G.R. No.

135904           January 21, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Alvin Tan (hereafter TAN)
seeks his acquittal by a reversal of the 29 June 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
1 

CR No. 20688 which affirmed his conviction for violating Republic Act No. 6539, An Act Preventing
and Penalizing Carnapping. TAN's motion for reconsideration of said decision and motion for oral
2 

arguments were denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its 6 October 1998
resolution. Said decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 19 December 1994
3 

judgment of conviction against TAN by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-45449.

TAN's indictment for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 reads as follows:
4 

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) Mitsubishi
Gallant car colored blue, bearing Plate No. CGS-723 owned by one PHILIP SEE, of
undetermined value, to the damage and prejudice of said Philip See.

Upon his arraignment on 14 July 1993 and with the assistance of counsel, Tan pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial immediately ensued as the parties waived the holding of a preliminary conference.

The trial court's terse recapitulation of the prosecution evidence proceeded in this manner: 5

. . . [P]rivate complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a 1987 Mitsubishi Gallant four-
door valued at P420,000.00, bearing plate no. CGS-723, colored blue, and with motor no.
4G32-FG2704 and serial/chassis no. A161UL-3011. Sometime in March 1992, accused Alvin
Tan was introduced to Philip by Alvin's fiancee, one Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and
Alvin became friends and started to see each other on several occasions thereafter.

On November 7, 1992, about 9:30 a.m., Philip together with his wife Ruby See and Robert
Chua (a neighbor) was at his place of residence . . . when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it
known to Philip that he was intending to buy Philip's aforesaid car and that he wanted to test-
drive it. On account of their friendship and believing Alvin's assurance that he would return
the car after he shall have test-driven it, Philip granted Alvin's request . . . . On thus getting
hold of the car, Alvin sped away and never returned. In vain, Philip waited for Alvin to show
up and return the car; Alvin simply did not show up, much less cause the return of the car.

Thus, Philip started to call up and look for Alvin at his office at Roosevelt Avenue, QC, but
Alvin avoided him by refusing to answer the telephone calls or pretending he was not
around; and Philip's attempts to see Alvin at his office similarly proved futile, for whenever
Philip would go to said office, Alvin would refuse to see him. Dismayed though he was, Philip
desisted as long as he could from reporting and complaining about the matter to the
authorities; Philip still believed that being a friend, Alvin eventually would come around to
returning the car to him. Meanwhile, sometime on March 5, 1993, with the assistance of
 some personnel of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Philip was able to cause the car's
1993 renewal registration in the absence of the vehicle and he was issued the corresponding
official receipt therefor.
1âwphi1.nêt

Sometime on May 19, 1993, Philip again tried to see Alvin at his place at Roosevelt. Again
Philip was told that Alvin was not around. One of Alvin's employees, however, advised Philip
to the effect that the car was parked and hidden right behind Alvin's warehouse. The location
of the warehouse having been given to him, Philip went to the place and at a distance of
some five feet, he saw the vehicle parked at the rear end of the warehouse. To his shock
and surprise, he saw that parts of the car, like the bumper, a door, and several interior
accessories, had been dismantled and were already missing. Worse, several pieces of wood
were piled on top of the car as if purposely hide and conceal it from view.

Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or about June 2, 1993, formally lodged a complaint for
carnapping against Alvin before the QC police station. Some two days later, or on June 4,
1993, Philip reported the loss of his car to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Traffic
Management Command and he accordingly signed the corresponding complaint sheets.
Too, an alarm for the subject car was issued. To his further shock and consternation, Philip
was informed by the PNP's Highway Patrol Group (HPG) that somebody had applied for a
clearance to sell the car and that the applicant was made to appear as one Philip See. . . .
Philip denied his alleged signature on the application and also denied having supposedly
applied for clearance to sell his vehicle.

Meanwhile, acting on the complaint lodged by Philip against Alvin before the QC police
station 1, the police authorities scheduled a visit to the place of Alvin, with Philip being asked
by them to pinpoint and identify Alvin in the course thereof. Accordingly, at Alvin's place, he
was identified and invited by the police to the station for investigation. While still at Alvin's
office, Philip saw on top of Alvin's table what Philip believed to be accessories from his car,
consisting of a two-way radio antenna and car stereo, which appeared to him to have been
dismantled from the subject car.

At that time Alvin took the car supposedly to test-drive it on November 7, 1992, the car was
in top condition, had low mileage, was "fully loaded" with complete interior accessories
including an imported Kenwood stereo, and had imported magwheels.

Expectedly, Tan impugned the prosecution's version and presented a completely diverse tale.

Firstly, TAN asserted that Philip See (hereafter SEE) filed the complaint to purposely collect a debt
from him and wittingly use the court as collecting agent. Secondly, TAN claimed that SEE instituted
the complaint in revenge of the quarrels they had over TAN's girlfriend whom SEE wooed, and (2) in
retaliation against the complaint for grave threats and illegal possession of firearms filed by one of
TAN's employees against SEE.

TAN then traced this legal predicament to the time when his girlfriend introduced him to SEE in
March 1992. TAN and SEE instantly became friends for they shared a similar acumen for business
and passion for target shooting. Inevitably, they engaged in and entered into several business
transactions which resulted in TAN's indebtedness to SEE in the amount of P800,000. Inspite of this,
SEE still offered to sell the subject Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for the amount of P280,000. TAN
declined the offer. SEE persisted to the extent that he brought the car to TAN's residence on 26
November 1992 and generously suggested that he would just add into the latter's existing
indebtedness to him the car's purchase price.
Sometime in February 1993, SEE tried to collect the car's purchase price but TAN had still no funds.
So TAN suggested that he would apply with a bank for a car loan using the car as security and apply
the proceeds of said loan in payment for the car. SEE agreed. Subsequently, TAN submitted in his
name a loan application with the BPI Family Bank in Makati. In compliance with the requirements of
the loan application, SEE personally supervised the car's appraisal and inspection on 19 March
1993. TAN additionally maintained that he and SEE signed a deed of sale covering the subject
automobile but that TAN did not receive a copy of said deed upon SEE's pretext that he would use it
for facilitation of the loan.

The bank approved the loan application but only in the amount of P129,000. Naturally, SEE
considered the amount insufficient and hence, refused to accept the terms of the loan.
Consequently, TAN did not seek the release of the loan.

The friendship eventually soured and the resulting "misunderstanding" with SEE impelled TAN on 19
May 1993 to instruct his warehouse overseer to return the car to SEE's residence. TAN's employee
drove the car to SEE's house, parked the car outside the gate and then handed over the keys of the
car to SEE's wife, Ruby.

Tan was therefore surprised when on 14 June 1993, police officers arrived at his residence and
invited him to the police station; this, to TAN's additional bewilderment, was in connection with SEE's
complaint for the carnapping of the car he already returned. TAN peacefully went with the police
authorities to the station.
6

Weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial court believed in the prosecution's version,
particularly in SEE's clear, positive, and straightforward account — which said court found amply
demonstrated — that SEE had withdrawn the consent initially given to TAN when the latter went
beyond test-driving and appropriated the car for his own use and benefit. To the trial court, TAN's
failure to return the car and his consequent appropriation thereof constituted unlawful taking — the
gravamen of the crime charged. It then concluded that TAN was obviously actuated by intent to gain.
The trial court then considered as completely undeserving of belief, TAN's supposition that despite
his heavy indebtedness and given his increasing difficulty to pay his loans, SEE had benignly
extended him credit, delivered to him the subject car and bestowed upon him the ultimate privilege
of paying the car at his convenience. Thus, in a decision promulgated on 19 January 1994, the trial
court convicted TAN, the dispositive portion of which read as follows:7

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alvin Tan y Lagamayo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of carnapping charged herein, defined and punished in Sec. 2, in
connection with Sec. 14, both of Rep. Act No. 6539 . . . and, accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from fourteen years, eight
months, and fifteen days as minimum, to seventeen years and four months as maximum; to
restore to the offended party, Philip See, the subject car . . . or in default thereof, to
indemnify said offended party in the sum of four hundred twenty thousand pesos; and, to pay
the costs, without prejudice to the application of Rep. Act No. 6127 in accused's favor.

TAN filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which was granted by
the trial court in its 4 July 1994 order. SEE then moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the
trial court in its 1 March 1995 order. SEE challenged these aforementioned orders of the trial court in
a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. On 23 August 1995, the appellate court gave
due course to and granted the petition. TAN assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals through a
petition for review before the Supreme Court, which promptly dismissed the petition. 8
Subsequently, based on TAN's "Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam," the trial court ordered
the elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, TAN challeged the Court of Appeals' affirmance of his, conviction. He argues before this
Court that the appellate court erred in (1) ignoring the peculiar nature of the law on carnapping, (2)
disregarding that there was no unlawful taking, and (3) rejecting circumstances on record which, if
considered, would be sufficient to acquit him on reasonable doubt.

In invoking the specificity of the carnapping law, TAN contends that the Court of Appeals should not
have employed as bases for his conviction the basic principles in theft enunciated in (1) People v.
Roxas, where rice was received, carted away and consumed, (2) U.S. v. de Vera, where a bar of
9  10 

gold and P200 in bank notes were received for examination and changing into coins but instead
appropriated, and (3) People v. Trinidad, where a ring was received for pledging but was sold and
11 

the proceeds thereof appropriated for the personal use of receiver.

A cursory reading of the pertinent portion of the challenged Court of Appeals decision reveals that
the basic principles of theft alluded to pertain to the signification of unlawful taking and as to when
this takes place. Thus, the Court in Roxas, de Vera and Trinidad declared that "the unlawful taking or
deprivation may occur at or soon after the transfer of physical possession" where "an act done by
the receiver soon after the actual transfer of possession resulted in unlawful taking." In such a case,
"the article was taken away, not received, although at the beginning the article was in fact given and
received." Hence, in applying these principles, the Court of Appeals adopted the theory of the
Solicitor General that SEE entrusted his car to TAN merely for test driving, and the latter initially
received the same for that purpose only; TAN must perforce be deemed to have unlawfully "taken"
the car soon after the test-driving for he failed to show-up and return said vehicle. 12

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crimes of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent of gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law
13 

with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
motor vehicles. Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken,
14 

with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without violence
or intimidation of persons or with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping
law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery
which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.

Obviously, TAN's proposition that the rudiments of theft, particularly as regards unlawful taking,
should not have been applied by the Court of Appeals, was misplaced. We shall see later on that the
appellate court's interpretation redounded in TAN's favor. As an element common to theft, robbery
and carnapping, unlawful taking — its import, intention and concept — should be considered as also
common to these crimes. However, we reject the Court of Appeals' acceptance, hook, line and
15 

sinker of the Office of the Solicitor General's thesis that there was unlawful taking in this case.

SEE asserted that on 7 November 1992 he turned over possession of his Mitsubishi Galant to TAN
for test-driving only, but the latter did not return the same after the lapse of not just several hours but
a number of months. SEE formally filed the complaint for carnapping on 2 June 1993. In the
meantime, during the seven-month interval when the car was allegedly in TAN's possession, (1)
SEE had persistently and perseveringly attempted to talk to and see TAN but the latter adamantly
refused to respond to his telephone calls or personally receive him in his visits; (2) SEE was able to
register the car with the LTO on 5 March 1993; and (3) SEE had seen his car on 19 May 1993 from
a distance of some five feet, parked at the rear of TAN's warehouse and in the initial stages of
dismantling. SEE also believed that "being a friend, [TAN] eventually would come around to
returning the car to him."
16

Even solely from this testimony, this Court finds that there was no unlawful taking. A felonious taking
may be defined as the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of movable property
without his privity and consent and without animus revertendi. Thus, an unlawful taking takes place
17 

when the owner or juridical possessor does not give his consent to the taking; or, if the consent was
given, it was vitiated; or in the case of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera, where an act by the receiver
soon after the actual transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking. In the last scenario, the
receiver's act could be considered as having been executed without the consent of the giver. SEE's
testimony clearly evinced his assent to TAN's taking of the car not only at the time he yielded the
physical possession thereof for the alleged test-driving but even thereafter, for he neither withheld
his consent nor withdrew the same during the seven month period the car was with TAN. At the very
least, SEE tolerated TAN's possession of the car. A contrary conclusion inspires only disbelief. For if
the car was truly carnapped, why did SEE wait for seven months before he reported the same?
Further, TAN's alleged refusal to meet SEE despite his repeated attempts to do so should have
sufficiently alerted him of the former's supposed malevolent intent, yet he still did not report the
taking. Even if he failed to report the taking, months after the alleged test-driving, he had allegedly
seen his car in the initial stages of dismemberment on 19 May 1993 yet, again, he did not report the
carnapping on that day nor on the next, but much later on 7 June 1993 or almost a month thereafter.

SEE said he believed and expected that the car would inevitably be returned to him. This is not only
unsatisfactory but irreconcilable and contradictory with his imputations of carnapping. For if he
believed that the vehicle would be returned to him for friendship's sake then he could not have at the
same time also believed that this friend carnapped his car. Clearly, SEE's behavior immediately
preceding, contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged unlawful taking was definitely not the
distraught conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He was even able to register the averred
stolen vehicle without sounding the alarm.

A fortiori, the cases of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera cited by the Court of Appeals have no
application here as no unlawful deprivation or taking of SEE's possession of, enjoyment and benefit
over the car occurred soon or long after his initial consent to the transfer thereof. Neither was there
an act executed by TAN soon after the alleged test-driving that would constitute unlawful taking.
These conclusions are buttressed by TAN's testimony, duly supported by documentary evidence,
that SEE cooperated with him for the availment of a car loan with the BPI Family Bank in Makati, and
that SEE personally attended to the inspection and appraisal of the subject car. The records,
therefore, do not support the finding of carnapping.

Noticeably, the Court of Appeals' erroneous contrary conclusions were heavily predicated on the
arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General that TAN's failure to show a written deed of sale and
to seek the release of his car loan "were inconsistent with [the latter's] idea of sale." It then posed
four questions which it concluded "certainly debilitated the pretensions of [TAN]," thus:
18

If there was really a deed of sale, why could not [TAN] present a copy thereof?

Assuming arguendo that [SEE] got [TAN's] copy of the deed of sale, why did he not secure
another copy from the notary public who notarized the same? Or, better still, why did he not
present the notary public to testify on the fact of the sale?
 Why did [SEE] have to sell the subject car to [TAN] at P280,000.00 when the latter was
admittedly indebted to the former to the tune of P800,000?

If [TAN] really bought the subject car from private complainant, why did he have to return the
same (car) to the lafter on May 14, 1993?

From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce that the Court of Appeals simply equated the lack of a
written deed of sale to SEE's lack of consent to TAN's taking of the car. But the mere absence of a
written contract of sale in this case does not necessarily mean that SEE did not also consent to the
taking nor that TAN's possession of the car was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus
probandi of showing that TAN's taking was unlawful. What took place in these proceedings was that
the appellate court magnified the weakness of the defense and overlooked the prosecution's failure
to discharge the onus probandi — to show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of carnapping
was indeed perpetrated. In short, the Court of Appeals and the trial court simply believed and
accepted the prosecution's tale. It ignored the basic legal precepts that conviction rests upon the
strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense;
and assuming that the evidence of the accused is weak, the same is no reason to convict,
especially, as in this case, where the case of the prosecution is not strong enough to sustain a
conviction. To reiterate, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, and unless the State
19 

succeeds in proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the constitutional
presumption of innocence applies. A conviction in criminal cases must rest on nothing less than the
moral certainty of guilt. 20

There is no quarrel in the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, for upon this
principle hinges the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law. However, it appears on record that the
appellate court overlooked, ignored, and disregarded some fact and circumstance of weight or
significance that if considered would have altered the result. Cogent reasons therefore exist
justifying the disregard of the findings of the appellate court, superseding the same with our own
determinations and conclusions, and ordering the reversal of the questioned decision and resolution
of said Court of Appeals. 21

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the herein impugned 29 June 1998 decision and 6
October 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment convicting
accused-appellant Alvin Tan of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; a new judgment is entered ACQUITTING said accused-appellant on ground of
reasonable doubt. 1âwphi1.nêt

Costs de Officio.

SO ORDERED.