Bantillo vs.

IAC

Facts:

 This case originated from a Complaint for Reconveyance filed by

petitioner Rosita Zafra Bantillo against respondent Elsa Maniquis-
Sumcad with the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato.

 In the Complaint, it was alleged that petitioner Bantillo (plaintiff

below) "is the surviving heir" of the deceased spouses, Candido
Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra; that the Zafra spouses had
occupied and possessed Lot No. 63 "under claim of ownership since
1950;" that petitioner, "as surviving heir and in representation of the
heirs of [the Zafra] spouses," had been in open and continuous
possession and occupation of Lot No. 63 ever since the death of the
spouses; that by virtue of Original Certificate of Title No. P-35267
issued in the name of respondent Sumcad, respondent had claimed
ownership of the disputed land and had sought petitioner's removal
therefrom; and that respondent had rejected demands to reconvey
the land to petitioner. c

 Respondent Sumcad (defendant below) filed a "Motion for Bill of

Particulars" 3 in response to the complaint. In that motion,
respondent Sumcad requested that petitioner Bantillo be directed
by the court: (a) "to specify what kind of surviving heir she is . . .;"
and (b) "to specify by what right or authority she represents the so-
called 'heirs of the spouses Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra'
. . . and [to show] the papers under which she is authorized to
represent them in court, and also [to specify and identify] these
other heirs by name and the nature of their heirship

 Petitioner Bantillo questioned the propriety of respondent Sumcad's

motion. Petitioner Bantillo alleged that the matters mentioned in
the "Motion for Bill of Particulars" were not essential to enable
respondent Sumcad to file an answer to the complaint, that such
matters are not proper subjects of a motion for bill of particulars.

 In response to a motion for a bill of particulars, regarding the complaint

filed by the plaintiff, the latter's counsel manifested in open court that she
was willing to specify the names of the heirs allegedly being represented
by plaintiff Rosita Bantillo as well as to submit the special power of
attorney executed by said heirs in plaintiff's favor.
 Subsequently, counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. In
support of the motion, it was pointed out that the plaintiff had not as yet
submitted her amended complaint as directed by the court. Neither had
the plaintiff complied with the July 5, 1982 Order of said court directing
her to specify the other Bantillo heirs and to produce the special power of
attorney authorizing her to represent their heirs in the action.

 Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to dismiss. Attached to the

Opposition was an amended complaint.

 Reacting to the Opposition, defendant on July 5, 1983 interposed a

Rejoinder with Motion to Strike Out/Dismiss Plaintiff's Pleadings, pointing
out therein that the plaintiff's compliance with the court's Order was
made more than one year from the issuance of the said Order. Invoking
Section 1(c), Rule 12 of the Rules of Court which grants a party only a ten-
day period within which to respond to a bill of particulars, the defendant
denounced plaintiff's tardy compliance as 'an outright sham and a mere
ploy intended to outsmart this Honorable Court and the parties.'

 On August 2, 1983, the court a quo issued the Order which is the subject
of this present appeal. In this Order the lower court found the Motion to
Strike Out/Dismiss Plaintiff's Pleadings, filed by the Defendant's Counsel
meritorious, grants the same and orders the dismissal of the complaint
and the striking out of the amended complaint, with costs.

Issue: W/N the Motion for Bill of Particulars, under Sec.1 Rule 12, was proper – YES

Ruling:

 Petitioner Bantillo contests the application in this case of Section 1

of Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging once more that the
matters mentioned in respondent Sumcad's disputed motion are
"not within the scope and ambit of a bill of particulars." Petitioner
also alleges that "there was really no bill of particulars required of
[petitioner]" by the trial court. Furthermore, it is contended that
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court is the applicable provision here.

 "Section 1. Motion for bill of particulars. — Before responding to a

pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within
ten (10) days after service of the pleading upon him, a party may move
for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable
him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.
Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details
desired.
 Under this Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks
clarification of any issue or matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by
the other party, is to file a motion, either for "a more definite
statement" or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the
submission of such statement or bill, further, is proper where it
enables the party movant intelligently to prepare a responsive
pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.

 The title of the (original) Complaint in Civil Case No. 161 expressly
stated that petitioner Bantillo had then brought suit " for herself and
in representation of the Heirs of Spouses Candido Zafra and Maria
Pimentel Zafra." In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint, petitioner
Bantillo alleged her capacity personally to maintain the judicial
action for reconveyance, manifesting that she is the "surviving heir"
of the Zafra spouses, the alleged original owners of the land under
litigation. The Court notes, however, the absolute lack of allegations
in the Complaint regarding the petitioner's capacity or authority to
bring suit in behalf of her alleged co-heirs and co- plaintiffs.

 On this matter, Section 4 of Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court

specifically provides:

 "Section 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be

sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacityor the legal existence of an organized association of persons that
is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to
the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which
shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the
pleader's knowledge."

 Petitioner Bantillo having failed to allege in her Complaint a factual

matter which, under the Rules, must be alleged or pleaded,
respondent Sumcad was not unjustified in moving for clarification of
such matter. Knowledge of the identity or identities of petitioner's
alleged co-heirs and co- plaintiffs and, more importantly, of the
basis of petitioner's claimed authority to represent the latter, would
obviously be useful to respondent in the preparation of a responsive
pleading; respondent Sumcad should be given sufficient opportunity
intelligently to contest these matters and possibly to raise the same
as issues in her Answer. The Court hence believes that the "Motion
for Bill of Particulars" filed by respondent Sumcad was not improper.
 The first paragraph of the disputed 5 July 1982 Order (quotedsupra,
pp. 3-4) of the trial court in Civil Case No. 161 states that petitioner
Bantillo, through counsel, had agreed to specify the names of her
alleged co-heirs and to submit a special power of attorney
authorizing her to represent said co-heirs in the action for
reconveyance. Petitioner's counsel was also directed to furnish
respondent's counsel with a copy of the corresponding
"amendments.

 As pointed out by petitioner in her Memorandum, the trial court did

not in its Order of 5 July 1982 expressly direct petitioner Bantillo to
submit a bill of particulars. What was in fact required of petitioner
was an amended complaint, which would incorporate the
"amendments" mentioned in the first paragraph of the Order. This
singular circumstance, however, does not preclude application in
this case of Rule 12, Section 1(c) of which provides

 (c) Refusal. — If an order of the court to make a pleading more definite

and certain or for a bill of particulars is not obeyed within ten (10) days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix,
the court may order the striking out of the pleading to which the motion
was directed or make such other order as it deems just. It may, upon
motion, set aside the order, or modify it in the interest of justice."

 Under the above provision, the court may upon motion in

appropriate cases direct the adverse party (a) to file a bill of
particulars, or (b) to make the pleading referred to in the motion
more definite and certain, either by amending or supplementing the
same. The trial court's disputed Order of 5 July 1982 falls squarely
within the second category. As the Order itself did not specify the
period for compliance with its terms, petitioner Bantillo was bound
to comply therewith within ten (10) days from notice thereof, i.e., on
or before 15 July 1982.

Petitioner Bantillo's reliance on Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules

of Court — which allows amendment of pleadings "once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. — is
misplaced. That provision does not apply in situations where it is the
court itself that orders a party litigant to amend his or her pleading.
Where, as in the case at bar, the trial court orders the amendment
after a motion for a bill of particulars has been filed by the adverse
party and heard by the court, the applicable provision is Section 1 of
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court: the amended pleading must be filed
within the time fixed by the court, or absent such a specification of
time, within ten (10) days from notice of the order.

The record shows that petitioner Bantillo filed her Amended Complaint
with the trial court only on 22 June 1983, or more than eleven (11)
months after the reglementary period of ten (10) days had expired.
The trial judge found no merit in the reasons advanced by petitioner
Bantillo for such delay and dismissed the Complaint, declaring that an
"unreasonable length of time" had already elapsed.

There is of course no question that petitioner's Amended Complaint

was filed out of time. Nonetheless the Court believes that in the
interest of substantial and expeditious justice, the Amended Complaint
should not have been dismissed and ordered stricken from the record.
In the first place, the amendment of the original complaint consisted
simply of deletion of any reference to "other heirs" of the Zafra
spouses as co-plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance; petitioner, in
other words, clarified that she alone was plaintiff and heir and
therefore was no longer suing also in a representative capacity. This
amendment, in the second place, imposed no substantial prejudice
upon respondent Sumcad and was thus formal in character. As a
matter of fact, Sumcad had not yet filed any responsive pleading at all
and had not disclosed the nature and basis of her own claim of
ownership of Lot No. 63. The issues had not yet been joined. Thirdly,
the Amended Complaint was already before the trial court and it could
have and should have proceeded with the case. c

Alternatively, if it be assumed that the Amended Complaint was

properly dismissed, such dismissal should not, for the same reasons of
substantial and expeditious justice, be deemed as having the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits and hence should be regarded as
without prejudice to petitioner's right to refile her complaint in its
amended form. Under this alternative hypothesis, to require petitioner
to refile her complaint in a new action, would appear little more than
compelling her to go through an idle ceremony. Under either view,
therefore, the trial court should have admitted the Amended Complaint
instead of striking it off the record. Public policy favors the disposition
of claims brought to court on their merits, rather than on any other
basis.