Republic of the Philippines

KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY

Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

CHAPTER II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

A. The 1987 Philippine Constitution

1. Constitution; Definition and Theoretical Basis (The Social Contract Theory)

Definition
That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of
sovereignty are habitually exercised [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 4].

With particular reference to the Constitution of the Philippines:

That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the
fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and
defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic [Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6].

Theoretical Basis (The Social Contract Theory)

Refers to the people who surrendered their sovereign power to the state for
the common good which reminds on the Art. II Sec. 1 of the constitution that
“sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.” (Marcos v. Manglapus, et al.,)

The state will perform government services.

1. Marcos v. Manglapus, et al., G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

FACT
On February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from presidency by
the people power revolution. Marcos fled to Hawaii aboard an aircraft due to
unsuccessful plot in his regime.

Marcos and his cronies left the Philippine economy devastated but recovered
after the assumed office of Mrs. Aquino three years later.

Mr. Marcos signified his wish to the Philippines to die but Mrs. Aquino barred
their return considering the consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of the government is threatened from various direction and
the economy is beginning to move forward.

A petition for mandamus and prohibition of the court was ordered to

respondents’ issuance of travel documents of the petitioners and to enjoin the
implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

ISSUE
Whether or not, the President may prohibit the petitioners from returning to
the Philippines in her exercise of powers granted by the Constitution.

RULING
No, the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family poses
serious threat to national interest and welfare.

Article III, Section 1 of the constitution, defining the judicial power

incorporates in the fundamental law ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia which
 Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

states, “in the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to
check – not to supplant the Executive, or to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of his act”.

Provided further, the President power under the constitution to bar the
Marcoses from their return to the Philippines appeals to the sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

2. Classifications of a Constitution

1. Written or unwritten. A written constitution is one whose precepts are

embodied in one document or set of documents; while an unwritten
constitution consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single,
concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of a
fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists,
customs and traditions, and certain common law principles [Cruz,
Constitutional Law, pp. 4-5].
2. Enacted (Conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative). A conventional
constitution is enacted, formally struck off at a definite time and place
following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or
ruler; while a cumulative constitution is the result of political evolution, not
inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by
any systematic method [Cruz, ibid., p. 5].
3. Rigid or Flexible. A rigid Constitution is one that can be amended only by
a formal and usually difficult process; while a flexible Constitution is one
that can be changed by ordinary legislation [Cruz, ibid., p. 5].

The 1987 Philippine Constitution is thus a enacted(conventional), written, and

rigid constitution in terms of manner of amending it.

3. Essential Parts of a Constitution

a) Constitution of Liberty. The series of prescriptions setting forth the

fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing
limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the
enjoyment of those rights, e.g., Art. III.
b) Constitution of Government. The series of provisions outlining the
organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down
certain rules relative to its administration, and defining the electorate, e.g.,
Arts. VI, VII, VIII and IX.
c) Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions pointing out the mode or
procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental
law may be brought about, e.g., Art. XVII.

4. Essential Qualities of a Written Constitution

a) Broad. Not just because it provides for the organization of the entire
government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the
State but because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every
contingency.
b) Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with
legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend.
c) Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in
confusion and divisiveness among the people [Cruz, ibid,, pp. 5-6]
 Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

5. Parts of the 1987 Constitution

1. De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987

FACT
The Barangay Election was held on May 17, 1982 proclaiming the
petitioners as barangay councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal
under Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 8, 1987, the incumbent OIC governor of Rizal signed a

memorandum designating respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores Rizal as the member of the barangay by the
authority of the minister of local government”

However, the petitioners condemned and prayed that the signed

memorandum declared null and void. That the respondents were
prohibited to enact because pursuant of Section 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982, states, the term of that: “shall be six years which
shall commence of June 7, 1982”. It is also the petitioners’ position that
the OIC governor are no longer of authority because of the ratification of
1987 constitution.

The petitioners prayed that memorandum be declared null and void and
the respondents prohibited from taking over their position. Petitioners
maintained that on the Section 2, Article III of the provisional constitution
dated march 25, 1986 which provided:
“All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.”

On the said provision, petitioners’ claim as elective officials on the 1973

constitution should be impeded upon the occurrence of any of the
aforementioned events.

ISSUE
Whether or not the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners
was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25,
1987.

RULING
The 1987 constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
Therefore, the provisional constitution was superseded. OIC Governor is
declared to be of no legal force and respondents are prohibited for
ouster/take-over of petitioner’s positions.

Section 8, Article X of the 1987 constitution further provides that the term
of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years. Unless otherwise provided that
the term of barangay officials has been determined by law, the term 6
years of Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

6. Interpretation of the Constitution/Principles of Constitutional Construction

 Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

a) In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10,

2003, the Supreme Court made reference to the use of well- settled principles of
constitutional construction, namely:
 verba leais the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the
rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have a common use.
 ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of the framers. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, it was held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision shall be examined in light of the history of the times and
the conditions and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed.
 ut maais valeat auam pereat the Constitution has to be interpreted as a
whole. In Civil Liberties Union, it was declared that sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.

b) If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. Again in Civil Liberties Union, supra., it was held that
while it is permissible to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. We think it safer to construe the Constitution from what
“appears upon its face”. The proper interpretation, therefore, depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof.

1. Francisco v. House of Rep., G.R. No. 160261, Nov.10, 2003

FACT

On November 28, 2001, 12th Congress of the House of Representative

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th congress.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,

which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)."

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an

impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
 Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes."

The house committee on justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment was “sufficient in form” but voted to dismiss on October 22,
2003 for being “insufficient in substance”.

On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed with

Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry.

Petitioner contends the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House

Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Whether or not the filing a second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional and constitutes political question.

RULING
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

The doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and

resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at
all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other
two great branches of the government.

2. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317

FACTS
Together with the case of anti-graft league of Philippines Inc. vs Juico, the
court resolved them jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 284 promulgated July 25, 1987.
 Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

Contrast with the provisions of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 constitution,
this executive order allowed cabinet members, their undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries or other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and be remunerated therefore. Respondents on the second
case, then secretary of Justice Ordonez on DOJ opinion no. 3, series of 1987
on construing section 7, par. 2, article IV-B that those executive office may
hold more than one office when: a) directly provided for in the constitution; b)
if allowed by law; c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective
positions. Petitioner objected to the Executive Order and to such opinion for
they have lumped together article VII, section 13 and the general provision in
section 7 of the article IX-B.

ISSUE
Whether or not executive order 284 was violative of article VII and article IX of
the constitution.

RULING
Yes. Looking into the intent of the framers of the constitution, it is clear that
they intended that provision on prohibition in holding any other office, unless
otherwise provided, should be interpreted literally. Hence, the provisions of
executive order no. 284 were deemed unconstitutional.

7. Supremacy of the constitution

The constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land,
must defer.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997

About the bidding of the manila hotel corporation of GSIS
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

8. Self-Executing and Non-Self Executing Provisions

c) In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered self-executing;
mandatory rather than directory; and prospective rather than retroactive.

d) Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general

principle is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

i) Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature

and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action
Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

[Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03,

1997]. '

ii) Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows a right

nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. Like
the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of this provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before the courts [Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April
13, 2004]

1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997

 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing.
 A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the  constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
proclamation no. 50 dated December 8, 1986, GSIS decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of Manila Hotel Corporation. The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic
partner” is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held
on September 18, 1995, only two bidders participated: Petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhard, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the
execution of necessary contracts, MHC in a letter dated September 28,
1995 match the P44.00 bid price. In a subsequent letter, the petitioner
sent a manager’s check of P33,000,000.00 as bid security, which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On October 17, 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has

disregard the tender of the matching bid and that the sale between GSIS
and Renong Berhard be consummated, MHC came to court on prohibition
and mandamus alleging that the act of GSIS violated section 10,
paragraph 2, of the 1987 constitution.

ISSUES
a) Whether or not section 10, of Article XII of the constitution is self-
executing
b) Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of national patrimony.
Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

RULING
a) Yes, second paragraph of section 10, article XII of the constitution
is mandatory, positive command which is complete itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement.
b) Yes, Manila Hotel become part of our national economy and
patrimony for historical events and guests have transpired in the
Hotel. Further, since the Supreme Court held that the tender of
matching bid is not premature, the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution must be upheld.

Wherefore, the court issued a cease and desist order enjoining the
GSIS from selling 51% of Manila Hotel Corporation to Renong
Berhard and directed the former to accept the matching bid of the
petitioner.

2. Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

About the conflict of WTO to 1987 constitution
 Declaration of principles is not self-executing.
 By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration
and state policies”.
 The counterpart of this article in the 1935 constitution is
called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco.
 The principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts.
 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature
in its enactment of laws.
 As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some section of Article XII are not “self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to
a cause of action in the courts.
 They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation”.

FACTS
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as founding member
with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to
the Senate, of “improving access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading parties, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The
president also saw the WTO the opening of “new opportunities for the
service sector, the reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with
exporting and the attraction of more investment into the country”.

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted a Resolution

concurring in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
agreement establishing the WTO which was earlier signed by DTI
Secretary Navarro in Marrakesh, Morocco.

On December 16, 1994, the President signed the instrument of

Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

ratification.

ISSUE
a) Whether the provisions of the WTO agreement restrict and impairs
the Philippine sovereignty.
b) Whether the WTO agreement violated the mandated economic
nationalism by the constitution.
c) Whether the senate concurrence in the WTO agreement and its
annexes but not in other documents referred to in the Final Act is
defective and insufficient.

RULING
a) No. the sovereignty of the state is subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines. The underlying
consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and citizens.
The same reciprocity characterizes the same commitments under
the WTO-GATT.
b) No, the constitution did not intend to pursue and isolationist policy.
The constitutional policy of self-reliant and independent economy
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion
nor mendicancy in the international community.
c) No. the court held that the final act is an instrument which records
the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and
not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its
integral parts. It should be added that the Senate was well aware of
what it was concurring in as shown by the member’s deliberation.

3. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

About the petition of minors, their parents, and future born on
the natural resources as approved by DENR the timber license
agreement.
 Feliciano, J., concurring: The court is in effect saying that
Section 16 of article II of the constitution are self-executing
and judicially enforceable even in their present form. This is
in consonance of the PD No 1152 entitle “The Philippine
Environment Code. The implications of this doctrine will have
to be explore in future cases; those implications are too large
and far-reaching in nature event to be hinted at here.

FACTS
Civil Case No. 90-77 was filed before RTC-Makati by 44 children duly
represented and joined by their respective parents, together with
Philippine Ecological Network, against Hon. Fulgendo Factoran, then
Secretary of the DENR who was later substituted by the new secretary,
Hon. Angel C. Alcala, upon proper motion by the petitioners. Through
public records, Factoran and his predecessors have granted Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLAs) to various corporation to cut the aggregate
area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. The
petitioners sought to stop the issuance of TLAs through invoking their right
to a balanced and healthful ecology based on Article 19, 20, and 21 of the
 Republic of the Philippines
KALINGA STATE UNIVERSITY
Brgy. Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, 3800

Civil Code, Section 4 of EO No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of PD

No. 1151, Section 15 and 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution and
further asserted that they “represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn”. They further asserted that the secretary
committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting TLAs for logging than
what is available. The RTC dismissed the case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners had cause of action based on Section 15
and 16 of the Constitution.

RULING
The Supreme Court asserted that petitioners had met all the requisites for
filing a class suit and that their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.

Based on Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution, the Supreme

Court Stressed that the right to balanced and healthful ecology is as
important as any of the civil and political rights and that it carries with it the
correlative duty of the State to refrain from impairing the environment
under Section 3 of EO No. 192 which was expressly vested upon the
DENR under the succeeding provision of such decree. Also, it was
restated in Section 1 and 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987. Also, the Supreme Court traced such right under previous laws
specially PD No. 1151 and PD No. 1152.

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners had the sufficiency of the
facts under its introductory affirmative allegations as well as the specific
averments to file an action against the respondent.

Cases:
1. Marcos v. Manglapus, et al., G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
2. De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987
3. Francisco v. House of Rep., G.R. No. 160261, Nov.10, 2003
4. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317
5. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997
6. Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
7. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993