174.5 People v. Acharon, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021

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CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL G.R. No. 224946

ACHARON,
Petitioner, Present:
GESMUNDO, CJ,
- versus - PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
PEOPLE OF THE HERNANDO,
PHILIPPINES, CARANDANG,
Respondent. LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J., and
DIMAAMP AO, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 9, 2021
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\.:..:..:.;/- - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45

assailing the Decision2 dated February 17, 2016 and Resolution3 dated May
31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36913 affirming
the Decision4 dated August 26, 2014 of Branch 270, Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 34-V-13, which convicted
Rollo, pp. 11-28.

2 Id. at 33-42. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
(retired Member of the Court) and Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio concurring.
Id. at 44-45.
4
Id. at 62-69. Penned by Presiding Judge Evangeline M. Francisco.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 224946
petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon (Christian) for violation of Section 5(i)

of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act (VAWC Law).
Facts
An Information was filed against Christian, the accusatory portion of

which states:
That sometime in (sic) January 25, 2012, up to the present, in

Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying financial support to the said
complainant. 5
Christian pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial and trial then
ensued. The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the RTC, is as
follows:
[AAA] 6 testified that she and [Christian] have been sweethearts for
six (6) years before they got married on September 30, 2011, in a civil
wedding officiated by Mayor Gatchalian. On October 6, 2011 or only six
(6) days after their wedding, [Chiistian] left to work at Pizza Hut, Brunei as
delivery rider. As placement fee, they borrowed the amount of P85,000.00
with 3% monthly interest from their godmother, Emelina So. She and
[Christian] agreed that the latter would send money in the amount of
Php9,633.00 per month in payment of their loan. However, [Christian] did
not send money on a regular basis. All in all, he was able to send money in
the total amount of Php71,500.00 only, leaving the balance in the amount
of Php13,500.00. For which reason, she felt so embarrassed with Emelina
So because she could not pay the balance. She even pleaded to So not to
lodge a complaint to the barangay. Emelina So communicated to the
employer of [Christian] in Brunei about their debt to her.
Moreover, while in Brunei, [Christian] maintained a paramour in the

person ofMelete Domalaon. The manager of [Chiistian] and his board mate,
Jovelyn Pastrano disclosed to her the indiscretions of [Christian]. [AAA]
identified the photographs marked as Exhibits "C" to "C-5" depicting
[Christian] and his alleged paramour. This brought her so much anguish.
The womanizing activity of [Christian] extremely hurt her feelings and
caused her depression. The message of [Christim1] that he no longer cares
for her since they are childless destroyed her whole being. [AAA] identified
[Christian] in open court and her sworn statement (Exhibit "A") she
executed in connection with this case.
On cross, she stated that when [Christian] left in December 2011,

she [was] jobless. Presently, she is gainfully employed. She lost
communication with [Christian] since January 2012. According to the
5
Id. at 34.
6 The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish
or compromise her identity, as welI as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not
be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People
v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated
September 5, 2017.
employer and friends of[Christian], the latter is living with his paramour in
Brunei. She filed this case because she was extremely hurt and she
experienced emotional agony by the neglect and utter insensitivity that
[Christian] made her endure and suffer. 7
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as likewise summarized

by the RTC, is as follows:
Christian Acharon vehemently denied the accusations against him.

According to h.im, his original stay in Brunei was two (2) years and three
(3) months. However, when he left on October 6, 2011, he was able to come
back to the Philippines only in February 2014. He had to extend his stay in
Brunei to bring some money to his family. While he was in Brunei, his
rented place was razed by fire and he met a vehicular accident which
required him to spend [a significant] sum of money. He and [AAA] had an
on and off communication from October 2011 until April 2013. [AAA]
demanded for him to pay their debt in the entire amount.
He used to send money to [AAA]. But it was the latter who told him
not to send money anymore. He also claimed that he was able to send the
total amount of Php71,000.00 to [AAA] in payment of their loan. He agreed
that the same is not enough to fully pay their loan in the total amount of
Php85,000.00. In their exchange of messages [on] Facebook, he and [AAA]
were talking about their debt, his alleged womanizing, and their separation.
On cross, he testified that [when he met a minor motor accident, he

managed] to go back to the office. He confinned that [medical expenses are
included in his Employment Contract in Brunei] (Exhibit "I"). He told the
court that when he arrived in Brunei, he was made to sign another contract
which has lower basic salary and big amounts were deducted from it. When
he met [the accident] he paid for his medicines because it would take [a]
long period of time to process and claim it to their office. For a year, he
estimated that he spent about $1,000.00 for medical expenses only. He
affirmed that he was the one who encourage[d] [AAA] to look for another
man (Exhibit "J"). Jovelyn Ranoso Pastrana is her former friend. It is not
true that he was staying in his girlfriend's house while he was in Brunei. 8
Ruling Of The RTC
In its Decision9 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC convicted Christian,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, ACCUSED
CHRISTIAN A CHARON y PANTONIAL is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty ofimprisomnent with a term of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one day of prision correccional [as minimum,] to six ( 6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor [as maximum] of his indeterminate sentence and a
FINE of One Hundred (sic) Pesos (Pl 00,000.00). The accused is further
sentenced to undergo mandatory psychological counseling under the
7
Rollo, pp. 64-65.
Id. at 65-66.
9
Id. at 62-69.
supervision of any government accredited clinical psychologist/psychiatrist

and shall immediately report to court his compliance thereto. 10
The reasons advanced by the RTC for adjudging Christian guilty were
his failure to maintain an open communication with his wife, his having a
paramour while he was in Brunei, and his neglect of his legal obligation to
extend financial suppmi. 11
Aggrieved, Christian filed an appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 12 dated February 17, 2016, the CA denied Christian's

appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA held that the refusal to give
financial support constitutes violence against women. According to the CA,
Christian's failure to provide financial suppmi, especially for the payment of
the loan they used to send him to Brunei, constitutes economic abuse. Thus,
the CA upheld his conviction.
Christian then filed this present appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in finding Christian guilty of causmg

psychological or emotional anguish when he allegedly failed to: (1)
financially support AAA; and (2) keep the communication lines open with the
latter. 13
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the appeal. Christian is, as he should be, acquitted of
the charge.
The present case is limited only to

Christian's alleged lack of
financial support
At the outset, it must be emphasized that Christian's criminal liability

should be adjudged only on the basis of his alleged failure to give financial
support to his wife as this is the only allegation contained in the Information.
"No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person
accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him." 14 The purpose of the law in having a right to be
infonned "is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, as he is
10
Id. at 69.
11
Id. at 67.
12 Supra note 2.
13
Id. at 17.
14 Canceran v. People, 762 Phil. 558, 566 (2015).
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the

offense." 15 By virtue of this right, "an accused cannot be convicted ofa crime,
even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him." 16
In this case, the Information filed against Christian only alleged that he
"did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to his wife AAA, by
denying financial support to the said complainant." 17
It was error, therefore, for the RTC to have allowed the introduction of
evidence tending to establish, for instance, that Christian had a paramour
when he was in Brunei as this is an irrelevant issue in this case in light of its
absence in the Information. Needless to say, the RTC further erred in
appreciating these pieces of evidence in establishing his guilt.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court now proceeds to determine

whether Christian is indeed guilty of violating R.A. 9262 by denying financial
support to AAA.
Mere failure or an inability to

provide financial support is not
punishable by R.A. 9262
Christian was charged, and later on convicted by the RTC and the CA,
under an Information that alleges a violation of Section 5(i) ofR.A. 9262, as
the Information accused him of "caus[ing] mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying financial support."
Section 5(i) considers as "violence against women" those acts "[c]ausing
mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of
access to the woman's child/children." 18 In Dinamling v. People, 19 the Court
laid down the elements to prove a violation of Section 5(i):
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a
woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they m&y be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the fan1ily abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woma11 and/or child mental or emotional
anguish; and
(4) The a11guish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of fina11cial support or
15 People v. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 20 I 9, 912 SCRA 271, 3 I 0-311.
16 Canceran v. People, supra note 14, at 568.
17 Rollo, p. 34. Emphasis supplied.
18 Emphasis supplied.
19 76 I Phil. 356(2015).
custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts

or omissions. 20
Not all of the foregoing elements, however, are present in this case.
Specifically, the fourth element was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
It is well-settled t.1-iat "criminal and penal statutes must be strictly

construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment,
implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words, the language
cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to
carry into effect the general purpose for which the statute was enacted." 21
The Court stresses that Section 5(i) ofR.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial
of financial support" in defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined
as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire"22 or "the act of not allowing someone
to do or have something." 23 The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or
an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to have or do
something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure," defined as "the
fact of not doing something [one] should have done," 24 which in turn connotes
passivity. From the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by
Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature - there must be a concurrence
between intent, freedom, and intelligence, 25 in order to consmnmate the crime.
In this connection, the Court deems it proper to clarify, as Associate

Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Mario V. Lopez pointed out in their
respective Opinions that the crimes penalized under Sections 5(i) and 5(e) of
R.A. 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita, even though R.A. 9262 is a
special penal law. 26 The acts punished therein are inherently wrong or
depraved, 27 and the language used un.der the said penal law requires a mental
element. 28 Being a crime mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of both
actus reus and mens rea to constitute the crime. "Actus reus pertains to the
external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens
rea refers to the accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent
accompanying the actus reus." 29
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or

emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally
due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) ofR.A. 9262,
20 Id. at 373.
21 People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651, 656 (I 950). Emphasis supplied.
22 "Denial," MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, accessed at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
denial>.
23 "Denial," CAMllRIDGE DICTIONARY, accessed at <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english
/denial>.
24 "Failure," CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, accessed at <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english
/failure>.
25 See Guevarra v. Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 476, 481.
26 Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier, p. 2; Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate
Justice M. Lopez, p. 2.
27 Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice M. Lopez, p. 2.
28 Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier, p. 3.
29 Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice M. Lopez, p. 3.
insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be

evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld
financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental
or emotional anguish upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense
under Section 5(i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea
is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both
must thus exist and be proven in court before a person may be convicted of
violating Section 5(i) ofR.A. 9262.
"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of

psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and
children." 30 In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological
violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" 31 with denial of financial
support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by
Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused
had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman,
thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial
of financial support being the means selected by the accused to
accomplish said purpose.
This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial
support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i),
even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other
words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to
the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to
so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary
interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright
unconstitutional, consequences.
To be sure, under the Family Code, the obligation to support is imposed

mutually upon the spouses. 32 In other words, both the husband and the wife
have the obligation to give support to each other. However, even as the law
imposes the obligation to support mutually upon the spouses, the failure of the
wife to financially support the husband only results in civil liability, whereas
if it is the husband who fails to provide financial support to the wife, this will
result not only in civil liabilitv, but also criminal liability under Section 5(i)
of R.A. 9262. Surely, this cannot be the case, as the law recognizes no
30 DinamlinJ; v. People, supra note 19, at 375.

31
Id. at 376.
32 ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family.
ARTICLE 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (Underscoring
supplied)
substantial distinction between the husband and the wife as regards their
responsibility to provide financial support to each other and the family.
It is also worth emphasizing that the obligation to give support is

measured "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 33 - which
also implies that it may depend on who is earning for the family. As well, the
amount of support "shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient." 34 As previously stated, therefore,
the prosecution must first establish that there is an amount of support legally
due the woman, and that the partner willfully denied the same to her to cause
mental or emotional anguish, before a conviction under Section 5(i) of R.A.
9262 may be had.
The elements of a violation of Section 5(i), insofar as it deals with

denial of financial support, are therefore:
(2)The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender,

or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children,
they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;
(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies

the woman and/or her child or children financial support that
is legally due her and/or her child or children; and
(4)The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children

the financial support for the purpose of causing the woman
and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.
Applying the foregoing discussion to the facts of the present case, the
Court finds that Christian is not guilty of violating Section 5(i) ofR.A. 9262
for the failure of the prosecution to establish the third and fourth elements of
the crime. The Court finds him innocent, for there is undenied evidence that
Christian tried, as he successfully did for a time, to provide financial support.
He testified under oath that he failed to continue providing support only when
his apartment in Brunei was razed by fire, and when he met a vehicular
accident there. There is also no dispute that he had already paid f'71,000.00
out of the f'85,000.000 of the debt that the spouses - not the husband alone
- were obligated to pay from their community property.
While Christian eventually failed to continue providing financial

support, this, however, is not enough to support a conviction under Section
,., FAMILY CODE, Art. 194.

34
FAMILY CODE, Art. 20 I.
5(i) ofR.A. 9262. Again, to be convicted under Section 5(i), the evidence
must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to
cause the victim mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or
humiliation through the denial of - not the mere failure or inability to
provide - financial support, which thereby resulted into psychological
violence. As the prosecution failed to establish that fact, i.e., willful refusal to
provide financial support, then Christian cannot be held guilty of violating
Section 5(i) ofR.A. 9262.
Neither could Christian be held

guilty of violating Section S(e)
The Court is aware that cases involving denial of financial support

typically involve Informations charging a person with a violation of either
Section 5( e) or Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. This is so because Section 5(e) of
R.A. 9262 punishes the acts of:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - xx x
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage in,
or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other hann or threat of
physical or other hann, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited
to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually

depriving the woman or her child of
custody or access to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity or controlling the
victim's own money or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or
common money, or properties[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, the Court has previously held that a person charged for violation
of Section 5(i) may, in the alternative, be convicted instead for violating
Section 5(e) by applying the variance doctrine.
In Melgar v. People35 (Melgar), the Court explained that the variance

doctrine may be applied because the only difference between Section 5(e) and
Section 5(i) is the element of psychological violence. In particular, the Court,
in Melgar, said that deprivation of financial support, by itself, is already
sufficient to obtain a conviction under Section 5(e), while psychological
distress brought by the deprivation of financial support is an essential element
in order for an accused to be punished under Section 5(i). In other words, the
Court held, in Melgar, that Section 5(i), insofar as it punishes deprivation of
financial support, has the same elements as Section 5(e), but with one added
element - the element of psychological violence:
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes

the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's
child/children." Notably, "[p ]sychological violence is an element of
violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts.
And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party."
Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's
denial thereof- which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse
- further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim
and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar

indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to
show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or
emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into
consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an
accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included
in the crime charged - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial
a/support, by itself and even without the additional element of
psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein. 36
The above ruling in Melgar was affirmed subsequently in the case of

Reyes v. People 37 (Reyes) where the Court, despite affirming the Court's
conviction under Section 5(i), still made an obiter dictum and said:
35
826 Phil. I 77 (2018).
36
Id. at 186-187. Emphasis, underscoring, and italics supplied.
37
G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019, 907 SCRA 479.
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly

indicted, Reyes can also be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2
for having committed economic abuse against AAA. Section 5 ( e), par. 2
identifies the act or acts that constitute the violence of economic abuse, xx
X [.]
xxxx
Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section 5 (e) ofR.A. No.

9262 attaches when the accused deprives the woman of financial support
which she is legally entitled to. Deprivation or denial of support, by itself,
is already specifically penalized therein. 38
Thus, Sections 5(e) and 5(i), under current jurisprudence, ultimately

punish the same act, i.e., the denial or deprivation of financial support by the
husband or the father of the children. And, as already stated, under present
jurisprudence, denial of financial support, by itself, is already sufficient to
make a person liable for a violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.
It is thus relevant for the Court to now determine whether, like the
accused in Melgar, Christian may be held liable for a violation of Section 5(e)
of R.A. 9262 even if the Information filed was for violation of Section 5(i).
To this point, the Court finds that Christian cannot likewise be held guilty of
violating Section 5(e).
The current judicial interpretation that denial of financial support, by

itself, is enough to convict under Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262 is not supported
by the letter of the law. To state once more, Section 5(e), R.A. 9262 punishes:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -

XXX
xxxx

threat of force, physical or other hann or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited

depriving the woman or her child of
woman or her children of fmancial
38 Id. at 494-495.
Decision i2 G.R. No. 224946
support legally due her or her family,

or deliberately providing the woman's
common money, or properties[.]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The language of Section 5(e) above is clear: the denial of financial

support, to be punishable, must have the "purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's xx x movement or conduct." To be sure, Section 5(e)
uses the word "deprive" 39 which, like the use of the word "denial" in Section
5(i), connotes willfulness and intention. The denial or deprivation of financial
support under Section 5(e) is, therefore, an intentional act that has, for its
purpose, to control or restrict the woman's movement or conduct. The willful
deprivation of financial support, therefore, is the actus reus of the offense,
while the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman's conduct.
Thus, similar to the discussion in Section 5(i), Section 5(e) cannot be read as
punishing the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support,
which is what happened in this case.
In this connection, the Court sees it fit to use this opportunity to clarify,
for the guidance of the bench and the Bar, the applicability of Section 5(e) of
R.A. 9262.
It is a well-established principle that every part of the statute must be

interpreted with reference to the context. 40 Section 5 (e), if read and understood
in its entirety, punishes acts, or the employment of machinations, that have
the effect of either (1) compelling a woman and/or her child or children to do
something unwillingly or (2) preventing her and/or her child or children from
doing something which is within her or her child's or her children's right/s to
do. Absent this element, the failure to provide financial support will entail
only civil, not criminal, responsibility.
A reading ofR.A. 9262 in its entirety bolsters the foregoing reading of

Section 5(e).
In an attempt to protect women from the different kinds of violence

they experience or to which they are vulnerable to while being in an intimate
relationship, R.A. 9262 provided an encompassing definition of "violence
against women." This definition is found in Section 3(a) ofR.A. 9262, which
provides:
39
Defined as "an act or instance of withholding or taking something away from someone or something."
See "Deprivation," MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, accessed at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/deprivation>_
4
° Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., G.R. No. 154674, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 773, 786.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a)

"Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or

physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in

nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of

lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of
the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent
shows or forcing the woman or her child
to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the

victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm
or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or her child.
C. "Poychological violence" refers to acts or om1ss10ns

causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering
of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any fonn or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of
the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt

to make a woman :financiallv dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or

preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects
on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of

financial resources and the right to the
use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or

properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,

however, Section 3(a) and its four subsections above only provide for a
comprehensive definition of violence against women and children. 41 Section
3(a) does not provide the specific punishable acts under R.A. 9262. Instead,
the specific acts that are criminalized by the law are enumerated under Section
5 ofR.A. 9262, which states:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their

Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical

harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical

harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent

physical hmm;

threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woma,'1 or child. This shall include, but not limited
41 Separate Concmring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe, p. 8.



depriving the . woman or her child of

woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's


common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on

oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child

to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitnte rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm,
or through intimidation directed against the woman or
her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,

personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her

child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering

outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or

on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his v.ill;
(4) Destroying the property and personal

belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or

violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule

or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or denial of access to the woman's
child/children. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of Section 5 reveals that it is meant to specify the

punishable acts based upon the classifications of violence against women
already identified and defined under Section 3(a). While there is no one-to-one
correspondence between the classifications of violence against women under
Section 3(a), on the one hand, and the specific punishable acts under Section
5, on the other, it can still be reasonably gleaned that the punishable acts spring
from the multifaceted definition of violence against women which the law
aims to protect women from. For example, Sections 5(a) to 5(d) appear to
protect women and their children from physical violence; Sections 5(f), 5(h)
and 5(i) from psychological violence; and Section 5(g) from physical and
sexual violence. Meanwhile, Section 5(e), as previously discussed, protects
the woman from acts of violence that are committed for the purpose of
attempting to control her conduct or actions, or make her lose her agency, with
most of the enumerated examples of acts having a connection with the use of
finances as the primary mode of controlling the woman. Thus, Section 5(e)
could be viewed as protecting the woman from economic abuse, as defined in
Section 3(a), in some cases.
To recall, when Section 5(e) describes the act of "(2) Depriving or

threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support" 42 as an act of violence against women and
children, it does so in the context of having "the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the w01nan's or her child's movement or conduct."43
Such control. or restriction of movement through the use of finances may, in
some cases, rise to the level of "economic abuse" as defined in Section 3( a),
as it is the financial dependence which normally allows women's partners to
exercise control over the woman's actions and decisions.
Thus, situations of economic abuse - making the woman financially

dependent upon her partner - if prosecuted, would also likely fall under
Section 5(e). Just to provide concrete examples, the National Coalition
· Against Domestic Violence (NCADV), a non-profit organization based in the
United States of America to improve legislation dealing with domestic
violence, explains that:
[b]y controlling and limiting the victim's access to financial resources, a

batterer ensures that the victim will be financially limited if he/she chooses
to leave the relationship. As a result, victims of domestic violence are often
42
Emphasis supplied.
43
See R.A. 9262. Sec. 5(e).
forced to .choose between staying in an abusive relationship or facing

economic hardship and possibly extreme poverty and homelessness. 44
The NCADV enumerates the different types of economic abuse as

follows:
1. Interfering with the victim's work perfonnance through

harassing activities, such as frequent phone calls or
unannounced visits;
2. Denying the victim access to money or the means of

obtaining it, to the point that he/she is entirely dependent
on the abuser for food, clothing and shelter;
3. Refusing to allow the victim to work or attend school, or

engaging in activities that make it impossible for the
victim to do so;
4. Intentionally withholding necessities such as food,

clothing, shelter, personal hygiene products, or
medication;
5. Stealing from the victim, defrauding their money or assets,

and/or exploiting the victim's financial resources or
property for personal gain;
6. Requiring justification for any money spent and punishing

the victim with physical, sexual or emotional abuse;
7. Stealing or destroying the victim's personal belongings;
8. Forbidding a victim from maintaining a personal bank

account;
9. Threatening to out an LGBTQ victim in their workplace;
10. Refusing to pay the victim court-ordered child or spousal

support; or
11. Forcing their v1ct1m to obtain credit, then rummg the

victim's credit rating or future ability to obtain credit. 45
Similar to the foregoing, the Battered Women's Support Services,

another non-profit organization in the United States, also enumerates the
various ways by which women are economically abused:
44 See Economic Abuse Fact Sheet, NCADV, accessed at <http://www.mmgconnect.com/projects/userfiles/

file/dcestop _ now /ncadv__economic_abuse_fact_sheet. pdf >.
45 Id.
1. Controlling paychecks and bank accounts;
2. Stealing from her;
3. Preventing the woman from accessing transportation;
4. Determining how money is spent;
5. Deciding where the woman will work;
6. Preventing the woman from working through isolation

tactics;
7. Outright forbidding the woman to work;
8. Forcing the woman to work in family business with little

or no pay;
9. Forcing the woman to become pregnant;
10. Preventing the woman from accessing child care;
11. Harassing the woman at her workplace to the extent that

the job is lost;
12. Controlling property decisions;
13. Destroying the woman's credit rating by usmg credit

cards, lines of credit, without permission or filing all
financial contracts (lease, credit cards, utilities, etc.) in the
woman's name and failing to make payments on time or
at all;
14. Forcing women to tum over government benefit payments

including child tax benefits;
15. Using his income for his individual interests while her
income is used to maintain the family collective interests;
16. "Giving" her all the "control" of the financial decision for
the family then criticizing her decisions and/or having
unrealistic understanding of what things cost;
17. Forbidding her to attend school or upgrading programs. 46
46 See Angela Marie MacDougall, Economic Abuse and Violence Against Women - How Battered
Women's Support Services Take Action, BATTERED WOMEN'S SUPPORT SERVICES, accessed at
<https://www.bwss.org/economic-abuse-and-violence-against-women-how-battered-womens-support-
services-takes-action/>.
These examples are referenced not to provide an exhaustive list of acts

that constitute economic abuse, but to highlight that there are different
possible scenarios in which control of the woman is obtained through
finances. As well, the foregoing examples are used to impress that mere failure
to pay financial support does not constitute economic abuse contemplated by
R.A. 9262.
The Court sees the need to clarify, however, that for purposes of
determining the required specific intent to constitute a violation ofR.A. 9262,
it is the letter of Section 5 which governs. 47 Section 3(a) just provides the
context- the various kinds of violence that women in intimate relationships
are vulnerable to - in order to provide a full picture of what the punishable
acts under Section 5 seeks to protect women from.
In sum, this is, therefore, the proper understanding of Section 5(e) of

R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with the deprivation, or threat of deprivation, of
financial support: There must be allegation and proof that the act was done
with the intent to control or restrict the woman's and/or her child's or her
children's actions or decisions, consistent with the letter of Section 5(e) itself.
It is this element of specific intent to control or restrict the woman's

and/or her child's or her children's actions or decisions which is the defining
characteristic that makes the act of "deprivation of financial support" under
Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262 criminally punishable. It is what elevates or
qualifies the act of"deprivation of financial support" from one in which only
civil liability may arise to an act that incurs criminal liability under Section
5(e) of R.A. 9262. As previously discussed, a contrary interpretation to the
foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional,
consequences as the law imposes the obligation to support mutually upon the
spouses.
In fine, and to reiterate, for deprivation of financial support to rise to a

level that would make a person criminally liable under Section 5(e), R.A.
9262, there must be allegation and proof that it was made with the intent to
control or restrict the woman's and/or her child's or her children's actions.
The elements of a violation of Section 5( e) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it

deals with deprivation of financial support, are therefore:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or

children;
(2) The woman 1s either the wife or former wife of the

offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with
whom such offender has a common child. As for the
47
See Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe, p. I 0.
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or

illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender either (a) deprived or (b) threatened to

deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or (c) deliberately provided
the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(4) The offender committed any or all of the acts under the
third element for the purpose of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct.
Applying the foregoing to this case, the Court holds that Christian is
also not guilty of violating Section 5(e) ofR.A. 9262 due to the absence of the
third and fourth elements. There is no proof that he deliberately refused to
give support in order to control the behavior or actions of AAA. Neither was
there any allegation or proof that he prevented AAA from seeking gainful
employment or pursuing economic opportunities. The evidence in this case
simply established that he failed or was unable to provide :financial support
which, as discussed, is not enough to convict under the law.
Conclusion
From the above discussions, the Court clarifies that it now hereby
abandons Melgar and Reyes insofar as they hold that a person charged with a
violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 may be convicted of violating Section
5(e) by applying the variance doctrine. Based on the discussions in this
Decision, the portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) that deal with denial or
deprivation of financial support punish different things. Section 5(e) punishes
the deprivation of financial support for the purpose of controlling the woman
or to make her and/or her child or children lose their agency. Section 5(i), on
the other hand, punishes the will:fol infliction of mental or emotional
anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation upon the woman and/or her child
or children by denying her and/or her child or children :financial support that
is legally due her and/or her child or children. Thus, while the portions of
Sections 5( e) and 5(i) that deal with denial or deprivation of :financial support
may seem similar at first glance, they, in reality, deal with different matters
and penalize distinct acts. As the Court comes to the realization that the said
sections punish different things, the Court, therefore, abandons Melgar and
Reyes to the extent that they hold that the variance doctrine may be applied
for Sections 5(e) and 5(i) ofR.A. 9262.
Finally, the Court clarifies that in either case, whether the accused is
prosecuted under Section 5(e) or Section S(i), the mere failure to provide
:financial support is not enough. In other words, neither Section 5(e) nor 5(i)
can be construed to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is
sufficient for a conviction. Those entitled to support and are not given any
have the remedy of filing a civil case for support against the delinquent person,
consistent with the provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code. In order
to be liable under the penal provisions ofR.A. 9262, therefore, it is necessary

to allege and prove the existence of the facts that qualify the act of denial or
deprivation of financial support from one in which mere civil liability may
arise to one where a person may be criminally liable.
The Court sees the need for this clarification, as R.A. 9262 was not
meant to make the partners of women criminals just because they fail or are
unable to financially provide for them. Certainly, courts cannot send
individuals to jail because of their mere inability - without malice or evil
intention - to provide for their respective families. In a developing country
like ours, where poverty and unemployment are especially rampant, courts
would inevitably find themselves incarcerating countless people, mostly
fathers, should the interpretation be that mere failure or inability to provide
financial support is enough to convict under Sections 5(e) and 5(i). As
Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda put it simply during the deliberations of
this case, "poverty is not a crime xx x [and] the failure or inability to provide
support, without more, should not be the cause of a man's incarceration."
Also, while R.A. 9262 was indeed enacted to protect women, it was not
meant to discount women's ability to provide for themselves, especially when
they are able-bodied. As Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen explained
in his Concurring Opinion:
Nevertheless, it is improper to think that women are always victims.

This will only reinforce their already disadvantaged position. The
perspective portraying women as victims with a heritage of victimization
results in the unintended consequence of permanently perceiving all women
as weak. To consider women as the weaker sex is discriminatory. In
safeguarding the interests of a discriminated class, we must be careful not
to perpetuate the very prejudices and biases that encourage discrimination
of the members of the class.
There is now more space to believe that portraying only women as

victims will not always promote gender equality before the law. It sometime
aggravates the gap by conceding that women have always been dominated
by men.
xxxx
No less than the Constitution mandates the State to recognize the

role of women in nation building. This role is not confined to child-rearing,
honorable as motherhood may be. It is entirely possible that the woman in
the sexual or dating relationship is more financially capable than the man.
Consistent with the spouses' mutual obligation to provide support under the
Family Code, the duty to provide financial suppmi should not fall on the
man alone. His mere failure or inability to provide financial support should
not be penalized as a crime, especially when the woman is more financially
capable. 48
Given the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court
herein proclaims the innocence of Christian from the charge.
48
Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Leonen, pp. 2-3.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on

Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 17, 2016 and
Resolution dated May 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
36913 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner
Christian Pantonial Acharon is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Let an
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
./4r"~. . .. 1 ' ~
ALll}X~~JgR G. GESMUNDO
,/ v Chief Justice
~& jJJ- ~{'/-Ali, (!JJw<AN'-1

l!Jt1,wJl'f'
AA f2 f ,1,1 ..(/
ESTELA M.P$f,AS-BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
SAMUE~N
Associate Justice
JHOSE~OPEZ RB. DI
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Arn
A v ~ ~ G. ~ESMUNDO
r. t/ t'chief Justice
ENBA1VC
G.R. No. 224946 - XXX, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
Promulgated:
November 9, 2021
x--------------------------------------------------~~ ---x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur in the result to acquit petitioner XXX (petitioner) of violation of

Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262, 1 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." As aptly observed by
the ponencia, the prosecution failed to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that
petitioner's failure to provide financial support to his wife, AAA, was made with the
specific intent of causing the latter mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule,
or humiliation. Rather, it was shown that his failure to do so was due to justifiable
reasons, i.e., his apartment in Brunei was razed by fire and he met a vehicular
accident, which incidents required him to spend a significant amount of money.
Moreover, it was also shown that despite petitioner's failure to remit the full amount
of P85,000.00 with three percent (3%) monthly interest, he was able to send to his
wife a total of P71,000.00 as payment for their loan.
Likewise, I concur in the ponencia's proposal to abandon the rulings in

Melgar v. People2 (Melgar) and Reyes v. People3 (Reyes) wherein it was held that a
person charged with violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 may also be convicted of
violation of Section 5 (e) of the same law pursuant to the variance doctrine. These
provisions have different elements since on the one hand, a violation of Section 5 (i)
is premised on the accused's specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, while a violation of Section
5 (e) is premised on the specific intent to control or restrict the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide for the rule on variance:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof~

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
Entitled "AN Acr DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;" approved on March
8, 2004.
2
826 Phil. 177 (20 J 8).
See G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019.
j
Separate Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. No. 224496
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. -An offense

charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the fonner, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.
As earlier intimated, it cannot be said that a violation of Section 5 (i) of RA

9262 includes or is necessarily included in a violation of Section 5 (e) of the same
law because the specific intent required to be proven in the two (2) violations are
fundamentally different from each other. As such, the accused cannot be charged
under Section 5 (i) and eventually be convicted under Section 5 (e), or vice-versa.
Nonetheless, I take this opportunity to elaborate on the proper treatment of

acts constituting "violence against women and their children." As will be discussed
below, for doctrinal accuracy, the types of violence stated in the subsections of
Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 should not be treated as means/punishable offenses, but
rather, as resulting effect/s of the acts committed by the accused under Section 5 of
RA 9262. Further, considering the multi-faceted nature of a case of violence against
women and their children, it is possible that several types of violence under Section
3 (a) may be experienced by the woman or her child as a result of an act punished
under Section 5. Hence, one type of violence under Section 3 (a) is not restrictively
associated to a Section 5 offense, and thus negates any exclusive correspondence.
Ultimately, the types of violence are enumerated in the law if only to provide for a
comprehensive definition of violence in light of RA 9262's animating policy to
ensure full protection to abused women and their children.
I.
Violence against women, otherwise known as "intimate partner violence," is

a significant problem recognized on a global scale. 4 As defined by relevant literature,
"intimate partner violence" is "any act of physical, sexual, psychological or
economic violence that occurs between former or current spouses or partners,
whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the
victim." 5 Ordinarily, four main types of "intimate partner violence" are identified,
to wit: (a) physical violence, or the intentional use of physical force with the
potential for causing death, disability, injury, or harm; (b) sexual violence, which
includes rape, as well as unwanted sexual contact and experiences; (c) stalking, or
the pattern of repeated, unwanted, attention and contact that causes fear or concern
for one's own safety or the safety of someone else, such as a family member or
friend; and (d) psychological aggression, or the use of verbal and non-verbal
4
See <https://www.who.int/health-topics/violence-against-women#taba:tab l> (November 9, 2021).
See "The psychological subtype of intimate partner violenee and its effeet on mental health: protocol for a
systematic review and meta-analysis," Sarah Dokkedahl, Robin Niels Kok, Siobhan Murphy, et al.
<https://systematicreviewsioumal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10. l l 86/s 13643-019-1118-1> (last accessed
November 9, 2021 ), citing "Glossary of definitions of rape, fernicide and intimate partner violence," the European
Institute for Gender Equality, p. 44.
communication with the intent to harm another person mentally or emotionally,
and/or to exert control over another person. 6
In our jurisdiction, RA 9262, or the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their

Children Act of 2004," was passed in order to address the prevalence of violence
against women and children committed by their intimate partners. 7 This law, enacted
"in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child[,] and other inte111ational human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party," 8 explicitly "recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members[,] particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security." 9
Under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262, "violence against women and their

children" is defined as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." The same
provision further contains subsections which provide for the types of "violence
against women and their children," namely, physical, sexual, and psychological
violence and economic abuse. Notably, despite its four subsections on the types of
violence, Section 3 (a) recognizes that these are not exclusive as evinced by the
phrase "it includes, but is not limited to, the following x x x." For reference,
Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:
Section 3. De_finition a/Terms. -As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against
women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, fonner wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
c01mnon child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed

against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her

child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him
to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
6
See https://www.atrainceu.com/content/3-types-intimate-partner-violence (last accessed November 9, 202 I).
7
https://pcw.gov.ph/vaw-faqs/ (last accessed November 9, 2021 ).
Section 2, RA 9262.
9
Id.
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual

activity by force, threat of force, physical or other hann or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or her child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to

cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography
in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial suppo1i or preventing the victim from engaging

in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the 1ight to

the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.
xxxx
As worded, the term "violence against women and their children" is

characterized under Section 3 (a) as "an act or a series of acts"; similarly, the listed
four types of violence against women and their children are referred to as "acts."
The subsections of Section 3 (a), in fact, further enumerate specific instances that
would fall under a particular violence type. Thus, a literal reading of these provisions
would lead one to believe that these types of violence are punishable offenses
constitutive of the crime violence against women and their children.
However, Section 5 of the same law list downs certain punishable acts which
are explicitly classified as "the crime of violence against women and their
children":
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The

crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any
of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical hann to the woman or her child;

Separate ConcmTing Opinion 5 G.R. No. 224496
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage

in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom
of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm
or threat of physical or other han11, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child

of custody or access to her/his fan1ily;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of

financial support legally due her or her fan1ily, or deliberately providing
the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal

right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,

occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's ow11 money
or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the

purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force,
physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or

through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:
(I) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private

places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the

woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the

woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm

to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any fonn of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to

the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
Given the phraseology of these separate provisions in the same law, confusion
arises as to what RA 9262 deems as the punishable offense and related thereto, the
specific criminal intent that must be proven. As earlier intimated, the language of
Section 3 (a) and its subsections creates an impression that what RA 9262
criminalizes is the type of violence, i.e., physical, sexual, and psychological violence
and economic abuse. In fact, in some earlier cases, 10 the Court has held that the type
of violence under Section 3 (a) is the means employed by the perpetrator and that it
is the violence under the circumstances in RA 9262 that the law seeks to outlaw. In
my view, this perception that the types of violence are the means of commission is
not completely accurate. Rather, as will be expounded below, the types of violence
should be deemed as the resulting effect/s to the victim, while the acts enumerated
under Section 5 of the same law should be considered as the punishable offenses
themselves.
II.
A meticulous scrutiny of the entire law would show that while RA 9262
mentions the different types ofvioience against the woman and their children under
Section 3 (a) and refers to them as "acts," what it ultimately criminalizes is the
"violence against women and their children" committed through the
enumerated acts under Section 5. In particular, Section 5 of RA 9262 should be
read in relation to Section 6 of RA 9262 which provides for the penalties relative
to the acts stated in Section 5 (and not Section 3 [al), viz.:
Section 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their

children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following
rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated

or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in

accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious
physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting
less serious physical injuries sha!l be punished by prision correccional; and
those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto
mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5 (b) shall be punished by imprisonment

of two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime
as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than
arresto mayor.
'° See Araza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020; AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607(2018); and Dinamling v.
People, 761 Phil. 356 (20 I 5).
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5( d) shall be punished by

arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling w1der Section 5(e) shall be pnnished by prision

correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto

mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision

mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be pnnished
by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or

committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be
the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in

the amount of not less than One hnndred thousand pesos (PJ00,000.00) but
not more than three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo
mandatory psychological connseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.
To my mind, the fact that (1) penalties are made relative to the acts listed in
Section 5 and not to the types of violence under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262; and the
fact that (2) Section 5 explicitly states that "[t]he crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts" confirms the
position that the types of violence stated in Section 3 (a) are not the means by which
the crime is committed nor the acts that are penalized.
This therefore begs the question - what now is the significance ofthe types of
violence listed in Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 when it comes to the prosecution of the
crime of violence against women and their children?
The way that the law is framed, and the placement of the provisions provide
us guidance on how to treat Section 3 (a) in relation to Section 5 of RA 9262. As
designed, the law first provides for the definition of "violence against women and
their children"; this term is then classified in types of violence, i.e., physical,
sexual, psychological, and economic, which are found in Section 3 (a)'s four
subsections, i.e., "physical violence" in subsection A, "sexual violence" in
subsection B, "psychological violence" in subsection C, and "economic abuse" in
subsection D. While it is odd that the types of violence are referred to in said
subsections as "acts," Section 3 (a) itself states that the term "violence against
women and their children" are acts "which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse."
The defined term "violence against women and their children" in Section
3 (a) would then appear in Section 5, which states in its preliminary sentence that
"SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts: xx x." As earlier discussed, the usage of the word "crime" in Section
5 vis-a-vis the term "violence against women and their children" in Section 3 (a),
among others, leads to the conclusion that the specific acts listed in Section 5 are the
punishable offenses; on the other hand, "violence against women and children"
under Section 3 (a) is more of a general characterization of the underlying nature of
the crime; in turn, the four types of violence are further variations of the nature of
violence that the woman or her child experiences. By virtue of an act committed
under Section 5, the woman or her child is indeed violated, and the violence
experienced by her and/or her child may either (albeit not exclusively) be
physical, sexual, psychological, or economic. Thus, to reconcile and to avoid
confusion between Section 3 (a) and Section 5, it is therefore submitted that the
types of violence under the former provision should be deemed as the resulting
effect/s on the woman and her child, which spring from the acts committed in
Section 5.
This treatment of the types of violence as resulting effect/s (rather than

means/punishable offenses) equally finds basis in the first paragraph of Section 3 (a)
which states that violence against women and children refers to an act or series of
acts "which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psvchological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
Overall, I reckon that Section 3 (a) and its four subsections only provide for a
comprehensive definition of violence against women and children, which is a by-
product of the specific acts mentioned in Section 5. Ostensibly, the intent of the
law in providing for the four (4) types of violence against women and their
children is not to establish them as the actual offenses per se but rather to create
a comprehensive concept of violence that sweeps across physical, sexual,
psychological or economic facets, which the women or her child may experience.
This intent squares with the animating policy of the law which is to protect women
and their children from all forms of discrimination and abuse in line with the State's
international commitments.
Accordingly, l submit that the Court's perception in some earlier cases

wherein the types of violence under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 were deemed as the
means or even the punishable offenses is conceptually inaccurate. At the risk of
belaboring the point, these types of violence are only descriptive of the effects on
the woman and her child which result from the specific acts committed by the
accused listed in Section 5 of RA 9262. Simply put, the acts enumerated in Section
5 are the means/punishable offenses, while the types of violence in Section 3 (a) -
physical, sexual, and psychological violence and economic abuse - are the
ends/resulting effects.
III.
The above-discussed conceptual nuances are relevant since it affects the

determination on where to situate criminal intent. In my opinion, considering
that (1) the punishable acts are those provided under Section 5 of RA 9262; and (2)
the types of violence under Section 3 ( a) are the resultant effects on the part of the
woman or her child, it is thus imprecise to say that the prosecution must show, by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused had the intent to inflict for example
psychological violence to the woman. Psychological violence, as well as the other
forms of violence under Section 3 (a), are descriptive of the violence experienced by
the woman or her child; the type of violence is more on the effect to the recipient
of violence, rather than the underlying intent of the criminal actor. The accused
may perform one Section 5 act, but the resulting violence on the part of the woman
may be multi-faceted; the accused may also perform a series of Section 5 acts, and
the interplay between these acts, may result into several forms of violence.
For instance, when an accused deprives a woman and her child of financial
support, the woman may either experience economic abuse or psychological
violence. Economic abuse is experienced when the woman or her child becomes
financially dependent; meanwhile, that same act may also cause psychological
violence, considering that deprivation of financial support may be the chosen avenue
for intimidation, harassment, or even ridicule which thereby causes mental or
emotional suffering. It is also common that in a scenario where there is deprivation
of support, other acts of abuse may occur. Verbal and physical abuse are unfortunate
occurrences in situations of domestic violence. The complexity and even cyclical
nature of domestic violence may permeate into various tragic experiences in the
household and thus, result into different effects on the part of the woman and her
child. This is also probably why Section 3 (a), while listing four types of violence,
recognizes that these types are not exclusive as evinced by the qualifier "it includes,
but is not limited to, the following xx x." The phrase "includes, but is not limited
to" recurs even in other portions of the law. This therefore shows that while RA 9262
attempts to characterize certain forms of violence, ultimately these types are mere
estimations of the common forms of violence; what remains important is to
understand that the law is comprehensive enough to cover all forms of abuse
against the woman and her child.
Notably, the ponencia properly recognizes the multi-faceted definition of

violence against women and their children by stating that "there is no one-to-one
correspondence between the classifications of violence against women under
Section 3(a), on the one hand, and the specific punishable acts under Section 5, on
the other":
A plain reading of Section 5 reveals that it is meant to specify the pnnishable

acts based upon the classifications of violence against women already identified
and defined under Section 3(a).While there is no one-to-one correspondence
between the classifications of violence against women under Section 3(a), on
the one hand, and the specific punishable acts under Section 5, on the other, it
can still be reasonably gleaned that the punishable acts spring from the
multifaceted definition of violence against women which the law aims to
protect women from. For example, Sections 5(a) to 5(d) appear to protect women
and their children from physical violence, 5(±), 5(h) and 5(i) from psychological
violence, and 5(g) from physical and sexual violence. Meanwhile, Section 5( e), as
previously discussed, protects the woman from acts of violence that are committed
for the purpose of attempting to control her conduct or actions, or make her lose
her agency, with most of the enumerated examples of acts having a connection with
the use of finances as the primary mode of controlling the woman. Thus, Section
5( e) could be viewed as protecting the woman from economic abuse, as defined in

Section 3(a), in some cases. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, an exclusive correspondence between a type of violence and a specific

Section 5 act runs the danger of glossing over more complex domestic violence
scenarios, and therefore may tie the Courts hands in deciding future cases where a
certain Section 5 act may be considered as producing multiple types of violence
based on what the woman or her child may actually experience in a given case.
Therefore, since the types of violence are neither exclusive to a Section 5 act
nor are the means/punishable offenses themselves, it is but proper to situate intent
on the acts mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262. These acts relate to purposes that
are in the nature of specific intent, and due to the mala in se nature of the offense,
must underlie the commission of the act sough to be punished. As case law instructs,
"in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry
is, has the law been violated?" 12 "[T]here may be mala in se crimes under special
laws, [as in this case]." 13 "The [prevailing] approach to distinguish between mala in
se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself,
then it is a crime mala in sex x x." 14
Going back to Section 5, it bears to stress that, "[s]pecific intent is used to

describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender
actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result
to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the
particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent
must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a
crime requiring specific intent." 15 This may be shown by the nature of the act, the
circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed, and the motive
of the accused. 16
In this case, petitioner was charged for deprivation of financial support to his
wife, AAA, in violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, which reads:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - xx x.
xxxx
ill Causing mental or emotional anguish, public 1idicule or humiliation

to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
11
Ponenda, p. 16.
12
Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 658(2015).
13 Id.
14
Id. at 659.
15
People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 448 (2003).
16
Recuerdo v. People, 526 Phil. 460,475 (2006).
Thus, the prosecution must prove that the accused, by depriving AAA, his
wife, of financial support, intended to cause her mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation, which thereby resulted into psychological violence.
The ponencia adopts this essential distinction between the result, i.e., the
type of violence under Section 3 (a), and the acts with the specific intent mentioned
under Section 5 of RA 9262, by stating that "to be convicted under Section 5(i) [for
instance], the evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
intended to cause the victim mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or
humiliation through the denial of - not the mere failure or inability to provide
-financial support, which thereby resulted into psychological violence." 17 With
this, it correctly frames the specific intent not relative to the form of violence alleged
to have resulted, but rather to the acts stated in Section 5.
The foregoing approach also has an impact on the application of the variance
doctrine. The acts found in Section 5 - and not the types of violence under Section
3 (a) - should be determinative of variance, i.e., what offense is charged and what
offense could the accused be convicted. The type of violence under Section 3 (a)
should not be applied in detennining variance since the same is not, after all, the
punishable offense, which as mentioned, is found in Section 5.
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, I deem it apt to point out that the ponencia
still cites the old fonnulation of the elements of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262
found in Dinamling v. People 18 (Dinamling). However, in my view, Dinamling
inaccurately phrases the third element of said violation as follows:
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the
elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(!) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or fonner wife of the offender, or
is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate
or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or

emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or

humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the children or
similar such acts or omissions. 19
17
Ponencia, pp. 8-9.
18 761 Phil. 356(2015).
19
Id. at 373.
As above-discussed, the specific intent must be situated on the acts sought

to be punished under Section 5 of RA 9262, and that the types of violence under
Section 3 (a) thereof should be treated as the resulting effect of said acts.
However, the formulation of the Dinamling elements fails to reflect this view since
"mental or emotional anguish" is treated therein as a result, rather than the
specific intent of the accused in relation to its corresponding Section 5 offense,
i.e., Section 5 (i). Thus, to avoid confusion and preserve the essential distinction
between the Section 5 and Section 3 (a), I submit that the elements for violation of
Section 5 RA 9262 should instead be:
(2) The woman is either the wife or fonner wife of the accused, or is a woman with
whom the accused has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with
whom such accused has a common child. As for the woman's child or children,
they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The accused commits any of the acts listed under Section 5 of RA 9262;
(4) The said act was committed with the specific intent relative to the offense listed
under Section 5 of RA 9262 for which the accused is duly charged; and
(5) The commission of the said act results into physical, sexual, or psychological
violence, or economic abuse or other form of violence against women and their
children as described under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 on the part of the victim/s.
Applying the foregoing, petitioner should be acquitted of the crime charged,

i.e., violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, since, as preliminarily mentioned, the
prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner's failure
to provide financial support to AAA was made with the specific intent of causing
the latter mental emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation - the fourth
element.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner should be ACQUITTED, and the petition

perforce GRANTED.
ESTELA M. WR~ERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 224946 - CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON, petitioner,

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Promulgated:
November 9, 2021
x-----------------~---x
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
I concur with the ponencia as regards the acquittal of petitioner

Christian Pantonial Acharon.
Further, I concur with the ponencia's clarification of the distinction

between Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, along with the
necessary abandonment of the application of the variance doctrine to these
provisions in Melgar v. People 1 and Reyes v. People. 2
Indeed, the mere failure or inability of a man to provide financial

support is not a crime. Treating it as such would perpetuate the stereotype
that women are always incapable of supporting themselves or their families.
On the contrary, this Court has noted that "[i]n this day and age, women
have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material
support of their families." 3 Moreover, I wish to emphasize the ponencia' s
statement that "while [Republic Act No. 9262] was indeed enacted to protect
women, it was not meant to discount women's ability to provide for
themselves, especially when they are able-bodied." 4
Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution affirmed the State's

commitment to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before
the law. 5 This Court discussed this constitutional provision in Alanis Ill v.
Court ofAppeals: 6
826 Phil. 177 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

' G.R. No. 232678. July 3, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65240>
[Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
Azcueta" Republic, 606 Phil. 177, 199 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
Ponencia, p. 21.
CONST., art. II, sec. 14.
6
G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. No. 224946
Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution requires that the State be active in
ensuring gender equality. This provision is even more noticeably proactive
than the more widely-invoked equal protection and due process clauses
under the Bill of Rights. In Racho v. Tanaka, this Court observed:
This constitutional provision provides a more active

application than the passive orientation of Article III,
Section I of the Constitution does, which simply states that
no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the
laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III,
Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that
is given to men must also be given to women. It does not
require the State to actively pursue "affinnative ways and
means to battle the patriarchy - that complex of political,
cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's
disempowerment."
Article II, Section 14 implies the State's positive duty to actively

dismantle the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports
it. 7 (Citations omitted)
Republic Act No. 9262 is an expression of this commitment. The law

protects women with the goal of restoring equality, rather than reinforcing
harmful gender roles that have long pervaded our society.
Men have traditionally been portrayed as stronger and more superior,

while women are depicted as weak and subordinate:
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women
are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate
roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And
[violence against women] is a form of men's expression of controlling
women to retain power. 8 (Citation omitted)
In Filipino culture, the husband is called "haligi ng tahanan," or the

strong pillar who establishes the home. Men are culturally expected to
provide for their families. Meanwhile, the wife is referred to as "ilaw ng
tahanan," because she is expected to be the warm, guiding light of the home
who must take on the role of bearing and raising the children.
In the past, women were forced to stay home and were not allowed to
pursue education and employment. However, recent statistics show that
society appears to have improved in this regard:
Id.
Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 91-92 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe. En Banc].
On the labor front, the Philippine labor force (15 years old and
above) numbered 40,426,000 in 2012 (64.2% of the population), 61% of
whom were males and 39% of whom were females. The labor force
participation rate ("LFPR") of females increased significantly from 30.6%
in 1970 to 50% in 2012. While the LFPR took a downward trend in 2013,
from 64.2% to 63.9%, the decrease was more pronounced among the male
labor workforce.
In 1974, 36.6% of the women in the labor force were engaged in

agriculture and related work. Over the years, however, the number of
workers employed in the service sector has overtaken the number of
workers employed in the agricultural sector, such that employment has
been driven by the service sector. In 2012, when the number of women
employed stood at 14,751,000, 28% were in the service sector, particularly
wholesale and retail trade; 20% in the agricultural sector; 10.3% in other
service activities; and lastly, 9% in the industry sector, mainly in
manufacturing industry. Thus, women in the industry and service sectors
combined to outnumber women in agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the
agricultural sector continues to play an important role in employment and
in job creation.
Statistics show that women's share in professional and managerial

positions is steadily increasing, although the rate of progress is slow. In
2012, 14,751 of37,600 or 39.2% of employed persons in major occupation
groups were women. Of the 14,751 women employed, only 11.6% of these
were employed as professionals, technicians, and associate professionals,
while 18% were women employed as corporate executives, managers, and
supervisors. These data show that women are still markedly under-
represented in managerial jobs compared to the overall share of their
employment. 9
Yet even though women make up a large portion of the work force,
they are still somehow expected to take primary responsibility for childcare
and the management of the home. Professor E. (Leo) D. Battad observed:
In a society that expects women to take care of the children and do

household chores, working women confront the problem of a double-
burden, or even multiple burdens in terms of longer hours of work and a
wider breadth ofresponsibility. 10
There is also the idea that only certain professions are suitable for
women and vice versa:
Then there is also the pre-employment practice of sex-based

preferences in the hiring phase. Women and men continue to experience
discriminatory practices in advertisements through sex-based preferences,
thereby reinforcing the traditional stereotypes of "women's work" and
9
E. (Leo) D. Battad, Review, The Continuing Narrative of the Economic Emancipation of Filipino
Working Women, 88 PHIL. L. J. 601, 60H502 (2014).
10
ld.at614--ol5.
"men's work." This practice, in effect, limits the worker's choices and
access to employment opportunities.
The lack of protection in the pre-employment phase contributes to

the phenomenon of occupation segregation. The equality of pay between
men and women is compromised due to existing practices of exclusion or
preference for either worker for particular work or occupation. Also, there
is an absence of affirmative actions to combat occupation segregation,
such as introducing schemes that would encourage women and men to
enter in nontraditional skills or occupation. 11
Even the courts are not immune to prejudices and biases against
women. 12 In Maxey v. Court of Appeals, 13 this Court, despite its intent to
uphold a woman's prope1iy rights, perpetuated the traditional gender role of
wives as the spouse who manages the affairs of the household. 14 This Court
stated that "[t]he major, if not the full[,] responsibility of running the
household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the
household." 15
Further, the conduct and language of some judges towards women

reveals their prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity. 16 This Court has only
recently revisited the "woman's honor" doctrine where it says that "no
young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been
sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect
her honor." 17 We advocated against the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure
and reserved Filipino woman and in favor of the evaluation of the testimony
of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception. 18 The credibility of a private complainant's testimony
should not be affected just because they are not the fictitious and generalized
demure girl, or the epitome of the Maria Clara Stereotype, especially when
11
ld.at618.
12 Id.
13
214 Phil. 160 (1984) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].
14 Id.
1, Id.
16
See Garcia v. Drilon, 7l2 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citing Benancillo v: Amila,
660 Phil. 286 (2011) [Per .J. Del Castillo, First Division].
17
People v. Amarela, G.R. Nos. 225642-43, January 17, 2018, 852 SCRA 54 [Per J. Mai1ires, Third
Division], citing People v. Gan, 150-B Phil. 593 (1972) [Per J. Antonio, First Division]; People v.
Sarmiento, 183 Phil. 499 (1979) [Per CJ. Fernando, Second Division]; People v. Gamez, 209 Phil. 209
(1983) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division]; People v Quidil/a, 248 Phil. 1005 (1988) [Per Regalado,
Second Division]; People v. Fabro, 269 Phil. 409 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division],
citing People v Sambangan, 211 Phil. 72 (1983) [Per J. Concepcion, Second Division]; People v.
Patilan, 274 Phil. 634 (1991) [Per J. Davide, Jr.• Third Division], citing People v. Rami/o, 230 Phil.
342 (1986) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division]; People v. Esquila, 324 Phil. 366 (1996) [Per J.
Melo, Third Division]; People v. Manahan, 374 Phil. 77 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc]; People v.
Dreu, 389 Phil. 429 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division], citing People v. Barcelona, 382 Phil.
46 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; People v. Durano, 548 Phil. 383 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, Third Division], citing People v Domingo, 297 Phil. 167 (1993) [Per J. Regalado, Second
Division]; and People v. Madsali, 625 Phil. 43 l (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]. citing People v.
Loyola, 404 Phil. 71 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
1, ld.
their testimony is supported by the other pieces of evidence presented in the

case. 19
In Kane v. Roggenkamp, 20 this Court called out a Regional Trial Court

judge's apparent severe lack of gender sensitivity. The trial court judge
acquitted the husband who was charged with physically abusing his wife
under Republic Act No. 9262. Primarily, the trial court judge asserted that
the woman chose to conceal her lover's abuse. 21 According to him, "the
hesitation of the woman to immediately leave her lover is an unnatural act
and, hence, unbelievable." 22 This Court then noted that "[a] more
enlightened interpretation of the evidence" requires "a less caricaturized,
less patriarchal set of assumptions." 23
Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to recognize the systemic

presence of patriarchy in our society, and how this contributes to the abuse
of women. The law acknowledges that women are more often the victims of
domestic abuse not because they are inherently weaker, but because of the
unequal power relationship between women and men. 24 As a result, the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women have historically
hampered their growth, forcing them into subordination to men. 25
This Com·t discussed the deep historical roots of unequal power

relations between women and men in Estacio v. Estacio: 26
Hence, Republic Act No. 9262 has been upheld as a valid law
meant to address this historical and societal problem.
This unequal power relation is better m1derstood when one

considers its deep historical roots:
The perspective portraying women as victims with a

heritage of victimization results in the unintended
consequence of permanently perceiving all women as
weak. This has not always been accepted by many other
strands in the Feminist Movement.
As early as the 70s, the nationalist movement raised

questions on the wisdom of a women's movement and its
possible divisive effects, as "class problems deserve unified
19
Perez v. People, 830 Phil. 162 (2018) [Per J. Leanen, Third Division].
20
G.R. No. 214326, July 6, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66520>
[Per J. Leon en, Third Division].
21
Id.
z2 Id.
'' Id.
24
Estacio v. Estacio, G.R. No.211851, September 16, 2020 [Per J. Leanen, Third Division].
25
Id. citing Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 85 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
26
G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelfJshowdocs/1/66987> [Per J. Leanen, Third Division].
and concentrated attention [while] the women question is

va6rue, abstract, and does not have material base."
In the early 80s, self-identifying feminist groups

were formed. The "emancipation theory" posits that
female crime has increased and has become more
masculine in character as a result of the women's liberation
movement.
Feminism also has its variants among Muslims. In

2009, Musawah ("equality" in Arabic) was launched as a
global movement for equity and justice in the Muslim
family. It brought together activists, scholars, legal
practitioners, policy makers, and grassroots women and
men from all over the world. Their belief is that there
cannot be justice without equality, and its holistic
framework integrates Islamic teachings, universal human
rights, national constitutional guarantees of equality, and
the lived realities of women and men. 27 (Citations omitted)
This historical inequality between women and men leads to women

being abused and the abuse going unpunished, even subjecting them to
"double victimization" -first by the offender and then, by the legal
system. 28
Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. 29

The more it pervades our culture, the greater its chances of infecting the
current and the future generation. 30 In People v. Jumawan, 31 this Court said:
The Philippines, as State Party to the [Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination Against Women], recognized that a change in
the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in
the family is needed to achieve foll equality between them. Accordingly,
the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 32 (Citation omitted)
Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must

ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. 33 In our
27
Id.
28
Garciav. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
29
Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division],
citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Re: Untian, Jr., A.C. No. 5900 (Resolution), April I 0. 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov. ph/thcbooksheltYshowdocs/ I/65162> [Per J. A. Reyes, Jr., En BancJ.
30
Id.
31
733 Phil. 102 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
32 Id.
Alanis Ill v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846> [Per J. Leanen. Third Division].
pursuit of equality, we need to acknowledge and dismantle the "obstacle[s]

to the full realization of the potentialities ofwomen." 34
Nevertheless, it is also improper to think that women are always

victims. 35 This will only reinforce their already disadvantaged position. 36
The perspective that portrays women as victims with a history of
victimization results in the unintended consequence of pennanently
perceiving all women as weak. 37 Indisputably, to consider women as the
weaker sex is discriminatory. 38
Laws such as Republic Act No. 9262 are intended to negate the
patriarchy in our culture, 39 not to bolster it. In safeguarding the interests of
women as a discriminated class, we must be careful not to perpetuate the
very prejudices and biases that contribute to their discrimination.
There is now more space to believe that portraying only women as

victims will not always promote gender equality before the law. 40 It
sometimes aggravates the gap by conceding that women have always been
dominated by men. 41
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think that men are
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. 42 If Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No.
9262 are interpreted to mean that the accused man's failure or inability to
provide financial automatically entails criminal liability, then this depiction
will be reinforced rather than corrected. This confirms the false idea that
women are incapable of supporting themselves and their families. Applied
correctly, Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 should not result
in the over-patronage of women.
The Constitution requires the State to recognize the role of women in

nation building. 43 This role is not confined to child-rearing, honorable as
motherhood may be. It is entirely possible that the woman in the sexual or
34
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
35
Estacio y Salvosa ~ Estacio y Santos, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020,
<https://e!ibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66987> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
36 Id.
37
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc].
~
38
Toliongco Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 231748, July 8, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66544> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
39
J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagata, 814 Phil. 103
(2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
40
J. Leanen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Dri/on, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc].
41 Id.
42
Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
43
CONST., art. II, sec. 14. See also Republic Act No. 9710 (2009), sec. 2.
dating relationship is more financially capable than the man. Consistent

with the spouses' mutual obligation to provide support under the Family
Code, 44 the duty to provide financial support should not fall on the man
alone. His mere failure or inability to provide financial support should not
be penalized as a crime, especially when the woman is more financially
capable.
We should not, however, go as far as denying the existence of

patriarchal dominance in many social relationships. 45 Courts must continue
to be sensitive to the power relations that come clothed in gender roles. 46
Gender roles in patriarchy may be detrimental to men as well. For instance:
Social and cultural expectations on masculinity and male

dominance urge men to keep quiet about being a victim, adding to the
unique experience of male victims of domestic abuse. This leads to latent
depression among boys and men. In a sense, patriarchy while privileging
men also victimizes them. 47
Persons who do not conform to traditional gender roles find

themselves excluded from the hegemony and underrepresented in society:
Those with sexual orientations other than the heteronormative,

gender identities that are transgender or tluid, or gender expressions that
are not the usual manifestations of the dominant and expected cultural
binaries - the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and
other gender and sexual minorities (LGBTQI+) community - have
suffered enough marginalization and discrimination within our society. 48
Truth be told, our law cruelly defines the normal. 49 This Court has
started to take steps to address this where possible. In a concun-ing opinion
from Republic v. Manalo, 50 we have acknowledged that couples of all
genders may constitute loving families:
The restncnve nature of our ma1Tiage laws tends to reify the

concept of a family which is already far from the living realities of many
couples and children. For instance, orthodox msrstence on
heteron01mativity may not compare with the various types of care that
various other "non-traditional" a1Tangements present in many loving
households.
44
FAMILY CODE, art. 68.
45
Perezv. People, 830 Phil. 162 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
46
ld.
47
J. Leonen, Concun-ing Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc].
48
Falcis !If v. Civil Registrar General, GR. No. 217910, September 3, 2019
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65744> [Per J. Leenen, En Banc].
49
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Republic v. Manalo, GR. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA
580 (2018) [Per C.J. Peralta, En Banc].
50 Id.
/'
,.
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the

commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by
legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as
romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal
history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the
intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will
always be different for each couple. It is that which we should understand:
intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible,
bound not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can
bring. 51
In Republic v. Cagandagan, 52 this Court upheld the trial court's

allowance of the respondent's change of name and recognized the situation
of intersex individuals:
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment
in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently !mows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and
of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to tal(e along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will hann other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified
the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to ( l) the diversity of

nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary
state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case. 53 (Citation omitted)
Recently, this Court promulgated the Rules on the Use of Gender°Fair

Language in the Judiciary and Gender-Fair Courtroom Etiquette 54 in an
effort not to "perpetuate gender stereotypes, which rest on unfounded
generalizations regarding the characteristics and roles of binary and non-
51
Id. at 632.
52
Republic v. Cagandahan, 586 Phil. 637 (2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
53
Id. at 65 1-652.
54
A.M. No. 21-11-25-SC, February 15, 2022, <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/24882/>.
/
binary genders, but indisputably influence the perspectives of the judges and
litigants alike." 55
We continue to fight toward genuine and meaningful equality for men

and women, as well as those who are nonbinary. It is vital to this movement
that we take apart the structures that perpetuate the abuse of women. The
doctrines in Melgar and Reyes now abandoned by this Comi are among
these harmful structures.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
-~ Associate Justice
55
Id.
ENBANC
G.R. No. 224946 - CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON v. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
Promulgated:
November 9 2021
x--------------------------------------------- c~~-------x
CONCURRING OPINION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
I agree for the most part with the ponencia of the learned Justice Alfredo
Benjamin S.Caguioa. I also thank him for graciously accommodating some of my
views in this case, especially the relevance of the civil law on support in determining
liability for violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262). I,
nonetheless, advance the following viewpoints with the hope of providing an
analytical framework for the judges of the Family Courts and designated Family
Courts to work with.
The analytical framework I most respectfully suggest is not an original one.

It is basically a reiteration of what first year law students have been taught when
analyzing a criminal fact-pattern or case for that matter.
We start every analysis with the basic elements of the subject crime. We
organize our thought process according to the established categories of actus reus
and where applicable mens rea. Here, both are applicable and will be discussed to
arrive at a reasoned disposition.
Why is this framework extremely important? This is because at times the

statutory definition of a crime could be confusing. The analysis often begins with
the elements of the crime. There is nothing wrong with that if the analysis takes full
account of the legal requirement that the elements must correspond to a criminal
act, conduct and/or circumstances (the actus reus) and a criminal state of mind
(the mens rea). This framework is consistent with the very definition of what a
crime is - actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. That is, except for strict liability
crimes, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist.
The extreme importance of this reference to the elements of a crime is

illustrated in the considered view of the esteemed Senior Associate Justice Estella
M. Perlas-Bernabe that the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is not a
result of the criminal act but an element of the intent in the doing ofsuch criminal
act. Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe thus rejected the fonnulation in
Dinamling v. People 1 that the third element of the offense of Section 5 (i) of RA
9262 is that the "offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional
anguish."
1 761 Phil. 356,374 (2015).
I
Her point of view is doubtless correct. With due respect, however, her
formulation is not the entirety of the elements of Section 5 (i). She is correct that
mental or emotional anguish is an integral part of the criminal state of mind
(i.e., the mens rea) in the definition of Section 5 (i).
Still, Dinamling is correct too that mental or emotional anguish is also an

integral part of the criminal act, conduct and/or circumstances (i.e., the actus
reus) penalized by Section 5 (i). If there was no mental or emotional anguish, or
if there was but it was not caused by any of the mentioned predicate criminal acts,
there is no violation of Section 5 (i). So it is not entirely fruitful to eliminate, as
the good Senior Associate Justice recommends, the third element of Section 5 (i) as
identified in Dinamling because mental or emotional anguish is both integral
parts of the mens rea (as the good Senior Associate Justice correctly observes) and
the actus reus (as Dinamling rightly mentions).
Of course, the enumeration of the elements of Section 5 (i) in Dinamling is

deficient because it fails to account for the mens rea component of mental or
emotional anguish as properly commented by Senior Associate Justice Perlas-
Bemabe. Nowhere in Dinamling was it mentioned that there must be that specific
criminal intent to cause mental or emotional anguish. While Section 5 (i) is a
special law, and generally crimes under a special law are erroneously lumped
together as mala prohibita, it does not mean that Section 5 (i) requires no mental
element. The reason is simply that the text of this provision calls for a mental
element. Indeed, if the definition of a crime is not broken into its elements, and by
elements, we mean the actus reus and the mens rea, we would fall into the same
deficiencies as the listing of elements in Dinamling illustrates.
Hence, it is extremely important that the analytical framework in

determining whether a crime has been committed by an accused and whether the
prosecution has proven this crime and its commission by the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, we must exainine the facts if they fit into the elements of the crime
charged, that is, if the facts demonstrate the commission of the actus reus and the
presence of the mens rea.
The Elements of a Crime
The crimes defined in Section 5 (e) and Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 are crimes
punished by a special law. But these crimes are not malum prohibitum just because
they are offenses defined and punished by a special law. These crimes require as an
element the presence of mens rea.
I digress a bit to quote the renowned Justice Regalado who abhorred this
classification of crimes into mala in se and ma/um prohibitum, which I passionately
shared in one2 of my opinions:
4. Nor should we hold a "judicial prejudice" from the fact that the two forms
of illegal possession of firearms in Presidential Decree No. 1866 are mala
prohibita. On this score, I believe it is time to disabuse our minds of some
2 Sama v. People. G.R. No. 224469, January 5, 2021.

superannuated concepts of the difference between mala in se and ma/a

proltibita. I find in these cases a felicitous occasion to point out this
misperception thereon since even now there are instances of incorrect
assumptions creeping into some of our decisions that if the crime is punished
by the Revised Penal Code, it is necessarily a ma/um in se and, if provided for
by a special law, it is a malum prohibitum.
It was from hombook lore that we absorbed the distinctions given by text
writers, claiming that: (I) mala in se require criminal intent on the part of the
offender; in mala prohibita, the mere commission of the prohibited act, regardless
of intent, is sufficient; and (2) mala in se refer to felonies in the Revised Penal
Code, while mala prohibita are offenses punished under special laws.
The first distinction is still substantially correct, but the second is not
accurate. In fact, even in the Revised Penal Code there are felonies which are
actually and essentially mala prohibita. To illustrate, in time ofwa.r, and regardless
of his intent, a person who shall have correspondence with a hostile country or
territory occupied by enemy troops shall be punished therefor. An accountable
public officer who voluntarily fails to issue the required receipt for any sum of
money officially collected by him, regardless of his intent, is liable for illegal
exaction. Unauthorized possession of picklocks or similar tools, regardless of the
possessor's intent, is punishable as such illegal possession. These are felonies
under the Revised Penal Code but criminal intent is not required therein.
On the other hand, I need not mention anymore that there are now in our
statutes so many offenses punished under special laws but wherein criminal
intent is required as an element, and which offenses are accordingly mala in se
although they are not felonies provided for in the Code. 3
Originally, a crime was considered to be the commission of a physical act

which was specifically prohibited by law. It was the act itself which was the sole
element of the crime. If it was established that the act was committed by an
accused, then a finding of guilt would ensue.
As early as the twelfth century, however, in large part through the influence
of the canon law, it was established that there must also be a mental element
combined with the prohibited act to constitute a crime. That is to say that an
accused must have meant or intended to commit the prohibited act. The physical
act and the mental element which together constitute a crime came to be known as
the actus reus denoting the act, and the mens rea for the mental element.
Violations of Section 5 (e) and Section 5 (i) have the requisite actus reus and
mens rea elements. In deciding the merits of a criminal case, the analysis should
always start from and refer to these elements and not from anywhere or to anything
else.
The following excerpt from Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21,
2007, supplies the rationale for this starting point of every criminal case analysis:
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea"
supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must
unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can
3 Concurring Opinion, People v. Quejada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).

be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as

material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as "a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," and "essential for
criminal liability." It follows that the statutory definition of our ma/a in se
crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the
U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no
mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights." The
criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime.
For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown;
there must also be an actus reus.
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the
criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship
of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of
the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision,
disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime
was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under
which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately,
our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory
definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests
when the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example, the statutory
definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus
making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and
conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
Actus reus is the act (or sometimes an omission or state of affairs) indicated
in the definition of the offense charged together with (1) any consequences of that
conduct which are indicated by that definition; and (2) any surrounding
circumstances so indicated (other than references to the mens rea or element of
negligence required on the part of the defendant, or to any defense). 4
In addition to a physical element consisting of committing a prohibited act,

creating a prohibited state of affairs, or omitting to do that which is required by
the law, the actus reus requires the conduct in question to be willed; this is usually
referred to as voluntariness. The doing of the prohibited act or conduct must
involve a mental element. It is this mental element, that is the act of will, which
makes the act or conduct willed or voluntary.
On the other hand, mens rea is the subjective or mental element of an

accused's intention to commit a crime, or knowledge that an accused's action or
lack of action would cause a crime to be committed, or willful blindness or
recldessness that an accused's actus reus would cause a crime to be perpetrated.
But mens rea, properly understood, does not encompass all of the mental
elements of a crime. As stated, the actus reus has its own mental element; the act
must be the voluntary act of an accused for the actus reus to exist.
Mens rea, on the other hand, refers to the guilty mind, the wrongful
intention, of an accused. Its function in criminal law is to prevent the conviction of
4 Criminal Law (Volume 25 (2020), paras 1-552; Volume 26 (2020), paras 553-1014) I Commentary at
https://www.lexisnexis.co. uk/legal/commentary/halsburys-laws-of-england/crim inal-Iaw/the-actus-reus.
the morally innocent- those who do not understand or intend the consequences
of their acts.
Mens rea is a contemporaneous mental element comprising an intention to

carry out the prohibited physical act or omission to act; that is to say a particular
state of mind such as the intent to cause, or some foresight of, the results of the
act or the state of affairs.
Thus, typically, mens rea is concerned with the mental element

accompanying the consequences of the prohibited actus reus.
The prosecution always bears the burden of proving the actus reus, the
mental element of voluntariness of the actus reus, and the mens rea mental
element. Therefore, in certain situations, a person who committed a prohibited
physical act still could not be found guilty. A number of examples come to mind.
For instance, if a person in a state of automatism as a result of a blow on the

head committed a prohibited act that this person was not consciously aware of
committing, the latter could not be found guilty. The mental element involved in
committing a willed voluntary act and the mental element of intending to
commit the act were absent. Thus neither the requisite actus reus or mens rea for
the offense was present.
The result would be the same in the case of an accused who had an unexpected
reaction to medication which rendered this person totally unaware of the latter's
actions. Similarly, if an accused, during an epileptic seizure, with no knowledge of
what this person was doing, shot and killed a victim, this accused could not be
found guilty of killing since both the ability to act voluntarily and the mental
element of the intention to kill were absent.
In all these instances, though the accused committed the actus reus, the latter
simply could not have formed the requisite mental elements of voluntariness in
the performance of the prohibited act or omission and intention to commit the
prohibited act.
The statutory definition generally furnishes the elements of each crime and
the elements in tum unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and
accompanying criminal intent. 5
The Elements of Section 5 (i) in relation to

Section 3 (a) (C)
i. Actus Reus of Violation of Section 5 (i)
The starting point is the statutory definition in Section 5(i) of RA 9262:
5 Valenzuela v. People, supra.
I
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts ....
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the

woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of
access to the woman's child/children.
In relation to Section 5 (i) is Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts ...
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause

mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
hmniliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in
any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation
of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
From this definition, the actus reus of this offense consists of the -
(i) relationship between an accused and offended parties, that is, a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode.
(ii) denial of financial support to those entitled to receive financial support and to
whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
a. The act is the deliberate withholding of the provision of financial support.
b. The consequence of the act is the absence or inadequacy of financial

support as defined by law for those entitled to be supp01ied by the accused,
since the complainant cannot compensate for the support denied to the
complainant and/or their children by the accused.
(iii) Legal entitlement to support and legal obligation (i.e., concurrence of

capacity and need) to provide support.
(iv) Mental or emotional anguish or likelihood or probability of mental or

emotional anguish on the part of those entitled to receive financial support and
to whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
I
(v) causation or likely causation of the mental or emotional anguish by the

accused's denial of financial support.
Let me expound on each of these components of the actus reus.
This is an objective element.
The presence of this element is not determined from a subjective (an

accused's or a complainant's) perspective but from these objective or real world
circumstances: (a) having a common child; (b) having engaged in a single sexual
act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child (sexual relations);
or (c) having lived together without the benefit of marriage as if spouses or having
been involved romantically over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of their relationship, but excluding casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization
between two individuals in a business or social context (dating relationship).
For purposes of establishing the actus reus, no other mental element than
voluntariness has to be proved.
To clarify, it is not required that an accused or a complainant intended or

was purposely involved, or knew that they were, in any of these types of
relationship. It is enough that the prosecution established that they voluntarily had
a child, engaged in a single sexual act, lived together as if spouses, or bonded
themselves romantically continuously over a period of time.
(ii) denial of financial support to those entitled to receive financial support and to
whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
This actus reus has two components: (a) an act and (b) a consequence.
The act, as correctly defined by Justice Caguioa, is the deliberate

withholding of the provision of financial support.
The consequence thereof is the absence or inadequacy of financial support

as defined by law (i.e., Article 194, Family Code: "Support comprises eve1ything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family") for those entitled to
be supported by the accused, since the complainant cannot compensate for the
support denied to the complainant and/or their children by the accused.
The test in establishing this actus reus is objective.

The presence of this element is not determined from a subjective (an

accused's or a complainant's) perspective but from objective or real world
circumstances.
The relevant objective circumstances to establish this actus reus include:
• subject-matter of the needed sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical

attendance, education and transportation;
• amounts required to pay for the foregoing support items;
• the claimed support items vis-a-vis the.financial capacity of the family prior
to the withholding of the provision of financial support;
• demand to an accused to pay financial support;
• capacity of an accused to give support;
• non-provision or partial provision of financial support; and
• absent or inadequate financial support on the part of the obligees of the
support since the woman is unable to compensate for the denied support
by the accused.
Notably, there is a legal obligation to provide support only if there is a

concurrence between the capacity to give support and the need to be supported. If
there is no such legal obligation, there can be no actus reus of deliberately
withholding financial support because there is really nothing to withhold. Also, if
there is no legal obligation to give support, the act of denying financial support
cannot be a criminal act since there is no legal mandate to do so.
There are two legitimate issues on this actus reus:
(a) whether the act component of the actus reus of denial of financial support refers to
the denial of full or partial financial support.
Hence, if an accused, during the period alleged in the Information, provided

some support for a portion or the entirety of this period, would he still be liable for
violation of Section 5 (i)?
My short answer to this issue is that the quantum of support denied by an

accused is not material. This is because the language of the statute does not make
such distinction.
Further, the purpose of the law is to redress a complainant's mental or

emotional anguish and deter others from causing it. The proposed distinction
should not be allowed because a denial of either a full or partial support could still
potentially result in such prejudice.
(b) whether the actus reus of denial of financial support has really a consequence
component, that is, the act of denial of support should result in the absence or
inadequacy of financial support to those entitled to be supported, that is, the financial
support to the woman and/or the children would be absent or at least insufficient as
a result of the accused's denial of support.
I/
Or, whether it is enough that an accused denied support regardless of the

consequence or impact ofth.e denial of support.
As already mentioned above, this actus reus has both an act and consequence
components. The act of denial of support must have the consequence of depriving
the woman and/or their children in whole or in part of the needed support as the
woman is unable to compensate for the accused's denied support.
Therefore, if the woman is able to provide the needed support for herself
and/or their children, and the accused's denial of support has no prejudicial
impact upon the obligees' support, then there is no violation of Section 5 (i) of RA
9262, even if the woman is mentally or emotionally anguished by the accused's
apparent finagling of the woman in terms of not sharing in the support obligations.
The rationale for the consequence component of this actus reus is the policy
behind RA 9262.
Section 2 states that the statute is designed to value the dignity of women
and children, to guarantee full respect for their human rights, to recognize the
need to protect women and children from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
If the woman is able to provide adequate financial support to herself and/or

the children sans the accused's financial support, the policy behind RA 9262 is not
at all implicated.
This is because, if the woman and the children are financially secure despite
the accused's denial of financial support, there is no impairment of their dignity or
violation of their human rights or their personal security. The woman's remedy
in this instance is not under RA 9262 but under the civil laws on support as well
as her access to and liquidation and dissolution of their property relations if any.
Another rationale is that the legal obligation to give financial support entails
the concurrence of the capacity to provide financial support and the need to be
supported. If there is no legal obligation to give financial support, the act of
denying financial support cannot be a criminal act because there is no legal
compulsion to extend financial support.
This actus reus of denial of support has two mental elements - the
voluntary mental element of the actus reus and the mens rea mental element.
The mens rea element will be discussed below.
As regards the voluntariness of the act, this means the prosecution has to
establish that the accused was not forced to deny financial support due to lack of
resources, other legal obligations and other circumstances beyond the accused's
control or discretion preventing the accused from providing financial support.
1
(iii) Legal entitlement to support and legal obligation (i.e., concurrence of

capacity and need) to provide support
This actus reus is an objective element. This is determined by the civil laws
on support. Neither an accused nor a complainant can determine for themselves
who is entitled to support and who is obliged to give support. The civil laws provide
the answer. Accordingly, the legal obligation to provide support requires the
concurrence of an accused's capacity to provide support and an obligee' s need for
support.
(iv) Mental or emotional anguish or likelihood or probability of mental or

emotional anguish itself, on the part of those entitled to receive financial
support and to whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
This actus reus has both subjective and objective components.
Mental or emotional anguish is subjective if the woman and/or her children

with the accused has/have attested to its existence, that is, they testify that they are
in fact suffering from mental or emotional anguish.
As held in Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015), this is element is

proven by the testimonies of the complainant woman and/or children since the
mental or emotional anguish is personal to them.
If the complainants testify to this effect, they have established halfway this
actus reus. The other half is determined by the credibility of this claim that must
then be examined on the totality of the evidence in the case.
Mental or emotional anguish is objective if the claim is limited to the

likelihood or probability of mental or emotional anguish of the woman and/or her
children with the accused. To be liable for violation of Section 5 (i), among other
requisites, the mental or emotional anguish need not exist as a fact but there must
at least be the likelihood or probability of its occurrence according to the
perspective of reasonable persons in the situation of the woman and/or her children.
Note that this actus reus of the likelihood or probability of mental or

emotional anguish is found textually in Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262 and not in the
text of Section 5 (i). Nonetheless, since Section 5 (i) must be read in relation to
Section 3 (a) (C), this particular component of the actus reus is deemed written into
the statutory definition of the crime under Section 5 (i).
(v) causation or likely causation of the mental or emotional anguish by the

accused's denial of financial support.
This actus reus has both subjective and objective components.
The causation of mental or emotional anguish by the accused's denial of

financial support is subjective if the woman and/or her children with the accused
has/have attested to the existence of this causation, that is, they testify that they are
1
in fact suffering from mental or emotional anguish as a result of the accused's

denial offinancial support.
If the complainants testify to this effect, they have established halfway this
actus reus. The other half is determined by the credibility of this claim that must
then be examined on the totality of the evidence in the case.
This causation of the mental or emotional anguish is objective if the claim

is limited to the likelihood or probability of the causation of mental or emotional
anguish by the accused's denial of financial support.
Causation need not exist as a fact but there must at least be the likelihood or
probability of this causation according to the perspective of reasonable persons in
the situation of the woman and/or her children.
The causal relationship required by the law is that the mental or emotional
anguish need not only be factual or consummated by the accused's denial of
support but also be likely or probable to happen as a result of the denial of
financial support.
This actus reus of the likelihood or probability of the causation of mental or

emotional anguish is found textually in Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262 and not in the
text of Section 5 (i). Nonetheless, since Section 5 (i) must be read in relation to
Section 3 (a) (C), this specific actus reus is deemed written into the statutory
definition of the crime under Section 5 (i).
Notably, the actus reus of denial of financial support has both act and
consequence components. The emotional or mental anguish must be caused by the
ultimate consequence of the denial of financial support, which is the absence or
inadequacy of support that cannot be compensated by the woman's own
resources. This connection among these components of the actus reus may be
illustrated as follows:
Conversely, if the mental or emotional anguish is not due to or likely to be

due to the absence or inadequacy of support, since the woman is able to provide
ample support or since the woman is bothered by something else, then Section 5
(i) is not the proper remedy for the woman and/or their children.
There is a mental element to this actus reus but this is found in the mens rea
element of Section 5 (i) - the accused's intention and purpose to inflict such
mental or emotional anguish upon the woman and/or their children or the willful
blindness or recklessness of the accused's conduct in not recognizing that the act
of denying financial support would probably or likely cause such mental or
emotional anguish on their part.
If
ii. Mens Rea of Violation of Section 5 (i)
While RA 9262 defines an offense punishable by a special law, violation of

Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C) nonetheless requires amens rea element.
The mens rea has three components:
(i) the specific intent of an accused to deny financial support to the obligees of
support, which requires as stated the mental element of voluntary
performance of this act and the intention, purpose and knowledge to do so.
(ii) the specific intent of an accused to cause the absence or inadequacy of

financial support on the part of the obligees of support, which requires not only
the mental element of voluntary performance of the act of denying financial
support but also the intention, purpose and knowledge to accomplish such
consequence of the act of denying support; the absence or inadequacy of
financial support on the part of the obligees of support must be a fact - they
must in fact be in need of the accused's financial support,
(iii) the specific intent to cause or to likely cause the obligees' mental or
emotional anguish due to the accused's denial of financial support and
its consequence of absence or inadequacy of financial support.
Note that the third specific intent requirement of to cause likely is found
textually in Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262 and not in the text of Section 5 (i). But
since Section 5 (i) must be read in relation to Section 3 (a) (C), this specific intent
is deemed written into the statutory definition of the crime under Section 5 (i).
This mental element consists of the accused's intention and purpose to

cause or inflict such mental or emotional anguish upon the woman and/or their
children by denying them financial support. This is the mental element required
where mental or emotional anguish is actually suffered by them.
Alternatively, the mental element may also be the accused's willful

blindness or recklessness in pursuing the act of denying financial support and
not recognizing that this act would probably or likely cause such mental or
emotional anguish on the woman and/or their children.
Application of the Elements of Section 5 (i) in

relation to Section 3 (a) (C)
I. Facts of the Case
Accused-petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 in

an Information alleging thus:
That sometime in (sic) January 25, 2012, up to the present, in Valenzuela

City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying

financial support to the said complainant.
He pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued. According to the trial
court, after he left for Brunei to work as an overseas worker, he maintained another
romantic non-marital relationship while not being emotionally separated from his
spouse. The latter is the sole complainant in this criminal case as she and accused
had no children. In Brunei, he lived together with the woman. He also failed to pay
the amount he and his spouse had borrowed to settle his placement fee. As
recounted by the trial court:
However, the accused did not send money on a regular basis. All in all,
he was able to send money in the total amount of P71,500.00 only, leaving the
balance in the amount of 1"13,500.00. For which reason, she felt so embarrassed
with [their creditor] because she could not pay the balance. She even pleaded
to [their creditor] not to lodge a complaint to the barangay. [Their creditor]
commw1icated to the employer of the accused in Brunei about their debt to her.
On cross, she stated that when the accused left in December 2011, she [was]
jobless. Presently, she is gainfully employed. She lost communication with the
accused since January 2012. According to the employer and friends of the accused,
the latter is living with his paramour in Brunei. She filed this case because she was
extremely hurt and she experience emotional agony by the neglect and utter
insensitivity that the accused made her endure and suffer.
Accused-petitioner explained that he really wanted to send and bring

money back from Brunei. Unfortunately, while he was in Brunei, his rented place
was razed by fire and he met a vehicular accident which required him to spend
a significant sum of money. He and his spouse had an on and off communication
from October 2011 until April 2013. He admitted though that complainant
demanded that he pay the entire amount of the debt.
He further recalled:
He used to send money to the private complainant. But it was the latter
who told him not to send money anymore. He also claimed that he was able to
send the total amount of !"71,000.00 to the private complainant in payment of their
loan. He agreed that the same is not enough to fully pay their loan in the total
amoW1t of l"85,000.00.
ii. Application of the Analytical Test to the

Facts of the Case
I agree with the ponencia that accused-petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
The prosecution failed to prove at all the requisite actus reus and necessarily
mens rea of Section 5 (i).
The following components of the actus reus are not disputed:

(ii) Legal entitlement to support and legal obligation (i.e., concurrence of

capacity and need) to provide support
(iii) Mental or emotional anguish or likelihood or probability of mental or

emotional anguish on the part of those entitled to receive financial support and
to whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
At issue are these components of actus reus:
(i) denial of financial support to those entitled to receive financial support and to
· whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
a. The act is the deliberate withholding of the provision of financial support.
b. The consequence of the act is the absence or inadequacy of financial

support as defined by law for those entitled to be supported by the accused,
since the complainant cannot compensate for the support denied to the
complainant and/or their children by the accused.
(ii) The consequence or likely consequence of mental or emotional anguish as a

result of the accused's denial of financial support
There was no deliberate withholding of financial support because -
(a) the unfortunate events in accused-petitioner's life in Brunei prevented

him from saving money that he could have remitted to the Philippines; with no
money to remit, there was nothing he was withholding much less deliberately
withholding; and
(b) there was no demand from his spouse to provide support; if there was no
demand to give support, it cannot be said that he was deliberately withholding or
in short denying financial support.
His spouse also did not suffer absent or inadequate support. She was
gainfully employed as she had admitted. She also did not demand support at all.
All she wanted was for him to pay his debt to their godmother.
Thus, the consequence of the act component-absent or inadequate support

is also missing.
While complainant suffered emotional or mental anguish, this was not the
result of any denial of financial support (which did not happen anyway) or the
absence or inadequacy of financial support (which did not occur too).
Rather, the emotional or mental anguish was due to the alleged other
relationship of accused-petitioner. This cause of the mental or emotional anguish,
however, was not the mode of psychological violence alleged in the Information.
It should not and could not have been, therefore, the proof-focus of the prosecution
evidence against him. This allegation, though harrowing to complainant, is not the
cause of the accusation, hence, it is irrelevant and inadmissible in this case.
Since the actus reus of the crime charged was not proved at all, any
discussion on its mens rea element is totally unnecessary. The reason is that there
is no prohibited act, state of affairs, and consequence to which the relevant mens
rea could attach.
iii. Criminalization of Non-Provision of

Support and the Variance Doctrine
RA 9262 does not criminalize the mere omission to pay support or solely
the non-provision of support. The matter of support as an item of the actus reus
appears only in Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C) and Section 5 (e) (2). In
both these provisions, lack of support or provision of inadequate support is
criminal only if the other components of the statutorily defined actus reus and
mens rea are present.
Neither does RA 9262 criminalize the mere denial of financial support.
In particular, I agree with Justice Caguioa that Melgar v. People, G.R. No.
223477, February 14, 2018, imprecisely held that Section 5 (i) necessarily includes
Section 5 (e) (2) and that this actus reus can be the sole basis for a conviction under
Section 5 (e) (2).
Justice Caguioa also correctly recommended abandoning this case law and
Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019, which affirmed Melgar.
Section 5 (e) (2) is not necessarily included in Section 5 (i) because the
element of the former is not only denial of financial support.
But for the element of depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or

her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support, which is a
common element with Section 5 (i), the statutory definition of Section 5 (e) (2)
requires different actus reus and mens rea.
Without exhaustively canvassing the elements of Section 5 (e) (2), the actus
reus includes the overarching prohibited consequence of controlling or
restricting, attempting to control or restrict, or threatening to control or restrict,
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct. This is not an element of Section
5 (i) and is a distinctive element of the crime loosely termed economic abuse.
Further, the mens rea of Section 5 ( e) (2) includes the specific intent to bring
about or cause - the intentional, purposeful and knowing bringing about or
causing of - the overarching prohibited consequence. This specific intent is not
present in Section 5 (i) and is a distinctive element of Section 5 ( e) (2).
The cause of accusation for Section 5 (e) (2) crime is different from the
cause of accusation under Section 5 (i). Each of these elements must be alleged in
the Information and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction.
Allegations for Section 5 (i) do not encompass allegations under Section 5

(e) (2) because the former are different from the latter.
The variance principle was therefore inaccurately applied in Melgar and

Reyes. The good Senior Associate Justice graciously conceded this point in her
Reflections and, for this and other reasons, I admire and respect superbly her
wisdom, graciousness, and humility.
iv. Opinion of Senior Associate Justice

Perlas-Bernabe
I agree with the good Senior Associate Justice that Section 3 (a) has a bearing
upon the meaning of the particular criminal provision in RA 9262, Section 5. I
myself refer to Section 3 (a) to identify the act and consequence and the mental
elements of Section 5. The Supreme Court has in fact done so countless times prior.
I respectfully suggest, however, that Section 3 (a) is not just about the effects
of the acts mentioned in Section 5 upon the woman and/or her children. 6
Section 3 (a) is far more comprehensive than what the good Senior Associate
Justice proffers. Please consider the following:
Section 5 (i) punishes the infliction of mental or emotional anguish by

means of the acts some of which are mentioned in Section 5 (i) while others are
stated in Section 3 (a) (C).
An example is marital infidelity which appears in the latter but not in

Section 5 (i). Denial of financial support is mentioned in Section 5 (i) but not in
Section 3 (a) (C).
Section 5 (i) requires the mens rea of the specific intent to cause mental or
emotional anguish. It is a specific intent because the mere voluntary performance
or omission of denial of financial support does not automatically result in the
actus reus of mental or emotional anguish. The latter effect must be specifically
willed or intended.
But Section 3 (a) (C) adds another dimension of actus reus and mens rea ~
likely to cause mental or emotional anguish.
6 The learned Senior Associate Justice opined during the deliberation that "[a]ccordingly, the Court would do well to
clarify the perception in some earlier cases wherein the types of violence under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 as
means/punishable offenses. At the risk of belaboring the point, these types of violence are only descriptive of the
effects on the woman and her child which result from the specific acts committed by the accused listed in
Section 5 of RA 9262. Simply put, the acts enumerated in Section 5 are the means/punishable offenses, while
the types of violence in Section 3 (a) -physical, sexual, and psychological violence and economic abuse - are the
ends/resulting effects.
Denial of financial support that is likely to cause emotional or mental anguish

is an actus reus that is different and apart from denial of financial support that
causes mental or emotional anguish. This actus reus has a different mental
component as mens rea. Likely to cause calls for the mental states of willful
blindness or recklessness and not intent, purpose or knowledge.
I also humbly opine that the mental element in mens rea is not the intent to
commit psychological violence or economic abuse. 7 I think, as the good Senior
Associate Justice does, that this is an imprecise way of identifying the mens rea of
Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C).
The mental element in mens rea must be correlated to the specific actus
reus component to which the mental element attaches.
The terms psychological violence and economic abuse, for instance, are a
bundle of components of the actus reus and the mens rea, some of which intersect
between these types of violence, some are shared between them, and some are
distinctive. So we have to be more specific and precise when identifying the actus
reus and mens rea involved.
Thus, I agree with the view of Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe that
Therefore, since it has been established that the types of violence are neither
exclusive to a Section 5 act nor are the means/punishable offense, it is but proper
to situate intent on the actual purposes mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262.
These purposes are in the nature of specific intent, which must underlie the
commission of the act sought to be punished.
Still, I do not think it was error for Justice Caguioa to categorize the
provisions of Section 5 into the types of violence identified and defined or illustrated
in Section 3 (a). I agree with the following approach of Justice Caguioa to which
Senior Justice Perlas-Bernabe disagreed -
A simple reading of Section 5 reveals that it is meant to classify the acts of

violence against women already identified and defined under Section 3. Sections 5
(a) to 5 (d) seek to protect women and their children from physical violence, 5 (f),
5 (h) and 5 (i) from psychological violence, and 5 (g) from physical and sexual
violence. Meanwhile, Section 5 (e), as previously discussed, protects the woman
from acts of violence that are connnitted for the purpose of attempting to control
her conduct or actions, or make her lose her agency. To the mind of the Court,
Section 5 (e) enumerates the act of "economic abuse" defined under Section 3.
This approach commends itself to a more organized and simplified

understanding of the elements of the Section 5 offenses in relation to the types of
offenses classified in Section 3 (a) (C). While there might be some divergence
7
The good Senior Associate Justice mentioned that "[t] he above-discussed conceptual nuances are relevant since it
affects the determination on where to situate criminal intent. In my opinion, considering that (1) the punishable acts
are those provided under Section 5 of RA 9262; and (2) that the types of violence under Section 3 (a) are the resultant
effects on the part of the woman or her child, it is thus inaccurate to say that the prosecution must show, by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, that "the accused bad the intent to inflict !for example! psychological
violence to the woman x x x".
between the types of offense categorized in Section 3 (a) and the definition of the
offenses in Section 5, there is a general correspondence in the coupling or pairing
made by Justice Caguioa. The approach may not be perfect but it is a shorthand
reference to what is relevant in Section 3 (a) vis-a-vis Section 5. But of course Senior
Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe is correct in advising caution in using these
pairings when they are not on-all-fours with the specifics of an actual case.
I appreciate her opinion that here, the specific intent requirement 1s as

follows:
Instead of stating that the prosecution must show that the accused intended
to commit psychological violence, it is submitted that the more accurate
phrasing is that the prosecution must prove that the accused, by depriving AAA,
his wife, of financial support, intended to cause her mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, which thereby resulted into
psychological violence.
She also mentions that -
Overall, I respectfully submit that it is necessary to fra..ue the specific intent

not relative to the fonn of violence alleged to have resulted, but rather to the actual
purposes mentioned in the acts stated in Section 5 itself.
I believe that her formulation is in synch with my discussion above on the

specific intent mens rea, to wit:
(iv) the specific intent of an accused to deny financial support to the obligees of
support, which requires as stated the mental element of voluntary
performance of this act and the intention, purpose and knowledge to do so.
(v) the specific intent of an accused to cause the absence or inadequacy of

financial support on the part of the obligees of support, which requires not only
the mental element of voluntary performance of the act of denying financial
support but also the intention, purpose and knowledge to accomplish such
consequence of the act of denying support; the absence or inadequacy of
financial support on the part of the obligees of support must be a fact - they
must in fact be in need of the accused's financial support,
(vi) the specific intent to cause or to likely cause the obligees' mental or
emotional anguish due to the accused's denial of financial support and
its consequence of absence or inadequacy of financial support.
To be sure, the key to analyzing criminal statutes and cases is -
(1) to examine the elements of the crime by using the categories of actus
reus and mens rea, and then,
(2) to determine the actual components of these elements from the statutory
definition of the crime itself and the purpose for the enactment of the criminal
prov1s1on.
I/
This analysis could be a painstaking one but it should able to account for the
policies behind the criminal statute.
Conclusion
ALL TOLD, I concur in the result and vote to grant the petition and acquit
accused-petitioner of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 or of any other crime
necessarily included therein if any.
AMY N/!JZ;.RO-JA VIER

;_(s~ciate Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 224946 - Christian Pantonhd Acharon, Petitione1; v.

People of the Philippines, Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 9, 2021
X- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - -X
CONCURRING OPINION
ZALAMEDA, J.:
Upon meticulous study of the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, I

concur with the ponencia as regards the clarification of the construction of
Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262.
To stress, the instant case establishes that the mere failure or inability
of an accused to provide financial support to a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
does not amount to criminal liability punishable under the above-mentioned
provisions of law.
At this juncture, it must be underlined that it is the duty of this Court

to abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force. 1
In line with the purpose of our judicial system to discover the truth and see
that justice is done, 2 We must not condone the perpetuation of an inaccurate
interpretation of the law merely on the basis of a mechanical application of
the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, this Court must not be shackled by
precedents, more so when altering the same promotes judicious dispensation
of justice.
In this regard, the present interpretation laid down by the ponencia is

more faithful to the text of RA 9262; not to mention, more in consonant with
the current cultural and societal norms of the country.
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 is clear in

that to amount to criminal liability,
the denial of financial support was
made ,vith the intent to control or
restrict the woman's action
1
See Tan Chong v. Secretary ofLabo:; 79 Phil. 249 (1947) [Per J. Padilla].
2
See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 1!5525, 115543, !15544, ]]5754, 115781,
i 15852, 115873 & 11593 l, 25 August I 994 [Per J. Mendoza_!.
Reflections 2 G.R. No. 224946
It is well settled that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning or applied according to its
express terms, without any attempted interpretation, and leaving the court no
room for any extended ratiocination or rationalization. 3
On this note, Section 5(e) of RA 9262 unequivocally provides that

"[A]ttempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:" through "[D]epriving or threatening to
deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support" is the act of violence punishable by law.
Corollary to this, Section 3 (D) of RA 9262 defines economic abuse as

"acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent", which
includes withdrawal of financial support, deprivation of financial resources,
and control of the woman's own and conjugal money or properties. Without
a doubt, Section 5(e) must be read in conjunction with Section 3(D) of RA
9262 since a statute must be read or construed as a whole or in its entirety.
All parts, provisions, or sections, must be read, considered or construed
together, and each must be considered with respect to all others, and in
harmony with the whole. 4 To be sure, Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 fleshes out
Section 3 (D) of said law; thus, acts punishable under Section 5(e) of RA
9262 may also amount to economic abuse defined by Section 3 (D).
However, I agree with the ponencia's clarification that Section S(e)

must not necessarily be limited by Section 3 (D) such that the acts
specifically enumerated under Section 5(e) need not always equate to
economic abuse in order to be punishable.
Verily, the ponencia is correct in that non-payment of financial

support, to be punishable, must be done to control or attempt to control the
woman - compelling her to do something unwillingly or preventing her from
doing something which is within her right to do. For the denial of financial
3
Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enrzquez, 798 Phii. 227 (2017) lPer J. Peralta]. ·
4
Valera~ Office ofthe Ombudsman. 570 Phil. 368 (2008) [Per CJ Puno].
support to rise to the level of violence that would make a person criminally
liable under Section 5(e), RA 9262, there must be allegation and proof that it
was made with the intent to control or restrict the woman's actions.
Moreover, when said act amounts to economic abuse, the same is necessarily
punishable under Section 5(e) of RA 9262.
It is worthy to note that in the different versions of the bills

consolidated and amended to craft the present RA 9262, the same
qualification as to controlling the woman was stipulated for acts pertaining
or amounting to economic abuse. 5 Moreover, economic abuse was explicitly
and consistently defined as either "willful neglect" or "denial" to provide
support to the woman, which includes the "withdrawal" thereof. 6
Significantly, it was also highlighted in the Senate Deliberations that in the
glossary approved by the National Statistical Coordination Board for its use,
economic abuse is defined as the denial of access of control of the woman
over economic resources. 7
Criminal liability under Section 5(i)

of RA 9262 pertains to denial of
financial support
In the same vem, Section 5(i) of RA9262 1s clear as to the act

prohibited.
To reiterate, words used in law must be given their plain meaning. 8 In

this regard, Section 5(i) of RA 9262 is unmistakable that to be punishable,
the mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation is inflicted
on the woman through the denial of financial support. Indeed, Black's Law
dictionary defines "denial" as a refusal or rejection, a disavowal 9 - which
confirms the ponencia that willfulness must be proven for a conviction
under the provision in issue. Verily, to be punishable under the law, there
must be a deliberate intent to inflict psychological violence on the woman
through the willful denial of financial support.
Additionally, it bears noting that in the different versions of the bills

consolidated and amended to arrive at RA 9262, the same word - denial -
' Senate Bill No. (SB) 2723, Section 3 (D), Section 5(d); House Bill No. (HB) 6054, Section 4 (A) (3);
and HB 5516, Section 3 ( e).
6
SB 2723, Section 3 (D) (I); HB 5516, Section 3 (e); HB 6054, Section 4 (A)(3); See also HB 2858,
Section 3 (3); HB 1320, Section 3(3)(a); HB 2753, Section 4(3).
7
SB 2723, TCM, 06 May 2002, pp. 6-8.
8
People v. Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil. 407,429 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban].
' Black's Law Dictionary, p. 521.
was used as regards financial support in relation to psychological violence. 10
Mutual obligation of the spouses to

provide support
Articles 68, 70 and 195 of the Family Code provide that the husband
and wife have the mutual obligation to financially support the family. To be
sure, it is not only the husband who has the responsibility to economically
support the family. This obligation is also qualified by the resources and
necessities of both partiesY
The above discussion on the wording of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA

9262, coupled with the mutual obligation of support prescribed by the
Family Code, inevitably results to and supports the interpretation that the
mere failure to provide financial support to a woman who is his wife, fonner
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
does not constitute violence criminally punishable under the law.
Here, as articulately explained by the ponencia, private complainant

cannot simply wait for financial support from petitioner Acharon. This,
especially since Acharon was able to pay more than half of the debt and his
failure to continue providing financial support is not deliberate or malicious
as he had justifiable explanations for the same.
This construction is likewise more in keeping with the present times.

Without a doubt, women are. currently more capable of supporting
themselves and their families. Further, given the state of our economy, it is
to be expected that furnishing financial support consistently is a chailenge.
The Variance Doctrine cannot be

applied to convict an accused of
violation of Section 5(e) ofRA 9262 if
the crime charged is violation of
Section 5(i) ofRA 9262
10
SB 2723, Section 5(h); HB 5516, Section 3(i); See also HB 1308, Section 2(a) (2); HB 2753, Section
4(3).
" FAMILY CODE, Art. 194 and 201.
As embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the

Rules of Court, the variance doctrine allows the conviction of an accused for
a crime proved which is different from, but necessarily included, in the
crime charged. 12
Prevailing jurisprudence allows for the conviction of an accused

charged with violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 and for the violation of
Section 5(e) of RA 9262 due to the variance doctrine. 13 However,
considering the clarification as regards the modes of violence against women
under Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262, the ponencia establishes that the
variance doctrine may not be applied anymore for the provisions in issue.
Given the material distinctions between the acts punishable and the
specific intent behind said acts specified in Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA
9262, the ponencia is correct that the former offense cannot be considered
subsumed in the latter. 14 This, notwithstanding the common factor of denial
or deprivation of financial support.
In sum, mere failure to provide financial support to a woman as

qualified by RA 9262 does not amount to violence punishable under said
law. In order to amount to criminal liability punishable under Section 5(e) of
RA 9262, the deprivation of financial support must be done to control or
restrict the woman. On the other hand, in order to be punishable as
psychological violence in violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262, there must
be a deliberate intent to cause the victim mental or emotional anguish, or
public ridicule or humiliation through the willful denial of financial support.
Considering the stark difference between the offenses, especially as regards
the additional elements of control for Section 5(e) and mental and emotional
anguish for Section 5(i), the variance doctrin~ does not apply.
Accordingly, I concur in the result and vote to GRANT the petition

and ACQUIT petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon of violation of Section
5(i) of RA 9262.
12
People v. Caoili, 815 Phil. 839 (2017) [Per J. Tijam].
13
See Melgar v People, G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
1
' See People v Caoili, 815 Phil. (2017) [Per J. Tijam].
/ ~'
EN BANC
G.R. No. 224946 - CHRISTIAN PANTO NIAL A CHARON, Petitioner, v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 9, 2021
___ ~ -----x
x--·-------------------·-------------Q
CONCURRING OPINION
LOPEZ, M. J.:
I commend the ponente's astute discussion on the interpretation of

Sections 5(e) 1 and 5(i)2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 or the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." Similarly, I wish to offer
this separate opinion to guide the bench and the bar in the prosecution of
crimes under this special law.
The present case arose from a criminal charge against Christian

Pantonial Acharon (Acharon) for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 or
psychological violence resulting from willful refusal to provide financial
support, to wit:
That sometime in [sic] January 25, 2012, up to the present, in

Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously cause mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying financial
support to the said complainant. (Emphases supplied.) 3
The decision acquitted Acharon and ruled that Section 5(i) does not
punish mere failure or inability to provide financial support. Neither could
Acharon be held guilty under Section 5(e) applying the variance doctrine. This
SEC 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of lhe following acts: xxx
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compei or compelling tbc wom.;111 or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the. right to desist from or desist from conduct which the ,,,oman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attemptirig to restrirt or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force. physical or other harn1 0r threat of physical or other
harm. or intimidation directed agai.n:::t the woman or ch;ld. This shall include, but not limited to, the
follm.ving acts committed with the purpose or effect ofc0ntroih1ig or restricting the woman's or her
child's movernent or conduct: xxx
xx.xx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or
her famiiy, or deliberately providing the w(:iman 1s children insufficient financial support;
z
(i) Causing menial or emorional anguisi1, public ridicule or hmni!ialion to the woman or her child,
including, but nvt limited ta, repc,a:ed -.:erba1 ;:md ernotional abuse, and dcniai of financial support
or custody of minor children of hccesS to the woman's child/childrert
Rollo, p. 34. P~nm:d by Presiding Judge Evangeline l\.1. Francisco.
f
is because Sections 5(e) and 5(i) deal with different matters and penalize
distinct acts. Accordingly, the ponencio abandoned the rulings in Melgar v.
People4 and Reyes v. People5 where the Court held that a person charged under
Section 5(i) may be convicted of Section 5(e) and vice versa.
To begin, the study of Criminal Law has long divided crimes into acts
wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be
wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which
a wrongful act is done. The rule is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs;
but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the law was violated.
A common misconception is that al! mala in se crimes are found in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all maia prohibita crimes are provided by
special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under
special laws, 6 and mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC. 7 In Dungo v.
People, 8 the Court explained that the better approach to distinguish between
mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent
immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission
is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not
immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons
of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.
Applying this approach, it becomes clear that Section 5(e) or "acts

committed with the purpose or effect of controiling or restricting the woman's
or her child's movement or conduct" and Section 5(i) or acts "causing mental
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child", are inherently depraved and immoral, hence, proof of the accused's
criminal intent is required. On this note, I suggest to adopt a framework in
better understanding the anatomy of RA 9262's penal provisions.
Foremost, proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of

crimes. 9 The tern1 corpus delicti refers to the body or substance of the crime,
or the fact of its commission. 10 It consists of the criminal act and the
defendant's agency in the commission of the act. In homicide, for instance, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the victim; (b) that the death was
produced by the criminal act ofperson/s other than the deceased and was not
the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that accused committed
the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which
produced the death. 11 In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of
the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. 12 In other
words, corpus delicti primarily describes the act (objective) and the agent
4
Melgar v. People. 826 Phil. 177, 187-188 (20 i 8).
G.R. No. 232578, July 3, 2019.
6
An example is Plunder under R.i\. No. 7080, ;:is amended.
7
An example is Technical Malversation.
8
762 Phil 630. 659 (2015).
People v. Oliva. 395 Phil 265,275 (20()0).
10 Rimorin, .S'r. v. People, 450 Phil 465,474 (2003";.
11
Quinto v. Andres, 493 Phil 643, 654 (2005).
i
2 People v. Murcia, 628 Phil. 648, 657 {20 l 0).
(subjective) in relation to the actus reus (AR) and the mens rea (MR) of a
crime. Actus reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included
in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's guilty state of
mind or criminal intent accompanying the actus reus. Hence, the formula is
"Corpus Delicti= Actus Reus+ Mens Rea."
ACTUSREUS
Actus reus may have a varied fonnulation depending on the definition

of the crime. Foremost, the crime may or may not consist of a single actus
reus. An example is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies (compound crime), or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other (complex crime proper). 13 In the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one
crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. 14 Also, in special complex crimes
like robbery with rape, there is only one specific crime but the prosecution
must prove the commission of external criminal acts of robbery and rape. In
offenses that require predicate crimes like a violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act, the component crimes must be identified to prove the more
serious crime of money laundering.
Moreover, the component circumstances may be considered in

ascertaining the actus reus. To prove treason under Article 114 of the RPC,
for instance, the prosecution must prove that the accused is either a Filipino
citizen or a resident alien. On the other hand, to prove murder under Article
248 of the RPC, the qualifying circumstance of trea(;hery, abuse of superior
strength, etc., must be established. When it comes to special laws, we need to
look for the specific circumstances intended by the legislators for the
application of the law. In RA 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, the law takes into
account the age of the victim who must be below eighteen ( 18) years of age
or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves. 15 In RA 94 75 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009, 16 the physical or
mental torture must be inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person
in authority. In RA 7877 or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, 17 the
offender must be a person who has authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in an e:ducalion, fraining, or work environment.
Lastly, the actus reus may include the result oi- the consequences of
the crime. In other jurisdictions, criminal offenses are classified as '"conduct
crimes" or "resulting crimes." In conduct crimes, proof of the commission of
the prohibited conduct only is required. On the other hand, resulting crimes
13
Articie 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
14
People v. Ne/mida, 694 Phil. 529, 569(2012).
15
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, Republic Act
No. 7610, June 17, ]992.
16
Anti-Torture Act of 2009, Republic Act No. 9745, November 10. 2009.
17
t
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of I 995, Republic t\ct Ne. 7877, February 14, 1995.
necessitate proof that the harmful act leads to a specified consequence. 18 In

Philippine Criminal Law, physical injuries under Articles 263, 265, and 266
of the RPC is considered a resulting crime. The determination of whether
"physical injuries" is serious, less serious, or slight depends upon the extent
of the resulting injuries arising from the infliction of harm to the victim. In
Article 263, for example, the crime is always serious physical injuries when
it resulted in the insanity, imbecility, impotency, or blindness of the victim.
Taken together, the comprehensive anatomy of actus reus can be

summarized as: "Actus Reus = act/omission + circumstances +
results/consequences. 19 Corollarily, the actus reus of RA 9262's penal
provisions may be analyzed using this framework as follows:
RA 9262's ACTUS REUS=

Acts/Omissions Circumstances Results/Consequences
(Section 5 of RA 9262) + (Section 3 of RA 9262) + (Section 3 in relation to
Section 6 of RA 9262)
Section 5 of RA 9262 refers to the specific acts of violence committed

against women and children, to wit:
SEC 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -

The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her chiid;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or bcr child physical

harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical

harm;
( d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent

physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or

her child to engage in conduct which the woman her
child has the right to desist from or to desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right
to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
thewoman''s or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
hal"m or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, but not limited fo, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restrkfoig the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
18
https:i/www.lexisnexis.en.uk/legallguidance/causa1krn-intervening-acts-in-crirninal-cases.
19
Criminal Law (Fifth Edition), Janet Loveless, p. 3S.
( i) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the

woman or her child of custody or access to
her/his :family;

woman or hel" children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman

or her child of a legal right;

legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own money
or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal
or common money, or properties;
(t) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on

oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child

to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
harm, or through intimidation directed against the
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,

personally, or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
(!) Stalking or following the woman or her child in

public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the

residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the

property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal

belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any forn1 of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emoti.onal anguish, public

ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, hnt not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial offimmdal support or
custody of minor dilk:!ren (Jr denial of access to the
woman's chi!d/childrn;;. (Emphases supplied.)
l
Section 3 of RA 9262 illustrates the different forms of violence, and

enumerates the circumstances surrmmding the criminal acts. Likewise,
i
Section 3 necessitates that the commission of the specific acts results in

some form of violence, whether physical, sexual, psychological or economic
suffering, making RA 9262 a "resulting crime."
SEC 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence

against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion. harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: x x x
(Emphases supplied.)
In relation to Section 3, the provisions of Section 6 impose the penalties

according to the crime committed, thus:
SECTION 6. Penalties. -The crime of violence against women and

their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to
the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section S(a) constituting attempted,

frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious
physical injuries shall have the penalty of prision mayor: those
constituting less serious physical iajuries shall be punished by
prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries
shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling w1der Section S(b) shall be punished by

imprisonment of two (2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty
for the consun1111ated crime as specified in the precc:ding paragraph
but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling umler Section 5( c) and 5( d) shall be punished

by arresto ma.var;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5( c) shall be punished by prisian

correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(i) shall be punished by arresto

n1ayor;
(e) Acts falling undc,r Section 5(g) shail be punished by prision

ma._,vor;
Concuning Opinion 7 G.R. No. 224946
(f) Acts falling l!nder Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman 0' child is pregnant
or committed in the presence of her child, the pe1ialty to be applied
shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribf'd in the section.
'
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine

m the amount of not less than One Hundred Thousand pesos
(~l 00,000.00) but not more than Three Hundred TI1ousand pesos
(~300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or
psychiatric treatment and shall repo1t compliance to the court.
MENS REA
Anent the "mens rea" of a crime, a distinction must be made between

general intent and specific intent. General criminal intent pertains to the dolo
required under Article 420 of the RPC. It means the accused purpose to do an
act prohibited by law regardless of the result. On the other hand, specific
criminal intent refers to the particular intent comprising the definition of the
crime, as for instance, the specific criminal intent to kill or animus inter_fzcendi
in homicide or murder. 21 In robbery, the specific intent is "gain", in illegal
detention the "deprivation of liberty", in mutilation the deprivation of
"essential organ of reproduction" is involved. In this regard, I agree with
Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Benabe that the specific intent of
the crime of violence against women and children must be framed to the actual
purposes mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262.
In Dinamling v. People, 22 the Court laid down the elements of a

violation of Section S(i) of RA 9262, to wit:
( 1) The offended party is a woman and1or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or fonner wife of the offender, or
is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such otfender has a
common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may
be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
tamily abode:
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or

emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or

humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
20 RPC, Article 4 provides that "[c]dmina! liability shall be incrnTed: (I) by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; and (2) by any person
performing an act which would be an offense ag,:i.irist persons ur prop~rty, 1.vere it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishrnent or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
21
People v. Malinao, 467 Phil 432. 446-447 (2004).
" 761 Phil 356. 373 (20 I 5).
i
children or similar such acts or om1ss10ns. (Emphases

supplied.)
The first and second elements refer to the "circumstances" described

in Section 3 of RA 9262. The third and fourth elements pertain to the specific
"acts" that the accused committed cmTesponding to those enumerated in
Section 5 of the law. Also, the third element evinces the mens rea that is the
specific intent to cause "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation'' resulting from the infliction of some fonn of violence to the
woman or her child. To reiterate, a violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262
requires a causal connection between the actus reus and the mens rea.
Otherwise, no crime of violence against a woman or her children under this
provision is committed.
Here, the corpus delicti for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 was
not fully established. As regards the actus reus, the surrounding
"circumstances" that the offended party is a woman and that the accused and
the victim are husband and wife were undisputed. Yet, the evidence of the
prosecution fell short to prove the specific "act", "results/consequences",
and "mens rea" constituting the crime. As the ponencia aptly observed, the
charge against Acharon alleged the act of "denying.financial support" which
connotes "willful refusal" to give support. Further, "from the plain meaning
ofthe words used, the act punished bJ' Section 5 (i) is, therefore, dolo in nature
- there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in
order to consummate the crime. "As such, mere failure or inability to provide
financial support is not punishable. The records reveal that Acharon
"successfully did for a time, to provide financial support. " Acharon "failed
to continue providing support only when his apartment in Brunei was razed
by fire, and when he met a vehicular accident. " At the trial, the complainant
even admitted that Acharon "already paid Pll,000.00 out of the
!'85, 000. 000" of their debt. Differently stated, there was no willful refusal on
the part of Acharon to give financial support. Similarly, the Information
against Acharon alleged that he "cause mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to his wife." Under the proposed framework, this
pertains to the "results/consequences " of the supposed denial of financial
support as well as the mens rea of the crime. Nevertheless, the prosecution
failed to substantiate this allegation.
VARIAN CE DOCTRINE
I agree with the ponencia that the variance doctrine is inapplicable since
Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262 deal with different matters and penalize
distinct acts. However, I wish to point out that the application of the variance
doctrine in Reyes v. People23 vvhere the Court held that a person charged under
Section 5(i) may be convicted of Section 5(e) and vice versa, is a mere obiter
dictum. In that case, the accused was originally charged under Section S(e) of
" G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 20 i 9.

RA 9262. Later, the accused moved to quash the infonnation because its
allegations do not constitute the offense. However, the trial court ruled that
the contents of the information sufficiently charged a violation of Section 5(i)
and not Section 5(e). Consequently, prior to the accused's arraignment, the
trial court directed the prosecutor's office to amend the Information by
designating the crime as under Section 5(i). After trial, the accused was
convicted with a violation of Section 5(i). Obviously, the trial comi did not
rely on the variance doctrine because the information itself sufficiently
alleged the elements of Section 5(i). tvioreover, the prosecution established
that the accused deliberately refused to provide financial support after
admitting that he was disappointed to find out that his wife filed a bigamy
case against him. The Court's statement in Reyes that it "agrees with the
observation of the CA that ifproperly indicted, Reyes can also be convicted
of violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse
against AAA '' is rn.ereiy an obiter dictum and not the controlling doctrine.
Strictly speaking, there is nothing to abandon.
Lastly, the variance doctrine is inapplicable only to some violations of

RA 9262 like Sections 5(e) and 5(i), and vice versa. The variance doctrine
may still be possibly applied to other punishable acts that are relatively
included or necessarily included and defined in Section 5 of RA 9262. For
instance, a person charged under Section 5(a) or "causing physical harm to
the woman or her child" can be convicted of violation of Section 5(c) or
"attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm. " - Section 5( c)
is necessarily included in Section 5(a). This is on the assumption that the
greater offense of consummated crime includes the lesser offense of an
attempted crime.
FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to GRANT the petition.

174.5 People v. Acharon, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021

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31\epublic of tbe llbilippin

CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL G.R. No. 224946

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45

Rollo, pp. 11-28.

petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon (Christian) for violation of Section 5(i)

An Information was filed against Christian, the accusatory portion of

That sometime in (sic) January 25, 2012, up to the present, in

Moreover, while in Brunei, [Christian] maintained a paramour in the

On cross, she stated that when [Christian] left in December 2011,

On the other hand, the version of the defense, as likewise summarized

Christian Acharon vehemently denied the accusations against him.

On cross, he testified that [when he met a minor motor accident, he

Ruling Of The RTC

supervision of any government accredited clinical psychologist/psychiatrist

Aggrieved, Christian filed an appeal with the CA.

In its Decision 12 dated February 17, 2016, the CA denied Christian's

Christian then filed this present appeal.

Whether the CA erred in finding Christian guilty of causmg

The Court's Ruling

The present case is limited only to

At the outset, it must be emphasized that Christian's criminal liability

presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court now proceeds to determine

Mere failure or an inability to

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts

It is well-settled t.1-iat "criminal and penal statutes must be strictly

In this connection, the Court deems it proper to clarify, as Associate

It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or

insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be

"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of

To be sure, under the Family Code, the obligation to support is imposed

30 DinamlinJ; v. People, supra note 19, at 375.

It is also worth emphasizing that the obligation to give support is

The elements of a violation of Section 5(i), insofar as it deals with

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2)The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender,

(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies

(4)The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children

While Christian eventually failed to continue providing financial

,., FAMILY CODE, Art. 194.

Neither could Christian be held

The Court is aware that cases involving denial of financial support

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - xx x

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually

In Melgar v. People35 (Melgar), the Court explained that the variance

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar

The above ruling in Melgar was affirmed subsequently in the case of

The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly

Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section 5 (e) ofR.A. No.

Thus, Sections 5(e) and 5(i), under current jurisprudence, ultimately

The current judicial interpretation that denial of financial support, by

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually

support legally due her or her family,

The language of Section 5(e) above is clear: the denial of financial