CHAPTER 2

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Due process- as a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial. - Darmonth v Wordward

a. substantive due process---requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to life,
liberty or property. In short, it is to determine whether it has a valid governmental objective for the interest of the public
as against a mere particular class. 

b. procedural due process---one which hears before it condemns; the manner by which the law will be implemented

1.   Requisites of “judicial due process”.

In the landmark case of  Banco Espanol Filipino v Palanca, 31 Phil. 921, 934 (1918), the Supreme Court enumerated the
following essential requirements of procedural fairness in judicial proceedings: 

(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; 

(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of
the proceedings; 

(3) the defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard; and 

(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.”

CASE 1.     BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921

FACTS Related requisite for judicial due process: jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca secured a debt with various parcels of real property in Manila. The debt amounted to
P218,294.10 at 8% per annum, payable quarterly. Property's estimated value was about　P292,558. After
the instrument's execution, mortgagor returned to Amoy, China and died on January 29,　1810.　The
foreclosure proceeding needed publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure.　
Publication was made in a newspaper of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the post office in　
a stamped envelope of the summons and complaint directed to defendant. The clerk, however, failed to
comply with the mail publication requirement. The bank was able to foreclose the property without the
defendant.

After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the court　to
set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to　
vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion　
itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court　had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.　His appeal was denied
by the lower court, hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced.

RULING RULING:
Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and refuses to appear or
otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the
mortgaged property, with respect to which jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact that the
property is located within the district and that the court, under the provisions of law applicable in such
 cases is vested with the power to subject property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be acquired.

Conclusions stated by the court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the same
is accordingly affirmed.

CASE  
2.   SENATOR JINGGOY ESTRADA VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
FACTS Related requisite for judicial due process: opportunity to be heard & lawful hearing - ATA(ano po meaning
ng ATA?hehe)
FACTS:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal
complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two
complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the
Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request
was made “pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to
the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is now the subject of the present certiorari case.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law.

RULING RULING:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First.There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates
his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that
it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a
respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a
trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

CASE 3.    Ombudsman vs. Reyes, 658 SCRA 626, October 5, 2011
FACTS FACTS: 
An affidavit was executed accusing Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza, who were Transportation
Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office
 (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin, of committing fraud against one Jaime Acero. Acero alleged
that after Pealoza informed him that he failed the examination for applicants for a driver’s license, Pealoza
made an offer that they would be willing to reconsider his application if Acero would pay an additional
amount of P680. Acero agreed and paid P1,000. However, the LTO issued an Official Receipt only for the
amount of P180.
Pealoza denied the allegations of Acero stating that when Pealoza received the application, he saw that
Acero obtained a failing grade in the examination. Acero was then given the option to either retake the
examination or pay additional costs. Acero agreed to pay. After Acero left the office, he called the LTO to
ask for the receipt for the P500 given to Reyes which caused both Pealoza and Reyes tried to cancel the
driver’s license of Acero which, however, could no longer be done.
On his part, Reyes stated that he took no part in the subject transaction; that it was Pealoza who processed
Acero’s application and the money was given to Pealoza, not Reyes.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao ruled that Reyes was guilty of grave misconduct and Pealoza,
guilty of simple misconduct. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment against Reyes stating that  it
was Pealoza who received the money and that no evidence was presented showing that Reyes was even
present when the transaction occurred.
ISSUE:
Was Reyes’ right to due process violated when the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a
decision based merely on the affidavits of Pealoza and his witnesses?

RULING HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person
so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
Hence, failure to furnish a copy of counter- affidavits in administrative proceedings violates the right to due
process of law. (which is different in a criminal case)
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1)
the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting
evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must
have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and
the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the
decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various
issues involved. In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was
not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, Reyes and
Pealoza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged against
them. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a co-respondent in the administrative case,
would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said
affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioners Decision dated September
24, 2001.
The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao via
a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the
violation of his right to due process in this case. It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right
to due process of a respondent in an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for
reconsideration to refute the evidence against him. In the instant case, the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao plainly disregarded Reyes protestations without giving him an opportunity to be belatedly
furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same.
_____________________________________________________________________
Difference between the case of Jinggoy Estrada and the case of Ombudsman vs. Antonio Reyes (as per the
video)
Summary: In the case of Estrada, the Supreme Court said that there is no need to furnish Estrada a copy of
 the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. In the case of Antonio Reyes, the Supreme Court said that
Reyes is entitled to the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
WHY? In the case of Estrada, it is merely a preliminary investigation in a criminal case to determine
whether there is probable cause to charge him in the Sandiganbayan. There is no decision yet against him.
He can later on request a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents when he is being tried.
In the case of Antonio Reyes, this is an administrative case and not a criminal one. In an administrative
case, decisions made by the Ombudsman on the erring government official are usually suspension,
dismissal from the service or exoneration. There are no further proceedings after that. That is why, if you
desire, you can file your comment in connection with the counter-affidavits of your co-respondents as it
may help your defense because the next step of the Ombudsman is to render a decision already. Note that
in criminal cases, probable cause (which can be taken on the counter-affidavits of the respondents) is
required before a case is sent to trial.

CASE 4.   Jessica Lucila Reyes vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, March 5, 2016

FACTS FACTS:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from
the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of
P172,834,500.00. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder
filed by the NBI on September 16, 2013 and (2) a Complaint 18 for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013.
Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, for fraudulently processing
the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project identification and cost
projection;19 (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, 20 project reports,21 and pertinent
documents addressed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Implementing
Agencies (IAs);22 and (3) endorsement of the preferred JLN 23-controlled Non-Government Organizations
(NGOs)24 to undertake the PDAF-funded project - and for personally 25 receiving significant portions of the
diverted PDAF funds representing Senator Enrile's "share," "commissions," or "kickbacks" therefrom, 26 as
well as her own.
 
Contention of Reyes: She imputes grave abuse of discretion against the Ombudsman in finding probable
cause against her for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 on the basis of: (a) Tuason's Sworn
Statement was not furnished to Reyes despite her repeated requests therefor, thereby violating her right
to due process; (b) Tuason's Supplemental Sworn Statement dated that did not mention Reyes's name at
all; (c) documentary evidence that were forged, falsified, and fictitious; and (d) hearsay declarations of the
whistleblowers who merely mentioned Reyes's name in general terms but did not positively declare that
they saw or talked with her at any time or had seen her receive money from Janet Napoles or the latter's
employees.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of Reyes’s right to due process.

RULING HELD:
None. In Estrada, the Court had already resolved in detail that under both Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, a
respondent to a preliminary investigation proceeding (such as Reyes in this case) is only entitled to the
evidence submitted by the complainants, and not to those submitted by a co-respondent (such as Tuason
in this case, prior to her grant of immunity as a state witness). Hence, failure to furnish a respondent in a
criminal case with the Counter-Affidavit of his or her co-respondent does not violate the right of the
former to due process of law, unlike in an administrative case.
Note: pag criminal case= beyond reasonable doubt
Pag admin case= preponderance of evidence
It must also be noted that by virtue of the Ombudsman's Joint Order dated May 7, 2014, Reyes was even
provided with copies of Tuason and Cunanan's respective Counter-Affidavits, and directed to file a
 comment thereon. In fact, Reyes even submitted separate Comments on May 13, 2014. Thus, there is
more reason to decline Reyes's assertion that the Ombudsman deprived her of due process. Time and
again, it has been said that the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which was
undeniably afforded to Reyes in this case.

CASE 5.   UYBUCO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014- GUILTY OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
FACTS FACTS:
 Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in
convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More importantly,
petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion to Reconsider the Decision of this
Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the Proceedings dated January
22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the proceedings on the ground that his
constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel were violated when his former counsel, due
to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense,
causing serious prejudice to him.
According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer" who
informed him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to present any evidence."
His former counsel also "failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was
inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to prepare and file a memorandum" and "merely
relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the
defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly
not applicable to petitioner’s defense." Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural
and substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.
ISSUE:
Whether due process was denied to Uybuco? 

RULING HELD: 
As to petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsel’s error, abuse of
discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case, and to allow a client
to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening
by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. While this rule has recognized exceptions, We find that there
is no reason for this Court to deviate from the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco
Properties, Inc. v. Moral:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel within the scope of a
"general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule
certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by
this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2)
when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property;or (3) where the
interests of justice so require."
The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
"to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it must be shown that the negligence of
counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given the
opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due process of law,
for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process." To properly claim gross negligence on
the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear
abandonment of the client’s cause.
Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been given the opportunity to present his evidence" and despite
said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted not to present any evidence for his defense, as shown
by their written Manifestatio ndated November 20, 2012, that "after earnest assessment and evaluation,
the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to present further evidence in his defense,
thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial and documentary evidence," militates against his
 claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must likewise fail. Accused-
movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or gross incompetence on his counsel
aloneas the decision not to present further evidence in his defense bears his conformity as shown by his
signature in the said manifestation.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity to be
heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. While petitioner claims that
he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary,
this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a
reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the
Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence by
affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former counsel.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution dated March 14,
2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby AFFIRMED.

CASE 6.   ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS VS. ALEXIS ALMENDRAS, G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015

FACTS FACTS: 
Petitioner sent letters with similar contents on  7 February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and
on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of
the first and second letters reads as follows:
This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS “DODONG” C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not
vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department, office, or bureau, public
or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x x x.
 
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis “Dodong” C. Almendras, a reknown
blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father,
the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family when he filed cases
against us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother.
 
I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official functions is malicious in
purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of harassment activities to perforce realise his
egoistic and evil objectives.
 
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned
officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty.
Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to
destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising
from libel and defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.
The RTC court thus submitted the case for decision, and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and
defamed.
CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner was given full opportunity to
present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by merely absenting himself from
trials without valid excuses.
ISSUES:
(1)  Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process;
(2)  Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature;
(3)  Whether or not the letters fall within the purview of privileged  communication; and
(4)  Whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
RULING HELD:
First, we rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. Settled is the rule that a client is
bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only exception is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross,
reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to
reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However,
perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.
Second, we find that petitioner’s letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of
privileged communication. For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be
given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. In order to qualify as privileged communication
under Article 354, Number 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest
to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication
is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has
the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice.
Lastly, having duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case, we rule that the damages
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court must be modified and equitably reduced.

CASE 7.    MALIKSI VS. COMELEC,  March 12, 2013

FACTS FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
       Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision,
declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from
performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.
       In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was
then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF
cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary
to pay the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order
dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to increase his cash deposit. On August 15, 2012, the First Division
issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
       Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process
because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts
of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof
that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En
Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration. Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for
certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images
without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division. In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-
7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari.
       The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received
notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division —referring to
the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the
decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not
abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the
printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
 Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by
the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision. Hence, Maliksi filed the
petition before the Supreme Court.
 
ISSUE: W/O Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on appeal the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards.

RULING HELD: The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the COMELEC First
Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards for the first
time on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him of his right to be present and observe the
decryption proceedings. The records showed that Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First Division issued an
Order dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for expenses for the
supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards, and a copy of the Order was personally
delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. Maliksi’s counsel was likewise given a copy of Saquilayan’s Manifestation of
Compliance with the 28March 2012 Order. In an Order dated 17 April 2012, the COMELEC First Division
directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount for expenses for the printing of additional ballot
images from four clustered precincts, and a copy of the Order was again personally delivered to Maliksi’s
counsel. The decryption took weeks to finish. Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received
notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In
addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc.

CASE 9.   IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998

FACTS Facts: 
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984
while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st
Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J
Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division because of Atienza’s dissent in favor
of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and
Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his
manifestation. On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia
stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special
order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it
would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation granted that a majority has already decided
on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
Issue: 
Whether or not due process has been observed.
RULING Ruling: 
Records disclose that: (a) the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on whether to convict or acquit
the petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Justice Atienza was in favor of exonerating
petitioners in 3 Criminal Cases. Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to convict her in 5 Criminal
Cases. As there was no unanimity of votes in 2 Criminal Cases, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm.
Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five (5) justices.
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores sent a written request to Presiding Justice Garchitorena asking
that he be given fifteen (15) days to submit his Manifestation; (d) on the same day, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario, after attending a hearing of the Committee of Justice
of the House of Representatives, launched together in a Quezon City restaurant where they discussed
petitioners cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of a non-member of
the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario agreed
with the position of Justice Atienza to acquit petitioner in 3 Criminal Cases and to convict her in the other
cases.
 Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision
convicting petitioner for the following reasons, viz:
First, Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or
division, shall be held in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all
cases filed with it
Second, The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow unscheduled discussion of cases. Third, The rules of
Sandiganbayan do not also allow informal discussion of cases. Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do
not allow the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases.
Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the exclusion of a member of a Division, whether
regular or special, in the deliberation of cases.
These irregularities violated the right of the petitioner to be tried by a court.  

CASE 10. DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986

FACTS Facts: 
Emma R. Delgado, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty.
Paulino Bautista, were charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in
deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States.cha
All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits
ensued. Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. The said lawyer has
filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being
allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and
had considered the same as Delgado’s waiver of her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the
others. She appealed before the CA and the CA sustained the lower court’s rule. Delgado later found out
that Yco is not a member of the IBP. 
Issue: Whether or not due process was observed.

RULING Ruling: 
On May 11, 1977 an Order was issued by respondent Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest
Emma R. Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment.
However, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside
Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the newly discovered fact Atty. Lamberto
G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed that she be granted a new trial on the
ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel.cralawn
The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar
in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer,
there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.
Difference between Delgado and Consulta case: Delgado was represented by a non-lawyer from beginning
to end. Consulta was represented by a real lawyer when he testified, but he was represented by a non-
lawyer when the prosecution witness testified.
_____________________________________________________________________
Another Scenario: Emma Delgado was convicted by the RTC. She then appealed her case to the Court of
Appeals where she was represented by a very competent lawyer. The Court of Appeals still sustained her
conviction. Can she request a retrial in the RTC as her right to due process was not complied with?
A:  Yes. The fact that she was represented by a very competent lawyer in the Court of Appeals does not
matter. In the lower court, which is the most important proceeding, the person who represented her is not
a lawyer and therefore that person was not able to correctly cross examine the witnesses against
DELGADO nor properly present her a good and credible defense. The competent lawyer who represented
her in the Court of Appeals cannot add nor subtract from the evidence presented before the RTC. (Garbage
in, garbage out 😊)
Note: On appeal, the appellate court shall decide based on the evidence presented in the trial court only.
Thus, from beginning to the end of the case in the trial court, DELGADO was not given the opportunity to
be heard which is a violation to due process.
CASE 11.  Consulta vs. People, February 12, 2009
(Right to counsel)
FACTS FACTS:
Pedro C. Consulta was charged of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons for stealing NELIA R. Silvestre’s 18K
gold necklace amounting to P3,500.00. The robbery happened when Pedro and his brother blocked the
tricycle that Nelia and her companions rented. Pedro was found guilty of the crime charged.
Pedro is now claiming that his right to due process was violated. He stated that Atty. Reyes who
represented him during arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal witness for the prosecution
was not a member of the bar. Atty. Reyes, however, was replaced by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the
Public Defender's (Attorney's) Office of Makati City who principally handled Pedro’s defense.
ISSUE: Was Pedro denied his right to due process? 

RULING RULING: No. 

Even if Pedro was represented by a non-lawyer during trial or during the presentation of witness by the
prosecution, he was still represented by a lawyer when he presented his evidence. Since Pedro was already
represented by Atty. Paggao who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot
now complain about having been denied due process.
From Atty.’s Video lecture
According to the SC: There was no violation of his right to due process because when he presented his
evidence, he was represented by a real lawyer WHEN HE TESTIFIED – the most important part of trial..
hence, there is no need for another trial from the beginning.
Accdg to Atty Gacayan – there must be a real lawyer from beginning to end. A real and competent lawyer
who cross-examines witnesses of the prosecution can raise reasonable doubt to justify the acquittal of the
client. When a non-lawyer conducts cross-examination to very important witnesses, it may lead to the
conviction of the accused. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard – you are heard
through your lawyer – in turn, your lawyer is heard through the cross-examination of the witness. (salamat
sa pagnotes haha, sa bata ako nakafocus eh)

CASE 12. People vs. Opida, June 13, 1986

(Right to counsel; Confessions obtained without the assistance of a counsel are not admissible as evidence)

FACTS FACTS:
Alberto OPIDA and Virgilio MARCELO were charged with murder as conspirators of the killer Mario del
Mundo. After trial, they were sentenced to death.
Their conviction was based on the testimony of two witnesses who were not able to positively identify that
the accused were at the scene of the crime. The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were also secured
without the assistance of counsel. 
The judge did not bother looking into the validity of the extrajudicial confessions. The judge then took it
upon himself to cross examine the only defense witness by asking irrelevant and mocking questions. He
also focused on the previous criminal activities and tattoos of the defendants.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of the right of the accused to due process?

RULING RULING: Yes.

Even if the accused were notorious criminals, they were entitled to be presumed innocent until the
contrary was proved and had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.  Convictions are not based on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual commission of
the crime.
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was all too eager to convict the accused. He did not display
the neutrality of an impartial judge. (the first requisite of judicial due process is not present in this case)
Because their constitutional rights have been violated, the guilt of the two accused has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court ordered them to be released immediately.
CASE 13. MORTERA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010
FACTS  FACTS:
Ramil Gregorio y Toribio, 24 years old, single, testified that on August 25, 2002, at about 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, he together with Jovel Veñales, Archie Saavedra, John Carpio, Plong Siano and Alberto Rojas
were drinking tuba at Cabato Lane, near Acapulco Drive, Governor Camins, Zamboanga City. Four of them
were sitting on a chair leaning on a concrete wall while two of their companions sat on the ground.
MORTERA stabbed ROBELYN ROJAS y MALLARI which caused his death
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his
right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards
him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise
reiterated his claim of self-defense.

RULING Held: 
The Supreme Court ruled that Mortera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It was correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and
comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon
perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality.
They were not out of context. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative
defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the
dark as to his intended defense.

CASE 14. RODRIGUEZ VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR, GR No. 190171,  March 14, 2011
FACTS Requisite: Impartial court or tribunal with jurisdiction to try and decide a case
Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was a case for arson entitled People of the Philippines v.
Teksan Ami, in which Regidor Tulali was the trial prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery
initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office
of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the
accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.
A day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte
Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and
collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan
filed by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge
Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge
Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies and issued an order
summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to
his possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint
against Awayan, among others.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding
against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte
Manifestation.
As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued
the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of ₱100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
Issue: Whether there was violation of due process?
RULING Ruling: Yes there was violation of due process
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise
the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same
for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears
stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative,
not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.Such power,
 being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed
as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation
bore Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him
and the accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case,
did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held
accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the
preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as
the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of
the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality
expected of a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and
impartiality required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and
the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the
court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

NOTE: Can RTC judge cannot suspend and fine a lawyer? NO, only the Supreme Court can

CASE 15.Bilbao vs. People, JULY 1, 2015

FACTS  FACTS:
         Nelson Lai y Bilbao, the petitioner in this case, was accused and convicted in a homicide case. The
conviction was handed down by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, and was affirmed by
the CA.
         Bilbao filed an appeal to assail his conviction on the ground that, among others, he was deprived of
due process when his criminal case was decided by the honorable presiding judge who acted as the public
prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the bench.

ISSUE:
         Whether the non-disqualification of the presiding judge, who was the public prosecutor in the
same case, is a violation of the due process clause.

RULING RULING:
         The SC annulled and set aside the decision of the RTC and remanded the criminal case to the RTC
of Bacolod with instructions to the Executive judge to assign another RTC who is not disqualified. The new
trial court judge is likewise instructed to resume the trial in the criminal case starting from the stage just
prior to the assumption of Judge Fernando Elumba.
 
RATIONALE:
         A public prosecutor who had been assigned to prosecute a case and was later appointed as judge
may not hear and decide on the same, even if the assignment as prosecutor occurred after the prosecution
has already rested its case. To do so would violate due process.
         What is being avoided: Partiality/biased judgment on the part of the judge who was previously the
prosecutor of the same case. If sya yong public prosecutor nong case tapos magiging presiding judge sya,
most likely biased na yong judgment nya. Charz
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just.
          Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and
hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process.
 
Facts of the Criminal case:
         On December 16, 1995, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, the victim Enrico Villanueva, Jr., and his
friends  were seated inside the passenger jeepney owned by Nelson Bilbao. The latter suddenly
approached them and ordered them all the persons seated inside to alight the vehicle. Bilbao then
grabbed the victim by the left arm and accused the latter that he had stolen the antenna of the jeepney.
The victim was able to free himself and ran away.
         At around 11:00 o’clock of the same evening, both the victim and the accused were inside the
dancehall. The victim was seated on a bench while the accused was dancing to the tune of the cha-cha. The
accused was about to approach the victim when a brown-out suddenly occurred. Immediately, the lights
went out and a gunshot rang out. Suddenly, the victim fell down bloodied; he identified Nelson Bilbao as
his shooter.

CASE 16. Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010
FACTS FACTS:
         Petitioner Susie Cha-Tan and respondent Jesse C. Tan  were married in June 1989. 12 years into the
marriage, the petitioner filed an annulment case on the ground of Psychological incapacity (Article 36 of
the Family Code). Both parties thereafter submitted to the court a compromise agreement. The
compromise agreement, contains, among others, that the two lots located at Corinthian Quezon City shall
be considered as part of the presumptive legitimes of their two minor children. The trial court rendered
their marriage void and likewise approved the compromise agreement.
         Meanwhile. Susie Tan cancelled the offer to purchse the Corinthian Hills Subdivision and
authorized Megaworld Corp to allocate the amount of P11,992,968.32. Records also showed that the
petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.
         Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking the main custody of the children. Thereafter, the RTC
awarded the respondent custody of the children and ordered the petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter’s name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in
Mariposa, Quezon City.
         Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration for alleged denial of due process on account of
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Contention of petitioner: Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file
pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment as
regards the custody of the children and the properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial court
issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of the respondent.
 
ISSUE:
         Whether petitioner’s right to due process was denied.

RULING RULING:
         Petition is denied.
 
RATIONALE:
         Petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost her right to
present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in
court. Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing
motion after motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to
believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner's end.
         Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the
hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge
was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the
evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process. 
CASE 17. Sec. Of Justice vs. Judge Lantion, 343 SCRA 377
FACTS
RULING
CASE 18. DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999
FACTS
RULING
CASE 19. MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263 SCRA 490
FACTS FACTS:
         Milagros Matuguina, a sole proprietor, has a timber business named Matuguina Logging
Enterprises (MLE) under Provisional Timber License No. 30. She also became the majority stockholder of
MIWPI (Matuguina Integrated wood Products Inc). Matuguina requested the transfer of the timber license
of MLE to MIWPI. While the approval for the request is pending, private respondent DAVENCOR (Davao
Enterprises Corporation) filed a complaint against MLE alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area
allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession.
MLE was conducting logging operations in DAVENCOR’S timber concession.

The Director of Forest Development issued and order declaring MLE to have encroached upon and
conducted illegal logging operations within the area of DAVENCOR.

The minister of Natural Resources issued a writ of execution against MLE and or MIWPI
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been violated.

RULING HELD: Yes, MIWPI’s right to due process has been violated.
         Petitioner MIWPI is a corporate entity separate and distinct from Milagros Matuguina/ MLE. There
is no clear basis for considering it as a mere conduit or alter ego of Matuguina/MLE.  Therefore, MIWPI
cannot be made liable for the obligations of the same for the said encroachment. In short, MIWPI was
never a party to the assailed proceeding.
         Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is
a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Indeed,
a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. 
         There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was
issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a
copy of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Execution of the Minister’s decision against it. MIWPI was
suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions
that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter
requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of
execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic
tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before
hearing all the parties concerned.

CASE 20.  PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA 452

FACTS FACTS:    
         This is a petition to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied the People's prayer
to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Regional Trial Court  of  Tacloban City from hearing two
(2) criminal cases in which one involves respondent Jane Go.
         Jane Go was being sued criminally for the death of her husband. The Prosecution averred that
Judge Espina earlier ordered the Prosecution not to proceed against Jane Go’s preliminary investigation.
 Judge Espina refused to inhibit himself. The matter reached the Court of Appeals and the CA ruled that
Espina does not have to inhibit himself from hearing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the state has been violated.

RULING HELD: Yes, the right to due process of the state has been violated.
         One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there
must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it.  Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge which is
described as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
         Due process is intended to ensure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach
the denouement according to a prepared script.
         Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for
the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. It would have been more
prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.

CASE 21. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

FACTS Facts: 
Evelio Javier and Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May
1984 elections.

On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, several followers of Javier were ambushed and killed. Seven
suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably,
it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the
ruling party.
Javier and Pacifico, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May
1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism”, intimidation, duress, vote-
buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed me of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation
of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. 
On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made.
Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner.
Further, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador.
Also the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but it requires that it be proclaimed by the
COMELEC en banc. In February 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down.The Solicitor General then
moved to have the petition closed, being moot and academic by virtue of Javier's death.
Issue: WON there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

RULING Held:
THe Supreme Court ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly
and consistently demanded “ the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of
due process. TO bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
 also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants
are entitled to no less than that.They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice.THey must trust the judge, otherwise they will not got to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence,
there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. 
Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plats in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending.The judge will reach his conclusions only after the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law

CASE 22.                      AZUL VS. CASTRO, 133 SCRA 271

FACTS FACTS:
Rosalinda Tecson filed a case for collection of sum of money before the
Rizal RTC against Pedro Azul. The case was raffled to Judge Sarmiento. On
27 Mar 1979, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 1979, Azul
filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive pleading. Azul
was unaware that J. Sarmiento retired and was temporarily substituted by J.
Anover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day.
However, Azul only received the order granting his on the 23 rd of the same
month way past the 5 day period granted. On the 17th of April, Tecson
already filed a motion to declare Azul in default averring that Azul’s 5 day
extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the
permanent judge who replaced J Sarmiento took office and he declared Azul
to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded
with the reception of evidence the next day and of course without Azul’s
evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default. On April 27th, J
Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already
decided the case moved for reconsideration to remove his default status.
On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but
on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial
on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the 20th of the same
month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but
was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the
21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but upon motion of Tecson on the
30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decision on the 27th. Finally, J Castro
disallowed Azul’s record on appeal on the 7th of September.

ISSUE:Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.

RULING HELD:
 Yes. The SC agreed with Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due process
commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain
standards of fundamental fairness and to ensure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are
observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued that when Azul’s counsel asked for a fifteen (15)
day extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume
that said first extension would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya personally went
to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only to be informed that J Sarmiento had
just retired but that his motion would be considered “submitted for resolution.” 
Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy
loads of cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested fifteen
(15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Anover, who had not permanently
taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would
be allowed. And to compound Azul’s problems, the order was sent by mail and received only twelve (12)
days later or after the five-day period. A court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be
done in a matter of days should not be sent by mail.  

CASE 23.PADERANGA VS. AZURA, 136 SCRA 266

FACTS Facts:
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself
from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in him,
that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is
clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is
bias, oppressive and is abusive in his power.
Respondent Judge denied the Petition for Inhibition on the ground that loss of trust and confidence by
petitioner in his neutrality is unfounded, notwithstanding the administrative charges filed against him, and
that the plea for inhibition was prompted more because of the city attorney’s (petitioner's counsel)
grotesque arguments and haughty conduct in his subsequent pleadings which already constitute direct
contempt.
Petitioner assails Order denying inhibition for having been issued despotically, whimsically, and with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON respondent judges should inhibit in hearing and deciding cases involving petitioners.

RULING Ruling:
Yes, Judge Azura should inhibit.
Considering the antagonistic positions taken by the parties in their respective pleadings, and, particularly,
the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner, which prompted him and others to file
administrative charges against respondent judge, the Court advert to the guidelines on the matter of
inhibition in Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, 21 SCRA 160 [1967], prescribing as follows:
“All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to
appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to
the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting
in a litigation but when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party
or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self- examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that
the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.”
The venue of said cases is transferred to Cagayan de Oro City each to be assigned by raffle to the Regional
Trial Courts thereafter.

CASE  24.                      DAVID VS. AQUILIZAN, 94 SCRA 707

FACTS Facts:
          That sometime in 1971, they were installed as share tenants by petitioner, Filemon David, over
separate portions of the latter's landholding situated at Polomolok, South Cotabato, each portion having a
seeding capacity of two (2) hectares, more or less, their sharing agreement being 50-50% of the net
produce. Sometime in 1973, private respondents were not allowed to continue their cultivation of the
subject lots as petitioner-landholder prohibited them from doing so and then took possession of the said
lots. The private respondents filed for a petition for reinstatement but David refused to and denied that
they were tenants. Petitioner claimed that Ricardo was his tractor driver before he resigned due to ill
health and later on as farm tenant of his father and even employed himself with the DOLE. Felomeno, on
the other hand, voluntarily surrendered his landholdings after he sold his working animals and continued
his faith healing occupation. On September 29, 1978, respondent judge without conducting any hearing
rendered judgment for private respondents and against herein petitioner.
Issue:
         Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process.

RULING Ruling:
         The court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It is a well-settled rule that "no one shall be personally
bound until he has had a day in court", by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has
been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the
attributes of a judicial determination; it is a judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld
where justice is justly administered. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set
aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law.
It may be attacked directly or collaterally, and the action therefore may be brought even after the time for
appeal or review has lapsed. The judgment is vulnerable to attack even when no appeal has. Hence, such
judgment does not become final in the sense of depriving a party of his right to question its validity.

CASE 25.                       LORENZANA VS. CAYETANO, 78 SCRA 485  

FACTS FACTS: 
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of
Lands). She later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to tenants
occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. 
On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzana’s land.
Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzana’s ejection
cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included Cayetano’s
property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejection cases so she prayed for the lower court that her
property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetano’s petition. The CA, upon appeal, favored
Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought
herself to the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Cayetano’s right to due process has been violated.

RULING HELD: 
The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a
party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make
her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to
protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and
executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person
to such judgment, which does not bind her;  nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since she
was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

26.                      ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. CA, 94 SCRA 261

Facts:
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful
and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim
against the group of Martinez and Pabilona. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the
case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as
the Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he
instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the
CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to
review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies;
that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza
is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding
their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice,
animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and
declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed
averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to
the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants
the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be
reinstated. The CA denied both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.

HELD: 
No. The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave
abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to
be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2 nd decision of the
CA.

27.ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353

Facts:
This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the Medical
Research Department in the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology
(NIST).
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology
for 28 years. She was holding the position of Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as
Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was
previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the
position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by
the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 61 points to Venzon. The issue was
elevated to the Office of the President by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant.
Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding
the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Resolution 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position.
After the denial of her motion for reconsideration of that resolution, on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed
to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed
his decision as the CSC chairman.
Issue: Whether or not due process is served in the case at bar?

Held: 
The Supreme Court was in favor of Anzaldo. It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of
law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of
the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals,
L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of
Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of
administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of
Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly
exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position. Anzaldo's promotional
appointment to the contested position is declared valid. 

28.SINGSON VS. NLRC, 273 SCRA 258

Facts: 
Assailed in the petition for certiorari before us is the Resolution of the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission  (hereinafter NLRC) reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter  in NLRC-NCR Case
No. 00-10- 05750-91 finding the dismissal of petitioner Miguel Singson illegal and ordering his
reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent in
an Order dated June 27, 1995.
The antecedent facts reveal that Singson was employed by private respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(hereinafter PAL) as Traffic Representative Passenger, Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in
passengers and baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991, petitioner was assigned to serve the check-
in counter of Japan Air Lines (hereinafter JAL) for Flight 742. Among the passengers checked in by him was
Ms. Lolita Kondo who was bound for Narita, Japan. After checking in, Ms. Kondo lodged a complaint
alleging that the petitioner required her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing any
receipt. A confrontation took place where the petitioner was asked by the security officer to empty his
pockets. The dollars paid by Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession. However, when the lower panel
of the check-in counter he was manning was searched, the sum of two hundred sixty five dollars (US $265)
was found therein consisting of two (2) one hundred dollar bills, one (1) fifty dollar bill, one (1) ten dollar
bill and one (1) five dollar bill. Petitioner was administratively charged and investigated by a committee
formed by private respondent PAL. 
She denied the allegation since the pieces of baggage did not only belong to her but also to her Japanese
companions. The man did not believe that the Japanese were her companions and he charged that she just
approached them at the airport. To settle the matter, he told her to give him two hundred dollars (US
$200) and he apologized for their argument. She gave him one (1) one hundred dollar bill and two (2) fifty
dollar bills or a total of two hundred dollars (US $200) as excess baggage fee. She placed the money at the
side of his counter desk and he covered it with a piece of paper. He did not issue a receipt. She then
reported the matter to JAL's representative. Ms. Kondo identified the employee who checked her in as the
petitioner. 
The investigation committee found Miguel Singson guilty of the offense charged and recommended his
dismissal. 
Issue: WON Miguel Singson was denied of due process  (for improvement)

Held: 
The court ruled that Miguel Singson was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as
presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal.
He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act
as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from
the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was
the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in
this case.
The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The
right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not
only entitled to an impartial tribunal (unbiased Court of law requisite of due process) in the resolution of
his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The
denial of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his
right to due process.

29.                       MAYOR ALONTE VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245

FACTS: 
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was
alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house who was then the
mayor of Biñan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biñan. The counsel and the prosecutor later
moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue
was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented
that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory
questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

RULING: 
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity
between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. 
The standard of waiver requires:
that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. ” 
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly
not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and
the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
3.   Procedural due process before administrative bodies:
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1)  The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)  Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)  While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)  Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)  The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)  The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7)  The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (only)?
The requirements of procedural due process are as follows:
1.    There  must  be  an  IMPARTIAL  AND  COMPETENT  COURT  with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it
2.    Jurisdiction MUST HAVE BEEN LAWFULLY ACQUIRED over the person  of  the  defendant  or  over  the 
property  subject  of  the proceeding
3.    The defendant must be given an OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
4.    Judgment must be RENDERED UPON LAWFUL HEARING

30.                      ANG TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635

FACTS: 
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees
laid off were members of NLU while  no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood
(NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
RULING: 
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by
Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1)  The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)  Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)  While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)  Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“”substantial.”” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)  The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)  The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7)  The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

31. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. EXECUTIVE SEC., G.R. No. 184869, September 21, 2010

This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation that takes property from a state
university, over its objections, for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.
FACTS: 
Petitioner, Central Mindanao University (CMU), is a chartered educational institution owned and run by
the State. In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of
the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name
over 3,080 hectares of those lands. Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of the
remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the area's cultural communities.

45 years later, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670
hectares from CMU's registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in
Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.

CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City, seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared
unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over
the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive
Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion,
however, and proceeded to hear CMU's application for preliminary injunction.

The RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et al's motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMU's
action for lack of jurisdiction.  Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional,
being a valid State act.

On appeal, the CA dismissed CMU's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMU's recourse should have
been a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law--
bearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action for prohibition
against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is
valid and constitutional;

RULING:
As already stated, CMU raised a ground for its appeal: the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when
it dismissed the action;

The CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the
case on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional.  Whether
the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of
CMU's right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to
hear and ascertain from the parties.  Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground
that it raised pure questions of law.
 
32. ATTY. ROMEO ERECE VS. MACALINGAY, ET AL., G.R. No. 166809, April 22, 2008

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.

FACTS:
Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR Region 1. Macalingay et al were Erece’s subordinates.
Macalingay et al were complaining that Erece had continuously denied them from using the company
vehicle. That Erece had been receiving his Representation and Transportation Allowance yet he prioritizes
himself in the use of the vehicle. The issue reached the CSc proper which found Erece guilty as charged.
Erece contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of
the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. 
After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their position
paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC over his objection. Macalingay
et al then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits. Erece submits that although he was
allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the
complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure,
still Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses.
This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Erece had been denied due process.

RULING:
The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of administrative due process. Nor is an
actual hearing always essential. . . .

33. DATUFAX MANGUDADATU VS. HRET, December 18, 2008;

Notice/opportunity to be heard

FACTS: Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O. Montilla (private respondent) were
congressional candidates for the First District of Sultan Kudarat.
Datu Pax won and was proclaimed on May 22, 2007 as the duly elected Representative of the said
congressional district.

Montilla filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad
Cautelam) contesting the results of the elections and the proclamation of petitioner.

the Secretary of the HRET served summons upon Datu Pax through registered mail at his residence,
requiring him to file an Answer to the protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

A certain Aileen R. Baldenas received the summons.

the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-179 which noted that 43 days from June 27, 2007 had passed since the
receipt of summons and petitioner had not filed an answer. HRET considered petitioner to have entered a
general denial of the allegations of the protest. 
Meanwhile, the petitioner informally learned of the respondent's protest and filed a Motion to Reconsider
and Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest, alleging that he never received the summons issued by
the HRET. Baldenas was not a member of the household nor his employee.

Petitioner contended that the HRET never acquired jurisdiction over his person because of the
absence of a valid service of summons. He argued that a substitute service of summons is made only
"when the defendant cannot be served personally at a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have
failed.
ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction over Datu Fax Mangudadatu was established.
First step: Serve summons should be personal service, no service by registered mail

HELD: No. The jurisdiction was not established. Hence, there was a violation of due process.

Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules provides:

RULE 22. Summons. – If the petition is not summarily dismissed in accordance with Rule 21 of these Rules,
the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent, as
the case may be, together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof to file his answer.

Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are suppletory to the above Rule, which state:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served handling a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make prompt
service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service.
In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following
circumstances:
(a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time,
(b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and,
(c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in
charge of his office or regular place of business.
 Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the
proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent.
Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of
summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process
grounds, with more reason should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the
electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court.

As per the use of registered mails by HRET, the Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its
own process servers to personally serve the summons, or alternatively, delegate the matter to the process
server of a court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the respondent/protestee in the
election case, at the expense of the petitioner/protestant.

34.                      DEP ED VS. CUANAN, December 16, 2008

MAIN POINT: The relative freedom of the CSC or administrative bodies from the rigidities of procedure
cannot be invoked to evade the fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
FACTS:
Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their respective minor daughters, Lily Borja and Charo
Castro, filed before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), two separate administrative
complaints for Sexual Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal
of Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.

Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador conducted a formal investigation (3 deped official), finding Cuanan
guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. RDO
Labrador concurred with the findings and meted out the penalty. This was affirmed by then DepEd
Secretary Andrew Gonzales.

On May 30, 2000, Cuanan filed a Petition for Reconsideration, but was denied for lack of merit by Secretary
Gonzales.

Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. CSC set aside the Resolution of Secretary Gonzales and exonerated
Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment. 

Cuanan requested his reinstatement as Elementary School Principal I. 1 st endorsement- District Supervisor,
2nd enodorsement SDS Dioscorides Lusung, RDO Ricardo Sibug informed the superintendent that Cuanan
could not be immediately reinstated to the service until an order of implementation was received from the
Department Secretary.

Deped Undersecretary requested for a copy of the resolution.

Then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a Petition for Review/Reconsideration and a supplemental
petition reiterating the prayer for reversal with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.

Subsequently, Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal effective April 30, 2003. 

However, the CSC set aside its earlier Resolution. It found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty
of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility,
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan received a copy of the Resolution on
November 9, 2004.

Hence, this petition for certiorari. alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for
review/reconsideration since the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the
resolution; that the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not
furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process?

HELD: Yes. Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process.

He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed
by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel; nor
was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the
DepEd were not served upon Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have
merited the attention or consideration of the CSC.

Section 43.A. of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:
Section 43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. - All pleadings filed by the parties with the Commission,
shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the Commission.
Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but which should not
entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion of
a party to the case. The said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the
original pleading and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider
the averments therein.(Emphasis supplied)

the Court has maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the
judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. CSC
Resolution No. 02160032 allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an
erring employee,
while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. 44 The relative
freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was
clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations:45 that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process.
35. ANG TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
FACTS: 
Toribio Teodoro, owner of Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army,
averred that a number of his employees were temporarily laid off due to alleged shortage of leather
soles.
On the other hand, the National Labor Union, Inc prayed for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, contended that:
The reason for employees lay off is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the BOC and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
The supposed lack of leather materials was but a sched to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
the bond with the Philippine Army, despite the breach of contract
The National Worker’s Brotherhood registered employee’s union dominated by Teodoro is illegal
for its existence and functions.
 Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU Inc. and unjustly
favoring the National Worker’s Brotherhood
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
The case then reached the CIR and eventually elevated to the SC, but a motion for new trial by the
NLU contending there were inaccessible documents which could not be offered in the CIR.  That
these documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered therein.
 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the National Labor Union Inc, was deprived of due process
RULING:

RULING:
 YES. The SC concluded that the Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented
to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of
its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with,
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
The SC had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)

Further the SC enumerated the requisites of administrative due process embodied as primary rights:
1.       The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2.       the tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3.       The decision must have something to support itself
4.       the evidence must be "substantial"
5.       The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected
6.       The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7.       The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The Court  held that the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen
the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth here in above.

The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved.

36. AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. DIRECTOR,  67 SCRA 287

FACTS: 
The American Tobacco Company (ATC) was a party to a trademark case pending before the Philippine
Patent Office. ATC challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate
any ranking official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings.
ATC argued that the same set of Rules provides that “all judgments determining the merits of the case shall
be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him ” hence it is improper for the director
to designate a lower ranking official as hearing officers to hear the case;

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners'
cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and
Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.

that it is clear that under the Rules, the Director must personally hear the case otherwise, there will be a
violation of due process.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of hearing officers other than the Director of Patents is a violation of due
process.
Receive evidence must be the Director accdg to law
RULING: 
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested
by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of
which the officer makes his decisions.  It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are
those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair
hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision
in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the
requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met.  In short, there is no abrogation of responsibility on
the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.  It is,
however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them.”
Able to submit evidence thus there was an opportunity to be heard

37. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA 53

Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr. was employed on probationary status by petitioner Manila Electric Company
(Meralco) as lineman driver. Six months later, he was regularized as a 3rd class lineman-driver
assigned at petitioner's North Distribution Division. In 1977, and until the time of his dismissal, he
worked as 1st class lineman-driver whose duties and responsibilities among others, includes the
maintenance of Meralco's distribution facilities (electric lines) by responding to customer's complaints
of power failure, interruptions, line trippings and other line troubles.

Due to his numerous infractions, private respondent was administratively investigated for violation of
Meralco's Code on Employee Discipline, particularly his repeated and unabated absence from work
without prior notice from his superiors specifically from August 2 to September 19, 1989.
After such administrative investigation was conducted by petitioner, it concluded that private
respondent was found to have grossly neglected his duties by not attending to his work as lineman
from Aug. 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989 without notice to his superiors.
In a letter dated January 19, 1990, private respondent was notified of the investigation result and
consequent termination of his services effective January 19, 1990,
Cortez: filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner

Labor Arbiter: Decision dismissing the case for lack of merit

Cortez: elevated his case on appeal to NLRC

NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent with
backwages.

Meralco: showed that private respondent was given the full opportunity of defending himself, otherwise,
petitioner could not have possibly known of private respondent's side of the story, 

Ruling: Notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as
elucidated in numerous cases decided by this court.   The essence of due process is simply an
15

opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's

side.

Hearings in administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies are neither oratorical
contests nor debating skirmishes where cross examination skills are displayed. 

In this case, private respondent was given the opportunity of a hearing as he was able to present his
defense to the charge against him. Unfortunately, petitioner found such defense inexcusable. In other
words, the fact that private respondent was given the chance to air his side of the story already
suffices.
38. GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706

Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students: 

1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; 
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel; 
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; 
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; 
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case (based on the evidence presented)
FACTS:
Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them from
enrolling in the said university.
NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that,
 Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises;
 that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman
et al incurred bad grades;
 that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll;
 that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were denied due process by the school.

 
HELD:
YES. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. NU never showed which school policies or duly
published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to show
that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial-type one) to determine Guzman et
al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.

Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”
Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed
upon any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and
regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary
to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. 
39.                      BERINA VS. PMI, September 30, 1982 

 Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC

1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
Facts: Babelo Beriña, Marilou Elagdon, Ernesto Roberto and Jesus Soriao are students of the
Philippine Maritime Institute, PMI for short.
In their petition which is styled FOR EXTRAORDINARY AND EQUITABLE REMEDY WITH
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, they claim that PMI, five weeks after school had started, posted
sometime in August, 1981, a notice that there would be a 15% increase in tuition fees retroactive
to the start of the current semester; that the students met and took positive steps in respect of the
problem; that their representatives held dialogues with the school administration.

Jesus Soriao, Ernesto Roberto, and Babelo Berina and an indefinite suspension against Marilou
Elagdon;" that the penalties were imposed without due process and had the effect of negating the
petitioners' right to free speech, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances.

Art 3 section 4
Issue: WON the students were denied of due process 

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that obvious from the expulsion and suspension orders that the
petitioners were denied due process, res ipsa loquitur. For the orders are bereft of the sides of the
petitioners. Hence the legal presumption of regularity cannot be availed in the instant case. The
imposing of the expulsion and suspension orders there was observance of due process which
simply means that the petitioners should have been given an opportunity to defend themselves.

The court ruled the expulsion and suspension orders are hereby set aside but without prejudice to
the power of the respondents to formally charge the petitioners for violation(s) of reasonable
school rules and regulations and after due notice to hear and decide the charge

40.                     DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, December 19, 2007

a Student has  no right to demand for cross-examination of the complainant and his witnesses IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST him. it is sufficient that he was given the
opportunity to file his answer and other evidence. due process is deemed complied with
FACTS:
Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La
Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to
petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux
Fraternity.

The fraternity war between the Tau Gamma Phi and the Domino Flux started
when Mr. Yap overheard a discussion of rival frat members over his frat that
led to confrontations and eventually to the mauling incidents of Domino Flux
members by the Tau Gamma Phi members.

Complaints were lodged to the Discipline board of DSLU charging the Tau
Gamma members involved in the mauling incidents. The director of the DSLU
Discipline office sent notices to persons concerned informing them of the
complaints and requiring them to answer. As it appeared that students from
DSLU and CSB were involved, a joint DSLU_CSB Discipline board was formed
to investigate the incidents. During the proceedings, respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi.

The Joint Discipline Board issued a resolution finding respondents Aguilar,

Bangubung, Lee and Reverente guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of
automatic expulsion. Respondents separately moved for reconsiderations but
were denied. Respondents sought the intervention of the courts and TROs and
injunctions were issued to compel DSLU to admit respondents. DSLU denied
enrollment to Aguilar. CHED also issued a resolution disapproving the penalty
of expulsion for all respondents. Aguilar was to be reinstated and the rest
were to be excluded. Despite the resolution, Aguilar was denied enrolment.
Aguilar using the CHED resolution filed a motion to dismiss in the CA and was
granted. Petitioners asked that the case be transferred to DECS from CHED
because they claim that DECS has jurisdiction over expulsion cases. Aguilar
was allowed conditionally to enroll but DSLU has not issued a certificate of
completion/ graduation in his favor despite him finishing and passing all his
enrolled subjects.

Angeles v Sison
HELD:  The right to due process on the part of a student is not violated even if he was not allowed
to cross-examine the other party or his witnesses. Due process is served if he was given the
chance to present his evidence. 
Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students: 
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; 
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel; 
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; 
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; 
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative
due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. 71 "To be
heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges
against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Given the right to present evidence=due process
Expulsion-permanent removal, cannot enroll in other schools
Exclusion-permanent removal from that school but can still be admitted in other schools
No serious physical injuries
5. .Due process in the dismissal of employees
41.   PLDT vs. ANTONIO Tiamzon, 474 SCRA 761
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2005/nov2005/164684_85.php
Note:    A party like the PLDT could not present an evidence to justify its act of dismissing the private
respondent for the first time on appeal without violating the right of the employee to due process of
law. This is so because the employee was dismissed based on a different ground which he was able to
prove to be false and unsubstantiated.
Facts: 
In 1994, PLDT discovered that there were some illegal long distance calls being made by employees.
Tiamson and his workmates were summoned. One employee named Vidal Busa admitted to the
wrongdoings but he implicated his other workmates including Tiamson. PLDT then made the investigation
formal and Busa was made to submit an affidavit containing his earlier story; notices were sent to the
employees to explain; an investigation was done; and later termination notices were sent. Among those
terminated was Tiamson. Tiamson later sued PLDT for illegal dismissal as he claimed the twin notice rule
was not fully complied with. 
ISSUE: Whether or not Tiamson was denied due process. 

HELD: 
Yes. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for
just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employer’s
case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense.
If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter. Moreover, the quantum of proof required in determining the legality
of an employee’s dismissal is only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla
of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. In this case, it appears that
although Tiamson was sent a first notice (asking him to explain his side) and then a second notice
(termination notice) and he was also invited in a confrontation with the management, still, the twin notice
rule was not fully complied with. The records show that Busa and his other workmates submitted affidavits
that did not implicate Tiamson. However, Busa was made to submit a second affidavit which now
impliacted Tiamson – which is quite irregular and inconsistent – this would already create doubt in a
reasonable mind as to whether or not Tiamson really committed the wrongdoing.
Records further show that PLDT based its termination of Tiamson’s services on the ground that Busa
witnessed Tiamson after the latter allegedly just finished making illegal long distance calls. This allegation
by Busa was never communicated to Tiamson (as shown by the records). Hence, Tiamson was never
notified of the charges against him – in short, the first notice sent to Tiamson was incomplete as to the
charges against him. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against
him, given reasonable time to answer the same, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Procedural due process requires that
the employer serve the employees to be dismissed two (2) written notices before the termination of their
employment is effected: (a) the first, to apprise them of the particular acts or omission for which their
dismissal is sought; and (b) second, to inform them of the decision of the employer that they are being
dismissed. Again, in this case, the first notice was not fully complied with hence, Tiamson was illegally
dismissed by PLDT.
42.                      MGG  Marine Services vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664

The Facts:
Molina was initially employed by the MGG Marine Services, Inc. (MGG) on July 1, 1988.

On March 25, 1990, the president of MGG, petitioner Doroteo C. Garlan went to the United States for a
brief sojourn.
On March 1, 1990, before his departure, he appointed a private respondent as comptroller and the overall
supervisor, concurrently with her then position as financial officer.

As comptroller, private respondent was tasked to hold in trust for the company corporate funds to pay its
obligations as authorized by the president and the board of directors. Petitioner Garlan instructed private
respondents to pay the company's obligations as they fell due.

Ma. Lourdes G. Unson, vice-president of MGG who also traveled to the United States, left with private
respondent 79 prepared and pre-signed checks, 16 in blank and 63 with specific amounts on them, with
corresponding vouchers containing the amount of debts due and the names of the creditors. Private
respondent was specifically told to pay only the creditors mentioned in the cash vouchers and to place on
each of the 16 black checks the amount stated in the corresponding check voucher. The said checks were
made payable to the private respondent, who upon withdrawal of the money from the bank, was to pay
the same to the creditors.
Issue: Were petitioners accorded due process at the hearing before the Labor Arbiter?

Held: 
Under the foregoing circumstances we cannot say that the Labor Arbiter abused his discretion in
considering the case submitted for resolution on October 30, 1992. There is no denial of due process
where the party was given an opportunity to present his case, which he did not take advantage of.
Breach of trust and loss of confidence
Notice to explain and notice to dismiss
43.                      Philippine Savings Bank vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 409

FACTS:
Victoria T. Centeno started, as a bank teller of petitioner Philippine Savings Bank and was
promoted as an assistant cashier of PSbank Taytay branch.

Centeno was acting branch cashier, substituting for Mrs. Victoria Ubaña, who had gone on
maternity leave. As acting branch cashier she was in charge of the cash in the vault and
the preparation of the daily cash proof sheet, which was a daily record of the cash of the
cash in the vault and was used as basis in determining the starting balance on the next
banking day.

November 16, 1984, Mrs. Victoria Ubaña reported back to work. Before turning over the
cash to Mrs. Ubaña, Centeno deposited P356,400.00 in the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. (Metrobank). However, what appeared as amount deposited in the November 16,
1984 cash proof and batch sheets of the cashier and clearing clerk, was P371,400.00, and
not P356,400.00 as shown in the Metrobank passbook. Petitioner later charged that
private respondent falsified the deposit slip and made it appear that she had deposited
P371,400.00 when actually she had deposited only P356,400.00.

On December 18, 1984, the branch accounting clerk, Lolita Oliveros, discovered a
discrepancy between the cash deposit recorded (P371,400.00) in the cash proof and
batch sheets and the deposit actually made (P356,400.00) as reflected in the Metrobank
passbook. She called the attention of the clearing clerk, Alberto C. Jose, to the matter.
They reviewed the records and found that what had been attached to the debit ticket of
Jose was a deposit slip for P356,400.00, and not for P371,400.00.

An audit team reviewed the account of the branch and found a P15,000.00 shortage
incurred on November 16, 1984, the day private respondent turned over her
accountability to Mrs. Ubaña after the latter’s maternity leave.

The committee found private respondent accountable for the shortage. 1 Hence, on
January 7, 1985, private respondent was given a memorandum as was given 72 hours to
respond but did not do so she asked for extension but no response was made.

Centeno was dismissed from the bank. She filed a case of illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter claiming
she was denied due process because she was not informed of the specific acts for which she was
dismissed.

private respondent was dismissed for loss of trust and confidence as a result of the
shortage, which, according to petitioner, she tried to conceal by falsifying the bank’s cash
proof sheet and the teller’s vale. Petitioner claimed that private respondent was accorded
due process prior to her dismissal.
Labor Arbiter found PSbank guilty for illegal dismissal on appeal, NLRC affirmed the
decision with modification: deletion of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees

Issue: whether there was violation of due process?

Ruling: No, due process was not violated

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with
two (2) written notices before termination may be validly affected: first, a notice
apprising the employee of the particular acts or omission for which his dismissal is sought
and, second, a subsequent notice informing the employee of the decision to dismiss him.
2 In accordance with this requirement, private respondent was given the required notices,
on January 7, 1985 and then on February 4, 1985.

fact is that petitioner waived the right to be heard in an investigation. Due process is not
violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen not to give his side of the
case. If he chooses to be silent when he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to
complain that he was silenced. 5 Private respondent having chosen not to answer, should
not be allowed to turn the tables on her employer and claim that she was denied due
process. Indeed, the requirement of due process is satisfied when a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side of the controversy is afforded the party. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all circumstances essential, especially when the
employee chooses not to speak. 6 Under the circumstances of this case, it is too much to
require petitioner to hear private respondent before the latter can be dismissed.
44.                     RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS. NLRC, 261 SCRA 589

FACTS:
The line of business of petitioner RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEMS, INC., is installing air conditioning systems
in the building of its clients. In connection with the installation work, petitioner hired 15 employees who
are the private respondents of this case.

On different dates in 1992, private respondents were served with notices of "Termination of Employment"
by petitioner with reason "due to our present business status". The terminations were to be effective the
day following the date of the receipt of notices. The private respondents felt that the termination was due
to their refusal to sign a "Contract Employment" providing a fixed period of employment which
"automatically terminates without necessity of further notice" or even earlier at petitioner's sole
discretion.
Due to this, the private respondents filed three cases of illegal dismissal against the petitioner to the NLRC.
They claimed that the termination was without benefit of due process.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. The private respondents were project
employees; thus, they are not entitled to termination pay, separation pay, holiday premium pay, etc. The
installation of airconditioning systems does not happen every day so the petitioner cannot hire permanent
workers
.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision. It said that the respondents are regular employees and that they
were illegally dismissed. NLRC ordered their reinstatement with full backwages.

ISSUE: Are the private respondents project employees or regular (non-project) employees? Were they
legally dismissed?

RULING:
Project Employees or Regular Employees?
To determine whether the private respondents are project employees, it should be shown that they were
assigned to carry out a specific project and that the duration and scope of that project must be specified at
the time the employees were engaged.
No evidence was provided to show that the respondents were made aware of the duration and scope of
the project during their engagement. The situation was further aggravated by the manner petitioner
dismissed the respondents. The reason given for the dismissal was "due to our present business status.” If
indeed the respondents were project employees, there is no need to serve termination papers because the
completion of the project means that their employment ceases.
If the petitioner resorted to such dismissals, it can be understood that the respondents are regular
employees after all. Still, this is inconclusive because the notices of termination were signed by and
prepared by the president and general manager of the petitioner who were probably unaware of the legal
implications of the termination papers.
As conflicting information was provided on the case, the court is mandated by law to resolve all doubts in
favor or labor. Thus, the private respondents were regular employees of the petitioner.
 Illegal Termination (due process related)
The termination reason 'due to our present state' is not one of the valid causes for termination of an
employment. In addition, the two requisites of due process which is notice and hearing was not complied
with by the petitioner. The terminations took effect the day following receipt of the notices of termination.
At least 30 days should have been given to the private respondents before the intended date of
termination.
There is also evidence of bad faith on the part of the petitioner. They placed an ad in the classified ads
section of the People’s journal. Clearly, they need replacements for the employees they just fired. Thus,
the alleged reason for dismissal is not true.
The Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of the private respondents as regular employees of
petitioner, without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with payment of backwages from the day they
were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated.
In administrative proceedings, does due process require that a party be assisted by counsel? (this answer
to this question can be found on the LUMIQUED case) 

 52.  LUMIQUED VS. EXENEA, 282 SCRA 125

 The fact that the petitioner who was under administrative investigation was
not represented by a lawyer during the hearings of his case could not claim
violation of his right to due process. Nowhere from the Civil Service Law nor
the Administrative Code of 1987 could we find a provision requiring the
presence of a lawyer for government officials under investigation during
hearings. Further, petitioner was given several opportunities to engage the
services of a lawyer but he failed to do so.

Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of

Agrarian Reform – Cordillera Autonomous Region (3 complaints by Jeannette
Obar-Zamudio

1. Malversation through falsification of public documents. He allegedly

falsified (93) gasoline receipts (reimbursed amount 44,172.46)
2. Violation of COA rules and regulations as he made unliquidated cash
advances in the total amount of 116,000 through deliberately concealing
his unliquidated cash advances
3. Oppression and harassment, due to previous complaints Lumiqued
retaliated by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just
 cause.

3 complaints were referred to the Department of Justice for action. Acting Justice
Secretary Eduardo Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145, creating a
committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued.

Committee: Regional State prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman,

City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as
members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days
from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recommendation within
fifteen days from its conclusion.

Investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to

submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however,
filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit
pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's complaints. The committee
granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.

Lumiqued submitted his affidavit alleging that the reason the cases were filed
against him was to extort money from him. He also admitted that his average
daily consumption was 108.45Li which is an aggregate consumption of the 5
service vehicles issued to him and that the receipts were turned over to him by
drivers for reimbursement.

Investigating Committee recommended Lumiqued’s dismissal and forwarded it to

DOJ Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum
to President Fidel V. Ramos.

Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of the findings of the committee with
the DOJ, but committee has no longer the jurisdiction as it was forwarded to the
office of the president. OP has to act with DOJ’s recommendation.

July 3 and 10 Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted and

Lumiqued was not assisted by a counsel since he was confident that he can
defend himself. July 17, 1992 he was unable to attend the third hearing since he
suffered a stroke on July 10.

May 12, 1993 President Ramos issued AO No 52 finding Lumiqued

administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of 15 gas receipts and he
was dismissed from service.

Lumiqued filed a petition for appeal addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued

prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former
position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and
regulations." But was denied.

August 31, 1993 Lumiqued filed a Petition for appeal which was denied. He then
filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was denied
constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.

Issue: Whether absence of counsel in administrative proceedings violates due process?

Ruling: No, The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by
the Constitution or the law.

Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the

government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baños) with the degree
of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and
grants, and underwent training seminars both here and abroad. Hence, he could have
defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. He was
obviously convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding
him that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is
confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more.
One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal

proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry  may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity
to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus,
the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to

explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through
pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As
long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot
be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if
a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration
cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee. 

**When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however,
public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due
process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not
absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public
officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In
this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional
precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief.
Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-
settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

  53. JOSE ATIENZA VS. COMELEC, MANUUEL ROXAS III, FRANKLIN DRILON and
NEREUS ACOSTA, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010
Atienza was expelled from the Liberal party

Facts: Franklin M. Drilon, president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s
withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But
Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced
Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.

Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party
matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s
ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. 

Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify
the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the
National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were
not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party
officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30,
2007.

Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2,
2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to "people
power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action.

Comelec issued a resolution, It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the
holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of
petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not
convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the
Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon’s term may be deemed to have
ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers
were elected.

Court issued a resolution, COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership
dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a
consequence, respondent Drilon’s term as LP president was to end only on November 30,
2007. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired and installed Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP
president.

Atienza: Filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction claiming that the NECO
assembly was invalidly convened, questioned the existence of a quorum, he was not
invited to the NECO meeting.

Roxas: Election as LP president complied with the provision of the amended LP

Constitution, petitioners were deemed resigned for holding the illegal election of LP
officers.
COMELEC issued a resolution denying Atienza’s petition and that they have no
jurisdiction in the issue of his expulsion. Hence the petition for certiorari

Contention of Atienza: Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the
party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and
the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling
them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the
equivalent of administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process
requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

Issue: Whether respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s

constitutional right to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.
Ruling: There was no violation of due process. The requirements of administrative due
process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards
set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which
certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental
power for the performance of a state function." The constitutional limitations that generally
apply to the exercise of the state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life,
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no
vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political
party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party
members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves
through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose
rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the
enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or
any of its agencies.