1

Historical Materialism, Number 8 (Summer 2001)

Peng Shuzhi and the Chinese Revolution: Notes Toward a Political Biography1
by Joseph T. Miller

Politics were Peng's profession. He had been trained in Moscow for the
life of a political organizer; he had no other obvious qualifications with
which to make his career. If anyone became a Trotskyist for lack of an
alternative, it was Peng Shuzhi. If he had been allowed to stay on within
the leadership of the official party, he might have become an even worse
Stalinist than Qu Qiubai, who by comparison was quite liberal-minded.2

Who was Peng Shuzhi? How influential was he, and it what ways, in the early
development of Chinese communism and the Trotskyist movement in China? Was he a
tool of Moscow, a "Bolshevizer" sent to take over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and put it in the hands of Stalin's Communist International (Comintern)? Was he merely
interested in his own power and position within the CCP, as some have claimed?
Peng's political choices and his writings do not support such a harsh indictment, in
my view, though he certainly made mistakes and had personality flaws that put him at
odds with comrades over the years. Revolutionaries are products of their background,
their experiences, and the general conditions of their existence. Any analysis must include
the context in which such individuals act, and must allow for, even expect, transformation
through changing circumstances.
This work is merely an introduction to the life and early political activism of Peng
Shuzhi, up to his role in the formation of the Communist League of China (CLC) in 1931.
Further, this cannot be the complete story of the Chinese Trotskyist movement, with all
the variants and differing perceptions that term encompasses.3 Rather, it is a small effort
to place Peng's life in the context of a period of revolutionary possibility for China and to
challenge, or at least question, some perceptions about his role in the development of
Chinese communism.

1Much of the original source material for this piece derives from research first carried out in the late 1970s
for my doctoral dissertation. This includes interviews and archival materials obtained at Taiwan's Institute
for International Relations and the Bureau of Investigation, as well as some material from the Hoover
Institute in California. In addition to primary documents obtained from Peng Shuzhi between 1974 and
1983, there are materials provided by Peng's daughter and by activists in the Trotskyist movement in Hong
Kong over the years. Newly available documents from the Chinese Communist party have also been
utilized. Unfotunately, this writer can only read English and Chinese, therefore, the Russian language
documents located in the Comintern archives are not included here.
I wish to express my appreciation to the anonymous reviewers of the original draft of this article.
Their comments and research suggestions have proven very helpful and have been incorporated into this
work where feasible, though I remain responsible for any errors or omissions.
Finally, I must express my deepest gratitutde to Ms. Cheung Ching Choy for her invaluable
support and guidance in the completion of this work.
2Benton 1996, p. 54.
3See Kagan 1969, Miller 1979 and Benton 1996 for extensive material on this movement. Readers will find
many areas of continuing dispute in the various treatments of Chinese Trotskyism, some of which will be
reflected in this article. For a historical note about the term "Trotskyism," see Mandel 1994, pp. 9-10.
 2

Peng's roles as a party theorist and chief of the CCP's propaganda department
during the period of the second Chinese revolution (1924-1927), attest to his centrality in
the history of the communist movement. Then, as he and hundreds of others helped form
the Left Opposition inside the CCP in the late 1920s, Peng remained on a revolutionary
path against overwhelming obstacles, leading ultimately to exile, first in Hong Kong and
Vietnam, then to Paris, and finally, in the United States. During this forced exile with his
wife and life-partner in revolution, Chen Bilan, both served as a leaders and teachers to
other revolutionaries, young and old, in the Fourth International, especially its Chinese
section, the Revolutionary Communist Party of China (RCPC), until Peng's death in
California in November of 1983 and Chen's death in Hong Kong in 1987.
On my first meeting with Peng and Chen Bilan in August 1974, they were clearly
still active partners in revolutionary struggle and fully engaged in the day to day
operations of the Fourth International. They spent days and weeks meeting with young
people from around the world, educating them and learning from them. They assisted the
RCPC in Xianggang (Hong Kong) in starting up the journal Shiyue Pinglun (October
Review), a periodical that continues more than twenty-five years later. They were not
tired or demoralized, but rather, energetic and hopeful about the future.
Over the next nine years, we met for interviews and updates, exchanged letters,
and shared notes on political struggles in which we were involved. Peng appreciated the
fact that, as a Vietnam war veteran, I had come to revolutionary politics. During our very
first meeting he wrote a Chinese couplet in my notebook, expressing his advice for me
and reflecting his own life story:

Kangkai shashen yi;

To go nobly to one's death is easy;
Changqi fendou nan.
To struggle for the long term is difficult.

It is in this spirit that one should view the life and work of this "constant dissident."4 It is
in this same spirit that this article is offered.

The Early Years (1895-1921)

Peng Shuzhi was born in the village of Tongle, in Baoqing (or Shaoyang) xian, on
November 24, 1895. Peng's family was one of the few better-off peasant families in this
poor village. He viewed his family as part of the "small landlord" class, though still
farmers. "They lived a simple frugal life and saved their money," according to Peng,
"which they used to buy more land. Thus the life of a peasant, though s small landlord,
could still be hard and bitter. My family was like this."5
The family was also more educated, with the traditional emphasis placed on
education of the male children. At age seven, Peng Shuzhi was placed in a school where

4Cheng 1998, p. 16. Remarks by the daughter of Peng and Chen at their final burial ceremony in France,
March 31, 1998.
5Peng Shuzhi, interviewed by Miller, Tape 1, Side A (Hereafter, Miller interviews). These interviews were
conducted in Chinese, while Peng and Chen were living in California. For those who read French, see
Claude Cadart and Cheng Yingxiang, Mémoirs de Peng Shuzhi. L'Envol du communisme en Chine (Paris:
Gallimard, 1983). This volume covers Peng's life up to 1925.
 3

the youth of several families were taught by a hired instructor. After five years, his
education was brought to a temporary halt due to the illness of his grandmother.6
One early influence on Peng's thinking and developing worldview was Chen
Tianhua's 1903 volume Xingshizhong (Alarm to Rouse the World), an early reflection of
a nascent Chinese nationalism. This was Peng's first window to the arena of world
politics and China's place in it. Whereas previously, his "world" consisted only of his
village, Peng now learned that "China was a big country and that it was in danger... It was
then that I thought of the need for China to develop a sense of nationalism."7
Eventually, Peng was able to return to school, where he began to question an
educational system which put a premium on rote learning of the Chinese classics, and
taught nothing about the real world or the outside world. A newly-hired science teacher
took special interest in this young student, and, recognizing the limitations of a small
village school, encouraged Peng to go elsewhere for a modern education.8
During the autumn of 1912, Peng and some others from his village traveled to the
larger town of Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, where they enrolled in Shaoyang
Middle School. According to Peng, this school was staffed "from top to bottom" with
"Japan returned students" who had been members of the national revolutionary group
known as the Tongmenghui (the predecessor to the Guomindang (GMD), or Nationalist
Party). The principal of this school, He Yanwu, was also a member of the Tongmenghui,
and he encouraged new forms of learning, which included debates on political issues.9
This was Peng's further introduction to politics and revolution. Since the the Qing
Dynasty had been overthrown in 1911-12, young people like himself were easily drawn to
the national revolutionary spirit of the times. Clearly, China was still in the grip of
Western and Japanese imperialism. Qing efforts to break or weaken this hold had been
pitiful against the overwhelming impact of this exploitative world system. Of course, this
situation moved many to action---from the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s and 1860s to
the Boxers of 1900 to the 1911 Revolution. All had their roots in nationalistic, anti-
foreign attitudes largely resulting from these imperialist pressures and the concomitant
internal problems.10
As for Peng's home province of Hunan, it was one of those most affected by Kang
Youwei's progressive reform movement of the late nineteenth century. Furthermore,
according to Zhang Guotao,"It was always on Hunan that the North-South wars
converged. The Hunanese had suffered from war for a very long time, and, generally
speaking, their young people inclined to the Left ideologically and were politically highly
sensitive. Indeed, to each modern Chinese revolutionary movement, Hunan contributed a
number of outstanding figures."11
Peng finally finished his high school education in Fall 1916. Since his family
could not afford to send him to college, he began teaching in an upper level elementary
school in Shaoyang. He followed national and international events through any
newspapers or magazines he could find, including Chen Duxiu's Xin Qingnian (New

6Miller interviews, Tape1, Side A.

7Miller interviews, Tape1, Side A.
8MIller interviews, Tape 1, Side A.
9Miller interviews, Tape1, Side A.
10Marx and Engels 1972, pp. 213-220; Esherick 1972.
11Chang 1971, p. 129.
 4

Youth), which greatly impressed him. Gradually, he learned more about radical political
theories and movements through such reading and through events taking place around
him.12
Eventually, at the end of the school term in 1919, he quit teaching. He was
confused about his future direction, though he knew he wanted to be politically active. He
later recalled that "At that time, my thinking on socialism was very vague, just at its
embryonic stage. It was also mixed with Marxism and anarchism."13
Early in 1920, Peng finally decided to leave his home village, with the hopes of
getting to Beijing, the center of Chinese radicalism since the May Fourth Movement of
the previous year. Due to warlord activity, however, he never made it. He stayed with
relatives in Guizhou for a time before finally returning to Changsha in September, where
he linked up with a major influence, Principal He Minfan.14
He Minfan was in his sixties, but he had a very youthful demeanor and was
always interested in new things, so he called himself "Old Youth" (lao shaonian). He was
organizing a socialist youth group in Changsha, and he had already collected a small
group of young people around him. Peng was soon encouraged by He to travel to
Shanghai, where he could work directly with Chen Duxiu in a more advanced communist
organization. As Peng has reported, He Minfan suggested that Peng should go to
Shanghai as one from among the "founders of the Changsha communist organization."
Since Chen and He Minfan had corresponded for some time, He provided a letter of
introduction for Peng to Chen Duxiu.15
By 1920, small Marxist study groups were established in some of the major cities
of China, inspired by the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917. The
Shanghai group, called the Marxist Research Society (Makesi zhuyi yanjiuhui), was
established by Chen Duxiu and others in May 1920. According to Arif Dirlik, Comintern
emissary Gregory Voitinsky "seems to have engaged [Chen's group] in considering the
possibilities for founding a Communist party."16 While this first effort failed, the group
did actually become the nucleus for the CCP. Also that Summer, the Foreign Language
Institute (Waiguoyu xueshe) had been established, led by Voitinsky's wife and Yang
Mingzhai to train Chinese activists in Russian as part of their Marxist studies.17
On his arrival in Shanghai, Peng joined the Socialist Youth League (SYL) and
Chen's study group, thus joining the CCP nucleus. He was also among some twenty
students who were studying Russian at Yang's school. According to Peng, "Of course, my
main purpose for going to Shanghai was to go to Russia to study."18
During this period, Voitinsky urged Chen Duxiu to send people to Moscow to
attend the soon-to-be-established Communist University for the Toilers of the East
(KUTV), an institution meant to provide trained communist revolutionaries to further the

12Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B.

13Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B.
14Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B.
15Peng Shuzhi 1983a, pp. 68-72; also Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B; Peng letter to this author, May 22,
1976.
16Dirlik 1989, p. 203; Feigon 1983, pp. 162-165.
17Dirlik 1989, p. 206; Peng 1983a; Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B; see Smith 2000, pp. 13-17. For a
very detailed description of the influence of the Bolshevik revolution on early Chinese Communists, see
Pantsov 2000, Chapter 2.
18Peng 1980, pp. 13-15; Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B; Miller interviews, Tape 2, side A.
 5

struggles in their home countries. According to Peng Shuzhi, he, along with about thirty
others, was selected to attend. Separate groups of two's and three's began to leave China
unobtrusively during February 1921 so as not to attract attention.19
Peng traveled with Ren Zuomin on this rather harrowing journey. They carried
with them a pass signed by Voitinsky to ease their way into Russia, but due to concerns
about being searched by the Japanese in Vladivostok, they tore it up and tossed it into the
sea:

Leaving Japanese-controlled territory was no trouble. But after crossing

the bridge over the Amur and getting into Russia, without a pass or ID,
trouble developed at Khabarovsk station. Authorities would not take
our word that we were traveling to Moscow to study. They did not
accept our story about tearing up the pass...Our problem was
compounded by the fact that we could not explain ourselves in Russian,
even after six months of studying the language.20

Peng and Ren soon solved their identification problem. However, they were
prevailed upon to stay behind in Khabarovsk to write and edit a Chinese-language
newspaper for a group of Chinese trade unionists. They were then transferred to the Red
Army to do educational work for a group of Chinese and Koreans in a Siberian unit until
it was disbanded in late July or early August 1921. Peng and Ren were finally allowed to
finish their travels to Moscow, arriving in late August or early September, ready to settle
in for their studies.21

The Moscow Years (1921-1924)

Soviet Russia, surrounded by hostile forces, was in the midst of a struggle for stability in
1921. Though the Bolsheviks were victorious in the civil war against the forces of
counterrevolution, they now faced a new enemy: economic and social reality in their
devastated nation, surrounded by hostile forces.22
Some of the effects of these domestic instabilities and international controversies
reached deep into the halls of the KUTV. When Peng Shuzhi finally arrived in Moscow,
he was informed by Liu Shaoqi that factional disputes had developed among some of the
earlier arrivals. As Peng explained in 1976, "One of the factions consisted of about five
students, centering around a man named Bu Shiqi, who spoke good Russian. He thus was
able to speak to the school authorities."23
This was a period of severe economic restrictions in Russia, due to the civil war
and international isolation. There were bread rations, but still not enough to go around.
Bu was able to secure extra rations due to his fluency in Russian, and he would distribute
these only to the students in his faction. Such corrupt practices, often found in times of

19According to a memoir by Xiao Jingguang, one of these students, there were only fourteen in this first
group. See Pantsov, 2000, pp. 166-167.
20Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B; Robert A. Burton interviews with Peng and Chen Bilian, in Brussels,
August 11-13, 1966 (Hereafter, Burton interviews). Copy of Burton interview transcript obtained from
Richard Kagan in 1973
21Miller interviews, Tape 1, Side B.
22Lenin 1966, pp. 21-9; Lenin 1971, p. 675.
23Miller interviews, Tape 2, Side A. See biographical note on Bu in Pantsov, 2000, p. 280.
 6

extreme scarcity, produced bitterness among the other Chinese students. As Peng
described it, "When a man is hungry, he does not mind his manners."24
In an attempt to resolve the disputes, a meeting was called of all the Chinese
students, where Bu's faction was required to admit its mistake, and the other, larger
faction was able to air its grievances. Eventually, with approval of the Comintern, a
Moscow Branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed, since it was felt
that the Chinese students needed more formal organization. This was an unusual step,
but it was certainly understandable in the context of language and other barriers. Peng
was chosen to be secretary of this Moscow branch, a post he was to maintain until his
departure from Moscow in 1924.25
During January and February of 1922, Peng was a delegate to the Congress of the
Toilers of the Far East in Moscow and Petrograd. As the Congress proceeded, conflict
developed over support for bourgeois-liberation movements in the colonies and the
lesser-developed world. For China, the conflict centered on the efficacy of an alliance, or
a bloc, with the Guomindang in China. The Chinese Communist delegates, including
Peng Shuzhi, were very much aware of the fundamental class nature of the GMD, based
as it was on merchants, rich peasants, and the military.26 They were also aware of Lenin's
statements concerning support for bourgeois-liberation movements.27
The issue was even further clarified by the remarks to this Congress of Georgi
Safarov, head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern. In reference to the Chinese
situation, he said:

We support any national revolutionary movement, but we

support it only in so far as it is not directed against the proletarian
movement. We must say: he is a traitor to the cause of the Communist
proletarian revolution who does not support the national revolutionary
movement. But on the other hand we say: he is a traitor to the national
cause who fights against the awakening of the proletarian movement, he
is a traitor to his people and to his national cause who hinders the Chinese
working class in its efforts to stand up on its own feet and speak its own
language.28

This question arose once again at the Fourth Comintern Congress at the end of
1922. Chen Duxiu, head of the CCP's secretariat,29 and Liu Renjing attended as
representatives of the Chinese movement. Liu reported on the general political situation
in China. He chided the GMD for scheming to make what he called a "military
revolution," while totally ignoring the necessity for "mass propaganda in the country." He
also pointed to the numerous strikes which had recently taken place in China as some

24Miller interviews, Tape 2, Side A.

25Miller interviews, Tape 2, Side A; Zheng Chaolin, who arrived in Moscow two years later (in 1923) has a
different take on the factional situation at Toilers University and what he viewed as Peng's authoritarian
behavior. See Zheng 1997, pp. 47-51.
26Whiting 1968, pp. 82-83; Chang 1971, pp. 204-205; see Chen 1922 for Chen Duxiu's early opposition to
the alliance with the GMD.
27Lenin 1971, pp. 603-604.
28Communist International 1922, pp. 166-167.
29Chen, 1991, p. 35; van de Ven 1991, p. 88.
 7

proof of the "awakening of the laboring masses." He declared that "the mass movement is
not a dream of the Socialists, but that it has already come into being." In his later remarks
to the Congress, however, Liu still argued that it was necessary for the CCP to join with
the Nationalist Party.30
When measured against the strongly anti-bourgeois speeches made at this same
Congress by Karl Radek, Leon Trotsky, and Gegory Zinoviev, Liu's presentation would
seem to prepare the ground for even deeper confusion among the Chinese students then in
Moscow. How could they be expected to return to China as effective fighters in the
revolutionary struggle with such mixed signals?31
By 1923, Peng Shuzhi gained an appointment as an instructor at KUTV. For the
next year he taught courses such as the "History of the Development of Social
Formations," and he lectured on Marxist philosophy.32 He was also admitted to
membership in the Soviet Communist Party, due to his increasing fluency in the Russian
language.
Peng's attendance at cadre meetings during 1923, at the time of the failure of the
German revolution, also exposed him to some aspects in the developing political struggle
between Stalin, by this time General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and Leon
Trotsky. He found it relatively easy to support the Lenin-Trotsky stance on economic
questions, but he had to look deeper into the party question, that is, the relationship
between democratic centralism and inner party democracy, before he was able to support
them on this issue as well.33
"At the time," Peng said in 1976, "I felt there was a division between the old
guard and the young. I often thought about this problem among the Russians. Many
among us worshipped Trotsky. Coming from China, we knew of only Trotsky and
Lenin...

But the problem of Trotsky versus Stalin was very difficult to

understand. Among others, it was a problem between the old
Bolsheviks and the young revolutionaries...Trotsky in "The
New Course" said that the old fell behind; we couldn't understand.
Later, of course, we did. In this situation, we were alone, with no
one to help us. We knew that things were not good. We studied
to find out why things were the way they were.34

During this period, the CCP in China was experiencing its own difficulties with
party questions. The official Comintern policy of collaboration between the CCP and
GMD had begun with the Sun-Joffe memorandum of January 26, 1923, declared China to
be unripe for communism "or even the Soviet system," and that "China's most important

30Communist International 1923, pp. 216-217; Whiting 1968 pp. 92, 95; In 1976 Peng said that duirng this
Congress he and Chen Duxiu established the Moscow Branch of the CCP as the liaison office for Europe in
order to bring more Chinese students to KUTV. He acted on this immediately, bringing people like Zheng
Chaolin to Moscow at the start of 1923 and significantly increasing the number of Chinese students. Miller
interviews, Tape 2, Side A.
31See Pantsov 2000, Chapter 3, for an extended discussion of Lenin's views.
32Burton interviews, August 11, 1966; Price 1976, p. 34.
33Miller interviews, Tape 2, Side B.
34Miller interviews, Tape 2, Side B; See Trotsky 1975, pp. 50-62, for the basic issues involved.
 8

and most pressing problems are the completion of national unification and the attainment
of full national independence."35
In spite of his early opposition to this policy, Chen Duxiu and the rest of the CCP
leadership had finally acquiesced to the Comintern representative's push for CCP
collaboration with the GMD and China's bourgeoisie. For example, in the April 23,
1923, issue of Xiangdao Zhoubao (The Guide Weekly), while Chen recognized the
historic importance of the working class, he argued for an alliance between the
"revolutionary bourgeoisie" and the Chinese working class. Only with this type of
leadership, he wrote, could the national revolution succeed.36
Later that same year, in Qianfeng (Vanguard), Chen argued that, while the
working class was necessary for a successful proletarian revolution, it could not function
as an independent force in China's national revolution. Only through a "melting of class
distinctions" could this national revolution succeed. Then the Chinese working class
follow with its own socialist revolution later.37
While still in Moscow, Peng Shuzhi claims to have developed very serious doubts
about the efficacy of such a policy. As he described it to an interviewer in 1966, when
friends tried to convince Peng this was analogous to communists joining the British
Labour Party, he pointed out that the Labour Party was essentially a workers' party,
whereas the GMD was fundamentally a party of the bourgeoisie.38 Peng read Chen's
articles and determined to challenge this attitude and the policies which grew from it on
his return to China.
In April of 1924, Trotsky spoke on the occasion of KUTV's third anniversary. It
is likely that Peng Shuzhi attended this event, along with other instructors and students.
Trotsky warned the audience about various attempts by the bourgeoisie to exploit
Marxism and Marxist movements for their own purposes. Specifically on the question of
China, he said:

We approve of Communist support to the Kuomintang Party in China,

which we are endeavoring to revolutionize. This is inevitable, but here too
there is a risk of national-democratic revival... the young Marxists of the
East run the risk of being torn out of the "Emancipation of Labor" group
and of becoming permeated with nationalist ideology.39

We see in Peng's later writings the apparent impact of these comments, since
similar ideas appear quite clearly in many of his articles after his return to China. In
particular, Peng generally makes the distinction between "support" to the GMD and an
outright alliance with the GMD, always warning about the capture of the movement by
the Chinese bourgeoisie.
Later that same year, Peng took part in the Fifth Comintern Congress, where Chen
Duxiu was elected (in absentia) to the ECCI. It was this Congress, according to Isaac
Deutscher, which "put its seal on the excommunication of Trotsky." By this time, he was

35Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank 1967, p. 70.

36Chen 1923a.
37Chen 1923b.
38Burton interviews, August 12, 1966.
39Trotsky 1969, p. 8.
 9

so isolated that "in the course of the full three weeks the congress heard nothing but foul-
mouthed vituperation against the man to whom the previous four congresses had listened
with deep respect and adoration."40
There is no record of any voices raised in Trotsky's defense. Of course, since
Trotsky decided not to defend himself, this should not be surprising. Also, Stalin,
utilizing his position in the Soviet party, had gradually increased the attacks on Trotsky
after the 1923 disputes, especially following Lenin's death in 1924. As Peng recalled this
Congress,

we didn't understand then what was taking place. Trotsky didn't speak
before the Congress...We could sense it then that Trotsky was being held
down by Stalin...I wanted to return to China. Thus, when the CCP Central
Committee wanted me to return, I was pleased. Since I got nothing out
out of the Fifth Comintern Congress, I wanted to return to China and
see what could be done.41

The Second Chinese Revolution (1924-1927)

By the time Peng Shuzhi returned to China in August 1924, the CCP had already held
three party congresses. The party had become a mere appendage to the Guomindang. Its
mission now was to "help strengthen the KMT's influence among workers and
peasants,"42 since the GMD apparently was unsuccessful in this work by itself. Even
Mao Zedong, a member of the CCP Central Committee, joined the GMD and supported
the call for bourgeois leadership of the Chinese national revolution in 1923.43
Soon after Peng's return, he was appointed editor of Xin Qingnian , now an
official organ of the CCP. This gave him his first opportunity to challenge the policy of
class collaboration then being followed by the CCP under Comintern directives. He
planned a special issue for December 1924, on the theme of problems of the national
revolution, a subject he had touched on earlier.
Peng's lead article in the special issue asked "Who is the leader of the Chinese
national revolution?" He provided a careful analysis of the classes in Chinese society,
their respective strengths and weaknesses, and their probable attitudes toward the
revolution. He argued that even though China's national revolution may be bourgeois-
democratic in character, this did not preclude the "necessity of having the most
progressive class in the position of leadership." Because of the "unclear separation of
classes in China," however, it was difficult to establish which class was the "most
progressive." This was Peng's task.44
Through his analysis of the Chinese bourgeoisie, sector by sector, Peng
determined that because of its "intimate relationship" with both imperialism and feudal
warlords, this class could not be expected to lead a successful national revolution.45

40Deutscher 1959, p. 146; also see International Press Correspondence, August 12, 1924, p. 612.
41Millerinterviews, Tape 2, Side B.
42Wilbur and How 1956, p. 66.
43Mao 1923.
44Zhongguo geming wenti lunwenji 1948, pp. 4-5; reprinted in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1 1983b, pp.
177-193.
45Zhongguo geming wenti lunwenji 1948, p. 15.
 10

The Chinese working class, on the other hand, had sufficient numbers and
consciousness to take leadership, since it was "directly under the oppression of
imperialism and the foreign capitalists."46 With working class leadership of the
revolution, the peasants and the handicraft workers would become effective allies, and
they would follow the working class "even into the proletarian revolution."47
Peng provided three answers to the question, "If the working class is the only
possible leader of the national revolution, why doesn't it change this revolution into one
of the proletariat?" First of all, the Chinese bourgeoisie was not the only enemy to be
dealt with; there was also imperialism and warlordism. Second, defeat of these two
enemies would just be the "first step" toward the proletarian revolution. Third, a
premature revolution of proletarian nature might force friends of the national revolution
into a counterrevolutionary stance. However, these concerns do not relieve the Chinese
working class from its historic task, according to Peng. While it fights for the national
revolution, the Chinese working class must at the same time prepare for its own
proletarian revolution unfettered.48
According to Peng, upon his return from Moscow, he shared with Chen a draft of
the above article, asking him to also write something on the question.49 Chen's article was
titled "Lessons of the National Movement over the past 27 years." He reviewed four
earlier movements in modern Chinese history: the 1898 Reforms, the Boxer Rebellion of
1900, the 1911 Revolution, and the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Chen concluded that
each of these efforts were "defeated" because they were simply based on "petty-bourgeois
leadership." He also credited the May Fourth Movement for being the first in which the
proletariat began to show its social force. Finally, Chen made an obvious bow toward
Peng's position when he wrote:

The lesson we have learned from the last 27 years of the national
movement is: of all social classes, only mankind's final class---the
proletariat, is the most uncompromising revolutionary class. Furthermore,
it is the natural enemy of the international capitalist imperialists...in the
national revolutions of those countries oppressed by imperialism, the
proletariat must assume leadership.50

In January 1925, the CCP held its Fourth National Congress in Shanghai. By this
time the party had more than one thousand members, with a youth group of over nine
thousand members.51 Peng Shuzhi participated as the delegate from the Moscow Branch
of the CCP, and he was elected to the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, taking
charge of the party's propaganda department. His role at this congress continues to be a
source of some controversy among participants in, and historians of, the Chinese
Communist movement.

46Zhongguo geming wenti lunwenji 1948, pp. 16-17.

47Zhongguo geming wenti lunwenji 1948, pp. 24-25.
48Zhongguo geming wenti lunwenji 1948, pp. 29-30.
49Evans and Block 1976, p.47
50Isaacs Collection 1948, pp. 224-225, 229.
51Wu Min and Xiao Feng 1951, p. 46; Zheng 1989, p.549.
 11

First, there is a dispute between Peng and Zheng Chaolin as to whether or not
Voitinsky attended this Congress. According to Zheng's memoirs, the "Comintern
representative Voitinsky attended once, and Qu Qiubai interpreted his speech. Voitinsky
drafted the political resolution and other important documents...On theoretical and
political questions, the congress simply accepted Comintern instructions."52 The
importance for Zheng of Votinsky's appearance relates to an argument over the source for
the polilitcal resolution at this congress. Zheng implied that Peng Shuzhi claimed
responsibility for this resolution that, in Peng's words, "marked the return of the CCP to
Bolshevism and the setting of conditions for the second Chinese revolution."53
Without access to all the sources, it seems to me that Peng Shuzhi simply denied
that Voitinsky and Qu Qiubai attended the congress, and never claimed to have actually
penned any resolution. Benton argues that Peng wished to deny Qu's role in accepting the
new line, though Zheng points out that Qu still favored the CCP-GMD alliance.54
From the "Resolution on the National Revolutionary Movement," however, it
seems quite clear that the policies which Peng and Chen now opposed together were
being revised, even if mildly. There was now a recognition that the Chinese working
class should lead this revolution, even if some "support" is given to the GMD,
particularly its left wing. Unfortunately, this new shift did not actually end the period of
"entry" into the GMD.55 While the "setting of conditions" took place, more would have to
happen to show the need for a final break, it seemed.
On this latter point, Zheng and Benton raise issue with a letter which Peng Shuzhi
wrote to comrades back in Moscow just after the end of the Fourth Congress. This letter
is actually a rather detailed report on the Fourth CCP Congress, which points out that the
mistakes of the Third Congress (mistakes that Qu Qiubai supported), were now being
corrected. Reporting on various debates which took place, Peng wrote:

As to the workers' movement, should workers join the

Guomindang? On this point, there were a few comrades who
reflected a little infantile leftism, arguing that workers should
not enter the Guomindang. In fact, if the working class thinks
about how to actually lead the national revolutionary movement,
entry into the Guomindang, in whatever scope, by workers is necessary.56

Is this in contradiction with Peng's views about CCP members being required to
enter the GMD and accept its discipline? Perhaps, on the surface, but it may also be read
in the spirit of Trotsky's 1924 comments concerning the effort to "revolutionize" the
Nationalist Party. Clearly, the leading role of the bourgeoisie is not the question here.
Rather, it signals an attempt to assert the leading role of the working class, even in a party
dominated by the bourgeoisie. In the context of the rising militancy of labor in 1925
China, this would seem to be a correct tactic.57

52Zheng 1997, p. 78
53Peng 1976, p. 48; also, see Zheng 1989, pp. 550-552; Smith 2000, p. 57.
54Benton 1985, p. 324; Zheng 1997, p. 79; van de Ven 1991, p. 211, 216-19, for more on Peng and Qu.
55Zhongyang danganguan bian 1988, pp. 329-341.
56Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi 1982, pp. 17-18; see Benton 1985 for his full critique of Peng.
57Smith 2000, Chapter 4.
 12

Another area of criticism of Peng's role at the Fourth Congress relates to a

resolution "attacking" Trotsky, according to Zheng. This was "unscheduled"; it had not
been prepared in advance and handed out. As Zheng recalled, "After the draft had been
read, it was a long time before anyone spoke. Finally, Peng Shuzhi got up and made a
speech along the lines that Trotsky was wrong on this or that point and must be opposed.
The result was that the resolution was passed unanimously."58
So, Peng Shuzhi, who claimed in more recent materials to be among those who
"worshipped" Trotsky while in Moscow, now seems to have supported a resolution
"attacking" him. Of course, we are dependent on Zheng's memory for this, though he
claimed to "clearly remember some minor details" of the congress. According to Zheng
and Benton, Peng apparently denied that such a resolution ever came up.59
However, a "Resolution on the Attitude of Comrade Trotsky" does show up in
more recently released archives of the Fourth CCP Congress. It cannot be appropriately
labeled an "attack," but rather, a mild critique in the early stages of the Stalin-Trotsky
conflict. Trotsky was still a "comrade," though he was criticized for his attitude toward
the leadership of the Soviet party and the Comintern. The resolution stated that his
statements may be used by the enemies of the world communist movement in a
reactionary period, and it accepted the Soviet party's analysis of "Trotskyism" as
"defeatist." Finally, it called upon Trotsky to accept "Leninism," at least as it was now
being constructed by Stalin and his followers.60
Peng Shuzhi's denial may also be the result of faulty memory, though he did
mention in his 1925 letter to Moscow comrades a "report on Leninism and Trotskyism" at
the congress.61 If Peng saw this as a major issue for the congress, wouldn't he be expected
to elaborate, especially if, as Benton constantly argues, he was a self-promoter? Wouldn't
his strong support for such a resolution raise his status with the Comintern and within the
CCP? Why didn't he say more about this in his letter to Moscow? We are still left with
more questions than answers on this issue. Of course, Peng was elected to the Central
Committee at this congress and put in charge of the Political Bureau's propaganda
department, so he certainly was not seen as an outsider or a threat to "established
authority" at this point.
Following this congress, the CCP experienced rapid growth, due to its leadership
in the growing and highly militant Chinese labor movement. These developments were
naturally met with great satisfaction in the Comintern. This did not result in acceptance of
independent leadership by the Chinese working class, however. Rather, the Comintern
remained committed to the "powerful bloc between the proletariat and the urban middle
classes."62
In July 1925, just as the Chinese labor movement was growing in strength and a
few months after the death of party founder Sun Zhongshan, Dai Jitao, the GMD's leading
theoretician, called for all those in the GMD to dissolve any outside attachments "and
become 'pure' Kuomintang members." Those Communists who joined the GMD under
Comintern directives were now faced with a dilemma. Either stay in the GMD and give

58Zheng 1997, p. 79.

59Zheng 1997, pp. 78-79; Benton 1985, p. 325.
60Zhongyang danganguan bian 1988, p. 325.
61Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi 1982, p. 17.
62Heller 1925, p. 16.
 13

up their membership in the CCP, or leave the GMD and "work openly in the name of the
Chinese Communist Party."63
According to Chen Duxiu, at a plenum in October of 1925, he warned that Dai's
pamphlet was "an indication of the bourgeoisie's attempt to strengthen its power for the
purpose of checking the proletariat and going over to the counterrevolution. We should
prepare ourselves immediately to withdraw from the Kuomintang and become
independent." Chen's proposal was rejected by a majority of the Central Committee and
the Comintern representative, Voitinsky.64
Then, on March 20, 1926, Jiang Jieshi carried out a coup at Guangzhou, arresting
many CCP activists there. Within two months, the GMD announced its "party-adjusted
program," which included such things as exclusion of Communists from "all higher posts
in the Kuomintang," cessation of any criticisms of the Three People's Principles, and the
required registration of any CCP members.65
Immediately following the March coup, the CCP regional committee at Shanghai
called a meeting at which it was decided that the policy of collaboration must be
reconsidered. According to Zhang Guotao, then head of the CCP's military affairs
department, the Central Committee decided to send him to Guangzhou to "investigate the
true facts of the incident" and implement a "delaying policy of compromise" with Jiang's
forces.66
On the other hand, Peng Shuzhi has argued that there was no "policy of
compromise." Rather, the policy was one of preparation of an "independent military force
to oppose Jiang Jieshi." Furthermore, according to Peng, it was he who was sent to
Guangzhou as the Central Committee representative to demand from Michael Borodin,
the new Comintern representative, a policy of opposition to Jiang. Peng pointed out the
dangers of an imminent rightist counterrevolution in Guangdong province, and he
proposed that all CCP members withdraw from the GMD in order to protect
themselves.67
Borodin suggested a meeting with some of the leaders of the so-called "left wing"
of the GMD. Of the four GMD representatives, only one expressed digust with Jiang's
March coup, but he was still opposed to the Communists leaving the Nationalist Party,
claiming that would only "weaken the left wing's position." In this way, Borodin was able
to garner opposition to Peng's proposal, and that was the end of it.68
Peng left Guangzhou in June and returned to Shanghai. The Central Committee
held another plenum in July, at which Chen Duxiu and Peng again advocated total
withdrawal from the GMD. Their proposal was not adopted, according to Peng, but the
Central Committee decided to send it on to Moscow, where it was later rejected as
"adventurist."69
In September, Peng wrote that, although the Northern Expedition might be might
be useful in ending warlordism and unifying China, its leadership (read Jiang Jieshi) must

63Wilbur and How, p. 206.

64Evans and Block 1976, p. 600.
65Brandt 1958, p. 75.
66Chang 1971, p. 494.
67Peng 1968, pp. 14-15; this is supported by Chen Duxiu's 1929 letter in Evans and Block 1976, p. 601.
68Peng 1968, p. 16.
69Burton interviews, August 12, 1966.
 14

be held accountable at every turn. It must not be allowed to turn this potentially useful
tool for the good of China into an instrument of bourgeois power enrichment. This "back
door" criticism of Comintern policy seemed the only way left open to Peng and Chen
Duxiu.70
By late 1926, the Nationalist Party was accepted into the Comintern as a
"sympathizing party." The CCP was ordered to restrain the peasant movement so as not
to "drive away the generals leading the victorious northward march" against the
warlords.71 Possibly responding to pressure from the Left Opposition led by Trotsky,
however, the ECCI was still giving lip service to the "independence" of the Communists
inside the GMD.72
In January of 1927, Peng Shuzhi asked the question, "Is Leninism Applicable to
the So-called 'National Peculiarities' of China?" Answering in the affirmative, Peng did
not stop there. After quoting Stalin's writings on Leninism, he proceeded to challenge the
very foundation of Stalin's policies in China, though indirectly. He enumerated five
principles which he termed the "basis" for the national revolution:
(1) the national revolution is one part of the world revolution;
(2) China's working class is the vanguard of the revolution;
(3) China's revolution must protect the interests of the peasants
to the end;
(4) completely recognize the equality of all nationalities; and,
(5) permanent revolution.73
Elaborating on the second principle, Peng argued that "if the interests of the
working class are sacrificed, then the revolution has been sacrificed." As for the fifth
principle, Peng discussed this without even mentioning Trotsky. He merely pointed out
that "the national revolution is not the last revolutionary stage for China. It must go the
way of socialist revolution."74
In early March, reflecting growing concerns within the CCP Central Committee,
Peng warned against the "rightist dangers" which existed for the Chinese revolution. The
fact that the revolution began to show signs of "bourgeois compromise, and even
reaction," led him to the belief that there was a real danger of defeat.75
Then, in what was to be his final article for Xiangdao , Peng analyzed the "anti-
communist, anti-labor, and anti-Soviet" tendencies represented by Jiang Jieshi. He argued
that future struggles will necessarily be of a "life or death" nature between the
revolutionary forces of China's working class and Jiang's "counterrevolutionary forces."76
The CCP Central Committee could see the growing strength of Jiang's right wing
in the Guomindang, yet, the Comintern still directed the workers of Shanghai not to come

70Peng 1926; reprinted in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1, pp. 205-218.

71Isaacs 1961, p. 117.
72Degras 1960, pp. 345-346.
73Peng 1927a; reprinted in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1, pp. 219-226. In fact, the term 'yongxu geming'
seems closer to the meaning of 'permanent revolution' that is generally discussed in the Trotskyist lexicon.
This was later replaced by the term 'buduan geming,' which is actually closer in meaning to 'continuous
revolution' or 'revolution without stages'. I would agree that Peng was probably not writing in accord with
Trotksy, but rather, in accord with how he (Peng) saw the Chinese events unfolding on the ground.
74Peng 1927a; see footnote on Qu Qiubai's response to this in Evans and Block 1976, p. 61.
75Peng 1927b; reprinted in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1, pp. 234-242.
76Peng 1927c; reprinted in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1, pp. 250-257.
 15

into conflict with Jiang's forces as they moved toward the city in late March. This
directive was received after the armed insurrection of March 21 had placed workers in
charge of the entire city, except for the foreign concessions.77
On April 12, Jiang Jieshi, in collaboration with the Shanghai underworld, began a
massacre which decimated the ranks of Shanghai's militant workers and CCP activists
and soon spread to other areas of China. As the most famous chronicler of these events
expressed it. "the workers had died on the cross of Kuomintang 'unity.' Under it,
militarists and the bankers now gambled and bargained for the spoils."78 Now , according
to Stalin, the GMD right wing had fully exposed itself, and the CCP could focus its
efforts on the left wing, led by Wang Jingwei.
On April 24, 1927, in the midst of what became known as the "white terror," the
Fifth Congress of the CCP began far to the West of the Guomindang power centers. Over
one hundred delegates arrived to represent the more than 50,000 members of the party.79
The "opportunism" of the party leadership was heavily criticized, but Chen Duxiu was
reelected to the post of General Secretary. Peng Shuzhi took part in this Congress as a
delegate from Shanghai, and while he was reelected to the Central Committee, he was
removed from the Political Bureau position as propaganda chief and replaced by Cai
Hesen, who had just returned from Moscow. This possibly reflected the conflict between
Qu Qiubai and Peng over Peng's "Trotskyism."80
Peng was then transferred to the post of Secretary of the Northern Regional
Committee, then vacant as the result of party co-founder Li Dazhao's arrest and
execution by Jiang's GMD. Peng stayed there until Wang Jingwei of the GMD left wing,
initiated his own purge of the Communists in July. Following this, Peng and other party
activists were required to go underground.81
During this critical and confusing period, an "emergency conference" of the CCP
Central Committee was called for August 7, 1927, in Hangzhou. This followed by only a
couple of days the abortive Nanchang uprising led by Zhou Enlai and others in an effort
to hold on to some base of operations for the CCP.
This emergency meeting was convened by Qu Qiubai, then head of the party's
peasant department and a political opponent of Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi. With only a
few Central Committee members in attendance, this meeting officially removed Chen
Duxiu as General Secretary, even though Chen had already resigned after Wang Jingwei's
purge the month before. Chen, Tan Pingshan, and their so-called "opportunism" were
blamed for the defeat of the revolution, letting Stalin off the hook.82
After Qu "unwillingly"83 took control of the party, he proceeded to initiate, under
directives brought to China by Stalin's protégé Lominadze, a policy of insurrection, even
in the face of disastrous failures such as Nanchang. Peng Shuzhi, then still in the North,
refused to take part in these efforts, believing its timing would only result in further

77Isaacs1961, p. 163.
78Isaacs1961, p. 185; see Evans and Block 1976, pp. 61-63 for Chen and Peng's plans for armed struggle.
79Wu Min and Xiao Feng 1951, p. 73.
80Zheng 1989, pp. 682-688; also Chang 1971, p. 621; Harrison 1972, p. 100; Schwartz 1951, pp. 68-71; see
Peng 1928, a series of lectures presented by Peng in the immediate aftermath of the 1927 GMD coup in
which he counters Qu's analysis of the revolution.
81Peng 1968
82Evans and Block 1976, pp. 74-75; Zheng 1989, pp. 725-727.
83Si Malu 1962, p. 131.
 16

decimation of the revolutionary forces. Ultimately, toward the end of 1927, Peng was
removed from all major party responsibilities.84
As a result of this insurrectionary policy, many thousands of workers, peasants,
and CCP organizers lost their lives or were imprisoned by GMD forces. By the end of
1927, CCP membership dropped from nearly 60,000 to 10,000. Rigor mortis had begun
to set in on the Second Chinese Revolution.

Peng Shuzhi and the Origins of Chinese Trotskyism

Peng Shuzhi argued that "the single most important reason for the beginning of the
Trotskyist movement in China was the failure of the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927." 85
While this is surely true, the Chinese Left Opposition, or Chinese Trotskyist movement,
had it earliest beginnings at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, not in China. Sun Yat-
sen University was established in the fall of 1925, following the death of Sun (Sun
Zhongshan) that March. Its purpose was to train revolutionary cadres for China who were
not necessarily members of the Communist Party.
This group of early oppositionists consisted mainly of younger activists who were
sent to Moscow during the years of revolution. According to Peng, "they were won over
to Trotskyism solely on the basis of Trotsky's writings and the influence of Karl Radek,
who was the rector of Sun Yat-sen University at the time."86
These supporters of Trotsky in Moscow were organized in secret around August
1928, just after the Sixth Comintern Congress and the Sith CCP Congress, both of which
were held in Moscow in order that they could develop what became known as the "Li
Lisan Line" for the Chinese revolution.87 Though Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi were
invited to attend these congresses, they declined, sensing a trap and realizing that the
party and the Comintern would not be open to criticism.88
As a direct result of the failure of the Russian Opposition, Stalin appointed Pavel
Mif the new rector of Sun Yat-sen University, replacing Oppositionist Karl Radek. Mif
and his protege, a Chinese student named Wang Ming, then began to exercise tight
control over the Chinese students. This fueled the fires of opposition, and the secret
organizations continued to grow.89
In an effort to keep the oppositionists from contaminating other students, they
were generally sent back to China as they were discovered. During the Spring of 1929,
two of these returning students brought two major documents written by Trotsky to Peng
Shuzhi. Upon reading them and finding himself in full agreement with the criticisms of
Stalin's policies in China, Peng passed them on to Chen Duxiu, who also agreed with
Trotsky's analysis. Chen and Peng then decided to organize a formal left opposition
within the CCP.90 Trotskyism in China now gained a new life and a very important
audience: cadres and party branch secretaries who had not paid much attention to the
earlier efforts to organize Trotskyist sympathizers.

84P'eng 1980, pp. 28-29.

85Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A.
86Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A.
87Sheng 1971, p. 166; also International Press Correspondence, October 4, 1928.
88Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A.
89Kagan 1969, p. 61.
90Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A; Evans and Block 1976, pp. 291-341, 345-397.
 17

In September 1929, five months after the formal organization of the Chinese Left
Opposition, Peng Shuzhi was called before a "Communist Party Joint Conference" to
defend himself and Chen Duxiu against charges of "opportunism." He turned this
conference into an argument for open discussion with the CCP on various political
questions, including the opposition, as well as "opportunism" and the "nature of the future
Chinese revolution." The party defended repression of open discussion by reference to the
"tense situation" in China. Peng countered by arguing that this "tense situation" could
only be relieved through open discussion of important political questions.91
In general, Peng argued for a complete reappraisal of the Central Committee's
political line, full freedom for party members to express and disseminate opinions within
the party, the publication of Chen Duxiu's writings and the documents of the Opposition
in order that "all party comrades might freely discuss and criticize them," the abolition of
"iron discipline" within the party, and a return to the democratic practices which should
be found in all Bolshevik parties.92
The joint conference was just one small part of the party leadership's campaign
against the Chinese Left Opposition. Not surprisingly, the official criticisms of the
Opposition in China were quite similar to those levied against Trotsky and the Opposition
by Stalin only a few years earlier.
Eventually, these attacks won the day, for on November 15, 1929, Chen Duxiu,
Peng Shuzhi, Wang Zekai, Ma Yufu, and Cai Zhende were all expelled from the CCP
under charges of "Trotskyism," factionalism, anti-party, and anti-International activities.
Soon after, other sympathizers and adherents to the Left Opposition were expelled,
including Chen Bilan, Yin Kuan, Zheng Chaolin, and others.93
In December, a document generally considered to be the single most important in
the early history of the Chinese Trotskyist movement was released over the signatures of
eighty-one former party members.. This political platform, titled "Womende zhengzhi
yijian shu" (Our Political Views), was co-authored by Chen Duxiu, Peng Shuzhi, and Yin
Kuan. According to Peng, some twenty-eight of the signatories were workers (printers
from many of the papers in Shanghai), while more than ten were "returned students" from
Moscow, some of whom had participated in party work during the 1925-27 revolution.
The others were party cadres and branch secretaries who had been convinced of the
correctness of Trotsky's position over the months since the establishment of the Left
Opposition inside the party.94
Ultimately, it was this group which was to form the organizational nucleus of the
unified Trotskyist movement. Its strength was found in its members' political experience
and organizational abilities. According to Peng Shuzhi, when the document of the
"eighty-one" appeared, "all of China was affected by it. After all, this was a split in the
Chinese Communist Party." 95

91Peng 1929, p. 2a; reprinted in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1, pp. 258-287.
92Peng 1929, p. 26.
93Zhongyang danganguan bian 1990, pp. 549-555.
94Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A; P'eng 1980, p. 14; Peng letter to Kagan, January 12, 1972. The
complete text of Womende zhengzhi yijian shu may be found in Peng Shuzhi xuanji Volume 1, 1983, pp.
305-335.
95Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A.
 18

With the expulsion of the Opposition group led by Chen and Peng, Chinese
Trotskyism, at least its strongest section, was now tranferred outside the "mainstream" of
CCP politics and activities.

The Struggle for Unity and the Uncertain Future(1929-1931)

The Chinese Trotskyist movement, which by 1930 consisted of four separate groups, was
eventually unified for only about a year and a half, from May 1931 to October 1932,
before a series of crises arose. In 1929 there were only two Trotskyist organizations.
The "Our Words" (Womende Hua) faction was made up of Chinese students who
had organized themselves while in Moscow and were sent back to China upon their
exposure. Founded in China in late 1928, it took its name from its periodical.
The situation in China was very limited regarding the activities of the "Our
Words" group. They had their first organizational meeting in January of 1929, when a
skeletal structure of responsibilities was established. They had only nine members in
China at this time, and according to Peng Shuzhi, "They had no position in the party.
They could do no work within the ranks of the party." The publication of Womende Hua
was about the extent of their activity at this early period. After a while, they managed to
set up a "branch with a fair amount of influence among the workers, " according to Peng.
Even so, their membership probably did not surpass twenty or thirty.96
Since most people in the "Our Words" group had no experience or position inside
the CCP, according to Peng, they did not really understand the full substance of Trotsky's
position on China. This was also the source of a sectarian attitude toward Chen Duxiu
and other experienced revolutionaries. Chen was criticized by this group for maintaining
his "Stalinist opportunism and adventurism," and his group's advocacy of a "workers' and
peasants' dictatorship" was denounced as "anti-Marxist."97
The second organization operating inside of China at this time was that of Chen
Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi, along with important cadres and workers from within the CCP.
Following their expulsion from the party, they began to publish, in March 1930, a
periodical titled Wuchanzhe (Proletarian), thus becoming the "Proletarian" faction.
Sympathizers to this group began to appear inside the CCP. They were referred to
in party documents as the "conciliators," since they were pushing toward a conciliation
between the current party leadership and the Left Opposition. Finally, the "conciliators"
were repressed, but not before large groups of cadres from all over China had been won
to the perspective of the Left Opposition. According to Richard Kagan, the "Proletarian"
group had attained a membership of some five hundred by 1931.98
Ironically, the third group grew out of the first two. This group, known as the
"October Society" (Shiyue She), was led by Liu Renjing and Wang Fanxi, a member of
the CCP since 1925 and someone who worked with the "Our Words" group. The
"October Society" was actually the organizational result of factional activities carried on
by Liu while he was also tenuously connected with the "Our Words" group.99
Liu was a sympathizer in the Trotskyist movement, and on his way back to China
from Moscow in 1929, he stopped in Turkey to visit with Trotsky, then in exile. He was

96Millerinterviews, Tape 3, side A.

97Pengletter to Kagan, January 12, 1972.
98Kagan 1969, p132.
99Wang 1991, pp. 133-136.
 19

given a programmatic document written by Trotsky for the Chinese Left Opposition. Liu
carried this document back to China, where he gave it to Peng Shuzhi in September, just
about the time that the Left Opposition was meeting with the "Our Words" group to
discuss political differences.100
According to Peng, Liu discussed the issue of unification with him. He argued
that members of the Left Opposition (they were still in the party at this time) should break
with the party and openly join the "Our Words" group. Peng responded that he and Chen
Duxiu had discovered serious organizational and political differences with "Our Words."
Furthermore, any unification which might take place must be a merger of two small
groups, not just some individuals joining a group outside the party. Principled
unification, Peng argued, required a full discussion of differences in order to develop a
common standpoint, otherwise the unficiation would soon be followed by splits.101
Ultimately, Liu joined "Our Words," where he conducted his own factional
activities, gradually drawing some members from Beijing and Shanghai, including Wang
Fanxi, around him. By Summer 1930, they organized their own faction and set up the
"October Society."
Peng Shuzhi recalled that in the first issue of their short-lived journal, Shiyue bao
(October), Liu attacked Chen Duxiu, referring to his "Letter to All Comrades in the Party"
as a "shameful document." This only served to reinforce the already negative attitudes of
members of "Our Words" and the "October Society" toward Chen and the other old
revolutionaries. Wang Fanxi described his own attitudes in the following manner:

As I, like all young Trotskyists of that time, did not quite believe the
sincerity of the conversion of Chen Tu-hsiu and his followers to
Trotskyism, I did not want to join Chen's group. After some discussion
with the Peking comrades and Liu, I decided to work with them by
organizing ourselves into a separate group and publishing an organ
called October.102

The establishment of the fourth Trotskyist group in China apparently followed fast
on the heels of the "October Society." This group called itself the "Struggle Society"
(Zhandou She), and it also included some returned students from Moscow. They also
organized sometime in the Summer of 1930, with seven members, including the two
students who had given Trotsky's articles to Peng Shuzhi in the Spring of 1929.
According to Peng, these individuals "were rather petty-bourgeois in outlook, not really
very good revolutionaries."103 Wang Fanxi has referred to the "Struggle Society" as the
"least important" of the four factions, and Kagan claimed that it "did not exceed thirty
members, and it was the least powerful and influential."104
Thus, by the Fall of 1930, there were four Trotskyist factions, all with differing
degrees of influence and involvement, and all with their own periodicals. As Wang Fanxi

100Evans and Block 1976, p. 640; Peng letter to Kagan, January 12, 1972.
101Kagan 1969, p. 137; Peng letter to Kagan, January 12, 1972; also Tang Baolin 1994, pp. 117-119.
102Wang 1976, p. 61.
103Miller interviews, Tape 3, Side A.
104Wang 1976, p. 61; Kagan 1969, p. 139.
 20

expressed it, "we all recognized that this was a bad state of affairs, and that it was
essential to create a unified Trotskyist organization in China."105
A stumbling block to the establishment of a unified Trotskyist organization was
the mistrust which the younger Trotskyists had toward older revolutionaries who had
been in CCP leadership positions. This was reflected in published attacks in the
periodicals of "Our Words," the "October Society," and the "Struggle Society." On the
other hand, some of the statements made by Peng Shuzhi, for example, in interviews and
in earlier writings, seem to express a certain attitude of superiority toward the younger
activists, and this may only have exacerbated the differences which already existed. It is
difficult, however, to dispute the fact, reported by Peng and by those who did not
necessarily agree with him on other issues, that the "Proletarian" group was more
effective in gaining adherents simply because of the seasoned revolutionaries found there.
A major source for the eventual unification of the movement, outside of the
situational imperative (the CCP was using disputes between Trotskyist groups to
undermine further efforts at recruitment), was the person of Leon Trotsky. Since late
1929, he had been in regular correspondence with the various groups. Each organization
presented its case as the true reflection of Chinese Trotskyism.
Trotsky soon came to realize that some of the disputes between the factions were
"merely academic," or "tactical questions," while others seemed to be purely personal. He
could see no valid reason for the expressed negative views toward Chen Duxiu and the
older revolutionaries.106
Early efforts at unification were already taking place in China. A Negotiating
Council for Unification was organized, which consisted of representatives from each
faction, and they worked on an agenda throughout the late Summer and early Fall of
1930. According to Wang Fanxi, "the negotiations took a very long time. Each group
expressed different opinions at every meeting of the council." The split between the old
and young revolutionaries continued to be a central obstacle.107
Eventually, the "Proletarian" faction found it necessary to write an open letter to
the members of the other three factions in an attempt to explain what was holding up the
unification process. This letter pointed out that, during the meetings of the council, there
were charges that the "Proletarian" group and some of its members were not engaged in
sincere negotiation. It also pointed out that those involved in various splits admitted that
these were not based on any particular principles. Basically, the "Proletarian" group
made a final pitch for greater efforts at unification without the petty disputes which
hindered the process up to that time. There was no question, however, that certain
political questions still had to be worked out between the participants, and that the only
successful unification would need to be a principled one.108
Peng Shuzhi admitted in 1976 that he felt more time was needed before a truly
principled unification could be effected. Wang Fanxi has charged Peng with being totally
opposed to the unification and required all other factions to dissolve into the "Proletarian"

105Wang 1974, p. 28.

106Evansand Block 1976, p. 439.
107Wang 1974, p. 28.
108Wuchanzhe, Number 6, November 25, 1930.
 21

faction. Peng disputed this version , admitting that he was just a bit more reticent about a
speedy unification than was Chen Duxiu.109
Finally, in a letter "To the Chinese Left Opposition" dated January 8, 1931, Leon
Trotsky made what was apparently the convincing case for quick unification. He then
elaborated upon his own analysis of some of the "controversial and semicontroversial
questions" concerning the Chinese Opposition. After review of these issues and the
various opinions which were reflected in the different groups, he stated emphatically,
"Dear friends, fuse your organizations and your press definitively this very day! We must
not drag out the preparations for the unification a long time, because in that way, without
wanting to, we can create artificial differences."110
Ultimately, as a result of Trotsky's intervention and guidance, some of the
disputes between groups were muted (at least temporarily), rendering any continued
division insupportable. The Unification Conference opened on May 1, 1931, and
stretched over three days, with the final day devoted to the adoption of resolutions.
This united movement took on a new name, Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi tongmeng
(the Communist League of China). Trotsky's 1929 document, "The Political Situation in
China and the Tasks of the Bolshevik-Leninist Opposition," was adopted by the
Communist League (CLC) as its programmatic foundation. Organizationally, a Central
Committee was elected, with Chen Duxiu as the General Secretary. Other members were:
Peng Shuzhi, Wang Fanxi [Wang Wenyuan], Song Fengchu, Chen Yimou, Song Jingxiu,
Zhang Jiu, Zheng Chaolin, Liu Hanyi, and Pu Yifan.
The League began to work in China's urban centers. From the various estimates of
strength during this period, it seems that a figure of five to six hundred CLC members
throughout China is the most accurate. While on the surface, the League was small, its
size did not mirror its capabilities for effective action given the high number of seasoned
cadres in the organization.
Almost immediately, however, the CLC came under constant harassment, from
both the official CCP and Jiang's GMD. Within three weeks of the League's formal
establishment, its members began to be arrested by the Nationalist Government. By late
1932, the main leaders of the League, including Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi, were on
trial and soon imprisoned. This seriously limited any further effective work on the part of
these "urban revolutionaries," but their odyssey continued in China for the next twenty
years, in spite of these obstacles.

Reflections and Concluding Remarks

How to evaluate the role played by Peng Shuzhi in these years of turmoil for the Chinese
revolution? His early days in chaotic post-Qing China seem to have awakened in him this
revolutionary spirit; he was a man of his times. With each new experience he is drawn
further into the fight for a new China. As a "founding member" of the Changsha
communist organization and one of the earliest communist activists to study in Moscow,
we see Peng develop quickly into a serious Bolshevik, in the truest sense of that term, one
committed to revolutionary struggle and clear, critical thinking.
Why as early as 1924, does Peng apparently break with the Comintern's policies
toward the CCP and the Chinese revolution? This would not endear him to the Moscow

109Wang 1974, pp. 28-29; Miller interveiws, Tape 3, Side A.

110Evans And Block 1976, p. 498, emphasis in original.
 22

center, and it doesn't bode well for his so-called "careerism" in the movement. Clearly,
while Peng accepted the notion of party authority and Comintern authority, this did not
mean unquestioned authority.
Perhaps in these internal debates , Peng thought the arguments presented by
himself and Chen Duxiu would be enough to win concessions. Perhaps he still believed
that democratic centralism actually operated in the Comintern. If so, he was obviously
wrong, and he, along with others, paid a terrible price for this miscalculation.
In the end, with the failure of the second Chinese revolution, Peng Shuzhi was
not afraid to continue on his revolutionary path, even with all the twists and turns that
entailed. His work in the foundation of the Chinese Left Opposition and later the
Communist League of China reflected this commitment, and it was not about career or
privileged position, it was about the fight for a new China.

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