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When Regions Go Abroad: Globalization, Nationalism and Federalism

André Lecours
Assistant Professor, Concordia University

Paper prepared for the conference “Globalization, Multilevel Governance and

Democracy: Continental, Comparative and Global Perspectives”
May 3-4, 2002
Queen’s University

The relationship between globalization and sub-state nationalism has attracted

much scholarly interest in recent years. The main research question on this relationship
generally relates to the impact on nationalism of economic interdependence/free-trade,
new communication technologies and the projection of Western, more specifically
American culture. From this perspective, researchers are interested in how globalization
shapes territorial politics and organization. There is another, less studied angle, to the
relationship between globalization and territorial politics: regional governments
becoming international actors. This phenomenon, often called ‘paradiplomacy’,
represents a manifestation of globalization, namely the complexification of world politics
through the multiplication and differentiation of actors. In other words, in acquiring
international agency and developing international relations, regions become part of
globalization rather than simply being acted upon by its processes. At the broadest level,
paradiplomacy is therefore intertwined with globalization, territorial politics and
decentralized institutional structures. But what explains paradiplomacy?
This paper suggests it is nationalism. It makes two arguments: first, that
nationalism is the crucial force behind paradiplomacy; second, that domestic and
international institutional contexts play an important role in conditioning the
consequences of nationalism for regions operating internationally. The paper is divided
into four sections. The first section discusses paradiplomacy as a relatively new
phenomenon and object of study. The second section argues that paradiplomacy is a
likely consequence of the existence of a strong nationalist movement because it provides
opportunities for identity/nation-building, the promotion of regional interests, and
political-territorial mobilization. The third section suggests that regional autonomy and
constitutional frameworks are the crucial structures of the domestic context shaping the
level and nature of paradiplomacy while political and/or economic continental regimes
play a similar role with respect to the international environment. The fourth section
compares two regions that have developed very active paradiplomacies: Québec and
Wallonia.

Paradiplomacy: Tackling a Recent Phenomenon.

International politics in the last decade or so has often been characterized as being
in transition and penetrated by new trends. Indeed, there is a general feeling of
uncertainty relative to the exact nature, structure and configuration of the international
system which has translated into a particular focus on new (or surging) processes such as
economic interdependence, democratization and ethnic accommodation. Considering the
magnitude of these issues and the momentous events that underlie them (the end of the
Cold War, European integration, and so on), it is hardly surprising that another new
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development has remained, although not unnoticed, largely under-studied: the increasing
international presence of sub-national entities, particularly regional governments. The
international activity of these governments is easily noticeable: they have representation
abroad (usually called ‘offices’ or ‘houses’), lead ‘trade missions’, sign agreem ents or
even treaties, participate in regional/international organizations and enter into bilateral
relations with states and/or other regional governments (Balthazar, 1993; Philippart,
1998). Regions getting involved in international affairs may not have as dramatic
importance and consequences as civil/ethnic wars, post-communist/authoritarian
transition or the changing structures of the global economy; nevertheless, it is an intricate
part of the re-configuration process of international and domestic politics or, more
accurately, global politics.
Regional governments operating beyond national borders is not a new
phenomenon. Many American states from the South developed an international presence
as early as the late 1950s to stimulate export and attract foreign investment while their
Northern counterparts followed in the mid-1970s for similar reasons (Kincaid, 1999;
p.111). Québec became internationally active in the wake of the 1960s Quiet Revolution;
other Canadian provinces, most importantly Ontario and Alberta, did the same, albeit in a
much more limited fashion, in the 1970s (Bélanger, 1994; Bernier and Thérien, 1994).
The first Basque government (1936-1939) sent delegations abroad and had contacts with
foreign governments, diplomats and other interlocutors in the context of the Spanish Civil
War (Ugalde Zubiri, 1999). Nevertheless, the international activity of regional
governments has acquired new prominence in the 1990s. In all of the cases previously
mentioned, and others such as Australian states (Ravenhill, 1999), the scope and intensity
of paradiplomacy has greatly increased in the last few years. Regions open offices and
conduct ‘trade missions’ abroad; become involved in regional/international organizations;
participate in regional/international conferences; establish bilateral relationships with
states and other regions; and so on. This new prominence is the result of both domestic
and international change: domestically, crucial processes include a surge in territorial
politics, most importantly nationalism, and institutional transformations towards de-
centralization, while internationally they correspond to economic globalization and the
construction of supra-national institutions. Of foremost importance is the fact that these
processes feed off each other to put pressure on central states and empower regions.

Paradiplomacy: A Global Process in Need of Comparison and Theorizing

The international relations of regions has the peculiarity of being an object of
study for both comparative politics and international relations scholars (Philippart and
Van Cutsem, 1999). Comparativists tend to see the subject matter in terms of the
extension of domestic situations related to territorial division of power and cultural
diversity (Michelmann and Soldatos, 1988; Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson, 1990)
while international relations specialists situate it more within the context of a turbulent
world order and the complications it entails for national foreign policy (Hocking, 1993).
Both groups of scholars view the parallel international action of state and regions, where
the latter is partially autonomous but clearly secondary to the former, as a possible
outcome of this conjunction between domestic, often federal dynamics and external
turbulence. Scholarship on paradiplomacy has been heavily case-oriented. A typical
contribution discusses the international relations of a particular region by documenting its
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international presence, identifying the focus of its foreign policy and evaluating that
policy’s success (Palard, 19999; Bernier, 1994). There is usually also an effort to explain
the existence and nature of a region’s international activity; however, this effort is rarely
guided by general theoretical considerations and corresponds primarily to the
identification of causal factors specific to a region. The work on paradiplomacy that does
not primarily or exclusively involve case studies tends to focus on the ‘nature of the
beast’; it seeks to make sense of the phenomenon, categorize its various forms and
interpret its consequences for the state. There has been little effort to ground the study of
paradiplomacy in a theoretical and comparative perspective. This paper represents a first
step into that direction.

Problematizing the International Agency of Regional Governments.

The defining features of regional governments as international actors are their
lack of external legitimacy and, in most cases, the absence of a formal-legal capacity to
act beyond national borders. Their lack of external legitimacy stems from the fact that
rules and practices in contemporary international politics have been designed and
established by and for states. State agency has in turn provided further legitimacy to these
rules and practices which tend to exclude other potential actors from the international
arena. International and regional organizations generally reserve memberships to states.
This is the case for the United Nations, an organization whose prestige greatly contributes
to consolidating the international status of states, and the European Union. States are also
the designated parties to regional economic arrangements such as the Free Trade
Agreement (FTA). They are the exclusive participants of military alliances and
multilateral peace-and-war diplomacy. They dominate the web of international bilateral
relations, whatever their specific nature (military, economic, cultural, environmental, and
so on). States are the centrepiece of institutions and regimes of global economic/financial
management such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank.
The current international rules and regime do not affect all potential actors, or
forces seeking actor status, equally. Political or economic agents such as social
movements, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations have all
become prominent in world politics over the last several decades. However, these actors
do not use the conventional channels designed for states because they are not state-like
structures. Regional governments are in a different, more delicate position since they are
institutional-territorial entities which can not readily use strategies of demonstration,
advocacy or political/economic pressure to get involved in world politics. They have to
rely on the state-centric networks and mechanisms of traditional diplomacy which tend to
be closed to them. Therefore, from an international perspective, the very notion of
regional governments as actors of world politics is far from being a ‘given’.
Regional governments also operate in internal-domestic contexts that do not
favour acquiring an international presence. They are almost never endowed with the
formal power to perform international acts such as the signing of treaties and agreements
with foreign actors. Central states are generally unwilling to make any room for their
regions to project themselves onto the international scene, and indeed do not take kindly
to any such efforts. The issue of regions as international actors is very sensitive for states
because it involves another challenge to their sovereignty and is viewed as troublesome
for the articulation of a coherent national foreign policy. It runs counter to the standard
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model of national institutions synthesizing societal preferences/ interests, and expressing,

defending and promoting them abroad. Moreover, the question of the international
activity of regions is often tied up with power struggles between levels of governments,
which means that states are likely to associate it with, or rather in opposition to,
national/domestic imperatives such as the preservation of a given constitutional, political
or even social order, and the building, consolidation and promotion of a national identity.
In sum, the doctrines of national interests, state sovereignty and national integration all
contribute to making, from the domestic perspective, the international agency of regional
governments less than self-evident.
International rules/practices and domestic political orders are not friendly to
regional governments projecting themselves onto the international scene. The key
theoretical implication of this situation is that regions are not ‘natural’ international actors
in the sense that their agency beyond national borders can not be taken for granted; it has
to be problematized, explained and theorized. Of course, state agency should not and can
not be considered a ‘given’ either, but the structure of international politics leads to its
‘routinization’. Regional governments benefit from no such mechanisms. However,
recent developments in the domestic institutional contexts of several Western states and
new trends in some aspects of international structures have combined to both push and
draw regions into world politics. In other words, cracks, albeit small, have begun to
appear in the order which effectively precluded any territorial-institutional units other
than the state to acquire an international presence.

Nationalism and the International Agency of Regions.

Empirical evidence shows that regions which have been most successful in
becoming international agents (Québec, Flanders, Wallonia, Catalonia, the Basque
Country) are penetrated by strong nationalist movements. Indeed, nationalism involves
three processes (Lecours, 2000) which can be logically and functionally related to
paradiplomacy. The first process is identity construction and consolidation. Nationalism
is a form of identity politics. It involves establishing boundaries between groups by
providing objective markers such as language with subjective meaning. Identities are
constructed and consolidated through a variety of mechanisms whose relative importance
vary from one situation to another: cultural change, institutional development, socio-
economic transformations, political context/competition. However, above and beyond
these structural variables, the articulation, and therefore construction, of the identities
underlying nationalism is ultimately the product of discursive practices. Creating and
shaping national identities necessitates ‘speaking the nation’, that is, promotin g the idea
of a national community. These claims have most impact when put forward by political
leaders since, in the context of liberal-democracies, they combine popular legitimacy
with policy-making powers.
The development of a region’s international pre sence constitutes for nationalist
leaders an additional opportunity to build and consolidate a national identity. Indeed, the
discourse of international relations is one of nations and, considering that states and
nations, are systematically conflated, so is international relations practice. In other words,
the very definition of international agents, at least with respect to territorial-institutional
units, entails nationhood. From this perspective, the development of an international
agency on the part of a regional government is full of symbolic meaning, and therefore an
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attractive strategic option for nationalist leaders. There are forms of paradiplomacy which
are more significant than others with respect to identity construction and consolidation,
namely those involving most specifically, albeit implicitly, a recognition by one or more
sovereign states of the legitimacy of a region as an international actor. Bilateral
relationships with states, as the closest thing to traditional diplomacy, are particularly
important symbolically. So is participation in regional and international
organizations/conferences. The relevance for identities of these acts of paradiplomacy is
not limited to the acts themselves; as important is the fact that these highly visible
paradiplomatic activities give nationalist leaders the opportunity to play to their domestic
audience. They provide a scene from which nationhood can be proclaimed most
forcefully, as foreign, regional or even international focus offers legitimacy and
discursive/communication opportunities. In short, through paradiplomacy, regions can
both behave as nations and present themselves as such.
The second process of nationalism is the definition and articulation of
regional/group interests. Indeed, the development of subjective communities associated
with the erection of boundaries between groups involves not only identities but also a
specific conception of the common good, or at least the identification of certain elements
which should be promoted and/or defended. In turn, the regional/group interest definition
is linked to, and becomes an integral part of, the collective identity. There are generally
two dimensions to this definition. The first is centred on culture. In building and shaping
identities, nationalist movements emphasize and politicize cultural distinctiveness;
consequently, they tend to define the ‘national interest’ primarily in terms of cultural
protection/preservation. The second dimension is more clearly ideological. The
emergence of nationalist movements tends to be associated with, and supported by,
ideologically-specific political forces. This has been the case in Flanders, where the
Flemish Movement is strongly associated with the Christian-Democracy, and in Québec
where nationalism is close to trade-unions and left-leaning organizations. As a result of
these linkages, nationalist movements, and the regions they seek to represent, although
never monolithic, often have an ideological personality.
Processes of interest definition and articulation are highly intelligible in
international politics. After all, traditional foreign policy is fundamentally about the
definition, defense and promotion of a (state) national interest. This is why the interest
component of paradiplomacy is the most straightforward and visible; indeed, regional
governments operating on the international scene adopt state-like discourses, that is, they
express preferences in the context of a ‘national interest framework. These preferences
may be ideological in nature, and therefore lead regional governments to take stand on
such issues as free-trade or the social nature of the European Union. In such cases, the
issues put forward by paradiplomacy may be understood in terms of domestic dynamics
surrounding nationalism. Paradiplomacy preferences may also follow the cultural aspect
of interest definition. In fact, cultural defense and promotion tend to be the most
important issues of paradiplomacy because they are central to its underlying force,
nationalism. Paradiplomacy extends the domestic struggles of nationalist movements for
cultural preservation into international politics. The Québec government, for example,
expresses concerns over the linguistic nature and consequences of such international
processes as globalization and the liberalization of trade, a preoccupation stemming from
its domestic struggle for the prominence of French in Québec society. Culture therefore
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shapes the foreign policy agenda of regional governments, including targeted

interlocutors. Flanders’ paradipl omacy focuses on countries such as the Netherlands,
Surinam and South Africa where there exists a cultural kinship (Massart-Piérard, 1999,
pp.722-723).
The third process of nationalism is political-territorial mobilization. Nationalism
is a form of politics, and therefore is fundamentally about power. The development of
nationalist movements is the product of power struggles between and within groups. It
involves most importantly competing political elites claiming to speak on behalf of
communities, that is, presenting themselves as their ‘true’ and legitimate voice. In liberal -
democracies where political legitimacy ultimately emanates from civil society, nationalist
leaders seek popular support, in the form of political mobilization, to substantiate their
various claims (representation, policy, institutional arrangements, and so on). The
peculiar feature of nationalism compared to other forms of politics is that mobilization
has to have a territorial basis; indeed, nationalist leaders need to structure mobilization in
a way that transcends social cleavages and emphasizes a commonness linked to territory.
Political-territorial mobilization, although generally sporadic and fluctuating in intensity,
is necessarily a feature of nationalism because it underlies both claims for power and for
policy/institutional change. The power of nationalist leaders rests on the prominence,
even the hegemony, of nationalism as a form of politics. In turn, this state of affair is
itself conditional to popular support, as is the ability of these leaders to bring about policy
and institutional change corresponding to their specific claims, usually formal
recognition/distinct status, autonomy, federalization or independence.
Political-territorial mobilization as a process of nationalism may be logically
related to regional governments looking to develop an international agency. The
peculiarity of paradiplomacy as a form of international expression is its highly conflictual
domestic dynamic. Paradiplomacy does not merely feature conflict over the definition of
foreign policy objectives as is the case for traditional (state) diplomacy; it also involves
struggles over the very expression of the foreign policy. States rarely welcome the idea of
regions ‘going abroad’; in fact, they tend t o oppose it vigorously. Some regional political
forces may adopt a similar attitude. Consequently, paradiplomatic activity, particularly in
its most visible forms (regional-international conferences, bilateral relationships with
states, and so on), present nationalist leaders with opportunities to stimulate political-
territorial mobilization because it pits the region against the centre, and sometimes
regional nationalist forces against non-nationalist ones. Since foreign policy is one of the
last reserved domain of the state, paradiplomacy represents, in the context of domestic
politics, a statement about power. It can therefore be understood not only as the
emergence of new actors on the international scene, but also as the most recent dimension
of historical territorial conflicts whose most prominent and acute manifestation is
nationalism and nationalist mobilization.
Paradiplomacy is closely linked to political-territorial mobilization not only
because it represents an additional variable in political conflicts and power struggles
which tends to provide opportunities for stimulating this process, but more specifically
because it can serve as a tool for achieving domestic policy objectives. The development
of a strong international personality gives regional leaders a prestige that can be used as
leverage in negotiations on constitutional and institutional change. In fact, a region that is
very active internationally projects the notions of distinctiveness and autonomy in a way
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that may lower the degree of contention surrounding certain regional claims and
demands. In the special cases where institutional change sought by a regional government
is independence, international activity becomes a functional necessity. Secessionist forces
need to establish an international network and present their project to foreign states in the
hope of obtaining formal recognition following an eventual declaration of independence.

Paradiplomacy and Opportunity Structures

Nationalism is the single most important variable conditioning paradiplomacy.
Regions where there are strong nationalist movements are much more likely to develop
an international presence than regions where no such movement exists. Also, the
paradiplomacy of the former is generally more intense and extensive than that of the
latter. However, structural contexts, both domestic and international, also play an
important role in determining the likelihood of regions becoming international actors
because they provide opportunities for action while imposing constraints. These contexts
also shape paradiplomacy agendas because they dictate the type of opportunities
available to regional governments.
Three elements of the domestic structural context are particularly important in
conditioning the international agency of regions. The first is the level of autonomy
enjoyed by a regional government. The literature on paradiplomacy has typically
considered the linkage between federalism and the international activity of regions to be
of foremost importance. While this paper has argued that nationalism is the critical
variable, the structure of territorial distribution of power also needs to be considered.
Federations, and some other decentralized systems such as Spain’s Autonomous
Communities and devolution in the United Kingdom, create regional agents. In turn, this
agency is susceptible to developing an international dimension, and the greater the
regional autonomy, the better the opportunity for paradiplomatic activity. This means that
the active paradiplomacy of Québec and Flanders, while primarily explained by
nationalism, is also shaped by the decentralized structures of the Canadian and Belgian
federations. Similarly, the weaker international presence of American and Mexican
states, while primarily the result of the absence of nationalist movements, is partially
attributable to the more centralized federalism in the United States and Mexico.
The constitutional framework accompanying these institutional arrangements
represents a second element of the domestic structural context that shapes paradiplomacy.
Typically, constitutions are not conducive to regions operating in the international arena;
they tend to make international affairs the reserved domain of the central state. Some
constitutional frameworks are particularly austere in this respect and, as a consequence,
make paradiplomatic activity quite difficult. Mexico’s constitution, for example,
explicitly forbids regions to sign agreements with foreign powers. The stranglehold of the
federal government on international relations stemming from this original 1917 provision
was further reinforced in 1988 when the constitution was modified to give the president
power over ‘foreign policy’ rather than the narrower ‘diplomatic negotiations’ (Julián
Durazo-Hermann, 2000; 480-81). At the other end of the spectrum are the (rare)
constitutions which explicitly give regional governments power over some aspects of
international affairs. These constitutional frameworks remove a crucial obstacle for
regions to access the international sphere and, as a result make paradiplomacy more
likely. The 1993 reform of the Belgian constitution, which included a transfer of power to
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the constituent units with respect to international affairs, triggered a flurry of

international activity from governments in Flanders, Wallonia and the French-speaking
Community.
Finally, the focus of a national foreign policy, and of international affairs more
generally, also condition the opportunities for paradiplomacy. In a context where
strategic and military issues are emphasized, regions have little to say since defense
policy remains the exclusive prerogative of central states. There is more room for regions
to find their way onto the international scene if cultural and economic issues are more
prominent, as regional governments often have, in virtue of the domestic distribution of
power, an initial interest and some degree of empowerment with respect to these matters.
It is no coincidence that paradiplomacy has become more important since the end of the
Cold War; indeed, the breakdown of the conceptual categories of ‘high’ and ‘low
politics’ has rendered national foreign policy agendas less hierarchical and therefore
more likely to attract the attention of regions.
It is interesting to note that these three sets of domestic opportunity structures
which complement nationalist movements in analyzing the origins and nature of
paradiplomacy tend to be most favourable when these movements exist. In other words,
the domestic structural context can not always be neatly separated from nationalism.
Great regional autonomy is often, although not always, the product of nationalism.
Constitutions that give regions power over international affairs are likely to have their
roots in nationalist conflicts as is the case for Belgium. Culture as a foreign policy issue
may be important to various types of states, but particularly for multinational ones which
tend to be naturally sensitive to cultural differences.
The international agency of regional governments in the West is also shaped by at
least two sets of international structures. The first set of structures is continental regimes.
In Europe, the EU represents a political regime which provides regions with the
opportunities and impetus to act beyond national borders. It does so in at least three ways.
At the broadest level, the EU has fundamentally changed the nature of the West European
state by capturing some of its sovereignty. In doing so, it has changed the way political
actors view the state, from a coherent, monolithic unit serving as the only possible
linkage between inside and outside to a perforated entity, and invited previously domestic
actors such as regional governments to take advantage of the new openings to access the
international scene. Second, EU policies such as structural adjustment programs which
make regions their central units build regional governments as potential international
actors by establishing a conceptual and political link with the ‘outside’. Third, the EU,
through the Committee of Regions, offers immediate channels for regional governments
to become international actors (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). Not only does the Committee
present regions with a concrete opportunity to operate beyond national borders, but it also
draws regions which might not have the means or motivations to actively seek an
international role. In other words, the EU can be seen not merely as an opportunity
structure, but indeed as a force behind the very international agency of some West
European regional governments.
Of course, the EU is also an economic regime. As such, it also shapes the
relationship between regions and the ‘outside’, as does less developed free -trade
structures like those existing in North America. Continental economic integration, and
the larger process of globalization, has diminished the capacity of states to structure the
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domestic economy, including and perhaps most importantly their ability to tackle issues
of territorial economic inequalities and discrepancies. Consequently, states losing power
to market forces is a particularly significant development for regions (Courchene, 1998).
In response to this weakened leadership of central states in governing the economy, many
regional governments have taken upon themselves to actively seek to attract foreign
investment and promote exports. These are core objective of most, if not all
paradiplomacies, and they involve some international network/action: offices abroad,
trade missions, and so on. Economic integration and liberalization of trade, because they
come with a set of norms and rules, also involve challenges to forms of socio-political
and cultural organizations that may be specific to some regions. Consequently, some
regional governments (Québec for example) have viewed the development of an
international voice as a necessary condition for dealing effectively with these processes.
The second set of international structures shaping paradiplomacy is the state
system. Regional governments are generally excluded from formal bilateral and
multilateral relationships. In fact, traditional diplomacy has been built around the
sovereign state, and the rules and procedures which structure it have further reinforced
the hegemonic role of states as actors of international politics. However, states are
increasingly willing to have bilateral relations with regional governments. Flanders, for
example, has signed cooperation agreements with Canada, the United States, South
Africa, Russia and Japan (Massart-Piérard, p.723). Some states have in fact developed
particularly significant relationships with foreign regions. France, for example, treats the
Québec premier very much like a head of state, and deals with the province in a fashion
approximating its traditional bilateral relations. These opportunities for regional
governments to enter into formal relationships with states give them new legitimacy and
enhances their international personality. Finally, bilateralism in paradiplomacy is not
limited to state-region relations; in fact, the bulk of paradiplomatic activity occurs
between regional governments, that is, in the form of inter-regional and trans-
border/transnational relationships. The Four Motors of Europe is a well-documented
instance of this type of paradiplomacy. Bilateral relationships between regions trigger a
dynamic process which is central in developing the international activity of regions:
indeed, because these relationships are not contingent on foreign states recognizing
regions as international actors, they offer great potential for the autonomous development
of regional governments’ international legitimacy, an outcome which in turn fosters these
same transnational relationships.

Québec and Wallonia

Wallonia has one of the most extensive paradiplomacy of any European region It
has developed bilateral relations with states in virtually every area of the world: Western
Europe (France, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria); Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria,
Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia);
North America (Québec); Latin America (Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Cuba); Maghreb
(Morocco, Tunisia); Sub-saharian Africa (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea, South Africa,
Democratic Republic of Congo); the Middle East (Lebanon and the Palestinian
authority); and Asia (Vietnam). It is involved in European Union institutions, and has
developed relationships with neighbouring regions. It also participates in multilateral
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forums such as La Francophonie and United Nations agencies (Division des relations
internationales de la Région wallonne, 2001).
The motor behind this paradiplomacy are the processes of identity construction,
group interest definition/promotion, and territorial mobilization which have permeated
Belgian politics for the last thirty years. In the case of Wallonia, it is debatable if these
processes correspond to nationalism per se. Indeed, Walloon leaders rarely speak of
Wallonia as a nation; they tend to use the concepts of region or political community.
Nevertheless, the logic of this politics is similar to nationalist politics, and it is indeed at
the heart of the region’s international aspirations.
It is often said that Wallonia is a region with no past and an uncertain future. This
is problematic for Walloon leaders because politics in Belgium is heavily dichotomized
beween the language groups as well as divided along regional/community lines, and
because the ‘Flemish side’ is united politically, institutionally and with respect to
identity. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Walloon leaders would want to create
a strong identity/political community capable of measuring up to Flemings.
Paradiplomacy serves as a mechanism to do just that (Massart-Piérard, 1999; 714). Three
aspects of Wallonia’s international relations serve to highlight this role of paradiplomacy.
First, Wallonia has chosen many of its partners for their Francophone character (France,
Québec, Maghreb countries) thereby using the international arena to assert its French-
speaking personality. Second, Wallonia has argued, albeit it largely unsuccessfully, for a
strengthening of an institution, the Committee of Regions, which provides great visibility
to regional leaders and legitimacy to their political community (Division des relations
internationales de la Région wallonne, 2001; 86-87). Third, leaders of both Wallonia and
the French Community are currently altering the design of their international relations
bureauracies (Division des relations internationales de la Région wallonne, 2000; 86-87)
in the hope of re-shaping the larger institutions of Francophones and, indeed, their
political identities. One of the reasons why Belgium’s French -speaking population has a
weaker regional/sub-state identity than Flemings is that they are institutionally divided :
French-speakers in Wallonia are members of both the Walloon Region and the
Francophone Community while those living in Brussels belong to that same Community
and the Brussels Region. Meanwhile, the Flemish Community and Region have merged.
In this context, Walloon/Francophone leaders are increasingly considering focusing on a
Francophone rather than Walloon and Brusseler identity. This move would involve a
process of institutional convergence which arguably was launched with the merger of the
sectorial divisions of their international relations departments.
In its struggle with Flemish nationalism, the Walloon Movement has defined the
interests of Walloons in three different ways. First, and at the broadest level, it has made
the economic development of Wallonia, which is poorer than Flanders, a priority.
Second, it has focused on the promotion of French. Finally, the Walloon Movement has
historically associated Walloons with the working-class of Belgium (industrialization
occurred early in this area and socialist and trade-unionist forces are very strong), thereby
defining group interests partly in terms of relations of production. Wallonia’s
paradiplomacy reflects these concerns. On the economic/development front, Wallonia has
created l’Agence wallonne à l’exportation whose main role is to help Walloon companies
do business abroad. It has also, in its bilateral relationships, emphasized scientific and
technological cooperation as a means of improving the Region’s position in the new
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economy. The Region’s linguistic concerns have shown in its choice of partners (France,
Québec…). Indeed, affirming Wallonia as an international French voice actively working
to promote the language is a logical extension of its domestic struggle. Also, Wallonia
has taken a particular interest in the protection of linguistic minorities, for example
working, albeit it unsuccesfully, to include this type of clause in the EU Charter of Rights
adopted in principle at the Nice summit in 2000. This position is unsurprising : Walloon
regionalism/nationalism is closely associated with feelings of powerlessness vis-à-vis the
numerically superior Flemings and, furthermore, one of the most contentious issues
between the two linguistic communities is the Francophone minority in Flanders which
the Flemish government seeks, by its own admission, to assimilate. Finally, the
connection of the Walloon Movement with the Socialist ideological family has also
transpired in the Region’s paradiplomacy. In discussing employment policy in the
European Union, Wallonia was careful to avoid ‘des formulations qui auraient pu mettre
en cause les acquis sociaux des travailleurs wallons.’ (Division des relations
internationales de la Région wallonne, 2001; 95).
The international relations of Wallonia also serve purposes of territorial
mobilization. Walloons are reluctant regionalist/nationalists; they have been put in the
position of having to turn to regional institutions rather than the Belgian state because the
Flemish Movement, when it was able to translate its numerical majority into political
power, forced the federalization process. The emptying out of the Belgian state, and
perhaps even its eventual disappearance, is somewhat of a frightening process for
Walloons/Francophones. In this context, playing the European Union card is a reasonable
move since a federal-type EU would mean that Wallonia would never be ‘alone’ but
rather always part of a larger, meaningful political structure. It is therefore unsurprising
that Walloon leaders would strongly promote a federal Europe. It stresses the ideas of
efficiency in decision making (read an increase in qualified voting), democracy, and
citizenship (Division des relations internationales de la Région wallonne, 2001; 85).
If the three aforementioned processes represent the driving force behind
Wallonia’s international agency, there also exists institutional contexts, both domestic
and international, which favour Walloon paradiplomacy. Domestically, two elements are
significant. The first element is the nature of Belgian federalism. Belgian federated units
enjoy great autonomy in a division of power that is exclusive (watertight) and non–
hierarchical. Consequently, these units present great potential as autonomous
international agents. The second element is the constitutional framework. Belgium’s
Regions and Communities are formally recognized, since 1993, the authority to conduct
their own international relations (including treaty-making) on matters falling within their
own jurisdiction. In other words, all their powers are extended to the international sphere.
The European Union represents a major external opportunity structure for
Wallonia to develop its paradiplomacy, and not only for the Union’s Committee of
Regions. Indeed, Belgian federated units are players in the Council of Ministers where
they can engage Belgium and flesh out the Belgian position in matters relevant to their
own internal jurisdiction (Lagasse, 1997; 53-58). Of course, in this context Wallonia does
not act as an independent agent. Rather, it is involved in mechanisms of conciliation and
coordination, and in the search for a consensus. Nevertheless, the EU allows Wallonia
and the other Belgian units, in virtue of the peculiarity of Belgian federalism, to give their
paradiplomacy a very distinctive outlook.
 12

The Canadian federation features no comparable mechanisms that would enable

its constituent units to speak in any way on behalf of the Government of Canada or to
formally shape Canadian foreign policy. Nevertheless, Québec arguably exhibits the most
developed paradiplomacy of any regional governement. The province has signed several
hundred international agreements since 1964 with partners, both states and regional
governments, from every continent (Ministère des relations internationales, 2000). These
agreements cover virtually all the fields in which the Québec government is involved
domestically : agriculture, economic development, culture, social services, transportation,
and so on. Currently, Québec has international representation in over 25 countries,
posting more than 250 people abroad.
Nationalism is the force that accounts for this strong international activity and
network. Of foremost importance is the issue of identity. Nationalism is a form of identity
politics; so is Québec paradiplomacy. For Québec however, engaging in international
relations does not serve identity construction purposes per se as is the case for Wallonia
since its identity is well established and quite strong; rather it represents a way to affirm
the distinctiveness of this identity vis-à-vis the Canadian identity and to frame it as a
national identity. Indeed, the development by Québec of an autonomous foreign policy is
meant to carry the message that the province is in fact a nation distinct from Canada. In
this context, the discursive choices made in the province’s s trategic plan for international
relations are revealing : the booklet refers to Québec as a ‘small nation’ and a ‘people`
whose original voice needs to be heard internationally, while ‘English Canada’ is lumped
in with the US and the UK as a ‘partner’ (Min istère des relations internationales, 2001;
p.29 and p.42). The practices outlined in this strategic plan also highlight the pivotal role
of the French language and culture in Québec' s foreign policy: France is clearly the
province’s crucial partner while La Francophonie is the key forum. This is coherent with
the nationalist project which centres around the shaping of a national identity based on
the Francophone dimension.
French also features prominently in the notion of Québec’s national interests.
More specifically, Québec nationalism has always conceptualized this national interest
primarily in terms of the defense and promotion of the French language. Not surprisingly,
this logic is extended into the international sphere through the province’s par adiplomacy.
Its work in La Francophonie, for example, is consistent with the objective of
strengthening French as a world language, thereby protecting Québec’s own cultural
position in the Americas. Culture also features in the definition of national interests
insofar as it is considered a fundamental good, perhaps the most fundamental. As such,
Québec’s paradiplomacy seeks to make the argument that culture must be treated
differently from purely economic/material goods, and should therefore be excluded from
the free-trade arrangements. In this context, one could say that there is a Québec view of
globalization which derives from nationalism. In fact, in addition to the cultural element,
Québec nationalism also involves, albeit to a lesser degree, the idea of a Québec model of
socio-economic relations (a model of the corporatist-consensual type) which is viewed as
being at odds with a neoliberal view of globalization.
Québec nationalism involves efforts at territorial mobilization which typically
take the form of attacks towards the federal government, and whose goal is to stimulate
support for increased autonomy or independence. This process and objective are clearly
reflected in the province’s paradiplomacy. First of all, the strategic plan adopts quite a
 13

combative language when refering to the federal government. It criticizes the ‘anachronic
character’ of the federal government’s position on the actors of international relations,
and dissociates Québec from the federal objective of furthering Canadian culture, arguing
that this mission involves the negation of Québec’s own culture (Ministère des relations
internationales, 2001; pp.23-24). This suggests that the very action of developing
international relations is meant as a challenge towards Ottawa. Indeed, for the PQ
government, requesting a ‘Québec presence’ in one forum/event or another is a no lose
proposition : if the request is accepted, the government gets its wish; if it is denies, it can
denounce the rigidity of Canadian federalism. Finally, Québec’s paradiplomacy puts a lot
of emphasis on image, that is on promoting a positive view of Québec abroad. The
strategic plan lists this objective as one of the four functions of Québec’s paradiplomacy
(fonction affaires publiques). This objective is related to territorial mobilization since it
can be seen, at least in part, as preparing the international reaction to an eventual
declaration of independence.
Québec nationalism is a much stronger force than the Walloon Movement. Why is
it, then, that both Québec and Wallonia have developed paradiplomacies which are
comparable in importance? The key here is that Québec’s domestic and international
contexts are not as friendly to international activity as Wallonia’s. Three differences are
particularly noteworthy. First, Québec does not have formal constitutional powers in the
area of international relations. In other words, the domestic mechanisms behind Québec’s
international activity are less formalized and more conflictual than Wallonia’s. Second,
and this is a direct result of the constitutional framework, the Canadian federal
government tends to oppose Québec’s international presence. This is not the case in
Belgium where the autonomous international action of Regions and Communities is
accepted. This is not to say that the different Belgian units do not interact when it comes
to international affairs; they do, but it tends to be in a perspective of conciliation and
consensus-seeking. Third, there is no political integration in North America and therefore
no supranational forum where regions can bypass the state and develop formal
relationships. Again, it is not that such transborder/transnational relationships do not exist
in North America. They do indeed, and these relationships most likely have been spured
by economic integration. However, if continental free-trade has presented Québec with
new opportunities to interact with other North American regions, it has not drawn
regional governments into a supranational arena in a way similar to the EU.

Conclusion : Paradiplomacy, Nationalism and Multinational States.

Among recent developments in the politics of Western states and international
relations, regional governments seeking to develop international agency is generally
viewed as marginal and unremarkable. This is hardly surprising since the last fifteen
years have featured ethnic conflicts/civil wars, the liberalization of trade, an acute crisis
of welfare-states and other spectacular developments. However, paradiplomacy is a
phenomenon which is bound to have far-reaching consequences, especially for
multinational states: it will most certainly affect the domestic politics of these states, and
indeed the very nature of internal-external linkages.
As previously discussed, nationalism is conducive to paradiplomacy because the
latter presents opportunities for political-territorial mobilization, nation-building, and the
promotion of regional-specific interests. In turn, once regional governments have taken
 14

interest in developing their own international personality, foreign affairs are likely to
become an additional source of conflict in multinational states. At the surface, these
central-regional disputes may appear to be about division of power and over different
foreign policy objectives; in reality, they are fundamentally about identity and political
legitimacy. This makes paradiplomacy a form of territorial conflict more difficult to
manage in multinational states than in traditional nation-states. On the one hand, regions
where there is a nationalist movement engage in paradiplomatic activities even if they
have a foreign policy agenda very similar to that of the central state, therefore rendering
almost meaningless compromise over the content of foreign policy. On the other hand,
central states, in addition to seeking to preserve a role which is traditionally theirs,
associate exclusivity in international affairs with the expression of a coherent national
identity. This suggests that a ‘federalization’ of international affairs whereby each level
of government would be empowered to act internationally in areas of domestic
jurisdiction is an unlikely solution for most states. It has happened in Belgium but only
because nationalism there comes from the group (Flemings) which, as a result of
representing a numerical majority, controls central institutions and drives constitutional-
institutional reforms.
Through paradiplomacy, multinational societies are at the forefront of a new
mode of internal-external linkage. Traditionally, states served as the most important, if
not sole connection with the international realm; through foreign policy, they aggregated
domestic interests and preferences, and expressed them to other international actors,
usually states. This mechanism is still significant, but it now coexists with other forms of
domestic-international linkage. One such form are the much discussed social, religious
and cultural movements which are increasingly targeting international processes such as
globalization, and following organizational patterns that do not recognize national
borders. The action of these movements is transnational; it involves individuals, groups
and associations establishing connections, many of them through the new technologies,
with similar actors in foreign countries without going through the state. Paradiplomacy
represents another type of internal-external connection which shares characteristics with
traditional state foreign policy and transnationalism without being one or the other.
Indeed, it involves state-like units projecting themselves onto the international scene
without the help, and often against the will of the central state. Regional governments as
international actors have the fluidity of transnational movements yet remain intelligible to
states as the result of their territorial-institutional nature. These features make some
regions of multinational states the bearers of a special, and potentially very effective
international agency, one which connects domestic and international politics in an
entirely new way.
 15

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