Conflicts Report Outline
Conflicts Report Outline
Conflicts Report Outline
A. Provisions
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(10a)
2. Article 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are
considered either:
B. Cases
Facts: Co Quico was a sales agent of Asiatic Petroleum. He was later in default
for a certain sum, so he left for China without rendering account to Asiatic.
Asiatic sought to recover the unremitted sum, by filing a complaint which led to
the preliminary attachment of Co’s deposit with Mercantile Bank of China.
There were summons by publication, and Co was declared in default, with
judgment rendered against him. A writ of execution was issued, and levy was
made on the deposits, but this was unsatisfied because the same were
transferred to Co’s son. Co’s counsel then appeared to have the proceedings
nullified on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of Co.
This was granted.
FACTS:
Birdie Lillian Eye died on September 16, 1932 at Los Angeles, California, the
place of her alleged last residence and domicile. Among the properties she left
was her 1⁄2 conjugal shares of stock in the Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
an anonymous partnership, organized under the laws of the Philippines. She left
a will duly admitted to probate in California where her estate was administered
and settled. Wells Fargo was the duly appointed trustee. The Federal and
California State’s inheritance taxes due thereon have been duly paid. The
Collector of Internal Revenue in the Philippines, however, sought to subject the
shares of stock to inheritance tax, to which Wells Fargo objected.
ISSUE:
Whether the shares of stock are subject to Philippine inheritance tax
RULING:
Yes. Originally, the settled law in the United States is that intangibles have only
one situs for the purpose of inheritance tax, and such situs is in the domicile of
the decedent at the time of his or her death. But the rule has been relaxed.
The maxim “mobilia sequuntur personam” up which the rule rests, has been
decried as a mere fiction of law having its origin in considerations of general
convenience and public policy and cannot be applied to limit or control the right
of the state to tax properly within its jurisdiction and must yield to established
fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and cannot be
applied if to do so would result in inescapable and patent injustice.
This rests on either of two fundamental considerations:
1. (1) Upon the recognition of the inherent power of each government to
tax persons, properties and rights within its jurisdiction
and enjoying, thus, the protect of its laws; and
Herein, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled therein. Accordingly the jurisdiction of the
Philippine government to tax must be upheld.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Manila Court has authority over the assets involved
HELD:
No. Administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the
state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one
state or country has no power over property in another state or country. The
entire amount invested in a contract of annuity by virtue of which the
beneficiary receives a periodical sum during her lifetime, no longer forms part
of a decedent’s estate and is beyond the control of the probate court. It has
passed completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly
authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as simple
consideration for the company's assumed obligation, which it has been
religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the
proceeds of the sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the company,
except, upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the
remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of
Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these
funds beyond the amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the
contract for annuity.
RULE:
It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt
twice over.
FACTS:
Plaintiff sought review of the appellate court's decision denying the effect of a
Maryland judgment for plaintiff in plaintiff's action to recover a debt from
defendant owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff attached the debt owed by the garnishee to
defendant. Plaintiff personally served the garnishee, a non-resident of Maryland,
with notice of suit for the debt to be tried in Maryland. Defendant claimed that
the debt owed by the garnishee in North Carolina did not follow the garnishee
when the garnishee travelled to Maryland and that Maryland courts could not
gain jurisdiction over the garnishee. The United States Court of Appeals
reversed.
ISSUE:
Should plaintiff have the right to plead his payment under the Maryland
judgment?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
FACTS: The sale of shares of the capital stock of the Pampanga Sugar Mills
was negotiated, perfected, and consummated in San Francisco, California.
A. Extrinsic Validity
1. Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
left her stock and money to her three grandchildren, bearing the surname
Templeton, but all interest and dividends are to be given to her only daughter,
Mrs. Templeton, as well as her jewelry and personal effects for their support
until the youngest of his age.
Issue:
WON Jennie, at the time the will was made, was a citizen of California (so that
her will may be probated in accordance with California laws)?
Ruling:
B. Instrinsic Validity
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(10a)
2. Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the
latter shall prevail over the former. (1281)
Facts: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his
death. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing his Texas properties,
the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, the recognized
illegitimate children were not given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule
of Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under
Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Held:
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas
law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the
Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even
if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.
FACTS
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila
while temporarily residing with her sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix
made her last will and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and
void. The petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic
validity of a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.
RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case
of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.”
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent. (Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion
Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of
the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and
would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
C. Revocation
1. Article 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void. (737a)
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does
not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the
law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in
which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place
in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n)
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills;
or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other
person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents,
and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (n)
D. Probate
FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York,
USA.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Jose executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to
his wife “all the remainder” of his real and personal property at the time of his
death “wheresoever situated.” In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael Jr. as substitute executor.
In his will, Dr. Jose provided that should he and his wife die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of their
deaths, the presumption is that he died first.
Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own last will and testament, containing
the same provisions as that of her husband. Likewise, she provided that should
she and her husband died under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of their deaths, it should be presumed that he
died first.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Jr. as trustee and
substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate
thereof in the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. The wills
were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills
ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be
appointed as special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple
consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. She was granted
letters of special administration and posted bond in the amount of PHP
10,000.00. As special administratrix, Salud consolidated the assets of the
Cunanan spouses, including the bank deposits of Dr. Jose.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed and asked to be notified of the
proceedings as heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as heirs were
disputed by Salud, who said that they were only collaterals and not heirs as
“heirship is only by institution” under a will or by operation of the law of New
York. Since the will of Dr. Jose provided a presumption that he predeceased his
wife, his estate passed on to his wife, Dr. Evelyn. Salud, being the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn, thus inherited the estate of the Cunanan spouses.
The Cunanan heirs soon asked that the RTC proceedings be nullified and that
the appointment of Salud as special administratrix be set aside. They also asked
that Dr. Rafael Sr., brother of Dr. Jose, be appointed the regular administrator of
the estate of the deceased spouses. They alleged that the Cunanan heirs and
Salud had entered into an agreement in the United States “to settle and divide
equally the estates.”
RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the
appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of
petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special
administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. The
RTC Judge reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether
the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence
of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign
country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
Salud’s motion for reconsideration was granted. In another order, the RTC
Judge held that the documents presented did not establish the law of New York
on the procedure and allowance of wills but granted a motion to submit
additional evidence to prove the law of New York. However, the RTC Judge
ruled that the probate of two wills in a single proceeding is not procedural.
ISSUES:
RULING:
“Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines
if made with the formalities prescribed by law of the place in which he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.”
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the
will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court,
and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Except for the first and law requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax
the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on
allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be
interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the
wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such
view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which advise that the rules shall be “liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in
the delay in the administration of justice.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two will contains
essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability
are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As
this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation.
Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez
Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
“cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance” means that with regards to notices, the will probated abroad should
be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate
for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim
are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section
4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies of
the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, …”
FACTS:
In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died
in Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a
house in Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was
Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children. The second marriage was
with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner Silvino
Suntay.
Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While
the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was
claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November,
1929. The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing
thereof. After the pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have found among the records
of his father, a last will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed
by the deceased on January, 1931 and probated in the Amoy District Court. He
filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed
in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China on
November, 1931.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be
validly probated in the Philippines
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills
must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of the will in
China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no
proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court
of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to
the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not
purport to probate the will.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to
probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been
done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot
be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
3. Administration of Estates
Assuming that a contrariety exists between the provision of the laws and the
command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.