Borrowing Mouths To Speak On Xinjiang

Borrowing mouths
to speak on Xinjiang
Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang
and Daria Impiombato
RS OF ASPI
EA
ST
TWENTY Y
Policy Brief
RATEGY
20
01 - 2 021
Report No. 55/2021
About the authors
Fergus Ryan is a senior analyst with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.
Ariel Bogle was an analyst with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.
Nathan Ruser is a researcher with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.
Albert Zhang is a researcher with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.
Daria Impiombato is a researcher with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Tilla Hoja for all of their work on this project. Thank you also to all of those who peer-reviewed the work
and provided valuable feedback that improved it, including Fergus Hanson and Danielle Cave.
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre receives funding from a variety of sources, including sponsorship, research and project support
from governments, industry and civil society. No specific funding was received to fund the production of this report.
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No specific funding was received to

fund production of this report.
Borrowing mouths
to speak on Xinjiang
Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang
and Daria Impiombato
Policy Brief
Report No. 55/2021
Contents
Executive summary 3
Key findings 4
Research methodology 5
Introduction: ‘Borrowing mouths to speak’ 6
The online influencer ecosystem 8
Case study 1: The ‘A Date with China’ propaganda campaign 13

The influencers 15
Case study 2: The ‘YChina’ media tour 20

YChina business structure 22
Case study 3: Mapping the strategic geography of influencers’ trips to Xinjiang 25
Platforms’ inconsistencies in labelling state accounts 29
Conclusion34
Notes35
Acronyms and abbreviations 41
2 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Executive summary
This report explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses foreign social media influencers
to shape and push messages domestically and internationally about Xinjiang that are aligned with its
own preferred narratives.
Our research has found key instances in which Chinese state entities have supported influencers in
the creation of social media content in Xinjiang, as well as amplified influencer content that supports
pro-CCP narratives. That content broadly seeks to debunk Western media reporting and academic
research, refute statements by foreign governments and counter allegations of widespread human
rights abuses in Xinjiang. Often, such content is then promoted by party-state media1 and diplomatic
accounts across major international social media networks and in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
briefings.2 This trend is particularly notable given the difficulty faced by journalists reporting in
Xinjiang.3
Our research also examines how the CCP’s use of foreign influencers presents a growing challenge
to global social media platforms, and in particular their efforts to identify and label state-affiliated
accounts.
This report focuses on the promotion of foreign influencers who disseminate content about Xinjiang
on US-based social media and content networks, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram,
as well as on Chinese platforms such as Bilibili. The report analyses this unique online influencer
ecosystem and examines three in-depth case studies with a focus on Xinjiang-focused foreign
influencer content and the amplification of that content by Chinese state entities.
The Chinese party-state continues to deny allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including
forced labour,4 mass detention5 and cultural erasure.6 Previous work by ASPI’s International Cyber
Policy Centre (ICPC) has found Chinese party-state entities using US social media networks in an
effort to create greater ambiguity about the situation in Xinjiang, push a counter-narrative and amplify
disinformation.7 It has also found that the CCP uses tactics, including leveraging US social media
platforms, to criticise and smear Uyghur victims, journalists and researchers who work on this topic,
as well as their organisations.8 Other tactics have included temporal and narrative alignment between
pro-CCP social media influencers and state entities (for example, targeting the BBC over its reporting
on allegations of systematic rape in Xinjiang’s internment camps, among other stories)9 as well as the
amplification of content that depicts Uyghurs as broadly supportive of the Chinese Government’s
policies in Xinjiang.10
3
Key findings
• Foreign social media influencers are creating content about Xinjiang that’s being used as part of
a wider, global propaganda push by the Chinese state to counter critical reporting about human
rights abuses in the region, often via amplification on US-based social media platforms.
• Some foreign influencers who are promoting CCP propaganda operate outside traditional
journalistic professional standards and aren’t disclosing key conflicts of interest (such as their
participation in state-backed and funded tours of Xinjiang).
• Our data collection has found that, between January 2020 and August 2021, 156 Chinese
state-controlled accounts on US-based social media platforms have published at least 546
Facebook posts, Twitter posts and shared articles from CGTN, Global Times, Xinhua or China Daily
websites that have amplified Xinjiang-related social media content from 13 influencer accounts.
More than 50% of that activity occurred on Facebook.
• As a part of our data collection, ASPI ICPC created a network diagram to help illustrate this unique
and burgeoning ecosystem (Figure 2, page 10). This diagram includes Chinese state media and
diplomatic accounts that share and promote content by foreign social media influencers.
An interactive version of this diagram is available online here.
• Video plays a key role in this ecosystem. Videos featuring foreign social media influencers are often
the preferred content that Chinese state entities repackage and boost online.
• ASPI analysed hundreds of YouTube videos depicting trips to Xinjiang made by foreign influencers.
Just as many tours of Xinjiang are largely directed by state-controlled institutions and government
bodies, our research suggests that some of the locations shown in the foreign influencers’
videos are chosen by state entities. When the locations weren’t chosen by the Chinese state, our
analysis found that detention centres were sometimes accidentally filmed. Our analysis of one
video, filmed by a ‘vlogger’ from Singapore, found that he unintentionally filmed seven separate
detention facilities in a 15-minute YouTube video showing his airliner’s descent into Ürümqi
International Airport.
• Our research has found that labelling schemes adopted by some video-sharing and social media
platforms to identify state-affiliated accounts are inconsistently applied to media outlets and
journalists working for those outlets. In addition, few platforms appear to have clear policies on
content from online influencers or vloggers whose content may be facilitated by state-affiliated
media, through sponsored trips, for example.
• The type of manipulation of the information environment described in this report can be harder to
detect and can circumvent efforts by social media companies to identify and categorise the online
activity of government and government-funded entities.
• This report argues that social media platforms should better craft and implement policies to
identify accounts with state links, or content that has been directly facilitated by states— policies
that should apply globally.

Research methodology
This research project used both quantitative and qualitative research methods, and it involved
in-depth and original data collection that spanned multiple languages. This included:
• cross-platform data analysis and collection that comprised US- and Chinese-based social
media networks and included text, imagery and video (social media collection tools included
CrowdTangle and Twint)
• programming tools such as RStudio to analyse data and create network graphs showing
interactions (packages used included tidyverse, ggplot and visNetwork)
• the collection, translation and analysis of Chinese-language material, including government
documents, state media reports, official speeches and other sources
• satellite imagery collection and analysis, including geo-coding locations based on our analysis of
published videos and social media content.
5
Introduction: ‘Borrowing mouths to speak’
We have always attached great importance to ‘borrowing a mouth to speak’ and used international
friends to carry out foreign propaganda.
—Zhu Ling, editor-in-chief, China Daily, 201611
This was how Zhu Ling (朱灵), then China Daily editor-in-chief, emphasised the importance of
utilising foreigners for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda in a speech celebrating the 30th
anniversary of his newspaper. Zhu was referring to a strategy of using ‘friendly’ or noncritical content
created by foreigners for both internal and external propaganda—a method the CCP has employed
since the Mao era.12 The strategy, sometimes referred to as ‘using foreign strength to propagandise
China’ (利用外力为我宣传), is based on the idea that propaganda can be particularly potent if it’s
created by foreigners.13
In Zhu’s speech, which was published in August 2016 in Qiushi, the CCP’s most authoritative journal,
he said that China’s propaganda should mix ‘what we want to tell’ with what foreign audiences ‘want
to hear’. The messaging should have emotional valence as well as making a reasoned point, Zhu
said. Consider, for example, the ‘Chinese Dream’, which is Xi Jinping’s signature soft-power campaign
designed to market globally the idea of a strong, successful, happy China. This should be explained
and disseminated, Zhu argued, through a combination of ‘speaking by yourself’ and ‘speaking
by others’.
The general principles of the strategy are endorsed by Chinese President and CCP General Secretary
Xi Jinping. At a June 2021 collective study session of China’s Politburo on external propaganda, Xi
stressed the need to ‘never stop expanding our circle of friends that understand China and befriend
China in the arena of international public opinion’, instructing that China must improve its capacity
to make its voice heard in the global ‘public opinion struggle’.14 Xi also reiterated a point he made in
a February 2016 Politburo work meeting on news and public opinion that more work should be done
on converging Chinese and foreign perspectives (融通中外). As Xi described in 2016, that convergence
isn’t meant to take place in equal measure, but to elevate and proselytise the CCP’s world view:
Bringing together the Chinese and foreign is more than just simply catering [to the tastes] of
foreigners. Rather, it is improving our ability to disseminate the Chinese way [of doing things],
to disseminate the Chinese system, Chinese concepts, and Chinese culture in ways … such that
foreign audiences will be happy to accept it, in language that is easy for them to understand,
so that Chinese concepts become a global lingua franca, and an international consensus.15
In response to Xi Jinping’s June 2021 instructions, Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), deputy head of the
Propaganda Department of the CCP and head of China Media Group (the official media conglomerate
directly under the Propaganda Department of the CCP) outlined how he intended to create ‘a studio
for influencers in multiple languages’ (多语种网红工作室) to better reach younger media consumers
globally.16 These state-supported training programs for online influencers would help the People’s
Republic of China ‘break through and enhance the ‘spread of a positive attitude’ (好感传播), according
to Shen.17

Xi Jinping has long called for Chinese media workers and academics to do a better job of ‘telling
China’s stories to the world’ in order to help redress what the CCP sees as a deep global imbalance
in what its refers to as its ‘discourse power’ (话语权), which is considered a core part of the country’s
‘comprehensive national power’ (综合国力).18 In a 2013 address to propaganda ministers from across
the country, Xi specifically instructed that there should be a ‘focus on building a discourse system
with new concepts, new categories and new narratives that integrate the Chinese and the foreign’.19
The strategy is hoped to help break what’s referred to within the CCP as the West’s ‘discourse
hegemony’ (话语霸权) over China.20 In the view of senior propaganda officials, Western media
encirclement of China is having a deleterious effect on how the country is viewed around the world.
A Pew Research Center survey released in June 2021 reflected the dire state of China’s international
standing, showing that majorities in 15 of the 17 advanced economies surveyed hold an unfavourable
opinion of the country.21
This reputational hit follows China’s early cover-up of the coronavirus outbreak, economic and
diplomatic coercion targeting foreign governments and companies22 and the continued exposure of
the CCP’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang by foreign academics,23 think tanks,24 international NGOs25
and journalists.26 China’s internal and external propaganda push has ramped up in response to this,
and also aims to burnish the CCP’s credentials as it celebrates its centenary in 2021.27 Propaganda
messaging on China’s handling of the pandemic and treatment of ethnic minorities has been deployed
to counterbalance critical reporting of those issues.28
Over the same period, China has stepped up pointed criticism of foreign media coverage of its
activities in Xinjiang and sought to hobble critical reporting on the issue by expelling foreign journalists
from the country. At least 18 foreign reporters from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and
the Washington Post were expelled from China in the first half of 2020, according to the Foreign
Correspondents’ Club of China,29 which is itself an organisation that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) has long described as illegal.30 MOFA says the expulsions were in response to curbs that the US
placed on Chinese reporters.31
Since their expulsion from China, coordinated attacks on the remaining corps of foreign journalists
have intensified.32 At the same time, MOFA spokespeople have repeatedly held up the American
journalist Edgar Snow, best known for his 1937 book Red star over China, as the exemplar of objective
foreign reporting on China.33 In reality, some historians argue that Snow’s reporting trips were carefully
choreographed and that his interviews with key figures, including Chairman Mao Zedong, were
controlled and censored.34
In the past, the CCP has ‘borrowed the mouths’ of friendly foreigners such as Snow to create approved
articles, books, photography, documentaries and movies. As this report shows, that same approach
has now been extended to foreign vloggers and online influencers.
7
The online influencer ecosystem
The social media influencer ecosystem is a global phenomenon in which people grow an audience
for their online accounts by creating particular types of content (travel videos, for example), typically
based on a specific personality, style, topic or message. The use of digital platforms to make money is
not unusual, and typical monetisation pathways include advertising revenue, paid product placement
and content deals. Endorsement arrangements between government institutions and social media
influencers are also common. For example, fitness influencers were paid by local governments to
urge Americans to stay at home during the Covid-19 pandemic.35 It’s worth noting that advertising
disclosure requirements vary by country and by platform.
China has a sophisticated social media influencer ecosystem across multiple platforms, including
Douyin (the domestic precursor to TikTok), the video-sharing site Bilibili and social media platforms
such as Xiaohongshu. There’s a popular niche for non-Chinese influencers or vloggers who, typically
but not always, speak Mandarin and share their content on domestic platforms.36 Some also operate
from China on US platforms, including YouTube and Instagram, and create content tailored to markets
in different countries. This is despite access to those services being blocked in China. This suggests
that the activities of the China-based international-facing influencers are tacitly condoned, even if not
necessarily directly endorsed, by the propaganda apparatus of the party-state.
Virtual private networks
Accessing banned foreign platforms in China is possible by using virtual private networks (VPNs),
which are strictly monitored in the country as they allow users to breach the ‘Great Firewall’,
or ‘climb over the wall’ (翻墙).37 Only VPN services authorised by the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology are allowed, while selling or accessing other non-authorised VPN services
is illegal.38 The law is applied selectively, and penalties are more often imposed when individuals
use VPNs to access controversial pieces of information or publish political content that opposes
CCP lines.39 In Xinjiang, for example, since a harsh internet crackdown that began in 2009,40 the
use of VPNs has been listed as one of the red flags authorities have used to detain Uyghurs and
other minorities.41
By leveraging the popularity of foreign media influencers in China, the Chinese state propaganda
apparatus can package their messages through potentially more persuasive voices in an attempt to
neutralise critical reporting about human rights abuses in Xinjiang and depict a more positive image
of the region. In turn, those foreign social media influencers may have their Xinjiang-related content
promoted at MOFA conferences,42 cross-shared on US-based social media platforms and referenced
in English-language party-state media articles, growing their profile and potentially offering new
opportunities for monetisation and audience building (Figure 1). While ASPI cannot confirm whether
foreign social media influencers are commissioned (and provided monetary compensation up front)
to create Xinjiang-related content, the BBC has reported that state media outlet CGTN has set up a
department tasked with contacting foreign social media influencers to cooperate or use their videos
(see case study 2).43 Likewise, this report will examine how influencers are invited to take part in
state-sponsored tours.

Figure 1: Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney’s Twitter account sharing a CGTN video of British vlogger Jason Lightfoot
Source: Twitter, 8 April 2021, online.
Our data collection has found that, since the beginning of 2020, 156 Chinese state-controlled accounts
on US-based social media platforms have published at least 556 Facebook posts, Twitter posts and
articles on CGTN, Global Times, Xinhua or China Daily websites amplifying Xinjiang-related social media
content from 14 influencer accounts. More than 50% of that activity occurred on Facebook. This data
includes foreign social media influencers in China and Chinese social media influencers who have
interacted with the foreign influencers in Xinjiang.
To illustrate how this ecosystem operates, ASPI ICPC built a network diagram (Figure 2) of Chinese
state media and diplomatic accounts that share or post content by foreign social media influencers;
reference foreign social media influencers; or promote China-based influencers who have interacted
with foreign social media influencers in Xinjiang. An interactive version of this diagram is available
online.44 Nodes are sized by the number of posts shared.
9
Figure 2: Network diagram of Chinese state media and diplomatic accounts that have engaged with foreign
influencer content
Source: Created by ASPI ICPC, available to explore online.
The most active state media accounts in our dataset were China Media Group’s subsidiaries CGTN
and CCTV, which are under the control of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department,45 as well as the
People’s Daily, which is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, and its ‘We Are
China’ branded social media accounts.46
Videos play a key role in this influencer ecosystem. Videos featuring foreign media influencers are
the prime content that Chinese state entities work to repackage and boost online. Our analysis of
these videos suggests that they fit into two broad categories with sub-themes targeted at different
international and domestic audiences.
The first category of videos seeks to reframe international narratives by displaying a wholly positive
image of life in Xinjiang. These videos tend to emphasise ‘exotic’ Uyghur culture, taking a marketing
approach to the content by depicting the region’s hospitality, food, dancing and happy men and
women. Infrastructure was also a popular theme, especially projects relating to agriculture, roads
and high-speed rail and direct references to China’s ‘rural revitalisation’.
The most active MOFA accounts on Facebook and Twitter promoting this style of content in our
dataset belonged to Zhang Heqing (张和清), who’s a cultural attaché at the Chinese Embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan. He promoted foreign-influencer-related content at least 56 times. For example,
Zhang shared a video featuring Stuart Wiggin (Figure 3). A British national, Wiggin posted videos on
YouTube and a number of Chinese platforms as ‘The China Traveller’ (司徒建国) from the Xinjiang leg of
the ‘A Date with China’ media tour (see Case study 1) about the ‘wonders’ of Xinjiang.

Figure 3: Chinese diplomat in Pakistan, Zhang Heqing (left), sharing content featuring foreign media influencers;
Barrie Jones’s video (right) criticising foreign media coverage of Xinjiang was shown in a MOFA briefing
Sources: left, Zhang Heqing, Twitter, 20 May 2021, online; right, Kerry Allen & Sophie Williams, ‘The foreigners in China’s disinformation drive’, BBC News,
11 July 2021, online.
The second category of videos is more overtly political and seeks to directly counter allegations
of forced labour and detention centres, among other issues. These videos at times pointedly used
positive depictions of local Xinjiang life to directly contradict allegations of human rights abuses—
for example, by creating content in Xinjiang cotton fields to counter allegations of forced labour
(Figure 4).47 Some videos in this category didn’t use footage from the region, but instead included a
speech to camera or an interview contradicting allegations of human rights abuses.
The most mentioned influencers in this category in our dataset were Canadian Daniel Dumbrill,48
the Barretts (Lee and Oli Barrett, a British father–son vlogging duo),49 and Barrie Jones of Best China
Info (also British).50 All of these influencers have been directly referenced by MOFA officials on social
media or in party-state media articles, and both Daniel Dumbrill and Barrie Jones have had their
videos shown at MOFA press conferences.51
Cao Yi (曹毅), a consul at the Embassy of China in Lebanon, shared foreign influencers’ content in
this category at least 31 times, including content from Daniel Dumbrill (a Canadian vlogger reportedly
based in Shenzhen)52 and Barrie Jones from the YouTube channel Best China Info (a British expatriate
potentially based in Guilin, China).53
11
Figure 4: Chinese state media posts featuring Raz Gal-Or visiting a cotton field (left) and Lee Barrett’s comments on
cotton picking in Xinjiang (right)
Source: left, China Xinhua News, New China, 16 April 2021, online; right, CCTV, Facebook, 29 March 2021, online.
The Twitter account of Li Bijian (李碧建), the Consul-General of China in Karachi, Pakistan, was also
an active actor in this category. He tweeted and retweeted at least eight posts, including a retweet
of Cyrus Janssen, who describes himself as a former golf professional now turned vlogger who posts
about China from his native Canada (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Li Bijian sharing content featuring foreign media influencers
Source: Li Bijian, Twitter, 6 August 2020, online.
This report now focuses on three in-depth case studies that analyse Xinjiang-focused foreign
influencer content and the amplification of that content by Chinese state entities. They include:
1. content created by social media influencers as part of the ‘A Date with China’ (中国有约) media tour
of Xinjiang in April 2021, which was hosted by the Cyberspace Administration of China
2. the online video brand ‘YChina’, created in part by Israeli Raz Gal-Or, and YouTube content created
by the company about Xinjiang
3. satellite mapping and analysis of the strategic geography of foreign social media influencers’ trips
to Xinjiang.

Case study 1: The ‘A Date with China’
propaganda campaign
Social media influencers from Canada, Germany, the UK and Ghana took part in the ‘A Date with China’
(中国有约) media tour of Xinjiang in May 2021, which was held under the auspices of the Cyberspace
Administration of China (CAC), which is the country’s chief internet regulator and censor. The tour was
co-organised by the China Daily, which is the newspaper published by the Information Office of China’s
State Council (the administrative office in charge of the CCP’s external propaganda) and by 11 of
China’s provincial-level cyberspace administrations, including the Xinjiang CAC.54
The campaign was launched on 19 April 2021 with an opening ceremony in Shaanxi Province.55
According to a CAC press release, the deputy director of CAC’s news and communications bureau,
Zhang Yong (张勇), said at the event ‘the campaign seeks to understand the Communist Party of
China’s initial intention to serve the people in making great achievements over the past century,
and to enhance the international community’s understanding and recognition of China’s
development.’56
An official contract award announcement for part of the campaign states that the tour would visit
14 places in China where Xi Jinping has travelled to since the 18th National Congress of the CCP in
2012. There are six ‘stations’ on the campaign journey: Shaanxi, Hubei, Guizhou, Guangxi, Xinjiang
and Fujian.57 The campaign is made up of a three-leg media tour to be held from April to September
2021. The first leg took participants to Shaanxi, Hubei and Guizhou provinces as well as the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region. The second leg took participants to Xinjiang for a week-long tour before
going on to Fujian Province in China’s east. At the time of writing, details about the third leg haven’t
been announced.
The official themes of the tour are a set of key CCP political slogans, including ‘Poverty alleviation’
(脱贫攻坚) ‘Rural revitalisation’ (乡村振兴) and ‘Reform and opening up brings a better life’ (改革开放
美好生活).58 Achieving a ‘moderately well-off society’ and eliminating poverty have been a centenary
goal of the CCP since at least 2012.59 In February 2021, Xi Jinping declared the end of extreme poverty
in China. With these and other centenary goals hitting their deadlines in 2021, China’s propaganda
apparatus has increased its efforts to publicise the party’s achievements, which is reflected in the
themes of the ‘A Date With China’ campaign.60
The foreign influencers who took part in the Xinjiang leg of the tour from 17 to 24 May were embedded
in a group of approximately 45 participants including foreign journalists, reporters for Chinese
party-state media outlets and journalists from domestic online and commercial media outlets
(Figure 6).61 According to media reports about the tour by the China Daily, the foreign influencers
included vloggers Kirk Apesland (a Canadian who goes by the online pseudonym ‘Gweilo 60’), Patrick
Köllmer (a German national with a sizeable following on Chinese social media), Robert Nani (a
Ghanian influencer in China) and British national Stuart Wiggin, who is identified as a People’s Daily
online reporter in China Daily ‘A Date With China’ content62 and as a ‘foreign expert’ working for the
People’s Daily subsidiary ‘People’s Daily Media Innovation’ (人民日报媒体技术股份有限公司) on their
website,63 but who also posts videos on YouTube and a number of Chinese platforms as ‘The China
Traveller’ (司徒建国). He does not describe himself as a party-state media employee on his Youtube
‘About’ section (see also ‘Platforms’ inconsistencies in labelling state accounts’ section on page 30).64
13
Figure 6: ‘The China Traveller’ YouTube ‘About’ page
Source: ‘About’, YouTube, 7 October 2021, online.
Joining them on the tour were two Chinese nationals: ‘Rachel’ Zhou Yiqiu (周忆秋), known online
as ‘Miss Wow’ or ‘Techy Rachel’, who has been a CGTN reporter and vlogger (see also ‘Platforms’
inconsistencies in labelling state accounts’ section on page 29).65 There was also a woman whom state
media journalists have named as Sabira Samat, who is also called a ‘Uyghur influencer’.66 Along with
another influencer known as Hurshidem Ablikim,67 she appears on ‘Guli Talks Xinjiang’ accounts on the
domestic platforms Douyin, Xigua and Weibo. Videos with the two women also appeared on YouTube
under the account name ‘Story of Xinjiang by Guli 古丽讲新疆’ as well as on Instagram,68 and used
to appear on Twitter until the account was suspended in May 2021.69 The Youtube account has been
rebranded ‘疆藏姐妹花 Xinjiang and Tibet sisters’ as of November, 2021. This brand shares content
about life in Xinjiang and sometimes directly addresses allegations of human rights abuses in the
region on YouTube70 and Instagram.71
Figure 7: Participants in the ‘A Date with China’ (中国有约) campaign pose for a group photo at an observation deck
along the C255 Highway in Ürümqi County in May 2021
Source: ‘“A Date with China”: From farming and pastoral village to farmhouse, rural industry is upgrading’ [‘中国有约 A Date with China’
|从农牧村到农家乐乡村产业在升级], China Daily, 19 May 2021, online.

The influencers
Patrick Köllmer, a German influencer, model, TV host and long-term guest on Jiangsu Television’s
‘A Bright World’ (世界青年说) TV program,72 was one foreigner who joined the Xinjiang leg of the
‘A Date With China’ media tour. Köllmer posted at least one video to his YouTube channel and three
videos to his Bilibili channel. In one video that was posted to his Bilibili account but not on YouTube,
Köllmer recounts his experiences on the media tour and what he noted about the ‘real Xinjiang’. In the
itinerary outlined by Köllmer, he says that he attended variety performances at each of the locations
they went to: Ürümqi, Kashgar and Hotan. In a separate video, Köllmer says that they also went to
Kashgar surrounds and Shache.73 ‘I went to many places in Xinjiang this week. I saw a lot of people, ate
a lot of delicious Xinjiang food, saw a lot of enthusiastic people, and saw many of their new industries.
I was also very happy to see all of that,’ Köllmer says in Mandarin. At another point, Köllmer says of
Xinjiang people: ‘It’s almost like [you can] grab any Xinjiang person off the street and they’re all able to
dance.’74
Köllmer also featured in videos shared by other ‘A Date With China’ participants that took a far more
political tone. In an interview with Köllmer conducted by Sabira Samat (whom we introduced on
page 14) and published on YouTube on 1 June 2021, Samat asks Köllmer about ‘the foreign media
and some people’ who she says ‘smear’ and ‘slander’ Xinjiang.75 Köllmer replies that he doesn’t watch
foreign media because he thinks it’s wrong and ‘it doesn’t feel right.’ Köllmer goes on to describe their
trip to the variety show, buying coffee and joining other ‘A Date With China’ participants at the markets
as evidence that Xinjiang is as safe as other parts of China that he has visited. Köllmer says that his
experience doesn’t match that depicted by foreign media: ‘When foreign media say something bad,
I don’t know, I think it’s not really cool.’ A shortened version of the interview titled ‘Xinjiang in the
eyes of a German boy’ (一个德国小伙眼中的新疆) featuring this quote was disseminated by Chinese
officials and state media on Twitter (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Sabira Samat interviews Patrick Köllmer (left); an edited down version of the interview was later promoted on
Twitter by Chinese diplomats Li Bijian (李碧建) (right) and Zhang Heqing (张和清)
Source: left, ‘Within German guy’s vision of Xinjiang’, YouTube, 1 June 2021, online; right, Li Bijian, Twitter, 18 June 2021, online.
Köllmer also appears in a separate interview conducted by CGTN employee Zhou Yiqiu (‘Miss Wow’)
at ‘Hotan Jade City’ (和田玉都城) in Hotan that was uploaded to her YouTube channel on 10 June
2021. In the clip, Zhou repeatedly attempts to elicit the German vlogger’s opinions on the political
situation in Xinjiang, but he demurs.76
15
Köllmer’s videos tend to get more engagement on Chinese domestic platforms compared to content
that appears on his YouTube channel. For example, on 27 July 2021, Köllmer’s YouTube account77 had
only 3,510 subscribers, whereas his Bilibili account had more than 150,000 fans.78 One video about
visiting a Xinjiang night market published on his YouTube account on 7 June 2021 reached 6,146 views
and 786 likes.79 On Bilibili, the exact same video received more than 52,000 views and 4,241 likes.80
Many of the videos apparently created as part of ‘A Date with China’ are presented as travel blogs.
However, content analysis of the comment sections on YouTube suggests that they’re often received
as political material. In a video titled ‘Xinjiang 2021—Back alleys, orchards, cotton fields and the desert
/ 新疆VLOG4 麦盖提县’,81 for example, vlogger Stuart Wiggin shared footage ostensibly from Makit
County in Kashgar, Xinjiang.
In this video, Wiggin visits a date plantation and later a cotton field, where he talks to the same
apparent cotton farmer as fellow ‘A Date With China’ participant and CGTN journalist ‘Rachel’ Zhou
Yiqiu82 and Patrick Köllmer.83 The video makes no explicit mention of Wiggin being part of a trip
organised by the Chinese Government. Wiggin talks to the farm workers about how much they earn,
but he makes no mention of the widely reported allegations of forced labour in cotton production in
Xinjiang.84 Yet despite the fact that forced labour isn’t raised in the video itself, of the 339 comments
made on the YouTube video as of 10 August 2021, many make explicit mention of such allegations
and discuss how the video ‘disproves’ them. For example, the word ‘forced’ appears almost 30 times,
typically referring to forced labour: ‘I WANT TO GO TO THE CONCENTRATION CAMP and BE A FORCED
LABOR’ WORKER so that I can earn 250,000 rmb’, ‘I mean I’m “forced” to work from Monday to Friday
every week to earn my salary … that counts as forced labor right ’, ‘Where’s the “forced labor” that
the west is screaming about?’ and ‘The only forced labour seems to be the machines!’
Interviews with local cotton farmers in Xinjiang posted by social media influencers to YouTube often
focus on themes of prosperity, including asking how much they earn (Figure 9). Examples include Miss
Wow China’s ‘Xinjiang cotton demystified: I interviewed two Uygur owners of a cotton field’, YChina’s
‘What I saw in Xinjiang working as a cotton farmer’ and The China Traveller’s ‘Xinjiang 2021—Back
alleys, orchards, cotton fields and the desert / 新疆VLOG4 麦盖提县’.85 The same man appears in the
Miss Wow China,86 Patrick Köllmer87 and Stuart Wiggin’s The China Traveller videos.88

Figure 9: Vloggers’ accounts of cotton farming in Xinjiang
Source: top left, The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021—Back alleys, orchards, cotton fields and the desert / 新疆VLOG4 麦盖提县’, YouTube, 6 June 2021, online;
top right, YChina, ‘What I saw in Xinjiang working as a cotton farmer’, YouTube, 8 April 2021, online; bottom left, Miss Wow China, ‘Xinjiang cotton demystified:
I interviewed two Uygur owners of cotton field’, YouTube, 17 June 2021, online; bottom right, ‘It turns out that Xinjiang is like this? The German guy played all
over Xinjiang and really loved it!’, [原来新疆竟是这样？德国小伙玩遍新疆，真的爱了！], Bilibili, 28 May 2021, online.
Many of the ‘A Date With China’ videos from YouTube vloggers feature an event with local dancers in
Kashgar. Examples include Miss Wow’s ‘Talking about Kashgar with Gweilo 60’ video,89 Gweilo 60’s
‘Ancient City of Kashgar Xinjiang China’90 and The China Traveller’s ‘Xinjiang 2021: I Explore the Ancient
City of Kashgar / 新疆VLOG2 喀什古城开逛!’ (Figure 10).91
Figure 10: Vloggers dance with locals
Source: top left, The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021: I explore the ancient city of Kashgar / 新疆VLOG2 喀什古城开’, YouTube, 31 May 2021, online; top right,
Gweilo 60, ‘Ancient city of Kashgar Xinjiang China’, YouTube, 6 June 2021, online; bottom left, Miss Wow, ‘Talking about Kashgar with Gweilo 60’, YouTube,
16 June 2021, online.
17
In contrast with Wiggin, Canadian vlogger Kirk Apesland appears more overtly political in his videos
from the trip. For example, in a YouTube video posted on 26 June 2021 and titled ‘Oppressed in
Xinjiang once again!’, Apesland walks and films at the Hotan Night Market, pointing to the renowned
tourist location as evidence that no human rights violations are taking place in the region. ‘This is in
Xinjiang province. This is not what you would expect from people that are oppressed and suppressed
like, seriously, look at this! Do these people look like they’re having a rough time?’ Apesland says
(Figure 11).92
Figure 11: China International Publishing Group’s ‘China Focus’ Twitter account reaching out to Kirk Apesland’s Twitter
account on 19 July 2021
Source: Twitter, 19 July 2021, online.
Content created as part of the Xinjiang leg of the ‘A Date with China’ tour received significant online
amplification across US-based social media platforms. China Daily articles and videos,93 in addition
to other related material, have been promoted at least 150 times by Chinese state media and MOFA
accounts on Facebook alone. The most active Facebook pages sharing ‘A Date with China’ content
were the People’s Daily’s ‘We are China’ account, which has more than 14 million followers, and the
Japanese version of the People’s Daily account, which has nearly 150,000 followers (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Chinese MOFA spokesperson Hua Chunying sharing a link to a China Daily article about the ‘A Date with China’
media tour (left) and MOFA deputy spokesperson Wang Wenbin sharing a China Daily video featuring the tour (right)
Sources: left, Hua Chunying, Twitter, 18 June 2021, online; right, Wang Wenbin, Facebook, 27 May 2021, online.
19
Case study 2: The ‘YChina’ media tour
A number of other foreign social media influencers have created Xinjiang content in 2021 that’s then
been heavily promoted, and sometimes repackaged, by Chinese party-state media and diplomatic
accounts. For example, Raz Gal-Or is the co-founder of the Y-Platform, which is a multichannel online
video network in China. He features in three videos from Xinjiang shared on the company’s YChina
YouTube channel in April 2021, in which he visits a local home among other activities.94 A video titled
‘What I saw in Xinjiang working as a Cotton Farmer’95 received significant amplification on social
media from diplomatic and party-state media accounts amid an international stand-off over Xinjiang
cotton and its alleged links to forced labour 96 (see Figure 13). While the YChina YouTube video doesn’t
show it, CGTN reporter Huang Yue was also at the cotton field and filmed an interview with Gal-Or.97
Subsequent party-state media coverage claimed that this was a chance encounter.98 Gal-Or also
appears to have given a live interview from the field with CGTN anchor Liu Xin.99
The promotion of YChina content by CGTN, which is supervised by the CCP’s Propaganda
Department,100 may be part of the outlet’s editorial strategy. The BBC, citing multiple anonymous
sources at CGTN, reported in July 2021 that the media organisation is focused on making use of
‘internet celebrities and influencers’ in a ‘fightback’ against foreign media reporting. The sources
told the BBC that a new ‘internet celebrities’ department has been set up at CGTN and tasked with
contacting ‘foreigners to either use their videos or to co-operate to make videos together and that
some departments have also been instructed to ‘find foreigners to send to Xinjiang to represent us.’101
In an interview with French newspaper Le Monde, Gal-Or disclosed ‘that it was the government that
had told him which farmers to meet in Xinjiang’.102 In a video posted to YChina’s YouTube channel
on 2 December 2021, Gal-Or said ‘no state media directed me in any part of my trip. It was my own
personal decision to go to Xinjiang.’103 YChina is listed as a “global stringer” on CGTN’s website.104 CGTN
describes “global stringer” as an “international video platform of CGTN, aiming to gather and reward
the world’s outstanding creators while displaying their content worldwide.” Bonuses are rewarded to
creators who submit high-quality work to the website, according to CGTN.105
Footage from Gal-Or’s visit to Xinjiang was widely promoted across US-based social media platforms
via the accounts of both state media and MOFA. For example, it was shared by YouTube channels
associated with CGTN106 as well as Shanghai Media Group’s Shanghai Eye,107 CCTV108 and Xinhua.109
On Facebook, state media and diplomatic accounts promoted content that mentioned Raz Gal-Or
and Xinjiang more than 50 times and in multiple languages up to 10 August 2021. Those included at
least 18 posts from accounts labelled as Chinese embassies and consulates (Figure 13), as well as
profiles associated with the Global Times,110 CGTN,111 Xinhua112 and China Radio International on various
pages, including its Spanish113 and German114 accounts, among others.

Figure 13: The Facebook account of the Chinese Embassy in Turkey featuring Raz Gal-Or’s trip to a cotton farm in
Xinjiang
Source: ‘Chinese Embassy in Turkey’, Facebook, archived 29 July 2021, online.
In a video posted to the YChina Bilibili account, that wasn’t cross-posted to the company’s YouTube
account, Raz Gal-Or addressed some YouTube comments left on his Xinjiang tour series of videos
(Figure 14). In answering one comment that said that he didn’t address any serious problems in
Xinjiang, Gal-Or says ‘friend, there aren’t any problems to mention.’ He also commented on questions
he could have asked the Uyghurs he interviewed in Xinjiang. For example, ‘What else can I ask? Take
me to your secret hiding spot where everyone controls your mind?’115
Figure 14: Raz Gal-Or addresses criticisms of his Xinjiang videos in a video posted to Chinese platform Bilibili but not
posted to YouTube
Source: ‘Three issues of Xinjiang videos were posted overseas, and I was sprayed’, [在海外发了三期新疆视频，我被喷了？], Bilibili, 17 April 2021, online.
21
Y-Platform business structure
Gal-Or founded YChina, or the ‘Foreigner Research Institute’ (歪果仁研究协会), with his Peking
University classmate Fang Yedun (方晔顿) in late 2016 and began making videos about sport and
interviews with foreigners in China.116 In January 2017, Gal-Or and Fang appear to have started a new
media company called Beijing weWOWwe Technology Limited Company (北京唯喔科技有限公司)
with a reported Ұ10 million (US$1.5 million) in seed funding from Gal-Or’s father’s company Infinity
Group and Will Hunting Capital (唯猎资本).117 In March 2020, the Nasdaq-listed Chinese social media
company Weibo Corporation joined a US$3.5 million series A funding round in Y-Platform.118
Fang Yedun is listed as CEO of weWOWwe according to information listed on Qichacha, a Chinese
corporate records database.119 A philosophy graduate from Peking University, Fang joined the CCP
in his senior year in 2012 or 2013.120 On 12 May 2021, Fang joined four other young CCP members in a
group interview about ‘youth’s responsibilities in the new era’ at a press conference organised by the
Central Propaganda Department of the CCP (Figure 15).121 At the press conference, Fang claimed that
his organisation had interviewed more than 5,000 foreigners in China in the four years since 2017.122
Figure 15: YChina co-founder Fang Yedun (second from left) joins Shou Xiaoli (寿小丽, far left), the deputy director of the
Bureau of External News Communication, Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and four other
young CCP members at a Propaganda Department press conference about ‘youth’s responsibilities in the new era’ on
12 May 2021
Source: ‘“This is our time, everyone has a chance to shine”’, [“这是我们的时代, 谁都有机会出彩”], The Paper, 13 May 2021, online. The Central Propaganda
Department officially changed its English-language title to the Central Publicity Department in 1998, although the Chinese name was not changed.

On-the-street interviews with China-based foreigners and funny, generally apolitical videos featuring
Mandarin-speaking expats discussing daily life inside China are the mainstays of YChina’s content
output. The company claims to have worked with brands such as General Electric, Google, Huawei,
Jeep, KFC, McDonald’s and Pizza Hut, according to the website of INNONATION, a company owned by
Amir Gal-Or, Raz Gal-Or’s father (Figure 16).123
Figure 16: Brands listed as having worked with YChina, according to the INNONATION website
Source: ‘Crooked Nuts Research Association and YCHINA’ [歪果仁研究协会和 YCHINA], INNONATION, online.
YChina has cooperated with party-state media since its inception. In May 2017, YChina teamed up
with CCTV News Center to create the ‘Silk Road Youth Talk’ (丝路青年说) series of videos that were
broadcast on CCTV1, CCTV13 and CCTV online.124 In 2019, YChina released a video featuring Gal-Or
helping a 90-year-old military doctor fulfil his wish to witness a flag-raising ceremony in Tiananmen
Square (Figure 17).125 That and other video interviews Gal-Or conducted with grassroots CCP members
were featured in the People’s Daily production ‘CPC at 100: Views from Expats’ (他们眼中的中国共产
党), which was also published on the People’s Daily domestic social media channels as well as its ‘We
Are China’ YouTube channel.126
Figure 17: Raz Gal-Or in the People’s Daily production ‘CPC at 100: Views from Expats’ (他们眼中的中国共产党) and at a
flag-raising ceremony in Tiananmen Square
Source: left, People’s Daily, ‘The real China as I see it : Raz Galor’, YouTube, 2 June 2021, online; right, Wang Wenbin, Facebook, 27 May 2021, online.
23
In an interview with the South China Morning Post in 2017, Raz Gal-Or said that the company’s ‘vision’
was to ‘create so-called positive energy, and let our fans learn something from us, you know not just
laugh.’127 ‘Positive energy’ (正能量) is a key phrase used by Xi Jinping since 2013 referring to the need
for an emphasis on uplifting messages over criticism in China’s information space.128
In September 2019, YChina published a series of videos featuring Raz Gal-Or touring Hong Kong and
commenting on the protests taking place there.129 His content was also used as part of efforts to
criticise the BBC following a 2 February 2021 report into allegations of systematic rape in Xinjiang’s
internment camps and the decision by Ofcom (the British broadcasting regulator) on 4 February 2021
to withdraw CGTN’s UK broadcast licence.130 In February 2021, YChina published a video of Gal-Or
parodying the supposedly negative way the BBC depicts China,131 and the video was picked up by
CGTN on its own website and YouTube channel.132

Case study 3: Mapping the strategic geography
of influencers’ trips to Xinjiang
Just as some media tours of Xinjiang appear largely directed by state-controlled institutions and
government bodies, the locations shown in foreign influencers’ videos may be chosen by state entities
to further particular narratives about the region. For this report, ASPI analysed hundreds of YouTube
videos depicting trips to Xinjiang made and posted by foreign influencers. Some of the videos seem
to have gone to considerable length to avoid featuring evidence of the CCP’s human rights abuses in
the region, such as detention infrastructure (although, ironically, such infrastructure was inadvertently
captured in some videos).
The Chinese Government has organised special media trips, such as ‘A Date With China’, to showcase
Xinjiang as a travel destination and an economic success story. Articles produced by journalists on
those trips often accuse the Western media of propagating ‘fake stories’ about Xinjiang, according to
the International Federation of Journalists.133
In contrast to many people (including journalists) who have independently visited Xinjiang, the routes
of these influencers, as shown in their videos, and particularly by participants in the ‘A Date with China’
campaign, don’t always reflect a representative view of Xinjiang. Instead, many present videos showing
only the same predetermined locations visited as part of organised tours.
One example of this is a video by Stuart Wiggin, a vlogger who China Daily has referred to as a People’s
Daily online reporter who took part in the ‘A Date with China’ campaign. In his YouTube video titled
‘Cherries and Camel Milk in Kashgar’134 Wiggin posits that he is filming in Shache (also known as
Yarkant), a town of around 120,000 people. However, our analysis of the video has found that no part of
the video appears to show the town of Yarkant. The first half of the video shows Wiggin in the Yarkant
County Na’an Industrial Park (莎车县馕产业园), which is a government-planned ‘poverty-alleviation’
and resettlement project that’s located in Odanliq Municipality (乌达力克镇), roughly half an hour
outside the town of Yarkant.135 The road to this location also passes the large detention complex in
Odanliq (Figure 18).136
Figure 18: The route from Yarkant to the Na’an Industrial Park (blue), the Odanliq Detention Complex (red outlines) and
Wiggin photographed within the Na’an Industrial Park
Source: Maxar via Google Earth, imagery collected and analysed by ASPI.
25
The second half of the video is also filmed within a government-organised ‘poverty-alleviation’ project
in Misha municipality (米夏镇).137 Misha is also a rural township outside of Yarkant. Videos mainly
featuring ‘model’ ‘poverty-alleviation’ projects are common products of the participants in the ‘A Date
with China’ campaign and several other bloggers who are supportive of government policy in Xinjiang.
Another example of this is several participants, including Wiggin138 and Apesland,139 making videos
about the same date farm in a rural township north of Mekit County. This same farm has also been
visited by CGTN foreign reporters140 and was profiled by the China Daily newspaper.141
Among the videos uploaded by social media influencers visiting Xinjiang that we analysed, many show
only small and limited sections of the cities being visited. For example, in a video of YChina’s Raz Gal-Or
titled ‘I interviewed 10 random Xinjiang locals, this is what they told me’, the initial shots are within
150 metres of Aksu International Hotel, and the most prominent shot is from a brief taxi drive back to
the hotel (Figure 19). This is in stark contrast to the work of many foreign journalists in Xinjiang who go
to considerable lengths to try to see large parts of the region.142
Figure 19: The approximate route taken by Raz Gal-Or, as presented in his published YouTube video, in which he
reportedly interviewed ‘ten random Xinjiang locals’, on foot (blue) and via taxi (yellow)
Source: Maxar via Google Earth.
There are more than 385 different detention facilities that have been constructed or expanded since
2017 across Xinjiang.143 Because this number is so high, many driving trips taken in Xinjiang will travel
past a number of those facilities. The trips taken by many vloggers and influencers are no different.
A number of vloggers and influencers featured in this report visited several locations that would have
required driving directly past a number of large-scale detention facilities. This fact directly contradicts
the narrative of ‘normality’ many of them are pursuing and presenting about Xinjiang. For example,
one location visited by a number of members of the ‘A Date with China’ campaign was a Mekit County
forestation project. This project is roughly 20 kilometres out of Mekit town, and the main route
requires visitors to drive directly past four large detention facilities, including one high-security prison
(Figure 20).144

Figure 20: The potential route from Mekit to the forestation project, with inserts showing details of the detention
facilities along the route
Source: Maxar via Google Earth; imagery collected and analysed by ASPI.
The strategic geography of influencers’ guided tours of Xinjiang demonstrates that the tours don’t
present a representative sample of Xinjiang, but instead often show only highly specific locations that
are regularly part of government-organised visits to labour programs. Additionally, the proximity of
some of these locations to large-scale detention facilities shows that, for many of those influencers,
it would be difficult to avoid seeing many of the detention facilities across the landscape (see box).
Detention infrastructure is hard to avoid in Xinjiang
Foreign influencers Fernando Munoz Bernal from Colombia and Noel Lee from Singapore also
travelled together to Xinjiang in early April this year.145 While both men were interviewed by local
media, their trips don’t appear to have been as highly choreographed as the previously described
case studies, and Bernal specifically denies travelling with China Daily.146 Both men used their
trip to claim that Western governments’ and media’s allegations of repression, forced labour and
genocide in Xinjiang are false.147
However, among the usual depictions of food markets and dancing shows set in tourist locations
such as the ancient city of Kashgar148 and the Hotan Night Market,149 one of the two influencers
inadvertently recorded evidence of re-education facilities. Noel Lee released a video shot from a
plane, showing his descent into Ürümqi International Airport.150 Over the course of this 15-minute
video, seven separate and active detention facilities listed in multiple databases of detention
facilities across Xinjiang are visible from the plane window, and an additional 10 facilities are in
the vicinity of the flight path but not visible through the window (Figure 21).151
Continued on next page
27
Figure 21: The approximate flight path (in blue) filmed by Noel Lee and the outline of 17 detention facilities in the
vicinity, including seven filmed through the window of the plane; the inset shows a collection of seven detention
facilities (including Midong Women’s Prison) in Ürümqi
The video includes a highly detailed view of Midong Women’s Prison, which is roughly 15 kilometres
away from Ürümqi International Airport (Figure 22). The prison is a high-profile detention facility
where several prominent detainees are held, including the relatives of overseas Uyghurs, who had
been detained as a part of the 2017 crackdown.152 One detainee who is currently detained there was
sentenced to seven years imprisonment for, according to her husband, having studied in Egypt.
Figure 22: Midong Women’s Prison in Ürümqi, seen in a video filmed by Noel Lee (left); satellite image of the prison (right)
Sources: Noel Lee, ‘Urumqi Air flight UQ2616 final approach—Shenzhen to Xinjiang 2nd April 2021 Boeing 737-800 B-205U’, YouTube, 6 April 2021, online;
Google Earth via Maxar, imagery collected and analysed by ASPI.

Platforms’ inconsistencies in labelling state
accounts
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter began providing contextual labels for state-funded media accounts
between 2018 and 2020, largely as part of efforts to reduce the impact of foreign influence operations
on US elections,153 but subsequent reports have found that some of these policies remain
inconsistently applied and problematic.154 This issue continues for China’s party-state media: ASPI
examined instances in which content about Xinjiang made by foreign vloggers was shared or reposted
on apparent party-state affiliated YouTube channels that weren’t labelled with YouTube’s ‘funded
in whole or in part by the Chinese government’ tag. There are also discrepancies between how the
accounts of individual journalists working for party-state media are labelled.
For example, a YouTube channel called ‘Frontline’ shared content from YChina’s Raz Gal-Or in Xinjiang
in which he was accompanied to cotton fields by a CGTN reporter.155 The YouTube channel links to a
Twitter account with the same name, which is labelled ‘China state-affiliated media’ and states ‘Proud
to work for China’s national broadcaster (CGTN)’.156 It also links to a Facebook page157 labelled with the
‘China state-controlled media tag’, and which changed its name from ‘CGTN Frontline’ to ‘Frontline’ on
4 September 2020. The same footage appears there with the state media tag (Figure 23).158
Figure 23: A video shared on the Frontline YouTube channel with no state media tag, in contrast with a Facebook video
under the same channel name and branding with a ‘China state-controlled media’ tag
Sources: left, Frontline, ‘Xinjiang from an Israeli’s eyes: “Everything is extremely normal here”’, YouTube, 4 April 2021, online; right, Frontline, Facebook,
4 April 2021, online.
There are also discrepancies among the major US social media platforms as to how journalists
apparently employed by state media are labelled. For example, ‘Rachel’ Zhou Yiqiu is labelled as a
CGTN reporter in CGTN news clips (it is unclear if she is currently employed by the outlet),159 but videos
on a YouTube channel associated with the name ‘Miss Wow China’ are unlabelled.160 The channel
links to Twitter161 and Instagram accounts,162 which are also unlabelled. Posts on the linked Techy
Rachel Facebook account,163 however, are labelled ‘China state-controlled media’. Her content from
the ‘A Date With China’ trip on YouTube, including a video with German vlogger Patrick Köllmer164 in
which they discuss Xinjiang issues, does not indicate it was created as part of a state-sponsored trip
or that she is affiliated with CGTN. On Facebook, the same video is tagged with a state media label
(Figure 24).165
29
Figure 24: The ‘The TRUTH OF XINJIANG—in a German vlogger’s eyes’ video on the Miss Wow China YouTube account
with no state media label, and the same video on the Techy Rachel Facebook page with a China state-controlled
media label
Sources: left, Miss Wow China, ‘The TRUTH OF XINJIANG—in a German vlogger’s eyes’, YouTube, 9 June 2021, online; right, Techy Rachel, Facebook, June 2021,
online.
Likewise, Stuart Wiggin is labelled as a People’s Daily online reporter in China Daily videos about the
‘A Date With China’ tour to Xinjiang.166 It is unclear whether he is currently employed by the outlet.
However, his personal YouTube channel, ‘The China Traveller’, where he has shared at least seven
videos that appear to have been filmed as part of the tour, has no state media label (Figure 25).
Nor does Wiggin indicate that he has links with state media on his YouTube ‘About’ page167 or in the
Xinjiang video captions as of 20 July 2021, or that he took part in an arranged trip.
Figure 25: Stuart Wiggin, with the name Stuart Thomas, referred to as a People’s Daily online reporter in a China Daily
video published on 27 May 2021 (left); a video published on his YouTube channel on 12 June 2021 with no mention of any
media affiliation or disclosure about the ‘A Date With China’ trip (right)
Sources: left, ‘Foreigners share impressions of Xinjiang (I)’, China Daily, 27 May 2021, online; right, The China Traveller, ‘XINJIANG VLOG6 - Finding Friends and
White Jade in HOTAN / 新疆VLOG6 和田捡到玉发财了！’, YouTube, 12 June 2021, online.
To date, social media companies largely don’t have clear policies on content from vloggers who aren’t
employed by state media full time but whose content may be facilitated in part by party-state media,
such as through sponsored trips. YouTube does require content creators to inform the company
about ‘paid product placements, endorsements, sponsorships’, for example.168 However, it also says
‘Different jurisdictions have various requirements for creators and brands involved in paid promotion’.
The same issue exists for vloggers and influencers globally, and, in some cases, local laws require the
disclosure of advertising partnerships.
The state media labels applied by Twitter, Instagram and YouTube have also been criticised for failing
to distinguish between state media outlets and how they’re owned and operated, even if they receive
some level of state funding or are under a level of state control.169 In China, for example, news outlets
aren’t monolithic in the type of reporting they do. YouTube, in particular, has stated that it makes no

distinction between the editorial policies of state-funded media.170 YouTube says that its labels are
based on information about the news publisher made available by Wikipedia and other independent
third-party sources: ‘It is not a comment by YouTube on the publisher’s or video’s editorial direction,
or on a government’s editorial influence.’171 Another issue is that, as other reports have noted, state
media labels aren’t included in search results or YouTube’s recommendation panel.172
The issue of providing contextual labels to state-affiliated accounts also fails to capture accounts that
may be operated by independent organisations that share state media or government propaganda
and messages. One example is the Facebook page titled ‘This is Xinjiang’,173 which has promoted
‘A Date with China’ content and other Chinese state media or MOFA posts. The description of its
Facebook pages appears to show that the page is run by a company called Beijing Jiandanshiji Culture
Media Co. Ltd (北京简单世纪文化传媒有限公司) based in Chaoyang District, Beijing.174 A contact
email address with the ‘jiandanshiji.com’ domain and a link to the company’s website is provided
in the ‘About’ section. On its website, Beijing Jiandanshiji Culture Media Co. Ltd says that it was first
established in June 2021, but it’s had a social media presence since at least April 2020.
The ‘Discover Xinjiang’ Facebook page175 also appears to be associated with this company, alongside
Twitter accounts Tianshan Fairyland,176 Discover Xinjiang177 and possibly another blank Facebook page
named Tianshan Fairyland (Figure 26).178
Figure 26: Screenshots of promotions of ‘A Date with China’ content and Facebook page ‘About’ sections
Sources: left, ‘This is Xinjiang’, Facebook, 19 July 2021, online; middle, This is Xinjiang, ‘Amazing Xinjiang’, Facebook, online; right, ‘Discover Xinjiang’,
Facebook, online.
On Twitter, the ‘Discover Xinjiang’ account has a ‘China state-affiliated media’ label. A Google cached
version of the ‘Discover Xinjiang’ pages shows that the operators of the account removed a link to the
company’s website some time between 17 and 22 July 2021 and after it received the state-affiliated
label (Figure 27). The current Google cache of this account has now been updated with the link
removed. However, searching ‘dxinjiang jiandanshiji.com’ returns one search result of a previously
cached version of the account with the link still in its bio.
31
Figure 27: Screenshots of Discover Xinjiang Twitter profiles taken on 23 July 2021 (left) and 17 July 2021 (right)
Source: Discover Xinjiang, Google cache, online.
On YouTube, the ‘Discover Xinjiang’ account posts similar videos published by Chinese state media
videos but uses its own watermark. It’s unclear whether these videos were originally created by state
media then shared with the ‘Discover Xinjiang’ operators or vice versa. One video published by China
Internet Information Center’s China.org.cn account titled ‘Xinjiang Diary’ follows Jay, a foreigner who
explores Xinjiang. This video has a label disclosing ownership or funding by the Chinese Government.
The exact same video, however, was published by Discover China’s YouTube account, which has no
clear affiliation to Chinese state media in its description on its account or on the video (Figure 28).
Figure 28: YouTube videos of Xinjiang Diary from China.org.cn (left) and Discover Xinjiang (right)
Source: left, China.org.cn, ‘Xinjiang Diary: Episode One’, Facebook, 22 December 2020, online; right, Discover Xinjiang, ‘Xinjiang Diary’, Facebook,
4 January 2021, online.

There’s also some evidence that the Facebook pages of Discover Xinjiang may have been
inauthentically amplified and breached Facebook’s community standards.179 According to
CrowdTangle, a Facebook post by Discover Xinjiang sharing episode 2 of the ‘Xinjiang Diary’ featuring a
foreigner, Jay, received more than 37,000 views and 2,100 likes but only 14 shares and zero comments
(Figure 29).180 Jay doesn’t appear to be affiliated with the other foreign influencers we have identified
in this report or with the ‘A Date with China’ tour. Over a period of eight hours, this post accrued
more than 24,700 thousand likes, which is equivalent to roughly one view per second. The number of
views increased steadily over time, suggesting automation rather than organic engagement, which is
generally more varied.
In addition, normalising the number of views and likes to the total likes/views that the post received
showed that the rate of which the post received likes matched very closely with the rate at which
the post received views. Our analysis finds that, for every 20 views, the post received on average one
like, and that behaviour occurred for at least eight hours continuously. Similar potential coordinated
behaviour was also observed on other Discover Xinjiang posts, including a post featuring episode 1 of
the Xinjiang Diary.181
Figure 29: Views and likes over time for Discover Xinjiang post since publication on 22 December 2020
Source: CrowdTangle, ‘Discover Xinjiang’, Facebook, 22 December 2020, online.
33
Conclusion
China has long been among the most restrictive countries for journalists to operate in, and Tibet
and Xinjiang are particularly difficult reporting environments. For years, foreign journalists have
faced surveillance, physical abuse, restrictive visa procedures and harassment of sources and news
assistants.182 Harassment of journalists in China in 2020 was particularly intense in Xinjiang, according
to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China.183 Correspondents were ‘visibly followed by police or
state security agents, asked to delete data from their devices, and prevented from talking to people’.
Rather than allowing critical reporting in Xinjiang, China has at times used orchestrated tours of the
region to counteract the growing body of witness accounts, satellite imagery, official government
documents and policies, general scholarship and local media reports that have contributed to a
growing understanding of the human rights abuses taking place there. The addition of online foreign
social media influencers into government-organised tours that have traditionally been made up of
party-state media, amenable diplomats and friendly foreign journalists reflects a willingness among
Chinese officials to innovate in the CCP’s external communication strategy. Likewise, the amplification
of influencer content about Xinjiang on social media by party-state media and diplomatic accounts
is used as part of campaigns to distract from and obfuscate allegations of human rights abuses in
Xinjiang, while reframing the discussion of issues about which the CCP is particularly sensitive.
Leveraging the global reach of US social media networks is a central part of this international
communication strategy. Our research has shown how the Chinese Government and party-state media
are using US social media networks to seek to create greater ambiguity about the situation in Xinjiang,
push a counter-narrative and amplify disinformation.184 This is occurring in an online environment in
which state accounts are often inconsistently labelled, or not labelled at all. US social media platforms
must better craft and better implement policies to identify accounts with state links or content that
has been directly facilitated by states, and those policies should apply globally. As some of them
have with Covid-19 and vaccine information, platforms could explore the introduction of specific
policies about misleading information regarding human rights abuses.185 Such policies could include
enforcement measures against violations similar to those that Twitter has implemented for sharing
false or misleading information about Covid-19.186
The use of foreign influencers also creates a degree of plausible deniability for the CCP’s international-
facing propaganda—a strategy adopted in the knowledge that foreign voices are more likely than
official CCP spokespeople to penetrate and relate to target overseas populations . At the same time,
the ability of foreign governments to conduct legitimate online public diplomacy within China—such
as posting on Weibo—is being curtailed and at times censored.187 In combination, this creates a potent
one-way vehicle for the extraterritorial projection of the CCP’s political power.

Notes
1 The term ‘party-state media’ is used in this paper to reflect the solidification of CCP control over media outlets that
followed a major reorganisation of the sector in 2018. See ‘Ownership and control of Chinese media’, Safeguard
Defenders, 14 June 2021, online.
2 ‘MOFA: BBC is not trusted even in the UK’, CGTN, 1 April 2021, online.
3 James Thorpe, ‘Understanding China is getting harder every month’, Foreign Policy, 27 May 2021, online.
4 Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, Nathan Ruser, Uyghurs for sale: ‘re-education’, forced
labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2020, online.
5 Nathan Ruser, ‘Exploring Xinjiang’s detention system’, The Xinjiang Data Project, 24 September 2020, online.
6 Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, Tilla Hoja, Cultural erasure, ASPI, Canberra, 24 September 2020, online.
7 Albert Zhang, Jacob Wallis, Zoe Meers, Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: the CCP, fringe media and US social media
platforms, ASPI, Canberra, 30 March 2021, online.
8 Zhang et al., Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: the CCP, fringe media and US social media platforms.
9 Jacob Wallis, Albert Zhang, Ariel Bogle, Trigger warning: the CCP’s coordinated information effort to discredit the BBC,
ASPI, Canberra, 4 March 2021, online.
10 Zhang et al, Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: the CCP, fringe media and US social media platforms.
11 ‘Tell the Chinese story well and spread it internationally’ [讲好中国故事做好国际传播], Qiushi, 1 August 2016, online.
12 ‘“Who is CPC?”: Edgar Snow, the first Western journalist to introduce Red China to the world’, Global Times 16 April 2021,
online.
13 Anne-Marie Brady, Sidney Rittenberg, ‘The political meaning of friendship: reviewing the life and times of two of China’s
American friends’, China Review International, 2002, 9(2):307–19, online.
14 ‘In the 30th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping emphasised strengthening
and improving international communication work to show a true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China’ [习近
平在中共中央政治局第三十次集体学习时强调加强和改进国际传播工作展示真实立体全面的中国], Xinhua,
15 ‘Grasping the right to speak internationally and effectively spreading the voice of China—an analysis of Xi Jinping’s
ideas and ideas of external propaganda work’ [把握国际话语权有效传播中国声音——习近平外宣工作思路理念探
析], Xinhua, 6 April 2021, online.
16 ‘The special subject of the main station’s Party group conveys and learns the spirit of the important speech by General
Secretary Xi Jinping at the 30th collective study of the Politburo of the Central Committee’ [总台党组专题传达学习习
近平总书记在中央政治局第三十次集体学习时的重要讲话精神], CCTV, 3 June 2021, online.
17 ‘The special subject of the main station’s Party group conveys and learns the spirit of the important speech by General
Secretary Xi Jinping at the 30th collective study of the Politburo of the Central Committee’.
18 ‘Transform China’s development advantages into international discourse advantages’ [把中国的发展优势转化为国
际话语优势], Qiushi, 25 May 2020, online; Samantha Hoffman, Social credit: technology-enhanced authoritarian control
with global consequences, ASPI, Canberra, 28 June 2018, online.
19 ‘Regarding telling the Chinese story well, General Secretary Xi Jinping said this’ [关于讲好中国故事，习近平总书记这
样说], Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, online.
20 Nadège Rolland, China’s vision for a new world order, NBR special report no. 83, National Bureau of Asian Research,
27 January 2020, online.
21 Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, Christine Huang, Large majorities say China does not respect the personal freedoms of its people,
Pew Research Center, 30 June 2021, online.
22 Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, Tracy Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy, ASPI, Canberra,
1 September 2020, online.
23 Gene A Bunin, ‘“We’re a people destroyed”: why Uighur Muslims across China are living in fear’, The Guardian, 7 August
2018, online; Timothy A Grose, ‘If you don’t know how, just learn: Chinese housing and the transformation of Uyghur
domestic space’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 6 July 2020, 44(11), online.
24 The Xinjiang Data Project, ASPI, Canberra, 2021, online.
25 ‘Break their lineage, break their roots’: China’s crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims,
Human Rights Watch, 19 April 2021, online.
26 Macarena Vidal Liy, ‘Xinjiang’s false normality’ [La falsa normalidad de Xinjiang], El País, 19 July 2021, online; Nathan
Vanderklippe, ‘Thousands of Uyghur workers in China are being relocated in an effort to assimilate Muslims, documents
show’, The Globe and Mail, 2 March 2021, online.
27 Vincent Ni, ‘“Making China great again”: pomp and propaganda as CCP marks centenary’, The Guardian, 1 July 2021,
online.
35
29 Track, trace, expel: reporting on China amid a pandemic—FCCC report on media freedom in 2020, Foreign
Correspondents’ Club of China, 1 March 2021, online.
30 ‘China takes aim at “illegal” club for foreign correspondents’, Bloomberg, 1 April 2021, online.
31 ‘Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang’s regular press conference on March 18, 2020’, media release, Permanent
Mission of the PRC to the UN Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, 19 March 2020,
online.
32 ‘Attacks on foreign journalists in China cast shadow over Beijing’s upcoming Olympics’, Hong Kong Free Press, 2 August
2021, online.
33 ‘A US journalist who dined with Mao is Beijing’s ideal for who should cover China’, Quartz, 15 April 2021, online.
34 ‘A US journalist who dined with Mao is Beijing’s ideal for who should cover China’.
35 Kaitlyn Tiffany, ‘America’s health will soon be in the hands of very minor internet celebrities’, The Atlantic,
18 February 2021, online.
36 Elaine Yau, ‘The social media stars in China who aren’t Chinese—how foreign influencers fluent in Mandarin are winning
legions of fans’, South China Morning Post, 22 February 2021, online.
37 Si Ying, ‘How Chinese VPN users are fined for illegally “climbing over the wall”’ [中国VPN用户被罚 “翻墙”怎么会违
法], BBC, 10 January 2019, online.
38 Wang Xuandi, ‘Hunan man punished for using VPN to watch porn’, Sixth Tone, 29 July 2020, online.
39 Si Ying, ‘How Chinese VPN users are fined for illegally “climbing over the wall”’; Nathan Vanderklippe, ‘China cracks
down on use of unsanctioned foreign websites and social media’, The Globe and Mail, 29 October 2020, online.
40 Henryk Szadziewski, Greg Fay, ‘How China dismantled the Uyghur internet’, The Diplomat, 22 July 2014, online.
41 ‘Eradicating ideological viruses’: China’s campaign of repression against Xinjiang’s Muslims, Human Rights Watch,
9 September 2018, online.
42 ‘MOFA: BBC is not trusted even in the UK’, CGTN, 1 April 2021, online.
43 Kerry Allen, Sophie Williams, ‘The foreigners in China’s disinformation drive’, BBC News, 11 July 2021, online.
44 The interactive figure is at https://bm-xj-vis.aspi.org.au. Use a mouse to navigate and scroll to zoom. Hovering over
edges will bring up a clickable link to the amplification post.
45 David Bandurski, ‘All this talk of independence’, China Media Project, 12 February 2021, online.
46 ‘About us’, People’s Daily, online.
47 YChina, ‘What I saw in Xinjiang working as a cotton farmer’, YouTube, 8 April 2021, online.
48 Daniel Dumbrill, ‘A Conversation With a “Chinese Concentration Camp” Survivor’, YouTube, 5 May 2021, online.
49 Barrett, ‘Xinjiang Genocide - The Campaign to Take Down CHINA // 新疆种族灭绝 - 阻碍中国崛起的手段’, YouTube,
50 Best China Info, ‘Millions of Uyghurs in camps Xinjiang? Lies. Where did the did the lies against China start? Pt 1of4’,
YouTube, 28 March 2021, online.
51 ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on March 26, 2021’, media release, PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2021, online; CGTN, ‘MOFA: BBC is not trusted even in the UK’, YouTube, 1 April 2021,
online.
52 Holly Chik, Eduardo Baptista, ‘The China-based foreigners defending Beijing from Xinjiang genocide claims’, South
China Morning Post, 30 March 2021, online.
53 ‘In conversation with Jerry Grey and Barrie V’, YouTube, 10 April 2021, online.
54 ‘A Date with China’, China Daily, online.
55 ‘“A Date with China” 2021 international media theme interview activity started in Shaanxi Station’ “
[ 中国有约 A Date
with China” 2021年国际媒体主题采访活动陕西站启动], Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, online.
56 ‘“A Date with China” 2021 international media theme interview activity started in Shaanxi Station’.
57 ‘Contract award announcement of the results of the interviews with the theme “A Date with China 2021” International
Communication Fujian Tour (Package 1)’ [“2021年中国有约”主题采访国际传播福建行活动结果公告(包1)], online.
58 ‘“A Date with China” 2021 international media theme interview activity started’ [中国有约 A Date with China”2021年国
际媒体主题采访活动启动], China Daily, 20 April 2021, online.
59 ‘Poverty alleviation: China’s experience and contribution’, State Council Information Office of the PRC, 6 April 2021,
online; ‘They are the people General Secretary Xi Jinping cares most about!’ [习近平总书记最牵挂的人，是他们!], CCTV
Finance, 22 September 2017, online.
60 ‘China launches all-out propaganda campaign as Xi Jinping claims poverty is over’, Radio Free Asia, 25 February 2021,
online.

61 ‘“A Date with China” 2021 international media theme interview activity will be launched soon’ [“中国有约 A Date with
China”2021年国际媒体主题采访活动即将启动], Sohu, 19 April 2021, online.
62 ‘Foreigners share impressions of Xinjiang (I)’, China Daily, 27 May 2021, online.
63 ‘Fusion media production, fighting the epidemic our way’ [融媒制作，用我们的方式抗击疫情], People’s Daily Media
Innovation, archived on 29 November 2021, online.
64 The China Traveller, ‘About’, YouTube, online.
65 ‘Rachel’ Zhou Yiqiu [周忆秋] and Sabira Samat appear in a China Daily video about ‘A Date With China’, online; and in
videos by other participants, such as Kirk Apesland, online.
66 ‘What’s daily life like for Uyghurs? A talk with Uyghur influencer Sabira Samat and Daniel Dumbrill’, YouTube,
67 ‘GLOBALink | Xinjiang Guli Epi 3: A vlogger’s beautiful trips’, Xinhua Global Service, 8 March 2021, online.
68 Gulixinjiang, Instagram, online.
69 Story of Xinjiang by Guli, ‘My twitter has been banned 我的推特已经被封号了’, YouTube, 24 May 2021, online.
70 Story of Xinjiang by Guli, ‘Within German guy’s vision of Xinjiang’, YouTube, 1 June 2021, online.
71 ‘Within German guy’s vision of Xinjiang Part 2’, Instagram, 4 June 2021, online.
72 ‘Wu Yuxiang was evaluated by David as a “garbage man” and his friends lost control of the scene in a fierce quarrel’
[吴雨翔被大卫评价“垃圾人” 小伙伴激烈争吵现场失控], Tencent Video, online; [World Youth Talk] German Wu Yuxiang
cut compilation, Bilibili, 7 October 2015, online.
73 Miss Wow, ‘The truth of Xinjiang—in a German vlogger’s eyes’, YouTube, 9 June 2021, online.
74 German boy Wu Yuxiang, ‘It turns out Xinjiang is like this? German boy toured around Xinjiang and really loved it!’
[原来新疆竟是这样？德国小伙玩遍新疆，真的爱了!], Bilibili, 28 May 2021, online.
75 Story of Xinjiang by Guli, ‘Within German guy’s vision of Xinjiang’, YouTube, 1 June 2021, online.
76 Miss Wow, ‘The Truth of Xinjiang—in a German vlogger’s eyes’.
77 ‘Wu Yuxiang Patrick’s World’ [吴雨翔 Patrick’s World], YouTube, archived 1 June 2021, online.
78 ‘German guy Wu Yuxiang’ [德国小伙吴雨翔], Bilibili, archived 3 August 2021, online.
79 Wu Yuxiang Patrick’s World [吴雨翔 Patrick’s World], ‘Unforgettable experience at a Xinjiang night market! German guy
eats at Hotan Night Market’ [德国小伙儿吃遍和田夜市], YouTube, 7 June 2021, online.
80 German Guy Wu Yuxiang, ‘Everything can be grilled! German guy eats his way through Hotan Night Market! Exploring
the best places to eat in Xinjiang!’ [万物皆可烤！德国小伙吃遍和田夜市！探秘新疆最好吃的地方!], Bilibili,
31 May 2021, online.
81 The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021—Back alleys, orchards, cotton fields and the desert / 新疆VLOG4 麦盖提县’,
YouTube, 6 June 2021, online.
82 Miss Wow China, ‘Xinjiang cotton demystified: I interviewed two Uygur owners of cotton field’, YouTube, 17 June 2021,
online.
83 ‘It turns out that Xinjiang is like this? The German guy played all over Xinjiang and really loved it!’ [原来新疆竟是这样？
德国小伙玩遍新疆，真的爱了！], Bilibili, 28 May 2021, online.
84 John Sudworth, ‘China’s “tainted” cotton’, BBC News, 10 December 2020, online.
85 The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021—back alleys, orchards, cotton fields and the desert’.
86 Miss Wow China, ‘Xinjiang cotton demystified: I interviewed two Uygur owners of cotton field’.
87 ‘It turns out that Xinjiang is like this? The German guy played all over Xinjiang and really loved it!’ [原来新疆竟是这样？
德国小伙玩遍新疆，真的爱了！], Bilibili, 28 May 2021, online.
88 YChina, ‘What I saw in Xinjiang working as a cotton farmer’, YouTube, 8 April 2021, online.
89 Miss Wow, ‘Talking about Kashgar with Gweilo 60’, YouTube, 16 June 2021, online.
90 Gweilo 60, ‘Ancient city of Kashgar Xinjiang China’, YouTube, 6 June 2021, online.
91 The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021: I explore the ancient city of Kashgar’, YouTube, 31 May 2021, online.
92 Gweilo 60, ‘Oppressed in Xinjiang once again!’, YouTube, 25 June 2021, online.
93 ‘Foreigners share impressions of Xinjiang (II)’, China Daily, 29 May 2021, online.
94 YChina, ‘I visited 3 families in Xinjiang, here is what they told me’, YouTube, 11 April 2021, online.
95 YChina, ‘What I saw in Xinjiang working as a cotton farmer’.
96 Peter S Goodman, Vivian Wang, Elizabeth Paton, ‘Global brands find it hard to untangle themselves from Xinjiang
cotton’, New York Times, 6 April 2021, online.
97 CGTN, ‘Foreign blogger Raz Galor visits cotton farm in Xinjiang’, YouTube, 5 April 2021, online.
98 ‘“Fabricated lies don’t go far”: Raz Galor came to Xinjiang to experience growing cotton’ “
[ 造谣一张嘴小高跑断腿”
高佑思来新疆体验种棉花], CCTV, 4 April 2021, online.
37
99 CGTN, ‘Liu Xin talks to foreign blogger on his experience in Xinjiang’, YouTube, 13 April 2021, online.
100 ‘The Central Propaganda Department takes over the merger of the three major news, publishing and film stations’
[中宣部接管新闻出版电影三大台合并], Caixin, 21 March 2018, online.
101 Kerry Allen, Sophie Williams, ‘The foreigners in China’s disinformation drive’, BBC News, 11 July 2021, online.
102 Frédéric Lemaître, ‘Beijing is desperate to find useful idiots’ [Pékin cherche idiots utiles désespérément], Le Monde,
3 May 2021, online.
103 YChina, ‘I am being ATTACKED by the New York Times?’, YouTube, 2 December 2021, online.
104 ‘‘Global Stringer Y China’, CGTN, archived 25 November 2021, online.
105 ‘JOIN US——GLOBAL STRINGER’, CGTN, archived 29 November 2021, online.
106 CGTN, ‘Foreign blogger Raz Galor visits cotton farm in Xinjiang’, YouTube, 4 April 2021, online; CGTN, ‘Liu Xin talks to
foreign blogger on his experience in Xinjiang’, YouTube, 13 April 2021, online.
107 ShanghaiEye, ‘What’s real Xinjiang and its cotton farm like? Follow this Israeli vlogger and find out’, YouTube,
108 CCTV Video News Agency, ‘Israeli vlogger documents real life in Xinjiang’, YouTube, 7 April 2021, online.
109 New China TV, ‘GLOBALink: Drones, “transformers” are “forced labor”—Xinjiang in eyes of a young Israeli’, YouTube,
110 Global Times, ‘Raz Gal Or, a 23-year-old young entrepreneur from Israel planned to spend a week in Aksu, a major
cotton producing area in Xinjiang, to experience the work and life of ordinary people, and to record local life using his
camera’, Facebook, 16 April 2021, online.
111 CGTN, ‘What did foreigners who visited a cotton farm in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region think about the
locals’ living conditions? Israeli Jewish blogger Raz Galor told CGTN that he was very impressed by Xinjiang cotton
industry’s advanced technology, noting that the locals enjoy a high salary’, Facebook, 5 April 2021, online.
112 China Xinhua News, ‘Those who advocate banning Xinjiang cotton “need to understand that people should really
consider a person’s culture before they try to judge their life and their work,” said Israeli businessman Raz Gal-Or,
adding tractor “transformer” is labor’, Facebook, 15 April 2021, online.
113 Radio Internacional de China en español, ‘El bloguero islaerí Raz Galor fue a comienzo de abril a la prefectura de Aksu,
la principal zona productora de algodón de Xinjiang, para experimentar el trabajo y la vida local’, Facebook,
114 CRI German, ‘Der israelische Video-Influencer Raz Galor erlebt die Arbeit und das Leben einfacher Leute in Aksu in
#Xinjiang und bringt die wirkliche Geschichte der Menschen hier in die Welt (via bilibili)’, Facebook, 17 April 2021, online.
115 ‘Three issues of Xinjiang videos were posted overseas, and I was sprayed’, [在海外发了三期新疆视频，我被喷了？],
Bilibili, 17 April 2021, online.
116 ‘This group of “crooked nuts” uses the “Chinese model” to create foreign internet celebrities’ [这群“歪果仁”用“中国模
式”打造外国网红], CBN Data, 2 April 2020, online.
117 Frank Tang, ‘How the Israeli who captured Chinese hearts plans to turn online fame into fortune’, South China Morning
Post, 25 November 2017, online.
118 Meir Orbach, ‘China’s Weibo backs Y-Platform in $3.5 million round’, CTech, 23 March 2020, online.
119 ‘Beijing Weiwo Technology Co. Ltd’ [北京唯喔科技有限公司], Qichacha, archived 29 July 2021, online.
120 ‘The Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee held a meeting of Chinese and foreign journalists on
“Youth Responsibility of Youth in the New Era”’ [中共中央宣传部就 “新时代青年的青春担当”举行中外记者见面会],
China Internet Information Center, 12 May 2021, online.
121 ‘“This is our time, everyone has a chance to shine”’, [“这是我们的时代，谁都有机会出彩”], The Paper, 13 May 2021,
online.
122 ‘“This is our time, everyone has a chance to shine”’.
123 ‘Crooked Nuts Research Association and YCHINA’ [歪果仁研究协会和 YCHINA], INNONATION, online.
124 ‘YChina’ [歪研会], Tianyancha, archived 25 July 2021, online.
125 ‘Since the reform and opening up, more and more foreigners have studied, worked and lived in China. In their contacts
with ordinary Chinese people, especially grassroots Communist Party members, their understanding of China and
the Communist Party of China has also deepened. So what do they think of these Communist Party members around
them?’ [改革开放以来，在中国学习、工作、生活的外国人越来越多。在与中国普通民众特别是基层共产党员的交往
接触中，他们对中国和中国共产党的认知也日益深化，那么他们是怎么看待自己身边的这些中共党员呢？], Weixin,
online.
126 People’s Daily, ‘The real China as I see it: Raz Galor’, YouTube, 2 June 2021, online.
127 ‘How this Israeli internet star, Raz Gal-Or, captured Chinese hearts’, YouTube, 6 December 2017, online.
128 The CCP’s ‘positive energy’ obsession, China Media Project, 15 December 2015, online.

129 YChina, ‘Hong Kong Today: What do the people have to say?’, YouTube, 8 September 2019, online.
130 Wallis et al., Trigger warning: the CCP’s coordinated information effort to discredit the BBC.
131 YChina, ‘How to make a “BBC-style” documentary about Wuhan?’, YouTube, 6 February 2021, online.
132 ‘How to make a “BBC-style” documentary about Wuhan?’, CGTN, 7 February 2021, online; ‘How to make a “BBC-style”
documentary about Wuhan?’, YouTube, 7 February 2021, online.
133 ‘IFJ report—The China story: reshaping the world’s media’, International Federation of Journalists, 2020, online.
134 The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021—Cherries and camel milk in Kashgar’, YouTube, 8 June 2021, online.
135 [新疆莎车县：馕产业成为增收新引擎], People’s Daily, online.
136 ‘Yarkant facility #2’, Xinjiang Data Project, ASPI, Canberra, 2021, online.
137 ‘Come quick! The cherries in Misha, Yarkant are red’ [快来！莎车米夏的樱桃红了], Xinmin Evening News, online.
138 The China Traveller, ‘Xinjiang 2021—Back alleys, orchards, cotton fields and the desert / 新疆VLOG4 麦盖提县’.
139 Gweilo 60, ‘What’s happening in Xinjiang?’, YouTube, 9 June 2021, online.
140 ‘Tasting red dates baijiu in Xinjiang’, CGTN, 25 May 2021, online.
141 ‘Our life is as sweet as a jujube—visiting the “fortune tree” of the people in Yangtak Township’, [我们的生活似枣甜——
探访央塔克乡百姓的“发财树”], China Daily, 21 May 2021, online.
142 See, for example, Nathan Vanderklippe, ‘How the Globe slipped under Xinjiang’s surveillance state to expose forced
labour at Lop County industrial park’, The Globe and Mail, 11 December 2020, online; Cate Cadell, ‘In China’s new
Xinjiang: patriotic tourism, police and propaganda’, Reuters, 19 July 2020, online.
143 Nathan Ruser, Documenting Xinjiang’s detention system, ASPI, Canberra, September 2020, online.
144 Xinjiang Data Project, ‘Mekit facility #3’, online; Mekit facility #2, online; Mekit facility #1, online; ‘Mekit facility #6, online.
145 FerMuBe, ‘Our journey to Xinjiang 2021’, YouTube, April 2021, online.
146 Lin Min, ‘Untrue coverage prompts Colombian teachers to speak out’ [不公指责促使哥伦比亚老师为中国发声],
Shenzhen Daily, 15 May 2021, online
147 Noel Lee, ‘Singaporean in XinJiang: GDTV world interview’, YouTube, 30 April, 2021, online.
148 Lee, ‘Singaporean in XinJiang: GDTV world interview’.
149 FerMuBE, ‘Xinjiang Night Food Market—April 2021’, YouTube, 4 April 2021, online.
150 Noel Lee, ‘Urumqi Air flight UQ2616 final approach—Shenzhen to Xinjiang, 2nd April 2021, Boeing 737-800 B-205U’,
YouTube, 7 April 2021, online.
151 ‘Fukang facility #2’, Xinjiang Data Project, ASPI, Canberra, 2021, online; ‘Fukang facility #3, Xinjiang Data Project, ASPI,
Canberra, 2021, online; ‘Xinshi facility #1’, Xinjiang Data Project, ASPI, Canberra, 2021, online; ‘Xinshi facility #6’, Xinjiang
Data Project, ASPI, Canberra, 2021, online; ‘Xinshi facility #7’, Xinjiang Data Project, ASPI, Canberra, 2021, online;
‘Xinjiang Camps Data’, GitHub, 2021, online; ‘Xinjiang Women’s Prison’ [新疆女子监狱], Xinjiang Victims Database,
Shahit, 2021, online; ‘Xinjiang No. 3 Prison’ [新疆第三监狱], online; ‘Ürümqi Prison’ [乌鲁木齐监狱], Xinjiang Victims
Database, Shahit, 2021, online.
152 ‘Buzeynep Abdureshit’, Xinjiang Victims Database, Shahit, 2021, online.
153 Geoff Samek, ‘Greater transparency for users around news broadcasters’, YouTube Official Blog, 2 February 2018, online;
Guy Rosen, Katie Harbath, Nathaniel Gleicher, Rob Leathern, ‘Helping to protect the 2020 US elections’, Facebook,
21 October 2019, online; ‘New labels for government and state-affiliated media accounts’, Twitter, 6 August 2020, online.
154 Ava Kofman, ‘YouTube promised to label state-sponsored videos but doesn’t always do so’, ProPublica, 22 November
2019, online; Nicole Buckley, Morgan Wack, Joey Schafer, Martin Zhang, Inconsistencies in state-controlled media
labeling, Election Integrity Partnership, 6 October 2020, online.
155 Frontline, ‘Xinjiang from an Israeli’s eyes: “Everything is extremely normal here”’, YouTube, 4 April 2021, online.
156 ‘Frontline’, Twitter, archived 2 August 2021, online.
157 ‘Frontline’, Facebook, archived 2 August 2021, online.
158 ‘Frontline’, Facebook, archived 2 August 2021, online.
159 ‘Walking with Rachel: what’s the latest trend in China’s job market?’, CGTN, 14 November 2020, online.
160 ‘Miss Wow’, YouTube, archived 20 July 2021, online.
161 ‘Miss Wow’, Twitter, archived 20 July 2020, online.
162 ‘miss_wow66’, Instagram, archived 5 August 2021, online.
163 ‘Techy Rachel’, Facebook, archived 3 August 2021, online.
164 Miss Wow, ‘The truth of Xinjiang—in a German vlogger’s eyes’, YouTube, 9 June 2021, online.
39
165 Techy Rachel, ‘Techy Rachel posted a video to the playlist Techy Xinjiang Trip’, Facebook, 9 June 2021, online.
166 ‘Foreigners share impressions of Xinjiang (I)’, China Daily, 27 May 2021, online.
167 ‘The China Traveler’, YouTube, archived 20 July 2021, online.
168 ‘Add paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements’, YouTube, online.
169 China’s telling Twitter story, China Media Project, 18 January 2021, online.
170 On Twitter, ‘State-affiliated media is defined as outlets where the state exercises control over editorial content through
financial resources, direct or indirect political pressures, and/or control over production and distribution’, online.
Facebook’s ‘definition of state-controlled media extends beyond just assessing financial control or ownership and
includes an assessment of editorial control exerted by a government’, online. YouTube states that ‘If a channel is owned
by a news publisher that is funded by a government, or publicly funded, an information panel providing publisher
context may be displayed on the watch page of the videos on its channel … Inclusion of the information panel
providing publisher context is based on information about the news publisher made available by Wikipedia and other
independent third-party sources. It is not a comment by YouTube on the publisher’s or video’s editorial direction, or on
a government’s editorial influence’, online.
171 ‘Information panel providing publisher context’, YouTube Help, online.
172 Buckley et al., Inconsistencies in state-controlled media labeling.
173 ‘Discover Xinjiang’, Facebook, archived 2 August 2021, online.
174 ‘About us’ [关于我们], Beijing Jiandanshiji Culture Media Co. Ltd, archived 23 July 2021, online.
176 ‘Tianshan Fairyland’, Twitter, archived 5 August 2021, online.
177 ‘Discover Xinjiang’, Twitter, archived 5 August 2021, online.
178 ‘Tianshan Fairyland’, Facebook, archived 5 August 2021, online.
179 ‘20. Inauthentic behaviour’, Facebook Community Standards, 2021, online.
181 ‘Discover Xinjiang’, Facebook, 22 December 2020, online.
182 Darkened screen: constraints on foreign journalists in China, PEN America, 22 September 2016, online.
183 Track, trace, expel: reporting on China amid a pandemic, FCCC report on media freedom in 2020, Foreign Correspondents’
Club of China, 2020, online.
185 For a prior example of enforcement action related to content on Xinjiang, see ‘Twitter deletes China embassy’s Xinjiang
“emancipation” tweet’, BBC News, 10 January 2021, online.
186 ‘COVID-19 misleading information policy’, YouTube Help Center, 2021, online.
187 Fergus Ryan, Weibo diplomacy and censorship in China, ASPI, Canberra, 29 May 2018, online.

Acronyms and abbreviations
CAC Cyberspace Administration of China
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEO chief executive officer
ICPC International Cyber Policy Centre
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)
NGO non-government organisation
UK United Kingdom
VPN virtual private network
41
RS OF ASPI
EA
ST
TWENTY Y
RATEGY
20
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Borrowing Mouths To Speak On Xinjiang

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Borrowing mouths

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021

Cover image: Illustration by artist Badiucao/https://www.badiucao.com.

No specific funding was received to

Introduction: ‘Borrowing mouths to speak’ 6

The online influencer ecosystem 8

Case study 1: The ‘A Date with China’ propaganda campaign 13

Case study 2: The ‘YChina’ media tour 20

Case study 3: Mapping the strategic geography of influencers’ trips to Xinjiang 25

Platforms’ inconsistencies in labelling state accounts 29

Acronyms and abbreviations 41

2 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

4 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

6 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Virtual private networks

8 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Source: Twitter, 8 April 2021, online.

Source: Created by ASPI ICPC, available to explore online.

10 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Figure 5: Li Bijian sharing content featuring foreign media influencers

Source: Li Bijian, Twitter, 6 August 2020, online.

12 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Source: ‘About’, YouTube, 7 October 2021, online.

14 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

16 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Figure 10: Vloggers dance with locals

Source: Twitter, 19 July 2021, online.

18 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

20 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Source: ‘Chinese Embassy in Turkey’, Facebook, archived 29 July 2021, online.

22 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

24 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Source: Maxar via Google Earth.

26 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Detention infrastructure is hard to avoid in Xinjiang

28 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

30 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Source: Discover Xinjiang, Google cache, online.

32 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Source: CrowdTangle, ‘Discover Xinjiang’, Facebook, 22 December 2020, online.

34 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

36 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

38 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

40 Policy Brief: Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

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Introduction: ‘Borrowing mouths to speak’ 6

The online influencer ecosystem 8

Case study 1: The ‘A Date with China’ propaganda campaign 13

Case study 2: The ‘YChina’ media tour 20

Case study 3: Mapping the strategic geography of influencers’ trips to Xinjiang 25

Platforms’ inconsistencies in labelling state accounts 29

Acronyms and abbreviations 41