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Tanega V Masakayan Case Digest

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Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner appealed.

Found guilty once again by


the Court of First Instance,1 she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended
party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay
the costs. The CA affirmed the decission of the RTC and the decision became final and executory upon
the dismissal of the SC on the review on certiorari filed by the petitioner. Back to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set
for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m.
At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on
February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested.

Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February
15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.

On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to
be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of
another alias warrant of arrest.

Issue:

WoN the period had prescribed in the present case.

Ruling:

No, the penalty has not yet prescribed.

Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty which prescribes in one year. The period
of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he
"is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a
convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of
final judgment." This connotes that evasion is indeed another term for jail breaking. For prescription of
penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape
during the term of such imprisonment.

In the present case, since the petitioner was never confined, the prescription of her sentence never run
in favor. Thus, her penalty has not yet prescribed.

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