Constantino V Cuisa G.R. No. 106064

CONSTANTINO V CUISA
G.R. No. 106064
FACTS
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the
country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback
programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-
conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee”
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such
power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur
foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue
that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence
of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the
country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
HELD:
There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract
or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board.
It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant.
On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident
exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute
the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the
expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would
have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among
the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and
defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded
and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the
respondents are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of
the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

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CONSTANTINO V CUISA

G.R. No. 106064

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