G.R. No. L-16439

Today is Tuesday, August 16, 2022
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured
her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering
the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of
Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired
to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and
his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to
the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-
Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child
was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life
and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis
that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis
for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife,
also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not
contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after
learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large
money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that,
under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his
wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that
his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member
rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of
the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
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Today is Tuesday, August 16, 2022

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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