110, 132–3,
Lakoff, George 11, 14–15, 85 201–3, 206, 208, 211, 235, 240, 249,
Lánczi, András 76–7, 79–82, 85 251
Laruelle, Marlene 28, 32–3, 37, 42, 159, Medvedeva, Irina 226
260 Memches, Filip 98
law 18, 59–60, 104–5, 114–15, 133, 198, Mezhuev, Boris 31, 36, 66–7
201–2, 207–9, 211, 236–7, 239, 247–8, Michnik, Adam 75, 98–9
260–2, 266–8, 270–4; anti-propaganda Mickiewicz, Adam 215
260–2, 267, 274; conservative-populist Mikhalkov, Nikita 32, 37, 39
party 179; draft 209–10, 212, 238, 261, Mikhalkov, Sergey 225
270, 272–3; electoral 114–15, 124; rule militarism 250–1
of 3, 43, 115, 134, 143, 145–6, 199 military 33, 100, 169, 252, 291
Law and Justice Party see PiS Miller, Chris 80, 163
Legutko, Ryszard 79, 97, 108, 292 Milyukov, Pavel 54
Lenin 4, 42, 103, 229; and Marxism- Mizulina, Elena 227, 231, 238
Leninism 4, 103; nationality policy 42 modernization 40, 44–5, 105, 135–6,
Leontyev, Konstantin 54–5, 60 159–61, 167, 265, 286; economic 157,
liberal democracy 5, 92, 97, 101, 132, 143, 159–61; imported 136; technological 40,
159–61, 163, 170–1, 189, 199, 214, 157, 159–60
280–1, 286, 289; development of 160, Molnár, Thomas 7, 72, 76–7, 81, 86
170; values 178 monetarism 3, 9, 40
liberal economics 104, 169 money 145, 160, 185, 234, 249
liberal economists 17, 158, 171 moral conservatism 18, 47, 260–9, 272; in
liberalism 1, 3–4, 7–8, 10–11, 13, 43, 65, Central Asia 265; diffusion of 262;
73, 75–7, 80–1, 83–5, 96–7, 159, 280–1, language of 270–1; and the new
292–3; classic 82–3; conservatism 18, conservatives 284; without politicization
281; and socialism 10–11, 67, 81, 96–7; of 261, 266, 274
virulent contestation of 293 moral renewal 44, 93, 95, 101, 107–8, 188
liberals 7, 14, 39–40, 73–5, 83, 85, 108, moral values 41, 246–7, 271
131, 168–70, 190, 224, 282, 284, 289, Moscow 27, 34, 36–7, 162, 166–7, 225,
291 248, 250, 252, 265, 267
Lipset, Seymour 161 Moscow State University 35
lobby groups 198 motherhood 215–18, 224–5, 227, 232–3
mothers 200, 202, 205–7, 215–18, 231–2,
Maciejewski, Jan 105 235–6, 238, 240; abandoned 219;
Mamikonyan, Maria 234 laboring 202; struggling 216
“Manifesto of Russian Conservatives. “mothers capital” 236; see also “family
Imperatives of a National Rebirth” 31 capital”
Mannheim, Karl 2, 10–11, 14, 25, 38, 43, MSZP see Hungarian Socialist Party
73–4, 245 Mudde, Cas 12, 113, 120, 135
Marcuse, Herbert 45 Müller, Jan-Werner 12, 73, 85, 113, 287
market economy 1, 5–6, 12, 31, 180, 230, Muslims 269, 271
280, 286
market reforms 5–6, 131, 293 National Bolshevik Party 28
markets 3, 5, 7, 31, 103, 110, 169, 288, National Conservative Union 31
293 National Cooperation Regime 82
marriage 203, 216, 229–30 nationalism 1–2, 12–13, 40, 42, 63, 66, 71,
Marx, Karl 14, 25, 71 96, 99, 140, 146, 181–3, 264, 280, 283;
Marxism 81, 84, 213 agrarian 183; chauvinistic 13, 42; crude
Marxism-Leninism 4, 103 63; non-revolutionary 42; populist 124;
“maternity capital” 223 right-wing 13
Matka Polka 215–16, 218 Navracsics, Tibor 76–7
Matyja, Rafal 97–9, 105 Nazarbayev, President Nursultan 263,
Mazzucato, Mariana 137 273–4
304 Index
Nazi Germany 252 133; and the Hungarian Fidesz 134;
Negri, Antonio 42 and the role of ideational foundations
neo-Eurasians 27–8 71; second and third government 76,
neo-nationalism 12–13, 283 79–80, 82, 124
neo-Weberian state model 72, 86, 184 Orenstein, Mitchell Alexander 3, 6, 115,
neoliberals 9, 96, 131, 158–9, 181–2, 117, 178, 180, 268, 287
184–5, 188–91, 293; economic reforms Organization for Economic Co-operation
8; strategies 134–5 and Development 113, 116
networks 2, 7, 10, 14–15, 46, 74, 184, 213, organizations 7, 13, 78, 80, 93–6, 99, 204,
218, 224; conservative pro-family 226; 207, 210, 212, 214, 218, 227, 234, 292;
expanding 11 conservative pro-family 96, 212, 290;
new conservatism 2, 9–10, 12–13, 15, international economic 3, 84, 145, 224,
25–6, 33, 46, 105, 185, 224; emergence 230, 273; non-governmental 7, 93, 269
and propagation of 280–1, 283, 285, Orthodox Church 7, 57, 264, 284; late-
287, 291, 293; in Poland 92–3, 95, 97, nineteenth-century Russian 64; religion
99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109 and politics in contemporary Russia
new conservatives 2, 4, 10, 12, 18, 39, 46, 159, 245, 255–6; in Southeast Europe
134, 223–4, 281, 283–6, 290–1, 293; 290
moderate 39; regarded as “social Osiatyński, Wiktor 7
conservatives” 284 OVR see Fatherland—All Russia Party 29
New Public Management 9, 72, 80, 86,
184 Palonen, Emilia 72–3, 181
new Russian conservatism 15, 17, 25–8, Panarin, Aleksandr 27–8, 42
32–3, 38, 224 Papkova, Irina 36–7, 39, 245
newspapers 212, 266; Fronda 98–9; parliament 5, 29, 101, 114–15, 166, 182,
Rzeczpospolita 104, 186; Życie 98 210, 238, 261, 269–71, 273;
nomads 264 conservative-dominated Hungarian 82;
non-voters 123 Kazakhstani 272, 274; national 260
norm entrepreneurs 9, 224, 228, 235, 240, Parliament, European 72, 114, 292
247; conservative moral 37, 223–4, 284, Parliament, Kazak 274
290; conservative Russian 230 parliamentary: commission 108, 213;
North Ossetia 173 committees 210–11, 227; fractions 201,
Nowacka, Barbara 203, 210 270
Nowak, Andrzej 97, 100, 102, 104, 106–7, Parliamentary Committee on Social-
143 cultural Development 272
Nowicka, Wanda 106, 200–3, 207–8 parties 1, 16, 29–30, 34, 73, 79–80, 107–9,
NPM see New Public Management 114, 117–18, 120–5, 130–4, 157, 188–9,
Nur Otan 272 270–1, 292; centrist 30, 122–3;
closeness to party for voters of 123;
Oakeshott, Michael 76 democratic union 131; economic left-
OECD see Organization for Economic wing 134; Fidesz 70, 124; first East
Co-operation and Development Central European 190; liberal SZDSZ
Oko, Dariusz 213 78; national-imperial 26; neo-
Oldakowski, Jan 186 conservative 119; new national-
opposition 25, 35, 43, 70, 73, 80–1, 92, conservative 31; people’s 125;
100, 108, 162, 169, 209, 211, 247, 249; post-communist 99; ruling government
democratic 75; extra-parliamentary 203
210–11; liberal 162, 255; parliamentary Patriarch’s Family Commission 226, 233
211; parties 70, 165, 198, 208, 211; pro- patriotism 15, 162, 250–1
democratic 162 PC 107, 130–1; activists 131; founding
Orbán, Viktor 6, 8, 16–17, 70–6, 79, members 130
81–3, 85, 124–5, 133, 143, 179, 182, peasantry 229
184–7, 190, 192; government and pedophilia 213
Russia 287; government in Hungary Pelc, Pawel 187–8
Index 305
periphery 12, 103, 118, 135, 146, 246, innovation 40; investment 187, 189,
289; semi- 103, 135, 184, 286, 289 293; macroeconomic 40, 164, 291
Petro, Nicolai 67 Polish: businesses 139; combination of
Piasecki, Marcin A. 183, 186–7, 189 populism and conservatism 131; crimes
Piketty, Thomas 138 104; culture 102, 104; economy 93,
PiS 16–17, 92–5, 107–10, 114–25, 130–4, 103–4, 106, 133, 139, 143, 185, 192;
139–42, 144–6, 178–9, 185, 187–92, families 108, 211; government 125, 130,
198–201, 208, 210–13, 217, 292; 187, 191–2, 203; history 96, 100, 104,
electorate 125, 141; government 94, 99, 106; and international classics of
109, 115, 125, 130–2, 134, 137–9, conservative thought 105; nation 92,
141–3, 187–9, 191, 198–202, 204, 212; 104–6, 208; pensioners 116; politics
leaders 131, 133–4, 142, 146; national 93–7, 108, 110, 185, 205; post-war
conservative 118; and PO supporters in conservatism 96; road to modernization
Poland 121; and Poland’s National 136–7, 146; society and politics 17,
Development Fund 183; policies 95–7, 101–3, 109, 141–2, 145, 198, 202,
109–10, 132, 143; politicians and 213, 215, 217–18; women 207–8,
experts 185, 190; power of 93–4, 99; 215–16
supporters 109, 119–22 Polish Catholic Church 99, 284
PO 27–8, 31–2, 36, 38, 58–9, 75, 80, 82, Polish conservatives 17, 92–6, 98–100,
107–8, 117–20, 122–3, 157–8, 168–70, 103–5, 109–10, 186, 189–91, 282–3,
187–8, 262–3; government 190; 286–7; envisage a resurrection of Józef
supporters in Poland 120–1 Pilsudski’s idea of the “Intermarium”
Poklonskaya, Natalia 248 (Międzymorze) 291; and Hungarian
Poland 4–5, 7–9, 92–3, 95–101, 103–7, conservatives 286
113–25, 130–46, 178, 185–8, 190–2, Polish Constitutional Court 94
198–201, 203–7, 209–13, 283–4, Polish Constitutional Tribunal 201
288–93, twenty-first-century 137; Polish Development Fund 138, 186, 189
accession negotiations with the EU 135; political elites 5, 27, 38, 47, 71, 95, 98,
budget deficit and public debt 187; 100, 113, 134, 137, 141, 143; emerging
currency of 116; democratic 219; and 100; general 98
the enmity with Russia 281; and the political forces 6–7, 81, 281; dominant
Eurofound Report depicting a 101; major 4, 102
fragmented and state-centered industrial political ideology 10, 45, 93–4, 108, 186,
relations regime 142; free 101; and 188; of alternative conservative
Hungary 1, 4–8, 14, 25, 115–17, modernization that Poland should
119–23, 125, 140, 179–80, 187, 281–3, embrace 92; dominant 94, 97, 110, 186;
285, 287, 291–2; imperiling 213; of Kaczyński 94
leading transition countries 6; political parties 1, 7–8, 13–14, 27, 74, 78,
membership in the Eurozone 132; 92, 125, 180, 192, 211, 218, 292;
neoliberal 217; new 145; partitioned Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)
216; post-socialist 216; pre-war 131; 78; Center Alliance party 130;
reproducing its peripheral position in its eurosceptic 132; Fatherland—All Russia
relations with the “old” EU states 135; Party 29; Fidesz 1, 16, 70–3, 76–83,
transforming into a supply base of raw 114–17, 119–25, 178–87, 190–2, 284,
materials and cheap labor for the EU 292; Hungarian Socialist Party 70, 118;
countries 135; and Václav Havel in A Just Russia Party 227; Law and
Czechoslovakia 75; and Western Justice Party 1, 16, 92–4, 102, 107,
European conservatives 287 109–10, 114, 123, 130, 178–9, 198–200;
Poland’s National Development Fund National Bolshevik Party (NBP) 28;
183 Polish Peasants’ Party 200; United
Polanyi, Karl 12, 146 Russia 9, 27, 29–30, 32, 35–6, 39, 160,
policies 100, 103–4, 109–10, 135, 141, 293
143, 145, 172, 178–80, 182–7, 190–2, political philosophy 75–6, 79, 97
204, 206, 282, 287; financial 190–1; political scientists 26, 35, 76–7, 79
306 Index
politicians 7–8, 12, 14, 17, 30–1, 74, 76, pregnancy 200–1, 203, 207, 237;
79, 180–1, 186, 252, 260, 262–3, 267, protection of 237; terminating 45, 207
283; post-communist 5, 101; publications, Hungarian Conservative
ultraconservative family 36 Speculations: Against Post-Communism
politicization 18, 94, 141–2, 192, 261–7, 76
270, 272–4; domestic 262, 273; societal public–private partnerships 9
264 Puchejda, Adam 109–10
politics 11–12, 70–1, 73, 80, 82, 94, 96, Putin, Vladimir 8–10, 27–9, 32–5, 37–8,
98–101, 104, 108, 170, 173, 245–8, 59, 67, 157–8, 160, 163–7, 169–71, 173,
255–6, 282–3; anti-liberal 114; 213, 227–8, 235–6, 239–40, 248–9,
conservative 78, 169; domestic 10; 266–8, 291, 293; administration of 15,
general 219; hard 260, 262; identity 10; 17, 30, 159, 224, 291; approval ratings
informing 94; populist 93; repressive 165; ascension to power 15; and
209; rightist 93; Russian 246–7, 255 Edinaya Rossiya 287; government of
Póltawska, Wanda 202 158, 165, 169; and liberal economists
Popper, Karl 86 17; popularity of 165; regime of 9, 158,
populism 1, 12–13, 70, 73, 93, 96, 108–9, 160, 162–3; return to presidential office
131, 134, 280; national conservative in 2012 15; rule of 166; succession line
122; and nationalism 12; nationalistic 165
138; paternalistic 73
post-communism 70–1, 73–7, 79, 81, 83, Ratujmy kobiety (committee) 210–11
85, 92, 96–8, 101–2, 105, 109–10, 281, recentralization 133, 140, 184, 289
283–4, 286, 292; rejection of 102, 107, reforms 6, 8, 82, 84, 101, 107, 110, 133,
188; Staniszkis’s theory of 102 136, 138–9, 166–7, 189–90, 192, 232–3,
post-communist 10–11; countries 3–8, 10, 280; economic 6, 8, 28, 102, 131, 159,
18, 187, 280, 282, 293; elites 93, 98, 170, 173, 190, 192; liberal 7–8, 229;
101, 109; Europe 2, 4, 10, 12–13, 136, political 160–1
280; MSZP 78, 80; order 98, 110; regimes 9, 83, 85, 142, 161, 164, 260–1,
period 14, 84–5, 96, 101, 104; region 2, 263–4, 266–9, 272–3, 291; change
6, 286 74–5, 83; hybrid 9, 260–3, 266; new
post-communists 5, 16, 70–1, 74, 83, 85, Hungarian 85
96–8, 100, 104, 109–10, 230; Third regional budgets 167
Republic 92, 96, 109; transformations regional decentralization, to accommodate
134; victory of 97 EU regional policy demands 72, 184
post-Soviet republics 260, 264, 269, 274 regression, binary-logistic 118–20
post-Soviet Russia, religious conservatism religion 44–5, 60, 67, 120, 183, 246; non-
in 28, 59, 237, 245–56 traditional 37; political 31, 290;
postmodernism 44–5 salvatory power of 58; traditional 36,
poverty 80, 206 42, 224, 286; universalistic 56
power 7–8, 15–17, 29–30, 43–4, 70, 72–4, religious conservatism, in post-Soviet
113–17, 131–3, 161–6, 168–70, 178–9, Russia 28, 59, 237, 245–56
198–203, 217–18, 285–6, 292–3; religious education 134
balance of 161; centers 25, 157, 262, Remizov, Mikhail 25, 31–2, 36, 39–45, 66,
265, 272; central field of 72, 80; 230
concentration of 80, 124; conservatives Renzi, Matteo 125
in 173; consolidation 165, 261–2, representatives 44, 46, 77, 95, 105, 108–9,
267–8; discursive 2, 27; economic 101, 125, 130–1, 143, 186, 202, 249, 272;
140, 146, 168; elites 142, 291; executive business 34; non-state labor 284
5, 41; external 75; global 1, 223; great reproduction rights 235, 284; restricting
37, 65, 68, 168, 170, 262, 268; party of 284
9, 15, 27, 29, 31, 293; political 81, 84, reproductive health 199–201, 203, 210,
113, 161–3, 166, 231, 281; president’s 214, 217; issues 198–9, 204, 211,
8, 271; regional authoritarian 72; 217–18; rights 17, 198, 200
separation of 101; structures 93, 234 reproductive rights, concepts 224
Index 307
right-wing: advisors 82, 85; conservatism nineteenth-century 58; universalism in
172; criticism 135; discursive agencies 56
93; elites 135; extremists 266; groups Russian conservatives 16, 18, 31, 33, 39,
268; intellectuals 85, 292; nationalism 41, 45, 47, 54–6, 63, 157–60, 168–9,
13; parties 1, 107, 131, 141, 145; 172, 283, 285–6; influenced by
politicians 133, 135, 139; populist and Slavophile ideals 57; new 25, 41, 47,
nationalistic protagonists 214; principles 223, 228; return to Danilevsky’s
74; radicals 214 approach and argue against universalism
rights 11, 67, 76, 200–1, 203–4, 206, 212, 65
214, 217, 219, 233, 240, 268, 270, 280; Russian Constitution 235
anti-system 132; of children 36, 227, Russian Culture 41, 60, 159, 170
232–4; collective 43; democratic 28; Russian Federation 35, 38, 234, 238,
female 218; generous 202; individual 246–8, 250–2, 255, 291
17, 46, 85, 143, 204, 214, 218–19, 240; Russian government 32, 36, 160, 163, 165,
minority 10, 146, 268; parental 233, 234, 236, 238–40
239; social 132; special 66; transgender Russian Institute for Strategic Studies 226
45, 238; voting 71 Russian law 18, 260–1, 268–73, 285
RISS see Russian Institute for Strategic Russian lawmaking 272
Studies Russian military dominance 17, 145, 173
Robinson, Paul 26, 47, 54–68, 161–2, 286 Russian National Front 35
ROC see Russian Orthodox Church Russian nationalism 42, 66; narrow 54;
Rogers, Douglas 245, 247 non-imperial 42
Roman Catholic Church 136; see also Russian Orthodox Church: authorities
Catholic Church engage in the institutionalization and
Romania 4–6 legitimization of the emerging field of
Roose, Jochen 16, 113–26, 284 conservative ideology production 37;
roots, political 130 clergy 252; internet journal pravoslavie.
rubles 232, 236, 238, 248–9 ru 226; in Russian society 255
ruling elites 32, 39, 102, 117, 133–4, 225, Russian Orthodoxy 17, 44, 56, 245, 248,
240, 283, 293 250, 252–6; role of 245, 255; united
Russia 1–4, 7–13, 15–18, 25–47, 54–67, with Belarus and Ukraine 38
83–4, 157–63, 165–73, 223–31, 233–7, Russian politics 246–7, 255
239–40, 246–8, 254–6, 260–74, 280–92; Russian society 245, 247, 251, 255, 268
and Central Asia 264–5; and the Russkaya Doktrina 32, 42, 44, 65
conservative economic programs 160; Rywin affair 2002 98, 105, 108, 110
conservative influence in 159, 161, 163, Rzeczpospolita 104, 186
165, 167, 169, 171, 173; criticizing
“offshore oligarchs” 293; distinguishing Sakwa, Richard 27, 46
from the West 56; modern 61, 158, 169, Scheppele, Kim 71, 76, 114
173; political leaders of 158; post- Schiek, Sebastian 18, 260, 262, 264, 266,
Soviet 252; regions of 238, 266; 268, 270, 272, 274, 287
revolutionary 265; in terms of Schlett, István 76–7, 79
authoritarianism 287; and Western Schmitt, Carl 41, 75, 132, 285
countries 271 schools 17, 36, 134, 187, 203–4, 252–5;
Russian 15–17, 35, 54–6, 58, 61, 65–6, neighboring state 253; public 203, 211,
157–60, 162–3, 169–71, 236, 253–4, 253
272, 282–3, 285–8, 290; adventurism Schumpeter, Joseph 161
287; army and Russian Orthodoxy Schwartz, Shalom 122
252–3; authoritarianism 287; businesses Scruton, Roger 78–9, 85, 132
166; child-welfare policies 232 Sebők, Miklos 182, 192, 283
Russian Child Protection Law 272 Second World War 10, 65, 104, 135, 252,
Russian conservatism 9, 33, 36, 41, 44, 54, 254
56–7, 59, 157, 245–6; contemporary 62, “selective economic nationalism” 181
245; history of 36; modern 34, 59; sex education 17, 203, 224
308 Index
sexual norms 266–7, 274 Strickland, John 64
Shchyogolev, Igor 225 Stroop, Christopher 58–9
Shekhovtsov, Anton 2, 9, 225–6, 291 Stumpf, István 76, 79–82, 85–6, 184
Smirnov, Archpriest Dimitry 226–9, 231, subsidies 103, 202, 289; cancelled
233 government 201; direct state 284, 289
Smith, Adam 86, 230 Supreme Church Council 37
Snow, David A. 14, 26, 263 Surkov, Vladislav 30, 32
social conservatism 30, 34, 59, 223, 284; Swiss Franc 116–17, 181
ideology of 30; and left-wing economics Szalamacha, Pawel 99, 109, 144, 187–9,
58 192
socialism 10–11, 25, 67, 81, 94, 96–7, 159, Századvég 70–1, 77–9, 82, 292; director
265 for research 77; director for strategy 81;
socialists 7, 34, 73, 77, 86, 158, 265 intellectuals 82, 85–6; think-tank 78–80,
society 4–5, 12, 59, 71–2, 84, 92–5, 161, 82, 85; website 82; writings 82
164–5, 199–201, 203–5, 208, 211–12, Századvég (social science journal) 78
216–19, 230–1, 262–5; neoliberalized Századvég Foundation 77, 186
93; open 86; post-communist 14; SZDSZ see Alliance of Free Democrats
preferred de-politicized 274
Soviet Union 14, 27, 39, 42, 46, 223, Tellér, Gyula 80, 82–5
237–8, 246, 252, 264–6, 286; former Thorne, Melvin 11
170, 265–6 Tikhon, Bishop (Georgy Shevkunov) 37,
Soviets 159, 231, 265 225
SRD see Strategy for Responsible Tompson, William 165
Development tradition 11–12, 15–16, 18, 38, 44–5, 47,
Środa, Magdalena 204, 211–12 100, 103, 106–7, 120, 122, 270, 272,
Stalinist communism 84 284–6, 288; conservative 1, 74; imperial
Staniszkis, Jadwiga 102, 109–10 42, 170; legal 42, 180; national 18, 38,
Stanovaya, Tatiana 162, 170–1 95–6, 131, 282, 284, 293; understanding
state 3, 32–4, 37–44, 80–2, 96–8, 103–5, of 44–5
131–6, 138–46, 163–5, 184, 217–18, transgender rights 45, 238
228–31, 233–5, 237–40, 282–3; all- transition 2–6, 12, 15, 17, 45, 97, 100–1,
powerful 255; authoritarian 271; 116, 159, 281, 286, 293; democratic
autocratic 261, 264; capitalism 39, 130, 169, 171; economic 5; post-communist
140, 146, 228; centralized 86; churches 293
37; dominant 245; efficient 99, 137; Treisman, Daniel 142, 165
egalitarian 60; foreign 273; intervention Trojan horses 286–7
121, 134, 223, 239; interventionist 38, Trotsky, Leon 229
41; lean 187, 190; liberal 86; mafia 184, Trump, Donald 132
192; media 2, 124–5, 199; neoliberal Tsymbursky, Vadim 27–8
217, 219; non-democratic 264; non- Tusk, Donald 130
liberal 72; oppression 75; oppressive 75;
ownership 140, 146, 173, 187, 282; Ujazdowski, Kazimierz 106
paternalist 72; pensions 191; pluralist ultraconservatives 17, 212, 224, 228–30,
106; post-communist 101; redistributive 232, 234–6, 238–40, 290; coalitions 17,
146; secular 131; sovereign 41; super- 213, 224–5, 227–8, 234–5, 238, 284;
centralized 166; unitary 140, 163 pressure groups 212; regard the lack of
state administration 41, 137, 144, 234, responsibility of fathers for their
245, 247, 253, 255; adjusted 143; central families as a legacy of communism 232;
146; neo-patrimonial 285 reject the existence of world
state ideology 46, 246, 291; new 246; overpopulation as “nonsense” 230;
official 170 reject the extension of human rights and
Stoeckl, Kristina 37, 223, 232, 245, 247 a concept of child welfare that has
Strategy for Responsible Development 138 developed over the last two or three
Strauss, Leo 70, 75–6, 79, 86 decades 235; reject the shift from state
Index 309
institutions to private families 239; Warsaw Uprising Museum 186
translation of “traditional values” into WCF see World Congress of Families
politics 240 Western Europe 2, 5, 10, 33, 47, 61, 178,
United Russia 9, 27, 29–30, 32, 35–6, 39, 230, 265, 284
160, 293; new majority party 29; party White, Kevin 70
agenda 32; party of power 9, 15, 27, WHO see World Health Organization
29–31, 41, 293 Wierzcholska, Agnieszka 7, 17, 134, 143,
US 31, 36, 78, 83, 107, 158, 167, 169, 183, 198–219, 290, 292
225, 234, 240, 271, 290; based world Wójcik, Piotr 103, 186, 190
congress of families 290; conservatives women 17, 45, 118–19, 191, 198, 200–1,
11, 285; dollars 116, 236 204–7, 209–10, 214–18, 227, 230–2,
236–8, 240, 248, 252; activists 198–200,
Valls, Manuel 125 203, 206–7, 216, 239; and children 204,
values 57–9, 61–2, 64, 66–7, 95, 97, 227; pregnant 237–8; rights of 143, 146,
100–1, 103, 105, 113, 119–20, 122–3, 198–200, 204–9, 213, 216, 218
134, 136, 199; fundamental 41, 58–9, World Bank 83–4, 138, 214
122, 125, 214; nation’s 55, 103; post- World Congress of Families 213, 225–6,
communist 101; universal 55, 57–8, 60, 290
62 World Health Organization 200, 203, 214
Varga, Mihai 1–18, 70–86, 178–92, World Russian People’s Council 37
280–93 WRPC see World Russian People’s
Venice Commission 114, 132 Council
Vladimir, Archbishop Evlogy 253–5 Wyborcza, Gazeta 92, 98, 107
Voegelin, Eric 70, 75, 77, 80–1, 86, 99
voters 70, 94, 122–3, 137, 173, 270–1 Yakunina, Natalia 227
votes 29, 70, 113–14, 122, 211, 284 Yeltsin, Boris 9, 28–9, 227, 229
Young Poland Movement 96
wages 142, 144, 163–4, 168, 184, 288
Warsaw Club 97 Zybertowicz, Andrzej 101–2, 132, 135
“Warsaw Express” 178–9, 181, 183, 185, Życie 98
187, 189, 191

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New Conservatives in Russia and East

Katharina Bluhm is Professor of Sociology at the Freie Universität, Berlin.

77 Women in Soviet Film

78 Russia—Art Resistance and the Conservative-­Authoritarian Zeitgeist

79 Ruptures and Continuities in Soviet/Russian Cinema

80 Russia’s Regional Identities

81 Understanding Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe

82 Russia’s Far North

83 The City in Russian Culture

84 The Russian Economy under Putin

85 New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-­

Edited by Katharina Bluhm and

ISBN: 978-1-138-49686-6 (hbk)

List of illustrations vii

1 Introduction: toward a new illiberal conservatism in Russia

2 Russia’s conservative counter-­movement: genesis, actors,

3 The universal and the particular in Russian conservatism 54

4 Against “post-­communism”: the conservative dawn in

5 New conservatism in Poland: the discourse coalition around

6 The national conservative parties in Poland and Hungary

8 The limits of conservative influence on economic policy in

9 The “Budapest–Warsaw Express”: conservatism and the

10 Gender in the resurgent Polish conservatism 198

11 “Traditional values” unleashed: the ultraconservative

12 Religious conservatism in post-­Soviet Russia and its relation

13 Ready for diffusion? Russia’s “cultural turn” and the

14 The emergence and propagation of new conservatism in

Katharina Bluhm is Professor of Sociology with a focus on Eastern Europe and

Irina Busygina is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Higher

The return of conservatism

Explanations for the rise of illiberalism

The weak institutionalization of political systems

The political economy of market reforms and transition

Civil society in ECE

How does Russia fit in? The re-­ideologization of Russia’s

Conservatism versus populism and nationalism

From communism to conservatism: the production of a new

National identity and space

Time of manifestos: the emergence of a conservative ideological field

Regrouping, radicalization, and counterbalancing

A regrouping of the Russian conservatives

The Izborsk Club—nexus of radical ideologists and political activists

The “moderate” counterweight

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the field of conservative

Core concepts in the new Russian conservatism

“Conservatism for development”

The sovereign state as nation or civilization-­builder

1 instead of human rights: the righteousness (pravda) of ‘man’

Tradition between cultural constants and modernity

Conservatism’s binary nature

Universalism in Russian conservatism

Papacy changed Christianity in many of its dogmas and teachings. It filled

Perhaps the Russian revolution, by its outcome, is even destined to redeem

Particularism in Russian conservatism

It is impossible to say which [form of] government would be better and

In the mid-­nineteenth century, the Slavophiles picked up on this theme. Aleksey

Ilyin claimed that “[t]here is no single universally obligatory ‘Western culture’

[…] advocates [of Western liberalism] postulate a single path of develop-

Particularism thus remains alive and well alongside universalism in con-

78 Russia—Art Resistance and the Conservative-Authoritarian Zeitgeist

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-

List of illustrations vii

2 Russia’s conservative counter-movement: genesis, actors,

3 The universal and the particular in Russian conservatism 54

4 Against “post-communism”: the conservative dawn in

10 Gender in the resurgent Polish conservatism 198

12 Religious conservatism in post-Soviet Russia and its relation

How does Russia fit in? The re-ideologization of Russia’s

The sovereign state as nation or civilization-builder

In the mid-nineteenth century, the Slavophiles picked up on this theme. Aleksey

Against post-communism’s “flawed” modernity

Tellér’s conception combines a quasi-Marxist perspective on structures such

Conservatism and the post-2015 “good change”

The socio-economic background of supporters for PiS and

Values and attitudes of the neo-conservative parties’

The self-definition of the PiS government and its

the criticism of the state’s liberalism (a night-watchman state) with the

The PiS government approach to socio-economic policy

radical de-urbanization and a return to agricultural practice, to the creation

Hungary as the avant-garde of heterodox economic policies