G.R. No.

180219               November 23, 2011

VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Virgilio Talampas was accused with the crime of homicide for the death of Ernesto Matic.
It was alleged by the witness Jose Sevillo, that while he, together with the brothers Ernesto and
Eduardo Matic, was repairing a tricycle in front of his house, Talampas passed by and stopped
near them. Talampas then alighted from his bicycle, walked towards them and brought out a
revolver, and fired the same to Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. Talampas again fired
his gun hitting Ernesto which caused the latter’s death. On trial, Talampas interposed self-
defense and accident. He insisted that Eduardo was his enemy and not the victim Ernesto. He
claimed that Eduardo had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he was able to parry the blow. On
his version, he claimed that while he and Eduardo was grappling with the wrench, he noticed that
Eduardo had a revolver so he tried to take control of the same, which accidentally fired and hit
Ernesto during the struggle. The RTC found him guilty of the crime of homicide. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim self-defense as a justifying circumstance

Ruling: NO, one who initiates the attack against another cannot interpose self-defense as a
justifying circumstance. The elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repeal the
unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in
defending himself.

Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a

defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code, the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising
due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to
something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal
act. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas’ felonious
deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in
the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated
his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

G.R. No. L-162             April 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO
ALCONGA, appellant.
Facts: On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality of San
Dionisio, Province of Iloilo several persons were playing prohibited games. The deceased Silverio Barion
was the banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the prosecution, was one
of those playing the game. Upon invitation of the said Maria de Raposo, the accused Dioscoro Alconga
joined her as a partner, each of them contributing the sum of P5 to a common fund. Maria de Raposo
played the game while the said accused posted himself behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the
cards of the latter and communicating by signs to his partner. The deceased appears to have suffered
losses in the game because of the team work between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga. Upon
discovering what the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant and expressed his
anger at the former.

On the morning of May 29, 1943, the accused was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of
Santol, performing his duties as home guard. The deceased came along and, addressing the former and
followed forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan" (bamboo stick). The accused avoided the blow by falling
to the ground under the bench. A second blow was given but failed to hit the accused. A hand-to-hand
fight ensued with the deceased’ dagger and accused bolo. The deceased ran away but was followed by
the accused. After running a distance of about 200 meters, the deceased was overtaken, and another
fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one which slashed the cranium (skull) — was
delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, besides many other blows deliver
right and left. On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan Collado, a guerrilla
soldier. Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga to Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is correct in

Ruling: It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased.
The initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on
the part of the latter. But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense, there
being then no more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the moment the
deceased took to his heels. Under such circumstances, appellant's plea of self-defense in the second
stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression.

Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating
circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the deceased. The first was properly
appreciated; the second was not, since it is very clear that from the moment he fled after the first stage
of the fight to the moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue
much less further to attack him. Article 13 No. 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that “ For provocation
in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act”.
G.R. No. 149152             February 2, 2007

RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow
police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting,
which prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the
rooftop of Antonio Abacan.  Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun,
searched the rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was
ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the
suspect) – Contreras died of the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted rooftop. He
was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun
pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied,
“Anong hindi ako?” and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when
Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!”
whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head. This prompted
Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako”
only when they approached him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there
are policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator
Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can invoke his fulfillment of duty as a justifying circumstance

RULING: The Supreme Court held that proof that the shooting and death of Contreras was a necessary
consequence of the due performance of petitioner’s duty should be provided.

The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised
Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted,
uncontroverted or established facts, the most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim to justify a claim of self defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of
unlawful aggression, petitioner’s plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail. In the
absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The prosecution’s evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who
was then only fourteen years old was hired as a house helper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the
accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away.
Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11 ;00 o’clock in the evening, the accused called
the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he
suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, ‘Come. let us have sexual intercourse”. The
accused held a bolo measuring 1–1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo
bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the complainant
and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her despite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual
intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or to anybody in
the house, otherwise he would kill her.
On the following morning, the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused.
Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied
her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force. The accused was later
brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit ‘E', which the accused allegedly used in
threatening the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was
suffering from insanity.
RULING: Appellant’s plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
“Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.— The following are exempt from
criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from
the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken
into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he
acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a
few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition.
 The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition—"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,”
and (b) the test of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.”
Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental
state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr.
Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of
time.

G.R. No. 127818 November 11, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO NEPOMUCENO, JR., accused-appellant.

FACTS: On May 2, 1994, Grace Guillermo was nagging and pestering his husband Guillermo
Nepomuceno, who was jobless at that time, to fund the postdated check that she issued. Guillermo left
home to avoid the nagging and tantrums throughout the day, and when he went home that night, they had
some arguments. Guillermo was desperate to avoid the nagging, he decided to get a gun as if he would
kill himself. The two then grappled the gun and Grace was shot on her leg and then eventually died.
Guillermo Nepomuceno was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime parricide by the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Manila, Branch 46). Guillermo filed an appeal
against the RTC decision contending that (1) the killing was accidental; (2) he is not criminally liable as
the killing was a result of simple negligence; (3) his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Guillermo Nepomuceno intentionally killed Grace Nepomuceno

2. Whether or not Guillermo is guilty of simple negligence

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding Guillermo
Nepomuceno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime parricide for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use of
personal violence upon his spouse, Grace Nepomuceno.

Guillermo contends that the incident was accidental and that he should be exempt from
criminal liability. For an accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here,
however, the act of accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not
being in self-defense, is unlawful — it at least constitutes light threats (Article 285, par. 1, Revised Penal
Code). There is thus no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption. He stated that
they were grappling the gun but the physical evidence shows that there have been no nitrates in Grace’s
hands, clear indication that she was not able to hold the gun. Furthermore, the medico-legal officer
opined that grappling for possession of the gun was impossible because the trajectory of the bullet was
going upwards and there were no smudges or signs of close firing. The fact that the victim was not shot
in the head, or in any vital part of her body does not negate intent to kill. The extent of the physical
injury inflicted on Grace, as above proved, manifests intention to extinguish life.

It has been held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence. What qualifies an act of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is
the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof. Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done
without malice but with lack of foresight, or with carelessness or negligence, and which has harmed
society or an individual.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAY MANDY MAGLIAN

Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

[G.R. No. 189834, March 30: 2011]

FACTS: The accused and his wife Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmariñas, Cavite
when they got into an argument. The accused refused to let Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to
fight. Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy had given him for Christmas and told her
he would burn them all and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can
of kerosene from him and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife’s plea,
the accused still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire. The accused
brought Mary Jay to one hospital to another to treat her but at the PGH where she was last transferred,
she was no longer able to recover. Before she expired, she told her mother what had happened to her,
declaring, “Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay Mandy burned me.)”

The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental. He said it was
Mary Jay who was being difficult while they were arguing. Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his
wife, left his wife and went upstairs to his son. While climbing the stairs, he heard Mary Jay shouting. He
ran down the steps and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of the kitchen.

Accused-appellant contends that, (1) he never or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed or so grave an offense as the felony charged against him; and (2) that he voluntarily, and
of his own free will, surrendered or yielded to the police or government authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not

RULING: No intent to commit so grave a wrong The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed. “This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the
particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act.” The intention of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.” As aptly explained by the trial court: The
accused had full control and possession of the kerosene. He is a bulky and very muscular person while
the deceased was of light built, shorter, smaller and weaker. the kerosene content of the gallon
container must have been poured over the head of the deceased. This explains why when she got
ignited, the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from head to toe. There was no disparity
between the means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third degree burns on her body. He is,
thus, not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.

Voluntary surrender An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
if the following requisites are present: ” 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary.
The Court explained, “The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused
to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.”
The claim of the accused is backed by the records of the case and a certification made by the
Dasmariñas Police Station that he has voluntarily surrendered. He contends that both the RTC and the
CA inexplicably did not appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his favor. That the Accused-appellant
at the time of his surrender had not actually been arrested. He surrendered to the police authorities. His
surrender was voluntary, as borne by the certification issued by the police. There is, thus, merit to the
claim of accusedappellant that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

G.R. No. 74515 June 14, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BERTITO TRIGO, accused-appellant.

FACTS: According to the testimony of the witness Marco Fuentes, the victim Alicia Trigo was seen at
the market of Pontevedra, Capiz. Suddenly there was a commotion and when the witness looked, he
saw Bertito Trigo stabbing the victim, who was Bertito’s wife. The witness saw Trigo in front of the
victim holding her with one of his arms. There was no other person near the victim. After awhile the
victim fell on the ground bleeding.

Accused, upon the other hand, denied that he killed his wife Alicia. According to him, he and his
wife were at the market to buy some goods for their store; that while they were walking, he saw Orline
Buaco draw from his waist a weapon; that Buaco tried to stab him but he (accused) was able to evade the
blow; that it was his wife who got hit by the blow delivered by Buaco; and after his wife was hit, Buaco
successively stabbed her. The court finds the accused guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender with penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide

RULING: We are not persuaded by appellant's claim that it was not him but a certain Orline Buaco who
stabbed his wife. In rejecting this defense, the trial court correctly observed significant
factors/circumstances surrounding the incident which belie appellant's defense that it was not he who
stabbed and killed Alicia Trigo. Firstly, there is great improbability of Orline Buaco's alleged first attack
hitting his wife if the said attack were aimed at accused. Secondly, there is greater improbability of the
deceased Alicia Trigo sustaining multiple stab wounds if it were the appellant whom Buaco wanted to
stab as then the latter would have aimed all the five other thrusts of the weapon at the accused and not at
the deceased Alicia Trigo. Thirdly, there was failure not only to shield her from the attack but also failure
to retaliate within the duration of the next five attacks upon the deceased. Fourthly, knowing that his wife
was already seriously wounded, the appellant would not have left her alone in the care of a policeman
especially after Buaco had already fled, and there was no more danger that the latter might attack
him. Fifthly, after appellant had secured police protection at the police station, appellant never returned to
personally attend to his wife and to ascertain if she received timely medical attention at the provincial
hospital at Bailan, Pontevedra.

The SC did not agree with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The accused did not surrender. He went to the police station seeking protection as he claimed that he
would be stabbed by the person who stabbed his wife. SC agrees with the penalty of Reclusion perpetua
given by the lower court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-
appellants.

FACTS: The accused-appellants Baltazar Lacao, Sr., Patria Lacao, Trinidad Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II,
and Baltazar Lacao III, were charged with the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent
of a person in authority, the deceased Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr.

A commotion arose from a card game where one Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused
Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him, was furiously arguing with the former. Lacao II unsheathed
his knife and threatened Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter’s neck. In response, Cpl. Jose G.
lnocencio, Jr. went down from the house to pacify the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao Il with a
knife, he held the latter’s hand holding the knife. Lacao II then asked to release him As Cpl. Inocencio did
not release him, the latter’s mother, Patria Lacao, then said: “Nyor, release my son.” As Cpl. Inocencio
released Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Lacao, Sr. and his other son.
Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, rushed inside the
house and surrounded the victim. The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women
hit him with stools. As the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and
he later slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued
stabbing the latter as he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: “Nyor, Nyor, are you
still alive?” Appellant Patria Lacao interjected: “What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have
to go.” Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away.

The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in self-defense since
Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire. Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by
pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed the victim and he is thus dutybound to prove the
essential requisites for this justifying circumstance. However, it cannot be denied that, even indulging in
the appellant’s theory, he definitely exceeded the limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged
unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim. In fact, from the eyewitness accounts, he even
continued stabbing the victim who was already slumped prone and helpless.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the crime
of homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery in the assault of the victim.

Whether or not Recidivism which was granted absolute pardon is still considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

RULING: Yes. In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he
unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated was the attack that
the victim was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein appellants, although apparently acting
without prior agreement, also instantly and all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were
independently performed on their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the commission
of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim might have
resorted to. Treachery was thus Correctly appreciated against all the appellants, the use of superior
strength being absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of commission.

Recidivism which was granted absolute pardon is still considered as an aggravating

circumstance. The lower court properly considered recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense
does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense
embraced in the same title of the Code. This aggravating circumstance of recidivism accordingly offsets
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PABLO CUDAL, Accused-

Appellant.

[G.R. NO. 167502: October 31, 2006]

FACTS: About 2:00 o'clock in the morning of January 1, 1998, as appellant arrived home in Barangay
Bonlalacao, Mangatarem, Pangasinan from a drinking spree with his cousins and nephews, he roused his
79- year old father Crispin Cudal (the victim) from his sleep. Appellant then asked money from the victim
so he could go back to the drinking session and pay for the liquor that he consumed. The victim replied
that he had no money, and told appellant that he was already drunk. This drew the two to a fight.

Some 50 meters away from the place of the incident, Camilo Cudal (Camilo), appellant's first cousin who
was then in the house of his mother-in-law, heard the commotion. Camilo immediately rushed to the
place and there saw the victim sitting on his bed and wiping blood oozing from his forehead. When asked
about what happened, the victim quickly replied that he quarreled with appellant and that he was hit by
him with a stone.

When Camilo confronted appellant, the latter reasoned out that he was asking money from his father but
the latter refused.

Camilo brought the wounded victim to the house of his (victim's) brother Segundino Cudal where first aid
was applied on his wounds. Camilo then fetched from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan the victim's daughter
Leoncia who brought the victim to a nearby hospital where he expired the following day, January 2, 1998,
at about 4 o'clock p.m.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant’s intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime should be
considered as a mitigating circumstance

RULING: Appellant's intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime, being an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, may be appreciated as aggravating if the same
is habitual or intentional, otherwise it shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court
observed:

We now come to another matter, which is the fact that during the incident, the accused was drunk. This
was testified to by Camilo Cudal and admitted by the wife of the accused. The accused himself admitted
that he had been drinking with his cousins and nephews, but he claims that he did not drink much.
Drunkenness is an alternative circumstance. It is aggravating if the accused is a habitual drunkard. It is
mitigating if it is otherwise.

The date of the incident is two (2) hours after midnight which ushered in the new year. Before that, the
accused and his relatives were celebrating and they drank San Miguel gin. No evidence was presented to
establish that he is a habitual drunkard. It is a legal maxim that when there is doubt, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused. This court therefore, believes that this should be taken as a mitigating
circumstance, which is favorable to the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO AGAPINAY, ALEX AGAPINAY, FORTUNATO AGAPINAY, DANTE AGAPINAY,
DELFIN AGAPINAY and CIRILO AGAPINAY, accused-appellants.

FACTS: On April 12, 1981, the Agapinay brothers together with Romeo, Virgilio Paino, Amor Flores,
and Eufemio Paino, went on a fishing venture in the sea of Batangan, in Gonzaga, Cagayan.

On the following day, when they are unloading their catch, Virgilio took the portable
shed that were using by the accused without permission of the latter. Hence, Romeo Agapinay
berated Virgilio for taking the shed. Shortly, the two exchanged words and tempers apparently
flared. Romeo stabbed him in his right arm while Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay held his arms.
Romeo stabbed him for the second time at the right s side of his back. Virgilio, however,
managed to extricate himself again and ran away. While he was running, Delfin, Alex, Fortunate,
Dante, and Cirilo threw rocks at him. All of a sudden Amor Flores appeared and plunged a knife
at the back of Virgilio. It was then that Virgilio collapsed. Antonio and Eufemio Paino, brothers
of Virgilio, and Artemio Siababa brought the wounded Virgilio to the Don Alfonso Enrile
Hospital at Gonzaga however he was declared dead on arrival. But before he died he confessed
that Agapinays as well as Amor Flores, as responsible for the incident. During arraignment, all
six accused pleaded "not guilty. The lower court found that the Agapinays had conspired to kill
Virgilio Paino and thus held them, all principals by participation.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a conspiracy on the part of the Agapinays when they
committed the crime charged.
RULING: NO. Conspiracy has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt to hold all six accused
as co-principals in the crime of murder. Conspiracy means, however, an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it. If the tragedy was a chance stabbing,
there can be no conspiracy to speak of. Hence, the parties' liability should be considered
individually. Only Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato should be held as principals in the crime of
murder. Romeo is guilty, as he admitted in open court, by direct participation, while Delfin and
Fortunate are liable as principals by cooperation. In holding the victim by his arms, both allowed
Romeo to inflict upon him a stab wound. Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, on the other hand, should be
held as simple accomplices for their acts of pelting the victim with rocks. Since the deceased had
already sustained two stab wounds, the act of hurling rocks at him was not indispensable to
justify holding them legally liable as principals.