Enf Gemini Complaint 060222
Enf Gemini Complaint 060222
Enf Gemini Complaint 060222
I. INTRODUCTION
1. From at least in or around July 2017 through at least in or around December 2017
(the “Relevant Period”), Gemini Trust Company, LLC (“Gemini” or “Defendant”), through
officers, employees, agents, or others, made false or misleading statements of material facts, or
omitted to state material facts, to Commission staff in connection with Commission staff’s
bitcoin futures contract (the “Bitcoin Futures Contract”) that was to be settled by reference to the
spot bitcoin price on the relevant day as determined by an auction (the “Gemini Bitcoin
Auction”) held on Gemini’s digital asset trading platform (the “Gemini Exchange”).
the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission Regulations of the Bitcoin Futures Contract,
Gemini, directly and through others, made false or misleading statements and omissions to
Commission staff with respect to the operations of the Gemini Exchange and the Gemini Bitcoin
Auction. The statements were made during in-person meetings with Commission staff in July
and August 2017, as well as in presentation materials, data, and documents provided to the
Commission. In some instances, Gemini made the false or misleading statements and omissions
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in response to specific questions posed by Commission staff who were considering, among other
things, whether the proposed Bitcoin Futures Contract would be readily susceptible to
manipulation.
or reasonably should have known that the statements and information conveyed or omitted by
Gemini directly and through others were false or misleading with respect to, among other things,
facts relevant to understanding whether the proposed Bitcoin Futures Contract would be readily
susceptible to manipulation.
Commission staff by Gemini directly and through others were material to evaluation of the
Bitcoin Futures Contract, including compliance with core principles of the Commodity Exchange
Act, including Core Principles 3 and 12, “Contracts Not Readily Subject to Manipulation” and
relevant to, among other things, assessing the size of, liquidity on, and number of market
participants using the Gemini Exchange and the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
5. The proposed Bitcoin Futures Contract was particularly significant because it was
to be among the first digital asset futures contracts listed on a designated contract market, at a
time of fervent interest by market participants in obtaining exposure to bitcoin through the
staff about the Gemini Exchange, the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, and the Bitcoin Futures Contract
was important to the Commission’s work as it sought to fulfill its statutory mission, including
ensuring financial integrity of transactions subject to the Commodity Exchange Act, protecting
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market participants, deterring and preventing price manipulation and any other disruptions to
acts and practices in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–26, and
brings this action to enjoin such acts and practices and compel compliance with the Act. In
addition, the Commission seeks civil monetary penalties and remedial ancillary relief, including,
but not limited to, trading and registration bans, disgorgement, pre- and post-judgment interest,
and such other relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate.
engage in the acts and practices alleged in this Complaint and similar acts and practices, as more
9. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (district courts have original jurisdiction
over civil actions commenced by the United States or by any agency expressly authorized to sue
by Act of Congress). In addition, Section 6c(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a), authorizes the
Commission to seek injunctive and other relief against any person whenever it appears to the
Commission that such person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or
practice constituting a violation of any provision of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder.
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10. Venue. Venue properly lies with the Court pursuant to Section 6c(e) of the Act,
7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(e), because Defendant is found in, inhabits, or transacts business in this
District, or because acts and practices in violation of the Act occurred, are occurring, or are about
“CFTC”) is an independent federal regulatory agency that is charged by Congress with the
administration and enforcement of the Act and the Regulations. The Commission maintains its
principal office at Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20581.
12. Defendant Gemini Trust Company, LLC is a New York chartered limited
liability trust company based in New York, New York, whose business is to operate a digital
asset trading platform and to offer custodial and related services. Gemini has not been registered
IV. FACTS
A. Virtual Currencies
13. A virtual currency is a type of digital asset defined here as a digital representation
of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value, but
does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are
distinct from “real” currencies, which are the coin and paper money of the United States or
another country that are designated as legal tender, circulate, and are customarily used and
14. Digital assets such as bitcoin and other virtual currencies are encompassed by the
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15. It is the purpose of the Act to, among other things, deter and prevent price
manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity; to ensure the financial integrity of all
transactions subject to the Act and the avoidance of systemic risk; to protect all market
participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales practices and misuses of customer assets; and
to promote responsible innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, other markets and
16. In furtherance of this purpose, DCMs are required by law to comply with core
principles of the Act and with applicable requirements established by the Commission. See
Section 5(d) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d). For instance, Core Principle 3 requires that a DCM
shall list only contracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation. See Section 5(d)(3) of
the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3); Regulation 38.200, 17 C.F.R. § 38.200 (2021). Further, Core
Principle 12 requires that a DCM shall establish and enforce rules to protect markets and market
participants from abusive practices committed by any party and to promote fair and equitable
trading. See Section 5(d)(12) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(12); Regulation 38.650,
17. In evaluating the extent to which cash-settled futures contracts such as the Bitcoin
Futures Contract are readily susceptible to manipulation, Regulations identify several relevant
factors, including, for example, the size and liquidity of the underlying cash market and the
trading volume and number of participants involved in determining the settlement price. E.g.,
Part 38 of the Regulations App’x C(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. pt. 38, App’x C(c)(2) (2021) (“In particular,
situations susceptible to manipulation include those in which the volume of cash market
transactions and/or the number of participants contacted in determining the cash-settlement price
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18. Section 5c(c)(4) of the Act and Commission Regulation 40.3 permit a DCM to
request that the Commission approve a new futures contract product prior to listing the product
for trading. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(4); Regulation 40.3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 40.3(a) (2021). Such a
request for approval requires a voluntary submission by the DCM of certain information set forth
in Regulation 40.3(a). If such a request for approval is made, Commission staff may request
additional evidence, information, or data demonstrating that the contract meets the requirements
of the Act. Regulation 40.3(a)(10), 17 C.F.R. § 40.3(10) (2021). After a forty-five-day review
period, which may be extended if the product raises novel or complex issues that require
additional time to analyze, the Commission shall approve the product unless the terms and
conditions of the product violate the Act or the Commission’s regulations. Regulation 40.3(b)-
19. Alternatively, Section 5c(c)(1) of the Act permits a DCM to list a new futures
contract for trading by providing the Commission a written certification that the new contract
complies with the Act and Regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(1). The written certification, often
submitted in the form of a letter (a “self-certification letter”), must include, among other things,
an explanation and analysis of the product’s compliance with the core principles for contract
markets set forth in the Act and Regulations,1 including Core Principle 3. See Regulation
certification, the Commission may, and did regarding the Bitcoin Futures Contract, engage in
discussions with the DCM and other relevant parties (e.g., as in this case, the underlying market
1
The core principles for contracts markets are set forth in 7 U.S.C § 7(d) and Part 38 of the Regulations, 17 C.F.R.
pt. 38 (2021).
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provider) concerning the contours and operation of the potential contract, and may ask the
relevant parties to alter the terms to conform with or better meet the core principles.
21. In evaluating a new product, Commission staff also can require additional
evidence, information or data that demonstrates that the contract meets, initially or on a
continuing basis, the requirements of the Act and Regulations. See Regulation 40.2(b),
22. Absent a finding by the Commission that certification of the new product would
be inconsistent with the Act or Regulations, a DCM may list the new product no sooner than one
full business day following the self-certification. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c); 17 C.F.R. § 40.2(a).
23. The Commission is authorized, upon requisite findings and proceedings, to alter
or supplement the rules of a DCM, including relating to such a new product. See Section 8a(7)
of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7). The Commission may stay the listing of the contract during such
24. In sum, the Commission has oversight authority with respect to new products,
including self-certified listings, and can act as necessary to ensure their compliance with the Act
and Regulations.
25. In and around the Relevant Period, Gemini and the DCM engaged with
Commission staff in connection with Commission staff’s evaluation of compliance with the Act
and Regulations of the potential self-certification by the DCM of the Bitcoin Futures Contract.
26. The Bitcoin Futures Contract to be traded at the DCM was to be cash settled by
reference to the spot bitcoin price on the relevant day as determined by the Gemini Bitcoin
Auction.
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27. This meant that the Gemini Bitcoin Auction price on the final settlement day of
the Bitcoin Futures Contract determined the price of the Bitcoin Futures Contract, with
28. The bitcoin price as determined by the Gemini Bitcoin Auction thus was an
29. During the Relevant Period, as well as before and after, the Gemini Exchange
operated as a digital asset trading platform, where customers could trade assets such as bitcoin
30. The Gemini Exchange began conducting the Gemini Bitcoin Auction daily at
Auction was designed to attract bids and offers in the hours and minutes leading to the auction
time, and then to arrive at a price in U.S. Dollars that would result in the greatest volume of
matched orders.
31. In the hours and minutes before 4 PM ET, market participants could enter
auction-only orders as well as continuous trading orders. The Gemini Bitcoin Auction price was
determined at 4 PM ET by finding the price at which the greatest aggregate buy demand and sell
demand from all eligible orders can be fulfilled, with all continuous trading orders and auction-
only orders.
32. Before and during the Relevant Period, Gemini took various steps to increase
trading volume and liquidity on the Gemini Exchange, including the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
application for an exchange-traded product involving Gemini. The rejection noted the Gemini
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34. The Bitcoin Futures Contract was expected to benefit Gemini’s business, such as,
among other ways, through licensing fees and increased trading volume on the Gemini Exchange
35. In furtherance of efforts to persuade Commission staff that the Bitcoin Futures
Contract complied with the Act and Regulations, Gemini, directly and through others, made
statements to Commission staff in connection with and concerning the proposed Bitcoin Futures
Contract and the operations of the Gemini Exchange and the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
36. For example, such statements were made during in-person meetings with
Commission staff in or around July 25, 2017, and in or around August 28, 2017, as well as in
presentation materials, data, and documents provided to the Commission during the Relevant
Period.
At times, Gemini personnel provided information to the DCM (or others) concerning Gemini
with the understanding and intent that the DCM (or others) would convey the information to
Commission staff.
38. At various times during the Relevant Period, as part of efforts to persuade
Commission staff that the Bitcoin Futures Contract complied with the Act and Regulations,
Gemini made and caused to be made false or misleading statements and omissions to
39. Such false or misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff were
material, including to the evaluation of compliance with the Act and Commission Regulations of
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40. During the Relevant Period, for instance, Gemini made and caused to be made
false or misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff regarding Gemini’s purported
41. One area under evaluation was whether the Gemini Bitcoin Auction and the
42. In oral and written communications to Commission staff during the Relevant
Period, Gemini represented that it was a “full reserve” exchange and that it required all
transactions to be fully “pre-funded.” Gemini represented that the “prefunding” aspect of the
Gemini Exchange made the Gemini Exchange and the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, and thus the
Bitcoin Futures Contract, less susceptible to manipulation because it increased traders’ cost of
capital and made improper trading conduct more expensive to malicious actors.
43. For example, in or around July 25, 2017, orally and in writing, as part of the claim
that the Bitcoin Futures Contract was not readily susceptible to manipulation, Gemini personnel
asserted to Commission staff that Gemini required all transactions to be fully “prefunded.” In a
July 25, 2017 written submission to Commission staff, with respect to the Gemini Bitcoin
Auction, Gemini referred to its “prefunding requirements” for auction orders and stated that,
“[a]s with all Gemini orders, auction orders must be fully (pre-) funded.”
cited the idea of “cost of capital” and the supposed prefunding requirement as one of the
“attributes that promote the integrity of the auction price and discourage manipulative conduct.”
According to Gemini, a Gemini market participant “was not permitted to place an order unless
they had enough funds in their account to place the order.” The claim was that these aspects
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supposedly made manipulative trading tactics costlier, and thus less likely, for a malicious
45. Such statements were false or misleading and omitted material information.
46. Gemini did not disclose its substantial efforts to reduce or largely eliminate
market participants’ cost of capital in order to facilitate greater trading volume on the Gemini
47. Gemini did not disclose to Commission staff, for example, that certain market
maker Gemini customers could and did obtain loans of digital assets controlled by Gemini
Principal-1 and Gemini Principal-2 from an entity they controlled (“Affiliate A”).
48. These loans were designed to facilitate trading on the Gemini Exchange,
52. Gemini Principal-1 or Gemini Principal-2 caused these loans to issue in part to
induce increased trading on the Gemini Exchange and/or the Gemini Bitcoin Auction in
particular.
53. For example, certain of the loans extended by Affiliate A included terms
explicitly requiring the recipient customer to maintain certain trading volumes on the Gemini
Exchange. Other loans extended by Affiliate A to select Gemini customers were accompanied
by written or oral statements that the loan proceeds were to be used for trading on the Gemini
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54. In effect, the select loan recipients could use Gemini Principal-1 and Gemini
Principal-2’s digital assets, rather than their own, to trade on the Gemini Exchange, including in
55. For example, shortly before the first Gemini Bitcoin Auction, a potential auction
participant expressed concerns to Gemini personnel about having cash or bitcoins (btc) in their
account in order to participate in the auction and asked for a line of credit. In response, a Gemini
personnel indicated, among other things, “I can ask [Gemini Principal-1 and Gemini Principal-2]
56. Shortly thereafter, Affiliate A extended a loan to that potential auction participant
Gemini communication in or around August 2017, regarding certain Gemini market maker
customers, “a number of them are using my capital, which makes up a material amount of their
balance sheet.”
58. The loans effectively allowed the borrowing Gemini customers to place orders on
the Gemini Exchange without fully prefunding their accounts with their own funds.
59. However, Gemini did not disclose to Commission staff that Gemini Principal-1
and Gemini Principal-2 made their own digital assets available to potential market makers to
trade with on the Gemini Exchange, including in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
60. Such false or misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff were
material, including to the evaluation of the compliance with the Act and Commission
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61. For instance, digital asset loans, particularly unsecured or at low or below-market
rates, could reduce traders’ cost of capital—and the cost of manipulative conduct—and thus
potentially undermine a purported rationale as to why the Bitcoin Futures Contract was not
readily susceptible to manipulation. Digital asset loans could misleadingly skew the apparent
volume, liquidity, or number of participants trading on the Gemini Exchange and in the Gemini
Bitcoin Auction.
62. Gemini also did not disclose to Commission staff that before and during the
Relevant Period Gemini gave “advances” or “credits” of fiat currency or digital assets to select
customers, such that the funds could immediately be used for trading on Gemini, and that
63. Gemini further did not disclose that at times it provided such “advances” or
“credits” in order to induce, facilitate, or fund trading on the Gemini Exchange or in the Gemini
Bitcoin Auction that would otherwise not be possible due to lack of funds in the customer’s
account.
64. While these advances or credits were outstanding, the auction participants could,
and at times did, use the advanced or credited funds to trade on Gemini and participate in the
65. For example, to facilitate participation in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction in or around
late 2016, Gemini provided an advance “credit” of approximately $400,000 to a select Gemini
market maker customer so that the customer could participate in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction that
66. Soon after the Gemini Bitcoin Auction that day, Gemini debited the funds from
the customer’s account. Gemini personnel discussed this round-trip credit and debit to the
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customer’s account as “a quick operational advance so they could cross themselves” in the
“operational advance” to a select market maker customer in the amount of 750 bitcoin in order to
induce greater trading volumes by that market participant on the Gemini Exchange.
68. Gemini records reflect that Principal-1 approved this “operational advance” of
750 bitcoin.
69. The market maker customer was not debited the advanced amount of 750 bitcoin
70. However, Gemini did not disclose to Commission staff that, effectively, Gemini
made its own digital assets and fiat currency available to customers to trade with on the Gemini
Exchange, including in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, until such later time as the customer
completed the deposit of the customer’s funds at Gemini—potentially days or weeks later.
71. Such false or misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff were
material, including to the evaluation of the compliance with the Act and Commission
72. For instance, credits and advances, particularly those of more significant size or
duration, could reduce traders’ cost of capital—and the cost of manipulative conduct—and thus
potentially undermine a purported rationale as to why the Bitcoin Futures Contract was not
readily susceptible to manipulation. Credits and advances could misleadingly skew the apparent
volume, liquidity, or number of participants trading on the Gemini Exchange and in the Gemini
Bitcoin Auction.
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73. During the Relevant Period, Gemini made and caused to be made false or
misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff regarding the extent and possibility of
74. For example, in or around July 25, 2017, orally and in writing, as part of the claim
that the Bitcoin Futures Contract was not readily susceptible to manipulation, Gemini
represented to Commission staff that self-crossing was prohibited on Gemini. In a July 25, 2017
written submission to Commission staff, with respect to the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, Gemini
concerning whether a Gemini Bitcoin Auction could occur when there is one participant trading
with itself, Gemini represented to the Commission in or around August 25, 2017, “No, we have
indicated that “self-trade prevention” was among the “attributes that promote the integrity of the
auction price and discourage manipulative conduct,” explaining that “[w]e prohibit the same
market participant from crossing with himself or herself (either intentionally or unintentionally)
77. Such statements were false or misleading and omitted material information.
concerning self-trading were material, including to the evaluation of the compliance with the Act
79. For instance, self-trading could lead to manipulative conduct, thus implicating
whether the Bitcoin Futures Contract was in fact readily susceptible to manipulation. Self-
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trading could misleadingly skew the apparent volume, liquidity, or number of participants
80. In fact, before in or around May 2017, Gemini did not effectively prohibit self-
trading in Gemini Bitcoin Auctions or have any technological means to prevent self-trading from
occurring in Gemini Bitcoin Auctions. Indeed, from the inception of the Gemini Bitcoin Auction
in 2016 to around May 2017, self-trading in Gemini Bitcoin Auctions on occasion actually
occurred.
81. Self-trading that occurred in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction during this period could
account for a significant portion of the Gemini Bitcoin Auction’s total trading volume on a given
day.
82. For example, for one auction in December 2016, approximately 70% of the total
auction trading volume resulted from a single auction participant trading with itself.
83. In fact, even after Gemini applied a technological mechanism aimed at preventing
self-trading in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, self-trading continued to occur on occasion during
84. In fact, for example, the same market participant could effectively enter into
whole or partially offsetting trades with himself or herself in a Gemini Bitcoin Auction because
there was not self-trade prevention between the Gemini continuous order book and the Gemini
statements to Commission staff concerning self-trading and shortly before the Bitcoin Futures
Contract was listed—a Gemini customer inquired as to a mechanism that would prevent that
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customer’s continuous trading order (e.g., an order to sell) from crossing that same customer’s
86. Rather than address such risk of a customer effectively trading with itself, Gemini
personnel discussed the issue, decided it was too hard to deal with, and left it up to the market
87. As Gemini Principal-1 then wrote in an internal message to several other Gemini
personnel regarding self-crossing and the Gemini Bitcoin Auction: “it’s really up to the MMs . . .
88. During the Relevant Period, Gemini made and caused to be made false or
misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff regarding trading fee rebates and fee
“overrides.”
89. For example, in a July 25, 2017 written submission to Commission staff, with
respect to the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, Gemini personnel represented that its “[m]arket maker
90. Then, in or around August 25, 2017, in response to Commission staff requests for
details concerning fee rebates and in particular Gemini’s market maker trading fee rebate
program, Gemini indicated to Commission staff: (a) that Gemini had no specifically defined
market maker program; (b) that Gemini had implemented a trading fee program that was
available to all Gemini market participants; and (c) that the public fee schedule on Gemini’s
website at the time reflected details of the program available to all Gemini customers.
91. Such statements and omissions were false or misleading and omitted material
information.
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concerning fee rebates and overrides were material, including to the evaluation of the compliance
with the Act and Commission Regulations of the Bitcoin Futures Contract.
93. For instance, fee rebates and overrides could reduce traders’ cost of capital—and
Bitcoin Futures Contract was not readily susceptible to manipulation. Fee rebate and overrides
could lead to wash trading or other types of abusive trading activities that affect prices. Fee
rebates and overrides could misleadingly skew the apparent volume, liquidity, or number of
participants trading on the Gemini Exchange and in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
94. In fact, Gemini at times before and during the Relevant Period entered into
bespoke or custom fee arrangements with market participants, including market makers, that
were not available to all Gemini market participants and that were not disclosed to the public on
Gemini’s website.
95. In fact, Gemini at times offered special fee rebate incentives and “fee overrides”
to preferred market participants, including incentives designed to induce trading in the Gemini
Bitcoin Auction, and including at more favorable terms than those on the public fee schedule.
96. For example, in or around August 2017, Gemini records reflect that Gemini paid
more than $90,000 to a Gemini customer as a rebate, based on the Gemini market maker
97. In fact, Gemini offered special fee rebate incentives that could be and at times
described above.
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98. For example, in or around August 2017, Gemini personnel learned that certain
Gemini customers had generated millions of dollars of fee rebates over a period of weeks
99. Upon learning of the significant rebates accrued to the Gemini customers, Gemini
100. In or around August 30, 2017, Gemini suspended and later terminated two Gemini
101. One of the suspended personnel was closely involved in the engagement with
102. This person also had been a principal speaker on behalf of Gemini during the in-
person meetings with Commission staff on July 25, 2017, and August 28, 2017.
103. Gemini Principal-1 and Gemini Principal-2 believed at that time that the
suspended Gemini personnel were not trustworthy. The two employees were later terminated.
104. Gemini considered the trading as improper and the rebates as fraudulent.
105. Gemini also initiated arbitration proceedings against the customers and the
employees.
106. Gemini expended millions of dollars in investigating and litigating these issues
107. During the Relevant Period, in addition to not informing Commission staff of the
existence of the bespoke or custom fee arrangement, Gemini did not inform Commission staff
that it had chosen to suspend an employee who had been speaking for Gemini at the meetings or
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that Gemini Principal-1 and Gemini Principal-2 had formed the belief that this employee was not
trustworthy.
108. During the Relevant Period, Gemini made and caused to be made false or
misleading statements and omissions to Commission staff regarding the Gemini Exchange’s
trading volume and liquidity, which were relevant to evaluating the Gemini Bitcoin Auction and
staff concerning trading volume and liquidity on the Gemini Exchange. For example, in a July
25, 2017 written submission to Commission staff, Gemini presented auction and trading
Gemini submitted, or caused to be submitted, data underlying the auction and trading
information cited in its July 25, 2017 written submission, including auction trading volume data.
110. Gemini also provided information describing the number of market participants
who placed orders in the Gemini Exchange and the moving average of the Gemini Exchange’s
111. Such statements also formed part of the self-certification to the Commission of
112. Such statements were false or misleading and omitted material information.
concerning the Gemini Exchange’s and the Gemini Bitcoin Auction’s operations, such as trading
volume, liquidity, and number of participants, were material, including to the evaluation of the
compliance with the Act and Commission Regulations of the Bitcoin Futures Contract.
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114. For instance, the nature of the apparent volume, liquidity, or number of
participants trading on the Gemini Exchange and in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction are factors
115. Gemini did not disclose and omitted that the information included trading by
Gemini customers who had received loans from Affiliate A and that, effectively, Gemini
Principal-1 and Gemini Principal-2 had made their own digital assets available to potential
market makers to trade with on the Gemini Exchange, including in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
116. Gemini did not disclose and omitted that the information included trading by
Gemini customers who had been provided advances or credits by Gemini to encourage or permit
those customers to trade on the Gemini Exchange, including in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, until
such later time as the customer completed deposit of the customer’s funds at Gemini—
117. Gemini did not disclose and omitted that the information included trading by
customers who were offered special fee rebate incentives and “fee overrides” to preferred market
participants, including incentives designed to induce trading in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction.
118. Gemini did not disclose and omitted that the information included trading during
which Gemini had limited or ineffective preventions of self-trading or collusive trading, and that
119. Gemini did not disclose and omitted that the information included substantial
amounts of trading by certain Gemini customers who had generated millions of dollars of
bespoke fee rebates over a period of weeks essentially by large volumes of trading among
themselves.
* * *
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120. Gemini made, and caused to be made, such false or misleading statements and
omissions during the Relevant Period to Commission staff orally and in writing, by and through
121. Gemini personnel involved in the false or misleading statements and omissions
knew or reasonably should have known the statements and omissions to be false or misleading.
122. The information directly and indirectly conveyed by Gemini to Commission staff
123. Among other things, the information directly and indirectly conveyed by Gemini
to Commission staff concerning the Gemini Exchange, the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, and/or the
Bitcoin Futures Contract was relevant to the evaluation of whether the Bitcoin Futures Contract
complied with the core principles for contract markets set forth in the Act and Regulations, as
124. The false or misleading information directly and indirectly conveyed by Gemini
to Commission staff was relevant to and impeded the Commission’s oversight role. The false or
misleading statements and omissions prevented the Commission from having a complete and
true picture from which to evaluate whether, in what manner, under what conditions, and subject
to what changes the proposed Bitcoin Futures Contract should be allowed to be listed or continue
125. Paragraphs 1 through 124 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
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127. During the Relevant Period, as described above, Gemini personnel violated
7 U.S.C. § 9(2) by, among other things, making and causing to be made false or misleading
the rules of any registered entity, and omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make
A. Statements and omissions concerning the purported track record, function, and
prefunding requirement and the related cost of capital to trade on Gemini made
the Gemini Bitcoin Auction less susceptible to manipulation, while omitting the
extent to which Principal-1, Principal-2, and Gemini made their own funds
failing to disclose that Gemini customers could and did trade with themselves,
e.g., self-crossing, as well as could and did engage in collusive or wash trading;
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D. Statements and omissions concerning Gemini’s fee override and rebate program,
while omitting the extent to which Gemini offered bespoke rebates and other
trading on the Gemini Exchange and/or in the Gemini Bitcoin Auction, and the
number of participants therein, while omitting the extent to which the information
rebates, fee overrides and rebates; and trading with funds provided by Gemini,
128. Gemini personnel knew or reasonably should have known the statements and
129. The statements and omissions were material to the Commission’s evaluation of
130. Gemini personnel engaged in the acts, practices, or conduct described above
while acting within the scope of their agency, employment, and office at Gemini. Accordingly,
Gemini is liable pursuant to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B), and 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.2 (2021), as a principal for Gemini personnel’s acts, omissions, or failures in violation of
7 U.S.C. § 9(2).
132. Each act of making any false or misleading statement of a material fact to the
interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, or
omitting to state in any such statement any material fact that is necessary to make any statement
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of a material fact made not misleading in any material respect, if the person knew, or reasonably
should have known, the statement to be false or misleading, including but not limited to those
specifically alleged herein, is alleged as a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. § 9(2).
Section 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1, and pursuant to its own equitable powers, enter:
7 U.S.C. § 9(2);
entity associated with them Defendant, including but not limited to affiliates, agents, servants,
employees, assigns, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with Defendant,
ii. Trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is
iii. Entering into any transactions involving “commodity interests” (as that
term is defined in Regulation 1.3, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2021)), for its own
indirect interest;
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vi. Soliciting, receiving, or accepting any funds from any person for the
vii. Applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the
and/or
17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9));
C. An order requiring Defendant to pay civil monetary penalties of not more than the
civil monetary penalty prescribed by Section 6c(d)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1), as
adjusted for inflation pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act
Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–74, 129 Stat. 584, title VII, Section 701, see Regulation
143.8, 17 C.F.R. § 143.8 (2021), for each violation of the Act or Regulations, plus post-judgment
interest;
pursuant to such procedure as the Court may order, all benefits received including, but not
limited to, trading profits, revenues, salaries, commissions, fees, or loans derived directly or
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indirectly from acts or practices which constitute violations of the Act and Regulations, as
described herein, and pre- and post-judgment interest thereon from the date of such violations;
E. An order requiring Defendant and any successors thereof to pay costs and fees as
F. An order providing such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
* * *
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By:
David Oakland
Senior Trial Attorney
doakland@cftc.gov
Alejandra de Urioste
K. Brent Tomer
Chief Trial Attorneys
adeurioste@cftc.gov
ktomer@cftc.gov
Manal M. Sultan
Deputy Director
msultan@cftc.gov
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