Parañaque Vs VM Realty
Parañaque Vs VM Realty
Parañaque Vs VM Realty
Realty Corporation
Facts:
The Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation,
pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, against private respondent
V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Metro Manila. The complaint was filed “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
Private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging
in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code);
and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
It turned out that the plaintiff had earlier filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same
parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939. Said case was ealier dismissed with
prejudice. The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became final. The RTC then
dismissed the second complaint, which the CA affirmed upon appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the local government of Paranaque can validly exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance
Ruling:
1. No. A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The following
essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
a. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
over a particular private property.
b. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit
of the poor and the landless.
c. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
d. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance because a resolution is different
from an ordinance. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment
or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
2. No. Although all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case, the
Court still holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the
State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata.
The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly
diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.