1. Republic of the Philippines v. Yolanda Granada, GR No.

187512, June 13, 2012

FACTS:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the CA Resolution affirming the grant
by the RTC of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent.

Sometime in May 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed
that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives
of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting,
Yolanda filed before the RTC a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead and
the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed
to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. However, the RTC denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA. Yolanda filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that
her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final
and executory and, thus, not appealable. The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3
the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal

RULING:
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of
the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the
bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on
that ground.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by
the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG
should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review
under Rule 45.

In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by
the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc, issued a few months later.

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the
RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of
Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court, a record on appeal is required to be
filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In
reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or
absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special
proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code.
Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioner’s
action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a
special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was
not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it
appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on
the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of
Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and,
hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed CA Resolutions are AFFIRMED.

2. Roberts V. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

FACTS:
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980,
Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in
Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and
that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them
and to return the same to Maxine.

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was
illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in
his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively, that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment
of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.

ISSUE: The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to
annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court
of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court).

RULING:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838,
Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and
other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the
intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the
testate case.
 WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved.
No costs.

3. Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976)

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a
special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City
of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973,

contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was
issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has
been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for
delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the
estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for
reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse
interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and
as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on
May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation
in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the

Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the
lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for
the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2)
the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of
Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir
in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix.
The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original
petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of
interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third
persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to
the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by
Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to
reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as
she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute

Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule
admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no
relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin
the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third
persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to
remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest
of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss
the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina
G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to
dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those
provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already
been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of
all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to
deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of
July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule
to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of
the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa
B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections
thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting
the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B.
Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of
cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the
second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing

orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed
to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G.
Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and
effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as
special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar
pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another,
directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to
the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing
that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B.
Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified
that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special
action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before
Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27,
1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B.
Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his
court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending
before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December
11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue
and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of
March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that
the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending
before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an
order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a
cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence,
and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the
person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed.
The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation
facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over
the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That
power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country,
the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it
is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer
to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down
the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
— residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure
to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the
quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To
say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is,
according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the
Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months
before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12,
1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue
for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that
objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in
asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not
necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy
to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special

administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13
Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened
the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or
not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his
judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing
the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment
of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the
beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have
as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other
next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the
late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G.
Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate
sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It
needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does
not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to
the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B.
Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein
that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office
of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on
September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23
Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa
B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals,
25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree
that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City
and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be
approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for
payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in

G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
4. Baybayan v. Aquino, GR No. L-42678, April 9, 1987
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the respondent
Judge on 4 December 1975, which dismissed, without prejudice, the petitioners'
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24 December 1975, which denied petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of said order.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa
Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano,
Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin,
Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all
claiming to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime
in 1945 in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the
decedent's estate, the value of which did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in
the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was docketed
therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1

After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the
estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to submit a project of partition. 2
Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to the Resales Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.

On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and
ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an
accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs
or pay its equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto. 3

A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents
were placed in possession of their respective shares. 4 However, when a representative of
the private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private
respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof,
the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in
contempt of court. 5

As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists, and the

spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the
lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales
Branch docketed therein as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the
herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain
said defendants from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6

Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, the
question of the Identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so
that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic engineer
to undertake said survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the Court a
report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by the Deputy Sheriff
to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the probate
court, are registered in the names of herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT
No. 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7

By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the
contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelists. However, the same court
ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is
necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine
whether or not the property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-
R, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269." 8

Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-
R, to which was attached an amended complaint wherein some defendants were dropped.
9 The respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply
with his order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without
prejudice on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation
plan and formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269." 10

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but the motion was
denied on 24 December 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court. The Court treated the petition as
a special civil action for certiorari. 13

Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent Judge had no
authority under the law, both substantive and procedural, to issue the questioned orders
because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec.
Proc. No. 24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.

The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to
amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R,
so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in said special
proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case
No. 231-R, wherein they prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with
the order of the probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly
to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial Judge
to whom they submitted their cause voluntarily. 14

We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for
their alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the
respondent Judge found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to
be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings
of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec.
Proc. No. 24-R do not justify the order to amend the complaint since the determination of
the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a court exercising
probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right
of an interested party to raise the question of ownership in a proper action. 15
 It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long fine of
decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance." 16

Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what
the amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that the
petitioners should not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by them in
Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would
want to appear therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the Orders
issued by the respondent Judge on 7 December 1975 and 24 December 1975, in Civil
Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

5. Pio Barreto Realty Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-62431-33 August 3, 1984
G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984

This petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
June 30, 1982 in CA-G.R. Nos. 12599-R, 12600-R, and 12601-R entitled "Honor P.
Moslares, petitioner v. Honorable Reynaldo P. Honrado, et al., respondents, was filed as
part of the effort to expedite the final settlement of the estate of the deceased NICOLAI
DREPIN.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) making permanent the temporary restraining order issued:

(b) declaring null and void the impugned orders of April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980,
September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980, for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction, with the September and October orders having
the additional defect of due process violation;

(c) declaring null and void the Deed of Undertaking and Deed of Sale in favor of
respondent Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc., for being mere consequences of null
orders;

(d) ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the transfer certificates of title
issued to Pio Barreto Realty Development, (TCT Nos. N-50539,
N-50540, N-50541) and to transfer the same to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin with the
annotation that this transfer to the estate is subject to the final decision in Civil Case No.
41287 of the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila; and

(e) denying the prayer for the exclusion of the three titled lots involved from Special
Proceedings Nos. 7257, 7261, and 7269 of the CFI of Makati Branch Civil Case No.
41287 abovementioned.

The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were initiated shortly after his
death on July 29, 1972 with the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic will on
August 23, 1972.

In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22) persons as his alleged
creditors, and within the six (6) months after publication within which to file claims
against the estate, twelve (12) persons filed their respective claims. The total amount of
obligations that may be chargeable against the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.

The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of three (3) parcels of titled land
with an area of approximately eighty (80) hectares, and another parcel with an area of
eighty-one (81) hectares still pending registration. The estate is saddled with claims of
creditors named in the Drepin will and creditors who have filed their claims within the
reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims is to sell the Drepin lots, so that
from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of the estate could be paid, and any remaining
balance distributed to the Drepin heirs.

Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August 23, 1972, nine
(9) offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM
Management Phils., dated August 15, 1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares.
Basis for Moslares' letter proposal is a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the
decedent in his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears that on said date, the deceased sold
80.3980 hectares of land absolutely and perpetually to Honor P. Moslares for the sum of
P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To secure the payment of the
remaining P2,300,000.00, the latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further
agreed not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin and
P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's creditors.

Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture
Agreement". Said agreement listed Drepin as the registered "owner" of the lots and
denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential
subdivision. The agreement specified:

(h) That the Developer agrees to reserve the right of the registered Owner of the land to
ask for immediate CASH payment against an "Absolute Deed of Sale " on the said above
mentioned properties, subject of this "Joint Venture Agreement" on the amount of not
less than TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,300,000.00) PESOS, after the big loan is granted to the Developer in or about thirty
(30) days to forty-five (45) days from the signing of this Joint Venture Agreement and
the "Special Power of Attorney",
(i) However, if the Owner of the property Mr. Nicolai Drepin not choose to be paid on
this said above mentioned property in CASH of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS, this "joint venture agreement is still in full force
and effect, OTHERWISE if full payment of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS receipt is acknowledged by the said Mr. Nicolai
Drepin, the "Joint Venture Agreement" is automatically cancelled and declared no force
and effect.

Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein
respondent Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator Atty.
Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the
Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale
with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. The probate court,
on August 17, 1978 issued an order approving respondent Moslares' proposal and
authorizing administrator Trinidad to enter into the appropriate agreement. This was
reiterated by the court in its order dated January 9, 1979, with the condition that GM
Management Phils. had only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with its letter-offer dated
August 15, 1978 and "failure on their part to comply with the same within the period
specified, the contract with the decedent shall be deemed resolved and ineffective."
Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and
submit a more beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor counsel for Tejano was
able to perform as required.

Requests for revision of payment and extension of period within which to pay the
balance of P1,600,000.00 were made by Moslares. Further, he filed a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion proposing transfer of the certificate of titles over the land subject of the
proceedings so as to enable him to generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The
same were left unacted upon by the probate court.

Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking was entered into by

respondent Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with
Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow
as well as the clearing and transfer of the certificates of title in the name of Moslares.
The latter proviso was to enable Moslares to secure the loan needed to pay for the
balance of the purchase price. Postdated checks were issued by Moslares to cover the
amount embraced in said undertaking. Approval of the agreement with Moslares was
strongly urged by the Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. At the
hearing of October 19, 1979, Moslares tendered P1,600,000.00 to the Judicial
Administrator. This was opposed by counsel for heir Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion,
on the ground that respondent Moslares had only until February 28, 1979 within which to
pay the same. Attorney Encarnacion thereupon brought to the attention of the court an
offer to buy the properties for P3,000,000.00 by herein petitioner Pio Barretto Realty
Development, Inc. Because of the differing contentions and the new offer, the probate
court ordered the parties to submit memoranda and set a conference on November 28,
1979 to discuss the new offer.

On November 12, 1979, respondent Moslares submitted his memorandum containing

three points to wit:
l. Actually, Honor P. Moslares is already owner of the Property, subject matter of this
proceedings, and as such, could no longer be the subject matter of this testate
proceedings. The payment made by Honor P. Moslares to the Judicial Administrator
through this Honorable Court on 19 October, 1979, is in compliance with the Contract
entered into between him and the late Nicolai Drepin, in 1970;

2. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979, particularly with reference
to the period, mentioned in No. 1, page 2 of the Order of this Honorable Court giving
Honor P. Moslares up to 28 February, 1979, within which to comply with his letter-offer
to the Court dated 15 August, 1978, is not yet final, said period having been extended;

3. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979, particularly No. 2, Page 2
thereof, barred Counsel for Cornelia B. Tejano from making any further offer, his right
to do so having expired on 28 February, 1979.

Thereupon, the probate court judge directed Moslares through the administrator Atty.
Trinidad, to furnish copies of — (1) Deed of Absolute Sale; (2) Special Power of
Attorney; and (3) Joint Venture Agreement. The same were promptly submitted.

On February 28, 1979, March 6, 1980 and April 15, 1980, letters to Judicial
Administrator Trinidad were sent by respondent Moslares seeking further extension of
time within which to pay the balance of his obligation to the estate, and for favorable
recommendations to the probate court in his reports saying: "Help me now, this is ours.
We can make money of all this sacrifice we had on the pass (sic)."

On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order dated August 17, 1978
authorizing the Administrator to finalize the sale with GM Management Phils. and giving
respondent Moslares ten (10) days from date to deposit the necessary amount to cover
the value of the checks as each fallsdue. Failure to do so would result in the automatic
rescission of the authority to sell to GM Management Phils. and the Administrator would
be permitted to accept other offers in the best interest of the Estate. This order was the
probate court's prompt action on a "Report with Motion for Cancellation of Order
Approving Sale to GM Management, Phils. Honor P. Moslares, if it fails to make good
the April 15, 1980 check "As Token Payment in Good Faith", filed by administrator
Trinidad on the same day, April 15, 1980.

GM Management sought reconsideration and amendment of the Order of April 15, 1980
to conform to the provisions of the Deed of Undertaking.

On May 23, 1980, administrator Trinidad filed a "Report with Motion to Authorize
Administrator to Screen Offers to Purchase Estate and Others.

On May 31, 1980, respondent Moslares filed another manifestation praying that his
pending motions be acted upon and that the motion of administrator Trinidad be denied
for lack of merit.

On June 30, 1980, administrator Trinidad made the following "Observation and Report
on the Motion of Buyer GM Management Phils. for reconsideration" —
2. Two checks, one for P50,000.00 and one for P250,000.00 were deposited on April 28,
1980 after the Order of the Probate Court. BOTH BOUNCED. DAIF (Drawn against
insufficient funds).

3. Another check for P300,000.00 is now held by the Administrator, postdated for today,
June 30, 1980 and Administrator just received, June 29, 1980 a telegram asking to
withhold deposit until after 30 days from amendatory order of the Probate Court.

xxx xxx xxx

6. The motion of Administrator is reiterated.

On July 2, 1980, the probate court issued the following order:

Finding the Motion of the Administrator well-taken and in the best interests of the Estate,
the administrator is authorized to enter into agreement with any other interested parties
on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M. Management Philippines to
continue with its offer and make good the same in as an ordinary buyer on the same first
paid first served basis.

Respondent Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration of said July 2, 1980 order on the
ground that:

1. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction over the three (3) parcels of land,
consisting of 80.3980 hectares subject matter of the Deed of Sale which the late Nicolai
Drepin, conveyed to Movant Honor P. Moslares. The only right which pertains to the
ESTATE, is the right to demand from Honor P. Moslares, the balance of the Deed of
Sale, which has been fixed by this Honorable Court at ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P1,600,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency;

2. As of November, 1979, the law that governs between the ESTATE and MOVANT,
Honor P. Moslares, is the DEED OF UNDERTAKING executed by the Administrator in
favor of Movant Honor P. Moslares, pursuant to the authority given by the Honorable
Probate Court to the Administrator contained in the Order dated August 15, 1978,
reiterated in the Order dated January 9, 1979, and in the Order dated 15 April 1980; and

3. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction to decree rescission of the Contract
into (sic) between the decedent and Movant Honor P. Moslares on the 9th day of
October, 1970.

This motion for reconsideration was opposed by administrator Trinidad as well as the
Tejano heirs through counsel, arguing that the probate court has jurisdiction to issue the
questioned orders because petitioner submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction and his
checks bounced also that the Deed of Undertaking was validly cancelled as a result of the
valid rescission of Trinidad's authority to sell to petitioner.

On September 30, 1980, the probate court issued an order denying respondent Moslares'
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. And on October 10, 1980 administrator
Trinidad executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. transferring the
titles to the properties in question in the name of the latter. The same was duly registered.
On October 20, 1980, the probate court approved the report of administrator Trinidad
dated October 16, 1980, with xerox copies of the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto
Realty, Inc. of the estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent court's order
authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of Undertaking with the vendee.

An urgent Motion and Manifestation was filed by respondent Moslares on April 8, 1981
praying that his motion for reconsideration of the orders be already resolved, followed by
an Omnibus Motion on April 27, 1981 to resolve all pending motions and praying that
the Deed of Sale and Deed of Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be cancelled. The
same remained unacted upon.

On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Metro Manila to determine title and ownership over the
Drepin lands.

On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the
Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order. Judgment was rendered by
respondent court in favor of respondent Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has
been quoted.

Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 12, 1982.
Hence, this petition.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals laid down the two principal issues involved in the
case, as follows: (1) whether or not the respondent judge (Judge R. Honrado) acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
exclude the parcels of land involved from the testate proceedings of the Drepin estate;
and (2) whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the impugned orders dated April 15, 1980, July
2, 1980, September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980.

We are in full accord with the respondent court's resolution of the first issue, and we
quote:

For continually presuming that the three titled lots were part of the Drepin estate and for
refusing to provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, did the respondent court
act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?

We hold that even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still acted
within its jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the jurisprudence
and rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the
question of exclusion, not "should". The obvious reason is the probate court's limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result to
inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed an the way that the properties
sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that would not prevent nor
defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.

And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287 is just such a suit instituted to settle the question
of ownership over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos. 259060, 259061 and 259062,
despite the claim for damages, because of the composite effect of the prayer in the
complaint thereof ...

xxx xxx xxx

In effect, We are saying that the question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to
Petitioner should be excluded from the probate proceedings below, can not be
determined with finality by Us in this case, because in this petition We are merely
reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court. Any ruling by the probate
court to include those properties "is only provisional in character and is without prejudice
to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership" (Sebial v. Sebial, L-
23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently, in reviewing the exercise of such
limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion of the
properties involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the probate court's jurisdiction
beyond the perimeters set by law and jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue
be ventilated and finally resolved in the already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as
We hold that respondent court's act of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute
grave abuse of discretion. In view of this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of
whether there was novation of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, or not.

This same elemental principle, we found occasion to reiterate in the cases of Junquera v.
Borromeo (19 SCRA 656); Borromeo v. Canonoy (19 SCRA 667); Recto v. dela Rosa
(75 SCRA 226); Lachenal v. Salas (71 SCRA 202); Bolisay v. Alcid (85 SCRA 213);
Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals (91 SCRA 540).

However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the respondent court's findings
on the second issue.

In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondent Moslares assails the
issuance of the four impugned orders by the probate court on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with the Mortgage entered into by the
deceased during his lifetime, due to the limited jurisdiction of the probate court merely to
settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent and not to pass upon questions of title to
property.

On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and nullifying the four orders of
the probate court, the Court of Appeals, in effect, would have the former court recognize
the alleged ownership of Mr. Moslares over the three titled Drepin lots involved in this
case contrary to its pronouncement in settling the first issue.

It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the deceased prior to his death,
that is, the Joint Venture Agreement listing Drepin as owner of the properties in question,
and the surrender to administrator Trinidad of the certificates of title, had led the probate
court to enter or include said properties in its inventory of the deceased's estate. Thus,
provisionally, ownership thereof was recognized as vested in the estate. Subsequently, in
the course of the probate proceedings, the sale of the properties was found to be
necessary to settle the deceased's obligations. It was then that herein private respondent
Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in an "Offer to Buy" said
properties, based on his previous agreement with the deceased during the latter's lifetime.
It is noteworthy that contrary to Moslares' assertion of ownership, he had offered to buy
the Drepin lands from the probate court. Surely, this is not conduct ordinarily expected of
one who is the owner of the property. Further, the fact that subsequent to the Deed of
Sale, the deceased as buyer and as absolute owner entered into an agreement with the
respondent merely as developer of the lands in question evidences a change of cause or
object as well as a change of relation between the parties. Moslares' own acts negate his
claims in this petition that he had acquired ownership of the properties. Thus, the
transparency of respondent's argument becomes readily apparent.

Having submitted his letter-proposal to the court, the same was approved, allowing
Moslares to pay the balance of the purchase price agreed upon by respondent and the
decedent in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00)
specifying the time and manner of payment thereof. Thus, he was given preference and
priority over other persons or groups offering to buy the estate. Having failed to comply
with the conditions of payment of the contract, the same was rescinded by the probate
court. Now, respondent questions this rescission which he maintains to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.

Estoppel works to preclude respondent from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. By
offering to buy the properties in question, respondent has clearly recognized the
jurisdiction of the probate court to which he had effectively submitted himself. It is well
settled that a party is estopped from disputing the jurisdiction of the court after invoking
it himself (Tible v. Aquino, 65 SCRA 207). After voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278; Capilitan v. dela
Cruz, 55 SCRA 706; Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 110
SCRA 241; Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438). A party will not be allowed to make
a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions. Doctrine of estoppel bars a party
from trifling with the courts (Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756).

The merits of the case likewise lead to similar conclusions.

It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from
determining rights to property left by a decedent which depends on the contract (Goodin
v. Casselman 200 N.W. 94, 51 N.D. 543). However, actions of the probate court, in the
case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by
the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with
the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89,
Revised Rules of Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the
court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such
contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which
had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the
probate court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be denied, however,
that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdicton to make it effective (Zuniga v. Court of
Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).

We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled
and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the
Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective
buyers. Under the theory of respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no
authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed
miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. It is to be remembered that
Moslares had already been granted undue leniency by the probate court to meet his
obligations to pay. But, the saga of Moslares' bouncing checks remains. Three reports of
Administrator Trinidad had been submitted as annexes to the petition for certiorari. The
report, dated June 30, 1980 showed that two of Moslares' checks were dishonored,
having been drawn against insufficient funds. The August 18, 1980 report stated that:
"All the checks submitted to the probate court for payment bounced." And in the report
dated April 15, 1981, it was further averred by the administrator that "... believing that
the bouncing checks were not intended to defraud the Estate," "he refrained from
prosecuting Honor P. Moslares criminally under the law on dishonored checks."

It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that
had been invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent.
Although the court recognized the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, still the same was not
being enforced as such but was used only as basis for the terms and conditions of
respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce the same is truly beyond the scope of
the probate court's jurisdiction. The court's actions constitute a refusal to pass upon the
validity of the contract to sell.

Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a
particular sale would be beneficial to the estate and this is generally respected by the
appellate courts (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 114, Fernandez,
et al., v. Montejo, 109 Phil. 701). To attack the nullity of the order of the probate court to
sell property of the deceased, it must be shown that the contract of sale is null and void
(Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 147). The infirmity of the subject deed of sale is premised
on the alleged nullity of the order of the court authorizing the sale. The validity of said
order may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the supposed ground for declaring it
void for lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the face thereof (Rafols v. Barba,
supra). Nevertheless, respondent could have prevented the sale of the Drepin lands.
Section 3, Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond. — No such
authority to sell mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or personal estate shall be granted
if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies within such tune
as the court directs; and such bond shall be for the security of the creditors, as well as of
the executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit of either.

provides respondent with the legal means by which he could have forestalled the sale of
the Drepin lands to the petitioner. (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, supra) If
third persons oppose an application for leave to sell the property of the decedent,
claiming title to the property, the title claim, cannot be adjudicated by the probate court,
but it can hold approval of the sale in abeyance until the question of ownership shall have
been decided in a proper action (Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). But this, he failed to
do. Ergo, we find no reason to disturb the questioned orders of the probate court.
 Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper
and meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and
ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to
question the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91
SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent's
property is final, the respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for the
rescission of the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72). Likewise, the initial
question of respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in question in
the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof may therein be finally
and conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v.
Salas, 71 SCRA 202). The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province
of the probate court remains merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended
beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court), dated June 30,
1982 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent restraining order issued against
the trial court is hereby DISMISSED. The impugned orders of the probate court dated
April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980 and October 20, 1980 are accordingly
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

6. Amparo S. Cruz, et al, v. Angelito S. Cruz, et al., GR No. 211153, Feb 28 2018

Factual Antecedents
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able - through the expedient
of an extrajudicial settlement that was written in a language that is not understood by one
of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the estate of her parents that was greater than that of
her siblings, in violation of the principle in succession that heirs should inherit in equal
shares.

Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her surviving heirs ·- received two lots as
against her siblings, including respondent Concepcion, who respectively received only
one lot each in the subject 940-square-meter property. This she was able to achieve
through the subject 1986 deed of extrajudicial settlement - which was written in English,
a language that was not known to and understood by Concepcion given that she finished
only Grade 3 elementary education. With the help of Amparo, Antonia was able to
secure Concepcion's consent and signature without the benefit of explaining the contents
of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement. For this reason, Concepcion did not have
adequate knowledge of the contents and ramifications of the subject deed of extrajudicial
settlement; she was left unaware of the sharing arrangement contained therein, and
realized it only when Antonia attempted to subdivide the subject property in 1998, and
the plan of subdivision survey was shown to Concepcion - which revealed that Antonia
obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM on
August 17, 1998.

Issues: Petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that the respondents' cause of action
for annulment has not prescribed, and that it ignored contemporaneous and subsequent
 acts of respondents indicating the absence of fraud or vitiation of consent in the
execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz.

Our Ruling
This is a simple case of exc1usion in legal succession, where coheirs were effectively
deprived of their rightful share to the estate of their parents - who died without a will - by
virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition which granted a bigger
share to one of the heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other heirs would be
effectively deprived of discovering and knowing its contents.

Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares." In this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs
renounced their shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the
remaining co-heirs, in equal shares as well.

In Segura v. Segura, It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 docs not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers
only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six
of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the
rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did
not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right
to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, while the CA was correct in ruling in favor of Concepcion and setting aside the
subject deed of extrajudicial settlement, it erred in appreciating and ruling that the case
involved fraud - thus applying the four-year prescriptive period - when it should have
simply held that the action for the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of
extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe, under the circumstances, given that the same
was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that Concepcion
was effectively deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.

7. Octaveo S. Maloles III v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129505, January 31, 2000

FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate
value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of
the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will
was annexed to the petition for probate. On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V.
Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and
allowing the will.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration
in his name.

On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch
61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted,
while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim
that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3

Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand,
private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.

Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an
order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos's
estate.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside
the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was
the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know
of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings
in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that
private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate; that private
respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner
should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.

On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to
Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC
Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August
26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court
of Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of
petitioner's motion for intervention.

Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the
records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending
case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The
order reads:

Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this
case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this
Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related
case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before
this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76
of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become
final.

It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her
motion and filed this case (No. 4343).

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case
No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August
1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be

approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.

Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in
his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the
petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were
commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter
branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to
expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:

Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue
hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate proceedings
of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and
distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court
Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and
under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court.

Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court
Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los
Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for intervention.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial
court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February
26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting aside the trial court's order on the ground that
petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.

2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 65) acquired
jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.

3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a
right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent.

4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition
for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 65
knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same restate estate of the
decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61.

First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did
not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing
the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that the
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondent's petition for issuance of letters testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited
to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.9

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much
so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such
nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the
will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the
testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been
explained by the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the
testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the
courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his
death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will
does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at
once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest
upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only
questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testator's death will
refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course,
that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting
under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily
mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new
will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a
chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death
would be in order.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling
of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that —

Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings
of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease
upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire
estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that
the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latter's death. In
other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the
probate court.12

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73,
§1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:13

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over
the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That
power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in
Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The
different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.14

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for
probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the
same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his
death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial
District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court
of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a
case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or
judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings
continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the
Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or
power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of
the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same
court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation
of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First
Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.

Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin
and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that
petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati
City, the Court of Appeals held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy.
Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest
in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first
time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the
records show, not supported by evidence.

. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will,
and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private
respondent's opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth
and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as
executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the
probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.16

Rule 79, §1 provides:

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration.

— Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters
testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them,
and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds.
A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will
annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent.17

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
"heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who
has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842
of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.18

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testator's will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary

concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural
that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to
carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may
the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is
present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she
filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the
probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner,
there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which
are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the
other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr.
De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the
allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.1âwphi1.nêt

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private
respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing
authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the
testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition
terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons
named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the
latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.