Zinn J.O. - Risk in Social Science (2006)

Risk in Social Science
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Risk in Social Science
Peter Taylor-Gooby and Jens O. Zinn
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Preface
Risk and uncertainty have emerged as central themes in social science,

for good practical and theoretical reasons. More flexible labour markets,
greater freedom to divorce, cohabit and re-partner and greater diversity
in life-styles erode the certainty with which people can map out their
futures. Step-changes in the complexity and scale of technological inno-
vation enable rapid rises in living standards, and, at the same time, bring
the possibility of major catastrophes closer. Unexpected disasters, from
the Challenger Space Shuttle to Chernobyl, from the Herald of Free Enter-
prise to Exxon Valdez remind us of the limits to our capacity for control.
Advances in social science improve understanding of how people per-
ceive and prioritise risks, broaden awareness of the bearing of a range of
other issues (trust, experience during the life course, democratic expecta-
tions) on people’s capacity to manage risks, and facilitate exploration of
the ways in which people communicate about and respond to risk and
uncertainty. New conceptual and methodological developments create
opportunities to extend this work.
In this book, we review recent work on risk, paying particular attention
to the way risk and uncertainty have emerged as central themes across a
range of areas. We also seek to draw together work from different perspec-
tives in order to improve current understanding of the contribution that
social science can make in this field.
The book rests on the active engagement of a number of people, includ-
ing in particular colleagues from the ESRC Social Contexts and Responses to
Risk research network and participants in our conference on Learning about
Risk in Canterbury in January 2005. We are extremely grateful to the ESRC
without whose support under grant 336-25001 this work would not have
been possible, and also to our project administrator, Ms Mary Mustafa, for
collating and preparing the manuscript against a very tight timetable.
University of Kent at Canterbury Peter Taylor-Gooby
October 2005 Jens O. Zinn
v
Contents
Notes on the Contributors ix
1. The Current Significance of Risk 1

2. Risk as an Interdisciplinary Research Area 20

Jens O. Zinn and Peter Taylor-Gooby
3. The Challenge of (Managing) New Risks 54

4. Crime and Risk 76

Hazel Kemshall
5. Risk, Environment, and Technology 94

Nick Pidgeon, Peter Simmons, and Karen Henwood
6. Everyday Life and Leisure Time 117

John Tulloch
7. Risk and Intimate Relationships 140

Jane Lewis and Sophie Sarre
8. Health and Risk 160

Andy Alaszewski
9. Life Course, Youth, and Old Age 180

Sarah Vickerstaff
10. Risk, Regulation, and Management 202

Bridget Hutter
11. Social Inequality and Risk 228

Anwen Jones, David Abbott, and Deborah Quilgars
vii
Contents
12. The Media and Risk 250

Emma Hughes, Jenny Kitzinger, and Graham Murdock
13. Social and Public Policy: Reflexive Individualization and

Regulatory Governance 271
Peter Taylor-Gooby
Index 288
viii
Notes on the Contributors
David Abbott is a Research Fellow at the Norah Fry Research Centre,

University of Bristol. He has a long-standing interest in issues of inequality
in Social Policy and has, since 1999, focused on research about the lives
of disabled children, young people, and adults with learning difficulties.
His latest book is Secret loves, hidden lives? Exploring issues for people with
learning difficulties who are gay, lesbian or bisexual (with Joyce Howarth,
Policy Press 2005).
Andy Alaszewski is Professor of Health Studies and director of the Centre
for Health Services Research at the University of Kent. Previously he was
director of the Institute of Health Studies (1991–2000) and Professor of
Health Studies (1992–2001) at the University of Hull. He is editor of the
international journal Health, Risk and Society (published by Routledge,
Taylor and Francis Group) and has published empirical studies of risk
management in health and welfare services (A. Alaszewski, L. Harrison,
and J. Manthorpe (eds.) Risk, Health and Welfare: Policies, Strategies and
Practice, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998 and A. Alaszewski,
with H. Alaszewski, S. Ayer and J. Manthorpe, Managing Risk in Commu-
nity Practice: Nursing, Risk and Decision making, Balliere Tindall, London,
2000), and a methodological text on Using Diaries for Social Research (Sage
December 2005).
Karen Henwood is Senior Lecturer in Social Science in the Cardiff Uni-
versity School of Social Sciences. She has substantive research interests
in the study of identity, culture, and risk. With Nick Pidgeon she has
previously studied the meanings and non-economic values people attach
to their natural environment. Throughout her career she has explored
the role of qualitative methods in psychology and the social sciences.
Her published articles have appeared in journals such as British Journal
of Psychology, Feminism and Psychology, Theory and Psychology, Journal of
Environmental Psychology, Social Science and Medicine, and British Journal of
Social Psychology.
ix
Emma Hughes is a research associate in the School of Journalism, Media

and Cultural Studies at the University of Cardiff. She is currently working
on an ESRC-funded project on Media Discourse and Framing and on her
Ph.D. which is based upon media representations of Genetically Modified
Crops. Recent papers include The Contaminated Risk of Genetically Modified
Crops: How threats are merged in the GM debate.
Bridget Hutter is Professor of Risk Regulation at the London School of

Economics (LSE) and Political Science and director of the ESRC Centre
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR). Her research concerns the
sociology of regulation and risk management, the regulation of economic
life, and the social control of organizations. She is author of numerous
publications on the subject of regulation including Risk and Regulation
(OUP 2001) and Organizational Encounters with Risk (ed. with M. Power
CUP 2005). She is also the Editor of the British Journal of Sociology.
Anwen Jones is a research fellow in the Centre for Housing Policy. Her
research interests include homelessness, anti-social behaviour, and sus-
tainable housing. She is currently working with Deborah Quilgars on
an EU-funded study of security and insecurity in home ownership and
another EU-funded project on cooperation in housing provision for risk
groups. Her publications include: Jones, A. and Quilgars, D. (2004) The
Prevention of Homelessness: an Advice Note Issued by the Welsh Assembly
Government, Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales and Fitzpatrick, S. and
Jones, A. (2005) ‘Pursuing social justice or social cohesion?: Coercion in
street homelessness policies in England’, Journal of Social Policy, 34(3):
389–406.
Hazel Kemshall is currently Professor of Community and Criminal Justice

at De Montfort University. She has research interests in risk assessment
and management of offenders, effective work in multi-agency public
protection, and implementing effective practice with offenders. She has
completed research for the Economic and Social Research Council, the
Home Office, and the Scottish Office. She is the author of the Home
Office risk training materials for probation officers, and the Scottish Office
materials for social workers, and has numerous publications on risk. Her
most recent publications include: Risk, Social Policy and Welfare (Open
University Press 2002) and Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice (OUP
2003).
Jenny Kitzinger holds a chair in the School of Journalism at the University

of Cardiff and is director of the Tom Hopkinson Research Centre and of
x
the Risk, Science and Health Media Research Group. Her work examines
power struggles in media production processes and is particularly con-
cerned with questions of media influence and audience reception. Recent
publications include Framing abuse: media influence and public understand-
ings of sexual violence against children (Pluto 2004), The Circuit of Mass
Communication: media strategies, representation and audience reception in
the AIDS crisis (Sage, co-author), Developing Focus Group Research: politics,
theory and practice (Sage, co-editor) and Mass Media and Power in Modern
Britain (Oxford University Press, co-author).
Jane Lewis is Professor of Social Policy at the LSE. She has a long-standing
research interest in family change, family policy, and gender issues. Her
most recent publications include: Should We Worry about Family Change?
The 2001 Joanne Goodman Lectures. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2003; and The End of Marriage? Individualism and Intimate Relations.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001.
Graham Murdock Reader in the Sociology of Culture at Loughborough

University, is well-known both nationally and internationally for his
research and writing on contemporary communications. His work has
been translated into seventeen languages and he has held visiting pro-
fessorships in the USA, Belgium, Norway, and Mexico, and most recently
in Sweden, as the Bonnier Chair at the University of Stockholm. He has
a long-standing interest in the way popular media represent areas of
contention and anxiety in social life and has investigated representations
of rioting, public disorder and terrorism. His recent and current research
examines the relations between media representations and public percep-
tions across a range of risk areas.
Nick Pidgeon is Professor of Applied Psychology at Cardiff University. He

has research interests in people’s perception of risk and its communication
with particular applications to public policy decision-making, environ-
mental issues (such as biotechnology, nuclear power, and climate change),
and industrial safety. A social psychologist by background, he has worked
extensively within interdisciplinary teams throughout his career. He is co-
author of the book Man-Made Disasters (with Barry Turner, 2nd edn. 1997)
and The Social Amplification of Risk (with R. Kasperson and P. Slovic 2003).
Deborah Quilgars is a senior research fellow in the Centre for Housing

Policy at the University of York. Her main research interests are in home-
lessness, housing and community care, and housing and risk. Deborah
is currently working on an EU-funded project on Security and Insecurity
xi
in Home Ownership; she was part of the research team involved in the
ESRC’s ‘Risk and Human Behaviour Programme’ which looked at fam-
ilies’ management of risk in a flexible labour market. Her publications
include: Quilgars, A. and Abbott, D. (2000) ‘Working in the risk society:
families perceptions of and responses to, flexible labour markets and the
restructuring of welfare’, Community Work and Family, 3(1): 15–36 and
Abbott, D. and Quilgars, D. (2001) ‘Managing the risk of unemployment’
in Edwards, R. and Glover, J. Risk and Citizenship: Key issues in welfare,
London: Routledge.
Sophie Sarre is a research officer currently at the LSE. Her primary research
area is families and social policy. She has also carried out evaluations
of services managed by the Department for Work and Pensions, The
Department for Education and Skills and the Family Welfare Associa-
tion. Publications include: (with Martin Evans, Jill Eyre, and Jane Millar)
Research Report, New Deal for Lone Parents: Second Synthesis Report of the
National Evaluation (DWP 2003); Evaluation of the Queensbridge and Dalston
Sure Start Programme (City and Hackney Primary Care Trust 2003); (with
Karen Clarke) ‘Breaking Down Barriers Between Health and Social Care’ in
David Taylor (ed.) 2001 Health and Social Policy Research Centre; (with
Jane Lewis and Jessica Datta) Individualism and Commitment in Marriage
and Cohabitation (Lord Chancellor’s Department 1999); A Place for Fathers:
fathers and social policy in the post-war period (LSE Welfare State Programme
1996).
Peter Simmons is a lecturer in the School of Environmental Sciences,

University of East Anglia. His main research focus for several years has
been the contextual study of public understandings of and responses
to environmental and technological risk. He also has a research inter-
est in space, place and risk, and in the use of deliberative processes in
risk decision-making. Current research includes a project on narrative
approaches to understanding people’s experience of everyday risk, part
of the ESRC-funded Social Context and Risk Response (SCARR) network.
Peter Taylor-Gooby is Professor of Social Policy at the University of Kent

and director of the ESRC Social Contexts and Responses to Risk network.
He is a founding academician at ALSiSS, a fellow of the RSA and current
president of the Sociology and Social Policy section of the BAAS. Recent
publications include: Ideas and the Welfare State, Palgrave, 2005; New Risks,
New Welfare, Oxford University Press, 2004; Making a European Welfare
State? Blackwell, 2004; and Risk, Trust and Welfare, Macmillan, 2000.
xii
John Tulloch is Research Professor of Sociology at Brunel University. His

research interests include the media and risk, high culture, television
production and Australian film. He directed the Centre for Cultural Risk
Research at Charles Sturt University, Australia, and currently directs the
Media and Risk Research group at Cardiff University. He is active in areas
such as HIV/AIDS research, sexuality and the body, fear of crime, and
perceptions of risk. He has obtained a number of grants in these areas from
the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical
Research Council. Recent major publications include: Risk and Everyday
Life (with Deborah Lupton), Sage, 2003 and Performing Culture, Sage, 1999.
Sarah Vickerstaff is Professor in Work and Employment at the School of
Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research at the University of Kent.
Her main research interests are in changes to the relationship between
paid work and the life course, in particular at the beginning and end of
‘working life’. She has recently completed work for the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation on Happy Retirement? The impact of employers’ policies and
practice on the process of retirement (The Policy Press, 2004), and for the
Equal Opportunities Commission on Older Workers and Options for Flexible
Work, 2005 (with W. Loretto and P. J. White). Sarah is also on the ACAS
Panel of Arbitrators.
Jens O. Zinn is a research fellow at the School of Social Policy, Sociology

and Social Research at the University of Kent. He worked empirically and
theoretically on risk and uncertainty for several years in the Collaborative
Research Centre on Status Passages and Risks in the Life Course in Bremen
(1995–9) and the Collaborative Research Centre on Reflexive Moderniza-
tion in Munich (1999–2002). Since 2002 he is working as network fellow
in the ESRC SCARR. Recent publications on risk and uncertainty: 2005:
‘The biographical approach—a better way to understand behaviour in
health and illness?’ In: Health, Risk and Society 7(1): 1–9; ‘Biographical
Certainty in Reflexive Modernity’. In: Kelly, N., Horrocks, C., Milnes, K.,
Roberts, B. and Robinson, D. (eds.) Narrative, Memory and Everyday Life,
Huddersfield University, 87–95; 2004; ‘Health, Risk and Uncertainty in the
Life Course: A Typology of Biographical Certainty Constructions’, Social
Theory and Health 2(3): 199–221.
xiii
1
The Current Significance of Risk
Risk is to do with uncertainties: possibilities, chances, or likelihoods of

events, often as consequences of some activity or policy. As such, risk has
always accompanied the development of human society (Sahlins 1974;
Garnsey 1988; Gallant 1991). Harvest failure, pestilence, migrations, new
currents in religion, technological developments, and the unforeseen
consequences of urbanization have all exerted a powerful and typically
unpredicted influence on the problems and difficulties we face. For much
of history, the lack of certainty was largely attributed to agencies beyond
human control: the ignorance of imperfect humanity, divine agency, luck,
destiny, or fate. In recent years, the idea of risk has attracted intense
scrutiny from social scientists—for two main reasons.
The first concerns the increasing complexity of our technologies and of
the institutions that govern our lives. Failures of technology and innova-
tion are well publicized. This applies to the Thalidomide tragedy (emerg-
ing in 1962), Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), the Challenger space
shuttle in the same year, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the continuing
arsenic poisoning of some 20,000 people a year in Bangladesh from the
early 1990s onwards (Pearce 2001), and more recent pharmaceutical,
nuclear, nutritional, and space-related catastrophes (the arthritis drug
Vioxx in 2004, the Tokaimura chain reaction in 1999, the BSE outbreak
from 1986 to 1996, and the Columbia space shuttle in 2003). These events
have all brought home the way in which risk has accompanied techni-
cal development and revealed the weaknesses of institutions for man-
aging the resulting uncertainty. Similarly, the shortcomings of a whole
range of social projects for improving human well-being, from high-rise
estates in big cities to the enormous growth of road transport, from the
1
centralization of the Soviet economy to the Common Agricultural Policy

of the EU, from the computerization of social security delivery in the UK
to privatization in health care and education, have all demonstrated the
difficulties in achieving the goals that had been confidently predicted by
their advocates. Issues of uncertainty are part of technical development.
It is the increasing complexity of the processes involved, both in terms
of the coordination of myriad activities in planning and in terms of
the institutions through which risks are governed, and the high level of
public awareness of shortcomings in risk management that account for
the peculiar modern force of the notion of risk.
Second, alongside the evidence that risk and uncertainty are endemic,
and that our technology and social institutions are unable to eliminate it,
it is increasingly recognized that risk and uncertainty also involve socio-
political questions of acceptability and of contest. Once risk issues become
politicized, the scope for resolution through technical means alone is
limited. A whole range of innovations including nuclear power, GM food,
motorway building and the Ilisu, and Namarda and Yangtse dam projects
all provoke vigorous and determined political protest. More broadly, the
possible consequences of the pivotal international project to impose a
largely market trade structure through the WTO, the shifts in the regula-
tion of intimate relations and family life as gay relationships are formally
recognized, the management of cohabitation, divorce and separation, and
the technology of fertility treatment and of the application of the new
genetics in people’s lives, all give rise to debate and conflict.
This has led to a rapid expansion of activity across social science.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we review these developments and pay particu-
lar attention to the trajectory of new work in economics, psychology,
and sociology. In all these disciplines, traditional approaches, based on
assumptions about risk calculation through the cool deliberations of
rational actors, abstracted from social and cultural settings and influences
or from the impact of emotions have been called into question. New
developments also seek to find ways of broadening debates originating
in decision theory and in the study of risk management into new fields.
These include the processes of risk communication, and the extent to
which users of mass media can be understood as passive recipients of
official messages; the way in which particular responses to uncertainty
emerge as normative systems, which constitute a factor in the govern-
ment of social life; the way the contexts in which judgements are made
influence risky choices by both lay-people and experts; and the social and
political outcomes in relation to trust or the operation of the institutions
2
intended to manage risks. One result has been experimentation with new
approaches and methods, including ‘mental modelling’ to understand
how people variously conceptualize risk issues and ways of coping with
them, new qualitative methods intended to provide opportunities to
examine the relation between a person’s social experience, biography and
identity and their conception of risk, and combined research methods,
linking together quantitative and qualitative work, to enable the gen-
eralization of conclusions informed by detailed and nuanced individual
analysis.
A further outcome has been a decline in confidence in technical experts
and in policymakers (both in government and in corporations) and the
proliferation of pressure groups and other bodies acting as watchdogs
and as rallying points for public concern. At the same time, people are
much more likely to take legal action when authorities fail to manage
risks successfully, leading to defensive constraints in many areas.
Risk has always been important. The increasing scale of the uncer-
tainties surrounding the technical innovations which our society makes
available at a breakneck pace and the collapse of confidence in authorities
and in official experts as the accredited managers of risk have pushed
issues in this field to the forefront in social science. They have also led to a
rapid pace of development in the social science concerned to understand
risk perception and response. In this book we examine in more detail
how risk has been recognized, analysed, and researched and how different
disciplines have responded, and provide an overview of the work that has
been carried out across a range of different fields.
The Emergence of Risk as a Social and Political Issue
The origins of the notion of risk are subject to debate. Wharton derives it
from the Arabic risq (‘something from which you draw a profit’—1992),
Chambers Dictionary from the Latin risicum (the challenge posed to a
sailor by a barrier reef—1946), Luhmann dates it in German to the mid
sixteenth century and refers to the Latin riscum in use earlier (1993),
and Giddens suggests it may come from the Spanish risco (a rock 1999;
see Althaus 2005: 570 for these and other derivations). Risk appears to
have emerged as an idea in the Middle Ages, in the context of voyages
into uncharted waters (Giddens 1999: ch. 2; Ewald 2002). It referred to
the uncertainty about outcomes of the exploratory/trading/imperialist
missions of the early mercantile world and was linked to the evolving
3
concept of insurance. It entered the world of moneylending and finance

more generally, and then became a useful tool in the conceptualization
of the probable consequences of investment decisions. During the eight-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of a mathematics of
probability (from Bernouilli’s ‘law of large numbers’, propounded in 1713,
onwards—see Boyne 2003: 4–9) facilitated the application of probabilistic
reasoning to risk issues, so that (as Knight puts it in his classic text, written
early in the twentieth century) ‘results become predictable in accordance
with the laws of chance’ (1921: 46).
The increasing sophistication of the mathematics of probability and
the economics of risk affected investment and market behaviour. The
early development of insurance was based on the experience and personal
judgement of underwriters (O’Malley 2004: ch. 6). Probability calculation
supported the development of a more sophisticated approach, where
the more modern notion of risk as ‘damage from the event multiplied by
the probability of the event occurring’ (Adams 1995: 8) leads to more pre-
cise estimates of premia in a competitive market. Insurance extended to
life insurance in the eighteenth century, and upper working class groups
developed mutual insurance and friendly society systems of support dur-
ing the nineteenth century. The progress of census and mortality statistics
enabled a more scientific approach to life insurance, with the foundation
of the Institute of Actuaries in 1848. These interlinked developments pro-
vided the foundation for modern approaches to banking, investment, and
insurance, and led to the growth of the international financial markets
that have now become central institutions in a globalized international
economy (O’Malley 2000; Baker and Simon 2002).
Techniques of probability assessment were applied across a broad range
of areas, including technical risk assessment through the sphere of busi-
ness and enterprise, epidemiology and the evaluation of the suitability of
particular treatments in modern health care, environmental protection,
and the management of crime. The method lent itself to risk monitoring
and response in virtually any field where evidence on current risk levels
is available, and can plausibly be used as a guide to the future. This is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. An important outcome at the
political level where merits more attention is the transition in the role
of the state through the developing modern period.
Foucault analyses this as a double process (1991). On the one hand,
governments sought to control their citizens by a whole catalogue of mea-
sures that include both the means whereby populations can be accurately
counted, assessed, judged, disciplined, and categorized. On the other,
4
policy aims at instilling appropriate values to achieve particular outcomes.

This is summed up in the compound notion of ‘governmentality’ (see
Dean, M. 1999: ch. 2). The logic of insurance is one means through which
both aspects can be linked. It includes the basis for a more precise estimate
of the needs and ability to pay of particular groups, and the justification
for different treatment of different risk categories.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governments
were able to accommodate to political pressures by extending and nation-
alizing the existing friendly society risk-sharing schemes of the upper
working and lower middle class into social insurance. This became the
foundation of European welfare states and the most important element in
government spending in developed countries in the settlement at the end
of the Second World War. The current pressures on welfare spending have
led to retrenchment of these systems (Pierson 2001). In some contexts,
this has meant a retreat from welfare inclusiveness to precise actuarial
calculation, with the denial of benefit to those who is with imperfect
contribution records. In others, it has led to the privatization of areas of
social insurance and the targeting of state help more accurately on clearly
defined groups (Myles 2002).
Risk, uncertainty, and risk-responses have also played a role in the
development of the institutions of family and household life. The slow
progress through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the legal
institutions that enabled women to hold property, gain access to employ-
ment rights and to independent social security, to the right to divorce,
towards control over their own sexuality and child bearing, and towards
a recognition of problems of violence and exploitation corresponded to
a shift in the status of marriage and sexual relationships (Lewis 2001).
Whilst marriage provided a form of security for women in dependence
on a male breadwinner (the domestic ‘haven in a heartless world’), the
development of alternatives raised the question of how to balance the
risks of threat, subordination, and lack of opportunity in marriage with
those available in other contexts. Population shifts included an increase
in the number of older, predominantly female, households, and raising
new issues about shifting patterns of poverty and of social need. In turn,
a new strand in the politics of personal interests, concerned with how
the risks of new and different lifestyles are to be managed, has emerged
(see Taylor-Gooby 2004: ch. 9). An increasing flexibility in family and per-
sonal life parallels the growing flexibility of employment in a context of
rapid technological innovation and ever-intensifying international trade.
Uncertainty is brought home at the level of individual life.
5
More Recent Developments
Risk issues and institutions for managing them have played an important
role in modern economics, in the development of the modern state, and
in relation to modern political and social institutions. Equally, develop-
ments in all these fields have directed attention to risk. Much of the
recent debate has been concerned with negative aspects, given impetus
by the obvious disasters, failures, and intractable problems referred to at
the beginning of the chapter. The core meaning of risk in the Oxford
English Dictionary is given as ‘a situation involving exposure to danger’.
However, in all economic, political, and social life, risks have a positive as
well as a negative side. This is also a key element in current conceptions
of risk, discussed further in Chapter 3.
A strong element in economic thinking stresses the importance of
risk-taking and the role of entrepreneurship (see Knight 1921: 361;
Schumpeter 1976). However, as Knight points out, a major direction in
the development of business is the prediction, analysis, and containment
of risks, so that, over time, risks are converted into certainties (Knight
1921: 347). One might add that large and uncertain projects which offer
possible high returns but involve considerable uncertainty have tended to
be supported by government, outside the traditional system of speculative
entrepreneurship—for example, North Sea Oil exploitation in the 1980s
and 1990s or the French nuclear power programme (the most developed
in Europe) from the 1970s onwards. As economies become more glob-
alized, and the capacity of nation states and other agencies to regulate
national markets diminishes (Scharpf 1997), the positive aspects of eco-
nomic risk-taking receive greater emphasis. This is summed up in the
declaration at the Lisbon EU conference in 2000 that the goal for Europe
must be to become ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based
economy in the world’ (Presidency Conclusions 2000: 3). The action
plan on growth and jobs includes ‘well-designed and sustainable social
protection’ to ‘minimise social dependency by creating strong incentives
to seek work, to take entrepreneurial risks and to be mobile’ (EU 2005,
Table 8).
In concert with this process, governments have encouraged policies
designed to promote ‘activism’, entrepreneurship, initiative, and risk-
taking among their populations, so that flexibility becomes the central
concept in the OECD ‘jobs strategy’ (Casey 2004, Table 1). The shift
from passive reliance on benefits to active willingness to seek jobs and
to retrain for them has been the leading theme in the ‘modernization’
6
of European and US social security systems through the provision of

opportunities rather than welfare handouts (EU 1997). At the level of
collective innovation, the political pressures on government to reduce
risks, running counter to an equal enthusiasm to promote and exploit
technical innovation, have led to discussion about the role of government
in managing new developments in the public interest. Here the chief out-
come has been the adoption of a ‘precautionary principle’ in regulation
(EU 2000: 1).
The problem that immediately emerges from the increased emphasis
on the positive as well as the negative aspects of risk is the question of
how to balance risk against advantage (Levidow, Carr, and Wield 1999:
307–11). This is intensified in the context of commercial and interna-
tional pressures, brought home by threats of trade wars and of WTO
litigation, to open up markets to new technologies. The most significant
example at the European level currently is the debate over the licensing of
GM foodstuffs. The EU initially refused to license some GM crops (oilseed
rape and maize) appealing to the precautionary principle, despite the
balance of scientific research which fails to provide compelling evidence
of problems. The refusal of five member states to accept the crops has led
to the maintenance of the ban, although the EU Commission’s officials
argue that it is hard to see how it can be scientifically, and therefore
legally, justified. The UK government sought to reconcile scientific evi-
dence and popular disquiet by organizing the GM Nation? Debate—the
largest consultation exercise about the introduction of a new technology
that is a matter of public concern so far in the UK—in 2002–3. The key
finding was that contact with experts hardened public opinion against
the new technology. The government has not licensed GM organisms,
possibly hoping that international commercial pressures at the level of
the WTO will resolve the issue. Political pressures prevent diffusion of a
new technology despite lack of scientific evidence—a clear demonstration
of the importance of political and social issues in policymaking about the
risks of innovation.
At the level of individual and intimate life, risk has always been bound
up with pleasure, in sexual relationships, eating, drug-taking, and a huge
range of other activities. We discuss recent work in this area further in
Chapter 3. One area of academic interest has been ‘edgework’—deliberate
risk-seeking in mountaineering, motor sport, relationships, sexual adven-
turing, and the new ‘extreme’ sports such as base jumping or free diving
(Lyng 2005). In social life, concerns about security interact with antag-
onism to paternalism, the nanny state, and over-regulation. This leads
7
to the view that, far from advancing enterprise and edgework, the pre-
dominant concerns of modern culture are obsessively over-protective:
one controversial perspective argues that current concern with risk pro-
duces a damaging ‘culture of fear’, expressed through a fascination with
risk-reduction in every aspect of lifestyle and a determination to find
scapegoats for any difficulty or set-back (Furedi 2002 and 2005; but see,
for example, Beck 1998; Harkin 1998; Mythen 2004 for contrary views).
Cultural shifts, influencing the way people think about risks at the per-
sonal level, are brought back to the political level, in the question of how
regulatory frameworks should operate in this context.
This brief review of some developments in economic policymaking and
in political and social life shows that, for a range of reasons, ideas about
risk and uncertainty and the availability of intellectual tools which both
claim to advance risk management and demonstrate the limitations of
such approaches have become more widespread. Risk concerns are now
pervasive and risk issues have become to a considerable extent political
and social concerns. In general, the climate of concern is negative: risks
are feared. However, there is also a positive side to risk in entrepreneur-
ship, active citizenship, and the excitement of edgework. Recent develop-
ments in the social science of risk are now recognizing both dimensions
in this developing field.
Approaches in Different Disciplines
Work on risk and uncertainty has advanced rapidly across a number of

social science disciplines. We review the impact of the new context of risk
research on developments in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Here, we wish to
chart out the main features of the work.
Economists have tended to tackle risk using a rigorous conceptualization
of rational action. A number of developments have led to modifications
of this core idea. Empirical evidence of paradoxes and inconsistencies in
the way people approach risky choices, even when they are relatively well
informed and have the opportunity to deliberate, provides a substantial
challenge (Hargreaves-Heap et al. 1992). A rational model places stringent
requirements on people’s capacity to process information and estimate
probabilities. Psychologists have demonstrated through experiment and
survey that cognitive illusions and distortions influence perceptions of
risk. Further work shows that responses to risks are often influenced by the
way the issues are presented. In addition, economists have developed the
8
concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1987) to capture the limitations

to people’s cognitive capacities.
As a result of these developments, work from an economic perspective
has increasingly moved from modelling based on assumptions about
rational action to attempts to chart precisely the limitations of ratio-
nal action in different contexts, so that risk responses can be analysed
more successfully. This process also reflects back on theory-building in
economics, since it provides an impetus for the modification of a simple
rational actor paradigm.
From a psychological perspective, approaches to risk are typically tackled
at an individual level, and experimental methodologies are important,
sometimes reinforced by interview and social survey. In addition to the
points about the limitations of human risk apprehension mentioned
above, work by psychologists has also demonstrated the importance of
other factors. For example, the issues of risk and trust, discussed in
Chapter 3, emerge from work that charts the interaction of the individual
social actors on whom psychology initially focuses. Recent work on men-
tal modelling has sought to analyse the conceptual frameworks in and
through which people think about risk and how to respond to it.
Social psychology has had a powerful impact on work from this per-
spective, bringing in psychometric contributions from social surveys.
This approach has demonstrated common features across concerns about
risks in a wide range of fields. Of particular importance to popular risk
judgements is the extent to which the issue under consideration provokes
dread, and conversely the extent to which it is familiar, regardless of the
objective extent of the threat involved (Slovic 2001: ch. 2). People who
take steps to avoid the dreaded unknown in possible but un-evidenced
risks from mobile phones may accept the substantial risks in riding a
bike to work on busy city roads. Work from this perspective has also led
to interest in the extent to which cultural factors influence risk percep-
tions and responses, and to attempt at ambitious theory-building which
include and seek to reconcile the contribution of both rationality and
the limitations of rationality on judgements. In addition, the institu-
tional frameworks which influence communication about risk through
the mass media and the opportunities people have to respond to risks
have attracted attention (Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slavic 2003).
Sociological approaches tend to start out from a rather different position,
since the background assumption is that social action is best understood
as shaped by institutions and culture, rather than directed by rational
planning or influenced by individual emotions. Risk approaches have
9
incorporated a strong interest in cultural factors, together with detailed

and often ambitious attempts to chart the importance of the institutional
changes that have recently brought risk to the forefront of debate. This
has led to approaches which link together the rise of the modern state and
modern forms of power to changes in the economy, in the experience of
work and in family life, and to the continuing impact of new technologies
and cultural shifts. A key focus is typically on the distinctive features of
modern approaches to risk. Serious analytical problems arise from the fact
that the theoretical frameworks used are often insufficiently precise to
generate hypotheses that can be tested successfully on the basis of the
available information. Cultural perspectives often lead to a case-study
approach. Such material requires careful situation in a broader theory of
society to support generalization.
This brief overview points to a number of features of social scientific
work on risk. All the disciplines have started out from positions which rest
heavily on core presuppositions: in economics, rational actor approaches,
in psychology, assumptions about the individual as the basic building
block of analysis, in sociology, the idea that culture or institutions can
be studied as developing in a substantially autonomous way. As research
has developed, these assumptions have been modified for two kinds of
reasons: first, work from other disciplines has influenced and contributed
to understanding, and assisted researchers in coping with the problems
they faced. Examples of this process are the importance in current eco-
nomic analysis of the psychological evidence about the limited capacity
of people to deal with risk issues and choices as, in any sense, rational
actors; the way in which psychologists have developed interest in ideas
about the impact of culture and of social institutions; and sociological
interest in the different rationalities of different social groups.
The second point concerns the impact of the experience of dealing
with practical issues on analysis of perceptions of and responses to risk.
Much of the impetus (and certainly of the research funding) for work
in relation to risk has stemmed from the involvement of government
and business in attempts to introduce new technologies or new forms
of management in areas where risks are involved. Research thus confronts
the puzzles and frustrations that arise when people do not respond to risks
and to expert judgements and advice in the ways predicted by theory—
whether the theory rests on claims about rational action, on assumptions
about the culture of different groups, or on other factors. One of the
most important contributions to social psychological work arises from
the developing ideas of Slovic, driven to a considerable extent by the
10
problems in understanding popular responses to dam and nuclear power

projects and by the politicized contests surrounding smoking in the USA
(1999). In Europe, the issues of GM food, of transport, of reforms to health
care systems, and of nuclear waste disposal have all provoked substantial
bodies of research (Royal Society 1992, 1997). These practical concerns
have also led risk research in new directions, concerned with trust in
government and in experts (raising issues about democratic institutions),
with issues of responsibility and with the extent to which research in this
field is a tool for popular empowerment or an additional mechanism for
official management (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 2002).
The impact of the theoretical problems experienced in different disci-
plines and of the practical demands made on risk researchers has been
twofold. The trajectory of academic development has led to increased
awareness of the limitations and difficulties of research confined within
one approach. This has led to greater interest in interdisciplinarity and in
hybrid approaches. At the same time there has been stronger recognition
of the interaction between academic research, government policymaking,
and the practical issues that confront businesses concerned to pursue
innovations across a wide range of fields. The outcome has been an esca-
lation of interest in research dealing with topics from crime to the mass
media, from public policy regulation to intimate family relations, from
employment to the environment, and seeking to situate understanding of
the issues within a broader intellectual framework. This book is designed
to provide convenient access to this growing body of work and to recent
theoretical developments.
We now move on to describe the plan of the book.
The Structure of the Book
Chapters 2 and 3 set out the contributions of different disciplines to

risk research, dwelling mainly on psychology and sociology. Chapter 2
examines the main areas of work during the past half century. In Chap-
ter 3, the most recent developments, currently attracting excitement, are
discussed. The following ten chapters each focus on a particular field of
research and follow a common structure of four main sections:
– A review of the context in which work in the field is situated;

– An account of how risks and uncertainties are understood in the area
and why the particular perspective has emerged;
11
– Discussion of the main research themes that have been the focus of
work during the past decade; the main findings of recent work; and
– The emerging problems and issues which are the focus of current
attention.
In this way, it is possible for the reader to trace developments and to look
at how interest has shifted between topic areas over time.
The key themes to emerge from the discussion of risk topics in the
chapters fall into six categories:
– A rapid expansion of interest in and awareness of risk;

– A shift from reliance on the perspectives of experts to much greater
recognition of the independent value of lay perspectives in under-
standing of risk;
– An associated move from rational actor to more socially informed
approaches;
– Theoretical and related methodological developments, concerned to
reconcile realist and constructivist approaches and quantitative and
discursive methods;
– A shift away from approaches directed at the elimination or reduction
of risk towards interest in the management of risks as they can be
identified; and
– New policy approaches which empower or (from another perspective)
subject individuals by shifting more of the responsibility for coping
with risk from state to citizen, running parallel to greater sophistication
in identifying risk factors and in the regulation and governance of
particular groups.
First and most obvious, all the chapters chart a rapid expansion of
interest in the theme of risk across all the areas examined. Issues have
become more complex as a result of technical innovations (e.g. in the
environmental field, Chapter 5, and in the problems to be regulated,
Chapter 10). At the same time, there is much greater awareness of the
difficulties faced by existing social institutions in managing risk, whether
in relation to crime (Chapter 4), securing satisfactory employment
(Chapter 9), or health (Chapter 8).
Second, approaches which focus on the authority of experts and gov-
ernment have tended to be supplanted by interest in the perspectives
of ordinary people, particularly those directly affected by the issue. This
is most evident in areas such as crime (Chapter 4) and public policy
12
(Chapters 13 and 10), where the emphasis was initially on the state impos-
ing particular regimes or implementing particular approaches. Research
focused on the technical value and the public acceptability of these
measures. This perspective has tended to be replaced by a broad range
of approaches which share much greater interest in the individual level
of understanding of risk, both in relation to the processes whereby people
assume responsibility for their behaviour, for example in avoiding crime
(Chapter 4) or in managing health and illness (Chapter 8), and in relation
to issues of trust, empowerment, and participation (see Chapter 5 on the
environment and technical developments).
Outside the immediate field of state regulation (Chapters 13 and 10),
research into family and intimacy (Chapter 7) or diversity (Chapter 11)
or into media and communication (Chapter 12) has moved away from
an understanding of the relevant processes as essentially ‘top-down’, so
that people tend to follow culturally prescribed roles or behave as passive
recipients of information about risks. These areas are now much more
likely to be investigated as interactive or plural, so that different groups
construct and follow norms and actively choose and assess media mes-
sages. This process is discussed in Chapter 6 on Everyday Life and Leisure
Time. Here the active construction of risk is conceptualized through the
notion of a continuing interactive ‘dialogue’ between expert and lay
understanding. The shift in approach has led to advances in research
methods, and the chapter also charts the growing interest in qualitative
and especially ethnographic methods as appropriate tools to study these
issues.
Expert authority is often seen as expressing scientific knowledge and
reasoned judgement. Initial work on risk responses often operated in
rational actor terms which privileged officially sanctioned expertise. The
third development, paralleling the move to value lay perspectives, has
been a shift away from the rational actor standpoint. Thus, approaches
to crime which stress the discipline appropriate to a logic of rational
deterrence have tended to be supplanted by those which focus more
on identifying risks and then on devising rehabilitation and training
programmes within the criminal justice system (Chapter 4). In analyses
of personal and family life, more attention is paid to the role of new
patterns of obligation and of ‘gendered moral rationalities’ in managing
relationships, as separation and re-partnering give rise to a more complex
set of interconnection (Chapter 7). In risk regulation research, the perspec-
tive that stressed technical issues of risk and the processes appropriate to
improving safety has been succeeded by one that also includes the social
13
factors that influence how people behave in managing systems to gain

higher levels of security (Chapter 10).
Fourth, there are new developments at a theoretical level, with impli-
cations for research methods that have not yet been fully realized. Many
researchers have grown uneasy with simple distinctions between realist
and constructivism approaches to risk, the former emphasizing risk as
external to and independent from social factors, and the latter seeing the
categorization of particular activities or phenomena as risky as itself a
product of social processes (Chapters 2 and 6). This leads to conceptual-
izations which seek to reconcile both approaches. In work on the role of
the media in communication and everyday life, researchers increasingly
analyse the way in which people reflect on and interact with the messages
they receive in constructing and modifying their own recognition of
risk (Chapter 12). In areas such as crime (Chapter 4), or health risks
(Chapter 8), the official agenda is mediated through popular responses.
The importance of the context of the rapid social changes discussed
earlier in this chapter to the intellectual processes which have directed
risk research is also significant. In many areas an important factor in
research has been the way that, just at the same time as people have
become more aware of risks, it has been recognized that the capacity
of the state or other authorities to meet them has been curtailed by
the pressures of globalization and by the reduced willingness of citizens
to accept direction from the authorities. The outcome is a tendency to
move towards analyses which consider risk not so much as something
to be controlled and removed, but as part of the context in which peo-
ple live, and to which they must adjust in their everyday activities, in
family life, in health behaviour, in seeking work or in planning retire-
ment, and in relation to ethnic diversity or sexuality (Chapters 6–9,
and 11).
These theoretical developments raise two important issues in relation
to methodology. The first is a shift towards detailed case studies of par-
ticular risk issues (the BSE crisis, mobile phones, street crime, unsafe
sexual practices, nanotechnology, and MSR vaccination) in order to chart
the interactions between the objective and constructed dimensions of
risk. Problems then arise in linking the particular to the more general
theoretical level of accounts of the social changes which underlie current
interest in risk issues. Chapters 6 on everyday life and 12 on commu-
nication discuss the way in which the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology has
exacerbated the problem of relating the ‘grand narrative’ to the everyday.
In Chapter 3 some of the recent approaches to this problem are discussed.
14
These include biographical methodologies, which situate the particular

risk issues along an individual’s life course, and combined quantitative
and qualitative research, which seek to link together the insights into
individual understanding of problems derived from interactive inter-
viewing with the generalizability of large, random-sample structured
surveys.
The fifth area of interest concerns the policy relevance of research.
The trajectory of development in a number of areas has been, broadly
speaking, from risk reduction to risk management, as mentioned above.
Policymakers increasingly recognize that the elimination of all risk is an
unlikely goal, and focus on systems that more accurately identify and
categorize risks and provide programmes for handling and reducing them
(see Chapters 4, 8, 10, and 13). This point corresponds to the argument
at the more theoretical level that risks are to be seen much more as
part of the way that people construct their social environment, rather
than as external and objective. In penal policy and in social services
(Chapters 4 and 13), the process of risk assessment is central to the way
in which offenders or members of different need groups are classified and
managed. Interest in risk factors in epidemiology and in the management
of health problems plays a similar role (Chapter 8). Assessment leads
to recommendations for custodial or non-custodial sentences, surveil-
lance through probation, provision of home help services, programmes
of health visitor contact to check on children’s development, and so on
(see Kemshall 2002; Warner and Gabe 2004).
Sixth, a number of commentators have suggested that risk has become a
central aspect of governance (for example, Dean, H. 1999; O’Malley 2000).
This develops in two directions: through the growing individualization
of risk and risk responsibilities in the discourse of official statements
(mentioned in the second point above), and through the emphasis on
regulation and control as policymakers have lost confidence in exclu-
sive reliance on rational actor approaches for changing the behaviour
of problematic groups and as new mechanisms for directing such risk-
management more accurately towards social problems have developed
(the fifth point).
From the first perspective, individuals are encouraged, for example,
through the counselling on job prospects included in the New Deal
for young unemployed people (Chapter 9), through the lifestyle advice
in health promotion programmes (Chapter 8), or through the provi-
sion of information on the pension level to which they are currently
entitled (Chapter 13), to understand in more detail the risks they
15
currently face. This is understood as both empowering, through the pro-

vision of transparent information, and transferring responsibility from
a more ‘hollowed-out’ state to more active citizens. A number of the
chapters (9, 11, 13) express concerns that a discourse of individualized
responsibility in a context in which inequalities remain stubbornly strat-
ified implies a bleak future for the most vulnerable groups.
Other concurrent developments form part of a more regulatory
approach. Examples are the move to prioritize punishment over rehabil-
itation and to fine-tune the range of custodial and non-custodial alter-
natives for different groups in relation to crime (Chapter 4); the careful
distinctions in mental health policy between those who suffer mental
health problems appropriate for community treatment and those which
require incarceration (Chapter 8; Rose 1990, 1999); or the use of a com-
plex range of tax-credits for different groups of low-paid workers coupled
with lower, closely monitored benefits for unemployed people judged
capable of work and more strictly targeted, more generous disability
support for those who are not, as part of a ‘welfare to work’ strategy
(Chapter 11).
Conclusion
Risk has moved up the agenda of social science as a result of developments

in institutions and in culture. New approaches in research and in analysis
have resulted. In the following two chapters we examine the development
of risk research and the issues that are currently at the top of the agenda
in more detail. We then go on, in the rest of the book, to demonstrate
the way in which realization of the significance of risk issues have trans-
formed academic work across a wide range of areas. Risk has become seen
much more as a complex matter, involving both real external factors
and social construction processes which privilege particular accounts of
risk and of how it emerges in people’s lives. This has led to the pursuit
of richer, more cross-disciplinary approaches, and more hybrid methods
of research. It has also led to the recognition of risk as both the object of
policy, in the sense that risk reduction is a goal aimed at in a wide range
of areas, and an increasingly important ingredient within policy, as the
management of continuing risks replaces risk elimination as the major
policy concern.
Risk is now at the centre of social science, for good reasons. We hope
this book will provide an informed, helpful, and up-to-date introduction
16
to the concept and serve as a guide and directory to the main currents of
work within the field.
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19
2
Risk as an Interdisciplinary
Research Area
Risk issues initially attracted attention as the growing complexity of tech-

nical processes and enterprises generated interest in practical problems of
risk management. Two factors—the realization that accidents and errors
were not simply technical issues, and the increased opposition of mem-
bers of the public to innovations—directed attention to psychological
and sociological approaches to risk. As theoretical and empirical work
developed, researchers from different perspectives recognized the impor-
tance of the sociocultural embeddedness of risk perceptions. This chapter
discusses the variety and complexity of risk issues and the value of the
various approaches.
The chapter starts by examining the established procedures of
statistical-probabilistic risk calculation in three main areas: insurance,
of technical risks, and toxicological and epidemical risks in health and
illness. Risks from this perspective are concerned with the extent to
which objective hazards can be managed through insurance, prevention,
and reduction, in relation, for example, to the reliability of technical
processes, the deterioration of machines, the probability of industrial
accidents, or the effectiveness of medicine or medical treatment. These
strategies are likely to be successful so far as risks and impacts can be
specified and a value-consensus on the acceptable level of risk exists.
However, risk decisions involve issues other than technical manage-
ment. Uncontrollable malfunctions like the Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant incident (near Harrisburg in 1979) or the catastrophic acci-
dents in Bhopal (1984) or Chernobyl (1986) revealed the limitations of
risk-management systems. In addition, evidence about the ways in which
20
Risk as an Interdisciplinary Research Area
people actually deal with risks indicated the weakness of common

research assumptions. Initially, researchers treated responses to existing
risks (e.g. traffic accidents, smoking, and drinking) as a benchmark for
the acceptability of new risks. Similar assumptions were applied to the
introduction of new technologies (Starr 1969). However, it became obvi-
ous that people treat established and novel risks in very different ways.
A further point is that public concern about the risks attending tech-
nical innovation in a wide range of fields, from food safety to nuclear
power, from new medicines to fuel additives, and from mobile phones
to air pollution raised difficult issues about acceptable risk levels for
policymakers.
As a result, researchers became more interested in peoples’ percep-
tions of and decisions about risky issues. Whilst behavioural economists
and cognitive psychologists sought to establish universal laws of human
decision-making, risk research in the narrower sense examined the prob-
lem of public perception of risks through a psychometric paradigm. This
approach aims to understand how risk perception is influenced by the
characteristics of risks as well as by socio-structural factors. Optimistic
expectations that this work would find more or less stable patterns in
perceptions and responses, which would allow researchers to predict and
to explain risk acceptance and which could be used for decision-making
by politicians and business, were not fulfilled. Another stream of research
in this area that has attracted more attention recently approaches risk
responses by assuming that people interpret their world through ‘mental
models’.
Researchers inspired by psychological and social psychological per-
spectives have attempted to integrate different approaches, mainly
those concerned with risk perception and risk communication, into an
ambitious Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Pidgeon, Kasperson, and
Slovic 2003). This enterprise built on the assumption that risk perception
is mainly determined by risk communication through the media and
other routes. Examination of the way these processes work can then
explain the amplification or attenuation of risk concerns. However, the
model has proved to have weak predictive ability.
Further research indicated that the public framework of risk perception
is a complex and socioculturally diverse mixture of stable and unstable
patterns. As a result, the more individualistic approaches have tried to
integrate sociocultural accounts of risk perception into their models.
Simultaneously, sociocultural and more general sociological approaches
have attracted attention.
21
The prelude to the sociological contribution to the risk debate was the
‘expert-layman’ controversy. In controversies between local laypeople and
experts on such issues as how to assess the impact of large-scale industrial
accidents, the authorities often found the rejection of official expertise
frustrating. Sociological and, increasingly, psychological approaches sup-
port the recognition that laypeople’s knowledge systems also offer valid
interpretations of risk.
One assumption has been that the ways in which people perceive and
respond to risk are significantly determined by the social organization
or group to which they are attached and their position in it. In later
cultural approaches, risk perceptions are often understood as linked to
the individual’s social identity. Others assume that the current explosion
of interest in risk in public discourse is a systematic problem associated
with the stage of development of modern societies. The risk society,
reflexive modernization approach argues that growing uncertainties have
to be accepted, because they can only be managed and not eliminated. In
another tradition, risk awareness is interpreted chiefly as the product of
society itself. The dominance of a new style of government which shifts
risks and responsibility to the subject is responsible for the preoccupation
with risk issues.
Statistical-Probabilistic Concepts of Risk
The development of statistical methods to calculate probabilities sup-

ported the rapid spread of risk ideas across a wide range of areas. Initially
applied in the concept of insurance, it spread into technical risk calcu-
lation in an industrializing society and into other domains, including,
for example, the estimation of the effects of treatments and lifestyles on
health and illness, or the assessment of pension benefits.
All these applications of the idea of risk rest on statistical-probabilistic
calculation. A central requirement for the successful calculation of risk is
that expected gains and losses can be transformed into an objective mea-
sure (most prominent in economics and technical approaches)—for exam-
ple, money, life expectancy, or, in epidemic and toxicological approaches,
death rates. In this way risk can be understood as an objective entity (risk
is understood to equal the probability of an occurrence multiplied by the
extent of damage) which can be calculated with the help of probability
theory.
22
Insurance
Insurance initially developed at the close of the Middle Ages as a method
for managing the risks of trade. Merchants sought to guard against insol-
vency in the event of losing a ship. The loss was calculated as the value
of a cargo, and estimates of the probability of loss based on experience.
The quality of risk estimation depends on experience of previous losses.
As long as past experience can be applied to the future, insurance is a
feasible solution.
In a changing world with an uncertain future, insurance companies
need reserves for unexpected events. They are sensitive to shifts in proba-
bilities, and are unable to manage risks where predictions of the future
entail a high degree of uncertainty. Examples would be a rapid and
unforeseen increase in flooding, or the problems involved in the nuclear
industry, where technology is innovative, experience limited, and the
possible costs enormous.
Technical Risk Analysis

The point of origin for technical risk research was concern with the
controllability, safety, and reliability of technical systems and processes,
and with the reasons and outcomes of failures in the context of the rapid
expansion of technical innovation during industrialization. Technical risk
analysis aims to make a process or technique more reliable and secure.
From this perspective, researchers need to develop the necessary routines
and techniques in order to identify vulnerabilities and eliminate them
in order to reduce the final risk to an acceptable level. The approach is
typically based on the principle of cost efficiency, so that the option with
the best balance of risk and cost is chosen.
Comprehensive risk analysis and evaluation developed from the mid-
dle of the ninteenth century onwards, particularly in major industrial
enterprises and the defence industry. Through ‘Operations Research’ and
‘Systems Analysis’, an independent stream of research to estimate risk
(risk assessment) was established, drawing on a purely technical and
economical approach. Typical methods are the analysis of hypotheti-
cal accidents, models and scenarios of possible accidents, cost-benefit
analysis, probabilistic estimation of safety and credibility, and quanti-
tative risk estimation. This strategy aims to control the uncertainties
and insecurities which go along with the application of new techniques
(Banse 1996: 31). The approach works well in many cases but also shows
23
systematic deficiencies which may trigger public concerns about new

developments.
Epidemiological and Toxicological Risk Analysis

Risk estimations are also relevant to medical contexts. Epidemiological
and toxicological research estimates how factors such as lifestyle or diet
influence the probability of falling ill (e.g. the connection between smok-
ing and cancer), or whether particular medical treatments significantly
reduce the symptoms of an illness. Other aspects concern the probability
and seriousness of side effects from a medicine and whether these are
acceptable compared with the risk of illness.
The whole logic of modern orthodox medicine rests on the direction
of treatment to tackle the identified causes of symptoms, to produce
objectively measurable improvements. This approach was central to the
development of scientific medicine, supplanting the former plurality
of magical and philosophical belief systems. However, problems may
arise. New illnesses with unclear symptoms and no certain treatment
strategies, as well as acknowledgement that some illnesses cannot be
cured at all, promoted patients’ engagement with alternative approaches
(Bury 2001). Their involvement is accompanied by the increasing influ-
ence of competing more holistic knowledge systems, such as acupuncture
or homeopathy, and by new approaches which seek to define health in
terms of positive well-being, rather than the absence of illness.
The Crisis of the Statistical-Probabilistic Approach to Risk

A rational and objective approach to risk calculation was successful as
long as it was applied to risks where the outcomes could be ascribed,
the expected harms, losses, or damages could be measured, and causes
and results controlled and isolated. It was sometimes not fully under-
stood that the probability and extent of losses can only be estimated
over groups of events and do not strictly apply to individual cases.
This approach encountered problems with innovative and large-scale
technologies where risks have changed not only quantitatively but also
qualitatively. In several other domains the risk logic also came under
pressure.1 The potential threats as well as the growing uncertainty regard-
ing ignorance and knowledge of possible outcomes were prefigured in
the Windscale reactor fire in 1957 and attracted growing public attention
during the 1970s and 1980s. The accidents mentioned in the first section
24
(including Bhopal, where a gas release from the Union Carbide plant
killed more than 2,000 people immediately and many more in the follow-
ing years, and Chernobyl, with uncounted deaths, injuries, and illnesses
caused by contamination) showed the limits of current approaches to
risk. The Challenger Space Shuttle accident in 1986 brought home the
uncertainties inherent in advanced technology. Perhaps more important
than any technical shortcomings of the statistical approach is the fact that
the public response to these disasters is a growing suspicion of technical
innovations and developments.
These new risks have qualities and dimensions which violate many of
the assumptions of risk calculation. They tend no longer to be geographi-
cally, regionally, or nationally restricted, but are global. They are complex
and increasingly entangled with different areas. New technical risks share
the characteristics of catastrophes. The potential material, and financial
and personal damage can hardly be estimated and may extend to the
elimination of all life on earth. They are mainly invisible and inaccessible
by direct means. They produce long-lasting outcomes, and are difficult
to determine, and the effects cannot easily be reversed. Not all of these
factors are absolutely new. Some were shared by past risks, such as plague
or crop failure. It is the extensive public awareness of the new risks that
brings home these characteristics in a way that is qualitatively different in
its cultural impact.
The disasters and accidents mentioned above graphically illustrate the
shortcomings of scientific, technical, and formal strategies in controlling
complex technical systems. These failures direct attention to the ques-
tion of how complex organizations can be managed safely. A series of
studies has shown how the rapid development of management systems
intended to reduce the scope for disaster often in fact increases it, because
complexity introduces greater uncertainty (Perrow 1984). Further work
shows how risks which conflict with the range of outcomes expected
within an organizational culture may not be effectively tackled (Turner
1978; Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000). Economic and political pressure can
also influence an organization’s safety culture (Vaughan 1996).
In some fields, the characteristics of new risks make adequate analysis
through probability estimations virtually impossible. If we still use such
approaches, the extent of subjective weightings and valuations has to be
taken into account. Scientifically developed long distance planning and
probability risk analyses pursue the successive adaptation of technical
systems to situational necessities (e.g. more restrictive safety regulation as
a response to accidents). Hypothetical assumptions substitute for practical
25
knowledge (models, ideals, and reductions of complexity), and empirical

knowledge is replaced by probability assumptions. Tests of the assump-
tions cannot be applied, and experiments and observations cannot be
repeated adequately. The potential damages and the probability of their
occurrence cannot2 be determined and reduced by the usual strategies of
learning by trial and error (Banse 1996: 34). Even though risk calcula-
tion in some areas was eroded by uncertainty and estimates were open
to interpretation by different scientists, the real crisis of the technical-
rational paradigm resulted from a separate socio-political development.
In many cases in which the potential damage is irreversible, growing
numbers of the public will not in fact accept any probability of risk,
however small (Luhmann 1993: 2). Examples are nuclear energy, vac-
cination resistance, and genetically modified food. Many experts were
astonished at public resistance to comparatively small new risks, in con-
trast to the acceptability of much higher everyday risks (such as those
associated with road transport or smoking) without even questioning the
dangers. The understanding of the public as ‘irrational’ was widespread,
and gave new impetus to further research on responses to significant
political decisions.
The Problem of Predicting the Acceptability of Risk

Politicians and other decision-makers have to act on the basis of available
knowledge, even though this knowledge may be limited. The central
problem is the acceptability of decisions, rather than the resolution of
technical questions. With the shift from technical problems to the ques-
tions of acceptability and the prediction of public response, social and
psychological issues move to the fore in risk research. How urgent this
question had become for technical risk research may be illustrated by
the fact that the first attempt to deal with the problem was by a leading
engineer turned academic.
Starr, former president of the Atomic Division of Rockwell Interna-
tional, analysed popular responses to risk in a way intended to be of use
to decision-makers (Krohn and Krücken 1993: 26). In his lecture What
is our society willing to pay for safety?, the findings are phrased in precise,
statistical terms: the public ‘is willing to accept “voluntary” risks roughly
1,000 times greater than “involuntary” risks’; tends to use risk of death
as a “psychological yardstick”; and acceptability “appears to be crudely
proportional to the third power” of expected benefits’ (1969: 1237). He
compares the risks of nuclear power with the level of risks associated with
26
the existing conventional power plants that most people apparently find
acceptable. The lower risks for nuclear power (estimated at 1 in 200 as
against 1 in 40), together with the expected gains, support his optimistic
expectation of a high social acceptability of the new technology.
Critics of this approach commented on the equation of acceptable and
accepted risks, the restriction to risk of death, the pecuniary calculation
of costs and profits, and the focus on quantitative approaches to the
exclusion of a qualitative dimension. They also pointed out that Starr
derived people’s preferences theoretically and not directly. This led to
interest in the examination of people’s actual risk perceptions, pursued
through the psychometric paradigm of risk research.
How Do People Make Decisions and Perceive Risks?

The psychologists who criticized Starr (1969) referred to another stream
of research which had already started to develop in decision-making
research. This work was pursued mainly by cognitive psychologists, who
originally experimented in laboratories with risk behaviour, examining
gambling and risky choices. Referring to the economic model of ratio-
nal action, behavioural economists and cognitive psychologists together
examined how people deviate from theoretical assumptions. This interest
resembles closely that of technicians and engineers who cannot under-
stand why and how people deviate from what seems the best risk cal-
culation for them, from a rational standpoint. Whilst risk management
was, for technicians and engineers, principally a technical problem of
calculation and public acceptance, from the perspective of behavioural
economists and cognitive psychologists it was understood as a more
general problem of decision-making. They were much more interested in
the universal laws of decision-making than specific responses to technical
innovations.
One stream of research sought to investigate the conceptual models of
reality people construct, and how these models differ from those based on
expert knowledge. Slovic and colleagues also worked from the assumption
that laypeople’s perceptions of risk were inadequate (‘faulty perceptions of
risk could be explained as a result of the cognitive limitations of human
beings’, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1977). They introduced, in
response to Starr (1969), a new methodological approach to investigate
risk perception, which became at the time the most influential approach
in risk research, the ‘psychometric paradigm’.
27
Behavioural Decision-Making
Since the assumptions of rationality seem to be inaccurate in many cases,
economists had started to find out how people really decide or judge.
Simon’s early work on ‘bounded rationality’ (1957) and further examina-
tions in behavioural economics led Tversky and Kahneman (1974) to the
conclusion ‘that the deviations of actual behaviour from the normative
model are too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed
as random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing
the normative system. We conclude from these findings that the nor-
mative and descriptive analyses cannot be reconciled’ (quoted in Renn
et al. 2000: 43). The central finding of Tversky and Kahneman (1974:
35) showed that ‘people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles
which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting
values to simpler judgemental operations.’ Even though these heuristics
are in general useful, they sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors.
The range of heuristics includes representativeness, availability, anchoring,
and adjustment.
People tend to compare issues with others by superficial indicators
assumed to indicate whether an issue belongs to a specific group with cor-
responding characteristics (representativeness) (Tversky and Kahneman
1974: 36). They often judge the frequency or probability of an event by
the ease with which such issues can be brought to mind (availability).
‘For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged
people by recalling such occurrences among one’s acquaintances’ (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974: 42f.). However, availability is also influenced by
factors such as media coverage rather than the frequency of the event
itself. This heuristic may produce systematic biases. Another important
heuristic shows that judgements are anchored to an initial value, which
is then adjusted according to present circumstances (Kahneman, Slovic,
and Tversky 1982), so that relative judgements depend crucially on the
respective starting points.
Another central result in the field of decision-making is the framing
effect. Although the concept of rationality assumes that the same problem
should always lead to the same result, even though the contexts differ,
the formulation (framing) of a problem influences the judgement. How
decision-makers frame a problem is partly influenced by the formulation
of the problem and by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of
the decision-maker. For example, a problem can be presented as a gain
(200 of 600 threatened people will be saved) or as a loss (400 of 600
28
threatened people will die). In the first case people tend to adopt a ‘gain
frame’, generally leading to risk aversion, and in the latter people tend to
adopt a ‘loss frame’, generally leading to risk-seeking behaviour (Tversky
and Kahneman 1981).
A number of criticisms of this research have been made. The exper-
iments were conducted in laboratories under artificial conditions. The
subjects had limited information and were under strict time pressures.
They may therefore deviate systematically from the real life situations
where people already have relevant experiences or can ask others for help
and advice. This approach shares with Starr the difficulty that little direct
information about people’s risk judgements in real life is employed.
At least two main strategies followed from this perspective. One tried to
map out the ways in which people think and decide by qualitative experi-
mental methods (mental modelling). The other approach, quite influential
for risk research, is to simply ask people directly (psychometric paradigm).
The Psychometric Paradigm
Following Starr’s work, the psychometric paradigm developed rapidly. It

promised to give access to the understanding of public risk preferences
which was urgently needed by politicians and other decision-makers. It
also anticipated the identification of more or less stable factors in risk
perception to which risk policy could refer. On this basis, it was hope that
policy could be adapted to fit public attitudes and be made acceptable
to a wider audience (Krohn and Krücken 1993: 28). The psychometric
paradigm to risk perception was principally developed by the ‘Decision
Research Group’ at the University of Oregon (Fischhoff et al. 1978, 1983;
Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein 1982, 1984, 1985, cited in Rohrman and
Renn, 2000, 17). Whilst Starr referred to revealed preferences, the psycho-
metric paradigm aims at expressed preferences which can be approached
by standardized questionnaires (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Slovic, Fischoff,
and Lichtenstein 1985). It assumes that ‘risk is subjectively defined by
individuals who may be influenced by a wide array of psychological,
social, institutional and cultural factors . . . many of these factors and
their interrelationships can be quantified and modelled in order to illu-
minate the responses of individuals and their societies to the hazards
that confront them’ (Slovic 2001: xxiii). People were asked to rate the
risks associated with various sets of hazardous activities, substances, and
technologies, such as nuclear power, pesticides, bicycles, or sunbathing.
29
Also, judgements were recorded about other hazard characteristics which

were hypothesized to account for risk perceptions. Several contextual
factors were identified to affect the perceived seriousness of risks, for
example, the expected number of fatalities (Renn 1983; Jungermann and
Slovic 1993) and the catastrophic potential of a risk.
We follow the authoritative introduction to risk perception research
of Rohrmann and Renn (2000). The work showed that risks with a low
probability but high consequences would be perceived as more threaten-
ing than more probable risks with low or medium consequences (von
Winterfeldt, John, and Borcherding 1981). Additionally, the perceived
characteristics of the risk source or the risk situation, for example, the
conviction of having personal control over a risk, familiarity with a risk,
the perception of equitable sharing of both benefits and risks, and the
opportunity to blame a person or institution responsible for the creation
of a risky situation, influence evaluation (Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichten-
stein 1981). Finally, beliefs and attitudes about the nature, consequences,
history, and justifiability of a risk are also important (Otway and Thomas
1982; Renn and Swaton 1984).
Multivariate analysis of the relations between these variables showed
that many of these risk characteristics are related to two or three under-
lying factors, which explain most of the variance of the judgements.
Most important is the factor which represents characteristics which were
related to the severity or dreadfulness of the hazard, such as terror,
lack of controllability, involuntariness, or concern for future generations
(the dreadfulness of risks factor). A second factor comprises knowledge-
related characteristics such as whether the risk is observable, known, or
new (the degree of knowledge and familiarity with the hazard factor). In
some studies the number of exposed people represents another factor, but
its influence is weak. This two-dimensional structure appears in a number
of articles by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980, 1981, 1985, 1986)
and Slovic (1987, 1992). Several studies reproduce similar structures, at
least for factors of dreadfulness and degree of knowledge (compare Renn
and Rohrmann 2000: 29).
Further research demonstrates the complexity of attitude structures.
National patterns of risk perception have been discovered, as well as
regional and local differences (Fitchen, Heath, and Fessenden-Raden
1987; Fowlkes and Miller 1987). Social stratification (by gender, ethnicity,
or social class) also influences the ways in which people perceive risks
(Rohrmann 1999). The central result is the identification of a mixture
of stable and unstable patterns of risk perception which generally make
30
overall predictions of the acceptability of risks difficult (Fischhoff, Slovic,

and Lichtenstein 1983; Slovic 1992: 127). However, the original hope of
discovering the explicit risk estimations and preferences of the public and
therefore the urgently needed knowledge for decision-making in politics
and economy was disappointed. One of the reasons for this unsatisfying
result might be that the study of risk perceptions within this paradigm
condenses information which is based on average ratings. The influence
of knowledge, values, and feelings, and of individual differences, receives
little attention. Before findings could be generalized, the cultural context
has to be explicated (Rohrmann 1999: 135–7), and this context is often
dynamic rather than stable. Another limitation is the unclear connection
between the measured risk perception and the practical response in every-
day life (Wilkinson 2001).
The important message of the psychometric approach for risk is that
for most (lay)people, risk is not just a combination of the size and the
probability of damage, as proposed by the technical-statistical approach,
but also has a social and subjective dimension.
Mental Modelling
‘Mental modelling’ approaches draw on the conventional concept of
rational decision-making and the insights of the findings of cognitive
psychology about heuristics and cognitive biases in laypeople’s decision-
making. The core idea is that people develop conceptual structures that
correspond to risks as they understand them. These structures may be
more or less accurate and may be mapped through psychological investi-
gation. The approach seeks to examine how people construct accounts of
reality.
Such models are useful in understanding the world, but as Fischhoff
et al. (e.g. 1997) point out, may lead to error if they contain misunder-
standings. This approach lends itself to the view that distinguishes exper-
tise and ignorance, and the concern with improving communication to
rectify the latter by ensuring that lay models correspond more closely
to those of experts. For example: ‘whatever the goal of communication,
its designers need to address the mental models that recipients bring to
it, that is, the pattern of knowledge, overly general understandings, and
outright misconceptions that can frustrate learning’ (Atman et al. 1994).
Models may typically be elicited through qualitative interviews and
then compared with expert understandings in order to identify dis-
crepancies (Weyman and Kelly 1999: 26). Quantitative studies can then
31
be designed to explore the extent of these discrepancies and their

relationship to knowledge and other factors. The approach draws on
decision-making research on heuristics and biases, and on findings from
psychometrics, but differs in the use of qualitative methods to elicit
lay understandings of risk, including beliefs both corresponding to and
differing from those of experts.
The potential of the approach was judged by the 1992 Royal Society
report as ‘highly promising’ (Pidgeon et al. 1992: 121). A considerable
amount of work has been carried out on lay models of specific risks
(reviewed in Weyman and Kelly 1999: 12), much of it indicating that
laypeople have simpler and more intuitive mental models than experts,
often influenced by cognitive biases which appear to result from the
use of simplifying heuristics. More recently, a number of writers have
questioned the critique implicit in much of the work (and expressed in
the Atman quotation above and by MacGregor and Fleming 1996) of the
accuracy of lay mental models. One strand concerns the extent to which
expert knowledge can be seen as unified and consistent and as having
an objective status, in contrast to the presumed subjective nature of lay
perceptions. Another raises the issue of the validity of lay knowledge of
risk issues in the context in which most people encounter them. This
approach effectively claims an equal status for lay understanding with
that of experts whilst acknowledging differences in perspective. A third
raises the issue of trust in expert accounts and how this contributes to
acceptance of the authority of expertise (Weyman and Kelly 1999: 26).
Attempt to Integrate Different Approaches
Some psychologists, unsatisfied with the lack of a dynamic perspective in

their models of risk perception and the under-examination of contextual
factors, have developed the concept of social amplification. This approach
combines risk perception and risk communication perspectives in such
a way that other social psychological insights may be integrated in an
overall theoretical framework. The social amplification approach (SARF)
developed by the Clark University group (Kasperson et al. 1988; Renn
et al. 1992) is an ambitious attempt ‘to construct a framework which
unifies understanding of risk-perception and -communication’ (Pidgeon,
Kasperson, and Slovic 2003: 2). The point of origin is the assumption
that most of our knowledge comes at second hand, and is acquired by
communication—mainly understood as information given by the mass
32
media. Risk messages are understood as signals emitted by social events

and ‘subject to predictable transformations as they filter through various
social and individual amplification stations’ (Pidgeon, Kasperson, and
Slovic 2003: 15).
The first stage of the basic model identifies several social processes
which influence risk perception. These include the operation of the chan-
nels through which information is disseminated (or not), the role of
social institutions in modifying signals, individual factors (e.g. the use of
the cognitive heuristics identified by Tversky and Kahneman), and social
and institutional behaviour, such as protest actions, or political processes
within parliament or public enquiries. In the second stage, ‘risk messages’
‘ripple out’ through a widening range of social groupings from the indi-
vidual to society as a whole. There is provision for feedback between the
various first-stage processes, and it is in the operation of these processes
and the interaction between them that amplification or attenuation of
risk signals occurs. The established theories dealing with risk institutions,
social systems, individual cognition, and so on provide understanding
of the various individual processes. Thus, the approach links together
existing work and provides a framework within which accounts of the
processes which influence the way risk events are perceived and influence
society, and in particular the way in which expert judgements fail to
carry consistent conviction with the public, are located. Parallels can be
drawn between SARF and work in other disciplines, for example, the
sociological analysis of the diffusion of ‘moral panics’ as a process of
‘deviance amplification’ in the understanding of the ‘mods and rockers’
seaside riots (Cohen 2002; Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones 2003).
The authors comment that existing research on risk signalling, com-
munications and the mass media, organizational processes, imagery, and
stigma contribute to the framework (Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003:
16–30). The approach is eclectic and interacts with other social sciences,
especially sociology, in its interest in social institutions and processes, and
increasingly with political science in the emerging awareness of how polit-
ical factors facilitate or obstruct the impact of risk perceptions on policy
(see Gowda 2003). However, the operation of ripple effects (which are of
most importance in relation to public policy) is less well understood, and
proponents argue that this is where more research is needed (Pidgeon,
Kasperson, and Slovic 2003: 31–6).
The main criticisms of the framework concern its ontology and its
account of social processes. It has also been criticized on the grounds
that it is not a theory and does not generate testable hypotheses
33
(Wåhlberg 2001). This may miss the point, since the approach claims to
offer an overall framework, which combines a range of disciplinary back-
grounds and middle-range theories (of human cognition and communi-
cation, attitude change, the influence of mass media, and so on), rather
than a tightly defined theory. It implicitly adopts the realist conception
of risk that underlies all work that makes a strong objective, subjective
distinction and ‘lies at the core of the SARF foundation’ (Rosa 2003:
62). This is challenged by those who adopt a more cultural approach
and see risks as socially constructed at all levels. The main criticisms of
the account of social processes concern the role of feedback, particularly
in relation to the media, and the implicit account of power in society.
Murdock and colleagues, drawing on the work of Bourdieu, point out
that media reporting is not simply a one-way process. The complex
interactions between individuals and the media in relation to risk events
cannot simply be captured in the account offered in stage one of social
amplification, drawing on an electronic engineering metaphor of signals
and feedbacks (Petts, Horlick-Jones, and Murdock 2001: ch. 6; see also
Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones 2003: 158).
Sociological Approaches to Risk
Sociological theories approach risk questions mainly from the opposite

direction to psychologists and economists, moving from societal insti-
tutional structures to the level of the individual, rather than the other
way about. The main problems tackled from this perspective are the
interweaving of culture and individual perception and responses to risk,
and the way in which these factors change or develop over time.
The influence of sociological approaches to risk originates with the
debate on the lay-expert division of knowledge. Many economists, psy-
chologists, and decision-theory researchers set the objective or rational
ideal as the standard for individual decision-making. The assumption was
that experts would tend to follow this model whereas laypeople (as the
research showed) do not. An alternative tradition in science studies has
criticized the claim that experts and science in general always take an
objective standpoint as a myth (in the context of risk, ‘Wynne 1982;
more generally, Latour and Woolgar 1979). The dismantling of positivis-
tic accounts of science and their intrinsic hierarchical political impact
on risk problems strengthened the view that citizens’ understanding of
risk has an equivalent validity and rationality to that of the accredited
experts. It also supported a new approach to public responses to the new
34
technologies, especially in the development of social movements opposed

to new technologies, such as the nuclear industry, and the promotion of
a more ecological lifestyle.
These public responses are explained from the sociological perspective
in terms of sociocultural change. The new developments were initially
examined, in the US context, through the cultural approach of Douglas
and Wildavsky, as the result of sociocultural change affecting societal
groups differently. In Germany, by contrast, Beck’s approach through the
concepts of Risk Society and Reflexive Modernization emphasizes the impact
of a general shift within modernity caused by new risks as well as socio-
structural changes. This perspective has gained ground rapidly and has
also been developed in the UK, whilst the systems theory approach to risk,
developed by Luhmann, is prominent only in Germany. In Britain, as
in other Anglo-phone countries, another perspective has gained ground,
explaining growing risk awareness in terms of a shift in how societies are
governed or govern themselves. This governmentality approach (Foucault
1991) was imported from France and fitted very well the experience of
free market liberalism from 1979 onwards.
Expert–Layman Controversy
Much early risk research assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, that
scientific and professional knowledge is superior to that of laypeople
or embodied in everyday life practices. The difference between lay and
expert judgements about risks and uncertainties was explained in terms of
limited knowledge and misunderstandings of reality. Despite the evidence
that scientists are also influenced by heuristics and biases (e.g. Tversky
and Kahneman 1974: 50), the assumption of an objective and superior
scientific knowledge, which would lead to an optimum solution if only
the confounding influence of policy, values, and ideologies could be
discounted, was central to the early risk debate (Wynne 1982).
In accordance with the basic idea of a positivistic science, accidents such
as those in nuclear power plants were regularly interpreted as caused by
the imperfect behaviour of the staff responsible. This led to recommen-
dations for improved staff selection and training. More recently, social
studies of science have argued that objective positivistic knowledge can be
illusory, and often serves to disguise social power enshrined as authority
(Wynne 1982).
Consequently, the practical sociological contribution to the risk
debate aims to acknowledge laypeople’s knowledge, values, and cultural
35
positions on the one hand and to show how expert knowledge is involved
in social processes of knowledge production on the other. It fills the gap
between those psychological approaches which interpret public responses
mainly as deviations from correct solutions generated by science and
the claims to objective and expert knowledge which ignore the social
embeddedness of knowledge.
A key finding in relation to such activities as public participation exer-
cises or the implementation of nuclear technology is that laypeople are
not necessarily irrational, but pursue a specific form of knowledge and
experience based on value systems which are culturally different from
rather than inferior to those of experts. The research of Wynne was
highly influential, especially in the UK. He pointed out that the laboratory
knowledge of the experts fails repeatedly in attempts to transfer it to real
life situations (Wynne 1982, 1987, 1992, 1996). He uses detailed empirical
studies to show that experts have their own beliefs, epistemologically
similar to laypeople’s knowledge, although constructed by following sci-
entific rules rather than through life experience. He showed, for example,
that expert framing of the safety problem regarding the production and
usage of pesticides was naïve. It assumed, for example, that ‘pesticide
manufacturing process conditions never varied so as to produce dioxin
and other toxic contaminants of the main product stream; drums of
herbicide always arrived at the point of use with full instruction intact and
intelligible; in spite of the inconvenience, farmers and other users would
comply with the stated conditions, such as correct solvents, proper spray
nozzles, pressure valves and other equipment, correct weather conditions,
and full protective gear’ (Wynne 1992).
Wynne also examined the responses of Cumbrian sheep farmers to the
claims of government scientists about the impact of radiation from the
Chernobyl disaster, and more generally in accounts of the risks from
agricultural chemicals (1992, 1996). He points out that the farmers felt
themselves ‘completely controlled by the exercise of scientific interpreta-
tion’ (1996: 63) but developed a thorough-going scepticism of scientists
pronouncements, because they were aware that the scientists made obvi-
ous errors. Official science failed to predict the course of the outbreak of
radiation in ways which was financially devastating for the farmers, and
made elementary and obvious mistakes in experiments and analysis. This
was because they simply did not have the farmers’ understanding of sheep
behaviour and of local environmental conditions (1996: 65–7).
Subjective and sociocultural beliefs or frames of reference differ. People
respond differently to risk and often deviate systematically from the
36
simple assumptions of a generalized rationality which seeks to apply to

all people in the same way. In this context, cultural aspects play an
important role.
Sociocultural Approaches to Risk
The sociocultural perspective on risk was initially informed by the seminal

anthropological work of Douglas (1963, 1966) and was further developed
by Douglas (1985, 1992) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). A stream
of work uses a quantitative perspective (Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Dake
1991; Dake and Wildavsky 1991) whilst another stream follows a quali-
tative approach (Rayner 1986; Bellaby 1990). In more recent qualitative
work, the influence of the functionalistic perspective of Douglas and
Wildavsky is supplanted by more descriptive approaches (Tulloch and
Lupton 2003).
The core assumption of the cultural approach is that the individual’s
perception and response to risk can only be understood against the
background of their embeddedness in a sociocultural background and
identity as a member of a social group, rather than through individual
cognition, as is proposed by mainstream economics and cognitive psy-
chologists (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 6–7). Risk is interpreted as a
socially constructed phenomenon although it has ‘some roots in nature’
(Thompson and Wildavsky 1982: 148). The different ways in which soci-
eties or specific social groups construct risks and dangers are understood
as depending on their form of social organization (Douglas and Wildavsky
1982: 8). Douglas and Wildavsky explain the new awareness of risk and
the rise of social movements opposing technical innovations in the 1980s
through shifts in the organizational culture of society (which they call
‘sectarian’), rather than by the occurrence of new risks. Complex histor-
ical changes have led to increased mobilization of citizen’s organization
opposing big government, big money, and market values (Douglas and
Wildavsky 1982: 10–1).
Douglas and Wildavsky developed a framework for analysing social
organization along the two dimensions of ‘grid’ and ‘group’. Grid stands
for the degree to which an individual’s life is regulated or prescribed by
the roles in a social group. It is high in hierarchical organizations and low
in egalitarian organizations. The group dimension stands for the degree
of identification with a particular group. It is strong when the individual
is a member of a group and weak when the individual does not belong
37
(Douglas 1992: 192). The result is a four-category typology (Thompson,

Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990: 62–6).
The cultural type of competition or individualism, typified by the mar-
ket and entrepreneurial perspective on risk, interprets risk-taking as an
opportunity to pursue personal goals in competition with others. Group
cohesion is weak and the normative bonding into the group is low.
In contrast, strong group incorporation and low hierarchy characterize
the cultural type of egalitarianism or enclave (the earlier sectarian type).
People belonging to this type emphasize cooperation and equality, and
have a strong sense of solidarity. They tend to focus on the long-term
effects of human activities and are more likely to abandon an activity
than to take chances. A strong group cohesion and highly regulated social
life are associated with hierarchy, or bureaucracy. Cultural types falling
into this category rely heavily on rules and procedures as provided
by social institutions to manage risks and uncertainties. The last type
stands for isolation, fatalism, or atomized respectively stratified individ-
uals which believe in hierarchies but do not identify with the hierarchy
they belong to. They rely only on themselves and are very reluctant to
accept risks imposed by others. Finally, some researchers have identified
a fifth group, located between the others. Hermit or autonomous individ-
uals do not belong to one of the specified types but can flexibly refer
to each type, as long as it fits their personal aims and needs (see, for
example, Rohrmann and Renn 2000: 34–5). The cultural approach has
a major impact on risk research. A mainly quantitative perspective refers
to risk perception approaches. Standardized measures for cultural values
(worldviews) were developed (Dake 1991, 1992), assumed to correspond
to group cultures. This concept of culture also influences the psychometric
paradigm, which tries to integrate cultural aspects in their instrument
(Slovic 2001).
The influence of cultural values on risk perception and responses is
still controversial. Some studies suggest that other attitudes associated
with risk sensitivity (specific fears in relation to the particular risk)
explain by far the largest part of risk perception, whilst the heuris-
tics and other variables stressed by psychometry (dread and custom-
ary risk) explain roughly half as much, and culture even less (Marris,
Langford, and O’Riordan 1998; Sjöberg 2000). One problem is that such
an approach interprets culture as an additional and independent, not
as a general underlying factor. The evidence of dread, for example, is
itself understood as strongly influenced by culture. Critics doubt whether
cultural approaches can be successfully captured through structured
38
questionnaires as developed by Dake (1991, 1992) or in general (Rippl

2002; Tansey 2004).
Besides the standardized quantitative stream of cultural theory, there is
also research in a qualitative tradition which uses the grid/group scheme
as a heuristic or a means out of charting sociocultural reality (e.g. Douglas
and Calvez 1990). Some researchers argue that the ideal types are too
schematic to grasp the complexity of social life (Funtowicz and Ravetz
1985; Johnson 1987). They also claim that the grid/group scheme is
little help in understanding how the shift of risk perception, from one
type to another, might take place (Bellaby 1990). More recently, research
has been influenced by cultural studies. These approaches use the cate-
gories of post-structuralism and postmodernism to analyse experience of
social change. The work of Tulloch and Lupton is influential (see Risk and
Everyday Life, 2003). Douglas drew attention to the fundamental distinc-
tion between Self and Other running across cultures and interpretations
of social contexts, and used it to provide an understanding of the multi-
dimensionality of socially available semantics and perception of risk. The
main concerns here are the different ways in which risk is understood by
different people, how people construct their identities and membership
of social (sub-) cultures referring to risk, how the understanding of risk
is engaged in ‘border crossings’ between Self and Otherness, and how
people interpret risks as positive Lupton and Tulloch 2002; Tulloch and
Lupton 2003)3 as well as sometimes negative. The concept of risk used in
this tradition is a descriptive one (‘real definition’), focusing on people’s
understanding of risk in the context of their everyday lives.
Risk Society and Reflexive Modernization

Beck’s work on the Risk Society (1992) originally published in German
(1986: Risikogesellschaft) was influential for theorizing in this field. It
was complemented by further publications (1995: Ecological Enlighten-
ment, 1999: World Risk Society) which respond to earlier criticisms. Several
publications critically discuss the initial assumptions (Lash, Szerszynski,
and Wynne 1996; Adam, Beck, and Van Loon 2000). The main thesis
and controversies about a changing modernity are published in Reflexive
Modernization (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; Beck, Bonss, and Lau 2003).
The growing risk-awareness and societal as well as individual responses
to risk are interpreted from the perspective of the risk society thesis in
a general framework of social change within modernity. The modern
worldview emerged through the interaction of many factors: the critical
39
and scientific spirit of the enlightenment, the technological advances of

the European industrial revolution, and the social and political changes
that followed the development of a working class, the continuing refine-
ment of the division of labour, the expansion of an international system
resting on sovereign nation states, and the political economy of national
economic management in the interests of assured growth. Beck’s thesis
claims modernization undermines its own foundations. He identifies two
central developments.
First, qualitatively new risks (or better: dangers, threats, and harms)
produced as unforeseen and unintended side effects of industrialized
modernity are emerging. A risk logic increasingly replaces the traditional
logic of social class. Although some risks and risk-dimensions still follow
class patterns (Beck 1992: 35), other and new risks concern people in a
way that is relatively independent from their social status. New risks, for
example, BSE, smog, radiation, climate change, genetically modified food,
and ozone depletion, mainly follow logics of allocation other than those
of social class. They are ‘democratic’ even though some might argue that
money and status could partly help to deal with such risks or influence
how they are perceived. Whilst these risks appear as unexpected side
effects of industrialized modernity, they also cannot be solved easily on
the basis of available knowledge. Their effects and causes are typically
only partly understood, and science does not provide us with the neces-
sary knowledge to manage them within the current policy framework. The
typical strategy used to domesticate uncertainty in modernity, insurance,
cannot be applied, it is claimed, since the necessary information on the
probability and extent of damages is not available—the risks are too
great and there is too little experience of them for prediction. Therefore,
uncertainty becomes a fundamental experience of modernity where it was
once successfully overcome by science and technique.
Second, understanding of social inequalities shifts from a collective
social class to an individual level. Beck (Beck 1992: 91–2) starts out
from the puzzle that ‘the structure of social inequality in the developed
countries displays an amazing stability’ whilst ‘the topic of inequality
disappears almost completely from the agenda of daily life, of politics, and
of scholarship’. ‘During the past three decades, almost unnoticed by social
stratification research, the social meaning of inequality has changed . . .
Social groups lose their distinctive traits, both in terms of their self-
understanding and in relation to other groups. They also lose their
independent identities and the chance to become a formative political
force’ (Beck 1992: 100). ‘Inequalities by no means disappear. They merely
40
become redefined in terms of an individualization of social risks. The

result is that social problems are increasingly perceived in terms of psy-
chological disposition: as personal inadequacies, guilt feelings, anxieties,
conflicts, and neuroses. There emerges, paradoxically, a new immediacy
of individual and society, a direct relation between crises and sickness.
Social crises appear as individual crises, which are no longer . . . perceived
in terms of their rootedness in the social realm’ (1992: 100).
Since the allocation logic of risk does not follow the traditional class
logic and the bonds to traditional social groups are weakened or dissolved,
political mobilization tends to follow the logic of risk rather than of social
class solidarity (1992: 35–6, 100).
The risk society approach claims that risks are real and also socially
constructed. Referring to Latour (1993), Beck (1999: 146, 150) claims
that risks or hazards are hybrids which are not accessible beyond their
social construction but also affect the social. It is not possible to be
only on the realist or constructivist side. Rather the distinction between
realism and constructivism or nature and culture is seen as a modern
idea of reality which never becomes real (‘We have never been modern’
as Latour puts it, 1993). This position can be understood as reconcil-
iation between the strong opposition of realist and constructivist sides
of risk, which is theoretically unsatisfying, even though still widely dis-
seminated in risk discourse. Risk society themes have been taken up in
the UK by Giddens. Adopting a different approach from that of Beck,
who discusses individualization processes on the institutional level (Beck
1992: 128–9), Giddens (1991) pays greater attention to the operation of
reflexive modernization at the individual level. This leads to a strong
emphasis on the ‘cultural turn’ away from received authority and exper-
tise and towards a citizenship of ‘active trust’, rather than taken-for-
granted deference to accredited experts (1994). Giddens follows through
the implications of a critical citizenry and a decline in the capacity of
nation states to manage the political economy for the political order
in the context of the ‘Third Way’ politics of New Labour in the UK
(Giddens 1999).
In Giddens’ view, the key cultural shift among the citizens of risk society
is that individuals are more conscious of their social context and their
own role as actors within it. Managing the risks of civilization becomes
both a pressing issue and one that is brought home to individuals. At the
same time however, confidence in experts and in accredited authorities
tends to decline as people are more aware of the shortcomings of official
decision-makers and of the range of alternative approaches to problems
41
available elsewhere on the planet. The tendency to breakdown of an

established traditional order in the life course provided by work, marriage,
family, and community leads to greater individualization and increased
uncertainty and anxiety. In this context, the individualized citizens of
world risk society are increasingly conscious of the responsibility to man-
age the risks they perceive in their own lives, and, in this sense, ‘self-create
their own biographies’.
The risk society approach has been criticized both theoretically (Lash
1994; Alexander and Smith 1996; Lupton 1999; Elliott 2002; Boyne 2003)
and on the basis of empirical evidence (Tulloch and Lupton 2003: 132).
Rose (1996: 321) points out that Beck’s claim ‘the prevalence of a lan-
guage of risk is a consequence of changes in the contemporary existential
condition of humans and their world (Beck 1992)’ may be misleading. A
number of studies (e.g. Ewald 1986; O’Malley 2004: 179) show that risk
emerged as a social category and as a concern for government in relation
to social insurance at least as early as the nineteenth century (see also
Dingwall 1999).
Further comments address the predominance of an individualized
notion of identity and agency. Since Beck mainly argues on the insti-
tutional level and interprets institutional individualization as a process
which can succeed or fail at the individual level, he pays too little
attention to differences between social groups. Focusing on the declining
role of social class and the importance of personal and active choice,
Beck tends to underestimate the continuing explanatory power of social
class categories (Mythen 2005). The responsible, confident, self-creating
individual may mainly be fulfilled within a particular social stratum
(Rose 1999).
Lash (2000) and others stress the significance of culture and an emo-
tional and aesthetic dimension to life, alongside choice in individual
action. Beck emphasizes that the cultural construction of risk is not the
whole truth. Risk and culture cannot be separated. ‘Risk’ and the ‘(public)
definition of risk’ are one and the same’ (1999: 135). He moves from a
notion of risks as dangers to risks as (social) expectations, which are nec-
essarily socioculturally constructed. He explicitly opposes the separation
of an realist and constructivist side of risk.
From the perspective of risk society and reflexive modernization,
the fundamental social changes regarding risk and uncertainty are
understood as the result of objective changes in the quality of risks as well
as societal transformations. Governmentality studies, however, interpret
this change in terms of a shift in strategies of power and domination.
42
From this perspective, risk is understood as a fundamental social con-

struction referring to a specific social constitution, rather than a change in
objective dangers.
Governmentality
Governmentality approaches draw on the path-breaking work of Foucault
(1991). Following some early work (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991) an
increasing number of books and articles has been published, examining
the phenomena of governance in a broad range of societal domains, such
as the governance of childhood (Bell 1993; Brownlie 2001; Kelly 2001),
crime (Garland 1997; Joyner 2001; O’Malley 2004), health and illness
(Turner 1997; Joyce 2001; Brown and Michael 2002; Flynn 2002), and
cyberspace (Loader 1997). For an overview, see Dean (1999). Foucault’s
work on societal governance contributes to the discourse on two levels:
he provides an instrument to analyse power and domination in society
and offers an historical analysis of how they were transformed during the
development of the modern state. Central to Foucault’s theorizing is the
connection between governing (‘gouverner’) and mentality (‘mentalité’),
which is united in the term ‘governmentality’. It indicates his broad view
regarding issues of power and domination, which are reduced neither to
direct external impacts on the subject nor to the governmental practices
of the state. It rather includes the construction of realities through prac-
tice and sense-making, encompassing the multitude of societal organiza-
tions and institutions producing social reality.
In his historical analysis of power and domination in societies from
the mercantilist nation states in the seventeenth century to the mod-
ern capitalist state, Foucault identifies significant changes. Modern states
developed new techniques for managing their populations and achiev-
ing national goals (Foucault 1977; see Dean 1999: 18–20). Instead of
punishment and immediate external control directed at a specific ideal,
the strategies refer ever more to populations and abstract categoriza-
tion to assess national resources and assist planning. These were trans-
formed into sophisticated systems of ordering, a whole rationality of
government which saw its role as including the reviewing, planning,
structuring, allocating, and regulating of its own population. Authorities
developed the use of audit, judicial discipline, economic management and
an apparatus of welfare, education, urban planning, and redistributive
measures directed at enhanced security during the life course to achieve
these ends.
43
The individual is no longer treated holistically but as a bearer of indica-

tors which qualify his or her affiliation to one or another group (as ‘at risk’
or ‘risky’). Specific ‘safety strategies’ were developed (most prominently,
social insurance), which supplant the former class (or ‘estate’ in mer-
cantile society) specific organizations. The friendly society, for example,
represents the idea of a prudent and responsible working class. Class
specific organizations were replaced with systems established by the state
which refer to the family or individual rather than to class solidarity.
Such historical transformations regarding societal self-constitution were
first supported by the analyses of the circle of scholars around Foucault
(e.g. Ewald 1986; Donzelot 1997).
Foucault also mentioned a far-reaching change within modern liberal
states (Gordon 1991: 19f.). Neo-liberal power strategies change the rela-
tion between state and economy. Whilst in early liberalism the state
was understood as controlling the liberty of the market, the market
became the central regulatory principle of the state itself. Economics is
no longer a domain with a specific rationality, laws, and instruments.
Rather all human action became characterized by an economic rationality
as far as the allocation of limited resources is concerned. The general
principle of government is no longer the regulation of natural liberty,
which has to be accepted. Instead it constitutes an artificial ‘freedom’ for
economically rational individuals (Burchell 1993: 271; Rose 1996: 50–62;
Lemke 2001).
This freedom is produced by linking ‘power strategies’ and ‘technologies
of the self’ which indicates another important theoretical distinction
introduced by Foucault. It allows systematic analysis of the link between
the strategies which aim to determine individuals’ behaviour directly
(power strategies) and the ways in which individuals are empowered to
manage their bodies, souls, and their way of life in order to attain such
goals as perfection, happiness, purity, or exceptional power (technologies of
the self ). The dominant moral model of the liberal project is not the direct
control of individuals, but rather the autonomous, self-responsible, pru-
dent subject, weighing rationally the pros and cons of choices. In several
societal domains, the governmentality approach shows how responsibil-
ity for societal risks such as illness, unemployment, and poverty is trans-
ferred to the collective and to individual subjects (individuals, families,
clubs, and so on). It thereby becomes a problem of self-provision (see, for
example, O’Malley 1996: 199–204; Rose 1996: 50–62; Dean 1999: 191–2).
Within this theoretical framework, risk and security are understood
as central elements of power and domination and thus a strategy for
44
the government of societies. Risk does not result directly from objective
facts, rather it represents a specific way in which aspects of reality can
be conceptualized and rendered controllable. From this perspective the
‘objective’ decision-making approach of rational choice, mainly used in
economics and psychology, is interpreted as a normative societal pro-
gramme which is linked to the rise of neo-liberal styles of governmental-
ity. The increasing amount of risk communication in society is therefore
understood as the result of the growing influence of neo-liberal strategies
of government.
One stream of research in the tradition of Foucault refers to François
Ewald’s work on the development of insurance as a core indicator of
the transition to modernity. It stresses that insurance does more than
distribute financial risks between insured parties. Insurance constitutes
and spreads a moral idea of responsibility. The actor is released from
responsibility for the insured event and the person affected entitled to
compensation. Insurance also is part of a moral technology which defines
correct behaviour. For example, compensation may be limited to motor
accidents where the driver is sober.
Even though the theoretical instruments developed by Foucault open
up a broad range of analysis, many governmentality studies focus nar-
rowly on the level of national government. For example, Dean starts out
from broad definitions (‘the conduct of conduct’—1999: 10—embracing
the ‘government of the self’, to include such personal activities as dieting
and religious practice—17), but by the end of the book concentrates on
‘historically delimited’ authoritarian and neo-liberal forms of government
(Chapters 7 and 8). In principle, however, the approach can include a
cultural account of power at all levels.
Governmentality perspectives have also been criticized as over-reliant
on a top-down functionalism that seeks to explain social developments
in terms of the exigencies of government and other power-holding insti-
tutions, to see people as inherently open to manipulation and to contain
an under-developed account of agency. The topic of agency emerges
mainly through the notion of a generalized subject constructed by societal
discourses. Individual possibilities for resistance are often underestimated
(Lupton 1999). One direction for development links together the accounts
of shifts at the level of political economy with detailed and nuanced
analyses of individual behaviours and responses. Kemshall’s work (2002)
on young people and perceptions of risks in the context of a more flexible
labour market or Hartley Dean (1999) on the changing responses to social
security regulation are examples of this approach.
45
Some Lessons and Perspectives from Interdisciplinary Work on

Risk and Uncertainty
All the approaches reviewed in this chapter contribute to the overall

understanding of perceptions and responses to risk. The technical and
rational calculation of risk is still applied successfully in domains where
knowledge of the relevant risk and shared values about its status, priority,
and management are available. Psychological approaches show how risk
perception deviates from technical scientific rationality, and that it is
subjectively constructed but is also influenced by factors such as gender,
national culture, age, class, and ethnic group. This corresponds to the soci-
ological insight that people perceive and respond to risks in the context
of their sociocultural embeddedness, which is also constituted by other
group affiliations, lifestyles, values, and identity constructions in general.
Furthermore, people often apply diverse strategies as heuristics in order
to simplify choice or to manage the decision-making load of everyday
life. This is not best understood as a deviation from a superior, objective
scientific rationality. Laypeople have specific knowledge and a perspective
which draws on their experience of scientific expertise, but is also linked
to local and everyday knowledge and their specific position in society.
Our current concerns regarding risk and uncertainty are as much an effect
of the evident limits of control by science and technology as they are an
outcome of a cultural perspective which tends to interpret uncertainties
as in principle controllable by rationality.
Overall, approaches which attempt to explain risk perception and
responses only at the level of one of the social science disciplines con-
tributing to work on risk seem inadequate. Nevertheless, the attempt to
combine a range of theoretical approaches within the social amplifica-
tion of risk framework encounters the problem of its limited predictive
power. We have available a range of different instruments and methods.
The absence of a homogenous approach may be seen as an advantage,
enabling us to do justice to the multidimensional reality of risk and
uncertainty in current society.
Some of those issues emerged in the very recent past and they still
attract research engagement and feed into continuing controversies. The
‘precautionary principle’ (the idea that if the consequences of an action
are unknown, but may have major or irreversible negative consequences,
then it is better to avoid it) is promoted in order to manage irresoluble
uncertainties and provide a way of deciding which risks we are willing to
take. The controversy about the irrationality of public responses to risk
46
as against the development of scientific knowledge continues. In several

research domains, there have been real improvements in knowledge in
recent years. The link between the media and the public is seen as inter-
active and complex, rather than just top-down.
People do not generally and automatically place their trust in estab-
lished institutions. Instead of following an overall objective rationality,
people’s perceptions and responses to risk are bound up with their cultural
and social context. The factors influencing risk responses and their inter-
action and dynamic development are difficult to predict. In the process of
decision-making, rationality as well as trust, emotion, competing perspec-
tives, and the accumulation of risks are interwoven, and further research
is needed in all these areas. Finally, discourse is often narrowed to the
negative side of risk. The fact that people are willing to take risks in
areas such as extreme sports and sexual activities also requires further
considerations. In the next chapter we consider how these issues are being
tackled in current research.
Notes
1. We explore the growing risk awareness and the erosion of traditional risks
through the example of technical risks because of their significance for the
development of risk research in general. The objective concept of risk was also
questioned in relation to health and illness, crime, environmental issues, and
several other domains mentioned in the thematic chapters of the book.
2. They are sometimes not allowed for ethical reasons, for example.
3. Compare the work on edgework and voluntary risk-taking (Lyng 2005).
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53
3
The Challenge of (Managing) New Risks
Research in the field of risk has expanded rapidly in recent years, as

Chapter 2 shows. Social science approaches have developed from an
initial concern with the management of technical issues, drawing on
rational actor models of behaviour, to include psychological and socio-
logical perspectives which seek to capture the complexity of the factors
that influence risk responses in different settings, and the ways in which
thinking about and managing risk is embedded in social and cultural
contexts. In parallel to the expansion in the range of disciplines and
methods applied to risk, is an expansion of theoretical interest, embracing
more sophisticated accounts of mental modelling, lay/expert interactions,
and theories of governmentality and of risk society.
This chapter deals with the most recent work and with the current
unresolved debates in risk research. The chief areas of interest stem from
three developments, both implicit in the argument developed in the
previous chapter.
First there is a widespread recognition that risk issues are endemic in any
society that relies on complex enterprises, particularly those involving
the onward rush of new and untried technologies. Once this point is
understood, there is no possibility of returning to a situation in which
risks could be understood as simply technical issues, which could be
eliminated if the right systems were put in place. The issue becomes much
more one of managing an acceptable level of risk.
This leads to the second point: if risk is understood as, to a great extent, a
matter of judgements about acceptability, a whole range of political issues
about trust in authorities, experts, and officials, about social communi-
cation and the mass media come into play. Once the views of the lay
54
The Challenge of New Risks
public are taken seriously, decision-making can no longer be exclusively a

preserve of the authorities, but must include processes of interaction and
participation between all those involved.
The third point follows from this and also draws on the much broader
range of social science approaches now included in the analysis of risk.
Recent work demonstrates the complexity of the risky choices that people
make in their everyday lives. Issues of social identity and group mem-
bership are bound up with risk-taking and risk-avoidance. Some people
actively seek out some risks, which others just as strenuously avoid. It
becomes clear that risk cannot be understood simply in terms of rational
judgement. Emotional factors supply the drive necessary to make choices
and are often implicated in the process of choosing. Equally, anxiety and
stress are associated with risk, and contentment with security.
Risk as a theme in social science has spread to embrace a whole range of
issues and approaches. Work in this field includes analyses at the macro-
level, seeking to understand risk and uncertainty as primary elements in
modern culture. It also refers at an intermediate level to the question
of how risks are to be managed by institutions and organizations in
a publicly acceptable way, and, at the micro-level, to the problem of
accounting for the way people respond in complex contexts. One major
challenge now lies in finding ways to bring together these levels of under-
standing. Another results from recognition that individual risk experience
develops over time, and methods which capture experience, anticipation,
and biography are required.
New challenges for risk research result from globalized risks, such as
global warming, BSE, influenza epidemics, and international crime and
terrorism, and the need for transnational collaboration to manage them.
National differences in risk regimes and cultures and the implications of
accounts of society in terms of risk become issues for further research and
theorizing.
Endemic Risk
The current discussion of risk is permeated by concerns about ‘new’

uncertainties which cannot be transformed by rational calculation into
manageable risks. With the acceptance that there are, in principle,
limits to knowledge and control, the question of how to cope with
uncertainty rises up the societal agenda. The ‘Challenge of Uncertainty’
55
(Zinn 2005a) emerges across many societal domains. At a technical level,

it refers to the problem of coping with the limits of scientific knowledge
and with the resulting question of which risks we want to take. These
political and ethical issues feed into the political principle of precaution.
Here and in other non-technical areas of risk, ‘objective’ rationality and
social and subjective rationalities compete with each other in political
controversies and processes.
Precaution
With the growing acknowledgement of the social as an important part of
risk management, different values and perspectives on risk are introduced
into the technical approach on risk. The ‘precautionary principle’ offered
a solution to the problem of coping with the mixture of limited knowl-
edge and ethical doubts with respect to the uncertain impact of technical
developments, particularly in the fields of the environment and health.
Adoption of the principle was driven by the desire for the political
management of public concerns rather than as a scientific concept. It
promised a systematic way of coping with the irreducible uncertainties
of decision-making and thereby providing legitimation for policy. It also
seeks to reduce errors caused by ignoring ‘early warnings’ and to develop
procedures for promoting greater awareness of the possible side effects of
innovations (EEA 2001).
The precautionary principle has emerged as a general rule for decision-
making across many areas of policymaking. The EU Treaty of Nice (2000)
declares that all areas of EU policymaking should embrace this principle.
Despite its wide application, the definition of the principle is imprecise.
A scientific and a ‘common sense’ approach can be distinguished (Burgess
2004: 158).
The scientific approach accepts precaution only on the basis of scientific
knowledge and calculation, whereas the common sense approach accepts
everyday life knowledge and concerns as reasons for rejecting innova-
tions where there is uncertainty. It opens up the discourse to ‘rationally’
unfounded rejections. Some authors interpret that as a necessary brake
on innovation required by ecologically informed decision-making (Japp
2000). This approach is criticized by those who claim the principle gives
too much power to irrational fears. Consumer organizations and the pub-
lic often react hysterically (Burgess 2004), and prevent necessary scientific
and societal development. This perspective argues that a reactionary ‘cul-
ture of fear’ (Furedi 1997, 2002) has to be overcome in order to support
56
societal (particularly economic) development (Wilsdon and Willis 2004).

However, the aspiration that unrestrained innovation will produce the
knowledge necessary to solve today’s problems (Wildavsky 1988, 1995)
also involves risk (Japp 2000).
Competing Rationalities
Awareness of the limits of technical risk assessment and management to
control uncertainty within the technical paradigm has led to attempts
to improve the quality of calculation and assessment. Additionally the
approach attempts to combine objective with social and subjective risk
problems. For example, Klinke and Renn (2002) seek to combine precau-
tion and rational assessment as appropriate to specific risk problems. They
distinguish ideal types of risks by combining several criteria to generate a
typology of six different risk types. Depending on the different character-
istics they recommend specific strategies to manage different kinds of risk.
Risk-based management is suggested for risks where both the probability of
occurrence and the extent of damage are relatively well known and can
mainly be managed by reducing the catastrophic potential by technical
and formal means. Precaution-based management is suggested when the
risk is connected with a relatively high degree of uncertainty. The first
priority of risk management is the application of precautionary measures
and the development of substitutes. Finally, discourse-based management
is appropriate when objective risk knowledge is not used properly, for
example, when the potential for wide-ranging damage is ignored (climate
change) or harmless effects are perceived as threats (mobile phones).
This approach starts from the identifiable characteristics of a risk prob-
lem and provides a systematic strategy for managing new risks and uncer-
tainties (Klinke and Renn 2002: 1082–5, 1090). Limitations emerge when
it is difficult to assign a risk to a category in advance. The approach
maintains the value of scientific knowledge and implies that on that basis
discursive strategies will lead to unambiguous solutions. Some research
indicates that this is often an unrealistic expectation (STAGE 2005).
The problem of the limits to the rational management of uncertainty is
powerful in other domains as well. For example, in health and illness it is
a widely shared norm that uncertainty has to be minimized, particularly
regarding the success of treatments (compare Alaszewski, Chapter 8).
Formal control structures take responsibility from the individual provided
that the rules are followed. However, the success of organizations depends
also on informal structures. A doctor who only followed strictly formal
57
rules might, when faced with an unexpected situation, become a risk.

At the same time, health knowledge is becoming increasingly diverse
and uncertain, as orthodox medicine is questioned by other knowledge
systems, such as homeopathy and acupuncture (Zinn 2005).
In criminology the ‘key contention is that the modernist disciplinary
agenda delivered through the welfare state has been replaced by a welfare-
penal agenda based upon risk’ (see Kemshall, Chapter 4). Despite the huge
range of actuarial risk techniques that are now applied, the more recent
concern in research and theorizing is about the implications and the dark
side of risk. Risk calculations are interpreted not only as an objective
issue but also as a moral concept interwoven with ideas of responsibility
and neglecting diversity (as also in the governmentality approach). Con-
cerns about crime cannot be divorced from decisions about the level of
uncertainty or deviance we would like to accept and about which crimes
provoke concern.
This tension between freedom, autonomy, and uncertainty is also an
issue in the context of family and partnership (compare Lewis and Sarre,
Chapter 7). When partnership is open to negotiation and decisions, as
the individualization thesis implies, it may become uncertain in terms of
continuity, but might become more certain in terms of quality. The con-
troversy in research is about how these uncertainties are to be understood
as good or bad and how they have to be handled, as something to be
supported or prevented by social policy.
Finally, the idea of regulation and management is increasingly infected
by the insight that in some high-risk organizations, it is impossible to
achieve absolute control (Vaughan 1996). This leads to interest in the
management of such pervasive uncertainties, and also in how manage-
ment and organization itself produce unforeseen risks and how we can
control them (see Hutter, Chapter 10).
The Public Acceptability of Risky Choices
The concern of politicians and other decision-makers about the public

acceptability of risky decisions generates support for research on good
risk governance (TRUSTNET 1999, 2004; PABE 2002; STAGE 2005). In this
context and more generally, the media are seen as a decisive framing
mechanism, capable of not only reinforcing acceptability but also of
destroying it. Public trust in authorities is a major influence on acceptance
of decisions, which cannot be overseen in detail. Recent research shows
58
that the issues of risk governance and participation, and media influence
and public trust are more complex than often assumed.
Risk Governance
The technical and knowledge-based approach to risk increasingly
acknowledges a role for the social and subjective aspects of risk, as the
previous chapter showed. These problems are embedded in a more general
perspective on risk governance (TRUSTNET 2004), which is mainly about
how decisions can be made in a publicly acceptable way. The focus shifts
from a technical question of risk to general ideas of democracy and
public participation. The central assumption is that participation can
increase public acceptance of risky decisions. A range of instruments (such
as consensus-conferences, public debates, roadshows, and surveys) have
been developed to facilitate public participation. Recent research shows
that participation alone is not enough and that attempts to foster accep-
tance may prove counterproductive. The idea of shaping public opinion
may come into conflict with the idea of democracy, which assumes early
public involvement in risky decisions, and a highly transparent decision-
making process.
The ideal of consensus is not necessarily attainable (STAGE 2005), and it
is sometimes necessary to find solutions in such cases. Japp gives a number
of examples (2000, compare Zinn 2004a: 17). He suggests that partial
interests could become embedded in more general collective interests so
that interest groups may accept compromises to promote public welfare.
Another strategy is moving from a pure instrumental rationality to a more
symbolic rationality, to shift perspectives on the problem and its solution
(compare also Hutter, Chapter 10). The pressing question in this area still
is how risk governance can be developed in a way which is morally and
democratically acceptable to the public.
The Media
Many approaches to risk assume that the media exert significant influence
on social identities, risk definitions, risk selection, and the knowledge
people have about risks, and are therefore central to risk awareness and
to explanations of people’s responses to risk.
From an objective perspective, the media were understood as a channel
for public information and a means to overcome an irrational risk aver-
sion. Sociological approaches initially also tended to conceptualize the
role of the media as framing public understanding of risk or facilitating
59
the development of ‘risk consciousness’ (Beck 1992: 23, 132f.). Although

it soon became clear that the relationship between the media and the
public is much more complex, systematic research in this field is compar-
atively underdeveloped.
Significant changes in understanding of the media during the 1990s
had major implications for approaches to risk, risk perceptions, and risk-
taking. The classical approach, focused on the objectivity, rationality,
and accuracy of media coverage (e.g. Freudenburg et al. 1996; Wilson
2000), encountered serious difficulties. On the one hand, the fundamen-
tal assumption that the role of the media was to support the public in
making adequate judgements by providing objective information met the
problem that often such objective knowledge is not available (Adams
1995: 194f.; Kitzinger 1999; Murdock, Pelts, and Horlick-Jones 2003). On
the other hand, the implicit and widely disseminated assumption that
media reports have a determining influence upon public risk perception
(e.g. Renn et al. 1992; Spencer and Triche 1994) was confronted with
evidence that the subject has a relatively more active role concerning the
interpretation of and response to risk (compare Kitzinger and Murdock,
Chapter 12).
Assumptions like the notion of a general risk consciousness in the risk
society approach (Beck 1992) or the determining influence of the mass
media on the public (e.g. Adams 1995; Kasperson and Kasperson 1996)
contain oversimplifications. Media research as well as sociocultural studies
show the ambivalence of audience attitudes towards the information they
receive about risk, the range of partial, ambiguous, and contradictory
views about the benefits and wisdom of the scientific knowledge indi-
viduals hold, and the contradictions, incoherence, and disagreement in
the ways in which these groups actively make sense of the threat posed in
areas such as environmental hazards (Irwin et al. 1999: 1312).
Sociocultural studies show that risks are discursively constructed in
everyday life with reference to the mass media, individual experience and
biography, local memory, moral convictions, and personal judgements.
The mass media are only one among other important factors (Tulloch
2000: 197; Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones 2003). Quantitative surveys
on general risk awareness may well give little information on peoples’
individual assumptions about the risks that they face—a point often
summed up as the ‘impersonal impact hypothesis’ (Dickens 1992; Cole-
man 1993; Wilkinson 2001b: 13).
The wide range of different findings in media studies cannot be
explained by a set of general rules or logics. They seem rather to be
60
influenced by the substantive nature of the particular topic under consid-

eration (Kitzinger 1999: 57) and/or to be the result of specific situational
constellations. Studies which compare media coverage at different points
in time tend to show that the social and political context is essential
for understanding risk-reporting and how it changes over time (Kitzinger
1999: 59). This suggests that research on the framing of risk perception by
the media can only fully be understood by simultaneous analysis of the
context of risk-reports and a careful ‘ethnographic’ analysis of the indi-
vidual’s embeddedness in cultural and social contexts and biographical
experiences.
Trust
Public trust in expertise, science, and politicians has declined, partic-
ularly as a result of the major accidents of the 1980s (Chapter 2).
The problem for politicians is exacerbated by the evidence that trust is
much easier to destroy than to rebuild (Axelrod 1981; Coleman 1986;
Fukuyama 1996; Gambetta 1998; Putnam 2000; Le Grand 2003: 29 etc. see
Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003, 31–2). Establishing trust has become
a topic of central interest for decision-makers and for risk researchers, in
order to facilitate the public acceptance of policy decisions (Jungerman
et al. 1996). In this section, we review psychological and sociological
approaches.
Psychological work on trust relationships between the public and insti-
tutions initially identified two main themes: the characteristics of the
agency to be trusted and particularly its competence to carry out the
role assigned to it (Renn and Levine 1991), and the relationship between
the values of the agency and the citizen (Siegrist, Cvetovitch, and Roth
2000). These general dimensions have been subdivided into a number of
component factors, including perceived competence, objectivity, fairness,
consistency, care, and faith (Hovland et al. 1953; Renn and Levine 1991;
Frewer et al. 1996; Metlay 1999). Recent work indicates that trust may be
bound up with more general and fundamental attitudes towards an issue,
which provides the basis for both trust and risk judgements (Poortinga
and Pidgeon 2005). This could also help to explain why some studies show
only a limited influence of trust on the understanding of risk (Sjöberg
2001; Viklund 2003).
The support for the existence of more general beliefs or attitudes funda-
mental to the relationship between trust and risk offers opportunities to
link to the more cultural and emotional approaches to trust, even though
61
it is still controversial whether the domain under consideration plays a

greater role in influencing trust and risk judgement (Petts 1998; Weyman
and Kelly 1999: 30), or is a general attitude which does not vary much
across different domains of risk (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2004).
Earle and Cvetovich (1995) argue that in everyday life, most people find
complex risk issues too difficult and wearisome to analyse, and resort to
a general sense of sympathy with the institution (or otherwise) rather
than cognition to guide them. This parallels sociological approaches,
which assume that culture plays a central role in trust and risk. It is
also supported by transnational research which shows significant cross-
national differences in trust (Renn and Rohrmann 2000; Viklund 2003;
Delhey and Newton 2005). These require more detailed investigation.
Sociological approaches have adopted a broad conceptualization of
trust to include self-confidence as well as trust in worldviews (religion, ide-
ology), in institutions (the family, the state), in abstract systems (money,
economy, medicine), or in others (partner, friends, group, neighbour-
hood). Trust is a fundamental prerequisite of complex modern societies to
enable people to act and secure social cohesion (Luhmann 1979; Barber
1983). When societies became more and more complex, the significance
of trust in ‘abstract systems’ became increasingly necessary to manage
everyday life (Giddens 1991). Trust exists between knowledge and igno-
rance (Simmel 1968: 393). In this sense the function of trust can be
defined as solving the problem of limited knowledge (Giddens 1995: 48)
by reducing its complexity (Luhmann 1979).
Trust may also be understood as a matter of choice when there is a
possibility of failure (Crasswell 1993). Because it is actively given and
therefore closely linked to the modern idea of risk, Luhmann (1979)
distinguishes trust from other forms of non-rational strategies to secure
expectations, such as hope or confidence. When there is no possibility of
choice, it is confidence or hope rather than trust that is at stake. A small
number of writers suggest that trust applies to circumstances where we do
not reflect on the issue. Once we make conscious decisions about whether
to trust someone or not trust is already threatened. From this perspective,
trust reduces to uncritical habit.
Further developments identify a new form of trust emerging within
modernity. This is ‘active trust’ (Giddens 1994) or ‘reflexive trust’ (Bonss
and Zinn 2005) associated with the shift from a class stratified to
a functionally differentiated form of society. Giddens (1994) argues
that in modernity a routinely given trust in abstract systems (such
as the expert systems, represented by scientists, doctors, and other
62
professionals—1991) is increasingly accompanied by active trust. Active

trust has to be won; it is not predetermined by status or gender role.
It is autonomously given and is therefore a powerful source of social
solidarity (Giddens 1994: 14f.). In the more uncertain conditions of late
modernity, democratic decision-making rests on the ‘clever citizen’—well
informed and able to criticize policy—and a dialogic style of governance—
in which government must seek to attract active trust. Optimistically,
Giddens proposes that clever citizens and open governance will lead to
a ‘democratization of democracy’. He recognizes, but has not entirely
resolved, the problems of uncertainty that such a process involves. Indi-
viduals must choose and may revise their choices about trust in personal
relationships and in political and social institutions. They must work to
build and sustain trust, but there can be no guarantee of success. It is
unclear whether such a dialogue will necessarily lead to consensus when
the interests, knowledge, and values of experts, politicians, and lay-people
systematically differ.
Most research concurs on the importance of trust in the current context
and agrees that further research is needed. Unresolved key debates cover
a considerable number of areas:
– The complexity and in particular the number of dimensions involved

in trust (relating to sources of information about risk, processes by
which risk policies are enacted, the relationship between the basic val-
ues of the institution trusted and the trusting citizen, and the domains
of risk in question);
– The importance of trust in risk perception;
– The relationship between trust, risk judgement, and the acceptability
of a risk; the role of cultural differences and of affect;
– The extent to which the problem concerns the factors which influence
how a message from a particular source is received, rather than interac-
tion between the risk assumptions of lay-people (derived from cultural
and other sources) and those of experts.
New Insights into Factors Affecting Individual Choices

in Everyday Life
In several disciplines (economics, psychology, and sociology) and

domains of risk research, it became clear that the way people make deci-
sions in the course of their life is much more complex than is understood
63
in terms of rationality and rational deliberation (Elster 1998; Jaeger et al.

2001; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Pixley 2004). When resources are limited
and/or no certain knowledge is available, or just in order to manage a
broad range of uncertainties in everyday life, individuals refer to different
strategies. They use a range of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1982)
and refer to emotion, trust, tradition, belief, and other factors. Besides
the cultural framing of decision-making and especially recognition of
the role of emotions challenged theoretical considerations and empirical
research.
Cultural approaches to risk have emphasized at an early stage that
emotions and affect are a major issue in relation to identity and group
affiliation and thus to the perception and management of risk (Douglas
1966; Lash 2000; Tulloch and Lupton 2003). A positive approach, which
interprets risk itself as the motivation to take risks, is outlined in the
edgework approach (Lyng 2005) and is also used to explain deviant behav-
iour in criminology. More remarkable in this context is the tendency
in technical, objectivistic, and rational approaches to risk to accept that
emotion can be something positive, a prerequisite for decision-making in
the first place.
Emotion and Affect

Sociological theorists, cognitive psychologists, and economists tradition-
ally understood emotions as contradicting rationality. Fundamental work
done by Elias (1978, 1982, 1994) interprets the process of modernization
as the control and domestication of irrational emotions prioritizing ratio-
nal thinking. In the tradition of these early analyses, emotions are mainly
seen as destabilizing modernity (Luhmann 1995) or as the negative out-
come of the growing uncertainties of current developments (Giddens
1991). This orthodox perspective was questioned by cultural approaches
which introduced a positive interpretation of risk and uncertainty
(Lupton and Tulloch 2002; Tulloch and Lupton 2003), especially in the
context of ‘edgework’ (Lyng 2005) and of reflexive modernization (Zinn
2004).
Emotions as the cause of action were also acknowledged in economics
thinking. Keynes (1936: 161–2) famously argued ‘that a large proportion
of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than
mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic.
Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full con-
sequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only
64
be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action

rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.’
The need for emotions for entrepreneurial and innovative decision-
making was accepted in economics (Pixley 2002: 83); in conventional
thinking on judgement emotions were interpreted as disturbances to an
otherwise superior rationality. This view was also shared by technical
approaches on risk, concerned that the objectively best risk calculations
become confounded by values and irrational beliefs.
Decision-making research accommodates emotions mainly as the
expected accompaniments of particular courses of action. One reason
may be that emotions as expectations can easily be added to the list
of items weighed up in the conventional rational choice model. Risky
choices then can be predicted by assuming that people assess the severity
and likelihood of the possible outcomes of choice alternatives, albeit
subjectively and possibly with bias or error, and integrate this infor-
mation through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a
decision.
This perspective differs from the view of researchers engaged in other
psychological research domains, as neuroscience and social psychology.
They focus much more on how immediate emotions influence decision-
making (Loewenstein et al. 2001). In contrast to earlier approaches,
emotions and affects are no longer solely interpreted as aberrations in
decision-making, but as a prerequisite. For example, Damasio (1996)
has argued, referring to research on people with specific brain injuries,
that emotions are necessary to value alternatives in the decision-making
process (the ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis). Emotions and rationality nec-
essarily interact in order to direct the decision-making process. In his
view, rapid and basic emotional evaluation combined with a rational
assessment would produce good decisions in a limited time. In this way,
feelings have a direct effect on decision-making. Clore, Schwarz, and
Conway (1994) argue that feelings affect people’s judgements or choices
within a decision-process in those cases where the feelings are experienced
as reactions to the imminent judgement or decision.
The research of Alhakami and Slovic (1994) and Finucane et al. (2000)
conceptualizes affect1 as an ‘orienting mechanism’ (Slovic 1999: 694f.).
Affect is prior to the rational evaluation of alternatives. ‘It thus appears
that the affective response is primary, and the risk and benefit judgments
are derived (at least partly) from it’ (Slovic 1999: 694). It is easy to
imagine a socio-biological account of how rapid ‘hard-wired’ responses
65
to threats might be highly valued compared with rational ones that took
longer to execute. There are also parallels to the notion of ‘quick trust’
(Alaszewski 2003: 238) or ‘facework-based trust’ (Cook, ch. 1 in Kramer
and Cook 2004) to account for the processes whereby people make deci-
sions whether or not to trust doctors on the basis of brief interviews when
they themselves are not competent to judge the technical issues (compare
also Eiser and colleagues 2002).
Emotional intensity seems to influence significantly risk perception and
risk-taking, as well. Emotions at a comparatively low level of intensity
can be understood to play the role of an advisor in decision-making. The
evaluation of one’s feelings is then used to find out how to judge (Loewen-
stein et al. 2001). Conversely, intense emotions might rule out cognitive
consideration. This fits in with the observation that under specific cir-
cumstances, risk calculation as a whole is rejected (Japp 2000; Rescher
1983; Loewenstein et al. 2001). One of the reasons to reject risk-taking
is that probable outcomes are seen as so horrible or catastrophic that
even the smallest probability acquires an unbearable emotional weight
(e.g., resistance to vaccination because it is believed to cause autism,
or the refusal to deal with nuclear energy as a whole because of the
incalculable damages of a serious accident). The problem that emotions
and rationality sometimes do not coincide (Loewenstein et al. 2001) is
rarely considered in the context of risk research, but is a common topic in
research on intrapersonal conflict (Schelling 1984). People are often over-
whelmed by their emotions and cannot act rationally, even if they want to
(Rolls 1999).
Edgework
Another perspective on emotions interprets them not just as a prerequi-
site for action in general but emphasizes the thrill which accompanies
specific risk-taking activities. This perspective is outlined in the edgework
approach (Lyng 2005), which is mainly applied to explain participation in
‘manifestly irrational’ leisure time activities (Lyng and Snow 1986) such
as high-risk sports. It is also used in criminology in order to understand
the motivation for some criminal activities (Katz 1988; Ferrell and Sanders
1995). Edgework can also take place in a broad range of activities, includ-
ing mountaineering, skydiving, some aspects of working life (stock market
trading, rigging scenery, and lighting), crime, drug use, and the arts.
Edgework deviates in many respects from other approaches to risk. It
is close to recent cultural approaches to issues of identity, in its emphasis
66
on emotions, and related issues such as aesthetics. The main assumption

is that risk and uncertainty itself attract people. This attraction is not
just explained as an anthropological constant but is understood in two
different ways in respect to modern society. From one view, edgework is
interpreted as an escape from the normative demands of modern society
which determine individual opportunities to shape ones life and gain
original experiences. Society is seen as limiting individual activities. From
the opposite perspective, exploring the limits of control is understood
as an expression of the normative idea of modern society extended into
the domain of leisure time activities (Lyng 2005: 5). On this view it can
be expected that people who explore the edge in everyday life (e.g. in
their work) are also inclined to do so during their leisure time by bungee
jumping, sky surfing, or similar activities. The edgework approach helps
to explain different styles of risk-taking with the help of emotions. How
this behaviour can be embedded in general societal developments is still
controversial.
Emotional experiences are often seen as positioned beyond rational,
cognitive, and textual approaches to risk. In the context of edgework,
the focus is on exciting experiences that people actively seek. Recent
research on health and illness has also considered how people manage
the experience of involuntary suffering (Wilkinson 2004a, b).
Challenges in Risk Research

Risk perception, responses to risk, and risk-taking have tended to be
analysed through strategies which examine a specific decision or a specific
attitude. Approaches which focus attention on context and on the inter-
action of different factors in risk perception and response raise questions
of how risk issues are to be understood interactively, in relation to other
risks and dynamically, over time.
One approach points out that much analysis focuses on risks as isolated
instances, whilst in everyday life, people respond to a range of mutually
interacting risks. There are indications that the embeddedness of a risk in a
range of competing alternatives influences how such risks are evaluated. For
example, in research on health and illness the risk of an illness tends to be
interpreted against the background of other current and previous illnesses
(Faircloth et al. 2004; Pound, Gompertz, and Ebrahim 1998). Health issues
are generally embedded in common patterns of behaviour regarding life
(risks) in general as Cornwell (1984) has shown in research on working
class responses to risk of illness.
67
Second, risk research has benefited greatly from the stronger inter-
est in culture and experience at the individual level in sociology since
the 1980s, whilst in psychology a move in the same direction, from
methodological individualism to the inclusion of cultural issues, has been
apparent in recent years (see Chapter 2). This ‘cultural turn’ (see also John
Tulloch’s discussion in Chapter 6) opens up new ways of understanding
the richness of the contexts in which people perceive and respond to risks.
However, there are real issues about how such approaches are to be linked
with the more institutional accounts of risk society theories or the macro-
sociology of governmentality approaches.
There is comparatively little research on the dynamics of how people
experience risks or how they develop specific ways of approaching risks
over time. Whilst at the macro-level there is little progress in theoriz-
ing risk processes since the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (see
Chapter 2), there have recently been promising developments at the
micro-level. In psychology Eiser (2003) attempts to bring together
risk research with cognitive and social learning theory. In sociology
the biographical approach develops without attracting much atten-
tion from mainstream risk research. It focuses on how people develop
specific patterns of action and behaviour under changing social con-
ditions. In these processes, risks and uncertainties are central issues
(Zinn 2005).
Referring to learning and social learning theory Eiser (2005) explores
the range of problems that result from the fact that a successful risk
learner needs to gather appropriate feedback from the environment on
when to pursue or not to pursue a course of action, and to be able
to modify behaviour accordingly. Learning theory deals with how we
assimilate information from practical situations, whilst social learning
theory (Mischel and Shoda 1995) extends this to the experientially based
views that people acquire about the social environment in which they
live and how they can handle it with confidence. In practice, many of
the risk situations we deal with provide poor feedback. For example,
most of the time speeding drivers reach their destinations safely—and
learn that the risks associated with speeding do not apply to them (Eiser
2005: 23).
In sociology, there has been considerable interest in new methods
which provide nuanced and detailed understanding of the way individ-
ual experience and context contribute to people’s perceptions of and
responses to risk. One important approach now attracting attention is
biographical methodology (Chamberlayne et al. 2000, 2002; Rosenthal
68
2004). ‘The purpose of the sociobiographical approach is to avoid the

overgeneralization and abstraction of many social research methods,
which often reduce individuals to aggregates, averages, or bundles of
variables, and which lose sight of the coherence of individual lives’
(Chamberlayne, Rustin, and Wengraf 2002: 3). The focus is the subject’s
interpretation of life situations, and choices in response to them; how
individuals maintain their identity or restore an injured identity over
time. This approach and other qualitative methods allow researchers to
explore how specific interpretations and action patterns develop during
their lives. They help to explain why people respond differently to specific
risks. They also facilitate examination of how competing risks interact in
the way individuals cope with uncertainty and how emotions are inter-
connected in experiencing, remembering, and learning from the past. In
this way, learning and social learning theory and biographical approaches
could complement each other.
Another challenge for risk research is globalization. Global warming,
epidemics of influenza, the spread of GM food through world trade
agreements, or international terrorism attract growing attention. The link
between national and transnational factors is not sufficiently theorized
and empirically analysed. The predominant focus on western industrial-
ized societies neglects the question of how such countries and their risk
practices are linked to those of other nations and cultures and how they
mutually influence them.
In this context still under-examined national differences in terms of
institutional risk regimes and risk culture(s) become more important in
explaining complex transnational interrelationships. It remains unclear
why specific risks raise greater concern in some countries than in others
and why more general risk awareness is differently developed in different
societies. Although some comparative studies exist (e.g. regarding risk
perception [Renn and Rohrmann 2000] or trust Delhey and Newton 2005)
there is scope for further research.
These sociocultural and institutional differences are linked to another
issue which receives little attention. Risk is not just an objective entity
but also a specific way of understanding society and placing a value on
particular approaches to opportunities and dangers. Social institutional
changes bound up with greater international competition, the introduc-
tion of new and more flexible technologies, the shift towards a post-
industrial society, changes in the status and role of women, and other
factors all interact to restructure the agenda of risks that people recog-
nize and confront in their everyday life. This leads to the emergence
69
of ‘new social risks’ associated with problems in access to employment

or satisfactory childcare or lack of appropriate education and training
(Taylor-Gooby 2004). Much work on risk and social change analyses risk
from perspectives that focus on individual experience and pay little atten-
tion to structural social inequalities. At the same time a moral programme
of individual responsibility in public policy reinforces discrimination
against disadvantaged groups, as social supports are withdrawn in a neo-
liberal policy context. This raises the issues of how perceptions of risk
are used as a resource in different systems of governance and how risk
causes different affects in the diverse sociocultural styles of government
in Europe and elsewhere.
Such a perspective resembles constructivism in the governmentality
perspective. More recently Baker and Simon (2002) diagnosed a funda-
mental shift in understanding of the role of insurance (social as well
as private). The notion of solidarity and risk-pooling through insurance
has become increasingly supplanted by a more active and enterpris-
ing approach they term ‘embracing risk’. They draw on a strong cur-
rent research tradition in identifying two general cultural trends, which
are most evident in Anglophone countries (see Rose 1996; Dean 1999;
O’Malley 2004). Increasingly, social problems are conceived and addressed
in terms of risk, and various efforts have been made to make people indi-
vidually accountable for risks. The paradigm of solidarity is being eroded
by new developments which return responsibility to the individual and
differentiate the population through lifestyle, and exposures to risk and
behavioural patterns. The return of the market is associated with a cultural
change which accords greater value to success in business enterprise, stock
market speculation, and other high-risk financial activities, and promotes
wider public engagement in such ventures. This perspective shows how
the notion of risk leads to different outcomes in different sociocultural
and institution contexts.
Conclusion
This review points out the wide range of new avenues for research result-
ing from the developments of the past two decades. Risk research is now
at a juncture where the interlinking of perspectives and methods from
different disciplinary traditions offers excellent opportunities for taking
research forward and for developing richer theoretical understanding of
70
risk and uncertainty as central features of how people live their lives
in a distinctively modern form of society. We go on to examine these
developments in detail across the main areas of research in the following
chapters.
Note
1. Affect in this context is ‘defined as a positive (like) or negative (dislike) eval-
uative feeling toward an external stimulus (e.g. some hazard such as cigarette
smoking)’ (Slovic 1999: 694).
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4
Crime and Risk
Hazel Kemshall
Introduction
Crime and risk have become intrinsically linked, and contemporary penal
practices have been significantly influenced by the risk society (although
just how extensively is a matter of some debate [Pratt 2000a, 2000b; Rose
2000; Sparks 2000]). The key contention is that the modernist disciplinary
agenda delivered through the welfare state has been replaced by a welfare-
penal agenda based upon risk (Kemshall 2002a). The modernist agenda1
sought to rehabilitate and normalize offenders, and to discipline the wider
population through the ‘soft policing’ of welfare (Donzelot 1980; Garland
1985, 1996). However, by the close of the twentieth century the modernist
agenda was discredited, primarily on the grounds of cost in a shrinking
welfare state (see Kemshall 2002a for a full discussion), and as inadequate
for the containment of crime (Pratt 2000a). The ‘social causes of crime’
were dismissed (heralding the ‘death of the social’ Rose 1996a), and crime
management through treatment was seen as a failure (Martinson 1974).
The Thatcher years (1979–90) saw an era of ‘prison works’ and tougher
community penalties and the development of what has been labelled a
New Right penology (James and Raine 1998). This period saw a severe
challenge to the cost and effectiveness of criminal justice and concern
with increased crime rates, and discontent with interventions that focused
on the ‘causes of crime’ (McLaughlin and Muncie 1996). This was epit-
omized by Thatcher’s famous statement that there is ‘no such thing as
society’. The welfare paradigm was replaced by a justice paradigm empha-
sizing personal responsibility, culpability, and blame, and a prioritization
of punishment over rehabilitation. This trend continued throughout the
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Crime and Risk
1980s and 1990s and led many penal policy commentators to argue for a
‘new penology’.
A New Penology?
Whilst the terms postmodernity and late modern are open to some debate
(see Kellner 1999 for a full review), theoretical insights from the risk
society and postmodernity realms have influenced much recent crime
research and analyses. Within criminology these theoretical features can
be seen in debates about the extent or otherwise of the new ‘risk penality’
(Feeley and Simon 1994) and the extent to which penal practices have
been transformed by conditions of postmodernity (Garland 1996, 2000;
Pratt 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). However, whilst there is much evidence of
the prevalence of risk concerns and the impact of actuarial practices on
criminal justice (Kemshall 2003), there is extensive debate as to whether
penal policy and crime management is solely governed by risk (O’Malley
2000, 2004; Hudson 2002). In particular, commentators disagree about
the extent to which penal practices are governed by risk, and whether
the modernist agenda is really defunct (O’Malley 2004). Whilst disputes
continue to rage (see O’Malley 2001) there is some consensus about the
main precursors and key themes of the new penology:
r The rise and extension of capitalism, and the development of techniques to
discipline and regulate the workforce particularly the ‘underclass’.
r The use of actuarial risk practices to ensure civil stability and social order.
r Concerns with the management of the ‘dangerous class’ and the risk distribu-
tion of ‘bads’.
r The role of risk in social utility thinking, in particular the influence of mod-
ernist reason and rational thought in the development of economic and legal
approaches to social and penal policy.
r Economic pressures on crime management and concerns to effectively and
efficiently manage criminal justice systems.
r The retreat from liberal crime management and penal policy under conditions
of advanced liberalism. (Kemshall 2003: 29)
The major claim of interest here is that the new penality is characterized
by a shift from a disciplinary focus on individual behaviour and the
possibility of change towards the management of risk distribution and the
‘management in place’ of those segments of the population not amenable
to change (Kemshall and Maguire 2001).
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Crime and Risk
Key Research Themes
Research into crime and risk has tended to be eclectic, both empirically
and theoretically, and has drawn on a number of theoretical perspectives,
ranging from rational choice theory in studies of situational crime preven-
tion and offender desistance studies (Felson and Clarke 1997); to positivist
approaches to the development and evaluation of risk assessment tools
(Bonta 1996); and governmentality theories to explore penal practice
and the regulation of conduct (Rose 2000). These are discussed in detail
below.
Research has also been policy led, with the emphasis upon economic
crime risk management leading to a number of initiatives such as the
recent Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) requiring evaluation. The CRP
initially earmarked £400 million for programmes (although as Maguire
[2004] states rather less was spent), and was spawned by ‘evidence-based’
policy. The CRP reflected particular government interest in the potential
of multi-agency partnerships (Morgan 1991), and situational crime pre-
vention techniques (advocated by Ekblom, Law, and Sutton 1996) (see
Maguire 2004 for a full review).
Rational Choice Theory, Situational Crime Prevention, and the Rational

Choice Actor
The conceptualization of the offender as a rational choice actor was
progressed by both research and policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s as
part of the New Right agenda of crime management and parallels similar
developments in health and social care (Kemshall 2002a, 2002b, 2003).
The rational actor is characterized as ‘volitional and rational’ (Lupton
1999: 21) and the emphasis upon personal choice and responsibility
reflected an era in which the ‘social’ was eschewed (Rose 1996a). The
rational actor is represented as an ‘information processing unit’, and any
actor who fails to process information correctly (e.g. towards pre-specified
desirable ends) is characterized as irrational (Bloor 1995; Lupton 1999).
Research in this area usually takes place within a realist paradigm and is
most often investigated using cognitive science (the ‘psy’ disciplines), and
treatment/interventions are shaped by this (e.g. cognitive behavioural
therapy). Risk is generally investigated at the individual level, for example,
studies of risk perception, risk-taking behaviour (such as drug-taking), and
desistance, or by collecting public perceptions of crime (some of which are
then deemed ‘out of step’ with expert views on prevalence rates). Within
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Crime and Risk
criminology, the rational choice actor is located within the positivist

tradition, and is characterized as a ‘free-willed actor who engages in crime
in a calculative, utilitarian way and is therefore responsive to deterrent’
(Garland 1997: 11).
Crime management and research in this arena has focused on two
areas: individual choice and the crime opportunity. Research attention to
individual choice has been most discernible in desistance studies (why
offenders stop offending), and in the cost-benefit calculations seen to
underpin many crime prevention strategies (e.g. the locks and bolts
approach to discouraging criminals). Informed by risk research in other
areas (Slovic 1992) the rational choice approach frames the offender as
a rational, calculative actor capable of making an informed risk decision
based upon a cost-benefit ratio if only given the correct information and
if only the costs of crime are made to outweigh the benefits. Desistance
studies have been focused on how these calculations are made, and what
costs and benefits are literally being weighed (Cornish and Clarke 1986).
Until recently these studies focused on individual rather than social or
structural factors, and have contributed to an individualization of offend-
ing distanced from any social causation (Young 1992, 1994). They have
produced what Farrall (2002) and Maruna (2000a) have called correlates
of desistance, for example, stable employment, but cannot explain the
‘precise sequence of events and processes involved’ (Farrall 2002: 3) leav-
ing us with an unexplained ‘black box’ of desistance (Maruna 2000a: 12;
Maruna 2000b).
The studies have also reinforced the notion of individual choice and
‘wickedness’, and vested blame and responsibility for offending solely
with individual offenders, thus reinforcing New Right responses to crime.
They also confirmed that some offenders would continue to have criminal
careers regardless of interventions, and that such careers could be inter-
rupted either by custody or by the reduction of crime opportunities. Ratio-
nal choice began to take on a new agenda, the ‘designing out’ of crime
(Clarke and Mayhew 1980) and the reduction of crime opportunities
through situational crime prevention and the control of environments. In
crime prevention terms this resulted in policies that increased the chances
of being caught, for example, CCTV, making homes more burglar proof,
introducing neighbourhood watch, and making cars more thief proof,
literally increasing the cost to the offender. These initiatives were subject
to extensive evaluation (Maguire 2004; Raynor 2004), although whether
they reduce crime or merely displace it to other less well-regulated areas
is a much debated point (Hughes 1998).
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Crime and Risk
Following research into other areas of risk, not least drug use, HIV
and condom use (Bloor 1995), and other health related issues (Petersen
and Lupton 1996), the rational actor has been much critiqued by the
sociological research literature (Lupton 1999). The interaction between
knowledge of a risk and subsequent action is seen as much more complex
(Lupton 1999), affected by distorted perceptions, constraints on personal
choice, limited opportunities to act otherwise, group norms and influ-
ences, and so on (Bloor 1995; Grinyer 1995; Rhodes 1997; Kemshall 2003:
60). In the desistance area this has resulted in a more interactive approach
concerned with opening the black box (Farrall and Bowling 1999; Farrall
2002), emphasizing the complexity of desistance using Byrne’s approach
which argues that social processes have multiple causes; that such causes
are not merely additive; and that subtle differences in initial conditions
may over time produce large differences in outcomes (Byrne 1998: 2–28;
Farrall 2002: 42).
Reviewing the Rational Actor: Reintroducing the Social

This reshaping of the rational actor has introduced important notions of
context, power (e.g. to act differently), and opportunity (to avoid or resist
risky situations) into risk research (see Bloor 1995; Rhodes 1995; Green
1997). In crime management this has led to revisions in both desistance
studies and situational crime management. Research in this area focuses
on contextual and structural issues and casts the rational actor as a social
actor, and focus is upon how these processes work and impact upon risk
decisions, and how risk decisions vary across different contexts. Social
action theories conceptualize risk as the product of social interaction,
context specific, and bounded by group norms and values (Douglas 1986).
Research studies focus on the interactive notion of risk and seeks to place
risk decision-making within context.
In the desistance arena, it has led to a reintroduction of the ‘social’,
with attention to the role of social factors in decisions to desist (May
1999). However, these factors (e.g. accommodation, employment, drug
use) have not added that much to the predictive criminal variables of
age, gender, and number of previous convictions (May 1999). However,
these social factors assist with explanations of the process and choice
of desistance (Farrall 2002). More recent studies have been concerned
with structural constraints on decision-making and take place within a
‘weak constructivist’ paradigm in which real risks are seen as ‘inevitably
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Crime and Risk
mediated through these social processes and can never be known in

isolation from these processes’ (Lupton 1999: 35). Research focuses on
opportunities and power to desist, and the social factors and resources
that play a role in such decisions (Maruna 2000a, 2000b; Farrall 2002).
The interaction of agency and structure is increasingly posed as a key
theoretical concern of such research (Farrall and Bowling 1999).
In situational crime management routine activity theory (Cohen and
Felson 1979) has recast the rational choice actor as an adaptive one and
the cost-benefit equation as one that is always changing (Ekblom 1997,
2001). Crime and its attendant opportunities are always changing (e.g.
computer fraud, or the growth of internet pornography). For Ekblom the
only response to this is a constant anticipationism from policymakers and
crime prevention personnel. Crime proofing requires non-criminals to
‘think thief’ and to constantly anticipate and remove crime opportunities.
However, such anticipationism has a built in obsolescence, prevention
strategies can never keep up, and they fall into disrepute as they fail.
However, the approach has been useful for introducing the interaction
between offender, crime opportunity and situation into the risk calcu-
lation. How the rational actor interacts with his/her context is seen as
crucial to effective crime management.
Risk Tools: The Pursuit of Certainty

Risk tools have been another area subject to much research and evalu-
ation. Such tools have been seen as essential to the proper functioning
of actuarial justice providing the mechanism by which offenders can
be identified and classified for risk-based interventions (Kemshall 2003).
Commentators have associated the development of risk tools within the
New Penology and located their use within an economic discourse of
crime control (see Kemshall 2003: ch. 3 for a full review). Risk tools
have also been inscribed within the responsibilization project of advanced
liberal governance (Rose 2000; O’Malley 2004), assisting with the identi-
fication of offenders for corrective programmes and moral re-engineering
(Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller 1992; Kemshall 2002b). Tool development has
generated research into risk factors to predict offending and characterize
certain individuals as risky, based largely on meta-analysis and the pro-
filing of risk recidivism factors and more recently harm factors. Research
is within the realist paradigm, utilizing quantitative methods, and has
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Crime and Risk
produced what has been called a ‘risk factorology’ for use in criminal
justice agencies such as police and probation (Kemshall 2003).
Risk assessment tools have played a key role in regulating the practice
of criminal justice personnel and providing a mechanism for allocating
offenders to different ‘treatment modalities’ (Bonta 1996). In essence,
such tools provide a rationing mechanism for scarce resources in crim-
inal justice (e.g. intensive behavioural programmes in probation). These
assessment tools have focused mainly on the prediction of recidivism rates
(the likelihood of reconviction in a particular [usually 2 year] period). The
nationally accredited tool for use in probation and prisons in England
and Wales is the Offender Assessment System (OASys) derived largely
from Home Office reconviction studies and the ‘what works’ literature
(Clark 2002). The quoted figure for the accuracy rate of OASys is 69.2 per
cent (Clark 2002). However, the tool has not been specifically designed to
predict the risk of harm and this is the least actuarially developed part
of the tool (reflecting in part base rate issues in this area). The tool’s
major contribution is in the area of criminogenic risk assessment and
in targeting offenders for intervention programmes in prison and pro-
bation (Kemshall 2003). The most common risk of harm tool is MATRIX
2000 used exclusively for the assessment of sex offenders within police
and probation. The tool has been validated retrospectively against a
20-year follow-up of reconvictions and found to identify high-risk offend-
ers of whom 60 per cent were reconvicted (Grubin 2000; Thornton 2002;
Grubin 2004).
The history of risk tools has been characterized as an attempt to ‘tame
chance’ and reduce uncertainty through the use of formalized risk meth-
ods of assessment and calculation (Hacking 1987, 1990; Reddy 1996).
Bonta (1996) has presented the development of risk tools as a journey to
ever increasing accuracy and reliability. Research in this field has tended
to pursue an uncritical and technical approach to risk, framing risk as an
‘artefact’ in which it is framed as objectively knowable and amendable to
probabilistic calculation (Bradbury 1989; Horlick-Jones 1998). Risk tools
are embedded in empiricism, scientific canons of proof, probabilistic
thinking, and a realist epistemology of risk. Early work is characterized
by positivist methods of data collection (statistical methods and meta-
analysis) and the collection of risk variables to identify particular seg-
ments of the population. Such tools have gained much currency within
police, probation, and prisons (Kemshall 1998, 2001, 2003; Robinson
2001), but research into both their use and development has resulted in a
number of critiques.
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Crime and Risk
The most common critique is from research into how tools are used by
practitioners ‘on the ground’ that has examined how actuarial practices
are mediated by both workers and institutional barriers to implemen-
tation (Kemshall 1998; Lynch 2000; Robinson 2001). As O’Malley has
put it, actuarial practices are rarely implemented in pure form (2001,
2004). This latter work raises the issue of context in risk practice, and
the particular influences of values, culture, organizational structures,
and the belief systems of staff and the impact upon risk decision-
making (Kemshall 1998; Kemshall and Maguire 2001; Robinson 2001).
This has focused some attention on implementation issues (Kemshall
1998) and also on sites of resistance to actuarialism (O’Malley 2001;
Robinson 2001, 2002), without characterizing the workforce as irrational.
Criticisms have also been made on methodological grounds (see
Kemshall 2001, 2003 for a review), and on the grounds of non-
transferability or indeed discrimination against certain groups (e.g
women, Hannah-Moffat and Shaw 1999). Such criticisms have also raised
research interest in how certain populations are singled out for risk atten-
tion, and how certain risks are chosen for attention (Sparks 2000, 2001a,
2001b). This research draws on cultural and social theory and is carried
out in the ‘strong constructivist’ paradigm (Lupton 1999) and is epito-
mized by work on fear of crime and victimization (Lupton and Tulloch
1999; Lupton 2000; Hope and Sparks 2000; Sutton and Farrall 2005), but
also includes work on media coverage and crime (Sparks 2001a, 2001b;
Kitzinger 2004; see also Jewkes 2004 for an introduction to the issue),
and on the relationship between risk practices and modes of governance
(Rose 2000). This is considered in the next section, and sees the definition
of risk and criminological attention to it, change from risk factors and
calculations of probability to a broader concern with ‘social insecurities’
(Goodey 2005).
Crime, Risk, and Regulation

Within cultural approaches to risk research in the crime arena, the tra-
ditional binary conceptualizations such as ‘real’ and ‘imaginary fears’,
and ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ perceptions of risk are discounted in order to
examine how such risks are produced (Lupton 2000). Within this fram-
ing of risk the focus is not individual risk decision-making, but on
how some risks are chosen for attention whilst others are not (e.g. the
attention to ‘Stranger-Danger’ in child sexual abuse and the relative
neglect of sexual abusing within families [Kitzinger 2004]). Such work
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Crime and Risk
pays attention to the symbolic and cultural meanings carried by risk

(Douglas 1992), and the political rationalities and strategies that underpin
them (Sparks 2001b). In essence, risk technologies are not morally neu-
tral but always carry a political and morally infused message (O’Malley
2004). Much work of this type is about ‘unpicking’ such underlying
rationalities.
Governmentality theorists in particular ‘explore risk in the context of
surveillance, discipline, and regulation of populations, and how concepts
of risk construct particular norms of behaviour which are used to encour-
age individuals to engage voluntarily in self-regulation in response to
these norms’ (Lupton 1999: 25). This is what Rose has termed respon-
sibilization (Rose 1996a, 2000). Rose (1996a, b) argues that governance
in neo-liberal societies is carried out at the ‘molecular level’ in which
the active citizen is required to self-regulate towards the preset norms of
society. Those who fail to exercise the prudential risk choice are excluded,
marginalized, and demonized. Offenders, particularly those deemed dan-
gerous or intransigent are a case in point, leading to what Garland has
called ‘a criminology of the Other’ (Garland 2001). Governmentality
theorists argue that the State’s power is dispersed, and that overt power
is exercised more subtly through facilitation, education, advice, training,
and public health campaigns all seeking to provide the active and risk
alert citizen with sound information upon which to make his or her risk
choice. Those who fail to make the wise choice are blamed, and deemed
to be in need of corrective programmes to alter their faulty thinking.
Whilst the rational actor is also at the heart of this approach, the research
focus is with how a particular construction of the rational actor is formed
and the role it plays in the governance of conduct and the regulation of
populations.
In criminology, this social constructivist approach to risk is epitomized
by work on fear of crime and victimization in which the ‘knowledges,
discourses, and experiences used by people to construct their notions of
risk and fear’ are investigated (Lupton 2000: 23). In this area attention has
been given to the gendered nature of victim experiences and fear of crime
(Walklate 1997),2 the risk of repeat victimization and the inequitable
distribution of victimization risks (Hope and Walklate 1995), and the
relationship between daily lived experiences (what Hope and Sparks 2000
call ‘tribulations of place’) and fear of crime. The importance of this work
is in its ability to ‘plot’ differences in risk perception across communities,
and between public and experts without reducing such differences to
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Crime and Risk
irrationality. The British Crime Survey (Budd, Sharp, and Mayhew 2005)
now plots differential exposure to risk across differing segments of the
population, recording higher levels for British Minority Ethnic (BME)
groups (Home Office Findings 237); and much recent research is exam-
ining how location and context play a significant role in victimization
risks and perception of crime rates (Goodey 2005).
From a broader perspective, the drive towards responsibilization and the
creation of an ‘active citizen’ (Rose 1996) is seen as compounding existing
inequalities (Walklate 1998). In brief, some sections of the population do
not have the resources to become expert risk managers of their fate and
the ‘activeness’ of some citizens can be heavily curtailed by poverty, social
exclusion, and geographic location. The ability to self-risk manage victim
risks may be quite different on a ‘sink estate’ to those deployed in ‘fortress
middle England’ (Stenson 2001).
The concept of responsibilization also raises questions about new tech-
niques of social regulation (although there is some debate about how
transformative present conditions currently are, see Garland 2001). This
trend can be discerned at two levels: at the level of moral engineering
of the individual offender mainly through CBT programmes (Kemshall
2002b) (see discussion above), and at the level of communities through
crime prevention (Stenson 2001). As O’Malley puts it, the rational choice
offender has become the risky offender, and victims have become ‘at
risk’ citizens (1992, 1994). Crime reduction is now everyone’s respon-
sibility (Gamble 1988; O’Malley 1992; Stenson 1993), and responsibil-
ity for crime prevention is devolved to public–private partnerships and
from the State to local communities (Crawford 2001). Research in this
area has tended to be either policy-led, providing evaluations of crime
prevention initiatives (Maguire 2004; Raynor 2004), or providing critical
analyses of the techniques of responsibilization (Stenson 1999, 2001;
Stenson and Edwards 2001). The former research tends towards pragmatic
evaluations of ‘what works’ (Raynor 2004) and is presented as morally
neutral from a realist perspective, and the latter investigates the moral
assumptions and techniques of regulation underlying crime prevention
strategies and operates within a strong constructivist paradigm. This
latter focus raises important questions about risk and security, in par-
ticular how to provide security within an increasingly diverse and risk-
infused society without the use of overt State power (Loader and Sparks
2002). Less risk may mean more surveillance, less justice, and less rights
(Hudson 2004).
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Crime and Risk
Recent Key Findings: A Summary
As outlined above, research into risk within the crime arena has been
diverse, carried out within differing paradigms and covering a wide
range of concerns. However, some key developments can be discerned.
The first is the presence of the rational actor and attention to indi-
vidual risk decision-making. Whilst the characteristics of the rational
actor have been subject to revision with increased attention to social
and contextual factors, much research takes this actor for granted (or
its counterpart, the hedonistic, irrational actor). With the advent of
governmentality theorists, the rational actor has been reconstituted and
problematized as the active citizen and is now held responsible for
personal moral self-regulation—the prudent citizen will act well. The
rational actor has also been extended to the rational at risk citizen
capable of avoiding crime risky situations if only properly informed and
responsible enough, and there has been increased policy and research
attention to public perceptions of crime and how to ‘deal with’ fear of
crime.
A further key research development has been interest in whether penol-
ogy has been transformed by a risk-based approach to justice and the
attendant development and use of risk tools and risk practices. This con-
tinues to be much investigated and much debated, and empirical studies
into actual frontline practices have resulted in some revision of the more
general theoretical claims (see, e.g. O’Malley 2004).
As Garland has expressed it, transformations in penality should be
evident in the ‘material forms’ of practice as well as in statements of
‘orientation’ (1995: 200) and this requires detailed empirical study. Par-
alleling, but largely distanced from this work, has been research and
development of risk assessment tools, with only relatively recent atten-
tion to the context of their use and their moral and political implications
(Kemshall 2003).
Social regulation in advanced liberal society has also been a growing
theme—in effect, how to provide security and effective crime manage-
ment in societies characterized by diversity, fragmentation, and a shrink-
ing State (Rose 2000; Stenson 2001; Stenson and Edwards 2001; Stenson
and Sullivan 2001). This research raises issues of how populations are
regulated and managed, how risks are distributed, and the allocation of
responsibility for their effective management between communities and
the State.
86
Crime and Risk
Conclusion: Emerging Problems and Issues
Risk has become ‘core business’ of the criminal justice system—its man-
agement, reduction, and avoidance. Crime has been inscribed as a major
risk in the twenty-first century, an ever present risk of everyday life
(Garland 2001). How to deal with the risk of crime is now a major
policy and research preoccupation. This has spawned quite a research
‘industry’, much of it policy-led and government funded, but also a large
critical industry of commentators and analysts on risk driven penal policy
developments.
Whilst it is not possible to review findings from the many studies on
crime and risk over the last 10 years it is possible to generalize some major
research outcomes. Perhaps the most interesting from the point of view of
risk is the increasing challenge to the notion of the rational choice actor
and RCT presented by studies on both crime prevention and desistance.
Is the concept of a uni-dimensional rational choice actor useful in a
society characterized by pluralism and fragmentation? Diversity and the
increased contextualization of social life make normative assumptions
about the rational actor more problematic. Whose rationality is it? Whose
cost and whose benefit? Policy planning based on the rational choice
actor has found itself in a position of ‘catch up’, chasing the ‘adaptive
actor’ and finding situational crime prevention techniques affected by
issues of diversity and structural inequality (Hughes 1998). The emphasis
upon the local has often reduced national consistency and resulted in
‘ghettoization’ (Crawford 1998: 264). The rise of ‘defensive strategies’ such
as the use of CCTV and private security has led to the creation of ‘fortress
cities’ based upon exclusionary risk management (Davis 1990; Hughes
1998; Crawford 1999)—those who can afford to do so leave ‘threatened
places’, those who remain assume a higher risk burden with less resources
to manage them (Hughes 1998). Whilst policy is largely concerned with
the creation of safe spaces, behind this there is an uncritical redistribution
of risks that is worthy of further investigation.
In the area of actuarial justice empirical studies into actuarial prac-
tices have revised the grand claims of the New Penology by providing
evidence of how such practices are often mediated by workers and are
embedded in the organizational contexts within which they are used
(Kemshall 1998; Lynch 2000; Robinson 2001). This research has shown
more variability in risk technologies within the delivery of penality, and
has demonstrated that there is no inexorable logic of risk (O’Malley 2001,
87
Crime and Risk
2004). This research is also building an empirical evidence base on how

risk technologies are actually deployed (see, e.g. Kemshall 2003), and
provides a base from which comparative work between differing forms
of justice can be made, for example, between actuarial and restorative
justice. O’Malley (2004) has argued that risk technologies are not value
neutral and that it is important to examine the moral assumptions under-
lying their construction and deployment. Some risk technologies may be
inclusive rather than exclusive, and emphasize rights as well as risks. Such
issues raise important questions about the types of risks we wish to avoid
and manage, those we deem as bad, and ultimately the type of society we
wish to live in.
Notes
1. Most commonly defined as the period of industrialization from the Industrial
Revolution to the late 1970s in Western societies. It is characterized by capi-
talism, industrial expansion, imperialism, representative democracies, and the
formation of the welfare state. The modernist agenda is described as the social
policy period covered by the formation and operation of the welfare state from
the Second World War onwards.
2. The role of gender is now under some dispute—see for example, Sutton and
Farrall 2005 who contend that males ‘play down’ fear of crime and that differ-
ences in crime-related anxieties are consequently overstated.
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5
Risk, Environment, and Technology
Nick Pidgeon, Peter Simmons, and Karen Henwood
Although philosophers and social scientists have a long history of raising

questions about the appropriate relationship between science and wider
society, such questioning is more widespread today as policymakers and
members of the public face controversies over the environment, health,
and the introduction of new technologies. Disputes that emerged in the
1960s and 1970s over the risks of nuclear power have been followed
by concerns in some countries over chemicals and pesticides, industrial
and transport related pollution, genetically modified foods, and latterly
nanotechnology. Many such controversies involve differing views about
the meaning of risk, its acceptance, and distribution across society.
This chapter reviews the wealth of research findings on how people
appraise environmental and technological risks. Its scope includes both
harm to the quality of the environment from ongoing human activities
such as large-scale technological systems and industrial processes, as well
as threats to human well-being with environmental/technological origins.
The latter, as in the case of climate change, in turn often themselves derive
from a close and complex set of interactions between human activities
and ‘natural’ events.
Environmental Risk
Environmental and technological issues are particularly interesting from

the point of view of risk research, as they tend to have a number of
characteristics which have been shown to be particularly difficult to deal
with both in formal risk assessments and in public policy (see Pidgeon
and Beattie 1998; Pidgeon and Gregory 2004). This complexity forms the
94
backdrop to discussion of how individuals and social groups represent

such risks. For example, many environmental threats, such as major
industrial plant accidents, stem from very low probability but high con-
sequence events which are particularly challenging to assess. Not all envi-
ronmental risks can be described probabilistically, and descriptions often
contain such uncertainty that experts themselves disagree about the
likelihoods and consequences. Equally, environmental and technological
risk invariably presents both hazard and opportunity, and it is now well
known that people evaluate outcomes very differently depending upon
whether they personally view them as ‘losses’ as opposed to ‘gains’. Many
hazards, such as naturally occurring radon gas, will never have been
directly experienced by those who must be persuaded to act to mitigate
their very real future consequences. And environmental hazards often also
involve making difficult trade-offs over time, with consequences possibly
very far into the future, such that long-term effects are inequitable in
their distribution across different groups or must be anticipated for people
not yet born (e.g. burning oil and coal offer benefits now, but brings
future risk from climate change). Finally, certain environmental hazards
(e.g. nuclear power or biotechnology) are associated with such extreme
societal conflicts about risk acceptability that they appear to be a proxy for
disagreements less over scientific facts than over different groups’ values,
politics, or ways of life.
Many of the above issues pose basic and often intractable societal deci-
sion problems, both for laypeople and for environmental risk assessment,
regulation, and management. This provides the first clue as to why levels
of public acceptance (or not) of a hazardous activity may at times diverge
from formal expert assessments of risk (the latter tending to emphasize
solely probability and consequence in the risk metric), and why resolving
such differences is not just a matter of ‘knowledge’ about the science and
technology at hand. Research on the social science of risk and uncertainty
also shows us why, in the arena of environmental risk assessment, policy
decisions may be particularly prone to conflict and mis-communication
between the many and varied stakeholders involved.
Within applied social and experimental psychology there is now a well-
established body of empirical (primarily quantitative) work on people’s
cognitive responses to environmental and technological risks, under the
broad umbrella of risk perception research. However, the argument we
present in this chapter is that understanding how people respond to risk,
and the ways in which they work through their decisions and ways of
living with risk, requires that attention be given to a range of wider
95
social and cultural, as well as spatially and temporally patterned dynamics

involved in risk issues (Krimsky and Golding 1992; Pidgeon et al. 1992;
Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003).
Research Themes and Findings
Psychometric Risk Research

Research on risk perceptions arose during the 1970s and 1980s, initially in
response to rising environmental concerns amongst Western populations,
in particular about the impacts of nuclear power. For the social and cogni-
tive psychologists of the time, this offered the possibility of an empirical
understanding of some of the judgements and beliefs underlying this
highly visible and complex social and public policy issue. Since then, of
course, risk perceptions research has embraced a more diverse set of both
disciplines (anthropology, sociology, and human geography) and hazards
(chemicals, electromagnetic fields, ecological hazards, air pollution, and
biotechnology). Although the objectives of the researchers themselves are
primarily theoretical and empirical, a range of significant public policy
issues surround the conflicts over particular technological developments,
and hence have been a major driver of much of the research in this
field (Pidgeon and Gregory 2004). From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s,
risk perception research was framed either within a cognitive science or
a sociocultural approach, with relatively little interaction between the
two. As we go on to argue below, more recent theorizing has stressed
an increased awareness of and interest in more interpretative approaches
which are sensitive to the symbolic qualities of risk perceptions as
grounded in context, and which seek to step beyond simple oppositions
such as ‘cognition’ or ‘culture’.
Early risk perception studies were dominated by the experimental
psychology investigations of Kahneman and Tversky into the mental
heuristics or short-cuts which people use in estimating probabilities, in
particular, availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment
(see, e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Gilovich, Griffin, and
Kahneman 2002, and Chapters 1 and 2). Whilst thought to be generally
adaptive, the use of heuristics was argued to sometimes lead to large and
systematic errors, so-called ‘biases’, in people’s assessments of uncertainty.
However, its foundations in Bayesian decision theory offered a relatively
restricted conceptualization of risk (essentially as subjective probability),
96
as well as an uncritical treatment of its use of the core concepts of bias

and error (see Einhorn and Hogarth 1981).
In hindsight, it is not difficult to see how the heuristics and biases
research came to be interpreted, by some external commentators at least,
as apparently demonstrating people’s ‘irrationality’ in the face of ‘true’
risks. Echoing this, Lupton (1999) describes much of the traditional psy-
chological risk perception research (e.g. as reviewed in Royal Society 1992)
as falling within a ‘techno-scientific’ model. That is, adhering to a set
of assumptions that reify the risk object as in some senses being real (as
assessed through formal risk analysis), whilst perceptions serve as devia-
tions from that baseline. However, in making this distinction Lupton and
others misinterpret the objectives of such research. As Fischhoff (1990)
points out, this research tradition has always accommodated a much
richer—non-dualistic—view of, on the one hand, formal risk assessment
practice (as itself a highly conditional and constructed representation
system; see, for example, Fischhoff et al. 1981; Slovic 1998), and, on
the other hand, public responses to environmental and technological
hazards (as constructions that hold a distinctive logic and meaning of
their own). Such a view forms the foundation for much of the work within
the classic psychometric paradigm (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein
1980; Slovic 2000). This work, using primarily quantitative questionnaire
methodology, suggested that perceived risks were sensitive to a range of
qualitative factors above and beyond pure probability and consequence;
such things as the controllability of an activity, the fear it evoked, its
catastrophic potential, voluntariness of exposure, equity of risk distrib-
ution, observability of the risk, and so on. In so doing, risk perceptions
were seen as richer and more complex than expert conceptions (see also
Wynne 1996; Slovic 1998).
The early psychometric studies provided a model for an extensive
research programme and literature (for overviews see Pidgeon et al.
1992; Pidgeon and Beattie 1998; Slovic 2000). However, whilst the basic
approach of psychometric risk perception research provided extensive
empirical descriptions of the psychology of risk perceptions, it did not
initially yield substantive theoretical progress towards explaining those
beliefs, or behaviour, in the face of risks. A major difficulty has been
the concepts used in psychometric research, which are proximal rather
than distal (close to rather than removed from the object of research):
predicting evaluations of risk often precisely because they are in part
tautologies of what it means to be hazardous or not (Marris, Langford,
and O’Riordan 1998). A second concern has revolved around the extent
97
to which the data analysis techniques used—primarily principal compo-

nents factor analysis—are descriptive of individual or merely aggregate
responses (Langford et al. 1999; Willis et al. 2005). In addition, such
concepts, being primarily individual and cognitive, rarely fully articulate
with social and cultural framing of risk issues, or until very recently the
role of emotions and affect (but see Loewenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al.
2002; Langford 2002). Also over time we have come to realize, as docu-
mented below, that people’s intuitive evaluations of hazards include wider
questions such as the trustworthiness of the political and institutional
arrangements for managing risk in society.
Sociocultural/Socio-Structural Approaches
The 1980s saw a growing interest in the role played by social, cultural,
and institutional processes in the construction of perception and other
descriptions of risk (see, e.g. Johnson and Covello 1987; Krimsky and
Golding 1992). Social and cultural factors are important because the
perceiver of risk is rarely an isolated individual, but a ‘social being’ defined
through a range of relationships with others (see Joffe 2003). Hence some
aspects of risk beliefs might be socially shared. Early work within social
psychology and sociology (Eiser and van der Plight 1979; Buss, Craik, and
Dake 1986) suggested that value orientations or ‘worldviews’ towards the
environment were related to attitudes to risk. The best known sociocul-
tural approach to risk, that of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), develops
the worldview idea in conceptual terms, positing that human attitudes
towards risk and danger vary systematically according to four cultural
‘biases’—individualist, fatalist, hierarchist, and egalitarian. Such biases are
held to reflect modes of social organization, thought, and value, all of
which serve the function of defending individuals’ favoured institutional
arrangements and ways of life, and in particular who to blame when those
arrangements become threatened from outside (see Chapter 2).
Risk is central to the process of institutional defence, with cultural biases
orienting people’s selection of which dangers to accept or to avoid, the
fairness of distribution of risks across society (Rayner and Cantor 1987),
and who to blame when things do go wrong (Douglas 1992). Cultural
theory has also been valuable in stressing the neglect, within the early
psychometric studies, of a concern for the political dimensions to risk (see
also Jasanoff 1998). Despite this, cultural theory suffers from a circularity
of argument in the definitions of the four cultural biases, and from the fact
that its categories of worldview are both static and top-down in nature
98
(Marris, Langford, and O’Riordan 1998). Nor have attempts to measure

empirically the cultural biases met with complete success (but see Slovic
and Peters 1998; Rippl 2002). The sum findings of empirical research on
cultural theory would be consistent with a more reflexive view, such that
people’s value orientations are not so much stable traits but plastic and
constructed from a set of available societal discourses about such things
as danger, blame, trust, and accountability (Rayner 1992). Setting aside
the much disputed structural-functionalist aspects of Douglas’ work, she
has pioneered the acceptance of the main principles of the sociocultural
perspective on risk (e.g. Lupton 1999).
Arguably as important as Douglas has been the work of Beck (1992) and
Giddens (1990) in their discussion of ‘risk society’. Risk society theory
starts from an analysis of the macro-structural conditions and conse-
quences of contemporary (late-modern) industrialized Western society.
The claim is that late-modernity has been accompanied by the emergence
of new classes of all-pervasive and ‘invisible’ risks, experienced only indi-
rectly through expert systems of knowledge. If modernity was defined
by the production and distribution of goods, late-modernity is defined
through the distribution of bads, or risk. Technical and environmental
risks (climate change, nuclear power, pollution, and chemicals) are the
hazards of risk society par excellence. According to Beck and Giddens,
consequences for the individual include the emergence of new forms of
anxiety and existential uncertainty (also Langford 2002), alongside the
fragmentation of traditional social categories such as gender, the family,
and class. Risk society theory also emphasizes the processes of reflexive
modernization (i.e., societal questioning of the outcomes of modernity),
greater individualization, and personal responsibility for the control of
risk as a result of the breakdown of established norms, values, and social
ties, personal risk reflexivity (through which people develop an awareness
of risk, and ways of responding to it in everyday life), and an increased
reliance upon risk experts. Risk society theory represents, in essence, a set
of arguments about changing macro-social conditions. Although these are
held to lead to impacts upon people’s understandings of risk issues at an
everyday level, the precise empirical consequences may be far less easy to
establish (see Tulloch and Lupton 2003).
Social Amplification of Risk

A criticism of both psychological and traditional sociocultural approaches
to environmental and technological risk research is that they both fail to
99
recognize the multilayered and dynamic character of the ways that risk
understandings come about. Events such as the Chernobyl disaster, the
BSE (mad cow) controversy, the major terrorist attacks in various countries
of the world since 2001, and the impacts of global climate change have
driven home to risk analysts and managers the extensive intertwining of
technical risk with social considerations and processes. As Erikson (1994)
succinctly puts it, modern disasters present us with a ‘new species of trou-
ble’. But social research on risk, despite substantial progress, is still quite
handicapped in seizing the opportunity. In theoretical terms, the risk per-
ception and risk communication literatures remain seriously fragmented:
between the psychometric paradigm and cultural theories of risk percep-
tion; between postmodernist and discourse-centred approaches and more
quantitative studies of risk; between economic/utility-maximization and
economic-justice approaches; and between communications and empow-
erment strategies for risk communication. Meanwhile, a professional and
cultural divide continues to separate the natural hazards and risk analysis
schools of inquiry, despite the obvious and considerable convergence of
interests.
One approach that at least attempts to bridge psychological, social,
and cultural approaches is the social amplification of risk framework
(Kasperson et al. 1988; Kasperson 1992; Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic
2003). The approach adopts a metaphor from communications theory to
explain why certain hazards and events are a particular focus of concern
in society, whilst others receive comparatively little attention. The social
amplification framework posits that whilst hazards and their material
characteristics (e.g. deaths, injuries, damage, and social disruption) are
real enough, these interact with a wide range of psychological, social, or
cultural processes in ways that transform signals about risk. In this way
the social amplification approach moves beyond the relatively static cat-
egories of both psychometric and cultural theories to stress the essential
dynamic and symbolic character to risk understandings. A key contention
is that signals may be subject to filtering processes as they pass through
a variety of social ‘amplification stations’ (scientists, the mass media,
government agencies and politicians, and interest groups) resulting in
intensification or attenuation of aspects of risk in ways predictable from
social structure and context. Kasperson et al. (1988) also argue that social
amplification accounts for the observation that certain events lead to
spreading ripples of secondary consequences, which may go far beyond
the initial impact of the event, and may even impinge upon initially
unrelated hazards.
100
Risk events, when they undergo substantial amplification and result in

unexpected public alarms or what some would call ‘social shocks’ (Lawless
1977), often surprise policymakers and risk managers. No less remarkable
is the extreme attenuation of certain risk events so that, despite serious
consequences for the risk bearers and society more generally, they pass
virtually unnoticed and untended, often continuing to grow in effect
until reaching disaster proportions. For example, Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, and
O’Connor (2005) suggest that, until quite recently, the issue of climate
change could be viewed in this way. Kasperson and Kasperson (1991)
describe such highly attenuated risks as ‘hidden hazards’ and offer a
theoretical explanation for their existence. Hidden hazards, in their view,
have to do with both the nature of the hazards themselves and the nature
of the societies and cultures in which they occur. The ‘hiding’ of hazards
is at once purposeful and unintentional, life threatening and institution
sustaining, and systematic and incidental.
The Kaspersons describe five aspects of such hazards that drive atten-
uation, each associated with differing causal agents and processes. Global
elusive hazards involve a series of complex problems (regional interactions,
slow accumulation, lengthy time lags, and diffuse effects). Their incidence
in a politically fragmented and unequal world tends to mute their signal
power in many societies. Ideological hazards remain hidden principally
because they lie embedded in a societal web of values and assumptions
that attenuates consequences, elevates associated benefits, or idealizes
certain beliefs. Marginal hazards befall people who occupy the edges of
cultures, societies, or economies where they are exposed to hazards that
are remote from or concealed by those at the centre or in the mainstream.
Many in such marginal situations are already weakened or highly vul-
nerable whilst they enjoy limited access to entitlements and few alterna-
tive means of coping. Amplification-driven hazards have effects that elude
conventional types of risk assessment and environmental impact analysis
and are often, therefore, allowed to grow in their secondary consequences
before societal intervention occurs. And, finally, value-threatening hazards
alter human institutions, lifestyles, and basic values, but because the pace
of technological change so outstrips the capacity of social institutions to
respond and adapt, disharmony in purpose, political will, and directed
effort impede effective responses and the hazards grow. The presence
of such hidden hazards has been documented in subsequent analyses
of environmental degradation and delayed societal responses in varied
regions around the world (Kasperson, Kasperson, and Turner 1995; also
Kasperson and Kasperson 2005).
101
Critics of the amplification idea suggest that it might be taken to

imply that there exists a baseline or true risk, which is then distorted
in some way by the social processes of transformation (echoing the
techno-scientific critique levelled at much of the psychometric research).
However, its proponents (Kasperson et al. 2003) have stressed that their
conceptualization of risk does not make this assumption: risk is associated
with objective hazards of the world, but is also firmly seen in terms of
signs, symbols, and images, a view more compatible with a more con-
structionist approach to the topic. For example, Rosa (2003) argues that
the framework steers a course between social constructivist and realist rep-
resentations, and can be understood in relation to sociologist Luhmann’s
distinction between risk and danger, and to lay ontologies of hazards.
A more significant critique advanced by Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones
(2003) is that the social amplification framework relies too heavily upon
a one-way ‘source-message-receiver’ framework derived from communi-
cations theory, and that this fails to account for the complex arenas of
power, agency, and interpretation that typically surround any environ-
mental or technological risk controversy (cf. also Molotch and Boden
1985). It certainly is the case that the social amplification framework
does not itself address the basic political, sociological, or psychological
processes which might underlie amplification or attenuation of risk sig-
nals and perceptions in any specific context. However, it does remain an
important conceptual device for understanding how the dynamics of risk
controversies and communications can play out.
Interpretive Risk Research

An argument running throughout this chapter is that all of the ‘tradi-
tional’ approaches to environmental risk perception above can be cri-
tiqued for a lack of attention to the framing and construction of the
‘risk object’ (Hilgartner 1992) within the terms of people’s everyday lives
and local contexts. Each, in their own way, impose a-contextual frames of
meaning derived from other than the everyday: whether the ‘qualitative’
hazard dimensions of the psychometric approach, the macro-cultural or
structural concerns of cultural theories, or the classical communications
paradigm in the case of social amplification. It is not surprising there-
fore to find that empirical attempts to explore the interface between
cultural and psychological approaches have produced mixed results (see,
e.g. Sjöberg 1997; Marris, Langford, and O’Riordan 1998; Slovic and Peters
1998). In methodological terms, it has also become increasingly clear
102
that questionnaire-based research alone does not capture the complexity

of risk perceptions in specific hazard locations, suggesting that methods
more sensitive to context are needed. Equally, the macrostructural con-
cerns of risk society theory—as the most recent meta-narrative of risk—
run a similar danger of imposing reified external categories (reflexive
modernity, ‘trust’ in expert systems) upon people’s private reflections
about risk issues.
It is against this backdrop that a range of interpretative approaches to
risk have arisen, stressing the symbolic and locally embedded nature of
the sociocultural element to risks, as well as the active interpretation of
people in the generation of risk understandings. Drawing on hermeneutic
and phenomenological traditions, such perspectives recognize the central
roles of meaning and interpretation in structuring social interactions
and being. According to this approach, it might be anticipated that the
concepts risk and ‘environment’ could assume complex roles and multiple
and symbolic meanings in lay discourse and action. Approaches within
such a tradition take a more locally grounded approach to both the
content and origins of risk perceptions (see studies such as Fitchen, Heath,
and Fessenden-Raden 1987; Irwin, Dale, and Smith 1996; Irwin, Simmons,
and Walker 1999; Bickerstaff and Walker 2001; Horlick-Jones, Sime, and
Pidgeon 2003; Poortinga et al. 2004; Simmons and Walker 2004). As
Horlick-Jones, Sime and Pidgeon (2003) point out, within the interpreta-
tive tradition, situation specificity and context have emerged as important
aspects of the processes of risk sense-making, as have shared interpretative
resources: the taken for granted ‘stock of knowledge’ as phenomenologists
describe it (Schutz 1970). Such approaches are predominantly qualitative
or mixed-method in nature (Jasanoff 1993), seeking to explore talk about,
and understandings of, risk where people are directly exposed to a haz-
ard (such as industrial environmental pollution, a chemical or nuclear
facility) within their everyday lives. The emphasis is upon the logics and
rationalities that local people bring to bear upon an issue (cf. also Irwin
and Wynne 1996) rather than with reference to an externally imposed
concept of technical, psychological, or culturally determined risk. As such,
interpretive approaches share some common ground with more psycho-
logically based approaches to perceptions and risk communication design
that are based upon the mental models technique (Morgan et al. 2002;
Cox et al. 2003).
A recent development in this area is the use of more narrative-based
approaches to understand environmental conflicts and risk. In particular,
Satterfield has begun to think through the possibilities of a narrative
103
approach to eliciting the values that attach to environmental risk (Sat-

terfield and Gregory 1998; Satterfield, Slovic, and Gregory 2000; Satter-
field 2001, 2002). Working initially within a decision analysis framework,
Satterfield has opened up new questions about more context sensitive
methodologies for exploring and eliciting people’s environmental values
(see also Burgess and Limb 1988; Henwood and Pidgeon 2001). Related
work by Tulloch and Lupton (2003) explores the role of risk biography in
everyday life, and that of Hollway and Jefferson (2000) the use of narrative
within a psychoanalytic frame to understand how anxieties and fear raise
in the face of everyday risk.
Technological Risk and Organizations

As yet, limited attention has been paid to the role of organizations and
institutions in the social generation of environmental and technolog-
ical risk. Kasperson et al. (2003) suggest that linking social amplifica-
tion effects to the considerable empirical base of knowledge concerning
organizational processes intended to prevent large-scale failures and disas-
ters might yield important theoretical and empirical insights. Most con-
temporary risks originate in socio-technical systems rather than natural
phenomena so that risk management and internal regulatory processes
governing the behaviour of institutions in identifying, diagnosing, prior-
itizing, and responding to risks often become key parts of the broader
amplification process. As Short (1992) points out, large organizations
increasingly set the context and terms of debate for society’s considera-
tion of risk. Understanding such amplification dynamics, then, requires
insight into how risk-related decisions relate to organizational self-
interest, messy inter- and intra-organizational relationships, economically
related rationalizations, and ‘rule of thumb’ considerations that often
conflict with the view of risk analysis as a scientific enterprise (Short
1992: 8). Since major accidents are often preceded by smaller incidents
and risk warnings, how signals of incubating hazards are processed within
institutions and communicated to others outside the institution do much
to structure society’s experience with technological and industrial risks.
Noting the relative void of work on organizational risk processing,
Freudenburg (1992, 2003) has examined characteristics of organizations
that serve to attenuate risk signals and ultimately to increase the risks
posed by technological systems. These include such attributes as the
lack of organizational commitment to the risk-management function,
the bureaucratic attenuation of information flow within the organization
104
(and particularly on a ‘bad-news’ context), specialized divisions of labour

that create ‘corporate gaps’ in responsibility, amplified risk-taking by
workers, the atrophy of organizational vigilance to risk as a result of a
myriad of factors (e.g. boredom and routinization), and imbalances and
mismatches in institutional resources. Freudenburg concludes that these
factors often work in concert to lead even well meaning and honest sci-
entists and managers to underestimate risks. In turn, such organizational
attenuation of risk serves systematically and repeatedly to amplify the
health and environmental hazards that the organization is entrusted to
anticipate and to control.
In her analysis of the Challenger accident in the USA, Vaughan (1992,
1996) also found communication and information issues to be critical but
argued that structural factors, such as pressures from a competitive envi-
ronment, resource scarcity in the organization, vulnerability of important
subunits, and characteristics of the internal safety regulation system, were
equally important. Evidence of a range of broad social and organizational
preconditions to large-scale accidents is available in the work of Turner
(1978; see also Turner and Pidgeon 1997). As a result of a detailed analysis
of 84 major accidents in the UK, Turner concluded that such events rarely
come about for any single reason. Rather, it is typical to find that a
number of undesirable events accumulate, unnoticed, or not fully under-
stood, often over a considerable number of years, which he defines as the
disaster incubation period. Preventive action to remove one or more of the
dangerous conditions or a trigger event, which might be a final critical error
or a slightly abnormal operating condition, brings this period to an end.
Turner focuses in particular upon the information difficulties, which are
typically associated with the attempts of individuals and organizations to
deal with uncertain and ill-structured safety problems, during the hazard-
incubation period.
The work on organizational processing of risk is important for two
reasons. It forms the foundation for an important critique of formal
quantitative risk analysis, in that human and organizational processes
are rarely open to direct measurement in the same way some technical
components of hazardous systems might be (e.g. Toft 1996). It also helps
to begin to map out a logic of why members of the public might view
the issue of trust (in risk regulators and managers) as a core concern.
If the main preconditions of technological and environmental disaster
are human and organizational one is probably right to be sceptical about
any claims to ultimate ‘safety’. However, as Power points out (2004), this
should not lead to a situation where organizations become over-focused
105
upon risk control (particularly solely through compliance to rules and

procedures) rather than a more ‘intelligent’ attention to safety issues.
Emerging Issues
Environmental Risk Management and Trust

The last decade has seen a surge in interest in the role of trust in peo-
ple’s responses to environmental and technological risks from both the
academic and policy communities. In Europe, the BSE crisis in particular
was seen as an event that had reduced public trust in risk-management
processes. Accordingly, ‘rebuilding’ trust in the science policy process has
been seen as a core policy objective of risk communication and stake-
holder engagement processes (House of Lords 2000; Beierle and Cayford
2002; Royal Society 2004). The question of trust and risk perception is
not a new one however, being first raised by Wynne (1980). He hypothe-
sized that differences between expert and lay constructions of risk might
depend on the evaluation of the trustworthiness of risk management, and
of the authorities to act both in the public interest and with regard to best
possible technical standards and practice. And indeed one interpretation
to be placed upon several of the qualitative dimensions of risk identified
in the psychometric studies (e.g. control over risk, equity of impacts,
whether a risk is known to science) is that they tap concerns about
institutional processes of hazard management.
Several early quantitative studies have also shown that trust in insti-
tutions is correlated with the perception and acceptability of various
environmental risks. For example, Pijawka and Mushkatel (1991–2)
found a strong negative relationship between trust in general institutions
of government and in specific agencies of government to protect public
safety and the perceived risk of a high-level nuclear waste repository.
As this was accompanied by high levels of opposition, they came to
the conclusion that public opposition to the siting of the repository, as
well as their perceptions of risk of the facility, was a result of a lack
of trust in the US Department of Energy. Freudenburg (1993) demon-
strated that while several socio-demographic and ideological variables
were only weakly related to concern about a potential nuclear waste
repository, trust variables had substantial higher predictive power. People
having high levels of trust in science and technology, and business and
federal government to build and manage the nuclear repository safely
106
were much less concerned about the repository than were people who
did not trust these groups with specific risk management responsibilities.
Bord and O’Connor (1992) found that trust in government and trust
in industry were both significantly related to concern about hazardous
waste sites. Likewise, Flynn et al. (1992) found that the level of trust in
(radioactive) repository management and risk perceptions were closely
connected. Trust in repository management was mainly indirectly linked
to opposition to the proposed siting of the Yucca mountain radioactive
waste repository, via the perceived risk of the waste site.
In conceptual terms trust cuts across all of the five main approaches
to environmental risk described above, while a number of recent risk
controversies have made policymakers aware that the public have become
key players in many controversial risk issues, and that (dis)trust may be a
core component of this (House of Lords 2000; Cabinet Office 2002). How-
ever, there is currently little agreement on the definition, meaning(s), and
properties of trust. Accordingly, the last fifteen years have seen a growing
body of both conceptual and empirical work on the determinants and
consequences of trust (see, e.g. Renn and Levine 1991; Slovic 1993; Frewer
et al. 1996; Cvetkovich and Löfstedt 1999; Johnson 1999; Poortinga and
Pidgeon 2003, 2004, 2005).
Three main approaches to trust in environmental risk management
can be identified. First, it can be conceptualized as a set of cognitive
judgements along discrete dimensions that are primarily related to the
(presumed) behaviour of risk managers. In particular care, competence
and vested interest (e.g. Frewer et al. 1996; Johnson 1999; Metlay 1999;
Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003). However, as Walls et al. (2004) point out,
seen from a more discursive perspective, different components of trust—
whilst conceptually distinct—can exist in tension, with social trust likely
to emerge as multidimensional and fragmented, as a product of a recon-
ciliation of competing ideas, knowledges, and impressions. They propose
the concept of critical trust as an organizing principle, something which
lies on a continuum between outright scepticism (rejection) and uncritical
emotional acceptance. Such a concept attempts to reconcile the actual
reliance by people on risk managing institutions whilst simultaneously
possessing a critical attitude towards the effectiveness, ‘motivations’ or
independence of the agency in question (also Langford 2002; O’Neill
2002; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003).
A second approach to trust, initially proposed by Earle and Cvetkovich
(1995), is theoretically informed by social psychology, and suggests that
trust may be predominantly based on identity-based concepts of value
107
similarity rather than carefully reasoned arguments or direct knowledge

of the behaviour of an institution or individual. Recent empirical support
for this second view has also been gained (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth
2000; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Gutscher 2001; Poortinga and Pidgeon
2006).
A third, emerging model of trust, stresses the importance of people’s
prior attitudes (Eiser, Miles, and Frewer 2002; White et al. 2003; Poortinga
and Pidgeon 2005). The associationist view starts from the premise that it
is a core belief, attitude, or affective association with an issue that forms
the basis for other judgements about a technological or environmental
risk, including risks and benefits and trust in risk management. It is
also worth noting here that the associationist model is compatible with
important emerging work on the operation of emotion and ‘affect’, which
are increasingly seen as a part of the way in which laypeople construct
risk issues (Loewenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2002). For example,
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2005) found evidence that people’s general affec-
tive evaluation of GM food serves as a powerful anchor for other more
specific risk judgements, among which trust in risk regulation was one.
They conclude that the conventional interpretation of trust (or distrust)
as the prior determinant of risk acceptability judgements (cf. Pijawka and
Mushkatel 1991–2) may need, at least in part, some revision. The findings
of this study also hold important implications for risk policy. Although
for many policymakers the ‘reclamation of trust’ has become an explicit
objective, this study suggests that risk communication efforts that are
aimed at directly increasing trust may not be universally effective in solv-
ing risk controversies (cf. also Fischhoff 1995). Such policies could well
be counterproductive where they are based on the incorrect assumption
that trust can be simply manipulated in order to increase the acceptance
of a controversial technology. Where trust in risk regulation is strongly
dependent on someone’s general prior attitude, it seems more important
to understand and then address the underlying drivers of concerns about
that particular environmental issue.
Public ‘Engagement’ and Policy

A key shift in focus currently occurring within this research domain
concerns the potential contribution that social sciences approaches to
environmental risk can offer for societal decision-making and resolving
environmental conflicts. Accordingly, a significant policy debate now
exists over whether people’s perceptions and beliefs should form one
108
input, directly or indirectly, to processes of public policy resource

allocation (see contributions to Okrent and Pidgeon 1998). This debate
touches upon a range of philosophical issues, in particular, regarding
the epistemological status of competing ‘expert’ and ‘public’ evaluations
of risk as well as the appropriateness of making a distinction between
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ depictions of risk (Pidgeon 1998; Slovic 1998).
Social science understandings of risk may require attention by policy-
makers simply because, as Sunstein comments (2002), perceptions can
lead to real consequences, such as secondary social amplification impacts
(see Kasperson et al. 2003). For example, Frewer (2003) reports that the
public announcement by the UK Health Minister in 1996 of a potential
link between eating British beef, ‘mad cow’ disease, and deaths from CJD
(Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease) triggered major consumer avoidance of British
sources of beef. Equally, a possible contribution to policy is suggested
whenever ethical or value based concerns are implicated in beliefs about
risk (as many of the sociocultural approaches, noted above, would suggest
is the case).
The debate over public participation in risk policy shifts the technical
focus away from one-way risk communication approaches to a more dia-
logic, two-way relationship between science and society, where learning
is possible on both sides of that relationship. Methods of public participa-
tion in environmental decisions are typically grounded in local contexts—
such as siting or planning disputes—and have accordingly traditionally
employed techniques such as consensus conferences, planning cells, or
more decision analytic approaches (see Renn, Webler, and Wiedemann
1995; POST 2001; Beierle and Cayford 2002). However, public partici-
pation is also being used with more nationally relevant environmental
issues, as in the case of agricultural genomics (see Pidgeon et al. 2005).
And very recently, proposals to extend participation methods to more
upstream areas of emerging technologies—such as nanotechnology—
have been made (Royal Society 2004; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wilsdon,
Wynne, and Stilgoe 2005). However, we do not yet know enough about
the consequences of participation processes, particularly where the con-
text is national rather than local or the time frame of impacts stretches
far into the future, to say with confidence whether this new approach can
meet the ambitious objectives being set for it. Above all there is a chal-
lenge to link the operation of analytic-deliberative processes more closely
to the needs of decision-makers and ordinary people, since one of the
expectations of deliberation (particular amongst people who participate)
is that it should indeed lead to concrete policy outcomes.
109
As a concluding comment, the example of environmental and tech-

nological risk is particularly instructive because it illustrates how research
framed by a seemingly unproblematic question—why do people object, or
not, to certain technologies?—has led to a transformation of the question
itself over a period of time as more empirical evidence has accumulated.
Mirroring thinking that has come out of the critique of the now dis-
credited ‘deficit model’ of public understanding of science (Irwin and
Wynne 1996), the evidence suggests that public risk perceptions exhibit a
complexity and rationality that may be sensitive to a range of factors that
go beyond, and are indeed typically ignored in expert risk analyses.
Acknowledgements
Work reported in this chapter was supported through a grant from the
Economic and Social Research Council under its ‘Risk In Social Contexts’
(SCARR) network, and partly by the Programme on Understanding Risk
funded by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust (RSK990021).
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6
Everyday Life and Leisure Time
John Tulloch
Theoretical Context
The context of risk debate in this book and elsewhere is generally taken
to be a shifting away from modernist ‘welfare’ paradigms to those of
personal responsibility and ‘justice’ (see Crime and Risk). An equivalent
shift is noted from interventionist state policies to those of either risk
society or new ‘governmentality’ (see Risk and Social and Public Policy). Yet
these contexts—especially when we look at theorizing risk, everyday life,
and leisure—need to be explored in the context of wider intellectual
debate.
Discussing theorization of the leisure industry and risk, Aitchison has
contrasted ‘Structuralist discourses . . . that focus on the big picture or the
grand narratives of capitalism, patriarchy, racism or ableism in explaining
social and cultural relations’ and post-structural analyses of the productive
consumption of leisure which focus on ‘the micro-level of the everyday
where difference and diversity may be visible within class, gender, race
and (dis)ability categorisations in addition to being identifiable between
such categories’ (2004: 98–9). She adds that ‘What has come to be known
as the “cultural turn” of the 1980s and 1990s’ redirected sociocultural
analysis ‘from social structures to cultural symbols and from the macro-
analyses of global power relations to the micro-analyses of everyday life’
(2004: 107).
In fact the ‘cultural turn’ was evident earlier as part of the ‘ethno-
graphic turn’ in academic research during the 1970s and early 1980s,
bringing an ‘everyday life’ focus to a wide range of disciplines. Every-
day practices had, of course, historically been of continuing central
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concern in anthropology and sociology, though as Denzin and Lincoln

indicate, always encapsulated within one or other theoretical-political
paradigm. Especially in the later (1970s to 1990s) stages of ethnographic
turn, ‘linguistic turn’, and reflexive anthropology, researchers faced an
ever-changing mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and
of critical and traditional theories. The ethnographic turn was especially
marked by its ‘blurred interpretive genres’ of paradigms, methods, and
theories, even though ‘thick descriptions’ of detailed everyday events,
rituals, and customs, and a conjuncture of both ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ nar-
ratives about ‘local situations’ became the preferred methodological focus
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 19).
The Ethnographic Turn: Culture as ‘Ordinary’

The growing field of cultural studies presented itself during the 1970s as
an anti-discipline and as the field of ‘blurred genres’ par excellence in
impacting on new studies of everyday life. In the space available it is
important to note two key movements here—the notion of culture as
‘ordinary’ and the importance of dialogic language. These were funda-
mentally to affect everyday life and ‘leisure’ research. I will illustrate each
of them via a symptomatic but creative cultural thinker.
By the late 1950s, in Culture and Society, Williams was already speak-
ing of the everyday yet holistic ordinariness of culture and during the
1960s/1970s developed his theory of culture both in terms of aesthetic
excellence and as an entire way of life. This encouraged analysis of texts
as significant symbolic action far beyond the normal ‘Engl.Lit’ canon
within high culture, and paved the way for later cultural/media studies of
everyday consumption of the leisure industries. Couldry notes, however,
the centrality to Williams’ thinking in holding ‘both notions of culture—
as specific works and as ongoing life process—in tension’ (2000: 23). ‘A
culture . . . is always both traditional and creative; that it is both the
most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings’
(Williams 1989: 4).
On the one hand, in everyday life extra-aesthetic arguments are made
about issues of quality and value, as when ‘we say that media or other
cultural representations do not . . . match our own experience, in the
social situations we know’ (Pickering 1997: 61, 65). On the other hand,
Williams’ emphasis on the ‘deep personal meanings’ within a culture
which is ‘ordinary, in every society and in every mind’ (1989: 4) has
opened out social theory in general, and risk theory in particular, to the
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possibility of examining every creative individual response to risk and

leisure in this ‘everyday’ way. For example, Alaszewski discusses how after
the ‘fateful moment’ of a stroke, many survivors construct narratives of
their ensuing lives in order to try and rebuild trust in the ordinary, and
to re-establish a new sense of identity. Thus, as Alaszewski makes clear,
narratives about ‘everyday activities such as cooking a meal for friends
or going out for a walk’ (2005: 23) provide more than the replacing of
new uncertainties by heightened risk-taking (e.g., the risk of falling whilst
walking), but also can provide the kinds of creative leisure-time pleasure
in achieving contact and control that others might find in extreme sports
or surfing.
This emphasis on deep personal meanings in everyday narratives has
become a regular feature of risk research. Whereas Alaszewski makes use
of Giddens’ notion of ‘fateful moments’, Thomson et al. contrast this
with their own usage of ‘critical moments’ in teenagers’ narratives of
agency and biographical choice, where critical moments are the rhetorical
device of ‘complication’ within narratives of social inclusion and exclu-
sion (2002: 351). Similarly, Tulloch and Lupton (2003) explore edgework
as a pleasure in extreme sports, as well as adults’ biographical narratives
about the risk of ‘border crossings’ (of geography, sexual preference, and
age), as liminal experiences situated in everyday life. Developing his edge-
work paradigm, Lyng (2005) speaks of personal ‘limit experience’ in sky
and BASE jumping, Courtney examines the ‘restorative dynamic of tran-
scendent experience’ (2005: 111) which links the competent art viewer/
listener to the edgework skydiver, and Simon explores the momentary
contemplation of risk and the sublime among English nineteenth century
mountaineering lawyers (2005: 222). Further, Gillespie (2002) explores
alternative liminalities and fateful moments by comparing alcohol and
automotive edgework in young Australian rural men (situated in everyday
terms of economic and social marginality and ‘hard masculinity’) with
urban dance party and chemical risk-taking young males who reflexively
share their transgression of normative boundaries with young women as
they negotiate new masculinities. There is also a growing literature on
risk rumours as ‘less organized, more spontaneous, and surprising’ stories
(Nerlich and Wright 2005: 2) working between knowledge sanctioned by
those in power and those who felt powerless during the British foot and
mouth epidemic (see also Burgess 2005 on internet rumours about mobile
phones). In all of these studies, risks and pleasures constructed as everyday
narratives (drawing as much on affect as cognition) are as key an element
in the ‘tension’ between Williams’ ‘known meanings and directions’ and
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‘new observances’ as are the kinds of texts studied by literary critics.

These everyday risk narratives are fine examples of Coward’s point, from
within cultural studies, that rather than making a hierarchy of ‘high’ and
‘popular’ texts and genres, our interest in ‘value’ should be in ‘how certain
texts criticize our everyday perceptions and make us see our surroundings
and our emotions in new and critical ways’ (1990: 91).
Dialogic Theory
For Williams the democratic communication of culture was dialogic,
a matter not only of ‘transmission; [but] also reception and response’
(Williams 1958: 301). An ongoing implication of the work of Williams and
others in the new, broader cultural studies (including history, geography,
English, critical psychology, sociology, and anthropology) was an ethical
commitment to resisting instrumental reductions of the human (Slack
and Whitt 1992: 576). The psychologist Shotter makes this especially clear
in Cultural Politics of Everyday Life where he quotes Bakhtin in arguing
that, ‘With a monologic approach . . . another person remains wholly and
merely an object of consciousness. Monologue is finalized and deaf to the
other’s response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any
decisive force’ (Bakhtin 1984: 292–3, cited in Shotter 1993: 197). Thus,
the ‘traditional analytic view of things’ (1993: 197)—for example, the
scientific-monological separation of expert analysis and lay object—must
give way. A new ‘politics of identity’ was needed:
citizenship cannot simply be instituted as a new ideology in a top-down power-

play by an elite group. It must emerge as a ‘living ideology’, a new ‘tradition of
argumentation’, consisting in a whole diversity of interdependent arenas. . . a great
‘carnival’ (Bakhtin, 1968) of different ways of socially constituting being in which
everyone can have a ‘voice’—in which they can play a part in the shaping and
reshaping of their lives. (Shotter 1993: 202)
At the same time, feminist theorist Ang was writing within cultural/media
studies about the problem of relegating the leisure audiences of television
‘to the status of exotic “other”—merely interesting in so far as “we”
as researchers use “them” as “objects” of study, and about whom “we”
have the privileged position to know the perfect truth’ (1987: 20). In
a re-thought ethnography ‘our deeply partial position as storytellers ...
should be ... seriously confronted ... as an inevitable state of affairs which
circumscribes the ... responsibility of the researcher/writer as a producer of
descriptions which, as soon as they enter the uneven, power-laden field
120
of social discourse, play their political roles as particular ways of seeing

and organizing an ever-elusive reality’ (Ang 1995: 75–6).
In this context the ‘ethnographer’s authority remains under assault.
A double crisis of representation and legitimation confronts qualitative
researchers in the social sciences’ (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 21). The
linguistic turn—of which Shotter’s re-appropriation of the dialogic in
Bakhtin is an important part—has thrown doubt on the ability of qualita-
tive researchers to ever capture lived experience directly, since such expe-
rience is created in the social text that the researcher her/himself writes.
Theories ‘are now read in narrative terms, as “tales of the field” (van
Maanen 1988). The concept of the aloof researcher has been abandoned.
The search for grand narratives will be replaced by more local, small-
scale theories fitted to specific problems in specific situations’ (Denzin
and Lincoln 1998: 22).
Crucially, this critical cultural-ethnographic conjuncture emphasiz-
ing, first, the ‘ordinariness’ of cultural creation and, second, the
researcher/professional as storyteller has drawn attention to narrative
reflexivity and empowered a rich body of recent risk research on the
construction of local-everyday and professional narratives. An example is
Sharland’s call for a critically reflexive, dialogic focus in social work where
we ‘look not only to what risk taking means in young people’s lives, but
to what we “make it” in our professional minds and actions’ (2005: 13).
Similarly Warner, in her analysis of homicide inquiry reports, emphasizes
the need for dialogic interplay of ‘active texts’ with (professional and lay)
voices, and for a (a cultural/media studies’ focus on) ‘how readers use text
in everyday life’ (2005: 4).
Research Themes
The thematic developments within the ‘everyday culture’ and dialogic

tradition of risk research include (i) developments directly within the
dialogic discursive and narrative analysis approach to risk; (ii) work that
draws on the dialogic in terms of research method and professional policy;
(iii) approaches that work empirically to theorize the expert/lay distinc-
tion; (iv) theoretical inquiries that draw on the substantive expert/lay
focus and a dialogic narrative/discourse methodological approach to ask
epistemological questions about the analytical object of risk; (v) ‘risk
cultures’ approaches that focus on affect and emotion; (vi) work on risk,
audiences, and media as leisure.
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Research Findings
Dialogic Discursive Analyses of Risk

Hassin’s analysis of the impact of AIDS on the social identity of
intravenous drug users is symptomatic of the importance of dialogic,
Bakhtinian narrative approaches to early 1990s risk research. She notes
that ‘Life stories are often constructed in dialogue’, producing research
narratives that bring together ‘different aspects of the individual’s experi-
ence’ and allowing the person ‘to integrate his or her story’ (1994: 393).
Thus, Hassin analyses her long interview with Roberta, an IV drug-using
woman with a baby, as her narrative voices of responsibility and irrespon-
sibility ‘are juxtaposed within a dialogic exchange that is “. . . agitated,
internally undecided and two faced” (Bakhtin 1984 [1929], 198)’ (1994:
394). ‘Through her telling, Roberta openly presents herself as the irrespon-
sible junkie but also the innocent faithful wife of the unfaithful husband:
responsible for contracting HIV yet the victim of her husband’s sexual
promiscuity’ (1994: 395). Roberta’s narrative goes through several other
moves, including the claim that her baby’s addiction was not the result
of her being on heroin, but—as socially responsible mother—because
she took a course of methadone to kick the habit (i.e. state sanctioned
legitimation). In her dialogical narrative ‘she was able to reconstruct a new
identity out of her experiences and the reactions of people surrounding
her’ (1994: 396).
Another early piece in health risk research, focusing on the dialogic in
media programming, was Tulloch and Chapman’s analysis of the framing
of radio talk between experts about the risk of AIDS to heterosexuals. The
focus was radio debate around Michael Fumento’s controversial book, The
Myth of Heterosexual AIDS. At first the Australian medical HIV specialist
Professor Dwyer, and then US political scientist Fumento were positioned
via intertextual authenticating devices as experts and framed by the
radio interviewers’ discursive procedures to display neutrality whilst being
interviewed singly. However, once they were on line together in direct
scientific empiricist/culturalist paradigm debate, Dwyer worked to regain
the status of sole expertise by positioning the audience within a ‘scientific
consensus’ via a range of semantic and rhetorical strategies.
Other more recent risk research has emphasized the significant absence
of dialogic ‘talk’, especially with children. Scott, Jackson, and Backett-
Milburn work through Giddens’ and Beck’s emphasis on increasing lack of
trust in both the project of modernity and expert knowledges, to examine
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the embeddedness of risk anxiety in the context of parent/child everyday

consciousness and practices. They argue that the ‘sexualization of risk
anxiety focuses on risks which are relatively rare as opposed to the all-too-
common dangers posed by abusive fathers and other male carers. . . . How
do children make sense of these when they are bounded by what cannot
be said, when the sexual aspects of danger are not made explicit, when
children themselves do not have access to sexual scripts which might
enable them both to understand the warnings they are given and apply
them to situations in which risk may be a factor’ (1998: 702).
Similarly, drawing on Giddens’ and Beck’s notions of trust and late-
modern reflexivity, and focusing on the everyday monologic and by-
rote practices of school sexual health classes, Lupton and Tulloch explore
teenagers wanting to ‘talk it over’ with people living with AIDS and with
sexual health counsellors, rather than with more monological doctors
and teachers. ‘What they wanted was to talk through the issues with
people who have experiential knowledge, to view the manifestations
of HIV/AIDS as it affects the body’ (1998: 29). Girls in particular were
also comfortable about their ability to talk with each other, whilst they
contrasted this with the macho uncertainty of boys. ‘For many of the girls,
the two discourses of the project of the body and trust were . . . connected,
since it is in “open”, “face-to-face” talk that you avoid “skimming the
surface” and get to understand “what actually happens to you”’(1998: 30).
Dialogic Risk Research Methods and Policies

A key theme in risk research has been dialogue between policymaking
bodies and various publics’ everyday practices. An early (1993) piece in
the tradition that draws on ‘everyday voices’ in relation to risk campaigns
and policy was Venables and Tulloch’s work for the New South Wales
Family Planning Authority in response to the ‘scientifically’ driven HIV
public health advertisements on television. The researchers constructed a
low-tech, ‘below-up’ campaign based on 17 focus group interviews with
Australian builders’ labourers who had already been cued about ‘safer-
sex’ by a visiting community theatre group (the research thus combining
Williams’ ‘high cultural’ and everyday approaches to cultural change). Via
the focus groups, the researchers explored both the leisure-time sexual
‘pick-up’ sites nominated by the builders’ labourers (rugby league and
working-men’s clubs) and the sexual narratives used by the men at the
time of pick-up. The workers were, for example, asked at what point in
meeting and having sex with a new acquaintance at the club they might
123
insert discussion about condoms. A consensus emerged from the focus

group discussions that raising ‘safe-sex’ whilst having drinks in the bar
after the first meeting on the dance floor would be the best time, by way
of specially produced cartoon beer coasters. Consequently, an HIV/AIDS
campaign was developed in which the builders’ labourers were consulted
(at a barbecue that brought the various groups together) about the design
of the cartoon beer-mats, and this low-tech medium of safer-sex was then
run successfully at one of Sydney’s largest rugby league clubs (Penrith
Panthers) in a predominantly working-class/migrant area of the city’s
outer-west (Venables and Tulloch 1993).
This research also worked within the linguistic-dialogic tradition of
health risk analysis. One of the focus group interviewers was an expert
(female) sexual health counsellor (Venables) and the other a well-
liked ‘layman’—a (male) builders’ labourers’ union organizer, who asked
all of the ‘sexual narrative’ questions. The gendered dialogic relation-
ship between the interviewed men and these two different discursive
power positions (the one as ‘scientific’ authority, the other as strongly
hetero-sexist male) were analysed as part of the meaning of the focus
group conversation about everyday safer-sex (Tulloch 1999: ch. 2).
In more recent work, Flynn, Bellaby, and Ricci comment on the inter-
vention by the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering’s (2004)
report on nanoscience and nanotechnologies which called for ‘upstream’
dialogue and engagement with publics ‘before critical decisions about
the technology become irreversible’ (2004: 65, cited Flynn, Bellaby, and
Ricci 2005: 18). They note that this intervention followed several years
of important analysis in Europe, including Renn (1998), Grove-White,
McNaghton, and Wynne (2000), Horlick-Jones et al. (2004), and Hunt,
Littlewood, and Thompson (2003) who all argued for more communica-
tive interaction between official stakeholder and lay publics. The notion
of an upstream process ‘designates the idea of conducting participatory
consultation early and before the “waters have become muddied” by insti-
tutional commitments to a particular course of action’ (Hunt, Littlewood,
and Thompson 2003: 6). However, Flynn, Bellaby, and Ricci’s own work
in comparing case studies of carbon storage and sequestration, geneti-
cally modified food and nanotechnology indicates that even attempting
to move public consultation upstream does not avoid a wide variation
in perceiving the uncertainties of science, ‘as the framing of risks and
benefits is necessarily embedded in a cultural and ideological context, and
is subject to change as experience of the emergent technology unfolds’
(Flynn, Bellaby, and Ricci 2005: 19).
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Flynn, Bellaby, and Ricci comments draw attention to both policy-

driven and theory-driven problems of risk society thinking in the con-
text of everyday ‘dialogic’ and ‘common culture’ approaches. As regards
policy, Mitchell, Bunton, and Green argue that there have recently been
a number of national and European policy developments which engage
with young people as risky, while often taking their ‘technical and sci-
entific knowledge . . . from disciplines such as: epidemiology, medicine,
economics, and engineering’ (2004: 2), thus differentiating objective from
subjective (i.e. supposedly misplaced) notions of risk. As regards theory,
Mitchell et al. note the repeated criticisms of Beck’s risk society thesis for
itself being ‘objectivist’ (Alexander 1996), remaining embedded in ‘cog-
nitive realism’ (Lash and Urry 1994), and for missing the ‘hermeneutical,
aesthetic, psychological, and culturally bounded forms of subjectivity and
inter-subjectivity in and through which risk is constructed and perceived’
(Elliot 2002, cited in Mitchell et al. 2004: 4). They argue for far more
understanding at both policy and epistemological levels ‘of the situated,
“everyday” reasoning and management of risk in order to begin to address
some of these problems with the risk society thesis’ (2004: 6). In this
context, Mitchell et al. introduce studies which relate to expert policy-
driven discourse at the level of regulation (by health promoters, Gillen,
Guy, and Banim 2004; by community action programmes to redesign
leisure space, Foreman 2004; by rail authorities, Tulloch 2004; by police
and traffic authorities, Lupton 2004; and by government and education
authorities ‘as an enticement for encouraging boys to engage in learning
as well as sport’, Pratt and Burn 2004: 251).
But always these recent studies are grounded ‘in the specific social and
economic contexts in which they are embedded: local spaces and places
where risk taking is perceived as part of the “normal everyday”’ (Mitchell
et al. 2004: 15). Frequently, these situated studies of young people engage
directly with dialogic negotiation of multiple identities in the process of
risk management. Thus Mitchell (2004) discusses the play in identity-
construction among young mothers in a deprived northern English city,
between the different discourses of risk society (in this case, ‘othering’
representations of risky paedophiles, joyriders, and needle users), ‘respon-
sible motherhood’ (differentiating themselves from other mothers who
leave their children at risk to the dangerous ‘outsiders’), and shifting
concepts of childhood as ‘work’ and ‘leisure’. Similarly, in a study of
prostitution in north-east England, Green (2004) explores ‘the complexity
of young people’s risk narratives, which are interwoven with the “voices”
of different and (often contradictory) identities’ (2004: 57)—not only
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between their own ‘risky bodies’ and their identity as mothers who care,
but also between prostitutes who work to support their children’s lifestyle
and those supporting a drug habit.
The Dialogic Relation of Expert and Lay Knowledges: Epistemological

Debate About ‘Risk’
Responding to Beck’s risk society thesis about scientific uncertainty, the
tradition of consultative public/policy-oriented risk research draws also
on two other major areas of risk theory: the focus on lay knowledge by
Wynne, and on ‘risk culture’ (rather than risk society) by Lash. In his
empirical study, ‘May the sheep safely graze?’, Wynne argues (in the tra-
dition of both Williams and Shotter) that ‘the fundamental sense of risk in
the “risk society” is risk to identity engendered by dependence on expert
systems which typically operate with . . . unreflexive blindness to their
own culturally problematic and inadequate models of the human’ (1996:
68). He challenges the ‘dismissive modernistic view of indigenous knowl-
edges’ conveyed by powerful sciences whose main epistemic principles are
‘instrumentalism, control, and alienation’ (Wynne 1996: 70), and argues
that farmers’ everyday, practical knowledge is ‘adaptive coping with mul-
tiple dimensions in the same complex area . . . . This kind of knowledge is
manifestly local and contextual rather than decontextual and “universal”’
(1996: 69–70). Wynne’s ultimate critique is of the supposed ‘objective
boundary between science and the public domain’ (1996: 75). ‘In Beck’s
. . . view, the . . . “out-there” risks are identified by counterexperts [hence]
the problems of trust and risk are only raised by expert contestation, and
as in Giddens’ account the public is only represented by different expert
factions. The human dimensions of such natural knowledges, whether
contested or not by other experts, is not recognised or problematised as
a public issue’ (Wynne 1996: 76). Like Williams and Shotter, Wynne is
arguing for a new kind of public citizenship based on ‘collective self-
conceptions’.
Wynne takes this argument further in his epistemologically focused
work, where he draws attention to the embedding of his own field of
the sociology of scientific knowledge within ‘the reflexive turn in the
humanities and social sciences’, and the resulting ‘impossibility to ignore
the ways in which propositional statements about the environment, risks,
or technologies, be these critical or not, embody and project the tacit
performance of corresponding models of the human subject, that is, of
human-culture-in-the-making’ (2002: 471). Thus, Wynne critiques the
126
top-down ‘monovalent simple-realist discourse’ (2002: 460) of institution-

alized science that has subverted and marginalized the ‘essential human-
cultural political dimension—about what kind of human we aspire to
be, and in what kind of human world’ (2002: 460). By confining all risk
debate to consequences, rather than to ‘public epistemic debate about pur-
poses . . . not only of technology but of scientific knowledge itself’ (2002:
473), institutional risk discourse imposes ‘not so much a prepositional
straitjacket on the public domain, but, more perniciously, a hermeneutic
one, where the supposedly objective meaning is left unquestioned—risk
and consequences’, and the citizen subject (the public) is constructed as
‘having a common objective instrumental frame of meaning—risk and
consequences’ (2002).
Shotter’s ‘citizenship . . . as a “living ideology”, a new “tradition of
argumentation”, consisting in a whole diversity of interdependent arenas’
reappears in Wynne’s emphasis on the need ‘to sustain the hybrid epis-
temic networks spanning multiple subcultures and local frames of mean-
ing’ (2002: 460), where local subcultural frames are deeply enmeshed in
everyday ‘lay knowledges’. This is Wynne’s epistemology of constructivist
realism—‘a natural-social-artefactual hybrid’, ‘contingent’, ‘unfinished,
always in the making’, and ‘forever incompletely represented’ (2002: 472);
or, to put it another way, ‘a great “carnival”’ (Bakhtin 1965) of different
ways of socially constituting being in which everyone can have a “voice”—
in which they can play a part in the shaping and reshaping of their lives’
(Shotter 1993, 2002). As with Raymond Williams’ emphasis on ordinary
creativity, Wynne’s central point is to ‘focus on innovation, its proper
human purposes and conditions’ (2002: 464).
Wynne’s epistemological insistence is that policy oriented to public
participation needs to be much more reflexive ‘about the human purposes
and visions which shape front-end innovation commitments’ (2002:
463). This position is reflected in a range of current risk research, from
Poortinga and Pidgeon’s finding that ‘in situations of distrust one must
begin with listening to the concerns of the public before giving them new
information’ (2005: 20), to Durodié’s generalized view of Western culture
where the appropriation of risk itself has led to ‘technical fixations’ on
security solutions rather than ‘significant public debate as to our aims and
purposes as a society’ (2005: 4). For Durodié, ‘by framing the discussion in
the fashionable language of risk, an element of passivity and inevitability
has been built into the solutions proffered. . . . The urgent need to engage
in a broader debate as to social aims and direction, based upon clearly
principled beliefs and the desire to engender amongst the population a
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sense of purpose that would truly make it resilient to acts of terror is . . .

not even considered’ (2005: 16, 17).
Risk and Everyday Cultural Affect

Lash’s notion of a reflexive risk culture has critiqued Beck’s risk society for
being trapped by the ‘legislation of cognitive reason’ (Lash 2000: 54). ‘Risk
cultures, in contrast, presume not a determinate ordering, but a reflexive
or indeterminate disordering . . . Their fluid quasi-membership is as likely
to be collective as individual, and their concern is less with utilitarian
interests than the fostering of the good life. . . . Risk cultures . . . are based
less in cognitive than in aesthetic reflexivity’ (Lash 2000: 47).
Like Wynne’s emphasis on ‘ambiguous knowledge’ involved in the plu-
rality of different public meanings, Lash refers to ‘indeterminate disor-
dering’ opposing the top-down monologism of rational-instrumentalist
normative orderings. But his emphasis leads him further into the aesthetic
and the affective than Wynne. Aesthetic reflexivity itself is of two kinds in
Lash’s formulation. First there is ‘judgement of the beautiful’ (including
‘the possible future bads which are risks’) which ‘we intuit . . . through
imagination . . . [as] schemata [that] are “representations” or “presenta-
tions”’ (2000: 56). Second, there is the ‘terrible sublime’, when ‘the event
or object is so powerful that the imagination cannot make a presenta-
tion. . . . Sensation is raw . . . Aesthetic judgements of the sublime expose
bodies with lack, expose open bodies to the ravages of contingency, to
darkness to fear and trembling’ (Lash 2000: 57).
Important work examining media images both as imaginative schemata
and as the embodied terrible sublime has been done by Boholm analysing
Chernobyl as metaphoric and symbolic representation in newspapers (see
below). Similarly, in theatre studies there have been analyses of ‘fans’
and risk which explore these two aesthetics of risk highlighted by Lash
(Tulloch 2005). In both cases, what is being considered is the importance,
in terms of affect, of sects or ‘affinity groups’, which, Lash argues, typically
‘are without hierarchy; they bond through intense affective charge’ in
the shifting multiple-identities of everyday life—‘not subsumed under
narratives of self-identity’ but ‘with that part of ourselves in which we
are incomplete and unfinished subjectivities, unfinished, lacking bodies’
(Lash 2000: 59).
Lash’s focus on sects in everyday lives has been extended in quite
diverse risk research fields. For example, Wild’s reflexive discussion of the
othering of New-Age Travellers (2005); Ferrell, Milovanovic, and Lyng’s
128
study of the hyperreal enterprise of once-a-year legal BASE jumping

(2001); Reith’s emphasis on the Bakhtinian ‘chemical carnival’ among
the ‘rapidly growing subcultural group of soft drug users’ (2005: 242);
Tulloch’s analysis of ‘liveness’, cognition, and affect among theatre fans
faced with embodied representations of risk crossing all of Lash’s dis-
cursive and aesthetic dimensions (2005); and Courtney’s discussion of
high art ‘competent viewers and listeners’ in developing an ‘impulsive
self’ in contrast to an ‘institutional self’ (2005: 103). Symptomatically, in
discussing Caravaggio’s indeterminately gendered paintings and Robert
Mapplethorpe’s erotic photographs, Courtney combines the main themes
that this paper has been discussing—of culture as ordinary but also cre-
ative, and language as dialogic—in his analysis of both queer theorists and
competent viewers/listeners of high art.
Media, Leisure, and Risk

A key intervention of Lash’s approach to risk cultures is his emphasis
that individual and social reflexivity encompasses more than rationalist
self-monitoring. For Lash (2000), reflexivity must also be seen to include
evaluation of social processes by way of aesthetic and hermeneutic under-
standings via everyday membership of a shared community or affinity
group. In this area Mary Douglas’ emphasis on individual ideas about dan-
ger and risk serving to bolster symbolic notions of a shared community’s
boundaries has been an influence. Within modernity the media have
been key symbol-making institutions engaging with a diverse range of
communities’ everyday leisure lives. Hence, a significant development in
this theme has been a focus on aesthetic reflexivity in terms of the media.
For example, Boholm’s analysis of several countries’ media coverage of the
Chernobyl disaster and her research team’s analysis of media coverage of
the Hallandsas tunnel-building environmental crisis in southern Sweden
draw directly on Douglas, via the ‘socially amplified hazards’ tradition, to
examine ‘risk understanding as intuitive and non-probablistic’ (Ferreira,
Boholm, and Lofstedt 2001: 284).
Ferreira, Boholom, and Lofstedt examined newspaper images of the
Hallandsas Tunnel pollution, showing a close-up of a dead, deformed
cow, a man pointing to a stream of polluted water, a farmer dumping
milk into a urine reservoir, and a family standing next to their defiled
drinking well. They noted of this ‘testimony of disorder’ (contrasting with
the conventional ‘countryside’ media representations of working farmers,
cows in fields, and gentle streams):
129
The kind of photographs that ‘witness’ the collapse of dairy farm imagery do not
rely on notions of rationality . . . but in the relation between how the imagery of
order is culturally constructed and how its disruption is visualized. . . . Like the
mixing of water and poison, the mixing of milk and urine . . . plays upon one
of the strongest “taboos” in every society. . . . The theory of rational choice . . .
overlooks the fact that choices are made according to available alternatives that
are themselves symbolic constructs. (2001: 291, 295)
In the case of the Chernobyl media images, Boholm argues that the
accident brutally forced the Ukrainian people, without the help of cultur-
ally available symbols, to reconsider their own mortality, their changed
perception of their own bodies, and their failure to fulfil their everyday
life projects as parents and grandparents. This failure—as we contemplate
the newspaper image of a little girl smiling happily into camera while
her mother and grandmother stare blankly beside her, surrounded by
their radioactive village—is a new imagistic ‘theatre of mortified flesh’
and ‘bodies that gaze’ (1998: 138).
However, the main approaches to risk, media, and leisure do not derive
directly from Douglas. To take two examples, if we look (a) at risk analysis
of media in the area of fear of crime and (b) at leisure and edgework analy-
sis, we can see the way in which critical discourses working within Denzin
and Lincoln’s blurred genres of everyday life analysis merge, engage, and
contest.
(a) As elsewhere in risk research, sociocultural analysis of fear of crime
has challenged attempts by institutional-administrative risk research
to measure the ‘rationality’ of response. In important early research,
Young (1987) focused on the cultural frames through which crime
‘makes sense’ within specifically (and materially) located communi-
ties. Taylor and colleagues drew on Williams’ notion of ‘structure
of feeling’ to examine the lived local experience of fear of crime by
examining the ‘symbolic locations of crime’ in two very different post-
industrial cities, the multinational corporation ‘headquarters city’ of
Manchester and the ‘module production’ city of Sheffield (1996).
An important feature of this and other work by Taylor (such as his
exploration of the emotions and anxieties related to fear of crime in
an affluent ‘village-style’ Manchester suburb, Taylor 1995) is his iden-
tification of different everyday channels of discourse (gossip overheard
at the supermarket check-out, anxious playground talk children bring
home to parents, local newspapers’ speculation about drug dealing
in the park) which engage dialogically as interwoven ‘noises’, ‘talk’,
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‘rumour’, and ‘myths’ of crime that circulate in a very specific local

community. They become the everyday ‘media’ which, historically
and geographically, represent a particular politics at a particular time.
This tradition continues in other areas of current risk research—e.g.
Nerlich and Wright’s study of rumour among farmers and in parlia-
ment during the British 2001 foot and mouth epidemic (2005), and
Tulloch and Lupton’s study of everyday narratives, risk biographies,
and media use in differently situated ‘post-industrial’ cities (as in the
Taylor et al. 1996 study), in this case Cardiff, Coventry, and Oxford.
For example, drawing on Beck’s ‘risky underemployment’ thesis, they
examine the differentiated use of media (local radio, works website,
holiday- and health-related websites, environmental and community
media, television, national newspapers) by ‘traditional’ and ‘high-
tech’ workers in dealing with work crises, technologically generated
risks (e.g. the GM food debate), fear of crime, and leisure-time plea-
sures and risks. Tulloch and Lupton embed their media analysis in
situated, everyday life methodologies, whereas a more ‘media-studies’
textually focused exploration of the emotive and expressive aspects
of crime via metaphorical and figurative representations underpins
Sparks argument that fear of crime among those minimally threatened
should not be seen as ‘irrational’, but rather as ‘intelligibly summariz-
ing a range of more diffuse anxieties about one’s position and identity
in the world’ (1992: 14). Hollway and Jefferson took this further psy-
choanalytically in arguing that anxiety is the product of the repression
of what is threatening the integrity of the self (like physical ageing and
existential boredom) via displacement and then projected onto other
targets such as fear of crime. Lupton and Tulloch critiqued Hollway
and Jefferson’s focus on unconscious displacement for ignoring the
conscious strategies and dialogically mobilized circuits of communi-
cation adopted in people’s everyday biographies, where fear of crime
is often a material phenomenon not simply a displacement of less
definable and manageable worries (1999).
(b) A similar reflexive engagement and contestation of analytical dis-
courses has recently become evident in edgework analysis of leisure
and voluntary risk-taking. For example, Lyng (2005) revisits his earlier
Marxian/Meadian analysis of high-risk leisure sports by way of a vari-
ety of intellectual paradigms: Weber’s disenchantment/enchantment
distinction, as in Ritzer’s ‘cathedrals of consumption’ (e.g. shopping
mall leisure) in late capitalism (2005: 22); Baudrillard’s postmodernist
131
emphasis on consumption practices as a direct conduit to corporeal

desire (as in sky diving and the mediated edgework of BASE jump-
ing); and Foucault’s post-structuralist account of edgework and the
transgressing of limits ‘as “acts of liberation” in the face of the micro-
politics of power operating in the modern world’ (Lyng 2005: 47).
Emerging Problems and Issues
Key problems associated with the persistence of rational choice theory in

risk research and policy is taken up in other chapters. Here the focus is
on problems and issues associated with post ‘ethnographic-turn’ under-
standings of cultures of risk as ordinary and everyday. In her conclusion
on theorizing leisure, Aitchison calls for a new conceptual synergy that
recognizes the interaction of ‘productive’ (everyday-transgressive) and
‘determined’ (structural power) relations of risk. The problems of achiev-
ing this are multi-layered.
First, there is the epistemological issue of the ‘reality’ of risk. Too
often in risk research the over-simple binary of either (a naïve-materialist
concept of) the ‘realist paradigm’ or constructivism operates. However,
there is now a considerable tradition of exploring positivist empiricism
and more relativist constructivisms in the context of materialist realism
(Bhaskar 1978; Lovell 1980; Young 1987; Tulloch 1990), as well as the
tradition of ‘structuration’ and agency (Giddens 1984). This has led
to specific debates about risk and constructivist realism (Wynne 2002),
the epistemology of risk and critical realism (Tulloch 1999), and a prag-
matic choice of realism and constructivism as ‘the appropriate means
for a desired goal’ (Beck 2000: 211). In citing Beck’s pragmatic position,
Irwin argues that ‘there is little point in attempting to calculate whether
social and institutional understandings are “real” or “imagined”. A more
appropriate sociological task is to consider the multiple experiences and
constructions of environmental hazard—including, very importantly, the
manner in which risk constructions interact with self-identities and wider
social understandings’ (2001: 177). This is sensible. But it also pushes the
problem back to the theoretical/conceptual level: how best to understand
the ontological and epistemological status of self-identity construction
and ‘wider social understandings’?
Thus, it seems clear that current research is positively engaged with the
construction of self-identities in conditions of risk, that these frequently
take account of the reflexive concern for dialogic negotiation within and
132
between everyday ‘lay voices’ and professionals, and that by and large
this work (often criticizing Beck) embeds ‘wider social understanding’
analysis in quite traditional understandings of the ‘otherness’ of age,
gender, sexual preference, class, and (dis)ability (Cartmel 2004; Murdock,
Petts, and Horlick-Jones 2003). At the same time, it remains a puzzle that
whilst media/cultural studies has had a good deal of influence in helping
establish the parameters of ‘everyday life and leisure’ in risk research,
it is still the case as Kitzinger notes that ‘some researchers display little
knowledge of the extensive debate within media studies about media
effects and audience reception processes’ (1999: 57). Kitzinger concludes
that risk research is needed ‘which combines rigorous in-depth method-
ologies, with theoretically reflexive approaches and multi-level research
designs that give due attention to production processes and audience
reception alongside analysis of media content’ (1999: 67). Murdock, Petts
and Horlick-Jones would add that this content should include a revived
attention to image analysis, since ‘mediated communication is as much
about symbolic exchange as it is about information transfer’ (2003: 172).
Third, then, we need to consider the ‘problems’ of post-ethnographic
turn risk research in the context of carefully replicated methodological
procedures. Here Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones argue ‘in-depth inter-
views, biographical narratives, and modes such as focus groups which
approximate as closely as possible to the conditions of everyday conver-
sation are likely to produce richer insights into the negotiation of media
meanings than standard questionnaires or self-completion tests’ (2003:
175). To this should be added Ang’s point about reflexive analysis of
the already empowered researcher herself, dialogically managing research
interviews with research subjects who are themselves negotiating narra-
tives of multiple subjectivity. As we have seen, the current condition of
risk research in relation to cultures, everyday life, and leisure is strong
in its qualitative telling of ‘tales of the field’, though still not always
articulate about the reflexive (speaking/writing) role of the researcher
her/himself.
Fourth, if risk research has recently begun to engage empirically and
locally with the ‘grand theories’ of ‘moral panics’ (Cohen 1972), ‘risk
amplification’ (Kasperson et al. 1988) or the ‘Risk Society’ (Beck 1995)
(Kitzinger 1999: 67), it is important not to forget the creative tension in
Raymond Williams’ work on ordinary cultures and everyday life. If on the
one hand, everyday narratives of stroke victims, prostitutes, people liv-
ing with AIDS, differently disadvantaged young people, etc. are valuably
being analysed both as ‘most ordinary common meanings’ and as ‘the
133
finest individual meanings’ (Williams 1989: 4), where on the other hand
are the analyses of art/popular cultural works now engaging with Beck’s
risk society? What are the ‘structures of feeling’ (Williams)—of combined
cognition and affect—which people are expressing as they contemplate,
for example, the words and images of contemporary risk conveyed by the
2004 series of British theatrical performances adapting Greek tragedy to
the invasion of Iraq one year previously? Or, at the ‘popular’ end of
image-making (following Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones), where are
the analyses of the leisure-style-images taken by soldiers at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq (Best 2004)? Here risk theory needs to revisit its own ‘grand
theories’, and explore, beyond its concern with governance theory, other
paradigms around globalization, such as the ‘new insecurity’ research
by political scientists, international relations specialists, sociologists and
communication scholars examining our era of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 2001;
Duffield 2001; Feldman 2004; Humphrey 2004). This will not efface recent
developments in situated work on everyday life and leisure, but would
reconsider Murdock et al.’s emphasis on ‘negotiations between “situated”
and “mediated” knowledge’ (and affect) within ‘private/public’ assem-
blage of policies. This is needed internationally (as in the ‘war against
terror’) and nationally (as the post-Cold War international ‘humanitarian’
agenda is replicated in ‘third way’ domestic agendas of ‘social capital’,
Roberts 2004). To begin to examine our own, situated everyday leisure
responses to the new mediated imagery of ‘shock and awe’ and ‘collateral
damage’ (Best 2004) would be one important new phase in reconsidering
‘hegemonic social relations and transgressive gender-leisure relations in
everyday life’ (Aitchison 2004: 211).
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7
Risk and Intimate Relationships
Jane Lewis and Sophie Sarre
Context
Interrelated changes in the labour market and in family formation have

resulted in what many have termed ‘new’ social risks for those in intimate
relationships (e.g. Bonoli 2004). The traditional, married, male breadwin-
ner family was long believed to offer protection against risk, particularly
for women and children. Normative prescriptions as to the gendered con-
tributions men and women were expected to make to families in respect
of earning and caring were clearly understood and were underpinned by
social welfare provision and family law. Core social programmes such
as social insurance made provision for dependants (usually women and
children) and family law sought to establish fault and hence entitlement
to alimony on divorce. Thus, social policies and family law rested on
basic assumptions as to what the family should look like and how it
worked. This traditional family model made provision for the support
of the unpaid work of care for young and old, albeit, as a generation of
feminist analysts of social policies have pointed out, at the price of female
economic dependence.
Labour market change and the even more dramatic pace of family
change over the last 20 years have resulted in the substantial erosion
of the traditional family model (Crompton 1999; Lewis 2001) and have
changed the configuration of social risk. High rates of family instabil-
ity, much greater fluidity in intimate relationships (such that cohabi-
tation may precede marriage and post-date divorce, and rates of extra-
marital childbearing are high in many western countries), and rising
rates of female labour market participation, especially among mothers of
140
young children, have made it impossible to sustain the traditional gender

settlement that underpinned social provision and regulation in modern
welfare states. Family forms are more fluid and the individual’s life-
course looks increasingly messy, with the increased possibility of multiple
episodes of cohabitation, marriage, and divorce (Haskey 1999).1 Above
all, the rising proportion of lone mother families have made considerable
claims on social provision, while rising rates of cohabitation, the driver of
so much family change, have raised issues for family law, which has his-
torically maintained a firm separation between the treatment of marriage
and cohabitation.
The male breadwinner model family has been substantially eroded
in two key respects: the changing pattern of women’s and to a much
lesser extent men’s contributions to the family in respect of cash (more
than care), and the changing structure of the family itself. In both
respects there has been increasing individual economic independence,
but nowhere has a fully fledged dual adult worker model replaced the
traditional family model. Greater female economic independence, but
not full autonomy, is possible via the wage. Indeed, while in Western
Europe there is evidence of substantial movement away from the male
breadwinner model towards an adult worker model (Crompton 1999), it is
most common to find some form of transitional dual breadwinner model
than a full dual career model. As Yeandle (1999: 142) has observed, a
complex relationship between individuals and labour markets is emerging
across the life course, which is ‘fraught with risk’ and which ‘requires
skilful negotiation’. The rapid pace of family change also means that
the nature of what constitutes risk in relationships has changed. Oppen-
heimer (1994) has argued that with the decline of the male breadwin-
ner model family the whole meaning of marriage and partnership has
changed. Given that two incomes are usually now necessary to meet
household expenditure (particularly, in the UK context, mortgage pay-
ments), relationships in which men and women continue to ‘specialize’
as earners and as carers may be more at risk of breakdown than ones in
which men and women make a more equal contribution of money and
time.
People have more choice in respect of partnering, reproduction, and,
to a lesser extent, the kind of contributions they make to families. Men
no longer have to marry in order to have sex and children. Women no
longer have to marry to gain economic support. In line with the possi-
bility of more individualistic behaviour, Inglehart (1997) has also docu-
mented a shift towards more individualistic attitudes. Indeed, as Beck and
141
Beck-Gernsheim (1995) have argued, the norm is now that there is no

norm, whether in respect of partnering or the extent of female employ-
ment. The erosion of the traditional family model has opened up the
possibility of more choice, but this has been accompanied by greater
uncertainty, both material and emotional, due particularly to the high
rates of relationship breakdown and the lack of firm expectations about
the nature of the contributions that men and women should make to
households. Indeed, it is no longer clear, for example, whether mar-
riage is perceived to protect against risk, or, in a society where relation-
ships are fluid, to constitute a risk because of the legal entanglements
it entails.
There is a large literature that seeks to make sense of changes in family
form and in the contributions that men and women make to families, and
to explore the reasons for them. Social theorists have conceptualized these
trends in terms of individualization, whereby people’s lives come to be
less constrained by tradition and custom and more subject to individual
choice, which in turn means that people take more individual respon-
sibility for planning their lives and evaluating the risks to themselves
(Giddens 1990, 1992; Beck 1992, 1995; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995;
Beck-Gernsheim 2002). This literature sees individualization in terms of
processes that are not inherently good or bad. Thus, while intimate
relationships have become more contingent, they may also have become
more democratic (Giddens 1992). However, most English-speaking com-
mentators have focused on what they see as the negative outcomes of
the changes, particularly in terms of the effects on child welfare, and
have concluded (often by reading off causes from the aggregate statistics
of behavioural and attitudinal change) that adults are acting as selfish
individualists, seeking what is best for themselves rather than others (e.g.
Bellah et al. 1985; Popenoe 1993; Dnes and Rowthorne 2002). In the first
part of the chapter, we explore these two influential positions, neither of
which is based on empirical investigation of how relationships work, and
some of the criticisms directed towards them.
Risk, as opposed to uncertainty, is held to be calculable (Knight 1921).
In respect of intimate relationships, it is generally known that there is
a high rate of relationship breakdown, although the precise figure may
not be known and the differences between the rates for cohabitants and
married people may also be unknown. It is also generally appreciated
that adult women, married and unmarried, mothers and non-mothers, are
now more likely to be employed; indeed, there is evidence of attitudinal
shifts among men and women approving this (Scott 1999). In addition,
142
in the UK, it is also generally known that the arrival of children is likely to
pose problems for ‘work-life balance’, particularly for women. However, it
is much more difficult to be sure of the extent to which people think
about their own decisions regarding their relationships in the context
of aggregate statistics. The powerful western idea of romantic love (de
Rougemont 1940; Luhman 1986) tells us that people ‘in love’ are ‘swept
off their feet’ such that ‘feelings’ overwhelm ‘rational calculations’. If this
is the case, and as we shall see, the evidence suggests that it may not be
for all groups, then it is most likely to dominate perceptions of risk at the
point of entry into a relationship. Later in any relationship, uncertainties
that emerge as a result of changes in feelings, or changes in economic and
social circumstances, including the arrival of children must be ‘managed’
in some way. In the second part of the chapter, we examine some of
the more empirical work on intimate relationships that has explored
perceptions of risk and uncertainty, and the ways in which uncertainty is
managed. This work has also been important for the additional questions
it has raised regarding both the positions outlined in the first section of
the chapter. Finally, we look at the policy and research issues that have
emerged.
Research Themes I: Individualisation and Individualism
Individualisation
The concept of ‘individualization’ endeavours to locate the choices made
by individuals. It refers to the way in which people’s lives come to be
less constrained by tradition and customs and more subject to indi-
vidual choice, which can only be understood against the background
of changes in the family, the labour market, and the welfare state.
Beck-Gernsheim (1999: 54) has described the effects of individualiza-
tion on the family in terms of a ‘community of need’ becoming ‘an
elective relationship’. Elias (1991: 204) expressed a similar idea in the
following:
The greater impermanence of we-relationships, which at earlier stages often had

the lifelong inescapable character of an external constraint, puts all the more
emphasis on the I, one’s own person, as the only permanent factor, the only person
with whom one must live one’s whole life.
As more opportunities open up and less and less is ‘given’ individ-

ual choice (and responsibility) also increase. Beck-Gernsheim (2002) has
143
argued that with the relaxation of social norms and greater individualiza-
tion and self-reflexivity, people are more likely to see life as a planning
project, and to write their own ‘personal biographies’, or to work on the
‘project of the self’ (Giddens 1992). So, people will make more deliberate
choices about whether to live together, to marry, to have children, and
how to combine employment and household work. They also feel a
greater personal responsibility for the outcomes of their choices, that is,
for evaluating and managing the risks.
Giddens (1992: 35) argued that by the late twentieth century, relation-
ships had become ‘pure’, that is, they are
. . . entered into for [their] own sake, for what can be derived by each person from
a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it is
thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay
within it.
These relationships are, in Giddens’ view, contingent: if a particular rela-

tionship does not provide one of the partners with what he or she seeks,
then that partner will move on. A Canadian study that attempted to
operationalize Gidden’s concept of the ‘pure relationship’, in which the
partners are committed only for so long as they feel that they personally
benefit, concluded that cohabitants came closest to matching the criteria
developed (Hall 1996).
(Selfish) Individualism
This is in large measure what those who regard the rapid pace of family
change with dismay fear. Giddens suggested that the emergence of the
pure relationship signalled the democratization of the family. However,
the majority of commentators on family change, whose interest lies in
examining the outcomes of the changes and who are fundamentally
concerned about the stability of the family, see it more negatively as
an expression of selfish individualism that poses risks above all to the
welfare of children. American sociologists, drawing conclusions primarily
on the basis of statistics showing the increasing instability of the family,
warned that marriage might become ‘so insecure that no rational person
will invest a great deal of time, energy, and money and forgone oppor-
tunities to make a particular marriage satisfactory’ (Glenn 1987: 351).
Bellah et al.’s influential study (1985: 85) of ‘middle America’ argued that
the individual is realised only through the wider community and read
off similar pessimistic conclusions from the statistics of family change:
144
‘if love and marriage are seen primarily in terms of psychological grat-
ification, they may fail to fulfil their older social function of providing
people with stable, committed relationships that tie them into the larger
society’. Popenoe (1993: 528) expressed this view most clearly, arguing
that the statistics of family change showed that ‘people have become less
willing to invest time, money, and energy in family life, turning instead
to investment in themselves.’ This interpretation of what lies behind the
statistics of family change in terms of individuals sizing up risks and
opportunities for themselves, without taking the interests of other family
members into consideration has dominated the American literature. It has
also resonated in the UK, where a polemical policy-oriented literature has
warned against the idea of family relationships becoming seen as merely
another ‘lifestyle change’ (Davies 1993).
Criticisms
Both the proponents of individualization and selfish individualism
assume that actors can exercise choice, manage risk, and shape their
lives. Both have been criticized for taking insufficient account of the
context in which actors make their choices. At the macro-level, as critics
of Beck and Giddens’ approach have pointed out, people’s capacity to
make choices, for example, in respect of separation and divorce, depends
in some measure on their environment, for example, on the constraints
of poverty, social class, and gender, or, more positively, on the safety net
provided by the welfare state (Lash 1994; Lewis 2001a), although Giddens
(1984) acknowledged the importance of structures and structural change
in constraining as well as enabling action. Nevertheless, the question
posed by Lash (1994: 120) regarding the importance of structural con-
straints for particular groups of the population in particular contexts is
pertinent:
Just how ‘reflexive’ is it possible for a single mother in an urban ghetto to be?. . .
Just how much freedom from the ‘necessity’ of ‘structure’ and structural poverty
does this ghetto mother have to self-construct her own ‘life narratives’?
In other words, the context in which people make choices and evaluate
risks and opportunities matters.
Other people are part of the individual’s context, and critics of both
individualization and selfish individualism have argued that relationships
and networks still matter and that the social theory of individualization
has paid insufficient attention to the pulls of ‘relationship’ and of the
145
needs and welfare of others that compete with the individual’s own
desires. Askham (1984), in one of the few qualitative, in-depth explo-
rations of marriage, concluded that married men and women faced a
conflict between the pursuit of identity and stability. In the view of
those concerned about selfish individualism, the pursuit of identity in
the form of self-gratification has won. However, people’s choices may
depend in part on the consideration they give to the welfare of others
(what might be perceived as opportunity by the actor may be perceived
as unwelcome uncertainty by another person), and on how far others
influence the way in which they frame their choices. Feminists have long
insisted upon the importance of connection and the relational self to
women’s moral sense (Gilligan 1982; Held 1993; Griffiths 1995). Sven-
huijsen (1998) makes the case for an ‘ethic of care’, taking a relational
view of the self, and viewing the individual as living in a network of rela-
tionships that are interdependent. The matter at hand then becomes, not
the individual pursuing a pure relationship, but rather how the individual
can achieve some freedom within the web of his or her responsibilities.
Empirical research has demonstrated the extent to which people take
the issue of their obligations to other kin seriously (Finch and Mason
1993; Smart and Neale 1999; Lewis 2001). The more recent attention to
social capital represents a wider appreciation of the extent to which no
one is an ‘unencumbered self’ (Sandel 1996), and also stresses interde-
pendence and hence the obligations people have towards one another
(Etzioni 1994).
Finally, whether the emphasis is on individual agency or relation-
ship, the twin issues of power and inequality constitute another impor-
tant limitation to the notion of individuals ‘writing’ their own biogra-
phies, assessing opportunities, and evaluating risks. Feminist analysis
has long drawn attention to the inequalities of what Bernard (1976)
called ‘his and her marriage’. Unequal power not only makes full indi-
vidualization unlikely, but also, like the structural constraints empha-
sized by Lash, pose risks that must be negotiated. Given that we are still
far from fully individualized relationships (in the sense of adult eco-
nomic independence), and that contributions of money and time within
married and cohabiting relationships remain gendered and unequal
(increasingly so with the arrival of children), the power that results
from control over resources is likely to be a particularly important
factor in determining how individuals are able to make choices and
avoid risks.
146
Furthermore, those who find themselves more dependent within mar-

riage may have less bargaining power, although Gottman (1994) has
stressed that women may wield emotional power within the home, even if
they lack control over material resources. However, economists using eco-
nomic bargaining models have recognized that resources are not shared
equally and that marital investment and exchange must therefore offer
both husbands and wives more than they obtain outside the marriage
(Lundberg and Pollak 1996). According to these theories, a rise in women’s
employment or an increase in their wages will threaten the stability of
marriage, because it will no longer offer women unequivocal gains, but
this is again to assume a model of self-interested economic rationality
in decision-making about relationships that takes no account of context,
the power of ‘connection’, and the ethic of care. Nevertheless, the issue
of resources and investments in a relationship is important. Working
within a neoclassical economic framework, Cohen (1987) pointed out
that investments in marriage are front-loaded for women because of
childbearing. The relative decline in the value of women on the marriage
market thus exposes them to the risk of the expropriation of their greater
investment in marriage—their ‘quasi-rents’—by their husbands. However,
power and inequality in intimate relationships and the effects they may
have on the capacity of the individual to act is an extremely complex
subject. Qualitative research exploring the workings of relationships has
shown the extent to which the kind of risks posed by the inequality in
resources between partners may nevertheless be accepted, justified, and
managed. Hochschild (1989) has suggested that each partner in a couple
may attach a different value to a particular resource, giving it a different
meaning.
Thus, whilst there is a measure of agreement that there is a trend
towards greater individualization, first, this cannot be conceptualized
simply in terms of increasing atomization. Context in terms of the cou-
ple’s own relationship and their wider connections to kin and friends,
as well as their structural position in society, is crucial in constraining
the individual’s calculations as to opportunities and risks. Nevertheless,
there is also evidence that people relish the much greater choice that they
have in entering and exiting a wide range of heterosexual and homo-
sexual intimate relationships. In the next section, we explore further
the mainly qualitative literature on heterosexual relationships that has
addressed various ways in which risks and uncertainties are perceived and
managed.
147
Research Themes II: People Perceiving and Managing Risk
Perceptions of Risk
The nature and extent of the risks that people in intimate relationships
perceive is difficult to estimate; we have already raised the issue of how far
people think about (and take steps to avoid) the possibility of relationship
breakdown. Whitehead (1997) has referred to the existence of a ‘culture of
divorce’ and Beck Gernsheim (2002) has suggested further that if a couple
has doubts about the durability of their relationship they will invest less
in it, making breakdown more likely. However, in a study of American
student lawyers who were about to marry and who had a good knowledge
of the divorce statistics, Baker and Emry (1993) found that they denied
that these statistics had any relevance for their own relationships. In other
words, it was possible for them to believe in the unique qualities of their
own relationships, notwithstanding widely publicized evidence of high
rates of breakdown.
Nevertheless, Hackstaff’s study (1999) of ‘marriage in a culture of
divorce’, which compared couples married in the 1950s with those mar-
ried in the 1970s, noted ways in which the divorce culture had permeated
the lives of the younger couples. Younger couples were surprised by their
own marital endurance, and unexpected divorces among their peers made
them feel that ‘it could happen to us’. Wynne (1996) has emphasized the
way in which lay actors’ perceptions of risk draw upon their own situated
knowledge of the world, which are in turn based on individual, local,
and contextual experience. This makes it more likely that couples will be
influenced by what happens to friends and family in terms of relationship
breakdown, than by aggregate statistics.
Smart and Stevens (2000) and Macgill (1989) have highlighted the way
in which circumstances that would commonly be seen as risky can bring
benefits to particular individuals. Such individuals therefore live with a
high degree of ambiguity about their risk position. Smart and Stevens
(2000) have argued on the basis of a qualitative study of cohabiting
women with children, who in the UK are disproportionately poor, that
cohabitation represents a rational response to low male wages and eco-
nomic insecurity (see also McRae 1993 using UK data; and Edin and
Kefalas 2003; and Moffitt 2000 for similar conclusions from US data).
Given that the father of her child is likely to be low-waged or unemployed,
a young woman who will likely also be poorly educated may decide
that cohabitation is a ‘better bet’ than either the legal entanglement of
148
marriage or trying to raise the child alone. Smart and Stevens termed
this ‘rational risk-taking’. These mothers operated in a context of poverty
and low educational achievement. Each option—marriage, cohabitation,
or single motherhood—was perceived to carry attendant risks. As Macgill
(1989: 58) has concluded:
People’s risk perceptions are determined by their interpretations of what they

recognise as the attributes, material and symbolic, or the risk source. . . What
attributes people identify and what they then mean depend on people’s prejudices
and values and their experiences of everyday economic and social life. . . To speak
in terms of irrationality and misperception. . . is plainly to misunderstand how
people, all of us, cope with conflicting realities.
We might add that to speak solely in terms of the pursuit of selfish

individualism is also to misunderstand how people cope with conflicting
realities. Indeed, it is impossible to attribute choices and a particular
evaluation of risk in intimate relationships to any one source, whether
the pursuit of self-interest, or the ‘alternative moral rationality’ (Duncan
and Edwards 1999) of connectedness and care. As the French economist
Thevenot (2001) has argued, we inhabit different kinds of rationality
simultaneously. Depending on the ways in which our social, economic,
and ideational context enables or constrains our actions—which will vary
over the life course—we may act more with the self or other in mind.
Indeed, recent research at the level of the household has highlighted
the importance of first understanding what individuals in couple rela-
tionships actually perceive as risk and what they are prepared to ‘take a
chance on’. The risk of ‘getting hurt’ in a personal relationship is widely
understood and accepted, but the search for personal happiness is felt
to depend in large part on taking this risk (Lewis 2006). The issue then
becomes how people seek to manage this risk.
Managing Risk
While romantic love may effectively counter a more calculative approach
to entry into an intimate relationship, as Seligman (1997) has pointed
out, love requires trust. In the case of decisions to marry or cohabit, there
is good reason to suppose that trust in the partner makes it possible to
ignore generalized knowledge about the risks. Furthermore, as Guseva
and Rona-Tas (2001) have pointed out in their analysis of the way in
which the Russian credit card market works, trust may prove an effec-
tive alternative to more tangible modes of calculating the possible risks.
149
Indeed, Lupton (1999) has suggested that people may seek to ‘pool risk’ in
their intimate relationships, which immediately moves us away from the
idea of individuals taking the responsibility for and evaluating risks. In
intimate relationships that are working well, Berger and Kellner’s (1964),
idea of marriage as the writing of a ‘joint script’, developed more than
a generation ago, or Morgan’s (1996, 1999) characterization of family
life in terms of ‘family practices’, implying that individuals are actively
engaged in ‘doing’ family, may be more accurate depictions than the idea
of increasingly autonomous individuals.
But even in love matches individuals may look for more tangible signs
of commitment, particularly later on in the relationship during times of
strain and difficulty. Most writers on the subject now agree that commit-
ment involves behaving in ways that support the maintenance and con-
tinuation of a relationship, even though the concept has proved difficult
to define. Thus, the promotion of commitment is seen as key to perma-
nence and stability in relationships, and, by extrapolation, to the success-
ful negotiation of risk and uncertainty. Furthermore, a strong argument
has been made that commitment is antithetical to selfish individualism
and is therefore difficult to sustain in cohabiting relationships, because
they are more contingent (e.g. Cherlin 1992).This view is linked to that
of those who are concerned that family change is a matter of concern
because it signifies a growth in selfish individualism and is controversial
because it infers that commitment will only be found in marriage.
Other research findings are much more cautious on this score. Mansfield
(1999) has suggested that there are two forms of commitment: to what
she terms the relationship, which is personal and now-oriented; and to
what she terms the partnership. The partnership consists of a ‘struc-
ture of understanding’ which serves to link purposes to expectations
and is future-oriented, thus amounting to a notion of commitment to
the ‘institutional aspects’ of the relationship that encompasses a shared
understanding of the kind of investments that will be made in it. Com-
mitment to the partnership is crucial to long-term stability (see also
Lewis 2001). However, it is not easy to separate personal commitment
from commitment to the relationship, as many social psychologists have
sought to do (e.g. Johnson 1991; Adams and Jones 1997). It may be,
as Smart and Stevens (2000) have argued on the basis of their study
of cohabitation, that commitment should be viewed as a continuum,
with ‘mutual’ commitment (to the other person and the relationship) at
one end, and ‘contingent’ commitment (dependent on any number of
issues to do with the behaviour of the other person) at the other. It is
150
less clear how to promote commitment. Those who start from the fact
that breakdown is more likely among cohabitants than married people
are likely to promote marriage as a solution (see Waite and Gallagher
2000), but there is also empirical evidence that commitment does not
inhere in a particular civil status (Smart and Stevens 2000; Lewis 2001;
Jamieson et al. 2002).
Nevertheless, it may be that for some couples marriage is perceived as a
welcome, additional manifestation of commitment, which in turn serves
to provide protective security against the risk of breakdown. A generation
ago the legal status of marriage with a traditional gendered division of
labour may have been perceived to provide the best protection. But today,
whether or not marriage is thought to provide additional security is likely
to be decided by individual temperament and social context (e.g. whether
marriage is preferred by family and friends). A measure of economic
independence may as likely be thought to provide a secure basis for taking
the risky step of entering a relationship, as it was once believed to be
inimical to the success of a traditional relationship (Lewis 2006).
However, well-established relationships, whether married or cohabiting,
will (usually) face challenges and difficulties along the way, which must
be managed. Recent research has stressed the importance of negotiation
in accomplishing this. For example, Weeks, Donovan, and Heaphy (1999)
have shown that while at the demographic level families and family build-
ing are becoming ever more diverse, there is convergence in terms of the
negotiated nature of commitment and responsibility across homosexual
as well as heterosexual family forms. Lewis (2001) showed the extent to
which married and cohabiting couples were prepared to negotiate the
investment of time and money in households in a search for balance and
commitment, in terms of both personal dedication and attachment, and
investment in the family on the one hand, and independence in terms of
time, career, and own money on the other. This is particularly important
given the well-documented unequal division of material resources in
families (Pahl 1989; Vogler and Pahl 1994). Older studies of marriage have
demonstrated the ways in which the partners in a relationship seek to
balance their own needs with those of the relationship (Askham 1984),
and to develop ‘coping mechanisms’ to bridge the gap between the ideal
and the reality of the relationship (Backett 1982; Hochschild 1989).
Thus, the ways in which people seek to manage intimate relationships
are often delicate, sometimes convoluted, and difficult for the researcher
to unpack. However, later on in a relationship people must be prepared
to re-assess, re-negotiate, and re-balance risk, especially at times of major
151
transition, such as the arrival of children, which poses emotional chal-

lenges and usually entails a change in the division of labour. At this
point, the attempt to balance and negotiate uncertainties becomes more
complicated because there is a third party—the child—to consider (Lewis
2006). Indeed, collective support may be particularly important at these
points of transition, as we argue in the next section.
Thus, we can see the extent to which empirical research at the level
of the household reveals a complicated picture of the way in which
risk is perceived and managed. The partners to a relationship may have
different perceptions of risk to themselves and to the relationship, which
depend in turn on their social contexts. These must be assessed, balanced,
and negotiated throughout the duration of the relationship, particularly
at times of major transition, such as parenthood. The research find-
ings about the ways in which relationships are managed demonstrate
the extent to which people are neither selfish individualists nor fully
individualized.
Emerging Issues for Policy and Research
The traditional family model was built on the legal obligations incurred
via marriage and a firm notion of what men and women should con-
tribute to families. Stable families and stable employment for men were
both crucial for the operation of the model. With much greater fluidity
in families and labour markets, the major issues that have been raised
by academic commentators and policymakers centre on the nature of
the shifting relationships between the individual, the family, and the
state. These have always been a source of difficulty, but the traditional
family model made it possible to elide individual and family in the
person of the male breadwinner, the ‘head of household’. If there is a
trend towards greater individualization in the sense of greater economic
autonomy on the part of adults, female, as well as male, and if family
formation is likely to get more rather than less unpredictable, with people
moving in and out of different kinds of relationships, then should not
adults be treated on an individual basis, for example, in respect of cash
transfers and pensions? If people are more actively choosing what they
want to do and whom they want to be with, and evaluating the risk
to themselves, then should not responsibilities also be individualized?
But what about the stability that is commonly perceived to be needed
by children and provision for the unpaid work or care more generally?
152
In short, the erosion of the traditional family model has arguably brought
with it ‘new social risks’ (Bonoli 2004). Moreover, these are profoundly
gendered in nature because even if the trend is towards individualiza-
tion, the division of paid and unpaid contributions to families remains
gendered and becomes critical at points of transition, such as the arrival
of children.
In fact, changes in social policies and family law have for the most
part sought to privatize responsibility to individuals in families, in their
capacity as parents and as workers (Eekelaar 1991; Brush 2002; Lewis
2002; Taylor Gooby 2004). Some have characterized these trends as the
deregulation of ‘the private’, citing, for example, the relaxation of divorce
laws (Glendon 1981; Seligman 1997). But at the same time, there has
been an increase in what might be termed ‘regulation at a distance’,
so that, for example, those wishing to divorce are freer to do so, but
must make arrangements for their children. The responsibility is passed
to the individual, which makes the individual’s evaluation of risks a
more difficult task. A good example from the field of social policy is
that of pensions: cohabiting or married people may negotiate a new
‘work-life balance’ when they become parents, weighing up a variety of
issues including personal career goals and what is considered best for
the child, but responsibility for oneself as a worker has increasingly been
extended to self-provisioning in old age. Thus again, making choices and
evaluating risks may be getting more difficult. But is this sufficient to
make a case for state intervention to tackle new social risks, and if so,
what kind?
There have been two particularly strong sets of arguments, one relating
to family law and one relating to family policy, that have considered
specific ways of addressing the new social risks arising from the erosion
of the traditional family model. The first seeks to ‘put the clock back’
and to encourage marriage as a means to promoting greater commitment,
family stability, and personal health, wealth, and happiness (e.g. Morgan
2000; Waite and Gallagher 2000; Ormerod and Rowthorn 2001; Dnes
and Rowthorne 2002; Wilson 2002). However, the assumption in these
arguments is that resources in marriage are pooled, which ignores the
problem of unequal control over resources. Furthermore, any attempt
to dictate ‘family values’ and to tell people how to conduct their pri-
vate relationships, whether by one person to another or by government
to people, is very difficult for liberal democratic states, particularly in
the English-speaking countries, which have historically drawn a firm
line between the public and private spheres. Commitment in intimate
153
relationships is increasingly understood as voluntary and personal matter,

rather than as a matter of duty or sacrifice. It may therefore be both easier
and more effective to treat cohabitants with children in the same way that
married people are treated than to use carrots and/or sticks to promote
marriage.2
Second, and in contrast to this first set of arguments, which tend to
rely on sanctions (against the unmarried) in order to promote marriage, it
has been argued that there should be more collective responsibility for
addressing the new social risks arising from family and labour market
change, particularly in relation to supporting the unpaid work of care as a
means to easing difficult transitions that couples must make over the life
course, especially to parenthood. Neo-liberals wish to confine the role of
the state to that of providing advice and encouragement to the free and
active citizen engaged in evaluating and avoiding risk (Lupton 1999). But,
as Taylor Gooby (2004) has argued in relation to social risks such as
the need for long-term care, there is evidence that people would welcome
more state support. In particular, the risk posed by transitions between
paid and unpaid work can only be met by attention to the policies that
address time, to work, and to care; proper compensation for care work;
and policies to encourage a fairer gender division of care work. Kittay
(2001) has argued strongly that public recognition of the value of care
work is the ethical response to these new risks, and not the privileging of
the traditional, heterosexual, nuclear family (see also Fraser 1997; Lewis
and Giullari 2005).
The issues thrown up by changes in family form and in the contribu-
tions that adults make to families are large and it is unlikely that they
can be addressed within the old frameworks of family law and policy.
State intervention in the private world of the family has always been a
sensitive issue. People expect to make their own choices and, in large
measure, to take responsibility for them, but it is a major challenge for
policymakers to work with the grain of change. If they are to do so,
they need more information about the nature of change at the household
level, in different kinds of heterosexual couples, which we have focused
on in this chapter, and in homosexual couples. In particular we need
to know more about perceptions of risk, and the way in which it is
balanced, negotiated, and managed in the very diverse family forms that
now characterize most western societies. For a better understanding of the
nature of new social risks, it is as important to know how people perceive
and understand their vulnerabilities and their obligations as it is to know
the statistics of family change.
154
Notes
1. There are signs that these patterns are becoming further complicated by periods
of ‘living-apart-together’, particularly among the young and the separated/
divorced (Haskey 2005).
2. In the USA, the 1996 welfare reform provided substantial incentives to State
Governments to encourage marriage in respect of welfare recipients (Horn and
Sawhill 2001).
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8
Health and Risk
Andy Alaszewski
In this chapter, I review current research on health and health care. In the
opening section I consider the importance of risk in the development of
health care, especially the ways in which the medical profession has used
it to establish a dominant role, and the development of epidemiology as
the main method of health risk analysis. In the second section I examine
the current risk research agenda and the ways in which this is shaped by
health policy agenda. In the third section I review four areas of health
risk research: patient safety, medical knowledge, risk communication, the
media. In the final section I identify two emerging areas of risk research,
trust, and health futures.
Health, Health Care, and Risk
The study of risk in relationship to health is well established and

can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The development of risk studies in health was closely associated
with and linked to the development of the medical profession as a
modern science or evidence-based occupation developing using exper-
tise and technologies to identify, prevent, and manage the threats
posed by disease and illness. However, trust in the medical profes-
sion’s ability to effectively assess and manage risk has been undermined
and risk management has been separated from clinical management
with the development of systems designed to identify and manage
risk.
160
Health and Risk
Risk and Health Care

The medical profession has developed a dominant position within the
provision of health care by claiming the authority and technical expertise
to identify and manage risk, for example, in the early nineteenth century
in the care of the insane (Alaszewski 2006), at the start of the twentieth
century in the use of the new imaging technology, X-rays (Larkin
1978), and in the latter part of the twentieth century in management
of childbirth (Rivett 1998: 153–4). Foucault noted in relation to mental
health (1971: 270), this privileged status was based as much on the social
standing and trustworthiness of medicine as its science- or knowledge-
base. In the late twentieth century a number of developments at global,
societal, and individual levels have undermined the medical profession’s
claim to monopolize the assessment and management of health risk.
Global processes such as mass tourism, international drug trafficking,
and the development of new technologies have resulted in new threats
that are proving difficult to manage such as drug resistant strains of
malaria, HIV, and drug misuse (Prothero 2001; Wallman 2001; Yi-Mak
and Harrison 2001). The BSE disaster highlighted the limitations of med-
ical and other expertise in identifying a major threat to human health
(Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005). At a societal level in advanced
industrial democracies the State’s uncritical acceptance of doctors as the
experts who recognize and manage risk has been replaced by a more
cautious even critical approach. This relates to a general concern with
cost and quality that underpins the ‘audit culture’ of performance review
and specific failings in the health care system and the costs of medical
errors (Fenn et al. 2000).
Investigations into health care disasters have found that experts have
failed to identify and effectively manage dangers and in some cases
even been a cause of harm (Alaszewski 2006; BRI 2001; The Shipman
Inquiry 2004). A common theme in these inquiry reports was the fail-
ure to effectively assess and manage risk and all made recommenda-
tions that greater prominence should be given to risk assessment and
management. Risk management is now central to the drive in the UK
to modernize public services including health and social care which is
designed to restore public confidence and create ‘high-trust’ organizations
(DoH 2000a, para 6.1). Increased awareness of the uncertainty of medical
knowledge and evidence from failures of such knowledge can be seen
as undermining the relationship of trust which provides patients with
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a sense of security. For example, the uncertainties and threats associated

with conventional medicine and the belief that non-orthodox medicine
is ‘safer’ as it is ‘natural’ (Cant and Sharma 1996) and provides more
control for patients (Killigrew 2000) are factors in its growing popularity
(Goldbeck-Wood 1996).
Risk and the Health of the Population

The actuarial model of risk prominent in many parts of the public sector
within the health field is closely associated with development of the
public health perspective. It focuses on harm and loss. Applied to the
future it is used to identify and minimize harm and loss (Kemshall 2000:
146) but when applied to the past it functions to allocate blame (Douglas
1992: 27). This approach has underpinned the development of public
health and is evident in its reliance on epidemiology to map the distrib-
ution of disease and its determinants in human populations (Silman and
Macfarlane 2002) and to identify the specific factors that put individuals
at risk. Epidemiology has generated a substantial body of scientific knowl-
edge on the nature of health risks.
This epidemiological evidence is now regularly communicated to the
public through the media and forms the basis of health promotion cam-
paigns. The emphasis is on ‘refocusing up-stream’ to identify and prevent
the causes of ill health. In Canada the concept of health promotion,
providing information on risk factors so that individual citizens could
reduce their personal level of risk, formed the central element of an influ-
ential report (Lalonde 1974). In the UK the Departments of Health (1975)
responded with Prevention and health: everybody’s business which formed
the basis of the Health of the Nation strategy (Department of Health
2004). To achieve its targets the government has made a commitment
to develop a new relationship with the public over risk by providing
information so that individuals can make informed decisions.
Comment
In the late twentieth century, risk has become a major issue. With the loss
of state confidence in the medical profession, risk has been separated from
clinical decision-making and forms the basis of institutional mechanism
whilst in public health the growing awareness of ‘self-destruction’ plus
the emergence of new infectious diseases such as HIV and SARS has
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meant that identifying and communicating information on risk factors

has become central to improving the health of the populations.
Research Themes During Last Decade
Given the importance of government bodies in funding health research,

research themes in the past decade have been shaped by policy and prac-
tice concerns. With the speed of policy development much research has
been responsive, evaluating changes after they have taken place, rather
than providing an evidence-base for such changes. In relation to health
care systems, it is possible to identify funding for research on patient
safety and the development of evidence-based practice. In public health
issues of risk communication have been prominent with interest in why
individuals do not respond rationally to risk information and the role of
media in shaping risk perceptions.
Organizations and Regulation: Patient Safety

In the UK, the Department of Health (2000 and 2001) has responded
to concerns about clinical errors and harm to patients by developing
systems to identify and minimize risk. An important example is the
National Patient Safety Agency whose function is to create a process of
learning from adverse events and near misses ‘to improve patient safety
by reducing the risk of harm from error’ (DoH 2001: 31).
Research fenders in the USA, Australia, and the UK have responded to
policymakers’ concerns about errors and negligence by developing pro-
grammes to identify ways of ensuring patient safety. In the UK the Chief
Medical Officer for England and Wales invited three research councils (the
Medical Research Council, the Economic and Social Research Council,
and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) to examine
the ways in which the research-base could be developed. The research
councils held a joint workshop then funded a number of interdisciplinary
networks to ‘increase and promote high-quality multidisciplinary patient
safety research’ (MRC 2003a). The consensus at the workshop was that
the focus of such research should be broader than evaluation of systems
designed to reduce errors and near misses. It should identify the broader
cultural and health service changes needed to enhance safety including
the ways in which staff and patient perceptions of and attitudes to risk
influence behaviour (MRC 2003b).
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Knowledge and Clinical Practice

The government has recognized that managing risk effectively involves
restructuring the decision-making process and in particular ensuring pro-
fessional practice is research or evidence based. For example, at Bristol
Royal Infirmary the key decision-makers consistently disregarded evi-
dence of harmful practice relying heavily on their own experience and
custom and practice (BRI 2001, synopsis paras 3 and 8). The policy
response to such failures has been to develop systems that generate
evidence-based knowledge and ensure it is implemented. In the UK, the
system has three components to
r Develop the evidence-base by encoding current knowledge in National
Service Frameworks and clinical guidelines;
r Implement evidence-based practice through a combination of professional
self-regulation plus local managerial control of clinical outcomes;
r Ensure compliance through routine external inspection.
Flynn noted the ways in which this system is changing the type of
knowledge used in clinical practice:
Medicine combines aspects of both ‘embrained’ and ‘embodied’ knowledge,

and . . . current schemes of clinical governance represent a drive to transform
medicine into ‘encoded knowledge’ (especially through the promulgation of Clin-
ical Guidelines by NICE . . . ) (Flynn 2002: 168).
This new system is generating a substantial body of research funded by

the government (NPSA 2006). However, much of this research is of rela-
tively limited interest to social scientist. It involves the development and
encoding of medical knowledge and systematically reviewing evaluations.
Rather less attention has been given to the implications of the chang-
ing nature of knowledge for social and economic relations although the
ESRC/MRC Programme on Innovative Health Technology is an exception.
Individual Behaviour and Health: The Importance of

Risk Communication
Despite the investment in health promotion and public health, which
is targeted at both the general population and at-risk groups, there is
little evidence that such campaigns have achieved their goals: see, for
example, sexual health behaviour (Alder 1997) or smoking and young
adults (Denscombe 2001). There is currently little evidence that expert
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Health and Risk
assessments of risk influence the ways in which non-experts perceive and

respond to risks and dangers (Slovic 2000). Many individuals and groups
persist with ‘high-risk’ behaviours (Stroebe and Taylor 1995).
Within the health policy community, the problem has been concep-
tualized in terms of risk communication. For example, the former Chief
Medical Officer of the Department of Health, Sir Kenneth Calman brought
together a team to review the current evidence of risk communication and
identify ways of improving it (Bennett and Calman 1999). This interest in
and concern about the effective communication of risk information has
stimulated research on this aspect of risk.
Media, Risk, and Health

Whilst experts can measure risk and (attempt to) communicate their mea-
surements to the public, this information is filtered through various media
and interpreted by social groups and individuals (Pidgeon, Kasperson, and
Slovic 2002). There is concern that the mass media undermine and distort
risk communication. Furedi (2002) has argued that the media exaggerates
certain hazards such as those associated with new technologies, food-
stuffs, and dangers to children. This in turn can create public panics with
scares about issues as diverse as childhood immunization programmes,
mobile phones, global warming, foot and mouth disease in livestock, and
the risks of long haul flights.
In the UK there have been concerns about the ways in which media
have amplified certain risks creating panics about hazards associated with
certain foods such as ‘listeria hysteria’. Such public concerns have at
times undermined public health measures, such as the MMR vaccination
campaign. There has been evidence of public concerns in the UK that
babies’ immune systems can safely cope with the MMR vaccine (Boseley
2002: 9) and media reports of a link between MMR and autism have
reduced take-up rates increasing the likelihood of a measles epidemic.
Given the centrality of the mass media, researchers have been interested
in exploring the ways in which it influences risk communication.
Comment
Policymakers in industrial democracies are committed to ensuring that
patients are safe and not harmed by health care systems and that the
delivery of services is based upon the latest evidence. They are also
committed to communicating information on health hazards and risk so
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Health and Risk
that citizens can make informed choices. However, given the evidence
of harm, of variation in practice and the failure of much information to
alter behaviour, they have funded research to increase understanding of
the process that underpins the effective identification and management
of risk.
Recent Findings on Risk and Health
Whilst research on risk and health has been stimulated by policy concerns
such as how to reduce the number of clinical errors or how to alter
professional, patients, and public behaviour and thereby increase safety
and reduce harm, a great deal of social science research is critical of
the responses to such concern and identifies the ways in which these
responses are unlikely to achieve their desired outcomes. This research
does provide important insights into the ways in which risk is cre-
ated and managed in both health and other key areas of contemporary
society.
Clinical Governance and Risk: Recognizing the Importance

of the Informal
In the past decade governments have sought to re-engineer health care
systems to ensure that they effectively identify risk. In the UK the govern-
ment wants the NHS to become a learning organization. These develop-
ments draw social science research. Turner and Pidgeon’s (1997) analysis
of man-made disasters has identified organizational failures which result
in a collective failure to identify ‘incubating’ hazards. Hood, Jones, and
Pidgeon (1992) have identified ways in which the organizational systems
can be redesigned using internal incentive systems to identify and manage
hazards. The redesign has emphasized the importance of learning rather
than punishing mistakes, in the context of a shift from a blaming to a
learning culture, in which employees are encouraged to report adverse
events and near misses (DoH 2001: ch. 3).
Research on the development of systems to manage risk more effectively
shows that the transfer of organizational models from industries such as
air travel into health care is not simple or straightforward. It tends to
underestimate the complexity of health care both in terms of the range of
skills and expertise required to deliver health care safely and the difficulty
of identifying ‘near misses’ and even accidents.
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The delivery of health care involves a diverse range of professional

and occupational groups. Whilst formal organizational structures seek to
control the relationship between groups and the ways in which risks are
identified and managed, actual practice often bears little relationship to
formal prescription. My own study of nurses working in the community
(Alaszewski et al. 2000) showed the limits of organizational control. When
working in clients’ homes, nurses were working in spaces controlled and
managed by clients. The practicalities of managing everyday interactions
meant that these workers developed their own routines and practices
to ‘control clients and reduce the consequences of uncertainty’ (Lipsky
1980: 86) and that such routines existed and functioned independently
of agency policy.
Similar ‘working practices’ have developed within hospital settings.
Lankshear, Ettore, and Mason (2006) analysed the social processes that
made it difficult to introduce structured decision-making systems in NHS
delivery systems. Such decision-making systems are grounded in formal
definitions of key decision-makers, for example, the hierarchy of senior
doctors, junior doctors, and midwives. In reality risk assessments are usu-
ally group decisions resulting from informal group workings. Midwives
played a key role in making the judgement that a labour was no longer
‘normal’. They tested their judgements within a community they trusted,
such as their midwife colleagues.
As Horlick-Jones (2003) has pointed out in a review of professional
decision-making, the role of formal systems designed to structure or
control the decisions made by professionals tends to emerge more in
the justification of a course of action which a professional has decided
to take on the basis of ‘experience-based practical reasoning’ than in
actually controlling practice (p. 225). Indeed risk can be invoked to justify
overriding the formal system. For example, Horlick-Jones noted how in
borderline cases or ambiguous conditions
Professionals routinely ‘play safe’ and use a variety of accounting practices—the

need to ‘seek clarification’ or an observation that the assessment ‘only just don’t
fit’—to rationalize their decision to override the formal criteria. (p. 225)
Whilst major reforms are taking place in health care systems designed to
enhance patient safety by managing risk more effectively, their impact is
likely to be limited since such reforms do not appear to take into account
the complexity of the health care systems and the centrality of informal
relations and processes in delivering health care. In the next section,
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Health and Risk
I consider in more detail issues related to changing use of knowledge in

health care.
Research on Knowledge and Health

Current government moves to develop a more systematic knowledge-base
for clinical practice represents a major challenge to the autonomy and
power of the medical profession. As Jamous and Peloille (1970) observed
in their classic analysis of the nature of knowledge in professional prac-
tice, uncertainty is a key resource. The lower the level of uncertainty,
the easier it is to encode knowledge and transfer the skills outside the
profession. Medicine has traditionally protected its knowledge base by
emphasizing risk and uncertainty and the limits of encoded knowledge
(Jamous and Peloille 1970). In the UK, the government has overcome
institutional resistance to such developments by co-opting key elements
of the professions, for example, the Royal Colleges are taking the lead in
developing clinical guidelines, and substantially increasing the rewards
for individual practitioners.
The shift to encoded knowledge in decision-making and risk manage-
ment may not achieve the desired policy goals. The difference between
formal prescription of decision-making and actual practices is a major
impediment. Harper, O’Hara et al. (1997) undertook an ethnographic
examination of the use of preoperative risk assessment forms by anaes-
thetists. They found that the real-world practical use of documents by
the medical professional was fundamentally at odds with how the orga-
nization prescribed their use. French (2005) examined the ways in which
nurses used research evidence and identified unarticulated rules of risk
management that influenced the uptake of evidence. Risk was unaccept-
able ‘if it is unpredictable, avoidable, if the nurse causes the damage,
if they are held responsible without authority, or if there is no support
system for dealing with the consequences’ (French 2005: 188).
Even where there is a major shift to the use of encoded knowledge,
research has found that such knowledge is not adequate or sufficient
as a basis for decision-making. In an analysis of two projects designed
to promote patient safety and reduce risk by reducing drug errors and
preventing falls, Proctor found that developments only took place when
the technical developments grounded in the use of encoded knowledge
were combined with a recognition of the broader social context, espe-
cially engaging patients and carers and professionals recognizing their
experiential knowledge (Proctor 2002: 57). Similar findings have come
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from research on NHS Direct, a telephone advice service in which nurses

use knowledge encoded within computerized decision support software
or algorithm to advise callers about self-care and use of other services
(DoH 2000a, paras 1.9 and 1.11). In an observational study Ruston and
her colleagues found that following an intial conversation with a caller,
nurses often made an intial judgement on the best course of action. They
then checked this against that prescribed by the algorithm, overriding the
algorithm if there was disagreement (Ruston 2006).
Whilst there are few areas of health care in which there has been such
a complete shift to encoded knowledge, in many areas of practice there
is increased use of computer-based systems designed to ‘support’ clinical
decision-making. Such systems provide a new context and set of resources
but they do not remove judgement or negotiation from decision-making.
Prior et al. (2002) examined the ways in which clinicians used Cyrillic, a
computer-based programme, to estimate patients’ risk of cancer. Cyrillic
made risk ‘visible’ by using inputted data on relatives to draw a family tree
of cancer and providing a numerical estimate of personal risk (p. 248).
Prior et al. found that clinicians had to make ‘sense’ of results and images,
and this involved craftwork especially in the laboratory. Such craftwork
meant that there was ‘always a large chunk of “tacit knowledge” embed-
ded in professional decision making’ (p. 256).
Researchers have identified the move towards evidence-based practice
and the use of encoded knowledge in clinical practice but this shift is
unlikely to improve the quality of clinical decision-making (however that
is judged) unless there is recognition of the organizational contexts which
shape responses to new knowledge. As Ferlie (2005) noted in his review
of development of evidence-based practice, knowledge by itself does not
change practice. The application of new knowledge requires changes in
the current relationship between staff and the development of new ones.
Without organizational leadership the necessary changes in work practice
will not take place and the anticipated benefits of the new knowledge will
not be realized. In particular change needs to acknowledge the complexity
of such decision-making, the influence of informal power relations, and
the use of tacit knowledge.
Communication and Risk: Limitations of Current Approaches

The current approach to risk communication is heavily influenced by the
rational actor model and health promotion campaigns attempt to make
target groups aware, even anxious, about a specific hazard, so that they
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will be responsive to information on the ways in which they can change

their behaviour to reduce their risk. This rational model can be found
in a variety of areas (for communication about risks associated with the
triple vaccination for Measles, Mumps, and Rubella, see Hobson-West
2003 and for risk communication with young drug users, Duff 2003).
Communication grounded in the rational actor model emphasizes the
role and position of experts, such as doctors, who have the ability to
identify relevant risk knowledge.
One clear research finding is that the ‘rational actor’ approach to risk
communication is not very effective. Individuals may understand the
message and may even respond with concern or anxiety, but then filter
out the behavioural implications. Ruston and Clayton (2002) showed the
ways in which women disregarded information and conceptually distance
themselves from the risk of coronary heart disease—even to those admit-
ted to hospital for heart treatment. Thirlaway and Hegg (2005) analysed
the ways in which women responded to an article in a UK national
newspaper identifying a health risk, namely, that ‘drinking a single glass
of wine a day increases a woman’s chance of developing breast cancer by
6 per cent’. The information did create personal anxiety and the women
use a variety of means to dissipate this anxiety. Most of these strategies did
not involve changing behaviour in areas such as alcohol consumption.
One of the key research findings is that citizens and patients are not
passive recipients of risk information but actively seek information on
risks from many different sources, especially when they are aware that
they are facing a crucial decision. Whilst they can use traditional sources
such as friends and relatives, if they have the skills and resources they
can, through media such as the Internet, access highly sophisticated risk
knowledge. For example, Carrier, Laplante, and Bruneau (2005) found
that public health messages about Hepatitis C targeted at injecting drug
users assumed that drug users adopt a homogeneous vision of Hepatitis C
and of its risk. Drug users in their study did access public health messages
but they set them alongside other sources of data and other visions of
Hepatitis C.
Trust is central to risk communication. Individuals give particular cred-
ibility to sources that they know, which may include family and friends
but also medical advisers with whom they have developed a relationship.
They are particularly concerned about the trustworthiness of particular
sources. As Frewer and Miles (2003) argued in their discussion of com-
munication about food risks, individuals use their personal experience
to evaluate the trustworthiness of personal sources, such as a particular
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Health and Risk
relative or doctor, and often use contextual information to judge the trust-
worthiness of impersonal sources. Information provided by a source that
has an identifiable commercial interest, such as a company marketing a
food product, will be considered as less trustworthy than a source without
such an interest, for example, an expert committee of scientists (see also
Walls et al. 2004: 140).
Individuals are neither passive recipients of information nor do they
respond to risk information in a simplistic rationale way. People actively
engage in looking for and using information, but may also make con-
scious decisions to avoid certain forms of information. Their response
to information is shaped by social context, which in health must
include individual and group perceptions of threats to health and how
these can be addressed. Thus, risk communication is part of the overall
process of managing health and illness and will be shaped by the same
processes. Zinn (2005) has drawn attention to biographical experiences
and resources which individuals develop over their life course and the
influence of biography in the response to chronic illness such as multiple
sclerosis. For example, men of the ‘unbending’ type do ‘not incorporate
the illness in their self-conception’ and are therefore less likely to seek and
accept information than women of the ‘legitimated’ type who actively
develop an ‘identify as multiple sclerosis sufferer’ (Zinn 2005: 5).
The Social Amplification of Risk and the Media

The development of new media such as the Internet and of facilities such
as NHS Direct has created easier access to medical knowledge. This has
undermined the position of medical practitioners as the sole source of
expertise and increased awareness of uncertainty in medical knowledge
(Miller, Kitzinger et al. 1998). This was particularly evident in the uncer-
tainties surrounding new health risks such as vCJD and HIV. These in
their early stages were ‘virtual risks’ which created considerable debate
between experts. Politicians, policymakers, and the public did not have
reliable sources of information on which to base their decisions.
Many regard the mass media as playing a major role in the develop-
ment of anxiety about risk. Amplification of specific hazards by the
media appears to play an important role in shaping perceptions of
risk and associated behaviour (Miller, Kitzinger et al. 1998). Philo, for
example, showed how individuals gave precedence to media accounts
of people with mental illness as dangerous and violent over their own
contradictory experiences even when they recognized that the media
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Health and Risk
accounts were fictional, as in soap operas (Philo 1999). Given the key
role of various media in shaping societal and individual assessment and
responses to risk, most of the risk research initiatives have included
research on the role of various media.
Researchers have focused on the ways in which the mass media has
influenced the identification of and response to risk. Burgess (2002) in a
study of new telecommunications technology such as mobile phones and
mobile phone masts found that the societal responses were highly varied.
In Scandinavian countries, despite high levels of mobile phone usage
and masts, there was little evidence of media concern and regulation.
In contrast, in Australia and Italy, there were high levels of concern
plus close regulation of masts. One explanation for these variations is
that institutions such as the mass media act as stations that amplify or
attenuate risks. Barnett and Breakwell (2003), for example, have explored
the ways in which social amplification has influenced responses to BSE,
AIDS, and the 1995 ‘Pill Scare’. However, critics have observed that this
framework fails to take full account of the diversity of the media and its
dynamic role as a symbolic information system, or of the active nature
of the accomplishment of associated sense-making by lay audiences
(Horlick-Jones, Sime, and Pidgeon 2002).
Given the opportunities and threats of new diseases or technological
changes, it is important to develop a measured approach to avoid either
a false sense of security or a panic response. In this context, analysis of
the ways in which the media and other institutions operate to amplify
or attenuate specific threats has provided a starting point for a more
sophisticated understanding of societal responses to health risks.
Comment
Risk study is a well-established area of health research. However, much of
this research is of limited interest to social scientists as it focuses on the
identification of hazards which can cause harm. It operates within the
positivistic tradition of risk analysis. Given government involvement in
the provision of health care and the funding of health research, it is hardly
surprising that the research agenda closely reflects policy developments
with issues such as patient safety, use of knowledge, risk communica-
tion, and societal responses to risk featuring prominently. A major social
science contribution has probably been to demonstrate that managing
risk involves complex social process operating at individual, group, and
societal levels and is not a simple straightforward process of objectively
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Health and Risk
measuring probability and consequence of specific hazards and using

rational decision-making systems to take action to minimize harm.
There is clearly scope for developing current research themes such as

the ways in which organizational processes can be developed to enhance
patient safety (Westwood, Rodgers, and Sowden 2002). There are however
two issues that emerge out of current research and could be given more
prominence in research, trust and ‘health futures’.
Trust and Health

Trust is an issue evident in a number of different areas. For example, in
patient safety; reporting systems only work when staff trust assurances
that they will not be blamed if they report errors; in risk communication
patients are receptive to information from sources which they trust. The
restructuring of public services is reconfiguring trust. Traditionally, public
services have been delivered through hierarchical structures such as the
NHS which aimed to provide a standardized service to patients who were
treated as passive recipients who could either take or leave the service. In
such services the key issues relate to the ways in which trust relates to
asymmetrical or power relations. For example, Cook et al. (2004) showed
how patients tended to trust doctors who treat them as equals, individuals
not cases, whilst Brehm and Gates (2004) explored ways in which trust
lubricated the potentially difficult relationships between supervisor, social
worker, and client.
However, it is possible to identify a shift towards new forms of public
services based on networks or partnerships. These new networks or part-
nerships involve a range of alternative, even competing, providers and
users have to be active citizens using their social capital to engage with
services, make choices, and even negotiate their own package of services
from a variety of providers. These new services reconfigure trust; it is less
about power and more about information and agreements or contracts.
With the development of new and competing sources of information
such as the World Wide Web, individuals have to decide which sources
they trust and use as the basis of their decisions. In such contexts, new
modes of trust develop. For example, McEvily and Zaheer (2004) identified
the role of network facilitators in developing trust within dispersed geo-
graphic clusters. Nissenbaum (2004) explored the issues associated with
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Health and Risk
trust on the Internet and other digital media in which long-term face-to-
face relations are replaced by short-term disembodied interactions.
Future and Uncertainty, New Technology

As Webster (2002), Director of the ESRC/MRC programme on Innovative
Health Technologies, noted such technologies can destabilize traditional
notions of medical authority and trust and create new dilemmas over the
meaning of health and illness. They are reshaping major areas of human
experience, for example, facilitating individual construction and manip-
ulation of body (Featherstone 2000), and creating ethical and commercial
impacts (Glasner and Rothman 2001; Petersen and Bunton 2001). There
are major concerns about the risks and acceptability of these technologies
(Siegrist 2000), and the government is seeking to address these concerns
by increasing public participation and improving the transparency of
decision making (HMG 1999).
The global impact of technological and economic change and the
changing pattern of and responses to risk was initially conceptualized
in terms of environmental changes. Beck’s analysis (1992) of emerg-
ing features of contemporary society focused on globalization, risk, and
the environment. Whilst this area remains important (O’Riordan and
Timmerman 2001) there is increased awareness of the impact of changes
on health and health care. For example, the development of new infec-
tious diseases (30 previously unknown since 1970s including HIV/AIDS,
DoH 2002), the spread of diseases such as malaria, normally associated
with the tropics, to temperate areas as a result of tourism or migration
(Prothero 2001) or the development of strains of micro-organisms
immune to normal drug therapies such as MRSA (Andersen, Lindemann,
and Bergh 2002). The development of biotechnology such as the geneti-
cally modified organisms has major implications for ethics (Almond 2000)
and the environment and health (Achyra 1999). These developments
have drawn attention to the role of science and expertise in predicting
and managing future change and potential risks.
Final Comment
Health provides major opportunities for social science research on risk.

Such opportunities are shaped by medical and health policy agendas.
Researching in this area presents challenges, for example, working with or
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Health and Risk
for policymakers who want quick and easy solutions to policy problems
and medical researcher who have little understanding or sympathy with
some aspects of social science research. Such challenges are also opportu-
nities; policymakers are also willing to fund social science research on risk
and are eager to make use of the findings of such research, and medical
colleagues can and do find social science complements their work.
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9
Life Course, Youth, and Old Age
Sarah Vickerstaff
In this chapter we consider how theorizations of the risk society have

impacted upon the sociological understanding of the life course, we take
current analyses and controversies about ‘youth’ and ‘old age’ as examples
to illustrate contemporary debates. The discussion is divided into six
parts. First, we provide a brief introduction to the idea of the life course
and its traditional conceptualization and how risks and uncertainties are
understood in the area of life course studies. In the next two sections we
review ongoing debates about how the life course has and is changing
with particular reference to the nature of ‘youth transitions’ and ‘retire-
ment transitions’ in contemporary western societies. In the fourth and
fifth sections, we consider recent major findings and evidence for the
extent of change within the life course. Finally, we conclude by consider-
ing the emerging problems and issues in current life course analysis.
Conceptualizing the Life Course and its Attendant Risks
The sociological concept of the life course is a shorthand for the way in
which the biological process of ageing is structured and given meaning
by the social context in which the individual lives. A typical definition is
given by Elder:
The life course refers to pathways through the age-differentiated life span, to social
patterns in the timing, duration, spacing, and order of events. (Elder 1991: 21)
The significance of chronological age as social marker is seen as

a specifically modern phenomenon emerging with industrial society
(Featherstone and Hepworth 1991: 372), in particular ‘childhood or
180
youth’ and old age have become distinct and specific stages with related
roles, expectations, and duties. As to why this is the case the dominance
of work is seen as key to structuring the modern life course. With the
move from domestic production to factory employment, related changes
in the family and the accompanying development of the state and the
education system, the stages of the life course became institutionalized
and defined in terms of labour market participation. In this process the
young and the old were excluded from selling their labour (Hockey and
James 2003: 64; on the evolution of retirement see Atchley 1976). Kohli
refers to this development as the tripartition of the life course into ‘a
phase of preparation, one of economic activity, and one of retirement’
(1986: 275).
This is of course a stylized picture of the male life course. For women
the relationship between the transitions from education to work, through
work, and into retirement are mediated by the complicating relationship
between family and work (Heinz 2001: 4). Hareven, who is interested in
the relationship between family time and industrial time, defines the task
of life course analysis more broadly:
The crucial question is how people plan and organise their roles over their life
course and time their transitions both on the familial and non-familial level in
such areas as migration, starting to work, leaving home, getting married, and
setting up an independent household. (1982: 6)
Hareven defines the ‘life-course paradigm’ as being concerned with the

‘synchronization of individual time, family time and historical time’
(2000: 128–9) and hence the timing of events and movements over the
life course (or ‘transitions’) becomes a critical factor:
Members of different cohorts undergo transitions, which are processes of individ-

ual change within socially constructed timetables. (Hareven 2000: 129)
The modern western life course has come to be seen as a set of prescribed
stages and transitions, which are not only reflected in social institutions
and processes, such as compulsory schooling up to a certain age, the
age at which one is entitled to a state pension, but also importantly in
individuals’ self-identity. The chronologization of the life course has come
to be seen as normal, prescribing what individuals’ expect for themselves
and others (Kohli 1986: 276).
Writers on the postmodern era or the risk society have suggested that
recent social and economic changes have disrupted the traditional mod-
ern life course. In the work of Beck changes in the labour market and in
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particular the insecurity associated with changing employment patterns

are a key marker for the risk society:
the specificity of the risk regime is that it firmly rules out, beyond a transition
period, any eventual recovery of the old certainties of standardized work, standard
life histories, an old–style welfare state, national and economic and labour poli-
cies. . . . Whereas the Fordist regime brought about the standardisation of work.
The risk regime involves the individualisation of work. (Beck 2000: 70)
As a result of these processes it is argued that the assumptions and

certainties of the modern life course are being overturned, and we are
witnessing the ‘erosion of a work-centred life course’ (Heinz 2001: 7).
There are a number of different elements to this: first that age cohorts
are no longer likely to make key transitions en masse at the same ages
(i.e. all leave education at 16, all retire at 65) and second, that work itself
has become insecure and unpredictable and hence an unreliable source
for sustaining individual identity. The experience of education, work, and
retirement has become individualized, changeable, and risky.
Individuals experience a greater range of choices or possibilities, and
hence individual or biographical characteristics appear more significant
in determining the routes people take. The ‘normal’ life course can no
longer be assumed:
Individualization is understood as a historical process that increasingly questions

and tends to break up people’s traditional rhythm of life—what sociologists call
a normal biography. As a result, more people than ever before are being forced
to piece together their own biographies and fit in the components they need as
best they can. They find themselves bereft of unquestionable assumptions, beliefs
or values and are nevertheless faced with the tangle of institutional controls and
constraints which make up the fibre of modern life (welfare state, labour market,
educational system etc.). To put it bluntly, the normal life-history is giving way to
the do-it-yourself life-history. (Beck-Gernsheim 1998: 56–7)
This conception of risk links to wider debates about the extent to which in
late modern (or postmodern) western societies patterns of consumption
have displaced patterns of work as the fulcrum for the social expression of
individual identity. Ransome points out that the difference between work
and consumption as the bases for social identity is that work placed peo-
ple in existing structures and routines over which they had relatively little
control whereas exercising one’s identity through consumption appears
to involve much greater choice and discretion. The individual is more
of an agent in consumption rather than receiving an already given work
182
identity (Ransome 2005: 100–1). If work loses its centrality as an anchor

for forging identity then clearly transitions into and out of work lose their
resonance as markers in the life course and Kohli’s characterization of the
tripartition of the life course breaks down; there is the potential for the
blurring of stages (Featherstone and Hepworth 1991: 372) with attendant
effects on identity formation:
processes of de-institutionalisation and de-differentiation within the lifecourse are,

it is argued, currently destabilising the age-bound categories of childhood, adoles-
cence and adulthood and working to overturn the notion that identity is produced
within the process of ‘scheduled development’. (Hockey and James 2003: 100)
As Brannen and Nilsen have summarized in this conception the ‘choice

biography’ takes over from the ‘standard biography’ (2005: 415).
The Changing Life Course: Youth
The changes to the life course hypothesized by the heralds of the risk
society are nowhere more keenly seen to prevail than at the beginning
and end of working life in youth transitions and retirement transitions.
Youth transition is usually seen as composed of three interrelated ele-
ments: the transition from school to work, the transition from family
of origin to family of destination, and the transition from family home
to independent living. In the traditional modern western life course
the majority of people left school at the end of compulsory schooling,
entered the labour market, and then subsequently left the parental home
to establish a family of their own. Looking back, these transitions are
seen as linear and relatively unproblematic because jobs were plentiful.
This picture is provided by Ashton and Field (1976) who disputed that
transitions for most young people were stressful or difficult, pointing to
the way in which family background and school conditioned or social-
ized most young people into a largely unquestioning acceptance of the
niche destined for them. Such a characterization is premised, to a degree,
upon an assumed golden age of unproblematic transitions in the 1940s,
1950s, and early 1960s. When, by implication, young people easily made
the related domestic and work transitions. Furlong and Cartmel (1997:
12) refer to young men making ‘mass transitions from the classroom to
the factories and building sites, while young women followed pathways
leading straight from school to shops, offices and factories’. This conjures
up an image of largely predetermined and unconscious transitions. In
183
this sense we can talk about normative transitions, where a significant

proportion of a population undergoes a particular transition (i.e. into
work) at the same time and ‘in conformity with established norms of
timing’ (Hareven 2000: 129).
However, from the 1970s onwards young people in many parts of
Europe are much more likely to stay in full- or part-time education after
compulsory schooling and as a result their full entry into the labour mar-
ket is typically later and for many this combines with a period of extended
youth dependency between childhood and adult social status (Iacovou
and Berthoud 2001). It is argued that the traditional youth transition
from school to (training to) work has been progressively fragmented and
individualized in this period resulting in less certainty, more risk, and a
variety of possible (and impossible) transitions for young people (see, e.g.
Chisholm 1995; Evans and Furlong 1997; Nagel and Wallace 1997; EGRIS
2001; Evans 2002). These changes are argued to have resulted in a period
of extended youth dependency (Coles 1997) with attendant consequences
for identity formation (Nagel and Wallace 1997). In addition to changes in
the pathways to paid work other transitions such as partnering and child-
rearing have also undergone significant change with the rise in divorce,
the postponement of marriage, the rise of cohabitation, and increases
in single parenthood (Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Bynner et al. 2002: 9–
11). The traditional pattern that young people left the parental home on
marriage no longer fits reality.
All this suggests that the contemporary paths to adulthood differ radi-
cally from the experience of previous generations in a number of crucial
ways. First, the precise timing and sequence of events is more individ-
ualized and cohorts cannot expect to follow the same paths as their
immediate contemporaries. Second, the outcomes of transitions are no
longer safely predicted, will there be a job or not, will they establish a
new household, in what context might they have their own children?
Pais argues against a linear view of the life course, arguing that young
people now experience a ‘labyrinth of life’ in which status passages
are reversible (2003: 119–22). Thus, the individual is faced apparently
with many choices but also with their concomitant risks such as long-
term unemployment, lone parenthood, and the failure to find a partner
(although it must be said that there is a strong evaluative judgement in
seeing these as risks). Third, individuals accept responsibility for making
their own paths in the sense that they see success or failure as arising
from their own efforts (Ball, Maguire, and Macrae 2000: 4). Travel
through the life course is experienced by the voyagers as individualized.
184
The implication is that the increasing individuation of pathways into and

out of paid labour means that individuals have to do more to negotiate
these transitions successfully.
The Changing Life Course: Old Age and Retirement
It is similarly hypothesized that transitions out of the labour market

have become fragmented and individualized. In the period after the
Second World War retirement briefly became for some a predictable, age-
patterned end to working life (Phillipson 1982, 1999; Harper and Thane
1989). Defined by state and private pension policies there developed firm
expectations about the end of working life, especially for men.
Historically, in so far as the majority of the British workforce faced compulsory

retirement at the statutory age, this decision [when to retire] was taken out of
their hands. (Maule, Cliff, and Taylor 1996: 178)
More recently, in many parts of Europe, the early exit of men from the
labour market (before state pension age) has led to a re-examination of
retirement and the theorization of its fragmentation as a homogenous,
age-related experience. The trend towards early retirement (in particular
for men) appears to have destabilized the traditional life course notion
of a ‘set’ retirement age of 60 or 65, with the result that the concept of
‘retirement’ itself has become more unpredictable and difficult to define
(Vickerstaff and Cox 2005: 78). This provides a parallel with the discussion
of the break up of mass transitions for young people. Routes into retire-
ment and older age and their timing have also apparently become more
complex and varied. This is what Guillemard refers to as ‘the decline of
age-based criteria as markers of the life course’ (1997: 454).
Theorists of post-modernity and the risk society have come to see the
third age or older age as a prime site of the new agency, choice, and
reflexivity that contemporary society allows (Giddens 1991; Beck 2000;
Gilleard and Higgs 2000). In the post traditional life course older people
have the opportunity (and the risk) of decisions about who they want to
be in retirement and how they will live.
Retirement has been reinvented as a time of transition to a new life, rather than
simply the end of an old one. (Hockey and James 2003: 102)
Once again this links to debates about the significance of consumption

for social identity. For those who are relatively well-off in retirement
185
it may be possible to maintain patterns of consumption after stopping

paid work leading Gilleard and Higgs to pose the question as to whether
‘continuities of consumption mask the changes from working to post-
working life?’ (2000: 31). Research on retirement aspirations and activities
reveals that for some retirement is an eagerly awaited opportunity to
spend more time on hobbies, migrate to spend their winters abroad, or
simply enjoy the opportunity to take up a range of new activities (Scales
and Scase 2000; see Vickerstaff et al. 2004).
This produces a very benign picture of old age in contemporary western
societies; however, at the same time there is a climate of risk and uncer-
tainty surrounding pensions and retirement, and many older people,
especially women in the UK, live in poverty. In addition to the pressure
on state pension systems as the number of older aged members of society
increases we have also seen changes in occupational and private pension
arrangements. In the UK, as in the USA previously, many private sector
organizations have shifted their occupational pensions from final salary
to money purchase schemes. These pensions shift the burden of financial
risk from the employer to employee and mirror the British government’s
recent efforts to encourage individuals to take out private or stakeholder
pensions. But many of those who have taken out personal pensions have
watched as the value of their savings diminishes in a declining stock
market (Vickerstaff and Cox 2005: 77–8). This experience of risk is no
respecter of class, income, or status. Where companies become insolvent
all employees who have paid into their pension schemes stand to lose.
These seem on the face of it to be classic examples of the ways in which
risk in late modern societies is being redistributed across traditional lines
of relative advantage and disadvantage such as class, race, and gender.
Not least the risk of living longer, with attendant possible consequences
for health and wealth. As Phillipson has put it: ‘Old age has been progres-
sively displaced from the institutional framework created by retirement
and the welfare state’ (2003: 2.4).
All this suggests that the prospect, planning for, and experience of
retirement are becoming more individualized. As Gilleard concludes:
Both the status ascribed to older people and the lifestyle created during retirement
are less structured than before. (1996: 495)
From this discussion of both youth and older age we have reviewed how
theorists of risk make a strong case for significant restructuring of the
traditional modern life course. In the next section we review the evidence
for these changes.
186
The Evidence: Youth
Evidence on how youth transitions are changing comes from two

main, contrasting sources: longitudinal studies, which map transitions of
cohorts across a time span and more micro-based research which looks
at individual biographies to uncover the experience of growing up (for
a wider discussion of the ‘two traditions’ in youth research see Heinz
et al. 1998; MacDonald et al. 2001; Evans 2002). Typically (but not exclu-
sively) the first kind of study uses more quantitative techniques to inter-
rogate large data sets, and the second focuses on qualitative methods to
uncover and explore individual experiences. Perhaps unsurprisingly these
different approaches reach different conclusions as to the current state
of youth.
There is plenty of evidence from longitudinal studies in Europe, the US,
and Canada that class, family background, educational level of parents,
gender, and race (summarized as socialization frameworks) continue to
significantly structure the educational careers of young people and thus,
the opportunities that may be available to them in the labour market
(e.g. Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Heinz et al. 1998; Schoon 2001; Bynner
et al. 2002; Evans 2002; Andres and Grayson 2003; Plug, Zeijl, and du Bois
Reymond 2003; Glaesser and Lauterbach 2004; Lehman 2004; Furlong
et al. 2005). In Britain despite the massive expansion in educational
opportunities (the increase in numbers staying on after 16 and the
increase in those going to University) young people from disadvantaged
backgrounds still lose out to the middle classes (Thomson, Henderson,
and Holland 2003: 33; Webster et al. 2004). There is evidence of growing
polarization in both work and non-work transitions. Those without qual-
ifications face an increased risk of intermittent or long-term unemploy-
ment; for young women, especially in Britain and USA this may translate
into an accelerated transition to motherhood (Bynner et al. 2002: 10–11).
Although the routes into the labour market have undoubtedly become
more varied the majority of young people, even in the difficult circum-
stances of major social change as in Eastern Europe, do make a transition
into employment and do leave the parental home. In a study comparing
the transitions of two birth cohorts in Britain from 1958 and 1970 it was
found that the two groups were virtually identical with respect to leaving
home and that by age 26 a similar proportion of young men were working
full time (1958 cohort: 89 per cent, 1970 cohort: 84 per cent and the
proportion of young women working full time had increased from 56 per
cent to 65 per cent across the cohorts (Bynner et al. 2002: 14). As Roberts
187
put it ‘Life goes on!. . . . Young People continue to fall in love, marry and
become parents’ (2003: 492).
Research, which focuses on the individual experiences of these
processes, is more likely to highlight the risks, discontinuities, and uncer-
tainties of educational and work careers and in particular stresses the non-
linear nature of the transition from youth to adulthood:
traditional patterns of transition have all but disappeared (with some class vari-
ations), or become extended in ways that create an ambiguous relationship to
adulthood for young people. (Thomson et al. 2004: 218; see also, e.g. Ferguson
et al. 2000; Thomson et al. 2002; Pais 2003)
Changes in the youth labour market and especially the collapse in the
demand for unskilled manual workers are seen as critical in having tipped
many young people into an arena of labour market uncertainty and risk.
The consequences of poor educational qualifications are now greater.
The picture derived from this research is of the individual young person
dealing with choice, chance, and opportunity with uncertain outcomes;
a set of experiences very different to those of their parents as young
people. They may seesaw back and forth between education and work,
semi-independence and independence blurring the statuses of ‘youth’ or
‘adult’. In a study of 800 16–18-year-old researchers concluded that at least
a third ‘were engaged in a series of multiple trajectories’, which defied any
sense of linearity or ‘transition’:
Movement seems opportunistic rather than purposive. It is characterised by ad

hoc, multiple and diverse experiences rather than any semblance of ‘career’. And
above all it is powered by a market-driven provision of ‘choices’ which allows
for continual ‘drift’ between part-time work, full-time work, training, further
education, school, college and unemployment. (Ferguson et al. 2000: 293)
In this context many young people are seen to go with the flow and in
the face of an unpredictable future invest more in the present (Pais 2003:
125).
This vision of a radical change in the experience of youth transitions
in the last 30 years has recently been contested by some writers who
have revisited the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s to test whether
our contemporary view of the period bears scrutiny. This work, based
on interviews undertaken in the 1960s and current accounts of remem-
bered transitions, suggests that the smoothness of youth transitions in
the past may have been exaggerated (Vickerstaff 2003; Goodwin and
O’Connor 2005).
188
In work reanalysing interviews undertaken in the early 1960s Goodwin

and O’Connor conclude that many of the young people in their sample
experienced frequent job changes and uncertainty about their futures,
leaving them to rely heavily on family for support and encouragement.
Not a picture that sits well with the assumptions about easy or smooth
transitions from school to work (2005: 216–17). Similarly, Vickerstaff
(2003) in a study of apprenticeship in the 1950s and 1960s found that
the experience of leaving school and going into the workplace was trau-
matic for many. This study came to the conclusion that perhaps the
key difference between current cohorts of young people and those inter-
viewed about their apprenticeships in the post-war period is the extent
to which young people in the past largely accepted that they had little
choice and few supports for resisting adult authority; whereas in research
today young people regularly assert that they do have choices (see, e.g.
Ball, Maguire, and Macrae 2000). They perceive their paths to have been
individualized, even if the common reality is of relatively circumscribed
possibilities conditioned by their class, race, and gender.
Work on the degree of complexity of current youth transitions using a
longitudinal data set from Scotland found six main clusters of transitions,
and that 52 per cent of their sample could be characterized as having
followed a linear transition, the most disadvantaged young people had
a much higher likelihood of a non-linear transition of the type argued
by others to be the general experience of all young people now (Furlong
et al. 2005). The authors conclude that: ‘linear transitions [are] just as
characteristic of the modern age as non-linear transitions’ (Furlong et al.
2005: 21).
If one combines this finding with recent work, reanalysing the past
(Vickerstaff 2003; Goodwin and O’Connor 2005; O’Connor and Goodwin
2005), it seems to suggest that youth transitions have always varied within
a cohort, some young people having a relatively easy and linear transition
to adult status, others experiencing a range of difficulties in their paths to
independence. What has changed is how as sociologists we examine these
processes. In the 1960s and 1970s research focused upon the underlying
structures which determined the likely course a young person would take,
so explanations focused around class and family background, quality of
schooling, and/or structure of the local labour market, for example. By the
late 1990s researchers became much more interested in the individual’s
experience of their own youth and hence biographical factors assumed a
much greater significance in our explanations (Goodwin and O’Connor
2005: 217–18). These two traditions in youth studies focus on different
189
groups: the transition theorists on the general trends and the ‘normal’
groups, and the biographers on the marginalized and more exceptional.
The Evidence: Old Age and Retirement
The retirement transition has not, until very recently, attracted the same
level of academic interest as we witness in the youth transitions arena
(Hirsch 2000: 2; Phillipson 2002: 2). However, the wave of early retirement
or labour market withdrawal (defined as before state pension age) amongst
men in many parts of Europe (see Phillipson 2002: 4–7) has led to debates
about the nature of the third age in contemporary western societies. Has
the shrinking working life opened up opportunities for the pursuit of
new interests and lifestyles or merely reinforced patterns of inequality
laid down through working life? The more optimistic literature on early
retirement presents a picture of individuals choosing to leave work in
their fifties to spend more time in leisure activities. Others have suggested
that we may need to recognize a new phase in the life course: ‘beyond
work but not yet into old age’ (Phillipson 2002: 2).
To review the evidence on these trends we need to consider first the
reasons why people are ‘retiring’ earlier than they did 30 years ago. In the
USA the study of retirement transitions has been dominated by labour
economists and gerontologists who focus on what Feldman (1994: 286)
has called individual difference variables. These studies, especially those
associated with the longitudinal Health Retirement Study, model factors
such as health, income, level of education, and domestic circumstances
to determine correlations between these factors and labour market par-
ticipation or timing of retirement. This body of research typically finds
that financial position and health status are the two key predictors of
individual retirement timing. A similar tradition in the British literature
confirms these findings (see, e.g. Disney, Grundy, and Johnson 1997;
Meghir and Whitehouse 1997; Tanner 1998; Bardasi, Jenkins, and Rigg
2000; Humphrey et al. 2003). European social policy researchers have
focused more on the impact of state pension policies and other benefit
regimes in encouraging or discouraging retirement (see, e.g. Kohli et al.
1991; Taylor and Walker 1993: 15–24; Bonoli 2000; Gelissen 2001; de
Vroom and Guillemard 2002).
Evidence on the British case suggests that the majority of people who
leave the labour market before state pension age cannot be said to have
chosen to do so. Donovan and Street concluded in their review of the
190
literature that ‘early retirement is in large part a function of manage-

ment practice and organizational culture’ (2000: 31). People leave their
jobs through redundancy, early retirement, or ill health (Campbell 1999;
Hayden, Boaz, and Taylor 1999; PIU 2000; Arthur 2003). Early retirement
may be more or less voluntary and even ill health, which might be seen
as an individual factor, is a variable mediated by organizational practice,
in that changes to work routine or job modifications could enable some
health issues to be accommodated at work (Vickerstaff et al. 2004: 26–7;
Vickerstaff 2006, forthcoming). The extent to which early retirement is
forced or voluntary has been highlighted as a factor in retirement satis-
faction (McGoldrick and Cooper 1994; Dench and Norton 1996; Maule,
Cliff, and Taylor 1996). As Guillemard reminds us:
The principles providing for an orderly passage from work to leisure have van-
ished. The end of work life is now flexibly organized; ever more subject to both
conditions in the labour market and company employment policies. . . . This could
be described as an ‘individualization’ of the life course. But such a description
misleads us into thinking that the individual has more room for choice, whereas
early exit is usually imposed upon him or her. . . . A sudden break, over which the
individual has little control, now marks the passage towards economic inactivity.
(1997: 455)
Researchers have identified at least two nations in retirement: those

relatively well-paid managers and professionals with a decent pension
who may have chosen to retire early and those on much lower incomes,
with or without a private pension who left the labour market because of
unemployment, ill health, redundancy, or encouraged early retirement.
In Britain there is proof of growing economic polarization with increasing
age (Scales and Scase 2000: 22). It is clear that lifetime earning trajectories
vary considerably according to class and gender and that ‘work history
matters’ (Bardasi and Jenkins 2002) for income in later life.
It is hardly surprising to find that those with higher earnings through-
out working life are financially more secure in older age and this fact does
not of itself prove or disprove that retirement transitions have changed
in response to the wider social changes that have affected the life course
more generally. Phillipson argues that the transition to retirement has
become extended and more complex (2002: 10–11) notwithstanding the
continuing structural effects of class and gender. To examine this assertion
we can look for two sorts of evidence: first, data about the extent to
which people take longer to retire or the very status of ‘being retired’ itself
191
has become more fluid and reversible and second, the degree to which
individuals have reconceptualized retirement and its significance.
In the continental European literature the increased complexity of pos-
sible pathways is often stressed:
The process of early retirement has destabilized the life course by substituting
functional categories for chronological categories. The effect was to increase uncer-
tainty, to decrease the retirement system’s control over the process, and weaken
the intergenerational contract. The growth of bridging pathways converted a stan-
dardized, orderly, predictable transition from work to retirement based primarily
on age criteria into a de-standardized, heterogeneous process based on functional
criteria. Since the chronological markers are becoming less visible, the end of the
life course has, for individuals, been blurred. (Jacobs and Rein 1994: 44)
In the USA, the flexible route to full retirement has more of a history with
many older Americans taking so-called ‘bridge jobs’, or becoming self-
employed between leaving their career job or employer and retiring fully
(Feldman 1994; Bruce, Holtz-Eakin, and Quinn 2000; Benitez-Silva 2002;
Taylor 2002: 23; Davis 2003). There is evidence here for retirement having
become a more drawn out process, with changes in status from working,
semi-retired, part-time working to fully retired.
In the British case there is much talk about the desirability of ‘gradual
retirement’ from an economic, social, and personal point of view; how-
ever, its practice still seems to be limited. The majority of older workers
in the 50–65 age range work full time, although part-time work is increas-
ing amongst men it is still a comparative rarity along with other forms
of flexible working arrangement (Loretto, Vickerstaff, and White 2005:
16–36). Using data from the British Household Panel Survey Bardasi and
Jenkins found that although the number of hours worked and income
declined for both men and women in the period before retirement there
was still a marked fall in income in the year of retirement itself (2002: 41).
This suggests that retirement from work still marks a dramatic shift in
income at least with attendant implications for individuals’ ability to
maintain existing consumption patterns.
Research on bridge employment in Britain shows that older workers
with more advantaged work histories, in terms of income and skills, are
more likely to enter flexible employment on leaving full-time careers
and are, unsurprisingly, better placed to obtain higher quality flexible
employment (Lissenburgh and Smeaton 2003: 30). A high proportion
of those who leave the labour market early through redundancy and ill
health find it difficult to get back into the labour market and are more
192
likely to have a range of benefit statuses between working and retiring at

state pension age (Beatty and Fothergill 2003). There is every reason to
hypothesize that if more flexible working options were available greater
numbers of older workers would take the opportunity to retire gradually;
however, such options are still likely to privilege those with a more secure
income (Loretto, Vickerstaff, and White 2005: 74).
The second area of evidence to consider is whether the experience of
retirement has changed dramatically and whether individuals find the
end of working life more risky and unpredictable. There is considerably
less research in this area. Studies suggest that men and women in man-
agerial posts have developed a firm expectation that they will retire early:
increasing workplace pressures and increasing job dissatisfaction have
served to entrench such expectations (Scales and Scase 2000: 7). It is
also clear from research that retirement timing may be a joint decision
between couples: ‘There is a strong correlation between spouses’ activ-
ity rates’ (Banks and Casanova 2003: 133–4). From a financial point of
view, couples may be balancing the opportunities and threats of retir-
ing in respect of joint earnings and pensions entitlement, but also in
terms of the opportunities to enjoy other activities in retirement together
(Vickerstaff et al. 2004: 20–1). There are also the risks, especially for
women, of marital breakdown and loss of expected access to a spouse’s
pension.
In recent research on retirement transitions in three organizations it was
found that people experienced retirement as an individual project, which
they were trying to manage. They had access to a range of experiences
of family members, work colleagues, and friends that seemed to suggest
that there were very variable outcomes and not a common retirement
pathway: retirement timing was to a degree unpredictable (Vickerstaff
et al. 2004). This appeared to confirm the individualization and deinstitu-
tionalization theories that chronological age markers no longer structure
the life course in the way they once did and that people must, in Beck-
Gernsheim’s definition, construct their own do-it-yourself life histories.
However, an individual’s ability to construct their preferred post-working
life was in reality severely constrained by their income, their health, and
their domestic circumstances.
For some commentators the consumption patterns of older people are
a marker for how this stage in the lifecourse has changed:
Those whose lives have been influenced by the cultures of consumption, and
whose participation in occupational and personal pension schemes has provided
193
the means to continue a consumer-led lifestyle, form part of a social vanguard.

(Gilleard 1996: 490)
Retirement is often seen and marketed as a consumption good; the private

pension industry spends considerable amounts of time and money pre-
senting positive images of a consuming third age fuelled by wise pension
saving (Mann 2001: 86–92).
However, in practice there are considerable differences in the consump-
tion patterns and possibilities for those on high incomes as opposed to
those on low incomes. The lifestyle choices associated with good private
pensions are not available to the majority without them (Mann 2001:
95–101). For those on very low incomes there is unlikely to be any sense
of choice at all.
There does seem to be evidence for more complex and protracted
retirement transitions than in the period 1945–75 (Henretta 2003: 94–5),
although historical material on the retirement process in that period is
thin. However, evidence on incomes confirms a more traditional picture
of a sharp break between working life and retirement.
Conclusion
In relation to youth transitions and the movement from paid work into
retirement, assertions about the diminishing effects of traditional struc-
tures of disadvantage such as class, gender, race, and location seem prema-
ture. These structural features of society still have considerable predictive
value in assessing the kinds of life course transitions individuals will make.
Having said this, it is clear that there are social changes, not least in the
labour market and family structures, which have and will continue to
affect the specific patterns of entry into and exit from paid work that
individuals experience. These transitions may well be ‘choppier’ for a
higher proportion of an age cohort than was previously the case, though
it is important not to rely on a golden age argument that assumes that
life course transitions were easy in the past. There is also evidence from
both studies of youth and old age that there is greater polarization within
age cohorts, making the risks of poverty and social exclusion greater
for the disadvantaged. To argue that a linear view of the life course is
redundant also, on the evidence, seems unproved. Nevertheless, it is clear
that individual biography includes not only the effects of social structure
but also individual responses to them through personality, motivation,
194
and identity formation. Those writers who have argued for a biographical
approach to understanding the life course have put the need to under-
stand the exceptions, the cases of individuals who do not end up where
one might have predicted them to, on the agenda. They have also focused
a spotlight on the strategies and understandings that individuals’ use to
respond to the risks they face.
In the field of youth transitions there is now a growing recognition of
the need to combine both the theoretical suppositions and the method-
ologies that have divided researchers in the past. Evans explores how dif-
ferent writers have grappled with the structure-agency debate in explain-
ing youth transitions and makes an argument for a middle ground theory,
which recognizes the usefulness of concepts of both bounded agency and
structured individualization:
agency operates in differentiated and complex ways in relation to the individual’s

subjectively perceived frames for action and decision. Thus, a person’s frame has
boundaries and limits that change over time, but that have structural founda-
tions in ascribed characteristics such as gender and social/educational inheritance.
(Evans 2002: 262)
One challenge in the field of life course study is to combine longitudinal

and micro, quantitative, and qualitative methods successfully to develop
a richer picture of how people travel through the different stages or phases
of their lives (for an example of a study which combines qualitative and
quantitative methodologies see Heinz et al. 1998; Kelle and Zinn 1998; for
a discussion of some of the methodological issues that arise from mixed
methodologies see Zinn 2002).
One of the key themes to emerge from this review of the life course
and risk is that the ways in which people define their own roles, their
own agency, appear to have changed. Many young people and those
approaching retirement articulate a sense of individual responsibility for
outcomes. They perceive themselves to have choices and be responsible
even when their individual room for manoeuvre is small. This may be
evidence for the individualization thesis or merely the impact of political
ideology, which for a number of decades has stressed the sovereignty of
the individual consumer and her market choices (see Zinn 2002; Brannen
and Nilsen 2005: 422–3). The range of scripts and narratives available
to the individual has expanded. More young people have been exposed
to education and career guidance that has encouraged them to develop
personalized expectations about work (Anderson et al. 2002: 5.5). Young
people are held more responsible for their success in education and the
195
labour market, and this may force them to be more reflexive about the
paths they take (Plug, Zeijl, and du Bois Reymond 2003: 142). It may also
be that the more turbulent or choppier quality of transitions into and out
of the labour market leads individuals to experience change and agency
more sharply than earlier generations (Webster et al. 2004). As the range of
routes from school to work and from work to retirement has become more
varied the complex interaction between social structures and individual
agency may have become more obscure but not necessarily less important
(Furlong and Cartmel 1997: 109; Lehmann 2004: 393–5; Brannen and
Nilsen 2005).
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10
Risk, Regulation, and Management
Bridget M. Hutter
Risk has emerged as an important concept in academic discussions and

also in the worlds of business and government. In many respects it has
become a new lens through which to view the world. For some commen-
tators this is consequential upon transformations in modern societies,
so risk is related to substantive changes in the worlds we inhabit and
to re-conceptualizations of the dangers surrounding us (Giddens 1990;
Beck 1992). It is argued that there is a class of risks peculiarly associated
with modern societies. These are involuntary, manufactured risks, that is,
those risks resulting from enormous advances in technology, the growth
of large-scale organizations, and globalization. These are the by-products
of legitimate and sometimes exciting new developments which carry with
them unintended dangers, such as pollution, threats to worker health and
safety, and the capacity to upset financial markets at great speed across
the globe. Such risks affect the food we eat, the air we breathe, our health
and safety at work, the stability of our economic systems, and so on. It
is these risks which are associated with regulation. Indeed, some regard
government intervention to regulate these economic activities as another
defining characteristic of modern societies (Hancher and Moran 1989).
The research area focusing on the regulation of the risks associated with
modern economic life is the subject of this chapter.
Basic Concepts: Regulation
The past 50 years have witnessed changes in social science definitions of

regulation. Early sociological definitions were broadly drawn and synony-
mous with notions of social control. Between the 1950s and the 1970s,
202
the term regulation took on a much more technical and narrowly defined
meaning relating specifically to state intervention in the economy. This
was particularly associated with the work of economists, political scien-
tists, and lawyers. In the 1980s and 1990s its conceptual boundaries once
again expanded to encompass both non-legal forms of regulation and
supranational regulation. So now there are many definitions of regulation
reflecting varying disciplinary backgrounds and changes in regulatory
practice (Mitnick 1980; Baldwin 1997; Black 2002).
Table 10.1 maps out four broad perspectives on regulation. This is not
intended to be an exhaustive typology but one which covers the main
approaches. The first two categories, ‘regulation as rules’ and ‘regulation as
the efforts of state agencies to steer the economy’, follow the distinctions
drawn by Baldwin, Hood, and Scott (1998: 3). These categories reflect the
work of economists, lawyers, and political scientists who were particu-
larly active in developing a definition of regulation which refers to state
efforts to regulate economic activities. Lawyers have, not surprisingly,
concentrated on regulation as state intervention through law, which is
backed by criminal sanctions and implemented by public agencies. This
is commonly referred to as the ‘command and control’ approach to regu-
lation, referring to the command of the law and the legal authority of the
Table 10.1. The four broad perspectives on regulation
1. Regulation as the State: legislative Typically economic Law

promulgation of activity Socio-legal
authoritative rules Markets studies
Organizations
Individuals within
organizations
2. Regulation as the efforts State: legislative, Economy Economics
of state agencies to steer economic policies Economic activities Political science
the economy Markets
Organizations
3. Regulation as organized State Typically economic Sociology
social control Non-state activities Socio-legal
A mix of state & Markets studies
non-state Organizations
Individuals within
organizations
4. Regulation as the control State Individuals Political Science
of risk Non-state Organizations Socio-legal
A mix of state & Markets studies
non-state Society Sociology
Social Psychology
203
state. Meanwhile political scientists and economists often take regulation

to refer to a wider range of state interventions, such as broad economic
policy, nationalization, and disclosure requirements.
The third category ‘regulation as organized social control’ reflects devel-
opments in the sociology of social control literature.1 These differ from
the early very broad definitions of social control which embraced all
forms of social control regardless of their intentionality, formality, or
institutionalization. These more contemporary definitions take a more
specific institutionally based focus, exemplified by Cohen’s definition of
social control as
the organized ways in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as
deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable in some
way or another (1985: 1).
He continues:
My focus is those organized responses to crime, delinquency and allied forms of

deviant and/or socially problematic behaviour which are actually conceived of as
such, whether in the reactive sense (after the putative act has taken place or the
actor has been identified) or in the proactive sense (to prevent the act). These
responses may be sponsored directly by the state or by more autonomous profes-
sional agents in, say, social work and psychiatry. Their goals may be as specific as
individual punishment and treatment or as diffuse as ‘crime prevention’, ‘public
safety’ and ‘community public health’ (1985: 3).
Such a definition embraces the social control of organizations and indi-

viduals, and focuses on responses which are intended to regulate, rather
than on a much broader range of responses which may regulate but do so
unintentionally. Moreover, it considers both state and non-state sources
and means of social control whilst keeping the focus firmly on organized
responses.2
A crucial feature of regulation is that it ‘attempts to control risk’ (Hood,
Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001: 3) and this is the key to the fourth and most
recent perspective on regulation, namely, regulation as the control of risk.
This perspective again focuses on organized responses to risk control,
whether they be state or non-state centred. It embraces the risks gener-
ated by economic organizations broadly conceived, that is businesses and
industries, but it also considers the control of individuals unattached to
organizational or market loci. A notable example is the recent work of
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin (2001) who consider a number of examples
involving risks located at the level of the individual. These include attacks
204
by dangerous dogs outside the home, attacks on children from convicted

paedophiles, and injuries and deaths from motor vehicles on local roads
(see also Hutter 2001).
As one moves from the first to the fourth definition the sources of reg-
ulation multiply and expand, and perspectives become ever more inclu-
sive. Whereas perspectives 1 and 2 are entirely focused on state centred
regulation, perspectives 3 and 4 embrace state and a variety of non-state
sources of regulation, such as industry and professional associations, self-
regulation, and third party regulation.
The changing perspectives on regulation have in many respects
emerged alongside changes in regulatory practice, that is, they have
emerged from action and scholars’ developing understandings of the prac-
tice of regulation. Thus, regulation has come to be defined as controlling
and also as a way of managing risks, but whilst the language of risk may
be relatively new the task of regulation as a way of managing risks is not.
Basic Concepts: Risk
Studies of regulation have long recognized that regulation and risk are
inextricably connected; however, the relationship between the two was
until recently assumed rather than explored. Accounts of the emergence
of regulation discussed the reasons for regulation in terms of protection
and intervention on behalf of consumers, the public, and the environ-
ment. The harms were seen as being associated with a rapidly changing
society but the language of risk was seldom used. Regulatory law was
recognized as ambivalent and contradictory, attempting to accommo-
date conflicting interests and balance the harms created by otherwise
desirable activities. The law was seen as ‘tolerant’—too tolerant maybe—
and reasonable—too reasonable even (Hutter 1988). Tensions between
these factors were a fundamental characteristic of regulation and ones
which were typically left largely unresolved by governments, the crucial
decisions being taken by field-level regulatory officials (Otway 1985).
The relatively unsophisticated discussion of risk in early studies of
regulation is not entirely surprising, reflecting the state of academic dis-
cussions of risk at the time. The situation has, however, changed rapidly in
the past decade which has witnessed a massive growth in academic studies
of risk and the rapid development of a risk industry (Gabe 1995). There are
a variety of disciplinary approaches to the study of risk and a range of dif-
ferent foci of interest, from the individual to cultural. Discussions of the
205
problems of industrialization have been replaced with broader discussions

about modernization, and relatively simple discussions of harm have been
replaced by increasingly sophisticated discussions of risk and uncertainty.
Risk is now seen as a characteristic of modernization, with all aspects of
modern life being interpreted in terms of risk and the private spheres of
business and industry becoming politicized (Beck 1992; Power 2004a).
Risk Analysis
Risk analysis, which embraces both the assessment and management of
risk, emerged as a defined area early in 1970s. Short, writing in 1984,
commented on its fast growth as a new discipline. The literature dis-
tinguishes between the two components of risk analysis, namely, risk
assessment and risk management. The former refers to the scientific, cal-
culable component of risk regulation whereas the latter refers to the policy
component (Pollak 1995). Early conceptions of risk assessment focused
on identifying, measuring, and evaluating outcomes from both natural
and technological hazards. The concern was to estimate the probability of
these events happening and to estimate their likely effects (Tierney 1999).
The assumptions were essentially realist, so it was assumed that there is
an objective world of risks which is discoverable, measurable, quantifiable,
and controllable by science (Gabe 1995). Policymakers saw risk assessment
as a way of systematizing their approach to risk, prioritizing actions,
and thereby hopefully diminishing exposure to risks and optimizing the
balance between risks and benefits (Rimmington 1992).
The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a growing recognition that risk
management, which involves the choice of policy options, necessarily
requires the assignment of values and politicized decision-making. There
was also increasing public awareness of scientific disagreements. Douglas
and Wildavsky (1982), in an influential book, commented ‘. . . substantial
disagreement remains over what is risky, how risky it is and what to do
about it’. They pointed to scientific disputes over how to interpret data
and how to then decide what is acceptable and pointed to a paradox
‘better measurement opens more possibilities, more research brings more
ignorance to the light of day’ (1982: 64). Commentators noted that values
differed between countries, between successive administrations, within
countries and within the research community (Otway 1985). Moreover,
the tools of technical risk analysis came under much criticism for being
too simplistic, making too many assumptions and for not recognizing the
values which may surround them (Renn 1992).
206
A fundamental divide emerged in the mid-1970s as a gap between

expert and lay opinions became increasingly apparent (Plough and
Krimsky 1987). The term ‘risk-perception’ emerged and psychological
risk analyses aimed at explaining why public reactions to risks are not
always in proportion to ‘objective risks’ (Otway 1985; Krimsky 1992). As
some observers have commented these studies do share similarities with
technical risk assessments to the extent that their aims are purportedly
scientific, objective, and quantitative (Gabe 1995: 4). Indeed the notion
of risk-communication was introduced in an attempt to bridge the gap
between expert views and lay perceptions, and, as some authors indicate,
this typically means ‘information transmission’ and ‘persuasion’ as the
underlying assumption is that the expert view is indeed the correct one
to follow.
There were variable consequences of these developments. One was
an exacerbation of the challenge to expert opinion and an accompany-
ing growth of mistrust in science and technology which were increas-
ingly seen as the cause of many of the risks in the everyday modern
world. There were some attempts to combine social science and scientific
approaches to risk analysis. These were referred to by some authors as the
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches to risk analysis, the former referring to techni-
cal approaches to risk analysis and the latter to social science approaches
which take into account the human factors influencing risk (Blockley
1996). Some risk management practices incorporated both approaches,
for example, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) (Hood and Jones
1996: 86). Indeed the influential Royal Society Report on risk, published
in 1983, differentiates between ‘technical risk estimation’ and ‘political
risk decision’, arguing that interaction between the two is necessary.
Social Science Approaches

Although there are examples of social scientists showing an interest in risk
prior to the 1970s this was the point at which social science approaches
to risk really started to emerge in any significant way. Psychological and
social psychological studies of risk perception emerged in the 1970s and
anthropology, building on the early work of Douglas (1985), developed
cultural theory in the early 1980s. This related concepts of danger and
risk to cultures, in particular to varying social and group values. Socio-
logical interest in risk dates from the mid-1980s, before this there was
very little sociological interest. This is emphasized by Short Jr, who in
his 1984 ASA Presidential Address, urged sociologists to pay more serious
207
attention to risk analysis, arguing that this was the preserve of techni-
cal discussion but there were important normative, social, and political
dimensions which demanded consideration.
In the late 1980s/early 1990s a number of significant macro-level risk
theories emerged—the work of European social theorists such as Beck
(1992), Giddens (1990), and Luhmann (1993). Beck’s Risk Society, which
has been especially influential, argues that contemporary western societies
are characterized by risks which are distinctive in a number of respects.
First, they are manufactured as opposed to natural. Second, they tran-
scend social and national barriers and may be global in their effects.
And third, these modern risks are closely but ambivalently associated
with science which is seen as responsible for the creation and definition
of modern risks but is also seen to have failed to control these risks,
thus leading to the emergence of a risk society characterized by global
risk situations. One consequence of this, claims Beck, is that there has
been a growing scepticism of science which has led to a demystification
of science itself. These theories have been criticized for their exclusive
focus on technological risks (Tierney 1999; Turner 2001). It has also been
claimed that they are too abstract to be useful for empirically oriented
research (Tierney 1999: 216). The concentration on technological risk
has been a continuing difficulty but with this proviso these theories
have, contrary to their critics, spawned numerous grounded studies of
risk. These studies have also succeeded in moving discussion beyond the
‘hazard’ based focus which characterized much of the US-based early work
(see below).
Many middle and micro-range sociological studies have adopted a social
constructionist approach to risk considering, for instance, the differential
definition of risks as risks and varying perceptions of risk amongst differ-
ent social groups. Of particular interest has been the influence of social
structures and social interests upon these definitions and perceptions, for
example, the role of organizations and the state (Gabe 1995; Vaughan
1996; Tierney 1999). Other sociological work has focused on the social
construction of formal risk analysis, and so has examined the social
processes and organizational influences upon formal risk analysis (Perrow
1984; Shrader-Frechette 1991; Vaughan 1996).
There are of course many ways of making sense of the world and coping
with risk. Science uses quantitative risk techniques as a way of ordering
the world, making sense of it, and rendering some sense of control
(Hood and Jones 1996). The law is another way of classifying danger
and setting up requirements for its recognition and management, and of
208
communicating about risk (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 90). These differ-
ent systems ‘talk in different languages’ (Luhmann 1993) and may well
clash with each other (Smith and Wynne 1989). Discussions of these
various systems and their impacts on organizations have emerged at the
core of risk regulation debates since the 1980s. In the remainder of this
chapter we will focus in particular on risk regulation.
Risk and Regulation: Research Themes
Discussions of regulation have reflected the broader literature on risk but

this has happened in a rather piecemeal way. Risk has become incorpo-
rated into some aspects of the regulation literature more than others. The
early 1990s witnessed the first real wave of work relating risk to regulation
issues. Areas which received particular attention were the importance
of the relationship between expert knowledge, risk, and regulation, in
particular the relationship between regulation and science (Nelkin 1992;
Jasanoff et al. 1995) and the role of political factors in determining risk
tolerance levels (Jasper 1992). These debates have been especially impor-
tant in research on policymaking (Brickman, Jasanoff, and Iilgen 1985;
Jasanoff 1991; Rayner 1991). Indeed Golding (1992) relates the growth of
risk analysis to early 1970s American regulatory legislation, for example,
the Environmental Protection Act. He argues that this prompted the pro-
fessionalization of risk analysis which was largely funded by government
agencies, especially regulatory agencies.
Other aspects of regulation examined with reference to risk in the 1990s
focused on the role of organizations in the mediation of regulation. Short
and Clarke (1992, 1993) were especially important in moving forward
these discussions (see also Perrow 1984; Reiss 1984). Whilst their 1993
paper maintained a primary focus on disasters3 their 1992 book Organi-
zations, Uncertainties, and Risk progressed the debate by mapping out the
importance of a broader range of organizational risk issues, some of which
were routine, some contextual, and other regulatory.
Social science discussions of risk and regulation during the 1990s were
muddled in their development. A lack of unifying theory concerned
some authors whilst others took a more sanguine view and others simply
regarded a single unifying theory as implausible/unnecessary (Clarke and
Short 1993; Tierney 1999). Yet all yearned for a more systematic approach
and by the turn of the century more systematic analyses of risk and
regulation were indeed appearing.
209
By 1990 the concept of ‘risk regulation’ was appearing in the social

science literature (Otway 1985: 5; Krier et al. 1990: 747). The term has
been used increasingly since the 1990s in legal, economic, political sci-
ence, public policy, psychology, and science studies literatures. Interest-
ingly many authors using the term risk regulation take its meaning for
granted and do not define what they mean by the term. Those who
do offer an explanation (e.g. Krier et al. 1990; Breyer 1993; Noll 1996;
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001) refer to state action to reduce health
and environmental risks. The main areas of discussion under the risk
regulation heading have been
r which risks the state responds to and how one might explain dif-
ferent responses (Noll 1990; Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001;
Vogel 2001);
r the influence of risk debates on regulatory policy, for example, the
influence of debates upon scientific expertise on regulatory policy and
the effects of government responses to risk upon public confidence
in government—and related debates about public participation in risk
regulation (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003);
r business risk management and its responses to state risk regimes
(Hutter 2001);
r international, trans-boundary risk regulation (Tait 2001).
Since the 1990s there has been a concerted effort to delineate a new
interdisciplinary area of risk regulation studies which would bridge reg-
ulation and risk management studies across a number of social science
disciplines. This has involved a slow coming together of risk and regula-
tion studies to create a more hybrid risk regulation studies. We now turn
to the findings of these studies.4
Risk Regulation Research Findings
Risk regulation studies have two main foci: the first and main focal
point is upon risk and governance and the second is upon risk reg-
ulation and organizations. The literature examines the circumstances
and ways in which risk has become an organizing concept for regu-
lation within and beyond the state (Power 1997; Clark 2000; Moran
2003).
210
Variation: Risk Regulation Regimes

State regulation remains a central focus for risk regulation studies. The
key work on variations in state handling of risks, particularly variations
between domains and states, is Hood et al.’s The Government of Risk.
This study developed the notion of risk regulation regimes in order to
explain variation and focuses on risks to health, primarily with reference
to the UK. Their analytical framework for describing and comparing
risk regulation regimes distinguishes between regime context (e.g. pub-
lic preferences, organized interests) and regime content (e.g. policy set-
tings), and analyses components of regulatory control (standard-setting,
information-gathering, behaviour-modification). They considered nine
domains and found substantial variation. Their results challenged any
widespread claim about the emergence of a risk society and called for
more nuanced examination of regulatory developments and ones which
considered in greater detail the relationships between different compo-
nents of regimes.
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin’s (2001) study of risk regulation regimes
is important for a number of reasons. It brings together risk regulation
in a systematic way. It develops a middle range examination of risk
regulation (2001: 12) which complements the broader macro-theories of
risk society, regulatory state, and audit society. Moreover, this work gives
us an organizing template for developing risk regulation studies. Apart
from drawing out the implications for regulatory theory this approach
can be used to examine other risk regulation regimes from institutional
and comparative perspectives. It provides us with a mapping device for
analysing and ultimately explaining variations in standard setting, for
instance, why some areas are dominated by quantitative risk assessments
and others are not (2001: 7) or why some institutional arrangements result
in risk bureaucracies staffed by risk experts whereas others are much more
generalist. So the approach is open to methodological, theoretical, and
empirical development across domains, time, and cross-culturally. As the
authors stress, this is one way of examining the issues as there is ‘. . . no
single correct way of conceiving risk regulation regimes’ (2002: 12).
Much current risk regulation work contributes to the study of risk regu-
lation regimes but not in any particularly systematic way. Historical case
studies contribute to our understandings of the emergence of particular
examples of regulation and also the ways in which third party actors
such as insurance companies have managed risks. There is also work
on the exposure of particular sectors of the population to risks but this
211
historical work seldom uses risk regulation approaches nor does it focus
on historical understandings of risk (Gourvish 2003).
Continuing research focuses on the factors which influence different
parts of risk regulation regimes in determining regulatory responses to
risks. There is work, for example, on the influences upon policymakers
at the governmental work. An example would be work on the influence
of public opinion upon regulatory policy which includes work on the
participation of civil society organizations in policymaking (see below).
Other work is being done on the factors influencing regulatory offi-
cials. Examples would include work on institutional attenuation which
considers factors which reduce regulatory awareness of risks both at an
everyday enforcement level and at the level of institutional policymaking
(Rothstein 2003). Also important is the ‘social amplification’ literature
which develops the risk-perception literature (see above) and examines
how risks may become magnified and acted upon disproportionately or
attenuated (Pidgeon et al. 2003). The focus of this work is on issues
of communication, stigma, trust and blame, and the ways in which
organizations process risk. Indeed, an important research finding is the
differential understandings of risk which may exist between nation states,
policymakers, and the general population (Jasanoff 2005) or between
different groups in organizations (Nelkin 1985; Krimsky and Golding
1992). Research findings to date have found that these processes are
highly contextualized, making policy recommendations and more gen-
eral theorizing difficult. A key risk-management message seems to be
on the importance of risk communication, often involving participative
mechanisms.
The Democratization of Risk and Regulation

Work on democratization, risk and regulation covers a number of interre-
lated issues. Most emphasis is upon the democratization of risk regulation
rather than risk (see below) and these debates are linked to earlier work
on the role of experts and expertise and the democratization of politics.
Generally, the process of democratization may be taken to include
greater open debate, greater public access to power centres, and greater
participation in decisions of government.
So democratization of regulation may be indicated by an increased
openness of state regulatory institutions to listen to and incorporate a
wide range of people in regulatory debates, and it may also indicate a more
active role for the citizenry in regulatory decision-making (Held 1987: 4).
212
A number of mechanisms have been found to be central here, namely,

greater rights and obligations upon the citizenry, greater accountability of
state actors, and increased governance of the government. Thus, account-
ability and transparency appear as central to the democratization process.
One of the features of the move from the paternalistic nanny state to a
constitutive model of regulation has been the incorporation of a wider
range of groups into the regulatory process. So regulation is no longer the
preserve of employers and directors but has been extended to involve a
broader range of participants including those ‘protected’ by regulation.
This would include, for example, employees, consumers, and the local
and global community. Increasingly, it has also involved interest groups
(see below).
Work on participative risk regulation has considered the nature of this
participation. Much of the work which has been done on this topic
has been preoccupied with the rights and wrongs of participation and
the processes by which it may be achieved (National Research Council
1996; Owens 2000). Rights have been found to typically be confined to
particular stages of the regulatory process such as the policymaking stage
or implementation stage. Moreover, some groups are more privileged than
others in their inclusion and/or ability to participate. The involvement of
non-governmental organizations in regulatory processes (NGOs) has been
hotly debated with controversy surrounding the possibility of selecting
representative NGOs and issues of internal governance and transparency
(Bruyn 1999; Weale 1999).
Democratization includes greater openness of government and greater
accountability of its executive. Generally state regulation has been found
to be more open to public scrutiny and the activities of state regulators
have been subject to greater accountability over time. The key questions
here concern calls for greater participation and also for greater legitimacy
of regulators. In part, the explanations offered relate to broader govern-
mental scrutiny of the public service (see below). They also relate to earlier
discussions about trust in the risk experts and risk expertise (Wynne 1996;
Turner 2001). Indeed one key argument for greater participation is that
it may increase the legitimation of policymaking processes (Rothstein
2003).
Debates about the relationship between science and regulation increas-
ingly focus on the contention that the relationship between science and
society is changing, in particular that it is marked by apparently increas-
ing public distrust of science, companies, and governments (see below).
There seem to be a number of reasons for this. It is partly related to the
213
rapid spread of IT and alternative sources of knowledge which fosters a

greater appreciation of the contestation of knowledge amongst scientists;
enables the fast and often dramatic news of any risk regulation failures;
and thus leads to greater scepticism. Coupled with this are reported levels
of distrust of government and corporate pronouncements. A real concern
here is that there is a fear that adequate risk management is not in place
and that scientists are not always in control of their creations. There are
thus concerns about the regulation of science and its application, with
the public in general having little knowledge of or faith in the regulatory
framework.
These debates have been fuelled by a number of regulatory and pol-
icy failures, some of which have become the subject of much academic
debate. In Britain, BSE and GM foods are key examples. In the case
of BSE, trust in government regulatory decisions was severely damaged
when the government erroneously assured the public that BSE was not
the problem it turned out to be (Phillips 2000). The GM food debate
in Britain is another example of a government failure to understand
the views of the public on a risk regulation issue—government, along
with scientists and industry, did not appreciate that there may be serious
public concern about a new technology which its critics feared might have
detrimental effects involving future generations (Gaskell and Bauer 2001).
These debates of course feed into work on risk regulation regimes (Vogel
2001), and also into the debate about widening participation, some of this
work doubting that such increasing participation does in fact increase
trust in government (GM Nation 2003; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2004).
Discussions about the possibility and effects of greater openness in sci-
entific debates are controversial, with disagreement about the desirability
of public involvement in these decisions and also about the outcomes
of such involvement (Jasanoff 1990; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Hilgartner
2000; Gurabardhi, Gutteling, and Kuttschreuter 2005).
Changing Patterns of Risk Regulation: The Governance of Risk and Risk

as a Form of Governance
Contemporaneous with the broadening participatory base of state reg-
ulation has been a more general conceptualization of regulation. Reg-
ulation is no longer regarded as the exclusive domain of the state and
governments, and the role of non-state actors in regulation is now widely
acknowledged (Baldwin, Hood, and Scott 1998; Moran 2003; Black 2002).
Some non-state sources are new and represent a growth of regulation,
214
but many of the sources of regulation are well established and have
existed for a very long time in one form or another. What is new is
the growing recognition of these alternative sources as regulation, their
formal co-option by the state and an increasing coordination of activities
between various regulatory sources.
This decentring of the state involves a move from public ownership
and centralized control to privatized institutions and the encouragement
of market competition. It also involves a move to a state reliance on
new forms of fragmented regulation, involving the existing specialist
regulatory agencies of state but increasingly self-regulating organizations,
regimes of enforced self-regulation (Braithwaite 1982), and American style
independent regulatory agencies.5 More broadly these changes represent a
move from government to governance, where the state attempts to ‘steer’
or ‘regulate’ economic activities through co-opting non-governmental
actors (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Moran’s (2000) view is that in Britain
we are witnessing a move from a ‘club-like’ pattern of regulation char-
acterized by informality, flexibility, and cooperation, to something more
contractual which is codified, procedural, and specialized.
These changes have led to a growing body of research on the changing
concept of regulation (Black 2002) and also different forms of decentred
regulation (Grabosky 1995; Hutter, forthcoming). This includes groups in
the economic sector, such as industry or trade organizations, companies
themselves, and businesses whose business is selling regulatory and risk
management advice to companies (Freeman and Kunreuther 1997; Gun-
ningham and Rees 1997; Ericson, Doyle, and Barry 2003). In the civil
sphere regulatory tasks may be undertaken by NGOs, charities, trusts,
foundations, advocacy groups, and associations (Bruyn 1999; Hutter and
O’Mahony 2004: 2). A deal of research is presently devoted to exploring
the workings of non-state regulation and its relationship with state regu-
lation across a variety of domains and also transnationally.
As the sources of regulation and risk management have multiplied, so
has research which focuses on the regulatory state and the ways in which
regulatory sources are themselves regulated. There are two main literatures
here. The first concentrates on the regulation of state regulators and public
officials. This literature examines new forms of public management and
the growth in the regulation of government and governance (Hood et al.
2004). The second literature considers the concept of meta regulation—
that is, the state’s oversight of self-regulatory arrangements (Grabosky
1995; Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair 1998; Parker 2002; Scott
2003). These literature of course connect with the accountability literature
215
mentioned above—in particular the literatures on audit, efficiency, and

performance.
Risk debates dovetail into these literature. For example, some authors
regard risk as a new mode of governance (Condon 2004). The law and
regulation are seen as ways of communicating about risk. Indeed forms
of risk management may come to be regarded as decentred modes of
governance whereby third parties take over from the state in the regu-
lation of risk. For example, according to Ericson, Doyle, and Barry (2003)
insurance is a technology of governance beyond the state. They argue that
the insurance industry shares similar goals to the state; employs similar
methodologies; and is subject to many of the same social forces. Indeed,
insurance companies are regarded by some as the original risk experts
producing information which is both used by the industry itself and is
also a source of exploitation by governments (Freeman and Kunreuther
1993).
This trend has itself led to its own forms of governance—namely, meta
risk management, a term Braithwaite (2003) uses to refer to as ‘the risk-
management of risk management’. This denotes regulators attempting to
manage not just their own risk management systems but those of those
they regulate. This is a reflexive, systems based approach to regulatory risk
management and one which connects with the other key research area,
namely, risk regulation and organizations.
Risk Regulation and Organizations

The research foci in this area of risk regulation studies have been upon
both public and private sector organizations and their use of risk manage-
ment approaches.
In Britain the use of risk templates is increasingly influential and public
agencies have been under pressure for some time to adopt business prac-
tices (James 2001), some of which are discussed under the generic title of
the ‘New Public Management’ (Hood 1991). Part of this move to adopt
new management techniques is an emphasis upon risk-based approaches
to all public sector departments (Cabinet Office 1999, 2002; NAO 2000).
These imperatives manifest themselves in risk regulation regimes through
the use of risk assessment tools, especially those derived from natural sci-
ence and economics (Hood and Jones 1996; Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin
2001) and in some cases a more general move to risk-based approaches
as a way of organizing regulatory activities (Black 2005; Hampton 2005;
Hutter 2005). One of the attractions of risk-based regulation is that it is an
216
apparently rational, objective, and transparent way of deploying limited

regulatory resources. Thus, its use may be appealed to should a crisis
require a need for blame shifting. Institutional imperatives to avoid blame
and liability is a key research issue (Horlick-Jones 1996; Hood, Rothstein,
and Baldwin 2001; Black 2005; Hutter 2005; Power 2005; and especially
Hood 2002). What is not clear from the existing literature are the limits
of blame shifting around risk-based models. Too much faith in risk-based
systems can be dangerous in itself (Holzer and Millo 2004) and could be
counterproductive in a number of ways, blame shifting included.
A traditional risk focus is upon accidents and disasters (see above).
Studies of these continue and early discussion so the organizational
factors leading to major risk events (Turner 1978; Perrow 1984) have
continued and developed. Notable recent examples would be Vaughan’s
(1996) work on the Challenger accident which underlines the very real
need to pay attention to minor anomalies, and communication and the
power dynamics within organizations. Work on ‘silent disasters’ (Beamish
2001) where the consequences of risk events may emerge slowly over time
is another important and relatively new area of research activity which
emphasizes a strong theme in much of the work on disasters, namely, the
ways in which everyday organizational life can incubate risks (Turner and
Pidgeon 1997) and the ways in which risky, deviant practices can be nor-
malized (Vaughan 1996). Such discussions feed into how organizations
routinely manage risk at an everyday level, for example, their systems
for risk identification and management and the tensions which may be
involved. Some work focuses on the organizational risk management
structures in place (Hutter 2001; Heimer 2005), some on risk person-
nel (Weait 1994; Power 2005), and some on the tensions which may
exist, for example, between production and risk management (Vaughan
1996; Hutter 2001). Increasingly this work emphasizes the dynamic and
interactive nature of risk management both with respect to internal
organization and the external environment within which organizations
operate.
A more recent area of research considers the influence of ‘risk speak’
on organizational risk management, in particular the emergence of new
risk management categories, examples include operational risk and enter-
prise risk management (Power 2004b) both of which have emerged in
corporate and regulatory discussions since the 1990s. Another example
of an emerging regulatory category is that of the ‘genetically modified’
and the associated transnational governance frameworks which have
emerged alongside the new category (Lezaun 2006). These frameworks
217
are national and international and relate to examinations of how trans-

boundary risks come to be so defined and responded to (Dodd and Hutter
2000).
Transnational Risks
There is increasing awareness of the cross-border effects of risks, most
especially involuntary risks such as environmental pollution, nuclear
contamination, and financial risks. Most research effort has focused on
regulatory responses to these risks. Research has considered the formation
and implementation of multilateral agreements between nation states;
the activities of transnational forums and organizations such as the OECD
and EU; international standard setting has received a deal of attention as
has the regulation of global industries, such as telecoms, across differ-
ent continents. A tension running through these debates is the relative
importance of the nation state vis-à-vis more international, even global,
forces. Some argue that the nation state has a more restricted role because
it has been superseded by supranational organizations. Others argue that
it has expanded its role and influence more directly and forcefully in
the international context, by becoming not only the exporter of goods
but also the exporter of regulatory standards and knowledge. It certainly
appears difficult to accept that the role of the nation state is diminishing.
What is important is to differentiate among nation states, as some are
more powerful than others, notably the USA and Japan. What is also
certain is that there is a tension between demands for internationally
effective regulations and even handedness on the one hand, and for
national economic advantage on the other.6
A key issue in these debates is the relationship between risk regulation
and trade. For example, what are the transnational effects of regulation?
Does risk regulation in one area lead businesses to engage in regulatory
shopping so they locate in less regulated areas? The extent to which
the regulation and free trade are opposed to each other is a matter of
some controversy. The debate thus turns on the effects of regulation on
economic competition; this is a subject about which there are strong and
very different views. This debate is sometimes characterized as the debate
between the ‘race to the top’ and the ‘race to the bottom’. The ‘race to
the bottom’ idea is that stricter standards are the source of competitive
disadvantage and will lead companies to move to the lowest cost location.
The state response in such a scenario is deregulatory both nationally and
internationally. Meanwhile, the ‘race to the top’ argument maintains that
218
those at the cutting edge of regulation are at a competitive advantage

because (in global terms) domestic producers can comply most easily. The
state response is a strategic trade policy where the state acts to encourage
international regulatory efforts (Porter 1990; Stewart 1993; Vogel 1995).
Much of the debate so far focuses on cost benefit analyses, where costs and
benefits can be evaluated differently, according to one’s standpoint. Little
other research has been undertaken on this subject, partly because of the
difficulty in getting comparative data and partly because of differential
evidential requirements according to standpoint on such a politically
controversial subject.
Emerging Issues
The relatively new status of risk regulation studies necessarily implies that
many of the research themes and findings discussed in this chapter are in
their infancy. There is a pressing need for theoretical development based
on empirical work. A number of areas demanding much more in-depth
and systematic research have emerged from the above discussion.
First, we need much more detailed and comparative work on risk regula-
tion regimes. More historical, cross-national, and cross-domain studies are
essential. A fruitful area for the development of the risk regimes analytic
is work on regulation beyond the state which increasingly may be seen
as part of a broader risk regulation regime. More detailed consideration
of the ways in which state, economic, and civil sources of regulation are
able to work together or may hinder each other’s efforts is required. This is
particularly relevant as some states look to outsource more risk regulation
activities and business demands less state intervention.
Second, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of
attempts to widen participation around risk regulation issues. Discussions
on this topic are often theoretical and rhetorical (exceptions include
Rothstein 2003; Gouldson, Lidskog, and Wester-Herber 2004). There is
a dearth of empirical case studies and comparative work which will enable
an assessment of what kinds of participation seem to work and the
circumstances which foster or inhibit participation. Indeed such research
may indicate that participative risk regulation is unhelpful in some
situations.
Consideration of the role of risk management within organizations is
a third emerging research area, most particularly research that examines
how risk management techniques are communicated and implemented
219
within organizations (Hutter and Power 2005). For example, it is not

at all clear how many government departments have bought into risk
based initiatives or to what extent. An important aspect of this remit is
to understand the limitations of risk management approaches, that is,
to analyse situations in which they are helpful and when they might
be counterproductive. A dimension of this is to research the differential
impact of various regulatory sources and tools and to undertake compara-
tive work across different types of organization and domain in the private
and public sectors.
A fourth area for development is consideration of the role of experts in
risk regulation (Power 2005). Current discussions of expertise are largely
confined to science, but there is undoubtedly a need to broaden out
the debate to include the relationship between other forms of expertise
and regulation. A topical example in light of the Enron and Parmalat
difficulties would be the status of the professional advice of accountants.
Such discussions include regulation beyond the state as professionals are
often incorporated into formal state risk regulation regimes as well as
themselves being a focus of regulatory practice. The work of the emerging
profession of risk management personnel both inside organizations and
outside as consultants is worthy of attention as these personnel increas-
ingly try to professionalize and extend their domains.
Fifth, despite the large literature on globalization, transnational risk
regulation studies is still a relatively under researched area. The one area
which has attracted a deal of attention is the effects of risk regulation
on trading but there is still a deal of empirical research needed on this
topic as much of the debate is rhetorical. Kagan and Axelrad (2000) have
conducted one of the most broadly international studies to date of multi-
national corporations and their reactions to national regulatory regimes,
but we await any further empirical work of this type. Another perspective
on this topic is the trading of risks between countries, for example, of
waste products or GM foods. We have some data on the topic (Bruce and
Tait 2001), but generally the effects of transnational risk trading on the
distribution of risks across the globe is under-researched.
Sixth is a related topic which was signalled in the 1990s as impor-
tant, yet remains relatively neglected—namely, the social distribution
and inequalities of risk (O’Riordan 1983; Short 1984; Tierney 1999).
Issues of risk and power are key to risk regulation studies but are often
neglected. More direct discussion is necessitated, especially in light of
Beck’s (1992) proposition that the risks of high modernity are democratic.
Consideration needs to be given here to inequalities both within and
220
between nations. Is it the case that all sectors of society suffer the
effects of poor risk management equally? And what are the effects
of transnational global agreements and regulatory shopping on devel-
oping countries—are they able to comply? Do they suffer the effects
disproportionately?
As risk regulation studies become more established we might expect
more interdisciplinary and international research initiatives to pursue
the themes outlined in this section. Risk regulation studies needs closer
analysis of the social and political contexts and the broader social and
cultural contexts in which risks are understood and experienced. The
objective will be to develop and challenge existing theories and connect
with other areas of risk research.
Notes
1. The third category cited by Baldwin et al. (ibid) reflects early sociological defi-
nitions of social control which are broadly defined and where the words social
control and regulation are often used interchangeably and not the category
identified here which is more focused and defined.
2. Whilst the mainstream sociological literature on social control gives us impor-
tant insights into the social control of economic life it is also fair to say that
the control of organizations and businesses is relatively neglected by the disci-
pline. The traditional and mainstream social control literature centres on the
behaviour of individuals. There is a corporate crime literature strongly related
to criminology but until fairly recently very little on regulation. The main
focus on the regulation of businesses and markets came, with a few notable
exceptions, from economists, political scientists and lawyers in the 1970s (ref
Bernstein 1955). And it is here that regulation developed as a more technical
term referring to state attempts to regulate economic activities.
3. This has been a traditional focus of risk discussions in American sociology,
indeed if ASA Annual Meetings are any barometer of research activity this
remains the case. As Turner (1994) cautions there is a need to differentiate
between hazards and risks.
4. In 2000 the ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR) was set
up to research precisely these issues and interfaces. See http://www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/CARR/
5. Indeed for Majone (1994) it is the rise of these agencies at both state and EU
levels which is the defining characteristic of the European regulatory state.
6. The most exhaustive work on global business regulation is Braithwaite and
Drahos, 2000. See also Stirton and Lodge, 2002; Thatcher, 2002; Lodge,
2003.
221
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11
Social Inequality and Risk
David Abbott, Anwen Jones, and Deborah Quilgars
Introduction
Following the work of such authors as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991,
1994), there has been considerable academic debate in social policy about
the emergence of a risk society (Culpitt 1999; Dingwall 1999; Taylor-
Gooby et al. 1999). One important factor is that, in a risk society, the
traditional fault-lines of social class are no longer the main divisions in
people’s ideas about their interests, but that risks, which cut across these
lines and may affect all members of society in similar ways, become more
important (Taylor-Gooby 2001a). The theory of risk society is important
not only because of its intellectual influence but also because these ideas
have begun to permeate into, and influence, the policymaking process
(Quilgars and Abbott 2000). In Britain, New Labour’s ‘third way’ in wel-
fare, with its emphasis on individual responsibility and the curbing of
state intervention, derives its intellectual underpinning from the risk
society theory as developed in the UK by Giddens (Giddens 1991, 1994,
1998). Current public policy is influenced by rational choice theory which
implies that individuals will not only perceive risks and take responsi-
bility for reducing risk, but that they will do so according to deliberate
calculations which will protect their interest. Research suggests, however,
that some individuals and groups are more likely to experience risks than
others and are less able to plan for, and deal with, contingencies. Research
has shown that our society is still unequal, that restructuring of welfare
has actually deepened some divisions in society, and that traditional struc-
turing factors continue to shape life experiences (Taylor-Gooby 2001a;
Glennerster et al. 2004). This chapter explores issues of inequality and
228
disadvantage in the risk society and questions whether traditional social

divisions such as class, gender, and ethnicity are becoming less significant
as people become increasingly reflexive and individualized.
Context
The latter half of the twentieth century was one of rapid social change
which saw transformation in traditional structures and institutions,
including employment patterns and welfare provision. Changes in the
global economy, characterized by increasing mobility of capital and the
development of new international markets, have had a major impact
on Western economies. These changes include globalization and sec-
toral changes (the decline of manufacturing and growth of the service
sector) and labour market deregulation. In the UK, successive Conserv-
ative Governments from 1979 to 1996 sought to create a more flexible
labour market both through the operation of general economic policies,
reducing the rights of employees and, notably, by curbing Trade Union
powers. The current Government has introduced some minimum stan-
dards within employment relations, for example, the National Minimum
Wage and has stated its support for a return to full employment, however,
like its predecessors, the current Government remains committed to flexi-
bility in the labour market. The UK labour market is now characterized by
increased labour market flexibility, new patterns of working, polarized and
more precarious forms of work, intensification of work, and widespread
feelings of insecurity (Burchell et al. 1999). Over the same period, succes-
sive governments have increasingly curtailed the level of and eligibility for
many forms of state provision. Traditionally, the welfare state responded
to both unplanned hazards (e.g. unemployment, divorce, and sickness)
and planned events (for instance, retirement) but in recent years the state
has sought to transfer the responsibility for provision towards individuals
and households (McRae 1995; Skinner and Ford 2000). This has been
described as a ‘new contract for welfare’ between the citizen and the state;
the main principle of this contract is that ‘wherever possible, people are
[privately] insured against foreseeable risks and make provision for their
retirement’ (Department of Social Security 1998: 2). These socio-economic
changes, it is argued, have meant that the UK has become an increas-
ingly risky society, especially for its most excluded and disadvantaged
citizens.
229
The issues of poverty and exclusion have been the subject of some
of the UK Government’s most high profile targets since they came to
power in 1997. In particular, the Government has pledged to cut and
eventually to ‘eradicate’ child poverty, and to ensure that within the
next two decades no one is disadvantaged by where they live. However,
there are no targets for working age poverty, for poverty of the popula-
tion as a whole, or for overall inequality. Whilst there have been some
improvements since 1997, for example, in relative child poverty, which
has fallen (but is still above the average for the EU) the UK remains
an unequal society. Wheeler et al. (2005), using data from the 2001
Census, examine five issues—health, education, housing, employment,
and poverty. The research shows the nature and extent of geographical
and social inequality in the UK and demonstrates the continued unequal
distribution of resources and prospects across the country and the entire
population. They found that poor people with the greatest need for
good health care, education, jobs, housing, and transport continue to
have the worst access to opportunities and services. Children from less
advantaged backgrounds continue to have lower levels of educational
attainment and these inequalities lead to lifetime inequalities due to the
relationship between education, unemployment, and earnings as well as
a range of other outcomes such as general health and psychological well-
being (Hobcraft 1998; CASE and HM Treasury 1999; Palmer, Carr, and
Kenway 2004).
The UK is divided between ‘work-rich’ and ‘work-poor’ areas with geo-
graphical location as well as qualifications influencing the chances of
obtaining a well-paid job. More than 5 million British men and women of
working age are in non-working families, double the number in the 1970s,
and there are growing not lessening divides between work-rich and work-
poor households. In 2002–3, 12.4 million people (22 per cent of the pop-
ulation) were living in low-income households although this represented
a reduction from 14 million in 1996/7 (Palmer, Carr, and Kenway 2004).
However, whilst unemployment has reduced among couple households
in recent years, there has been much less success in reducing the numbers
of people who are economically inactive who want to work, in long-
term worklessness due to ill health and disability, and in worklessness
among single-adult households. Whilst the proportion of children and
pensioners who live in low-income households is falling, the proportion
of working age adults without children who live in low-income house-
holds has risen over recent years. Being in paid employment does not
eliminate the risk of living in poverty, two-fifths of people in low-income
230
working age households now have someone in paid work. Of those who
find employment in low-paid work two-fifths no longer have work six
months later. More than half of employees on below average incomes are
not contributing to a non-state pension (Palmer, Carr, and Kenway 2004).
Commentators (McKnight 2005; Phillips 2005) have recorded how
some groups are more insecure and disadvantaged than others, for
example:
r Inactivity rates among disabled people remain high (44% of men aged
25–34 and 70% of men aged 55–64) and there remains a large unmet
demand to work and high rates of poverty among disabled people;
r Overall, unemployment rates for minority ethnic groups remain signif-
icantly higher than for the White population, with Bangladeshi and
Black Caribbean males particularly likely to be unemployed (with those
in work receiving lower average earnings than White counterparts);
r Despite improvements in female participation rates over time, only 53
per cent of lone parents were employed in 2003;
r Employment rates for men aged 50–64 fell from 84 per cent in 1979 to
64 per cent in 1993;
r Young people have benefited from government employment initiatives
and the National Minimum Wage but the unemployment rate for 16–
17-year-olds still stands at 21 per cent.
As noted earlier, a key assumption of the risk society thesis is that social
change has a common impact across all social groups and that all citi-
zens tend to respond to risks in a similar way. The traditional structures
and inequalities such as class, gender, and ethnicity are less significant.
According to risk society theories, modern late-industrial societies are in
transition, moving from industrial society towards this risk society. In
the process of reflexive modernization, more and more areas of life are
released from tradition, so that people develop an increasing engagement
with both the private and more public aspects of their lives, aspects
that were previously governed by taken for granted norms. These devel-
opments are what Beck calls ‘individualization’ (Elliot 2002: 295). The
general thrust of individualization theory is that ‘given’ forms of collec-
tive identity have been eroded. Previously existing social forms such as
fixed gender roles, inflexible class locations, and masculinist work models
disintegrate so that identities are no longer simply ascribed but have to
be created by individuals from a range of opportunities and possibilities
(Baxter and Britton 2001; Elliot 2002).
231
In the risk society, traditional political conflicts centred round class,

race, and gender are increasingly superseded by new, globalized risk con-
flicts. Where industrial society is structured through the composition of
social classes, the risk society is individualized. This does not mean that
social inequalities or structuring of opportunities through such attributes
as class, gender, or ethnicity have disappeared. In the early stages of
transition from industrial to risk society, risk and class positions tend to
merge, leaving the most materially disadvantaged most endangered by
risk. The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risks because of
their lack of resources compared with the advantaged. Nevertheless, risk
society theory contends that the influence of traditional markers such as
class, gender, and ethnicity are less significant in the risk society; they
have become less obvious and acknowledged as affecting life chances as
people increasingly make their own choices and become responsible for
reflexively creating their own biographies.
The development of a post-traditional order, social reflexivity, and the
associated social changes produce a society in which people think about
risk and the role of the state in meeting it in a fundamentally different
way. In the risk society, individuals question the ability of the state to
meet their interests and deal with risk but at the same time, individuals
are increasingly confident in their own capacity to cope with the risks
they face (Taylor-Gooby 2001a). The nature of welfare citizenship has thus
changed as well (Edwards and Glover 2001). For Mythen (2005: 139)
Risk society thesis is concerned not only with the individualisation and routinisa-
tion of risk, but also the broader transference of responsibility from institutions to
individuals . . . the rolling back of the state in capitalist cultures has led to a tipping
of the scales of accountability. As governments divest themselves of responsibility
for risk—through privatisation, promotion of private insurance schemes and the
withdrawal of state pensions—health risks are converted into baggage to be han-
dled by the individual.
Individuals are pressed into routinely making decisions about education,

employment, relationships, identity, and politics and to take responsi-
bility for their actions. The ‘semantics of individualization’ (Zinn 2002)
include now familiar terms such as self-realization, self-control, self-
responsibility, and self-management. The arrival of advanced or late
modernity, therefore, is not wholly about risk, it is also about an expan-
sion of choice and opportunity to determine one’s own future. However,
as life courses become (allegedly) dependent on individual decisions, the
pressure increases on individuals to make the right choices or be exposed
232
to considerable pressures if they are frequently forced to acknowledge

their own responsibility for failure (Zinn 2004).
Key Research Themes
Risk society theories have been criticized for their overly rationalistic
and individualistic model of the human subject, for their tendency to
generalize and the failure to pay sufficient attention to the role played
by class, gender, ethnicity, and nationality in constructing differing risk
experiences, in shaping subjectivity and individual life chances (Lash
1993; Alexander 1996; Lupton 1999). However, little empirical research
has been conducted that has sought to examine the speculations of risk
society theories (Lupton and Tulloch 2002; Mythen 2004). In particular,
few studies in the fields of sociology and social policy have specifically
examined social divisions and inequality from a risk society perspec-
tive (exceptions are Baxter and Britton 2001; Ginn 2001; Taylor-Gooby
2001a). There is recognition within risk research of the importance of
cultural and social differences (Lupton 1999; Rohrmann 1999; Lupton
and Tulloch 2002; Tulloch and Lupton 2003). To date, however, empirical
studies have focused mainly on perceptions and responses to risk and
(particularly in youth studies) risk-taking, rather than on differences in
the distribution of risk along the lines of disadvantage and inequality.
Policy research suggests that differences such as disability, sexuality, and
faith (Skeggs 1997; Bottero and Irwin 2003; Burchardt 2003; Molloy,
Knight, and Woodfield 2003; Patrick and John, undated) are also signifi-
cant in shaping life chances but, again, little attention has been paid to
these issues within risk research. There is, however, a significant body of
empirical work on risk which examines agency, individualization, reflex-
ivity, risk-taking, perceptions of, and responses to, risk, as well as more
general empirical work, which indicate the continuing significance of
inequality.
Inequality and risk have emerged as issues in a number of studies,
particularly in youth studies (Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Green, Mitchell,
and Bunton 2000; Mitchell et al. 2001) and in other policy related
research, for example, on pensions and the welfare state (Taylor-Gooby
et al. 1999; Ginn 2001; Ginn and Arber 2001; Kemp and Rugg 2001). The
remainder of the chapter therefore draws on a wider body of literature that
demonstrates the continued significance of inequality in the risk society.
As it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of all literature
233
on inequality, the following sections draw on research from three major

themes within the life course: youth transition to adulthood; access to and
security within the labour market; and older age and retirement. These
three themes provide a framework for an examination of risk society
theories, particularly in relation to individualization, reflexivity, and the
distribution of risk, during the life course. The following sections explore
to what extent traditional social structures and divisions continue to
shape individual life experiences, perceptions of and responses to risk; to
limit reflexivity and constrain choice. Traditional divisions such as social
class and inequalities in income and wealth are considered, as are the
cross-cutting divisions and differences of gender, age, ethnicity, disability,
and sexuality.
Recent Major Findings
Young People and the Transition to Adulthood

The literature on youth transitions seeks to understand the experience of
youth and emerging adulthood in societies where the traditional routes
from school to work and parental home to independent living have
become less secure and fragmented. Furlong and Cartmel (1997) suggest
that if the social order has changed and if social structures have weakened
then we would expect to find evidence of these changes among young
people. They sought to explore whether the traditional parameters which
were previously understood as structuring the life chances of young peo-
ple are still relevant, and the extent to which the terms individualization
and risk convey an accurate picture of the changing life contexts of the
young (1997: 2) through empirical analysis of the social condition of
young people. Vickerstaff (Chapter 9 in this volume) examines similar
issues. Furlong and Cartmel examined changes in education, labour mar-
ket transitions, patterns of dependency, leisure and lifestyle, health, crime
and insecurity, and politics and participation. They concluded that radical
social changes had taken place and that the experiences of young people
growing up in the 1990s are quite different from those encountered by
earlier generations but that social divisions that were seen as shaping
life chances in the past are still of central importance in understanding
structural inequalities in risk society.
The changes in young people’s life contexts are closely linked to the
transformation of the youth labour market which was part of the broader
234
process of economic change in Western economies. These changes have

led to a demand for a better qualified and more highly educated workforce
but, although there are more opportunities for training and education
for all young people, existing social disadvantages have been maintained.
Young people from working class backgrounds and ethnic minorities, in
particular, face a new set of disadvantages in the labour market stemming
from the development of peripheral employment where new forms of
flexible working have increased insecurity and the risk of periodic spells
of unemployment (Furlong and Cartmel 1997).
Furlong and Cartmel (1997) and others (Mitchell et al. 2001) accept that
collective social identities have weakened and that this is reflected in an
individualization of life experiences and a convergence of class cultures.
The growth of the service sector and the decline of traditional manu-
facturing have been associated with the decline of collectivism among
working class youth who now experience, and have to deal with, risk
and insecurity on an individual level. Nevertheless, they remain critical of
the significance which risk society theories attach to changes in the way
individuals interpret the world and subjectively construct social reality,
particularly in relation to individual reflexivity.
Life in late modernity involves subjective discomfort and uncertainty. Young

people can struggle to establish adult identities and maintain coherent biogra-
phies, they may develop strategies to overcome various obstacles, but their life
chances remain highly structured with social class and gender being crucial to an
understanding of experiences in a range of life contexts. (1997: 109)
Other studies of youth tend to concur that young people face increas-
ing risk and uncertainty but that the ways in which these risks are
experienced, perceived, and dealt with are still mediated by traditional
structures such as class, poverty, gender, disability and ethnicity as well
as place. Disabled people, for example, are severely limited in the extent
to which they can exercise choice and act reflexively to create their
own biographies. Morris (2002) highlights the very significant barriers
faced by young disabled people in their transition to adulthood which
relate directly to the disabling societal barriers they face. Young disabled
people with learning difficulties and/or communication impairments, for
example, are often not treated as autonomous, decision-makers. Many
have no experience of an independent social life and few opportunities
to make friends: they spend most of their time with family or paid
carers and have no independent access to transport, telecommunications,
or personal assistance over which they have choice and control. Small,
235
Pawson, and Raghwan (2003) concur and suggest that young adults with
learning difficulties rarely get to exercise their choices in the risk society
as their relationships are tied so closely to their care and support.
Mitchell et al.’s study (2001) of young people growing up in
‘Townsville’, a deprived town in the North East of England, examined
young people’s experiences of risk and identity. They found that young
people may live in an increasingly ‘timeless’ and ‘globalized’ world, as
Furlong and Cartmel (1997) suggest, however, ‘local places’ and ‘spaces’
remain a crucial medium and mediator of lived risk experiences, locality
and neighbourhood still constitute an important dimension of struc-
tured inequality. Subjective feelings of risk are a central feature of young
people’s lives, together with a perceived lack of collective tradition and
security, but perceptions of risk and opportunity are clearly socially
constructed in relation to specific cultural contexts (Green et al. 2000).
Mitchell et al. (2001) also found that young people pursued individ-
ual solutions to wider socio-economic-related insecurities and exclusion,
often opting for sometimes individualized and often highly risky solu-
tions to their problems. For example, Green (2004) in a study of young
mothers working in prostitution found that for some, the risk of not
having enough money to look after their children and be ‘good mothers’
outweighed the risks of prostitution. Whilst risk might be generated ‘at
a distance’ by global and economic processes, risks are not experienced
as such by this group. This leads to what Furlong and Cartmel (1997)
call the ‘epistemological fallacy of late-modernity’; risks are experienced
and addressed individually rather than collectively even though they may
result from wider socio-economic pressures beyond the individual.
Kemp and Rugg (2001) draw on risk society theories to examine the
impact on young people of the change in housing benefit, specifically
the ‘single-room rent restriction’.1 They found most young people were
not the well informed, calculating actors assumed by Beck and Giddens;
young people were constrained by a lack of knowledge, by social class,
and family background. Their degree of choice was heavily constrained
by their low income, by the rules governing the housing benefit scheme,
and by their imperfect knowledge of those rules. The authors conclude it
would be more accurate to say that they were experiencing, not ‘biogra-
phies of choice’, but constrained or ‘semi-dependent’ biographies.
Risk and uncertainty are features of everyday life for young people who
have to negotiate a set of risks that were largely unknown to their parents;
this is true irrespective of class or gender (Furlong and Cartmel 1997).
As the individualization thesis suggests, these risks and uncertainties
236
are experienced and dealt with in an increasingly individualized way

and young people are forced to reflexively negotiate a complex transi-
tion to adulthood. At the same time, studies suggest risks are distributed
in an unequal fashion and correspond closely to traditional lines of dis-
advantage which continue to structure life chances (Furlong and Cartmel
1997).
Access to and Security in the Labour Market

In the risk society, the emergence of cyclical global recessions mean that
unemployment and job insecurity no longer blight only the poorest and
least academically qualified groups in society; the threat of redundancy
is universalized, ‘you can run into anyone down at the unemployment
office’ (Beck 1998: 55). In the risk society employment-related risks and
opportunities ‘are sluiced through the channels of individualization’
(Mythen 2005: 133). As the risk regime develops, employers and the
state lose structural autonomy and control, traditional collective networks
of support and security collapse, and individuals are forced to assume
responsibility for shaping their own biographies (Mythen 2004).
For a majority of people, even in the apparently prosperous middle layers, their
basic existence and life-world will be marked by economic insecurity. More and
more individuals are encouraged to perform as ‘Me and Co’, selling themselves on
the market place. (Beck 2000: 3)
Most commentators agree that there is a consistent trend towards increas-

ing flexibilization, and consequently insecurity and risk of unemploy-
ment, in Britain’s labour market (Ford 1998; Wheelock 1999; Quilgars and
Abbott 2000). However, whilst the labour market may be perceived as a
site of general insecurity, empirical evidence suggests that risks continue
to be unequally distributed. Labour Force Survey figures showed unem-
ployment rates at six times as great for unskilled workers at 12 per cent
in 1997, compared to a low of 2 per cent for professionals (Cebulla et al.
1998). Unskilled workers remain more at risk of recurrent and prolonged
periods of unemployment; gender divides between the sexes continue
to be reproduced through unequal pay, status, and conditions and the
unemployment rate for men from minority groups continues to be dis-
proportionately high. Some working age families in Britain experience
combinations of disadvantage which mean that they are almost certain to
have no work. These disadvantages include being a lone parent; having
low qualifications and skills, being disabled; being aged over 50; living
237
in an area with a high-unemployment rate, and being a member of a

minority ethnic group (Berthoud 2003). There is also evidence to suggest
that gay men and lesbians face discrimination in the workplace (Sussman
1996; Citizens Advice Bureaux 2003). Keogh, Dodds, and Henderson’s
(2004) study of working class gay men found that their sexuality had
adversely affected their education and employment opportunities, many
were unemployed or working in moderately paid jobs that they did not
enjoy.
The Government explicitly recognize that the Disabled population in
general are doing far less well than non-disabled people in the labour mar-
ket (Cabinet Office 2005). Burchardt (2003) writes that this disadvantage
is by no means random and that those who are already significantly dis-
advantaged (in terms of, e.g. being poor or having low educational qual-
ifications) are at significantly greater risk of becoming disabled and sub-
sequently experiencing unemployment or reductions in income. Within
the population of disabled people overall, those with learning difficulties
do even less well. Of an estimated population of 1.2 million, Beyer et al.
(2004) suggest that only 35 per cent of adults with learning difficulties
are in employment. Williams et al. (2004) highlight the barriers to labour
market participation for people with learning difficulties including widely
held beliefs that people with learning difficulties are unable to work,
severe benefit disincentives, difficulties in accessing transport to get to
work, and a lack of information about work options and the rights of
disabled people in the workplace.
The risks and uncertainties which, Beck argues, have permeated all
walks of life, including work and employment, do not have the same
consequences for all. Some individuals have a safety net of their own
in the form of highly marketable skills and knowledge, and this gives
them the confidence to take risks in relation to their employment and
livelihood, for example, giving up well-paid jobs to become self-employed
(Tulloch and Lupton 2003). Disadvantaged social groups, however, expe-
rience higher levels of unemployment, are more likely to be employed
in the peripheral workforce, and continue to habitually live under the
spectre of job insecurity (Mythen 2005).
Quilgars and Abbott (2000) explored the issues of how labour market
risks are perceived and managed within the workplace and the family.
They questioned whether people reflexively reflect on their situations and
act on these thoughts to protect themselves and their families as rational
choice economic theory would suggest. The research demonstrated that
individuals, irrespective of class, age, or gender, believed, as Beck has
238
contended, that the labour market in Britain in the 1990s had become
increasingly risky. Similar findings are reported by Taylor-Gooby (2001a)
in a study of risk and contingency and Tulloch and Lupton (2003) in
their study of people’s understanding of and responses to risk in Australia
and Britain. Respondents in all three studies believed that secure lifetime
employment was no longer a certainty, even among highly educated
professionals. These studies found that people were reflexive about their
labour market positions. They described the changing nature of work, the
implications of global and technological change for their security, and
their future employment prospects, in some cases demonstrating a good,
insightful knowledge of their local labour markets.
One area where risk theory did seem to describe people’s experiences
was in responses in the workplace. Workers in all types of employment
felt relatively powerless in the face of labour market restructuring and
globalization (Quilgars and Abbott 2000). Those in non-manual work felt
more protected from employment risk with some options open to them
to improve their labour market position, but those in manual work had
very little personal autonomy in the workplace. What was striking was the
highly individualized nature of people’s accounts of how they could or
could not minimize the risk of unemployment. They spoke of how they,
as individuals, had to improve and strengthen their position in whatever
way possible, often in competition with others. Collective solutions, most
obviously through trade unions, were absent from discussions.
Where risk theory did not reflect Quilgars and Abbott’s respondent’s
(2000) accounts to the same extent was in discussion of financial plan-
ning. Evidence from this study supports a growing body of work which
demonstrates that people are not as keen to seek individualized solutions
as the risk society thesis might suppose. There were a number of reasons
for their reluctance: many respondents retained a belief in the role of the
state in welfare provision and there was also scepticism of the ability of
the private sector to protect them. Research has also found that people
find it difficult to estimate the risks of certain events happening to them
(such as divorce, ill health, and unemployment) and are often mistaken
about their own futures (Rowlingson 2000; Taylor-Gooby 2001a). In
addition lack of knowledge or financial capability (often, although not
always, associated with low educational levels and class) can be a barrier
to planning. Even where people are both willing and able to think and
plan ahead, their capacity to do so is often limited by economic insecurity
and lack of resources. The majority of respondents in the higher socio-
economic groups in Quilgars and Abbott’s study were heavily involved in
239
financial planning, but for the majority of lower class respondents neither
saving nor investment was an option. As one respondent remarked
[Financial planning is] . . . important if you can afford to do it. But if you can’t afford to
do it, it’s no use talking about something that’s just a pipe dream. (Quilgars and Abbott
2000: 28)
The evidence clearly shows a consistent trend towards increasing flex-

ibilization, and consequently insecurity and risk of unemployment, in
Britain’s labour market. In support of risk society theories, empirical stud-
ies suggest that people are reflexive, they consider the risks they face, and
how these might be avoided, for example by strengthening their labour
market position, often in a highly individualized way. Nevertheless, it
is evident that risk and insecurity in the labour market continue to be
structured by existing inequalities, and that the ability to behave reflex-
ively, to exercise choice, and to plan for contingencies such as unem-
ployment is highly dependent on socio-economic factors and existing
inequalities.
Older Age and Retirement

Theorists of post-modernity have seen older age as a prime site of
the agency, choice, and reflexivity that contemporary society allows
(Giddens 1991; Beck 1992; Gilleard 1996; Gilleard and Higgs 2000). In
the risk society, older people have the opportunity (and the risk) of
decisions about who they want to be in retirement and how they will
live. ‘Retirement has been reinvented as a time of transition to a new
life, rather than simply the end of an old one’ (Hockey and James 2003:
102). Whilst some commentators focus on the opportunities for older
people in the risk society, others focus on the political economy of ageing
and the continuity of experiences structured by class, gender, race, and
other inequalities. Research on the needs of older people with learning
difficulties, for example, suggests that they face great constraints around
making choices in older age (as they often do when younger), that they
enter residential or nursing care at an earlier age and suffer boredom,
and isolation (Foundation for People with Learning Disabilities 2002).
Heaphy, Yip, and Thompson (2003) found that amongst older gay men
and lesbians, discrimination in the workplace had adversely affected their
chances of financial security in old age. An adequate level of income in old
age is obviously an important element (in addition to physical, emotional,
and mental well-being) in maintaining quality of life but research suggests
240
that recent changes in pension policy will do little to alleviate the relative
poverty of many older citizens.
The Government has promised security in retirement for those who
cannot afford to provide for themselves and a strengthened private pen-
sions framework for those who can. In return, it expects individuals,
wherever possible, to provide for their own retirement (Ring 2003). For
Mann (2003: 2)
‘. . . the message is clear; a private pension ensures the consumer is planning and
making choices . . . people with private pensions want to be in control of their
own lives, not dependent on others. Self-reliance is good, dependency bad’.
A climate of risk and uncertainty surrounds pensions and retirement in

the UK as pension schemes collapse, final salary schemes are closed to
new entrants, and many of those who have taken out personal pensions
have seen the value of their savings diminish. Research suggests that
it is the less well off who are at most risk, they are likely to have the
greatest difficulty in understanding the pensions market, be unable to
find or afford advice, and find themselves at greater risk of falling into
reliance upon means tested state provision (Ring 2003). Yet it is these very
groups, the low to medium earners, that the government is particularly
encouraging to make some or more provision.
Poverty and inequality in old age is largely a result of disadvantage,
during working life, of low pay, and/or exclusion from the labour market.
As Fennell, Phillipson, and Evers (1988: 93) note ‘it is in the retirement
transition that the individual calls upon the resources he or she has
developed during the early and middle phases of the life-cycle.’ A mea-
sure of exclusion is built into private and occupational pension schemes
due to the way the labour market and pension funds operate (see the
discussion of insurance in Chapter 2). The inherent limitations include
actuarial assumptions based on the length of employment, contribution
records and age of retirement, access to the sort of employment that
provides a pension, discrimination within, and the imperfections of the
labour market and, more recently, employer demands for a more flex-
ible workforce, less full-time employment, and less people on perma-
nent contracts. Most significantly, occupational pensions and provisions
based on labour market access offer nothing to those whose work is
unpaid—mainly women who remain at greater risk of poverty in old age
(Mann 2003).
Ginn (2001) raises the question of whether women’s pension prospects
are likely to improve in the future. It is clear that the current government
241
expects most mothers of school age children to be in employment, but

gaps for child rearing and other caring responsibilities (e.g. for elderly
relatives) will continue to reduce the years of pension contributions and
also future earnings prospects. In a privatized pension system the lower
lifetime earnings of those who undertake caring commitments translate
directly into lower pension income. In contrast, state pensions (basic
and earnings related) can protect women by compensating for breaks
in employment and lower earnings whilst providing family care. If the
basic pension is allowed to wither away, increasing numbers of lone older
women will face means testing, whilst many working age women are also
likely to find their second-tier pension insufficient to compensate for the
lower basic pension, drawing them into means testing.
Ginn and Arber (2001) examine the extent of ethnic disadvantage in
private pension scheme arrangements and analyse variation according
to gender and specific ethnic group, using three years of the British
Family Resources Survey, which provides information on over 97,000
adults aged 20–59, including over 5,700 from ethnic minorities. They
found both men and women in minority ethnic groups were less likely
to have private pension coverage than their white counterparts, but the
extent of difference was most marked for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. A
minority ethnic disadvantage in private pension coverage, for both men
and women, remained after taking account of age, marital and parental
status, years of education, employment variables, class, and income.
The research suggests that minority ethnic groups—especially women—
will be disproportionately dependent on means-tested benefits in later
life, due to the combined effects of low private pension coverage and
the policy of shifting pension provision towards the private sector. The
short employment records of the largely migrant older ethnic population,
discriminatory processes operating in the labour market against ethnic
minorities, limited type and availability of jobs in areas of settlement, and
lack of language fluency and certain cultural norms may all contribute
to a lower lifetime income and hence to poorer pension entitlements in
old age compared with the white majority (Ginn and Arber 2001; Pilley
2003). However, there is considerable diversity among different minority
ethnic groups: the extent of disadvantage in lifetime earnings relative to
the majority white population varies, depending on migration timing
and circumstances as well as other factors. Further, since gender and
class influence employment participation and pension arrangements, it is
likely that structural inequalities exist within each minority ethnic group
(Ginn and Arber 2001).
242
It is clear that in pension provision, as in other areas of welfare policy,

there is (and will continue to be) a hierarchy of risk that corresponds
with some very traditional forms of social inequality and with different
elements of the social division of labour. From this perspective, Giddens’
and new Labour’s ‘third way’ appear:
blinkered by traditional definitions of welfare and dependency. . . . It also returns

us to a very traditional road paved with Victorian ideas of self-help and pop-
ulated by the ‘reflexive’ professional middle classes . . . the dismissal of public
pensioners (most whom will be working class women) as embedded in a cul-
ture of dependency is offensive. It neglects the hierarchy or privileges—and the
greater risks—imposed by the different elements of the social division of welfare.
(Mann 2003: 14–15)
Empirical evidence suggests that, in accordance with the risk society

thesis, individualization is becoming a feature of everyday life. Beck’s
appreciation of the inherently unstable quality of ‘tightrope biographies’
resonates with the uncertainties and insecurities faced by many people in
western cultures who are faced with the constant demands of planning
and shaping their futures and living with uncertainty. However, whilst
research studies provide some support for the contention that the broader
structuring factors characteristic of industrial society may have weakened
somewhat in their influence in the contemporary era, particularly in the
move towards individualization, it can be seen that they are still impor-
tant (Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Lupton 1999: 113; Elliot 2002). Despite
promising greater scope for creativity and choice, individualization tends
to underplay the influence of structural inequalities that empirical evi-
dence shows still exist and shape the lives of individual actors and groups
(Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Taylor-Gooby 2001a, 2001b; Mitchell et al.
2001). However, as these empirical studies suggest, it does appear that
whilst many groups and individuals continue to face similar risks as in
the past, for example, poverty and unemployment, the way risks are
perceived and experienced has changed. In the risk society, inequalities
are viewed as individualized, perceived as ‘psychological dispositions: as
personal inadequacies, guilt feelings, anxieties, conflicts, and neuroses’
(Beck 1992: 100).
As individuals assume a greater role in making their own choices
then too they assume greater responsibility for the consequences of
243
their choices and actions (Mythen 2004; Zinn 2004). To choose the
wrong kind of university degree, occupation, or marriage partner, to
become unemployed, or to have an inadequate pension tend to be
considered the outcome of an individual’s faulty planning or decision-
making rather than the outcome of broader social processes (Warde
1994; Lupton 1999; Zinn 2002). Social crises such as mass unemploy-
ment are reduced to aggregates of individual failures, a lack of skills on
the part of the individual rather than a general decline in demand for
labour stemming from world economic recession. The individualization
of risk may mean that situations which would once have led to a call
for political action are now interpreted as something which can only
be solved on an individual level through personal action (Furlong and
Cartmel 1997).
The adoption of third way approaches in social policy serves to justify
policies which stress individual responsibility but such policies tend to
support the interests of groups whose material and cultural resources
make them most able to deal with the contingencies of risk society
and confront the interests of those groups least able to meet the needs
they experience (Taylor-Gooby 2001a). Risk society theory implies value-
consensus and social changes are understood as applying equally to all
members in society whereas the empirical evidence suggests that some
groups are more vulnerable to risks. There is a danger, as Mann (2003)
and others have argued, that the needs of the most vulnerable and disad-
vantaged, those who are unable to behave in a calculating, rational way
will be neglected. As noted above, individuals are also likely to be blamed
for their decisions, their behaviour, or their inability to save or to meet
their own needs.
The attack on ‘dependency culture’ reveals a hatred of the very idea of dependency
and a refusal (and one which also finds support within some radical voices within
social policy) to accept that some people need continuing support to cope with
their lives. There seems to be real contempt around for people who cannot or will
not be ‘empowered’ at the moment, especially if they are not obviously physically
incapacitated in some way. (Hoggett 2001: 44)
The unrelenting reproduction of inequalities in Western Europe sug-

gests that social class remains a significant yardstick of life chances in
contemporary society. Access to material resources continues to be the
key determinant of action and it is therefore unlikely that the radical
restructuring of cultural experience outlined in the risk society thesis has
transpired (Elliot 2002; Mythen 2005). Regardless of whether class identity
244
has weakened, empirical evidence suggests that the degree and intensity
of individualization continues to be mediated by existing inequalities
of class, gender, ethnicity, and age as well as other differences such as
sexuality and disability. Different social groups are destined to encounter
contrasting life experiences, with insecurity and risk being concentrated
amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged.
Note
1. The single room rent, which apples only to single claimants under 25 years
of age living in privately rented accommodation, is effectively a ceiling on
the maximum rent that can be taken into account when housing benefit is
calculated. It does not directly affect the amount of rent a landlord can charge
which can lead to a shortfall between what a young person receives in benefit
and the amount they pay in rent.
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12
The Media and Risk
Emma Hughes, Jenny Kitzinger, and Graham Murdock
The Context: Media Attention and ‘Expert’ Assessment
The column inches of newspaper space and the minutes of television time
devoted to risk rarely neatly parallel scientifically defined hierarchies. A
death from an aeroplane accident is 6,000 times more likely to make the
front page than a death from cancer, and nuclear accidents receive far
greater attention than the fatalities caused by smoking (Greenberg et al.
1989). Nor do patterns of media attention parallel the actual trajectory
of any particular threat. For example, coverage of salmonella poison-
ing dramatically decreased, whilst actual incidents increased (Miller and
Reilly 1995). Conversely, coverage of river pollution has risen whilst pol-
lution levels have declined (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992: 206). Observing
these variations risk professionals are often tempted to complain that
journalists exaggerate risks that pose little threat to the public and play
down those that do. This ignores the very different roles the two groups
play. Professional risk assessment is in the business of calculating how
likely a threat is (probability) and how widespread its effects will be
(magnitude). Unlike pre-modern notions of ‘fate’ or ‘misfortune’ how-
ever, contemporary ideas of risk also involve discussions of controllability
and preventability, and this inevitability places them firmly in the
social and political arena raising difficult questions of accountability and
blame.
Historically, journalists have been assigned three major roles in mod-
ern democracies; providing full, reliable, and disinterested informa-
tion on developments that affect collective life; organizing an open
arena for voicing and debating public anxieties and concerns; and
250
The Media and Risk
operating as a watchdog on the performance of corporate and governmen-

tal power centres, checking for failures, evasions, and abuses. These roles
are now performed in a context in which publics in western democracies
have become progressively mistrustful of both politicians and experts
(particularly those employed by governments or major corporations)
and increasingly concerned about the implications of techno-scientific
developments both for the environment and for human health (Beck
1992). They suspect those in power of pursuing their own sectional or
professional agendas rather than upholding the public interest (Petts,
Horlick-Jones, and Murdock 2001). Consequently, a great deal of risk
coverage is taken up with scrutinizing scientific innovations, company
activities, and government policies. During the 2001 anthrax attacks
in the USA, for example, the press took the opportunity to assess ‘the
strengths and weaknesses of the nation’s public health infrastructure [and]
the political and policy backgrounds against which this infrastructure
operates’ (Winett and Lawrence 2005: 3).
The issue of preparedness (or lack of it) for future anthrax attacks
was pushed onto the public agenda by suspected terrorist action, but
media attention can also be prompted by more broadly based political
action. Mazur’s work, for example, has shown that the degree of media
interest in nuclear power paralleled the number of participants in the
largest anti-nuclear demonstration in each year (cited in Dunwoody and
Peters 1992: 206–7). In both cases coverage was picking up on the social
and political concerns of readers and audiences. Rather than seeing the
media’s role as a simple ‘mirror’ for expert definitions and assessments
of risk these writers argue that it is entirely appropriate that news cov-
erage should take account of issues around risk management, account-
ability, justice, and the possibilities for action, rather than simply focus
on the likelihood or magnitude of a threat (Lichtenberg and MacLean
1991: 165–7).
Major Research Themes: Modelling

Mediation—Transportation and Construction
These disagreements about the way media should operate in complex

democracies are indicative of a deeper division between two very dif-
ferent models of how mediated communication works, which have led
to two different traditions of research. Professional risk managers and
researchers have tended to see media as transportation systems whose
251
The Media and Risk
main role is to disseminate the risk information and assessments arrived

at by experts with the minimum amount of alteration, interference, and
‘noise’. Borrowing metaphors from engineering they envisage newspapers
and broadcasting stations as relay posts transmitting messages about
risk to individual receivers who then decode and assimilate them. Even
in its more sophisticated variants, represented by the influential social
amplification of risk (SARF) model developed by Kasperson and his col-
laborators (see Kasperson and Kasperson 1996), this model cannot deal
adequately with the complex social and symbolic organization of risk
communication. In transportation accounts the media system is all too
often presented as a black box, an undifferentiated institutional nexus,
rather than a highly differentiated field of action in which media orga-
nizations compete for audience time and attention in clearly demar-
cated markets, tabloid and broadsheet, commercial and public service,
governed by different rules, requirements, and pressures. The emphasis
on information transfer and the dominant metaphor of ‘message’ relay
is too one dimensional to catch the way additional layers of meaning
are generated by the connotations carried by key phrases and images.
Audiences are viewed primarily as individuals rather and as members of
social networks embedded in specific social location that offer access to
particular kinds of resources for interpretation and response (see Murdock,
Petts, and Horlick-Jones 2003). As a result the transportation approach
has tended to be replaced by approaches which emphasize the part
played by different actors and forces in the social construction of media
messages.
In this conception, risk communication is seen as a continual process
of construction. Journalists and programme makers produce risk accounts
out of the materials obtained through established routines of surveillance,
search, and assembly. Language and imagery combine on the page or on
the screen to assemble a range of meanings. Audiences draw on their
stock of interpretive resources to develop their own interpretations and
then take them for discursive outings in the course of everyday talk
and argument. Since most recent research on risk communication has
worked with some variant or other of this constructionist approach,
it forms the main focus for this chapter. We review recent research
across these three areas, examining the role of journalists and institu-
tions in making the news, the interaction between the imagery which
informs media messages and the reality communicated, and the role
of audiences in actively contributing to the interpretation of media
output.
252
The Media and Risk
Recent Findings: Making the News
The news media are both complex organizations working with finite
resources and tight deadlines and (with the major exception of public
broadcasting organizations) commercial businesses competing for audi-
ences and advertisers. These two institutional features combine to shape
the routine coverage of risk in powerful and predicable ways and help
to determine which risks attract attention, how, when, who, why, and
under what conditions. In examining how these decisions get to be made,
researchers have identified two key factors; the organization of the pro-
duction process (particularly the imperative of meeting daily deadlines)
and the way the relations between journalists and their sources are orga-
nized; and journalists’ professional conceptions of what makes a ‘good’
story (the features that make an event newsworthy and the properties of
an impactful image, photograph, or piece of film).
Sources and Relations

Source–journalist relations have a major impact on how stories are ini-
tially defined or ‘framed’. The initial British press stories voicing concerns
about GM foods and crops, for example, frequently referred to the earlier
BSE (Mad Cow disease) crisis (Murdock 2004). By establishing this parallel
they invited readers to look for a repeat of the government’s prevarica-
tion, deception, and perceived lack of concern with public health. This
frame gained ground because there was no settled scientific consensus
on the long-term impacts of GM foods. Since the evidence was itself at
issue (Hargreaves and Ferguson 2000) demands from the government and
the established scientific community for factual accuracy in reporting
made little headway and the way was left open for critical and opposi-
tional voices to set the agenda. Eventually, the government was forced
to respond to public concern by establishing an independent national
debate on the issues, GM Nation?, supported by a series of sustained
investigations into possible impacts (see Understanding Risk Team 2004).
This remains however an exception. Generally, research shows that the
media privilege ‘official sources’: (Stallings 1990; Scahnne and Meier 1992)
and that press releases and announcements of policy initiatives are a
key source of news stories. Releasing information at pre-arranged press
conferences with carefully arranged deadlines consolidates the power of
official voices. Information that can be attributed to an ‘official’ source is
less likely to be scrutinized for validity than information from ‘alternative’
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sources. Journalists will often rely on the ‘bureaucratically visible’ rather

than those with most direct expertise (Shepherd 1981; Dunwoody and
Peters 1992). They may also feel freer to present ‘contentious’ statements
if these can be identified as official. A lack of policy events will often
mean a lack of media interest. Journalists and editors interviewed in the
mid 1990s, for example, commented that genetics was not a ‘big news
story’ because of the lack of legislation, and those talking about BSE
commented that as ‘nothing was happening’ it was no longer of media
interest (Kitzinger and Reilly 1997).
Where reporting about risks involves a crisis, such as a sudden flash
flood, this privileging of official voices is likely to be even more prominent
and journalists will often seek out an ‘information-csar’, relying on a sin-
gle official source which they feel to be reliable and trustworthy (Schanne
and Werner 1992: 152). In the face of tight deadlines in a ‘disaster’
journalists will turn to those agencies seen to have responsibility for a
specific topic. Early reports therefore may frame the crisis in ways which
exclude the perspectives of ‘opposition groups’, except where there are
established patterns of contact (Stallings 1990; Freudenburg et al. 1996).
However, journalists may shift the ground rules once the immediate
crisis is past and they redefine a story as a ‘risk story’. They may then
become more critical of official sources, concerned about motives and
open to treating different positions as legitimate (Dunwoody and Peters
1992). They may also take more account of the speaker’s willingness to
go beyond formal risk assessment statements to comment on political
problems and solutions. Sources on different sides of a debate may differ
in their willingness to do this. If official sources are seen to ‘hold back’ on
journalists, they will be more prepared to seek out alternative opinions
and give a platform to ‘mavericks’ (Kitzinger and Reilly 1997).
Journalist-source relations are not shaped solely by journalists’ choices
and preferences, however. The resources commanded by ‘claims mak-
ers’ seeking (or responding) to media attention also play a major role.
Government and corporate sources have bigger budgets and teams of
dedicated PR people. This enables them to stay in the definitional contest
to frame issues for longer. In the first phase of US press coverage of silicone
breast implants in the 1990s, for example, coverage focused on the health
risks and featured testimony from women who alleged they had been
damaged. Following a major public relations campaign by the leading
manufacturer, Corning, however, later coverage was dominated by indus-
try assurances that implants were safe (Powers and Andsager 1999). Also,
as Hansen argues, in his case study of Greenpeace’s occupation of the
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redundant Brent Spar oil platform designed to prevent Shell from sinking
it in the North Sea, whilst critical voices can command news attention
for their claims through dramatic, highly visual, actions they have much
more difficulty controlling the way their claims are framed and inflected
by individual newspapers. Whereas the left of centre tabloid, the Daily
Mirror, hailed Shell’s decision not to sink the rig as a ‘Victory For the
People’, the conservative broadsheet, the Daily Telegraph, attacked it as ‘A
Triumph for the Forces of Ignorance’ (Hansen 2000). Governments on the
other hand often have less room for manoeuvre than corporations and the
efficacy of official sources may be undermined by bureaucratic and polit-
ical restrictions (inhibiting them from providing a quick and ‘quotable’
response to journalists’ enquiries). Alternative sources may have ‘better’
resources in terms of being able to process requests quickly, provide vivid
quotes, and produce ‘human interest’ stories or dramatic demonstrations
that make for good pictures (Kitzinger 1998; Miller et al. 1998).
These requirements stem from a wider set of journalistic conceptions
of what makes a good story. These ‘news values’ are shared by reporters
working in widely different news organizations and help account for the
relatively stability of general patterns of risk coverage.
Constructing Newsworthiness
The media will tend to focus on risks which kill or injure many people
at one time (e.g. a plane crash), rather than those which have a cumula-
tive effect over the year (e.g. car crashes) (see Singer and Endreny 1987;
Hansen 1994). Routine sources of danger (such as traffic accidents) are
less newsworthy than sudden catastrophes and unusual risks are more
attractive than common risks (Dunwoody and Peters 1992: 205). Report-
ing also tends to be ‘event’ orientated rather than issue orientated (Kris-
tiansen 1988). A crisis such as a famine will attract attention; the process
which leads up to this crisis has little media value (a tendency which
has dire consequences for commitments to prevent, rather than simply
respond to, such problems).
The reporting of risk is also influenced by the pace at which a threat
unfolds and how evidence is marshalled and procedures launched as
‘news events’. Long-term and continuous developments (such as envi-
ronmental degradation) have less chance of breaking into news pro-
duction cycles because journalists are concerned with the ‘news of the
day’ (Hansen 1991). A geographically bounded event—such as an oil
spill—will also provide a more media friendly crisis than one without
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a ‘news centre’. To counter these structural biases environmental activists

have become skilled at creating news events that fit compressed time
frames whilst highlighting longer term risks and which offer journalists
dramatic images that encapsulate the core arguments and allow people
to visualize an invisible or hidden risk. During the campaign against the
commercial planting of GM crops in Britain, protest groups around the
country invaded fields hosting trial plantings and ripped up crops dressed
in the same kind of white protection suits as those worn by the workers
who entered the Chernobyl nuclear power station after fire had destroyed
the reactor. By establishing an instantly recognizable association between
the alleged health and environmental impacts of GM and the proven
environmental contamination and cancer clusters caused by the failure
the Chernobyl plant these highly photogenic costumes created a powerful
image of widespread, long-lasting, contamination (Murdock 2004).
Another key factor influencing media attention, particularly in the
tabloid press, is the existence of a ‘human angle’ to the story, a personal
face to the tragedy (Hansen 1994). News stories about risk often feature
personal accounts—the soldier claiming to suffer from gulf war syndrome,
the parents who believe their child’s autism was caused by vaccination,
and the father who protests that the allegations of abuse made against
him by his adult daughter are liable to be false memories induced by psy-
choanalysis. The ability of personal accounts to engage audience interest
can get a risk onto the news agenda in spite of official denials (Kitzinger
1998; Boyce 2005). However, the other side of this coin is that when a
risk is still hypothetical and there are no proven victims to talk to, a story
is less attractive to journalists. For example, it was not until journalists
could interview people suffering from the brain disease associated BSE
that media attention fully re-focused on the problem (Kitzinger and Reilly
1997). Emerging diseases with long gestation periods may thus not attract
media attention until it is ‘too late’.
Journalists’ judgements about the perceived relevance of a risk will be
influenced by the degree of cultural, political, or geographical proximity
of the threat to themselves and their perceived audiences (Adams 1986;
Lichtenberg and MacLean 1991; Kitzinger 1998). For example, when 52
people died in a terrorist attack in the London underground and on a
bus in July 2005 this received front page coverage across the UK media.
The dead and injured were honoured and commemorated by an official
two minute silence and the threat of future attacks discussed at length.
However, far less attention is paid to the threats posed to civilians in other
countries. In Iraq, for example, almost twenty-five thousand civilians
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were killed between March 2003 and 2005—the equivalent of the London
bombings every two days, day in, day out, for three years. These deaths
barely registered in the UK media (in contrast to reports of every death of
a British soldier involved in the conflict) (Kirby and Davies 2005).
The cultural obsession with celebrity also structures risk reporting, par-
ticularly in tabloid titles, ensuring that risks which impact on stars and
public personalities are likely to get more attention than those that simply
affect the ‘ordinary person’. As a consequence, we may come to know
about the threat of different diseases through the lens of celebrity afflic-
tions (Rogers and Chang 1991). Where the tragedy strikes, and to whom,
is therefore a key factor in determining the extent of attention it receives.
Although the cross-national reach of the contemporary mass media offers
a potential basis for the emergence of an increasing global civil cosmopoli-
tan sensibilities in ways which support environmental responsibilities
(Szerszynski and Toogood 2000) in practice reporting about risk often
gets caught up in discourses of national (or ethnic or religious) self-
interest. Risks are often portrayed as originating elsewhere and crossing
national borders through immigration and tourism (‘terrorism’), imports
and smuggling (proscribed GM materials), or bird migration (avian flu).
Who is identified as a source of threat is also significant in determining
the extent of media interest often a problematic aspect of media reporting.
This can be illustrated by looking at the risk to children of murder or sex-
ual assault. Research shows that journalists are much more interested in
the threat posed by strangers than that posed by relatives. The abduction
and murder of children by strangers is cause for national shock and alarm.
But headlines such as: ‘WEEP, 3 children murdered in 100 hrs as Britain
sinks to a new low’ (Sun, 14 August 1991) ignore the evidence that 150 to
200 children meet their death every year at the hands of their own mother
or father. One child is killed in this way every few days, year in, year out
(NSPCC 1992). Stranger-danger stories, however, have far greater appeal
to journalists. They offer a clear ‘other’ to be made a villain of the piece—
‘the predatory paedophile’ and the random and public nature of such
attacks makes every reader or viewer feel that their child is potentially at
risk from the ‘pervert on the loose’. By contrast, journalists see cases of
abduction or sexual assault by relatives as less palatable to their listeners,
readers, or viewers (see Kitzinger 2004).
As we noted earlier, questions of accountability and blame often fea-
ture prominently in risk reporting. The ability to blame someone (an
official, an institution, the government) may be an important criterion
in attracting the media to a story (Sandman, Weinstein, and Klotz 1987).
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Scientific uncertainty is not necessarily attractive to journalists, but con-

troversy is (Kitzinger and Reilly 1997). Media interest tends be heightened
where there is overt conflict between stakeholders (Peters 1995), perceived
government failures, or clear evidence of vested interests promoting a par-
ticular position or attempting to silence or discredit oppositional voices
(Miller and Reilly 1995). By the same token, a story may disappear from
public view once blame is seen to lie at the door of ordinary individuals
rather than experts or those in authority. For example, the salmonella in
eggs story was ‘resolved’ once consumers rather than producers were seen
to be at fault (Miller and Reilly 1995).
Recent Findings
From Actuality to Fiction

Up until now we have concentrated on news reporting of risk since that
is what most of the research to date has focused on. However, if we want
to understand how risk is represented in contemporary public culture and
how these representations provide resources for everyday understandings
and misunderstandings it is vital to take account of non-news media,
particularly fiction. Whilst in some ways the news media are ill adapted
for addressing potential risks (as opposed to crises or disasters which
have already occurred) fiction is a rich mine of imagery and narratives
about the future and a major cultural space in which to explore issues
of ethics, power, and responsibility. A systematic comparison of how
human genetic research was represented in news and fiction over one year
found that fictional formats were much more able to represent aspects
of the ethical and social conflict around genetic developments and that
it was through fiction, rather than news reporting, that the media most
thoroughly explored some of the challenges that new genetic knowledge
might present to individuals in the future (Kitzinger et al. 2000). This is an
exception however. To date, comparatively little systematic research has
been done in this area by scholars interested in risk, but we can usefully
sketch in some of the key issues by looking more closely at the most
famous popular fiction of risk, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.
Originally published in 1818 it was adapted for the stage five years
later as, Presumption: Or the Fate of Frankenstein, and has enjoyed contin-
ued currency in western popular culture ever since, providing the basis
for countless comic books, cartoons, films, and fancy dress costumes
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(Graham 2002). In the process it has become ‘the governing myth of

modern biology’ (Turney 1998: 3), a readily available reservoir of images
and discourse that has been drawn on in successive debates on the impli-
cations of the next wave of genetic research and its applications.
As the GM debate in Britain illustrates, it offered powerful symbolic
ammunition to critics of incorporating GM ingredients into foodstuffs
and allowing commercial plantings. Protesters dressed as the monster
appeared on demonstrations and picket lines. The tag ‘Frankenstein
Foods’ achieved widespread currency in news reports and formed the basis
of the public campaign against GM launched by the Daily Mail, Britain’s
second largest circulation national daily paper. Another best selling daily,
the Daily Mirror, drew on the image of Baron Frankenstein’s obsessive
pursuit of his project and his total disregard for other people’s opinion, to
produce a font page lampooning Tony Blair’s support for the GM industry.
Headed, ‘The Prime Monster: Fury as Blair says: I eat Frankenstein Food
‘and it’s Safe’ ’ it carried a digitally manipulated portrait of the Prime
Minister in the image of the monster made famous by Boris Karloff in
the 1931 film of the story (Murdock 2004).
Frankenstein is the pre-eminent tale of science overreaching its proper
limits and of reason producing technologies that their creators can no
longer control. It belongs firmly in the Gothic tradition of narratives that
challenged the Enlightenment ideal of ‘progress’ with its axial assumption
that the practical application of scientific breakthroughs would produce
a continuous stream of individual benefits and social betterment. Later
science fictions, however, were as likely to be utopian as dystopian. When
Gernsbach, the founder of modern science fiction, launched his magazine
Amazing Stories in 1926, he set out to champion progressivism and tech-
nological benevolence (Graham 2002: 27). This positive deployment of
futuristic images is still very much in play in contemporary discussions.
For example, in the debates about the risks of changing the law to allow
embryos to be used in stem cell research it was proponents of these moves,
not their opponents, who referred to science fiction scenarios (Kitzinger
and Williams 2005).
Understanding Risk
The webs of meanings offered by media accounts and representations of
risk, both factual and fictional, provide one of the key sources that people
can draw on in developing their own understandings and responses. As
we mentioned at the outset however, constructionist accounts of sense
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making see this process as always and everywhere thoroughly social.

Instead of looking for direct relations between individualized consump-
tion and personalized responses this approach explores how mediated
accounts intersect with grounded experience and vernacular knowledge,
how people’s present responses are shaped by their past biographies, and
how provisional interpretations are continually tested, modified, or con-
firmed through everyday conversation and argument. The guiding image
is of diverse publics with a variety of ‘biographical and social histories’
drawing on ‘a number of circuits of communication in facing a wide range
of risks’ in a diversity of concrete circumstances (Tulloch and Lupton
2001: 5; Tulloch and Lupton 2003).
In this approach the notion of a simple ‘hypodermic’ effect on our
perceptions is decisively rejected and the media’s role in informing public
responses to risk is seen as part of more complex sociocultural process. We
come to risk stories already ‘primed with culturally learned assumptions
and weightings’ (Douglas 1992: 58; cited in Lutpon 1999: 37) and we
have other sources of knowledge, which rather than being dismissed as
superstition or ignorance can be seen as ‘lay expertise’ (Wynne 1996).
Attention to micro-narratives of how people assess risk shows that our
responses are reflective and strongly shaped by both our social location
(Tulloch and Lupton 2003: 132) and our negotiations of our self-identity
(as belonging or not belonging to an at risk group) (Macgill 1989). This
does not mean, however, that the media are without influence or that
their impact is impossible to identify.
Media-oriented research suggests that the quantity of media coverage
accorded to different types of risk can help inform how we think about
safety and danger by helping to set the agenda for concern informing
different waves of public anxiety at different points—concern shifting
from worries about particular diseases, to the ‘problem’ of ‘young people
today’, illegal drugs or the threats associated with the internet or terror-
ism. Sometimes the sheer amount of media attention to the potential of
a risk can set the agenda, even if the bulk of reporting concludes that the
risk is negligible. This was clearly the case in the flurry of attention to the
safety of the MMR (mumps, measles, and rubella) vaccine. The very fact
that the media gave extensive attention to debates about the vaccine’s
safety, even if most coverage came down on the side of the vaccine, raised
questions about a previously routinely accepted medical procedure. By
getting people to think about the MMR vaccine the media set the scene
for a change in take-up rates that, policymakers feared, could lead to a
disease epidemic (Petts and Niemeyer 2004: 13; Boyce 2005).
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Usually, however, it is not just a question of the extent of reporting, the

nature of the coverage is also significant. Research exploring what people
recall from media reports, how they relate to media representations, and
how they use these materials in constructing their own sense of risks is
a vital part of understanding the media’s role and reveals a much more
multi-layered and complicated picture than simply exploring the media’s
agenda setting role.
Research into our ‘geographies of fear’ suggests that the media impact
on where we feel threatened, and by whom (and how we defend ourselves
against, or attack, those who we identify as being a threat). For example,
media reporting routinely associates mental illness with random violent
assaults when the evidence shows that they are much more likely to injure
themselves than other people. Empirical research with audiences suggests
that, in the absence of news offering alternative images of the mentally ill,
this link increases fear and misunderstanding (Philo 1996). Similarly the
media often associate mental illness, mental disability, or ‘deviance’ (such
as being gay) with paedophilia. This not only makes it hard for a woman
to believe that her respectable, socially skilled, and apparently ‘normal’
husband might be capable of abuse but also feeds into vigilante attacks
on gay men or those with mental illness or disabilities (Kitzinger 2004).
There is often a strong disjuncture between the patterns of violence
logged by police statistics or in-depth academic research and those
mapped out by news reporting. For example, news reports tend to focus
on the threat to women out alone at night, yet it is young men who are
most likely to be attacked in the street, whilst women are more vulnerable
in their own homes (Weaver, Carter, and Stanko 2000). A similarly skewed
picture is presented by the coverage of child sexual abuse. Ninety-six
per cent of newspaper articles about how to protect children focus on
threats from strangers whilst only 4 per cent even partially address abuse
by fathers, uncles, step-fathers, brothers, and other family members, the
most common category of abuse identified through organizations which
work with children (Kitzinger 2004). Focus groups with members of the
public suggest that the sheer quantity of coverage devoted to children
being abducted can bring stranger-danger to the forefront of our thinking.
It also shows that stranger-danger stories may be particularly memorable
for readers because parents may identify with the distress of the distraught
family and the outrage of the shocked community. The iconographic
image of the abducted child in their school uniform, released by the
police, may strike a chord with every viewer; indeed, they probably have
a similar school photograph on their own mantelpiece. The setting of
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the search, from the play ground to surrounding waste land, could be
‘anywhere’. The narrative structure of stranger abductions is also very
powerful—readers eagerly follow the story as the police first announce
that the child is missing, the search proceeds, the parents appeal for his
or her safe return, and finally, all too often, the body is then found and the
search for the murderer begins. The figure of the threatening other is also
very easy to process. The predatory paedophile is a monster of common
imagination.
However, simply to blame the media for the widespread focus on
‘stranger-danger’ rather than other forms of sexual abuse, including
incest, is to ignore the role of other factors in the forming of our fears.
Media accounts of children being abducted and sexually assaulted by
strangers are important in making us fear the threat that strangers can
pose to children but a constructionist approach also alerts us to the
possible importance of other circuits of communication. The circulation
of everyday knowledge in routine conversation between friends and
acquaintances is also key in supporting the focus on some sources of
threat, and not others. The ‘social currency’ of different types of risk
knowledge (the extent to which it is publicly shared or not) may also play
a role in shaping everyday understandings of risk. When an unknown
man behaves suspiciously around children (e.g. hanging around outside
a school offering sweets) this becomes a matter for public knowledge. The
head teacher may send out letters of warning and parents will exchange
their concerns outside the school gate. By contrast, when a child is dis-
covered to have been sexually abused within a family this is usually kept
a closely guarded secret.
As the above thumbnail sketch around stranger-danger suggests, there
are some common factors which seem to impact on how people receive
risk narratives. These include the power of visual images and specific
phrases, the use of narrative drama, the impact of personal accounts, and
the role of identification. Although none of these factors should be seen
as acting in isolation they each merit sustained investigation.
Sometimes a picture is worth a thousand words. Indeed, sometimes
images may undercut messages presented in the text or narration of a
news story or broadcast. For example, the dramatic and recurring image
of people dying of AIDS wasting away, which was so often displayed in
the early days of the AIDS crisis, undermined health education attempts
to inform the public that people with HIV usually display no symptoms
at all (Miller et al. 1998). Similarly, in-depth research into how peo-
ple responded to a documentary about nuclear power found that the
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The Media and Risk
disturbing and ‘unnatural’ image of a steaming pond next to a nuclear

power station conveyed a powerful sense of threat to viewers, even when
the narrator explained that the steam was produced by the hot water used
in the cooling towers (Corner et al. 1990).
As we noted in our discussion of ‘Frankenstein Foods’ the promotion
of specific labels, phrases, and words can be powerful carriers of ideas
about risk. For example, the precise (or imprecise) language used in media
discussion of disease risks can help to inform how people think about
transmission. In the early days of the AIDS crisis journalists routinely
wrote about the risk of ‘body fluids’ (preferring not to specify terms such
as ‘semen’ which might be unpalatable over the breakfast table). One
consequence of this language was that it left some people believing that
HIV could easily be spread via saliva. After all, they argued, saliva must be
dangerous because it is a body fluid. Again, though, the role of broader
cultural categories needs to be considered. If the term body fluids alone
were shaping perceptions, then tears should be seen as equally dangerous.
The fact that they were not suggests other factors were also coming into
play such as deep cultural ideas about purity and pollution.
The way in which an account is organized as a narrative may be as
important as the details of what is said. For example, a documentary
examining leukaemia clusters around the nuclear power plant Sellafield
was told through an account of one family’s quest for understanding
and justice around their child’s illness. This structure proved crucial in
shaping how people related to the documentary. Corner and his col-
leagues argue that the family tragedy scenario prevented people assimi-
lating other information and debate even when it is clearly included in
a text. They conclude: ‘the sheer power of the depiction it offered of one
family’s tragedy, backed up by the programme’s own “dark” framing of
the industry . . . tended to crystallise meanings at the lower level for our
respondents, leaving the wider reach of speculation relatively unassimi-
lated’ (Corner et al. 1990: 100).
Overlapping with this last point is the observation that personal
accounts may sometimes be more effective in making people think
about risk than facts and statistics. For example, Boyce found that what
made people ‘think twice’ about vaccinating their own children often
had very little to do with the ‘facts’ presented in the media about the
risks of MMR. Instead, parents were often profoundly moved by the
powerful testimony from parents who believed their children’s autism
was caused by the vaccine (Boyce 2005). Similarly research into media
coverage of ‘inherited breast cancer’ found that women were sometimes
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barely aware of the scientific research and discoveries in this area. How-
ever, they vividly recalled, and had engaged with, fictionalized and factual
presentations of human interest stories about ‘breast cancer families’. Few
women in this research had taken in the front page news that specific
‘breast cancer’ genes had been discovered. What they did recall were the
tragic tales of whole families ‘cursed’ by breast cancer and the traumatic
decision facing some women considering prophylactic mastectomies. It
was these personal accounts which helped to shape their own risk assess-
ments (Henderson and Kitzinger 1999).
The final key aspect of media coverage we wish to highlight here
overlaps with this and concerns issues of imaginative identification and
empathy.
Earlier in this chapter we mentioned that journalists seek to craft risk
stories they consider ‘relevant’ and with which readers/viewers might
identify. However, identification involves active audience involvement
and requires the mobilization of complex levels of cultural categorization.
For example, in the early days of the AIDS crisis, the disease was
presented as ‘belonging’ to particular, socially marginalized, risk groups,
particularly gay men. This allowed people to insulate themselves from a
sense of being at risk even if they were engaged in high-risk behaviour. As
long as they refused the associated identity they could feel immune from
the virus (Miller et al. 1998). The mode of presentation (via the concept of
risk groups), and the moralistic dimensions of AIDS discourses (associating
the disease with deviance) combined with pre-existing social categories
and people’s own identity management strategies to create a particular
type of media ‘effect’ for some people.
Similarly complex processes of identification, or distancing, are evident
in women’s responses to statistics about male violence. This was clearly
demonstrated in some responses to the Zero Tolerance campaign, the
first major advertising initiative in Britain designed to highlight the risks
of sexual abuse and challenge social attitudes towards assaults against
women and girls. One retired woman, reacting to a campaign statement
that almost 50 per cent of female murder victims are killed ‘by their
partner or ex-partner’, suggested that the victims must be mainly prosti-
tutes murdered by their clients. The figures were therefore, she explained,
not applicable to ‘ordinary people’. Similarly other participants in this
research argued that the statistics publicized by campaign about the high
incidence of rape were not as bad as they might seem. This was because,
they argued, they must include ‘bogus’ cases such as ‘date rapes’ or inci-
dents where women have ‘led the man on’.
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As this example shows, statistics about the frequency of a threat are

not simply accepted by people and translated into an understanding of
risk. They ‘negotiate’ with statistics drawing on prevailing stereotypes and
mythologies. Faced with publicity highlighting endemic sexual violence,
some respondents nevertheless managed to keep rape and assault as the
preserve of stranger-danger or to see it as a misfortune that only happens
to women who ‘ask for it’.
Issues of identification are not self-evident. In the aftermath of the
London underground bombings, for example, much was made of ‘British
identity’. However, a sense of being British does not preclude identify-
ing with people from other nations. The concept of the universal Mus-
lim community, the Ummah, for example, cuts across geographic and
national boundaries. Disproportionate concern about a ‘home grown’
tragedy can thus be seen as hypocritical. As ‘Ali’, a young Luton man
commented, when interviewed about the bombings:
[the West] are grieving 52 people who died in London, but I’ve been grieving the
death of thousands of children in Palestine, in Chechnya, in Kashmir, in Iraq, since
I was 15.
Technological changes which allow access to transnational media can

support such identification. As Ali went on to comment:
It’s not just the BBC and ITV any more, we have al-Jazeera, we have the internet.
We live in a globalised society. The world had become a smaller village. If some-
thing happens to innocent people in Iraq, the Muslims of Luton will know about
it and feel that grief. (quoted in Akbar and Duff 2005)
Emerging Research Approaches: From Active to Interactive

Audiences
As we have noted, the main shift in research in this field has been
towards constructionist approaches. These have tended to focus on how
readers and viewers draw on their stocks of cultural resources to inter-
pret or ‘decode’ particular media texts (a documentary, a soap opera, a
feature film, or a news bulletin) and how their understandings are mod-
ified or confirmed through conversation and argument. This emphasis
has produced a dominant image of media audiences as continuously
‘active’, selecting, comparing, connecting, debating, and judging. With
the growing ubiquity of the Internet, however, this description only tells
part of the story. Audiences are moving from being active to becoming
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interactive. More and more people are shifting between the television
screen and newspaper page and the World Wide Web with increasing
frequency and fluidity, checking accounts, locating additional informa-
tion, following links to other sources, and dipping into the debates on
bulletin boards. Some are contributing as well as accessing material, help-
ing to develop online information resources, writing web logs (‘blogs’)
publicizing their experiences and opinions, and posting images shot on
camera phones or compact digital video cameras. In some cases, these
amateur pictures, of the immediate aftermath of the London bombings or
the initial devastation caused by the Indonesia Tsunami, are the only eye
witness record we have of major risk events.
Almost all print and broadcast news organizations now have web pages
as do the government agencies, corporations, scientific and professional
organizations, social movements, and campaigning groups that source the
news machine. This development is still in the process of formation but it
is already clear that it has the capacity to alter flows of public knowledge
about risk and control over the communication process in fundamental
ways raising urgent new research questions.
The increasing ubiquity of the Internet shifts the balance between
expert knowledge, everyday experience, and personal testimony and
increases opportunities for public participation in debates around shared
risks. This has contradictory implications. On the one hand it could
reinforce the shift towards more populist forms of news-making as news
organizations in an increasingly competitive marketplace use enhanced
public ‘feedback’ as the basis for campaigns tailored to popular preoccu-
pations and misconceptions. On the other, by requiring both media and
risk professionals to rethink their roles and to see representations and
accounts of risk as increasingly collective and collaborative constructions
rather than finished products manufactured behind closed doors and
‘released’ for public consumption, it strengthens moves towards more
open deliberation on key issues. Exploring these possibilities requires
sustained research mapping emerging patterns of peer-to-peer activity and
interaction on the web, and tracing how they intersect with established
institutionalized systems of public communication.
A focus on modes of participation, however, can all too easily obscure
the persistence of substantial inequalities in access to and use of the Inter-
net and the continuing exclusion of significant numbers of the elderly
and those in poverty. Nor are these ‘Digital Divides’ simply a matter of
income. They are also the outcome of differential access to key social
and cultural resources (see Murdock and Golding 2004). Addressing these
266
The Media and Risk
exclusions presents urgent tasks both for public policy and for research.
We need to look in detail at the factors that support active information
searching and participation in key risk areas.
By alerting us to the fact that perceptions and interpretations alone are
rarely the sole or even sometimes the major determinates of responses to
risk. The issue of Digital Divides introduces a second and broader research
agenda there are socio-economic pressures beyond communication issues.
A consumer may be concerned about GM products, but buy them because
they are cheaper, a homeless male prostitute may exchange immediate
access to accommodation, for the more distant fear of HIV. To develop
a full understanding of the media’s role in constructing risks we need
always to keep such contexts and questions of power firmly in mind.
Media research in this field must be firmly integrated with research across
these issues.
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13
Social and Public Policy:
Reflexive Individualization and
Regulatory Governance
Peter Taylor-Gooby
The Context: Two Perspectives on Risk

in Social Policy Research
Welfare states are currently undergoing rapid change as part of the broader
social shifts associated with the transition from a modernity structured
around neo-Keynesian nation state capitalism towards a more global-
ized, post-Fordist, and individualized future. The developments in the
UK associated with the emergence of New Labour and of a third way
social policy are at the forefront of these shifts, and this chapter focuses
particularly on this country. These changes are reflected in risk-research in
this field. Social policy is about the meeting of social need under particular
circumstances: mass democracy, modern industry, and particular patterns
of family and household life. The needs on which policy focuses are
those not met through employment or family and household dependency
and care.
Recent developments in the context of social policy have led to increas-
ing pressure on the capacity of national governments to meet such needs
effectively on a mass scale. To simplify, the demands on welfare states
are rising (as a result of ageing populations, increases in the numbers of
single person households, greater fluidity in family life and flexibility in
employment, and innovations in medical technology). This is happening
just at a time when the capacity of governments to provide is declining
(as globalization and more open international markets in goods, labour
271
Social and Public Policy
and finance intensify pressures to cut spending and maintain competitive-

ness) and as voters in the advanced welfare states become more inclined to
question high taxes and social contributions, and as growing inequalities
impose pressures on the willingness of the electorate to pay for services
which they see as going to more distant groups (see Barr 1998: 12–13;
Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001; Taylor-
Gooby 2001 for discussion). The outcome is a duality in policy which has
led to two corresponding streams of research.
Mass services tend to be cut back; means-tested support and private
services play a greater role. Welfare state ideologies stress the responsibility
of the individual for her own welfare. At the same time, the mechanisms
directed specifically at vulnerable and high-risk groups who are unable
to manage their own needs effectively and concerned to identify and
manage those risks are sharpened and extended. Social policy is about
constraining one aspect of the role of the state (mass provision) whilst
expanding another (regulation of the lives of the vulnerable). This reflects
contrary trends in the experience of risk and uncertainty: citizens are
more likely to experience uncertainty in the course of their lives, as a
result of shifts in work, family life, and in social expectations about the
capacity of government to manage these shifts. At the same time, some
aspects of life grow more secure: life expectancy continues to increase,
living standards to rise, and opportunities to communicate, travel, and
become acquainted with other cultures expand. Greater individualization
and greater control have both stimulated research interest.
This leads to a puzzle in modern analysis of risk and public policy. On
one hand, a great deal of work is concerned to chart the recent trajectory
of the development of the welfare state from a social insurance, mass
protective model to one which stresses the activation of individuals to
tackle risks on their own behalf, with appropriate support (Barr 1998;
Ewald 2002; Jessop 2002). This fits with a logic which interprets current
social changes as a transition away from circumstances of confident stable
growth, industrialism, and nuclear families, mainly supported by a bread-
winner’s earnings. The new direction is one in which changes in work
and work patterns, household structures, and the complex international
shifts at the economic, political, and cultural level summed up as global-
ization presage greater uncertainty about the life course and increasingly
stringent limitations on the capacity of the nation state to manage the
problems that individuals face. This model stresses the transition from cer-
tainty to uncertainty in people’s understanding of their lives and sees the
welfare state as responding in parallel fashion, by reducing its predictable
272
mass service provision, but expanding the supportive services it provides

to enable individuals to identify, pursue, and grasp the opportunities
available to them (Beck, Bonss, and Lau 2003: 6).
On the other hand, a parallel analysis points out that, although
mass social insurance systems are no longer expanding, and privatized
or means-tested individualized services are, it is not obvious that the
importance of the actuarial calculations through which life-course risks
were precisely assessed, central to the traditional welfare state approach
to risk during the expansive period of modern society, has declined
in social policy. Modern techniques of risk-rating, risk assessment, and
risk-management are pursued in child protection, in the management
of those with mental health problems, of asylum seekers, of the frail
elderly, of homeless people, and of other groups in order to identify the
vulnerable accurately, to assess the cost benefit of interventions, and to
target resources upon them cost effectively (Leonard 1997; Kemshall 2002;
Denny, 2006).
Risk-research in social policy thus contains examples of both the shift
from a modern to a reflexive risk society (Giddens 1994, 1998), and the
expansion of technocratic governance (Dean 1999). It is this duality and
the rapid pace of change in welfare state policies which provides a rich
field for the application of theoretical models and also for extensive
data gathering to test and refute them. It also provides opportunities for
confusion and debate between those who emphasize the move to social
uncertainty or to social management, towards independent activation
or to the control of individual behaviour, to greater responsibility or to
regulation, since both are happening at once.
Research Themes
Social and public policies deal with needs in two spheres of people’s lives:
the private sphere of family care and intimate relationships, and the more
public market sphere of paid employment, income, and poverty. The
broad approaches of risk society and governance and regulation have led
to a focus on particular themes within these areas, and to a redrawing of
the boundaries between them. As expectations of individual proactivity
and responsibility for achieving outcomes and managing risks for the
mass of the population grow stronger, some areas shift to the private
sector; research in fields as diverse as pensions and access to paid work
increasingly concerns individual values and motivations. At the same
273
time, the behaviour of particular groups in what was formerly a private

arena of life enters the public sphere. The risks encountered in child and
elder care, health-related activities such as smoking, diet, and exercise
become matters of public concern. The focus of mental health services
shifts from integration of those defined as mentally ill into the com-
munity to the identification of vulnerable or dangerous groups and the
concentration of available resources onto these cases. On the one hand,
interest in how individuals manage their lives in risk society grows. On
the other, new techniques of governance for vulnerable and threatening
groups become the focus of attention. We will examine some key findings
in these areas.
Major Findings
The main currents of research activity in relation to the risks dealt with in
social and public policy concern the two main areas affected by the new
policy stance: the private sphere of family and care, and the public sphere
of work and incomes. We also discuss briefly research on state policies
for medicine and health (for a broader perspective, see Chapter 8). This
area straddles private and public spheres, and brings out the collision of
interventionism and individualization.
Family and Care: Individual Responsibility and Surveillance

and Regulation
The context of research in this area is greater diversity in family forms,
a shift towards female employment, and an expansion of private care.
Since the 1970s divorce rates and single parenthood have doubled and
cohabitation trebled. The proportion of mothers in paid work has trebled,
whilst male employment has fallen by 14 per cent (ONS 2004, Figures
2.11, 2.14, Table 2.4; Williams, 2004: 15). Day care for children has tripled
since the early 1990s, roughly half in day nurseries and almost all private
(ONS 2003, Table 8.21). Elder care provision has roughly doubled, most
of it private, whilst residential accommodation has declined sharply (ONS
2004, Tables 8.1, 8.2). As a result of these changes, the pattern of risks
faced during the life course and their incidence for different social groups
have shifted.
Research falls into two general categories: work which analyses current
shifts in terms of greater self-oriented individualization in the ways people
274
live their lives, and work which stresses the re-emergence of ‘moral ratio-
nalities’, of reciprocity, and of ‘compassionate realism’ in relationships.
In relation to risks in the area of the family and social care, the chief
contrast between the two main approaches lies in understanding of the
impact of a greater diversity of sexual relationships and in family life
on the risks people anticipate and how they respond to them: individ-
ualization is interpreted as leading towards a liberation from traditional
roles and obligations, so that ‘the ethic of individual self-fulfilment and
achievement is the most powerful current in modern society’ (Beck and
Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 22; see Williams 2004: 56 and chapters 3 and 4).
On the other, a stream of empirical research examining family rela-
tionships in the context of divorce and re-partnering concludes that ‘the
shape of commitments is changing, but there is no loss of commitment’
(see Finch 1989 and Williams 2004: 8 for a detailed account of processes
whereby such commitments are negotiated). This process is understood
in terms of people’s greater involvement in ‘moral reasoning about care’.
Such consideration includes recognition of the responsibility and capac-
ity to pursue the role of ‘energetic moral agents’ (p. 42) in negotiating
relationships and commitments in terms of what is the ‘proper thing to
do’ (p. 8). In short, the transition is from a situation in which people
asked ‘what ought I to do?’ in relation to a received system of moral rules,
to one in which they consider ‘How best can I manage this?’. The new
practical ethics are based on respect for others, being non-judgemental
and openness to reciprocity in a constructed system of moral negotiation.
This issue has important policy relevance. A stream of policy-related
arguments presses for greater regulation of more individualized lifestyles.
From this perspective, Deacon argues that ‘welfare . . . has to delineate,
reaffirm and at times enforce the obligations that people have to their
families, their neighbours and to the wider communities in which they
live’ (2004a, 2004b: 22). Sacks calls for ‘clear connections between rights
and responsibilities’ (1997: 233). In policy, such assumptions have led to
the establishment of a Child Support Agency with the role of enforcing
the financial obligations of absent parents to their children and to a wide
range of schemes to promote good quality parenting and from childmin-
ders and day nurseries within a national childcare strategy (DfES 1998).
Government identifies lifestyle changes as generating risks which it needs
to address.
The regulatory aspects of these policies can be located within an over-
all economic strategy, led by the Treasury, which is concerned to pro-
mote high levels of employment. In relation to childcare, this strategy
275
is expressed in policies to mobilize mothers into paid work, which include

contributions towards the costs of childcare for low-income parents
through the Child Tax Credit. The Sure Start strategy has invested in
the provision of day nurseries in areas of high social deprivation and
encouraged provision elsewhere (DfES 1998). These policies are highly
targeted on low-income groups, but represent a substantial investment in
the UK context, where intervention in the area of family responsibilities
has traditionally been limited.
One area where the issue of how far government should adopt a reg-
ulatory as opposed to an enabling stance in relation to family care has
provoked considerable debate is that of social security for lone parents.
The New Deal for Lone Parents (the main system of means-tested support
for this group) has developed an increasingly forceful approach, including
invitations and then requirements to attend interviews at which claimers
will be encouraged to take paid work, and at which the income gap
between wages and benefits for those in work and the benefits for those
out of work are stressed. Duncan and Edwards in a national qualitative
study (1999) show how the assumptions behind this policy fit with the
values of most lone parents. However, a minority, particularly among
lower social class white people, value mother-care particularly highly.
They follow a different moral rationality from the incentive driven indi-
vidualism implicit in the policy of attaching markedly higher incomes
to paid work. The result is that they are penalized in the current policy
framework. Benefits for those who remain outside the labour market to
provide mother-care remain low to enhance employment incentives. One
approach identifies the key issue as lack of access to work, and the key
risk that lone parent families run as poverty; the other focuses more on
the risk of lack of access to mother-care faced by their children when their
mothers take jobs.
Paid Work, Inequality, and Poverty

The themes of support and empowerment for more proactive citizens
versus regulation of individualist behaviour also emerge in policies in
the area of employment and access to opportunities, one of the central
themes of New Labour policy. A key aspect of the third way approach
is the promotion of social justice in an unequal market-based society
through greater access to opportunities. This is immediately apparent
in the area of paid work and the risk of gaining access to the labour
market. As globalization and technological change reduce the availability
276
of unskilled labour in developed countries, entry into paid work for low-
skilled young people is becoming increasingly problematic. The main
policies include both market incentives and the regulation of behav-
iour on the one hand, and the expansion of supported opportunity on
the other. The former area includes New Deals for various groups with
weak access to employment, legislation to impose a minimum wage,
and to establish an extensive range of means-tested Tax Credit support
to enhance incentives for the low paid in one of the most unequal
wage-structures in Europe (Luxembourg Income Study 2004), and cut-
backs in the out-of-work benefits available for those of working age, so
that unemployment benefit is replaced with a time-limited Job-Seeker’s
Allowance and access to Incapacity Benefit constrained. Tax credits for
those in work, the childcare strategy, and a cautious expansion of the
maternity and paternity benefit regime can also be seen as enhancing
opportunities.
Government has also restructured pensions, the largest spending area
of social security. The shifts continue a long-term process of shifting from
state to private provision (DSS 1998) and involve promoting various pri-
vate investment systems, whilst state pensions are more heavily targeted
through means-testing and tax credits. Research into the impact of these
policies has shown:
– Growth of employment, reflecting general economic buoyancy, but

particularly marked among young mothers, young people, and those
with disabilities, indicating that policies to enhance the employabil-
ity of these groups have enjoyed some success; (NAO 2002: 6; Trea-
sury/DTI 2003; charts 2.4, 2.5; for more detailed discussion see Taylor-
Gooby 2004: ch. 3);
– Little change in the level of economic activity, sickness, and disability
being the main factors preventing men of working age from working
and home responsibilities for women (ONS 2002: 69);
– A decline in poverty, especially among families with children, which
reverses a 20-year trend to rising poverty levels (DWP 2004: 4);
– Inequality, which has increased sharply since the late 1970s, shows no
sign of falling as incomes at the top end continue to rise (Hills 2004:
69–70);
– Policies to expand the role of private pensions have been rela-
tively unsuccessful; as available schemes prove unattractive, company
schemes continue to decline, and individual savings rates remain low
277
(Pensions Policy Institute 2003). Pressures on the new means-tested

state pensions credit are forecast to continue to rise, possibly to 80 per
cent of all pensioners by 2050 (Clark and Emmerson 2002).
The evidence on the mixed successes and limitations of the new policies
has stimulated research on caring relationships and the motivations of
carers, incentives, and paid employment and on trajectories of poverty.
Care issues and the emergence of the two strands of individualization in
risk society and of governance in areas which had previously been seen
as part of a private sphere are discussed above. The pattern of research in
relation to the risks that face people in the areas of work, employment,
and poverty is broadly similar. On the one hand, the extent to which peo-
ple become increasingly individualized, their judgements and the choices
they make in these areas are subject to examination. On the other, the
key issues are seen as the processes of management and control of access
to paid work.
In relation to work incentives, a series of surveys by Dean and
others (e.g. 1999, 2002a, 2002b) analyses work motivations and patterns
of employment among groups of employed and unemployed people in
particular regional labour markets. The results show a range of orienta-
tions to paid work, but stress the significance of a ‘dependency trap’ in
which those on benefits feel that access to higher-paid employment is
denied them. Using different methods based on micro-simulation from
an elaborate model of the tax and benefit system, Brewer, Clark, and Myck
also conclude that ‘the overall effect on labour supply is uncertain, but it
is probably small’ (2001: 1).
Further work discuses welfare fraud, in the context of the individualized
assumption that those faced with choices between work and benefits will
make decisions governed by incentives. Fraud is a strong concern of gov-
ernment (in line with the individual incentive approach to work motiva-
tions) and has led, for example, to the setting up of a welfare fraud group
in the Treasury under the Paymaster General. Most research, however,
indicates that the problem is relatively small and confined to particular
groups (Rowlingson et al. 1997; Rowlingson and Whyley 1998). Much
of the discussion is confused by statistics which count overpayments of
benefit as fraud and multiply known fraud by substantial weightings on
the assumption that it is the tip of an iceberg of undetected fraud (Dean
and Melrose 1995). A review of quantitative and qualitative work shows
that while public concern exists it has not ‘reached high levels’ (Williams,
Hill, and Davies 2004: 2).
278
In relation to poverty and the success of government initiatives in

poverty reduction most research is cautiously positive. However, two
issues may be identified. First, government policies operate in a context
which is favourable, since economic conditions ensure relatively high
employment and upward pressures on incomes, but even in this con-
text, the targets set are unlikely to be reached (Dickens 2002; Suther-
land, Sefton, and Piachaud 2003; Walker and Wiseman 2003). Second,
the advances are made through policies that ensure substantially lower
incomes for those who do not succeed in gaining paid work. The fact
that overall engagement in paid work has not risen indicates that there is
an obstinate core of poverty which the new programmes will be unable
to tackle (Hasluck 2000; Piachaud and Sutherland 2002). This leads to
interest in the operation of the new measures to direct those out of work
into paid employment.
Central to the new approach is the ‘single gateway’ for all able-bodied
claimants (Maxwell and Kenway 2000: 31; Butcher 2002). This includes
assessment of benefit entitlement, reinforcement of obligations to enter
activation programmes, counselling and advice about the impact of ‘make
work pay’ benefits on incomes in work, and the opportunities avail-
able on training schemes and in local labour markets, to press home
the duties associated with the linkage of welfare state rights to citizen
responsibilities. The process includes a contract between claimant and the
benefits service about job-search behaviour and benefit rights. As research
at the CRSP centre in Loughborough indicates, a major issue is that ‘the
partners to the contract are not equal. Users need to be empowered
to ensure that the state fulfils its side of the contract’ (CRSP 1999: 7).
This area of work reflects the governance of social security claimers and
the processes whereby new state systems intensify control (Hill 1999:
106).
In pensions, the unwillingness of many individuals to invest privately
has stimulated work on motivations and expectations in this field, and on
government policies designed to influence behaviour. Work which focuses
on individualization and choice shows high levels of mistrust of both pri-
vate and public providers, combined with unrealistic expectations of the
retirement incomes that existing contributions will produce (Rowlinson
2002; DWP 2003; Taylor-Gooby and Hastie 2003). The outcome is that
the choices pursued do not further the public policy goal of adequate
mass pensions.
In relation to governance and control, a further concern is the extent
to which privatization policies will disadvantage groups who are already
279
weak by market standards, intensifying the risks that these groups face.
Ginn points out the problems that women, often with career and con-
tributions records interrupted by years spent child-rearing, face (Ginn
2004: 129–32); Hills discusses low-income groups (2004: 362–3). These
arguments have led to new proposals for pension reform, and the field is
currently at the centre of policy debate (PPI 2003; ESRC 2004; Hills 2004).
Medicine, Health, and Health Promotion

The twin agenda of reflexivity and governance emerge prominently
in the arena of health care. On the one hand, a well-established
stream of research in sociology argues that individuals take greater
responsibility for their own health and are more inclined to challenge
the judgements and assumptions of professionals and state agencies
(see, for a review, Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones 2003; Horlick-Jones 2004).
On the other, the view that individuals will wish to take greater respon-
sibility for their own health has led to measures intended to influence
the choices that people make and research into the way in which lay
publics respond to professional advice on health risks (Kemshall 2002:
44–52). Broader research interest in the body reflects the division between
individual proactivity in body-management and medicalized regulation
(see Twigg 2005).
There is considerable evidence that individuals are discriminating in
their use of health advice. The simplistic view that, in risk society, the
expert is simply devalued, as Giddens and others sometimes suggest
(see, e.g. Giddens 1994: 95) and the equally simplistic view that the
authority of experts is unquestioned are both limited. Thus, Ward, Bissell,
and Noyce show that ‘mapping the contours of consumer ideas about
risk becomes a complex project in which people [shift] back and forth . . .
between docile and reflexive approaches’ (2000: 148). Similarly Williams
and Calnan suggest ‘people are not simply passive or active, dependent
or independent, believers or sceptics. Rather they are a complex mixture
of all these things . . . ’ (1996: 264). Nettleton’s view of the new health
promotion agenda incorporates both expertise and lay response: ‘a range
of risks are presented by the experts and it is up to individuals to calculate
the likely consequences of certain actions to themselves’ (1997: 208).
In this context, government policy has shifted to place health promo-
tion (resting heavily on changes in consumer behaviour) at the forefront
of its health agenda. A series of government pronouncements (The Health
of the Nation, DH 1992, Our Healthier Nation, DH 1999, and Choosing
280
Health, DH 2004) stress the importance of lifestyle changes in relation

to tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption, healthier diets, and exercise
as of central importance to improvements in people’s health. This strand
of policy builds on research that is well-summarized in Cabinet Office
papers (Halpern et al. 2003). Relevant policies include both support and
empowerment of active citizens, and also measures to direct and regulate
behaviour.
Information is made available through a range of means including a
major web and phone-based NHS direct advice and information service,
warnings on cigarette packets, and guidelines for healthy alcohol con-
sumption and exercise regimes. At the same time, tobacco advertising
is circumscribed, anti-smoking advertising becomes increasingly com-
pelling, pressure is brought to bear on food manufactures to reduce salt
and sugar and introduce healthier prepared foods, and alcohol advertising
is limited and underage smoking and drinking are to be curbed. Exercise
schemes for older people and other at risk groups are to be established.
This programme includes elements of both activation of individuals and
regulation of behaviour—more marked in relation to tobacco than alco-
hol. It straddles both aspects of state policies to risk (Petersen 1997).
The chief issues to emerge from this brief review of current research are
that
– A reorientation of public policy is underway, which responds to the
increased individualization of a reflexive risk society;
– At the same time, the new policies also regulate and govern groups
seen as most likely to be at risk themselves or to create risks for others.
These shifts have stimulated the rapid development of new avenues in
research. Five issues are perhaps most pressing.
First, it is clear that the operation of public policy incentives and
patterns of motivation in relation to individual behaviour is imperfectly
understood (Frey 1997; Le Grand 2003). While economic psychology has
generated a considerable volume of work on motivations and on how
economic rationality can be modified in a laboratory setting, it is sim-
ply unclear how far values and assumptions associated with citizenship,
traditional welfare states, and the expectations of what the government
will provide relate to such rationality in particular everyday life contexts
(see Taylor-Gooby 2000, Chapter 1, for a discussion).
281
Second, globalization and the growing importance of cross-national

relationships at economic, political, and cultural levels are extensively
discussed in the literature. However, apart from specific fields such as
European public policy (e.g. Wallace and Wallace 2000; Richardson 2001),
there is relatively little analysis of the role of these relationships and their
influence on policy. A number of studies examine globalization and in
general conclude that the impacts are both positive and negative, but
broaden the range of issues relevant to policy (e.g. Yeates 2001; George
and Wilding 2002; George and Page 2004). The new journal Global Social
Policy seeks to provide a focus for this field. There is some work on the
influence of international actors in particular policy areas—for example,
the extent to which WTO agreements on the service sector and on govern-
ment provision as competition to private providers will impact on social
care provision. In addition a considerable quantity of work has analysed
migration issues and the social policy treatment of refugees (Bloch and
Levy 1999; Kaye 1999; Burnett and Peel 2001; Ungerson 2003). However,
the theoretical importance given to this field, particularly by risk society
analysts, suggests that more work will emerge in the future.
Third, an established tradition in social and public policy analysis has
examined the impact of policies on different social groups, paying partic-
ular attention to social class divisions, and, more recently, to gender and
ethnic divisions (see Titmuss 1958; Williams 1989). Increasingly other
divisions by age, sexuality, and region attract attention. Work which
focuses on risk often pays surprisingly little attention to these issues,
treating the population as homogenous in relation to risk (see chapter 11).
Thus, an important strand in theoretical approaches writes in terms of
social changes understood as affecting all individuals in broadly similar
ways (e.g. Giddens 1994, 1998; Bauman 1998; Mythen 2005). A consid-
erable volume of empirical work makes generalizations on the basis of
studies of particular groups (Irwin, Simmons, and Walker 1999; Ewald
2002; Petts and Niemeyer 2004) and this is often a preferred method in
psychological work (e.g. Eiser 2004). The different impact of risks and
policies to meet them on different groups in a risk society merits attention
(see Vail, Wheelock, and Hill 1999: ch. 1). In addition, governance and
surveillance approaches often deal with the extent to which government
manages poor and vulnerable minorities. This raises the question of how
new forms of management regulate lives at the bottom in the interests of
other social groups (Kemshall 2002: 130).
Fourth, the emergence of new patterns of risk in the course of people’s
lives has led to new political agenda: the risks to individual welfare of
282
being unable to get adequate care support for children or frail elderly
kin so that one can pursue paid work, of being unable to access secure
employment in a rapidly changing labour market, or of failing to gain
reliable provision from private or voluntary providers, are now far more
salient than they once were. The politics of public policy appears to
operate differently in this additional welfare domain. Traditional welfare
states were driven essentially by class politics (Baldwin 1990; Huber and
Stephens 2001). In the case of new social risks the groups directly affected
(lone parents, unskilled people who find difficulty getting jobs, poorer
groups) are smaller and often transitory, so that corresponding mass
constituencies do not exist (Bonoli 2002). As a result, outcomes are more
likely to be directed by other actors, often governments concerned to
mobilize the labour force into employment or employers who wish to cut
labour costs (Taylor-Gooby 2004: ch. 9). The area of new social risks is now
emerging onto the research agenda, with implications for understanding
shifts in the politics of social policy.
Nonetheless, issues about risk and social and public policy are begin-
ning to play a substantial role in research. The new directions are summed
up in two recent and very different books. Le Grand’s Motivation, Agency
and Public Policy (2003) provides a detailed review of relevant behavioural
economic research to reinforce the case for ‘well-designed public services,
ones that employ market-type mechanisms but do not allow unfettered
self-interest to dominate altruistic motivations’ (2003: 168). He argues
that if market and quasi-market systems are designed appropriately, they
can effectively empower individuals against service providers or other
more privileged citizens. The upshot is that governments do not need
to operate through the authoritative interventionism typical of the neo-
Keynesian model to achieve welfare goals. Welfare states are still possible
in a more individualist risk society. The resources of the economic psy-
chology of behaviour in response to risk and of the public administration
of experiments in quasi-market design are used to buttress the argument.
Kemshall’s Risk, Social Policy and Welfare (2002) is written more from
the perspective of governance and regulation. It examines policy shifts
in health care, child protection, and mental health services to investigate
how far ‘risk is replacing need as the key organizing principle in health
and personal social services’ (p. 22). In health care the health promotion
agenda and growth of the private sector, in child protection the increasing
use of various administrative tools to identify high-risk children and
concentrate resources on them and in mental health and community
care, comparable approaches which focus on individuals who may be a
283
danger to themselves and others are charted. The key conclusions are
that ‘responsibilization is the price of citizenship and inclusion’ in the
emerging welfare framework, and that ‘individuals and . . . communities
are increasingly responsible for the generation and prudent use of their
own welfare resources (active rather than passive welfare). . . . Techniques,
strategies and mechanisms . . . have changed with the times and the
objectives . . . have been reconstituted from social solidarity to control
and discipline, to diversity management’ (2002: 130).
These studies seek to take forward research overviews in, respectively,
the individual responsibility and the state regulation approaches that are
head and tail of the new welfare state settlement. They show how new
directions in research are becoming established in work on social and pub-
lic policy at a theoretical and a practical level. This field offers rich oppor-
tunities to test analytically based claims about social change and transi-
tions from modernity. The opportunity to do this is now being taken up.
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287
Index
active citizen 85–6 childbearing 147

active texts 121 childbearing, extra-marital 140
actuarial justice 81, 87 children 141, 143, 152–3
actuarial model 88, 162 choice 132, 142–6, 154
actuarial practices 77, 83, 87 class 42, 44, 46, 77, 99, 117, 133, 145,
actuarial risk 77 232
advanced liberalism 77 clever citizens 63
aesthetic 42, 118, 129 clinical governance 166
aesthetic reflexivity 128 clinical practice 164
affect 64, 65, 98, 108, 128, 134 cognitive bias 31, 32
age 46, 80, 133 cognitive limitations 27
ambiguous knowledge 128 cognitive psychology 27, 31, 96
amplification 33,100–2, 133 cognitive science 87, 96
animal spirits 65 cohabitation 140, 141, 148–150
anthropology: reflexive 118 communication 32, 100, 102, 133
anxieties 99, 104, 123, 130–1 community of need 143
attenuation 33, 100, 104–5 complex organizations 25
attitude 30, 108 conflict 2, 95
audience 60, 133, 265 conflicting realities 149
audit 43 conflicts 108
autonomy 44, 141, 150, 152 consensus conferences 109
consumption 117, 182, 185, 192, 194
Bayesian decision theory 96 context 85–6, 103, 142
Beck 39, 122, 123, 128, 142, 145, controllability 97
228 cost-benefit 81
Beck Gernsheim 142, 143, 148 crime management: situational 78, 80
behavioural economics 27, 28 Crime Reduction Programme 78
belief 30, 36, 64, 108, 109 crime, fear of 84, 86, 130, 131
biographical approach 68, 195 crime, social causes of 76
biographical narratives 133 crime: careers 79
biographies 42, 131, 144, 146 criminal justice 76–7
biography 104, 119 criminogenic risk assessment 82
blame 30, 76, 98 critical moments 119
blurred genres 118 cross-national comparison 62
body 128, 280 cultural biases 32, 35, 98, 99
border crossing 119 cultural studies 118, 120
bounded rationality 9, 28, 80 cultural theory 39, 98, 99, 100
Bourdieu 34 cultural turn 41, 68, 117, 118
British Crime Survey 85 cultural values 38
culture 9, 10, 29–31, 36, 42, 46, 60, 68,
catastrophic potential 30, 97 83, 96–8, 103, 124, 130–2
certainty 6 culture as ordinary 118, 129
288
Index
culture of divorce 148 Ewald 45

culture of fear 8 experiences 84
culture: popular 134 experimental psychology 95, 96
expert and lay knowledge 35–7, 95, 106,
danger 6, 42, 129 126
Decision Research Group 29 expert systems 99
deficit model 110 expressed preferences 29
democracy 59
democratization 144, 212 family 5, 58, 99, 143, 152, 273, 274
‘democratization of democracy’ 63 Family Resources Survey 242
desistance studies 79 family: nuclear 154
dialogic 122 family: traditional 142, 152–3
dialogic interplay 121 fatalism 38, 98
dialogic language 118 fateful moment 119
dialogic negotiation 125 feminism 140, 146
Dialogic Theory 120–121 Fischhoff 97, 108
disability 117, 133, 230, 235, 238, 40 fluidity 140, 152
disaster incubation period 105 Foucault 43
discourse 45, 100, 130 framing 28, 36, 82, 253
distrust 107, 127 freedom 44
division of labour 152 functionalism 45
divorce 140, 153
domination 43, 45 gender 80, 99, 117, 133, 154, 232, 237
Douglas 98, 99, 129, 130 Giddens 99, 122–3, 125–6, 142–5, 228
dread 30, 38 globalization 101, 134, 161, 220, 229,
236, 239, 271, 282
economic 77, 78, 81, 100, 152 GM Nation 7
economic rationality 44 governance 213, 215, 278, 279, 280
Edgework 7, 66–7, 119, 131 government 7, 43, 45, 70, 107
egalitarianism 38, 98 governmentality 43–6, 78, 84, 86, 117
Eiser 98, 108 grand theories 133, 134
Elias 143 grid/group 37–9
embracing risk 70
emotion 42, 47, 64–5, 98, 107–8, 120, health 57, 78, 124, 153, 160, 280
130, 142, 147, 152 heuristic 28, 31–5, 38, 46, 64, 96–7
empathy 264 House of Lords 106, 107
employment 142, 277 hybrid 41
empowerment 100, 120
epidemiology 24, 162 individualism 38, 98, 144–5, 149–50
epistemology 109, 132 individualization 42, 79, 99, 142, 144,
constructivism 102, 125, 130, 132, 259 147, 153, 182, 191, 231–2, 235, 237,
constructivist realism 127, 132 239
critical realism 132 inequality 40, 70, 87, 146–7, 220, 233–4,
critical trust 107 276–7
realism 34, 78–81, 100, 102, 125, 127, Inglehart 141
132 insurance 23, 45, 70
relativist constructivism 132 insurance: social 5, 42, 44, 140
social constructionism 84, 208 intimate relationship 140, 143, 149,
ethnographic turn 132–3 273
Etzioni 146 intuitions 98, 129
everyday knowledge 46 irrationality 47, 78, 97, 149
everyday life 46, 62–4, 69, 87, 102–3,
117–21, 128, 130–4 justice 76, 85, 117
evidence-based 78, 164 justice: restorative 88
289
Index
Kahneman 96 narrative 103–4, 119, 122, 128, 131–3

Kasperson 100–2, 104, 109 national patterns 30, 69, 134
Knight 4, 142 natural hazards 100
knowledge 30–6, 46–7, 56, 60, 99, 104, negotiate 146, 150–2
119, 122–3, 134, 149 neo-keynesianism 271
knowledge: local 126 neo-liberal 45, 84
knowledge: situated 148 network 145, 173
Krimsky 98 New Labour 228
new penology 76, 81, 87
labour market 140, 143, 152 New Right 79
language as dialogic 129 new social risks 25, 40, 70, 100, 140,
Lash 125, 128–9, 145 153–4
late-modernity 77, 99, 123 non-probabilistic 129
Latour 34, 41 norm 99, 142, 144
lay and expert 83, 260
lay knowledge 27, 32, 46, 106, 120, 124, offender desistance studies 78
127 Okrent 109
Le Grand 283 old age 185, 190
learning 31, 69 ontological 132
legitimacy 56, 121 ordinary cultures 132–3
leisure 117, 129, 130, 134 organization 83, 104, 204, 215, 217, 219
Lewis 140, 145, 150–4 organizations: high-trust 161
liberalism 44, 70, 81, 86 Other 84, 133
Lichtenstein 97
life course 141, 180, 183, 194 pensions 153
lifestyles 46, 101 perception 9, 27, 30, 38, 80, 97, 108,
linguistic turn 118, 121 152–4
local 46, 85, 118, 121, 127, 131 Petts 133, 134
Loewenstein 98, 108 phenomenology 103
Luhman 143 Pidgeon 109
Lupton 99, 104–5, 119, 123–5, 128–9, pleasure 7
131, 150, 223, 233 pluralism 87
Lyng 128, 131 policy 87, 95, 107–8, 123
political rationalities 84
male breadwinner 141 Poortinga 103, 107, 108
marriage 5, 141–2, 145–51 population 76, 77, 83, 86
marriage: traditional 151 positivism 35, 79, 82, 132
media 32–4, 47, 59, 60, 128–33, post-fordism 271
165 postmodernity 77, 100
media studies 118, 133 post-structural 117
Mental Modelling 9, 31–32, 130 poverty 85, 149, 194, 230, 241–3, 277–9
meta-analysis 81 power 35, 43, 45, 84, 105, 124, 145–7
methodology 102, 104, 118, 120 precautionary principle 7, 46, 56
mistrust 207, 214, 279 preferences: revealed 29
mixed-method 103 probability 4, 22, 82, 95, 96, 97
modernity 45, 76, 129 probability: subjective 56, 96
modernization 99, 206 prudent citizen 44, 86
modernization: reflexive 39 psychoanalysis 104
moral 45, 58, 70, 81, 85, 88, psychology 46, 102
146 Psychometric Paradigm 9, 27, 29–31, 38,
moral panics 33, 133 97, 100, 106
moral rationality 149 public 109, 128
multiple identities 125 public acceptance 95
multiple subcultures 127–8, 133 public engagement 108
290
Index
public opinion 212 Satterfield 104

public responses 97 science studies 34
public understanding 110 self: identity 128, 132
pure relationship 144 self: monitoring 129
self: provision 44
qualitative methods 69, 81, 103–6 self: reflexivity 144
quick trust 66 self: responsible 44
self-interest 104
race 117 side effects 56
rational choice 45, 65, 78–81, 87, 130, single motherhood 149
170 Sjöberg 102
rational risk-taking 149 Slovic 97–100, 107–9
rationality 9, 24, 28, 37, 43, 47, 64, 110, Smart 148, 150
144 Social Amplification of
rationality: scientific 46 Risk (SARF) 32–3, 46, 99, 104,
rationality: technical scientific 46 171, 212
Rayner 98, 99 social capital 134, 146
risk culture: reflexive 128 social exclusion 85
reflexivity 99, 129, 232, 280 social learning theory 68
regulation 58, 83, 95, 104, 125, 163, social order 77
202–9, 215, 274–5 social policy 153
regulation 85–6 social psychology 9
relationships 142, 148 sociocultural/socio-structural
Renn 107, 109, 124 approaches 98–99
resistance 45, 83 socio-demographic 106
responsibility 42, 70, 76, 78, 84–6, 104, somatic marker 65
117, 120, 142–6, 152–4, 184, 195, 274 Starr 26, 27
retirement 185, 190, 191, 240–1 state 86, 154–5
risk 34, 67, 76–8, 80, 87, 95, 101–9, 129, stereotypes 265
141–50, 204 stigma 33
risk: acceptability 95 studies 80
risk: analysis 23, 97, 100, 105, 110, 206 subject 44, 126–7
risk: assessment 23, 57, 78, 94–7, 168, subjectivity 125
206 suffering 67
risk: communication 100, 109, 164 surveillance 84–5, 274
risk: culture 69, 126, 129 symbols 84, 103, 129, 130–33
risk: distribution 77
risk: dynamic character 100
risk: multidimensional reality of 46 tales of the field 133
risk: perception 46, 78, 83, 95–6, 98, 100, Taylor-Gooby 153, 228
107, 148 technologies of the self 44
risk: pooling 150, 153 Third Way 134, 271
risk: positive/negative 6, 7 Thompson 119, 124
risk: regulation 104, 108, 211 transcendent experience 119
risk: technological 104, 131, 208 transgression 119
risk: transnational 218 transition 187, 188, 191, 193,
‘risk society’ 39, 76, 99, 125–6, 133, 181, 234
185, 208, 228, 232–5, 273, 278 trust 11, 32, 47, 63–4, 105–8,
risk-taking 66, 78, 119, 121, 131 123, 126, 149, 173
romantic love 143, 149 trust: active 41
routine activity theory 81 trust: facework-based 66
Royal Society 109 trust: institutional 106
rule of thumb 104 trust: reflexive 62
rumour 131 trustworthiness 106
291
Index
Tulloch 99, 101, 104–5, 119, 122, 128–9, victimization 84

131, 223 vulnerability 154
Turner 101, 105
Tversky 96 welfare paradigm 76
welfare state 5, 76, 141, 143, 145, 229,
uncertainty 47, 55, 63, 82, 95, 99, 105, 272
119, 124, 126, 142–3, 150, 174 Wildavsky 98
underclass 77 women 5, 241
unemployment 148, 230, 235, 237, 239, work-life balance 143, 153
243 Wright 119, 131
utilitarianism 128 Wynne 34–6, 97, 103, 109–10, 124,
utility-maximization 100 126–8, 148
value 31, 46, 83, 95, 99–01, 107, 118, youth 183–4, 236
120, 149, 153
Vaughan 105 Zinn 232
292

Zinn J.O. - Risk in Social Science (2006)

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Risk in Social Science

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Peter Taylor-Gooby and Jens O. Zinn

ISBN 0–19–928595–0 978–0–19–928595–2 (hb)

Risk and uncertainty have emerged as central themes in social science,

Notes on the Contributors ix

1. The Current Significance of Risk 1

2. Risk as an Interdisciplinary Research Area 20

3. The Challenge of (Managing) New Risks 54

4. Crime and Risk 76

5. Risk, Environment, and Technology 94

6. Everyday Life and Leisure Time 117

7. Risk and Intimate Relationships 140

8. Health and Risk 160

9. Life Course, Youth, and Old Age 180

10. Risk, Regulation, and Management 202

11. Social Inequality and Risk 228

12. The Media and Risk 250

13. Social and Public Policy: Reflexive Individualization and

David Abbott is a Research Fellow at the Norah Fry Research Centre,

Emma Hughes is a research associate in the School of Journalism, Media

Bridget Hutter is Professor of Risk Regulation at the London School of

Hazel Kemshall is currently Professor of Community and Criminal Justice

Jenny Kitzinger holds a chair in the School of Journalism at the University

Graham Murdock Reader in the Sociology of Culture at Loughborough

Nick Pidgeon is Professor of Applied Psychology at Cardiff University. He

Deborah Quilgars is a senior research fellow in the Centre for Housing

Peter Simmons is a lecturer in the School of Environmental Sciences,

Peter Taylor-Gooby is Professor of Social Policy at the University of Kent

John Tulloch is Research Professor of Sociology at Brunel University. His

Jens O. Zinn is a research fellow at the School of Social Policy, Sociology

Risk is to do with uncertainties: possibilities, chances, or likelihoods of

centralization of the Soviet economy to the Common Agricultural Policy

The Emergence of Risk as a Social and Political Issue

concept of insurance. It entered the world of moneylending and finance

policy aims at instilling appropriate values to achieve particular outcomes.

More Recent Developments

of European and US social security systems through the provision of

Approaches in Different Disciplines

Work on risk and uncertainty has advanced rapidly across a number of

concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1987) to capture the limitations

incorporated a strong interest in cultural factors, together with detailed

problems in understanding popular responses to dam and nuclear power

The Structure of the Book

Chapters 2 and 3 set out the contributions of different disciplines to

– A review of the context in which work in the field is situated;

– A rapid expansion of interest in and awareness of risk;

factors that influence how people behave in managing systems to gain

These include biographical methodologies, which situate the particular

currently face. This is understood as both empowering, through the pro-

Risk has moved up the agenda of social science as a result of developments

Risk issues initially attracted attention as the growing complexity of tech-

people actually deal with risks indicated the weakness of common

Statistical-Probabilistic Concepts of Risk

The development of statistical methods to calculate probabilities sup-

Technical Risk Analysis

systematic deficiencies which may trigger public concerns about new

Epidemiological and Toxicological Risk Analysis

The Crisis of the Statistical-Probabilistic Approach to Risk