Chapter 11: Ash’arism

Ash’arism by M. Abdul Hye, M.A, Ph.D, Professor of Philosophy, Government College,

Rajshahi (Pakistan)

Al-Ashari’s Life and Work

Asharism is the name of a philosophico-religious school of thought in Islam that
developed during the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries. This movement
was “an attempt not only to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly
crept into it but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the religious
thought of Islam.”
It laid the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or orthodox Kalam, as opposed
to the rationalist Kalam of the Mu'tazilites; and in opposition to the extreme orthodox
class, it made use of the dialectical method for the defence of the authority of divine
revelation as applied to theological subjects.
The position at the end of the third/ninth century was such that the development of
such a movement as orthodox Kalamwas inevitable. The rationalization of faith,
which developed, at the beginning of the second century of the Hijrah as a systematic
movement of thought, in the name of rationalism in Islam or Mu'tazilite movement,
was, in its original stage, simply an attempt to put Islam and its basic principles on a
rational foundation, by giving a consistent rational interpretation to the different
dogmas and doctrines of Islam.
But when the Mu'tazilite rationalists began to study the Arabic translations of the
works of Greek physicists and philosophers made available to them by the early
'Abbasid Caliphs, particularly by al-Mansur and al-Mamun, they began to apply the
Greek philosophical methods and ideas to the interpretation of the basic principles
of Islam as well.
Some of the early 'Abbasid Caliphs, particularly al-Mamun, began to patronize the
rationalism of the Mu'tazilites in public. The Mu'tazilite speculation, in the hands of
the later Mu'tazilites, those of the second and third generations, under the influence
of Greek philosophy and with the active support and patronage of the Caliphs,
tended to be purely speculative and “absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to
a merely negative attitude of thought.”1
They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality and thus identified the sphere
of philosophy with that of religion. They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure
thought. They ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very
nature, incapable of logical demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of
Islam deal with supersensible realities and, as such, they must first be accepted on
the authority of revelation.
The Mu'tazilites, in their zeal to judge everything by reason alone, destroyed the
personality of God and reduced Him to a bare indefinable universality or to an
abstract unity. This idea of an abstract, impersonal, absolute God could not appeal
to the ordinary Muslims. The orthodox section of the people reacted strongly against
the Mu'tazilite rationalism and began to consider the Mu'tazilites to be heretics.
The extreme rationalistic attitude of the later Mu'tazilites was followed by powerful
reaction from the orthodox section of the people. This reaction was greatly
aggravated by the unfortunate attempt of the Caliph al-Mamun to force Mu'tazilism
(rationalist Kalam) on his subjects by introducing mihnah (a compulsory test of faith)
in the Mu'tazilite doctrines, particularly in their doctrine of the createdness of the
Qur'an. The whole of the third/ninth century was a time of reaction.
The orthodox Muslims (and among them were the Traditionists [the Muhaddithin]),
the Zahirites (the followers of Dawud ibn `Ali), and the Muslim jurists (fuqaha')
adhered strictly to Tradition and literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the
Sunnah,2 and refused to admit any “innovation” (bid'ah) in the Shari'ah (the Islamic
Code). Any theological discussion was considered an “innovation” and was as such a
cause of displeasure to them.3 The reactionary influence of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal
and his Zahirite followers was very strong at that period and the orthodox Muslims
kept themselves safely aloof from the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers.
The reaction against the rationalist Kalam went to such an extreme that even the
anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'an were interpreted by them in a purely literal
sense. Malik bin Anas said: “God's settling Himself firmly upon His Throne is known,
the how of it is unknown; belief in it is obligatory; and questioning about it is an
innovation.”4 Any speculation about sacred things was considered an innovation.
Every dogma was to be believed in without raising the question how or why (bila
kaifa).
But such an attitude of blind faith could not be maintained for any length of time.
Islam, as a universal religion and as a living force, had to adapt itself to new thoughts
and to new surroundings. So, as time went on, there arose gradually a party, from
amongst the orthodox section of the Muslims, who realized the necessity of putting
Islam on a solid ground by advancing “reasons” for the traditional beliefs, of
defending these beliefs against all sorts of attacks internal and external, and thus
purging their faith of all the non-Islamic elements that had crept into it.
They founded the orthodox theology of Islam by using Kalam or the philosophical
method in order to meet the dialectical reasoning of the Mu'tazilites. These
theologians who employed Kalam for the defence of their faith were, therefore,
known as the Mutakallimun (orthodox theologians).5
But, although these thinkers used philosophical method in their discussions, they
obtained the primary materials from revelation. They developed a rival science of
reasoning to meet the Mu'tazilites on their own ground. In the beginning this new
orthodox theological movement developed privately and secretly. It was at first a
gradual unconscious drift. It could not come to the open for fear of public criticism.
Al-Junaid, for instance, had to discuss the unity of God behind closed doors. Al-Shafi'i
held that some trained people might defend and purify the faith but that should not
be done in public. Al-Muhasibi and other contemporaries of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal
incurred his displeasure for defending the faith with arguments or reason. But
gradually the movement gathered strength and began to be openly preached almost
at the same time in different places of the Muslim world-in Mesopotamia by Abu
al-Hasan `Ali bin Isma`il al-Ashari (d. 330 or 334/941 or 945), in Egypt by al-Tahawi
(d. 331/942), and in Samarqand by Abu Mansnr al-Maturidi (d. 333/ 944).
But of these three, al-Ash'ari became the most popular hero, before whom the
Mu'tazilite system (the rationalist Kalam) went down, and he came to be known as
the founder of the orthodox philosophical theology, and the school founded by him
was named after him as Ash`arism.
Al-Ash'ari was born at Basrah. Regarding his date of birth there is difference of
opinion. Ibn Khallikan, in his discussion of the life of al-Ash'ari, mentions that he was
born in 260 or 270/873 or 883 and died at Baghdad in 330/941 or some time after
that.6
According to Shibli Nu'mani and Ibn `Asakir (the author of Tabyin Kidhb al-Muftari, on
the life and teachings of al-Ash'ari), he was born in 270/873 and died in 330/941.7 He
was buried between Karkh and Bab al-Basrah (the gate of Basrah). He was a
descendant of Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, one, of the famous Companions of the Prophet.
Al-Ash'ari, in his early youth, came under the care of the great Mu'tazilite scholar of
the Basrite school, Abu 'Ali Muhammad bin `Abd al-Wahhab al-Jubba'i, and, as a
disciple of his, became an adherent of the Mu'tazilite school and continued to
support its doctrines up to the age of forty. After that there happened a sudden
change in his mind and one day he went to the Mosque of Basrah and declared: “He
who knows me, knows who I am, and he who does not know me, let him know that I
am Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari, that I used to maintain that the Qur'an is created, that
eyes of men shall not see God, and that the creatures create their actions. Lo! I repent
that I have been a Mu'tazilite. I renounce these opinions and I take the engagement
to refute the Mu'tazilites and expose their infamy and turpitude.”
What brought about this sudden change in al-Aah'ari is not definitely known to us.
Shibli in his `Ilm al-Kalam says that “the change came to him due to some directions
which he had obtained in a dream...”.8 Ibn Khallikan mentions in this connection the
story of a public discussion in which al-Ashari met his old Mu'tazilite teacher,
al-Jubba'i, on the problem of salah wa’l aslah, i. e., the problem whether God's actions
are to be based on rational consideration and whether He is bound to do what is
best for His creatures.
Al-Ash'ari came to al-Jubba'i and presented the case of three brothers, one being
God-fearing, another godless, and a third having died as a child, and asked him as to
what would be their positions in the next world. Al-Jubba'i could not give a
satisfactory and consistent reply to that question and, on his having failed to justify
rationally the Mu'tazilite doctrine of salah wa’l aslah, al-Ash'ari abandoned the
Mu'tazilite camp.9
But whatever might have been the cause of this change, when he changed he was
terribly in earnest. After the change he wrote a number of books and Ibn Furak says
that the number amounted to three hundred. Ibn `Asakir Dimashqi has given the
titles of ninety-three of them, but only a few have been preserved and are
enumerated by Brockelmann.
His work al-Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah was printed at Hyderabad, Deccan (India), in
1321/1903 and a small treatise Risalah fi Istihsan al-Khaud fi al-Kalam was printed in
1323/1905 and reprinted at Hyderabad in 1344/1925. Al-Ash'ari's other famous
works are al-Maqalat al IsIamiyyin (published in Istanbul in 1348/1929), Kitab al-Sharh
wal-Tafsil, al-Luma`, Mu'jaz, I’adah al-Burhan, and Tab'in.
Of these books the Maqalat al Islamiyyin wa Ikhtilaf al Musalliyyin is the most authentic
book on the views of different schools about religious dogmas and
doctrines. Al-Maqalat was written much earlier than the other books on the same
subject, such as Shahrastani's Kitab al-Milal wal-Nihal, or Ibn Hazm's al-Fasl fi al-Milal
wal-Ahwa' wal Nihal.
Ibn Taimiyyah said in his Minhaj al-Sunnah that the most comprehensive of the books
he went through on the views of different people on the basic principles of Islam was
al-Ash'ari's al-Maqalat al-Islamiyyin and that he (al-Ash'ari) discussed many of such
views in details as were not even mentioned by others. Ibn al-Qayyim also spoke very
highly of this work. In his Hadi al-Arwah and Ijtima` al-Juyush al-Islamiyyah, he said,
“Shahrastani, `Abd al-Qahir Baghdadi, and other later writers on the subject simply
copied from al-Ash'ari's book and did not discuss the views in details.”
Al-Ash'ari's other famous book al- Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah seems to have been
written by him just after his abandoning the Mu'tazilite views. In this book we find he
is almost a Zahirite. The reaction against the Mu'tazilite speculation might have been
very strong in his mind at that period. Al-Maqalat seems to be a later work.
The Risalah fi Istihsan al-Khaud deals with the objections raised by the extremely
orthodox against the use of Kalam, and the replies given by al-Ash'ari, justifying its
use in matters of faith.
Al-Ash'ari's theology has been discussed mainly in these books. He had a good
number of pupils who passed as famous theologians and who spread and developed
his doctrines and dogmas. Some of those older Ash'arites were abu Sahl Saluqi, Abu
Quffal, Abu Zaid Maruzi, Zahir bin Ahmad, Hafiz Abu Bakr Jurjani, Shaikh Abu
Muhammad Tabari, and Abu al-Hasan Bahili. Some of the pupils of these older
Ash'arites became still more famous and the best known among them are Qadi Abu
Bakr Baqillani, Abu Bakr bin Furak, Abu al-Qasim al-Qushairi and abu Ishaq Isfra'ini
and his pupil Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwaini, known as Imam al-Haramain.10

Ash’arite Theology
Al-Ash'ari maintains an intermediary position between the two diametrically
opposed schools of thought prevailing at the time. He had to fight against both the
opposing parties. At the one extreme were the Mu'tazilites who made reason in
preference to revelation the sole criterion of truth and reality and, thus, passed
slowly into comparatively innocuous heretics. At the other extreme were the
orthodox groups, particularly the Zahirites, the Mujassimites (anthropomorphists),
the Muhaddithin (Traditionists), and the Jurists, all of which were wholly opposed to
the use of reason or Kalam in defending or explaining religious dogmas and
condemned any discussion about them as innovation. Al-Ash'ari wrote his Istihsan
al-Khaud mainly to meet the objections raised by the orthodox school against the use
of reason in matters of faith.
In that treatise he says: “A section of the people (i.e., the Zahirites and other orthodox
people) made capital out of their own ignorance; discussions and rational thinking
about matters of faith became a heavy burden for them, and, therefore, they became
inclined to blind faith and blind following (taqlid). They condemned those who tried
to rationalize the principles of religion as `innovators.'
They considered discussion about motion, rest, body, accident, colour, space, atom,
the leaping of atoms, and attributes of God, to be an innovation and a sin. They said
that had such discussions been the right thing, the Prophet and his Companions
would have definitely done so; they further pointed out that the Prophet, before his
death, discussed and fully explained all those matters which were necessary from
the religious point of view, leaving none of them to be discussed by his followers; and
since he did not discuss the problems mentioned above, it was evident that to discuss
them must be regarded as an innovation.”
They further contended that these so-called theological problems were either known
to the Prophet and his Companions and yet they kept silent and did not discuss them
or they were not known to them. If they knew them and yet did not discuss them, we
are also to follow them in keeping silent, and if they could remain unaware of them
we can also do so. In both cases discussion about them would be an “innovation.”
These were, in brief, their objections against the use of Kalam in matters of faith.
Al-Ash'ari, then, proceeds to justify theological discussions about matters of faith. He
tries to meet these objections in three ways. First, by turning the objections of the
orthodox against themselves by pointing out to them that the Prophet had not said
that those who would discuss these problems were to be condemned and charged
as innovators. Hence, their charging or condemning others as innovators was itself
an innovation, for it amounted to discussion about matters which the Prophet did
not discuss, and condemn the action of those whom the Prophet did not condemn.
Secondly, “the Prophet was not unaware of all these problems of body, accident,
motion, rest, atoms, etc., though he did not discuss each of them separately. The
general principles (usul) underlying these problems are present in general, not in
details, in the Qur'an and the Sunnah.” Al-Ash'ari then proceeds to prove his
contention by citing verses from the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet, and
thereby showing that the principles underlying the problems
of harakah, sukun, tawhid, etc., are, as a matter of fact, present in the Qur'an and the
Sunnah.11
Thirdly, “the Prophet was not unaware of these matters and knew them in detail, but
as problems about them did not arise during his life-time, there was no question of
his discussing or not discussing them.” The Companions of the Prophet discussed
and argued about many religious matters which appeared during their life-time,
although there was no direct and explicit “saying” of the Prophet about them, and
because of the absence of any explicit injunction from the Prophet they differed in
their judgments about them.
Had the question, for instance, of the creation of the Qur'an, or of atoms or
substance, been raised in so many words in the life of the Prophet, he would have
definitely discussed and explained it as he did in the case of all those problems which
were then raised. “There is no direct verdict (nass) from the Prophet, for instance, as
to whether the Qur'an is created or uncreated. If to call the Qur'an created is an
`innovation,' then, on the same ground, to call it uncreated must also be an
`innovation.”' Al-Ash'ari then concludes that Islam is not opposed to the use of
reason; on the other hand, rationalization of faith is a necessity in Islam.
Al-Ash'ari discussed the main theological problems in his Maqalat al-Islamiy-
yin and al-Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah.In these books al-Ash’ari selects a few principles
which distinguish the Ash'arites from the Mu'tazilite school of thought. Later on
al-Ghazali put them in a consolidated form in his Ihya 12 as the “Principles of Faith”
or Qawa'id al-`Aqa'id, and Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi explained them more
elaborately. The main problems about which the Ash'arites differed from the
Mu'tazilites are:
(1) The conception of God and the nature of His attributes.
(2) Freedom of the human will.
(3) The criterion of truth and the standard of good and evil.
(4) The vision (ru’yah) of God.
(5) Createdness of the Qur'an.
(6) Possibility of burdening the creatures with impossible tasks.
(7) Promise of reward and threat of punishment.
(8) The rational or non-rational basis of God's actions.
(9) Whether God is bound to do what is best for His creatures.13
The problems discussed by the Ash'arites in their system may be broadly classified
into two categories: (i) theological, and (ii) metaphysical.

Fundamental Principles Of The Ash'arite Theology

1. Conception of God and the Nature of His Attributes
According to the Ash'arites, God is one, unique, eternal, existent Being; He is not a
substance, not a body, not an accident, not limited to any direction, and not in any
space. He possesses attributes such as knowledge, power, life, will; He is hearing and
seeing and has speech.
About the nature of divine attributes two extreme views were held before the
Ash'arites. On the one hand, there were the extreme Attributists (Sifatis), the
Anthropomorphists (Mujassimin), and the Comparers (Mushabbihin), who maintained
that God possesses all the attributes mentioned in the Qur'an and that all such
attributes as God's having hands, legs, ears, eyes, and His sitting firmly (istiwa) on His
Throne must be taken in their literal sense.
Such a view of the attributes of God is pure anthropomorphism, implying God's
bodily existence. On the other hand, there were the Mu'tazilites who held that God
is one, eternal, unique, absolute Being, having no touch of dualism in Him. His
essence is self-contained. He does not possess any attributes apart from His essence.
His essence is, for instance, knowing, powerful, seeing, willing, etc. They denied the
attributes of God as anything other than and addition to His essence.
The Ash'arites maintained a view which was, so to say, a reconciliation between the
two extreme views. In agreement with the Sifatis and in opposition to the Mu'tazilites
and the “philosophers” (those who were under Greek influence), the Ash'arites held
that God possesses attributes in general. They classified the attributes of God into
two main groups: (i) sifat-i salbiyyah, or negative attributes, and (ii) sifat-i
wujudiyyah or existential or positive attributes. According to them, the sifat-i
wujudiyyah, which they also called sifat-i `aqliyyah or rational attributes, were seven:
knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, seeing, and speech.
The extreme Sifatis asserted that even those attributes of God which imply His bodily
existence are also to be taken in their true literal sense. As against them, the
Ash'arites maintained that God possesses the apparently anthropomorphic
attributes no doubt, but these should be understood not in their literal sense. They
are to be believed in bila kaifa, without asking “how,” and bila tashbih, without
drawing any comparison.14
The Ash'arites here introduced a principle that the attributes of God are unique and
fundamentally different from those of the created beings and as such should not be
compared to them. This is known as the doctrine of mukhalafah, or absolute
difference. This doctrine signifies that if any quality or term is applied to God, it must
be understood in a unique sense and never taken in the sense in which it is normally
used when applied to created beings. Because of the doctrine of mukhalafah, the
Ash'arites held that we are not allowed to ascribe any attribute to God unless it is
expressly so applied in the Qur'an. God's attributes differ from those of the
creatures, not in degree but in kind, i. e., in their whole nature.
The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites, held that “God has attributes which inhere
eternally in Him and are in addition to His essence.”15 These attributes are eternal,
but they are neither identical with His essence, nor are they quite different from or
other than His essence. God is knowing, for instance, means that God possesses
knowledge as an attribute, which is inherent in God, and although it is not exactly the
same as His essence, yet it is not something quite different from and other than His
essence. The Ash'arites, here, maintained a very difficult position. They were between
the two horns of a dilemma. They could neither assert the eternal attributes of God
to be identical with nor wholly different from the essence of God.
They could not agree to the Mu'tazilite view and assert the identity of the attributes
with the essence of God, because that would be a virtual denial of the attributes.
They could not also assert that these eternal attributes are something absolutely
different, or other than and separate, from God, as that would lead to multiplicity of
eternals, and go against divine unity.
They, therefore, maintained that these attributes are, in one sense, included in and,
in another sense, excluded from, the essence of God.16 It is common knowledge that
the Asharites contended that essence (mahiyyah), and attributes (sifat) are two
different things and they cannot be otherwise in the case of God, the Supreme Being.
The Ash'arites made a distinction between the meaning or connotation (mafhum) of
a thing and its reality (haqiqah). So far as their meaning is concerned, the attributes
and the essence of God are not the same and as such the attributes are in addition
to the essence of God, i.e., they have different meanings. The meaning
of dhat (essence) is different from the meanings of different attributes.
God's essence, for instance, is not knowing or powerful or wise, but so far as their
ultimate haqiqah (reality or application) is concerned, the attributes are inherent in
the divine essence, and hence are not something quite different from or other than
the essence of God.17
In support of the above view of theirs, the Ash'arites advanced the following
arguments:
The analogical argument of the Ash'arites of the older generation: God's actions
prove that He is knowing, powerful, and willing; so they also prove that He possesses
knowledge, power, will, etc., because the ground of inference cannot differ in
different things. What is true in the case of a created being must also be true in the
case of the Divine Being.18 In the case of a human being, by “knowing” we mean one
who possesses knowledge and even common sense and draws a line of demarcation
between an essence and its attributes.
On the same analogy, distinction must be drawn between the essence of God and
His attributes. The essence and the attributes should not be supposed to be blended
in the Divine Being. Hence the attributes of God cannot be identical with His essence,
as the Mu'tazilites held. But this analogical reasoning is very weak, for what is true of
a finite being need not necessarily be true of an infinite being. But, according to the
doctrine of mukhalafah, God's knowledge or power or will and, as a matter of fact, all
His rational attributes signify quite different meanings when applied to created
beings.
Secondly, they argued that if all the attributes of God are identical with His essence,
the divine essence must be a homogeneous combination of contradictory qualities.
For instance, God is merciful (rahim) and also revengeful (qahhar); both the
contradictory attributes would constitute the essence of God, which is one, unique,
and indivisible (ahad), and that is absurd.
Further, if the attributes are identical with God's essence, and if, for instance, His
being knowing, powerful, and living is His essence itself, no useful purpose will be
served by ascribing them to Him, for that would ultimately be the virtual application
of His essence to itself, which is useless. Hence the divine attributes cannot be
identical with the divine essence.
Thirdly, if the attributes of God are not distinct from His essence, the meanings of
the different attributes will be exactly the same, for God's essence is a simple and
indivisible unity. The meanings of knowing, willing, and living, for instance, will be
exactly the same, and thus knowledge will mean power, or power will mean life, and
so on.19
This also is an absurdity. These different attributes imply different meanings and
hence they cannot be identical with God's essence. His essence is one and He
possesses many attributes which eternally inhere in Him and, though not identical
with His essence, yet they are not absolutely different from His essence.

2. Free will
On the question of free-will or on the ability of man to choose and produce actions,
the Ash'arites took up again an intermediary position between the libertarian and
fatalistic views, held by the Mu'tazilites and the Jabrites respectively. The orthodox
people and the Jabrites maintained a pure fatalistic view. They held that human
actions are predetermined and predestined by God.
Man has no power to produce any action. “Everything,” they contended, “is from
God.” God has absolute power over everything including human will and human
actions. The Mu'tazilites and the Qadarites, on the other hand, held that man has full
power to produce an action and has complete freedom in his choice, though the
power was created in him by God.
The Ash'arites struck a middle path. They made a distinction between creation (khalq)
and acquisition (kasb) of an action. God, according to the Ash'arites, is the creator
(khaliq) of human actions and man is the acquisitor (muktasib). “Actions of human
beings are created (makhluq) by God, the creatures are not capable of creating any
action.”20 “There is no creator except God and the actions of man are, therefore, His
creation.”21 Power (qudrah), according to them, is either (i) original (qadamah) or (ii)
derived (hadithah). The original power alone is effective. Derived power can create
nothing. The power possessed by man is given by God and as such it is derived.22
Al Ash’ari said, “The true meaning of acquisition is the occurrence of a thing or event
due to derived power, and it is an acquisition for the person by whose derived power
it takes place.”23 God is, thus, the creator of human actions and man is the acquisitor.
Man cannot create anything; he cannot initiate work. God alone can create, because
absolute creation is His prerogative. God creates in man the power and the ability to
perform an act. He also creates in him the power to make a free choice (ikhtiyar)
between two alternatives - between right and wrong.
This free choice of man is not effective in producing the action. It is the habit or
nature of God to create the action corresponding to the choice and power created
by Himself in man. Thus, the action of man is created by God, both as to initiative
and as to production or completion. Man is free only in making the choice between
alternatives and also in intending to do the particular action freely chosen: Man, in
making this choice and intending to do the act, acquires (iktisab) either the merit of
appreciation and reward from God if he makes the right choice, or the demerit of
condemnation and punishment if he makes the wrong choice.
The Ash`arites, thus, in order to avoid the fatalistic position, introduced the doctrine
of acquisition by which, they thought, they could account for man's free-will and lay
responsibility upon him. Man has no free-will in the Mu'tazilite sense; he has no real
and effective power, but has some derived power by which he acquires a share in
the production of the act: In the case of voluntary actions of human beings, there
are, so to say, two causes.
The action is the combined effect of the real cause, God, and the choice and intention
of man, the acquisitor, the possessor of ineffective power because of its being
derived power. God creates in two ways: either with a locus (mahall) or without a
locus. Human actions are His creation with a locus.24
“God creates, in man, the power, ability, choice, and will to perform an act, and man,
endowed with this derived power, chooses freely one of the alternatives and intends
or wills to do the action and, corresponding to this intention, God creates and com-
pletes the action.”25
It is this intention on the part of man which makes him responsible for his deeds.
Man cannot take the initiative in any matter, nor can he originate any action. But the
completion of the act is partially due to his intention: He, thus, acquires the merit or
demerit of the action because of his intending to do a good or bad action. Man's free
choice is, so to say, an occasion for God's causing the action corresponding to that
choice.
In this the Ash`arites come very close to the occasionalism of Malebranche which
was expounded in Europe eight centuries and a half later. This correspondence and
harmony between the choice of man and God's creation, according to the Ash'arites,
is not due to a harmony established by God previously, but because of His habit or
nature to create the harmony whenever human action is done.
This, in short, is the solution of the problem of free-will offered by the Ash'arites. The
Ashh'arite view on this problem is not free from logical and ethical difficulties. It was
really very difficult for them to reconcile the absolute determination of all events by
God with man's accountability and responsibility for his deeds. Some, of the later
Ash'arites, particularly Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, discarded the veil of acquisition in
order to escape the charge of fatalism, and advocated naked determinism.26

3. The Problem of Reason and Revelation and the Criterion of Good and
Evil
The Ash`arites differ from the Mu'tazilites on the question whether reason or
revelation should be the basis or source of truth and reality: Both the schools admit
the necessity of reason for the rational understanding of faith, but they differ with
regard to the question whether revelation or reason is more fundamental and, in
case of a conflict, whether reason or revelation is to get preference.
The Mu'tazilites held that reason is more fundamental than revelation and is to be
preferred to revelation. Revelation merely confirms what is accepted by reason and,
if there be a conflict between the two, reason is to be preferred and revelation must
be so interpreted as to be in conformity with the dictates of reason.
The Ash`arites, on the other hand, held that revelation is more fundamental as the
source of ultimate truth and reality, and reason should merely confirm what is given
by revelation. The Ash`arites prefer revelation to reason in case of a conflict between
the two. As a matter of fact, this is one of the fundamental principles in which the
rational Kalam of the Mu'tazilites differs from the orthodox Kalam of the Ash'arites.
If pure reason is made the sole basis or source of truth and reality, including the truth
and reality of the most fundamental principles or concepts on which Islam is based,
it would be a pure speculative philosophy or at best a rational theology in general
and not a doctrinal theology of a particular historic religion, i. e., that of Islam in par-
ticular. Islam is based on certain fundamental principles or concepts which, being
suprasensible in nature, are incapable of rational proof. These principles, first, must
be believed in on the basis of revelation.
Revelation, thus, is the real basis of the truth and reality of these basic doctrines of
Islam. This faith, based on revelation, must be rationalized. Islam as a religion, no
doubt, admits the necessity of rationalizing its faith. But to admit the necessity of
rationalizing faith is not to admit pure reason or analytic thought to be the sole
source or basis of Islam as a religion. Reason, no doubt, has the right to judge Islam
and its basic principles, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it cannot
submit to the judgment of reason except on its own terms.
Reason must, therefore, be subordinated to revelation. Its function is to rationalize
faith in the basic principles of Islam and not to question the validity or truth of the
principles established on the basis of revelation as embodied in the Qur'an and the
Sunnah. The problem of the criterion of good and evil follows as a corollary to the
problem of reason and revelation. The problem of good and evil is one of the most
controversial problems of Islamic theology.
The Mu'tazilites held that reason, and not revelation, is the criterion or standard of
moral judgment, i.e., of the goodness and badness of an action. The truth and moral
value of things and human actions must be determined by reason. They contended
that moral qualities of good and evil are objective; they are inherent in the very
nature of things or actions and as such can be known by reason and decided to be
good or bad.
The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites, held that revelation and not reason is the
real authority or criterion to determine what is good and what is bad. Goodness and
badness of actions (husn wa qubh) are not qualities inhering in them; these are mere
accidents (a'rad). Actions-in-themselves are neither good nor bad. Divine Law makes
them good or bad.
In order to make the ground of controversy between the Mu'tazilites and the
Ash'arites clearer, we may explain here the three different senses in which these two
terms, good and evil, are used.27
(i) Good and evil are sometimes used in the sense of perfection and defect
respectively. When we say that a certain thing or action is good or bad (for instance,
knowledge is good and ignorance is bad), we mean that it is a quality which makes
its possessor perfect or implies a defect in him.
(ii) These terms are also used in a utilitarian sense meaning gain and loss in worldly
affairs. Whatever is useful or has utility in our experience is good, and the opposite
of it is bad. So whatever is neither useful nor harmful is neither good nor bad.
Both the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites agree that in the two senses, mentioned
above, reason is the criterion or standard of good and evil. There is no difference of
opinion in the above two senses. But good and bad in the second sense may vary
from time to time, from individual to individual, and from place to place.
In this sense there will be nothing permanently or universally good or bad; what is
good to one may be bad to others and vice versa. This implies that good and evil are
subjective and not objective and real. Hence actions are neither good nor bad, but
experience or workability would make them so and, therefore, they can be known by
reason without the help of revelation.
(iii) Good and evil are also used in a third sense of commendable and praiseworthy
or condemnable in this world and rewardable or punishable, as the case may be, in
the other world.
The Ash'arites maintained that good and evil in their third sense must be known
through revelation, not by reason as the Mu'tazilites had held. According to the
Ash'arites, revelation alone decides whether an action is good or bad. What is
commanded by Shar' is good, and what is prohibited is bad. Shar` can convert
previously declared good into bad and vice versa.
As actions by themselves are neither good nor bad, there is nothing in them which
would make them rewardable (good) or punishable (bad). They are made rewardable
or punishable by revelation or Shar'. As there is no quality of good or evil seated in
the very nature of an act, there can be no question of knowing it by reason.

4. The Problem of the Eternity of the Qur'an

There was a great controversy over the question whether the Qur'an is created or
uncreated and eternal. This question is bound up with another question whether
speech is one of God's attributes or not. The orthodox section of the Muslims,
including the Ash'arites, held that God has it as one of His seven rational attributes,
and as His attributes are eternal, divine speech, i.e., the Qur'an, is also eternal.
As regards the eternity of the Qur'an, the Ash'arites adopted again an intermediary
position between the extreme views of the Zahirites and the Mu'tazilites. The
Hanbalites and other Zahirites (extreme orthodox schools) held that the speech of
God, i. e., the Qur'an, is composed of letters, words, and sounds which inhere in the
essence of God and is, therefore, eternal. Some of the Hanbalites went to the
extreme and asserted that even the cover and the binding of the Qur'an are
eternal.28
The Mu'tazilites and a section of the Rafidites went to the other extreme and
maintained that the Qur'an was created. They denied all attributes of God, including
the attribute of speech, on the ground that if it be an eternal attribute of God, there
would be multiplicity of eternals, to believe which is polytheism and contrary to the
basic principles of Islam. They further argued that “the Qur'an is composed of parts,
successively arranged parts, and whatever is composed of such parts must be
temporal.”29
Hence the Qur'an must be created. The Ash'arites maintained that the Qur'an is
composed of words and sounds, but these do not inhere in the essence of God. They
made a distinction between the outward and concrete expression of the Qur'an in
language, and the real, self-subsistent meaning of it, and held that the Qur'an, as
expressed in words and sounds, is, no doubt, temporal (hadath); but against the
Mu'tazilites they asserted that the Qur'an in its meanings is uncreated and eternal.
The “self-subsisting meaning” eternally inheres in the essence of God. These
meanings are expressed; their expression in language is temporal and created. It is
so because the same meaning, while remaining the same, might be expressed
differently at different times, in different places by different persons or nations. They
further maintained that this meaning is an attribute other than knowledge and will
and, as such, inheres eternally in the essence of God and is, therefore, eternal.30
In support of this contention the Ash`arites advanced the following arguments:31
(i) The Qur'an is “knowledge from God”; it is, therefore, inseparable from God's
attribute of knowledge which is eternal and uncreated. Hence it is also eternal and
uncreated.
(ii) God created everything by His word kun (be) and this word, which is in the Qur'an,
could not have been a created one, otherwise a created word would be a creator,
which is absurd. Hence God's word is uncreated, i. e.. eternal.
(iii) The Qur'an makes a distinction between creation (khalq) and command (amr)
when it says, “Are not the creation and command His alone?” Hence God's
Command, His word or Kalam, which is definitely something other than created
things (makhluq), must be unereated and eternal.
(iv) Further, God says to Moses, “I have chosen thee over mankind with My
apostolate and My word.” This verse signifies that God has speech. Again, Moses is
addressed by God with the words: “Lo, I am thy Lord.” Now, if the word which
addresses Moses is a created thing, it would mean that a created thing asserts that
it is Moses Lord (God), which is absurd. God's word, therefore, must be eternal.
The Ash'arites further pointed out that all the different arguments advanced by the
Mu'tazilites (and in Sharh-i Mawaqif as many as eight such arguments have been
mentioned), in support of their view that the Qur'an is created, would apply only to
the expressed Qur'an and not to the real Qur'an, the latter being the “meanings of
the Qur'an.”32

5. The Problem of the Beatific Vision

On the question of the beatific vision, the Ash`arites, true to their attitude of
reconciliation, again tried to adopt a course lying midway between the extreme
anthropomorphic view of the Zahirites and other orthodox Muslims on the one hand
and the view of the Mu'tazilites and the “philosophers” on the other.
The extreme orthodox Muslims and the Zahirites, in particular, held that it is possible
to see God and the righteous persons would actually have His vision as the chief
reward for their good actions. They further held that God is settled firmly on His
Throne, He exists in different directions, and is capable of being pointed out. The
Mu'tazilites and the “philosophers” denied the possibility of seeing God with eyes, as
that would imply His bodily existence, which is absurd.
The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites and the “philosophers,” and in agreement
with the orthodox class, held that it is possible to see God;33 but they could not agree
to their view that God is extended and can be shown by pointing out. They accepted
the philosophical principle that whatever is extended or spatial must be contingent
and temporal, and God is not an extended and temporal being.
This admission landed them into a difficulty, for if God is not extended and only
extended things can be seen, God cannot be seen;34 but this conclusion conflicts
with their position that beatific vision is possible. So, in order to get out of this
difficulty, they asserted the possibility of seeing an object even if it is not present
before the perceiver.35 This was a very peculiar and untenable position, for it
repudiated all the principles of optics.
It is possible to see God even though our sense of vision does not receive the
corresponding “impression” of the object on it. Besides, it is possible for God to
create in human beings the capacity to see Him without the necessary conditions of
vision, such as the presence, in concrete form, of the object itself in space and time,
normal condition of the appropriate sense-organ, absence of hindrance or
obstruction to perception, and so on; and though God is unextended and does not
exist in space and time, “yet He may make Himself visible to His creature like the full
moon.”
They further contended that the vision of God is possible without any impression on
our sense-organ for another reason. There is practically no difference between a
“sensation” and an “after image” except that the sensation possesses an additional
quality over and above the common qualities present in both, and this additional
quality, i.e, impression on the sense-organ produced by the external object, does not
make any difference in the perception of an object.
Hence, though this impression is missing in the case of seeing God, it may still be
called “seeing.” The weakness of this argument is apparent to any student of
psychology, because an after-image is possible only when it is preceded by an actual
impression of the object on the sense-organ. The actual impression of the object is,
therefore, a precondition of an after-image in the case of beatific vision too.
The Ash'arites were faced with another difficulty. The Mu'tazilites had pointed out
that if seeing of God is possible, it must be possible under all circumstances and at
all times, for this possibility is due either to His essence or to an inseparable attribute
in Him. In either case, it should be possible at all times. And if it is possible at all times,
it must be possible now; and if it is possible to see Him now, we must see Him now,
for when all the conditions of “vision” are present, the actual seeing must take place.
The Ash`arites met this objection in a very naive manner by saying, “We do not admit
the necessity of actual seeing taking place, even when all its eight conditions are
present.”
The Ash'arites supported their views on the basis of revelation. According to the
Qur'an, Moses asked of God, “O, my Lord, show Thyself to me so that I can see
Thee.” Had seeing been impossible, Moses would not have said so, for, otherwise, it
must be assumed that either he knew its impossibility or did not, and both the
alternatives are absurd, because an intelligent person like him could not have been
ignorant of this impossibility and could not have asked for what he knew was
impossible.
Again, according to the Qur'an, God said to Moses, “If the mountain remains fixed
in its place, you can see Me,” and if the antecedent is possible the consequent must
be possible. Here, evidently, the antecedent, fixity of the mountain, is in itself a
possible thing. Therefore, the consequent, the vision of God, must also be possible.
Some other verses also support the conclusion.36
There are a few more controversial problems of secondary importance, in which the
Ash`arites differed from the Mu'tazilites. These are, for example, promise of reward
and threat of punishment by God; whether God can make His creatures responsible
for the actions for which they have no ability; whether God's actions are bound to be
based on rational considerations and on purpose; whether He is bound to do what
is best for His creatures; and whether the knowledge of God or recognition of His
existence is based on reason or revelation.
These theological problems of secondary importance are more or less the corollaries
of the main principles in which the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites differed.
The Ash'arites held that God is the only real cause of everything; He alone possesses
real and effective power and this power is unlimited; His will is absolutely free - not
determined by anything. Whatever power human beings apparently possess is given
by God. Man does not possess any real and effective power. God, being absolutely
free in His action, is not bound to act on rational purpose. He does not act
teleologically for, otherwise, His actions would be determined by something external
to and other than Himself and He would not remain absolutely free. External purpose
would put a limit to God's omnipotence.
Like Spinoza, al-Ash'ari held that there is no purpose in the mind of God which would
determine His activity. From thus anti-teleological view it follows that as God's action
is not teleological, He is not bound to do what is best for His creatures. He does
whatever He wills. But as He is an absolutely intelligent and just being, His actions, as
a matter of fact, are all full of wisdom.37
As against the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites held that God can make us responsible for
the actions which we have no power to do. The Mu'tazilites held that God cannot do
so, because that would be an irrational and unjust act on His part. It is admitted by
all schools of thought in Islam that power or ability of men to do a thing is given by
God. But opinions differ on the question whether this power or ability is really
effective in producing any action. The Mu`tazilites and the Qadarites held that man's
power is fully effective and can produce an action. But the Ash'arites maintained that,
being derivative, it can have no effective force. Similar are their respective positions
with regard to the ability to act.
This ability is no doubt given by God as an accident, but the Mu'tazilites, particularly
Abu al-Hudhail `Allaf, held that this ability is given to man simultaneously with the
performance of the act. But the Ash'arites maintained that it is given before the
actual performance of the act;38 but being a mere accident in man, it has only a
momentary existence and is of no practical use to man in performing the act.
As a matter of fact, it ceases to exist when the actual action takes place. Man,
therefore, does the act, practically without having the power and the ability to do so.
He is held responsible for his actions because of his choosing freely one of the two
alternative actions and intending to do the action so chosen. But neither his choice
nor his intention can produce the action. It is God who creates the action and is thus
its effective and real cause.39
There is an almost similar controversy over the question of God's promise of reward
to the virtuous and His threat of punishment to the wrong-doer. This was one of the
five main problems with which the Mu'tazilite movement started.40
The Mu'tazilites held that God is bound to fulfil His promises of reward and
punishment. Every action, good or bad, must take its own course and be followed by
its logical and normal consequence. A right action, therefore, must be followed by its
reward and a wrong one by punishment. God has made promises in the Qur'an and
He, being a just being, cannot do otherwise, i.e., He cannot punish the virtuous and
forgive the wrong-doer.
On the other hand, the Ash'arites maintained that, being all-powerful and absolutely
free in His will, God can punish His creatures even if they have not committed any
sins or reward His creatures even though they have done no virtuous deeds. There
is nothing binding on God; His will is not subject to teleological considerations.
It is by the inner necessity of His own nature that He fulfils His promises of reward to
the virtuous and does not do otherwise. And it is in His infinite mercy that He may
forgive any wrongdoer or vicious person, in spite of the threats of punishment for
his vicious acts. This act of forgiveness will also be in accordance with His nature as
the most generous and gracious being.

Ash’arite Metaphysics
Al-Ash'ari's interest was purely theological and his discussions did not contain much
metaphysics.41 But the subsequent Ash'arites found it impossible to achieve their
main object of defending the faith and harmonizing reason with revelation without
making reference to the ultimate nature of reality.
Al-Ash'ari's theological system was, thus, considered to be incomplete without a
support from metaphysics. The system was fully developed by the later Ash'arites,
particularly by Qadi Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Tayyyib al-Baqillani who was one of
the greatest among them. He was a Basrite, but he made Baghdad his permanent
residence and died there in 403/1013. He was a great original thinker and wrote
many valuable books on theology and various other subjects.
He made use of some purely metaphysical propositions in his theological
investigations, such as substance is an individual unity, accident has only a
momentary existence and cannot exist in quality, and perfect vacuum is possible,
and thus gave the school a metaphysical foundation.
About him a Western scholar has remarked: “It is his glory to have contributed most
important elements to, and put into fixed form what is, perhaps, the most daring
metaphysical scheme, and almost certainly the most thorough theological scheme,
ever thought out. On the one hand, the Lucretian atoms raining down through the
empty void, the self-developing monads and pre-established harmony of Leibniz;
and all the Kantian “things-in-themselves” are lame and impotent in their consistency
beside the parallel Ash'arite doctrines; and, on the other, not even the rigours of
Calvin; as developed in Dutch confessions, can compete with the unflinching
exactitude of the Muslim conclusions”.42
The Ash'arites, being primarily interested in theological problems, kept their
philosophical discussions mainly confined only to those questions which they
thought had a direct or indirect bearing on these problems.43 Willingly or unwillingly,
they had to philosophize “in order to meet the contemporary philosophers on their
own ground.” But when they began philosophizing, they were very earnest and
became great metaphysicians.
In dealing with the most important basic principles of Islam: (i) the existence of God,
as the creator of the universe, and His unity and oneness, and (ii) the belief in the
prophethood of Muhammad, they had to use certain proofs which necessitated
some metaphysical and epistemological discussions. Hence they had to develop a
theory of knowledge and a theory of reality, which were peculiarly their own. God,
the ultimate principle, is, according to the Ash'arites, a necessary existent; His
existence is identical with His essence.
In proving God's existence the Ash'arites used three arguments. Their argument
from the contingent nature of motion is not of much importance to our discussion.
The other two are:
(i) All bodies, they argued, are ultimately one in so far as their essence is concerned.
But, in spite of this basic unity, their characteristics are different. Hence there must
be an ultimate cause for these divergent characteristic, and that ultimate cause is
God.
(ii) The world is contingent. Every contingent thing must have a cause; therefore, the
world must have a cause, and as no contingent thing can be the cause, that cause
must be God. The major premise (i.e., every event must have a cause) does not
require a proof. The minor premise - the world is contingent - they proved in the
following manner: Everything that exists in the world is either a substance or a
quality. The contingent character of a quality is evident, and the contingence of
substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart from qualities.
The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence of substance; otherwise, the
eternity of substance would necessitate the eternity of quality.44
The Ash'arites believed in miracles which were considered to be the basis of the
proof of prophethood and, in order to defend this view, they had to deny the laws of
nature. They also denied causality in nature and made God the only cause of
everything.
Now, in order to explain the full implication of the above arguments, it was necessary
for them to develop a theory of knowledge and a metaphysics.
The world consists of things. Now, the question arises: What is meant by a thing, what
is its nature, and how far do we know it?
Al-Baqillani defined knowledge as the cognition of a thing as it is in itself.45 A thing is
defined by the Ash'arites as “that which is existent.” Everything is an existent and
every existent is a thing.46 So, according to the Ash'arites, existence, whether
necessary or contingent, is the thing or the essence of the thing-in-itself and not a
quality in addition to it, as the Mu'tazilites held.
Al-Jahiz, al-Jubba'i, and some other Mu'tazilites of the Basrite school defined a “thing”
as that which is known,47 and held that existence is a quality of it, added to its
essence. The Ash'arites, as against these Mu'tazilites, contended that if existence is
an additional quality, the essence-in-itself would be a nonexistent and hence a
non-entity and the subsequent-addition of the quality of “existence” to it would
involve a clear contradiction in so far as it would make the non-existent existent.48
This is an absurdity. The thing-in-itself which is the object of knowledge according to
the Ash'arites, is, therefore, an existent thing or a body. Everything that exists in the
world has a contingent existence and is either substance or quality. In this sense God
is not a thing.
The Aristotelian categories of thought were subjected by the Ash'arites to a searching
criticism. Only two of those categories, substance and quality, were retained by them.
The other categories, quality, place, time, etc., are nothing but relative characteristics
(i'tibarat) that exist subjectively in the mind of the knower, having no corresponding
objective reality.
Like Berkeley, the Irish philosopher, they also did not make any distinction between
the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The world, therefore, consists of
substance, on which the mind reflects, and qualities, which are not in the
thing-in-itself but only in the mind of the knower. The qualities are mere accidents
which are fleeting, transitory, and subjective relations, having only a momentary
existence. A quality or accident cannot exist in another accident but only in a
substance. No substance could ever exist apart from a quality. The substance, being
inseparable from its accidents, must also be transitory, having only a moment's
duration, just as the accidents are. Everything that exists, therefore, consists of mere
transitory units (subjective), having only a moment's duration.
The Ash'arites, thus, rejected the Aristotelian view of matter as “a permanent
potentiality (hayula) of suffering the impress of form (surah),” because a possibility is
neither an entity nor a non-entity but purely a subjectivity. With inert matter, the
active form and all causes must also go. They, too, are mere subjectivities. This led
them straight to the atomists and, as a matter of fact, they did become atomists after
their own fashion.
In this connection we may observe that the object of the Ash'arites was, like that of
Kant, to fix the relation of knowledge to the thing-in-itself; and they showed here a
great originality in their thought. On this question they not only anticipated Kant but,
in reaching the thing-in-itself, they were much more thorough than Kant. “In his
examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a process,
Kant stopped at the idea of ‘Ding an sich’ [thing-in-itself], but the Ash'arite
endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the contemporary
Agnostic-Realism, that the so-called underlying essence existed only so far as it was
brought in relation to the knowing subject.”49

Ash'arite Atomism
The substances perceived by us are atoms which come into existence from vacuity
and drop out of existence again. The world is made up of such atoms. The Ash'arite
atoms are fundamentally different from those of Democritus and Lucretius. The
Ash`arite atoms are not material; they are not permanent; they have only a
momentary existence; they are not eternal but every moment brought into being,
and then allowed to go out of existence by the Supreme Being, God, the only cause
of everything in the universe. These atoms are not only of space but of time also.
They are non-material or ideal in character. They resemble the monads of Leibniz.
But the Ash'arite monads differ from those of Leibniz in having no possibility of
self-development along certain lines. Each monad has certain qualities but has
extension neither in space nor in time. They have simply position, not bulk, and are
isolated from and independent of one another. There is absolute void between any
two monads. Space and time are subjective. All changes in the world are produced
by their entering into existence and dropping out again, but not by any change in
themselves.
The Ash'arite ontology necessitated the existence of God. Their monads must have a
cause, without which they could not have come into being, nor could there be any
harmony or connection between them. This cause must be a cause sui; otherwise
there would be an infinite regress of the causal nexus. The Ash'arites found this
cause in the free-will of God. It creates and annihilates the atoms and their qualities
and, thus, brings to pass all motion and change in the world.
The Ash'arites were, thus, thoroughgoing metaphysicians. Being was all important in
their ontology. The will of that Being or God must, therefore, be the ground of all
things. Hence they did not find any difficulty, as Leibniz did, in explaining the
harmony and coherence among the isolated, windowless, and independent monads,
constituting the one orderly world.
Leibniz had to bring in, in his monadology, a Monad of monads or God, and fall back
upon the Theory of Pre-established Harmony to bring his monads into harmonious
and orderly relations with one another, and this he could do only at the cost of his
monadology, and by abandoning his pluralistic and individualistic metaphysics.
But the Ash'arites, consistently with their ontology, fell straight back upon God, and
found in His will the ground of orderliness and harmony in the universe. They were,
thus, more thorough and consistent than Leibniz in their theory of monads. The
Ash'arite atomism approaches that of Lotze's, who in spite of his desire to save
external reality, ended in its Complete reduction to ideality. But, like Lotze, they could
not believe their atoms to be the inner working of the infinite Primal Being.
The necessary consequence of their analysis is a thorough going idealism like that of
Berkeley. Their theory of knowledge reduced the universe to a mere show of ordered
subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley, found their ultimate
explanation in the will of God. Their interest, as we have already pointed out, was
mainly theological. Interest in pure monotheism was very strong with them. Their
metaphysical and epistemological discussions were actuated by a pious desire to
defend the idea of divine creations, to drive men back to God and His revelation and
compel them to see in Him the one grand fact of the universe.
The Ash'arites are here more consistent than Berkeley. God, according to them, is
the only cause in the true sense of the term. No created thing, having created power,
could be the cause of anything.
The attitude of the Ash'arites towards the law of causation was sceptical. They denied
objective validity of causality in nature. No created thing or being can be the cause
of anything. Things or beings in nature do not possess any power or quality which
could produce any effect. The so-called power which men and objects of nature seem
to possess is not an effective power, for it is a derived power, not an original power
which alone can produce effect.50 Whatever power the creatures might possess
must have been given by God, who alone possesses all real power. Being (God) is the
only Ultimate Reality.
The things of the world are composed of indivisible units monads which, every
moment, are created and annihilated; and it is God who creates and annihilates them
and their qualities, thereby bringing about all the motion and change in the world.
There is, thus, no such thing as a law of nature and the world is sustained by a
constant, ever repeated activity of God.
There is no such thing as a secondary cause; when there is the appearance of such a
cause, it is only illusionary. God produces the appearance of the effect as well as the
effect. Things of the world do not possess any permanent nature. Fire, for instance,
does not possess the nature or quality of burning; it does not burn. God creates in a
substance “a being burned” when fire touches it.
The Ash'arites thus denied power in the cause as well as the necessary connection
between the so-called cause and effect. Shibli mentions that the Ash'arites rejected
the idea of causation with a view to defending the possibility of miracles on the
manifestation of which, according to them, prophethood depended. The orthodox
school believed in miracles as well as in the universal law of causation; but they also
maintained that, at the time of manifesting a miracle, God suspends the operation
of this law and thus brings about an exception.
Asha`ari, however, maintained that a cause must have always the same effect (i.e.,
the effect of one and the cause cause could not be different at different times).
Having accepted this principle as formulated by their leader, the Ash'arites could not
agree to the orthodox view and, therefore, to prove the possibility of miracles they
rejected the law of causation altogether, According to them, there is no power in the
antecedent to produce the consequent. “We know nothing but floating impressions,
the phenomenal order of which is determined by God.”51
Objection might be raised against the Ash'arite metaphysics that it establishes in
effect a relationship between God and the atoms, but relationships, according to the
Ash'arites, are subjective illusions. In reply to this objection it may be pointed out that
all relationship applies only to contingent beings or things perceived by the senses.
It would not hold in the case of the Necessary Being, God, who is suprasensible. And
according to their principle of mukhalafah, nothing which is applied to created things
or beings can be applied to God in the same sense. God is not a natural cause but a
free cause.
This is the Ash'arite system as completed by Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani. It faced a
strong opposition from the orthodox, particularly from the followers of Abmad bin
Hanbal. Al-Ashari's opinions did not get much recognition outside the Shafi'ite group
to which he belonged. The Hanafites preferred the doctrines of his contemporary
al-Maturidi who differed from al-Ash'ari in certain minor controversial points. Shibli
has mentioned nine such points.52
In Spain, Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1063) opposed the Ash'arite doctrines. The Saljuq Sultan
Tughril Beg, who was an adherent of the Hanbalite school, treated the Ash'arites very
badly, but his successor Sultan Alp Arsalan and especially his famous vizier, Nizam
al-Mulk supported the Ash`arites and put an end to the persecution to which they
had been exposed. Nizam al-Mulk founded the Nizamite Academy at Baghdad in
459/1066 for the defence of Ash'arite doctrines. It is under his patronage that Abu
al-Ma'ali `Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini got the chance of preaching the Ash'arite doctrine
freely.53
The Ash'arite system could not obtain widespread acceptance until it was
popularized by a1-Juwaini and al-Ghazali in the East and by Ibn Tumart in the West.
It was al-Juwaini who could legitimately claim the credit of making the Ash'arites'
doctrines popular. His vast learning and erudite scholarship brought him the title of
Dia' al-Din (the light of religion).
Al-Juwaini received his early education from his father, Shaikh Abu Muhammad `Abd
Allah, and after the death of his father, he got further education from his teacher,
abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, a great Ash'arite scholar. Al-Juwaini, in course of time, was
recognized by the scholars of the time to be Shaikh al-Islam (the chief leader of Islam)
and Imam al Haramain (the religious leader of Makkah and Madinah). For thirty
years, he continued teaching and preaching the Ash'arite doctrines.
Al-Juwaini was the teacher of al-Ghazali. He wrote many books on various subjects.
Some of these are: al-Shamil, on the principles of religion; al-Burhan, on the principles
of jurisprudence; al-`Aqidat al-Nizamiyyah; and Irshad, on theology. He was born in
419/1028 and died at Nishapur in 478/1085.53 Being the Shaikh al-Islam and the
Imam of Makkah and Madinah, al-Juwaini's Fatawa (judgments on religious matters)
used to be respected by people in general throughout the Muslim world; and for this
reason, his writings got the widest circulation and, through these writings, Ash'arite
doctrines became known everywhere.
One great theological result of the Ash'arite system was that it checked the growth
of free thought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the Islamic Shari'ah. The
Ash`arite mode of thought had its intellectual results also.
It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy and prepared the ground for
philosophies propounded by men like al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Al-Ghazali
is generally included among the Ash'arites and it is he who maybe said to have
completed the Ash'arite metaphysics. It was he who, by giving a systematic refutation
of Greek philosophy in his famous work, Tahafut al-Falasifah, completely annihilated
the dread of intellectualism which had characterized the minds of the orthodox. It
was chiefly through his influence that people began to study dogma and metaphysics
together.54
Strictly speaking, al-Ghazali was not an Ash'arite, though he admitted that the
Ash'arite mode of thought was excellent for the masses. “He held that the secret of
faith could not be revealed to the masses; for this reason he encouraged exposition
of the Ash`arite theology, and took care in persuading his disciples not to publish
the results of his private reflection.”55
Al-Ghazali made the Ash'arite theology so popular that it became practically the
theology of the Muslim community in general and has continued to remain so up to
the present time.

Bibliography
Abu al-Hasan bin Isma'il al-Ashari, Kitab al-Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah, Hyderabad,
Deccan, 1321/1903; Risalah fi Istihsan al-Khaud, Hyderabad, Deccan, 1323/1905,
1344/1926; Maqalat a1-Islamiyyin wa Ikhtilaf al-Musalliyyin, 2 Vols., Istanbul, 1929;
`Abd al-Karim al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal wal-Nihal, ed. Cureton; Shibli, `Ilm
al-Kalam, 4th edition, Ma'arif Press, Azamgarh, 1341/1923; Qadi `Add and Sayyid
Sharif, Sharh al Mawaqif; abu al-`Ala, Sharh-i Mawaqif, Newal Kishore, Lucknow;
al- Ghazali, Ihya' ` Ulum al-Din, Newal Kishore, Lucknow;
Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan, 2 Vols; Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, The Development of
Metaphysics in Persia, Bazm-i Iqbal, Lahore; al-Mas'udi, Muruj ad-Dhahab;
Dhahabi, Mizan al-I`tidal; Baihaqi, Kitab al-Asma' w-al-Sifat; D. B.
Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926; Ahmad Amin, Duha al-Islam, 4th edition,
Cairo, 1946; Taftazani, Sharh `Aqa'id-i Nasafi; Khayali, Sharh-i `Aqa'id-i Nasafi.

• 1.Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, p. 53.

• 2.Ahmad Amin, Duha al-Islam, p. 36.
• 3.Al-Ash'ari, Istihsan al-Khaud, p. 4.
• 4.Al-Shahrastani, al-Milal wal-Nihal, p. 50.
• 5.The subject originally was not called `Ilm al-Kalam. This name was given afterwards,
during al-Mamun's time. See Shibli, `Ilm al-Kalam, p. 31.
• 6.Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan, p. 454.
• 7.Shibli, op. cit., p. 56.
• 8.Ibid.
• 9.Ibn Khallikan, op. cit., p. 55.
• 10.Shibli, op. cit., pp. 56. 57.
• 11.Al-Ash'ari, op. cit., pp. 4-9
• 12.Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, p. 53.
• 13.Shibli, op. cit., p. 59.
• 14.Al-Ash'ari, al-Ibanah, p. 47.
• 15.Idem., al-Maqalat, p. 291.
• 16.Abu al-`Ala, Sharh-i Mawaqif, p. 571.
• 17.Ibid., .pp. 581-82.
• 18.Al-Shahrastani, op. cit., p. 51.
• 19.Al-Ash’ari, al-Maqalat, p. 484.
• 20.Ibid., .p. 291.
• 21.Al-Ash’ari, al-Ibanah, p. 9.
• 22.Idem, al-Maqalat,, pp. 539-54:
• 23.Ibid., p. 542.
• 24.Abu al-`Ala, op. cit., p. 625.
• 25.Al-Shahrastani, op. cit., p. 53.
• 26.Shibli, op. cit., p. 72.
• 27.Qadi ‘Add and Sayyid Sharif, Mawaqif, vol. IV, p. 182; Musallam al-Thubut, p. 114.
• 28.Baihaqi, Kitab al-Asma' wal-Sifat, p. 198.
• 29.Qadi `Add and Sayyid Sharif, op. cit., p. 601.
• 30.Sharh-i Mawaqif, p. 602; al-Ibanah, pp.23-42.
• 31.Al-Maqalat, p. 292.
• 32.Dhahabi, Mizan al-I`tidal (Allahabad edition), pp. 179-93; al-Ash'ari, al -Maqalat, pp.
582-602.
• 33.Al-Ibanah, p. 9.
• 34.Shibli, op. cit., p. 63.
• 35.Sharh-i Mawaqif, pp. 610-24.
• 36.Al-Ibanah, pp. 13-20.
• 37.Al-Maqalat, p. 252; Shibli, `Ilm al-Kalam, p. 59.
• 38.Al Maqalat, p. 43.
• 39.Al-Shahrastani, op. cit., p. 53.
• 40.Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab.
• 41.Shibli, op,.cit., p. 57; Iqbal, op. cit., p. 55.
• 42.Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional
Theory, pp. 200-201.
• 43.Sharh-i Mawaqif, p. 15.
• 44.Shibli, op. cit., pp. 87, 88.
• 45.Sharh-i Mawaqif, p. 15.
• 46.Ibid., p. 128.
• 47.Al-Maqamat, p. 520.
• 48.Sharh-i Mawaqif, p. 109.
• 49.Iqbal; op. cit., p. 57.
• 50.Sharh-i Mawaqif, p. 262; al-Maqalat, p. 539
• 51.Shibli, op. cit., p. 64.
• 52.Ibid.. p. 92.
• 53.Ibn Khallikan, vol. I, p. 312.
• 54.Iqbal, op. cit., p. 59.
• 55.Shibli, op. cit.,p 66.