Name: Devika Hemant Nigde Deshmukh

5th year B.L.S. LLB

Seat No.
Date: February’ 2022

MOOT COURT PRESENTATION

MAHATMA GANDHI MISSION LAW
COLLEGE
Phase - II, Sector - 8, Nerul, Navi Mumbai

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 IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT
ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

ARJUN PANDIT & ORS. ……. PETITIONERS

VS
UNION OF GANRAJYA & ORS. …….. RESPONDENTS
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO 000 OF 2021
BENCH:

MEMORIAL SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF ARJUN PANDIT AND ORS.

SR. NO. CONTENTS PG. NO.

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 1. INDEX OF AUTHORITY 4

2. LIST OF ABBREVIATION 5

3. TABLE OF CASES 6-9

4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 10

5. STATEMENT OF FACT 11-12

6. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 13

7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14-15

8. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 16-29

ISSUE NO. 1 16-19

ISSUE NO. 2 20-23

ISSUE NO. 3 24-26

ISSUE NO. 4 27-29

9. PRAYER 30

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITY

SR. NO. CONTENTS AUTHOR

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1. LEGISLATION

 The Constitution of India

 Indian penal code, 1860
 Criminal Procedure Code,1973

2. BOOKS

 Indian Penal Code,1860 RATANLAL AND

DHIRAJRAL
 Code of Criminal Procedure,1973
 The Constitution of India P.M. BAKSHI
 Legal and Commercial Dictionary TAPASH GAN
CHOUDHARY

3. LEGAL DATABASE

 https://indiankanoon.org/
 https://blog.ipleaders.in/
 https://www.britannica.com

THE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION ACTUAL TERM

Appeal Cases

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 AC

All India Reporter

AIR

Allahabad
All.

Article
Art.

Criminal Law Journal

Cr.L.J

Criminal Procedure Code

Cr.P.C

Kerala
Ker
.
Paragraph
Para.

Supreme Court
SC

Supreme Court Cases

SCC

Supreme Court Journal

SCJ

Supreme Court Reporter

SCR

Supreme Court Weekly

SCW

Section
Sec.

Superintendent
Supdt.

Ganrajya Penal Code

GPC

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

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It is humbly submitted that the petitioners has approached the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Ganrajya invoking its jurisdiction under Art. 32 of
the Constitution of Ganrajya
Article 32 of the Indian constitution gives the right to individuals to
move to the Supreme Court to seek justice when they feel that their
right has been ‘unduly deprived’. 
The Article is included in Part III of the Constitution with other
fundamental rights including to Equality, Freedom of Speech and
Expression, Life and Personal Liberty, and Freedom of Religion.
Only if any of these fundamental rights is violated can a person can
approach the Supreme Court directly under Article 32.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
THE ACCUSED:

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Arjun Pandit and Manohar Lal Kashyap are two prominent leaders of the 'Jan
Sevak' party. Mr. Pandit is a young politician whereas Mr. Kashyap is a veteran
leader who is an MP from the State of Telhi.

INCIDENCE 1:

Mr. Pandit was invited by 'Special Rajya Forum' for an open discussion on
'Corruption' in Public Life. Mr. Pandit spoke against the BVP and its leaders.
He spoke about the instances where the PM was allegedly aiding rich
businessmen in getting good deals and how he exploited his Office to garner
unaccountable offers and money. The debate got intense and the party workers
of both the parties started hitting each other which forced. A lot of damage was
done to the venue and many party members were injured.

INCIDENCE 2:

'The 'New Morning' interviewed Mr. Kashyap about the incident. He took a
strong stand in favor of Mr. Pandit and the allegations against the PM. It further
angered the members of BVP and a mob gathered outside his residence. Police
had to intervene and stop the mob of party workers from vandalizing the house
of Mr. Kashyap.

INCIDENCE 3:

2 weeks later, 'New Morning' organized a debate again the leaders of both
parties were invited. Mr. Pandit again criticized the PM on the same charges of
corruption, misadministration and inefficiency. Elsewhere Mr. Kashyap kept
the reporter to stop the recording. This wasn’t aired on TV. But on 24th Jan this
feed was leaked to a newspaper, which published every single dialogue of the
debate.

THE FILING OF THE CHARGES:

A criminal complaint was filed by the Public Prosecutor after the sanction
granted by Govt. before the Session Court under s. 499, 500 GPC against Mr.
Pandit and Mr. Kashyap. After a preliminary inquiry, the process was issued to
call the accused before the Court. Thereafter, the accused filed a Civil Writ
under Art 32 of the Constitution before the SC challenging the constitutional
validity of s. 499 & 500 of GPC.

THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS ARE:

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That Sec. 499 & 500 of the GPC are violating Art.19 & 21 of the Constitution.
These provisions infringe the fundamental right to free speech conferred by
Art.19 (1) (a) and it cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction in a
democratic setup as provided under Art.19 (2). Even speaking the truth is an
offence under these penal provisions and the objective of Art.51-A (b) stands
defeated. Defamation is a civil wrong against an individual for there is no
remedy under the criminal law. Further defamation as a crime can’t be included
in the word 'defamation' used in Art.19 (2) of the Constitution.

THE CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT ARE:

The Respondents contended that the law on defamation serves the larger
interest of the public. The individual rights and societal harmony are linked.
The law on defamation under s.499 & 500 of GPC do not affect Art.19 and
restrictions are within constitutional parameters. Ingredients of the offence of
defamation are well defined in the Penal Code and are constitutionally valid.
The procedure to deal with a complaint of defamation meets the requirement of
Art.21 of the Constitution

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE NO. 1

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1. WHETHER SEC. 499 AND 500 OF GANRAJYA PENAL
CODE, 1860 VIOLATE ART. 19(1) (a).

 Art. 19(1) (a) guarantees every citizen the freedom of speech and expression.
This right has been characterized as a “basic human right.” (1)
 The importance of freedom of speech and expression though not absolute it
is necessary as it requires the free flow of opinions and ideas essential to
sustain the collective life of the citizen. (2)
 The Courts must strike down any law which imposes an unjustified
restriction upon the freedom of speech and expression unless it is a ground
specified under Art. 19(2).(4)

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

 Freedom of speech means freedom to speak so as to be heard by others, and,

therefore, to convey one's ideas to others. (5) It is a supreme condition of
mental and moral progress.
 The very idea of freedom of expression necessarily connotes that what one
has a right to express may be communicated to others, and that includes right
to freedom of circulation of ideas.(6)
 The freedom to think as you will, and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth which is futile
without free speech and assembly discussion.(7)
 Hence it is an important means of free conscience and enables people to
contribute to debates on social and moral issues and is the best way to find a
truest model of anything.(8)
(1)
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manubhai D. Shah, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 171.
(2)
S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal & Anr., (2010) 5 S.C.C. 600.
(4)
Kameshwar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 116.
(5)
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
(6)
All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, A.I.R.
1962 S.C.
(7)
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India and others v. Cricket Association of
(8)

Bengal and others, (1995) 2 S.C.C. 161.

 A tolerant view must be opted especially in cases of public officials who

have a significant role in the business of government and public affairs. Such
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 people are considered to be held in a position that would draw or even
demand public scrutiny. They also are considered to have significant ability
to defend themselves regarding such public scrutiny and therefore cannot
claim defamation unless the statement is not only proven to be false, but the
defamer is proven to have shown a reckless disregard for that falsity.(9)
 If a person is under a fear of being sued, he may not express himself freely
on public issues and this would chill the public debate. (10) Hence, defamation
laws must be crafted with care to ensure that they do not serve, in practice, to
stifle freedom of expression.
 The "reasonable restrictions" are those which are meant to prevent the
expression of a thought which is intrinsically dangerous to public interest (13)
and would not include anything else. (14) Defamation as a reasonable
restriction enshrined under Art 19(2) does not fulfill the “Test of
reasonableness”. (15)
 The "reasonable restrictions" are those which are meant to prevent the
expression of a thought which is intrinsically dangerous to public interest (13)
and would not include anything else. (14) Defamation as a reasonable
restriction enshrined under Art 19(2) does not fulfill the “Test of
reasonableness”. (15)

(9)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

(10)
Ram Jethmalani v. Subramanium Swamy, A.I.R. 2006 Delhi 300 (India).
(11)
Chintaman Rao v. State of MP, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118.
(12)
Bhagat Ram v. State of HP, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 454.
(13)
Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector Of Excise, Govt. Of Tripura, 1973 1 S.C.R. 533.
(14)
Subramaniam Swamy v.Union Of India (UOI), Ministry Of Law, W.P (Crl) 184 of 2014 (India).
(15)
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 2.

ISSUE NO. 2

a) Criminal Defamation Does Not Fit In The Bracket Of Reasonable

Restriction
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  The phrase 'reasonable restriction' connotes that the limitation imposed on a
person in the enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an
excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. (11)
 Public interest can be served by the provisions of civil defamation, hence
making criminal defamation unnecessary. Furthermore, when such
provisions are used as means to stifle free speech, then they clearly go
beyond being reasonable restrictions and act as an antithesis to the
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. Art. 19(2) itself talks about
reasonable restrictions. (12)
 Its impact is primarily restricted to the alleged offender and his/her victim, who
has the option of clearing out the false information and also the remedy of
filing a civil suit against the offender. Thus, treating acts of defamation in a
similar manner as graver offenses is clearly unsustainable.
a) DEFAMATION AS REASONABLE RESTRICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 19(2) DO NOT MEET THE TEST UNDER “DOCTRINE
OF PROPORTIONALITY

 While regulating the exercise of fundamental rights it is to be seen whether

the legislature while exercising its choice has infringed the right
unreasonably or disproportionately, (16) or excessively.
 The doctrine of proportionality emphasizes upon a balance of fundamental
rights on one hand and the restrictions imposed on the other. (17)
 The reasonableness of a restriction must be checked against the fundamental
right that it restricts and not the ground on which it was imposed. (18) They
cannot assume any disproportionate characteristic in the name of
reasonableness.

(16)
U.P.v. Jaikaran Singh, 2003 9 S.C.C. 228.
(17)
Bansal Alloys and Metals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (260) E.L.T. 343 (P&H) (India).
(18)
Lakshmi Ganesh Films v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (4) A.L.D. 374 (India).

 It is necessary that imposition of reasonable restrictions and its extent would

depend upon the object which they seek to serve.(19)

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 The penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the
misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the
misconduct would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
 Therefore, civil defamation stands as a less restrictive and an equally viable
alternative. Hence the provisions under charge do not meet the test of
proportionality or least restrictive measure, they do not withstand the litmus
test as postulated under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.

Prevailing Condition And The Duration Of Restriction

 It is not enough to look into the degree or magnitude of restriction,

but it has to be made sure that the restriction is not imposed
prematurely. Therefore it has to pass the test of proximity.
 The Code was drafted in the year 1837 by the first Indian Law
Commission, the said provision in the Code was enacted with the
object of preventing the voice of dissent or criticism of the
administration and for strengthening the British Rule. The position
has vastly changed with the enforcement of Constitution and the
Society becoming more and more free and open and a demand for
transparency in public dealings. (20) We are suffering from a
colonial hangover by retaining criminal defamation.
 In a Democratic setup like ours, the restriction as stringent as
criminal defamation should have no place. Any legislation would
be an unreasonable restriction within the purview of Art. 19 if the
punishment is too harsh in the present-day social background, in
relation to the offence committed as is the case with criminal
defamation where the punishment may extend to imprisonment for
2 years which is excessive and hence should be struck down as
unconstitutional.

(19)
M/s. Laxmi Khandsari and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors, 2008 4 S.C.C. 720.
(20)
Santosh Tewari and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., 1996 20 A.C.R. 808.

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 Issue no. 3

2. WHETHER SEC. 499 AND 500 OF THE GPC, VIOLATES ART. 21

WHILE SEC. 199 (2) IS VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14.

 The right to personal liberty in Art. 21 must be read with Art. 19 and Art. 14,
with a view to strengthen the right to personal liberty and to overcome the
weakness of guarantee of procedure established by law. (33)
 As the test propounded by Art. 14 pervades Art. 21 as well, the law and
procedure authorizing interference with personal liberty and the right to life
must also be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.
(34)

 Therefore since Sec. 499 and 500 imposes unreasonable restrictions with
respect to Art. 19(1) (a) and is arbitrary, vague and fanciful with respect to
Art. 14, it violates Art. 21.

A. SEC. 499 AND 500 GPC VIOLATES ART. 21

 The Right to Life guaranteed under Art. 21 embraces within its sweep not
only physical existence but also the quality of life. If any statutory provisions
run counter to such a right it must be held unconstitutional. (35)
 The expanded meaning of Right to Life includes the right to hold a particular
opinion, to sustain and to nurture that opinion. (36)
 Since criminal defamation unjustly violates the right to life and personal
liberty, the same must be struck down as unconstitutional.

(33)
Haradhan Saha v State of West Bengal, 1975 3 S.C.C. 731; Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of
West Bengal, 1973 1 S.C.C. 856; R C Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 1 S.C.C. 248.
(34)
District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 186.
(35)
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, 2006 8 S.C.C. 399.
(36)
Ozhair Hussian v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 Del. 103 (India).

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a) Sec. 499 and 500 of Indian penal code, 1860 violates the right to life

 It is the fact that life and personal liberty will not only include physical
security but would comprehend those rights enumerated in Art. 19, as well as
others which would go to make a man’s life meaning and worth living. (37)
 It is humbly submitted that Sec. 499 and 500 of the GPC, 1860 takes away
the right to socialize as it makes interactions and mere criticism between
individuals a criminal offence.

b) Sec. 499 and 500 of Indian penal code, 1860 violates personal liberty

 The right to life or personal liberty is important rights so they are placed on a
higher pedestal than all or any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part
III.(38)
 The state must satisfy that both fundamental rights are not infringed by
showing that there is a law and it does not amount to a reasonable restriction
within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.(39)

B. SEC. 199 OF THE CR.P.C VIOLATES ART. 14

 The Sec. 199 of Cr.P.C violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.

 Whenever there is arbitrariness in State action, whether it be the legislature
or the executive, Art. 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down
such State action. (40)
 That Sec. 199 of Cr.P.C fails to make a reasonable classification. Art. 13(2)
of the Constitution makes any law which is inconsistent with this
fundamental right as void ab initio as it imposes the duty upon the State to
not to deny any person of his right to equality before the law or of the equal
protection of laws. (41)

(37)
Indian Drug and Pharamaceuticals v. Workmen, 2007 1 S.C.C. 408.
(38)
Subramaniam, supra note 35.

Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295.; State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey,
(39)

A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1660.; Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154.; John Martin v.
State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 775.;Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
(40)
Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487.

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 (41)
INDIA CONSTITUTION Art. 14.

a) That Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness

 The right to equality means not only the right to be not discriminated but
also protection against the arbitrary or irrational act of the State. (42)
 Art. 14 is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the executive organs
of the State from exercising its authority arbitrarily. It protects the citizens
from the legislative and executive tyranny of discrimination. (43)
 Post 1974, the Apex Court has emphasized on the doctrine of classification.
According to the Wednesbury principle, adopted by the apex court in the
Maneka Gandhi case, if the classification shows the act of the state to be an
arbitrary act under Art. 12 of the Constitution, Art. 14 would strike it down.
(44)

i. Sec. 199 of Cr.P.C fails to make a Reasonable Classification as it is

unable to satisfy The Intelligible Differentia for classification.
 Art. 14 lays down that every person is entitled to equality before the
law and equal protection of the laws and the State is bound to protect
every human being from inequality.(45)
ii. There is no substantive basis for classification.
 Sec. 199 of Cr.P.C bestows certain privileges to a certain class of
people who are answerable to the general public but saves them from
any criticism. It is humbly submitted that there exists no reasonable
nexus between the special classification made for certain people in
this provision of Sec. 199 and the object which this procedural section
seeks to achieve i.e. to promote greater public good.
 Hence, the absence of arbitrary power is an essential of the rule of law
upon which our entire constitutional framework rests its edifice. (46) To
complain a denial of equality in the sense of non-arbitrariness, the
petitioners need not allege discrimination.

(42)
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, 2002 5 S.C.C. 111.

Basheshar Nath v.The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1959 S.C.
(43)

149.

Saujat Ali v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1631; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd.
(44)

v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 K.B. 223 (United Kingdom); Maneka v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. ; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J &K, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1992.
(45)
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1234.

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 (46)
A.P. Agarwal v. Govt. Of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2000 1 S.C.C. 600. 14

Issue no. 4

3. WHETHER SPEAKING TRUTH IS AN OFFENCE UNDER SEC 499

AND 500 OF GPC AND CHERISHED OBJECTIVE OF ART. 51-A (b)
STANDS DEFEATED

 It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the first exceptions of
Sec. 499 stipulate that it is not defamation to impute anything which is true
concerning any person if it is for the public good that the imputation should
be made or published (47)
 Moreover, for exception four, truth has to be backed by “reasonable action”
and “good faith”. Additionally, when the provision even goes to the extent of
speaking of truth as an offence punishable with imprisonment, it deserves to
be declared unconstitutional.
 Therefore it is humbly submitted that the added requirement of the accused
having to prove that the statement made by him was for the public good and
good faith is unwarranted and travels beyond the limits of reasonableness. It
defeats the cherished value as enshrined under Art. 51-A (b) 101 which is
associated with the national freedom struggle. (48)

A. TRUTH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENCE.

 It is humbly submitted before this court that the provision relating to

defamation under Sec. 499 GPC does not recognize truth as an absolute
defense but qualifies that if anything is imputed which is even true
concerning any person; it has to be for the “public good “and also in “good
faith”. Whether an imputation is made for the public good is a question of
fact. Good faith also must be established as a fact.(49)

(47)
Chaman Lal v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1372 (India).

(48)
INDIA CONSTITUTION Art. 51-A (b).

(49)
Chaman, supra note 102.

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a) Public good is in itself vague.

 The words “public good” is quite vague as it does not provide any objective
standard or norm or guidance, as a result, the provisions do not meet the test
of reasonable restriction and eventually, they have the chilling effect on the
freedom of speech.
 It has been held that “public interest” do not provide any objective standard
or norm.
 Moreover, nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done
or believed without due care and attention.(50)
 The mere plea that the accused believed that what he stated was true by
itself, does not sustain his case of good faith. The concept of “good faith”
has been made intrinsic to certain exceptions and that really scuttles the
freedom of speech and freedom of thought and expression and thereby it
invites the discomfort to Art. 19(1) (a).

i. Defamation is only by a false statement.

 Salmond defined defamation as the wrong of defamation lies in the

publication of a false and defamatory statement about another person
without lawful justification.
 Indian courts have also interpreted sec 499 as a publication of a false
statement about a man to discredit him without any legal justification
or excuse therefore.(51)
 Therefore it could be concluded that it is necessary that a statement
must be false to give rise to the offence of defamation. Hence it is
submitted that if a true statement is made and truth being the first
basic character of justice, to restrict the principle of truth only to the
public good is nothing but an irrational restriction on the free speech.

(50)
Sec. 52, The Indian Penal Code, 1872, No. 35, Acts of Parliament, 1860.
(51)
Mangana nand v. State of U.P. and Anr, 2006 CRILJ 3344.

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  If it is proved that a representation or statement in question is true in
substance and in fact, it is utterly irrelevant to consider whether it is
defamatory or not.
 Further, the Court said that a person has no right to the protection of
reputation to which that person is not entitled. (52) It is the rights which
are fundamental, not the limitations and it is the duty of the Supreme
court and all courts in the land to guard and defend those rights,
zealously.

B. DEFAMATION DEFEATS THE CHERISHED VALUE AS

ENSHRINED UNDER ART. 51-A (b) WHICH IS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.

 It is humbly submitted before this court that the Art. 51-A (b) under
the title of fundamental duties provides that it shall be the duty of
every citizen of India to cherish and follow the noble ideals which
inspired our national struggle for freedom. (53)
 To understand the Noble idea of our freedom struggle, the noble ideas
followed by the father of our nation can be relied on. Gandhi
emphasized on using noble means, such as satyagraha (asserting for
truth) and ahimsa (non-violence) for arriving at peace.
 Moreover, Individual interest is strongly established when
constitutional values are respected, (54) therefore when truth is not
considered as an absolute defense, the constitutional value under Art.
51-A (b) is defeated. This hampers individual interest and indirectly
the public interest. Since a restriction which is not authorized by a
valid law cannot be saved by any other clauses, Therefore it is
humbly submitted that Sec. 499 be held unconstitutional.
 Moreover, no presumption can be drawn against the petitioners, the
petitioners being not editor, printer or publisher.

(52)
Miss Simi Garewal v. T.N. Ramchandran ,(1976) 78 BOMLR 623.
(53)
INDIA CONSTITUTION Art. 51-A (b). 16
(54)
Subramaniam, supra note 35. 115 Yasin v. Town Area Committee, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.
(55)
Jayant baruah v. dilipbaruah, 2014 Cri LJ 3349 (Gau.).

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and
arguments advanced, it is most humbly prayed and pleaded before the
Hon’ble Court to adjudge and declare –

 That Section 499 and 500 of GPC are unconstitutional.

 That the restriction imposed under Article 19 sub-clause (2) of The
Constitution of Ganrajya relating to Defamation is in violation to
Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19 Sub-clause (1)
(A) of The Constitution of Ganrajya.
 That Section 199 Sub-clause (2) of Cr.P.C is in violation of Article 14
of The Constitution of Ganrajya.

And pass any other order as it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and
good conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

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