Money Judgement
Money Judgement
Money Judgement
NOW COMES the United States of America, by and through Dena J. King,
United States Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina, pursuant to Fed.
requests that the Court enter a $3,500,000.00 forfeiture money judgment against
$3.5 million from the fraud. Thus, based upon the record, Section 982(a)(2), the
I. BACKGROUND
(Doc. 1) charging him with bank fraud. Specifically, as set forth in the Factual
Defendant effectively owned, managed, and rented through various nominees and
companies. See Factual Basis (Doc. 4 at ⁋ 4). Through this scheme, Defendant
“and his co-conspirators closed on at least sixteen loans from financial institutions,
totaling over $3.5 million, to purchase real estate.” Id. at ⁋ 6. “Once acquired,
order to illustrate the scheme, the Factual Basis identifies the specifics of the
The properties that Defendant purchased via the fraud were, as noted above,
often purchased via nominees and have all been refinanced and/or tied-up in
Government now requests a forfeiture money judgment justified by the Factual Basis
Any person who is convicted of violating the bank fraud statute shall forfeit
to the United States any property which constitutes or is derived from gross proceeds
576 Fed. Appx. 932, 937-38 (11th Cir. 2014) (gross bank fraud proceeds subject to
forfeiture); United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 101-102 (2d Cir. 2013) (proceeds
means receipts and not profits; forfeiture of loan proceeds obtained directly and
indirectly is appropriate); United States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir.
2011) (“‘[P]roceeds’ of a fraudulently obtained loan equal the amount of the loan.”);
United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 794, 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant not entitled
to set-off for loan proceeds that he repaid); United States v. Farkas, 2011 WL
5101752, **4-5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2011) (same), affirmed, 474 Fed. Appx. 349 (4th
Cir. 2012).
evidence. United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 669 (4th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1995). The Court’s “determination may be
information submitted by the parties and accepted by the court as relevant and
Appx. 349, 360 (4th Cir. 2013) (court may rely on trial record to determine
forfeiture). The Government may satisfy the preponderance burden by both direct
and circumstantial evidence. United States v. St. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir.
2007).
U.S.C. § 853 support imposition of a money judgment when the Court finds the
amount of money that a Defendant will be ordered to pay 1 and when directly
forfeitable assets have been rendered unavailable.2 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2; see also
21 U.S.C. § 853; United States v. Chamberlain, 868 F.3d 290, 296 (4th Cir. 2017)
1
Since a money judgment is only collectible via the forfeiture laws, and is not a
traditional judgment in the sense that it is not collectible via the Federal Debt
Collection Act, a money judgment is essentially a placeholder as to the maximum
amount of substitute property that the Government may forfeit from a Defendant
who has otherwise rendered forfeitable property out of reach.
2
The substitute property provisions apply if, as a result of any act or omission of
defendant, the otherwise forfeitable property cannot be located upon the exercise of
due diligence; has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; has
been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; has been substantially diminished
in value; or has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided
without difficulty. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1)-(2). In a case such as this, in which
property was purchased in nominee names, refinanced, and placed in complex
judicial proceedings tied to foreclosure and bankruptcy, these substitute property
provisions are satisfied.
4
money judgments in Fourth Circuit), citing, United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262,
272 (4th Cir. 2003). Rule 32.2 provides in pertinent part as follows: “[i]f the
government seeks a personal money judgment, the court must determine the amount
32.2(b)(1)(A); see also United States v. Butler, 578 Fed. Appx. 178, 182 (4th Cir.
2014) (district court must find nexus between forfeiture calculation and crime).
defendant acquired and such liability cannot be imposed on a defendant for property
solely acquired by a co-conspirator and not defendant, courts have construed the
United States, 955 F.3d 171, 175 (1st Cir. 2020) (collecting some cases on receipt
controlled); see United States v. Carpenter, 941 F.3d 1, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 2019)
on the word, “acquire”; reasoning that defendant liable for proceeds under his
control at some point); United States v. Jergensen, 797 Fed. Appx. 4, 8 (2d Cir.
2019) (each defendant liable for transfer that he approved); United States v.
that he controlled); United States v. Chittenden, 896 F.3d 633, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2018)
As set forth above, the law authorizes forfeiture of gross proceeds of bank
fraud in this case, and Defendant controlled the conspiracy, its entities that acquired
real estate with the proceeds, and the real estate itself. So, gross proceeds are the
Defendant coordinated the scheme and controlled the real estate, he directly or
indirectly received. And, as the sentencing record will reflect and the Government
anticipates that Defendant will agree, all of the properties actually purchased with
the fraud proceeds have been rendered essentially out of reach by additional loans
and refinancing, foreclosure actions, bankruptcy actions, and straw owners created
See United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, 143-44 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing
that fact “that defendant is indigent or otherwise lacks adequate assets to satisfy a
judgment does not operate to frustrate entry of a forfeiture order” since forfeiture is
possession).
III. CONCLUSION
DENA J. KING
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
s/ Benjamin Bain-Creed
Florida Bar # 0021436
Assistant United States Attorney
Suite 1650, Carillon Building
227 West Trade Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
Telephone: (704) 344-6222
Fax: (704) 344-6629
Email: benjamin.bain-creed@usdoj.gov