Database Security Virtualization and Cloud v1.1!03!18 2010
Database Security Virtualization and Cloud v1.1!03!18 2010
Database Security Virtualization and Cloud v1.1!03!18 2010
Including: Limitations of existing database security approaches Security considerations when deploying virtualization How distributed monitoring best fits virtual and Cloud Computing environments
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www.sentrigo.com
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In this era of security appliances, solutions that met security threats utilizing host-based software models were by and large neglected. Network-based IDS and IPS won the battle against host-based solutions, and most enterprises do not add much to the OS-provided simple endpoint security (one noteworthy exception is 3rd party antivirus software that most enterprises continue to deploy on PCs even though they may have appliances at the perimeter providing protection). The concept of simply placing an appliance (or even a few appliances for that matter) in a rack and attaching it with a wire or two to a switch is very attractive, especially when resources available for security are limited. And for the first generation of systems architectures, the assumptions surrounding security persuaded enterprises that network appliances were an acceptable solution. However for many applications today, especially those implemented in a distributed model, capturing application transactions on the network only identifies the majority of external threats. Driven by an increasing number of breaches by privileged insiders, and greater sophistication by external hackers, regulations are now requiring broader coverage of these threat vectors. Enterprises concerned with insider transactions (e.g. administrators working directly on servers, applications users abusing authorized access, etc.) have been leading the adoption of hostbased solutions, either in conjunction with network appliances, or as their primary approach. In addition to the increasing concerns about the insider threat, now that more and more applications are collapsing into virtual machines, (and in the case of Cloud Computing, outside the enterprise perimeter), it undermines the past assumptions that led to appliance-based security deployments. Even more challenging from a security perspective, these new databases may dynamically appear in new locations over the course of time, based on an organizations changing capacity requirements. These new architectures beg the questions of whether the network appliance approach will still be relevant when many transactions will not make it to the network, or whether a network monitoring approach is efficient when the application network moves from LAN to WAN.
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because of the large potential for damage that can be done on the local machine (e.g. via an SSH connection), it became clear to enterprises that to fully understand the threats to their databases, monitoring must also cover local and intra-db attacks. At this point, appliance vendors were forced to add local agents to their solutions, making many of todays network-based solutions a hybrid network appliance and host-based solution. In most cases, these agents send local traffic back to the appliance for analysis where each transaction that was originally done on the local host is measured against the appliances policy. The hybrid approach is not ideal (for example, local access in breach of the security policy cannot be efficiently blocked since by the time it reaches the appliance it has already been processed by the database), but as long as most applications run on the network in plain sight of the appliance, some enterprises were willing to accept the risks. These hybrid solutions lose many of the benefits of a pure network-based solution by introducing significantly more complex implementation requirements such as kernel-level installation of the agent, for example, requiring reboots to the DB server. And, as noted above, they still miss the sophisticated attacks generated from within the database itself those attacks based on stored procedures, triggers, and views. However, more importantly, they also fail to address several key technical challenges when implemented in either a virtualized environment, or in the cloud. The next sections will introduce these challenges, and demonstrate how an architecture designed for distributed monitoring at the database memory level instead of network monitoring can best address them.
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What can be done in such a case? Clearly the only solution is bringing the security inspection closer to its target. One solution is dubbed the virtual appliance where a virtual machine that runs the software formerly run by a dedicated appliance is installed on virtual servers and the servers are re-architected to send traffic through the virtual machine. This approach has two severe drawbacks: performance and architecture complications. The performance problem of virtual appliances is as follows: dedicated appliances have the advantage of being able to cope with the enormous volumes of back office traffic (using dedicated NICs, dedicated hardware, and optimization of the software to fully utilize the dedicated hardware). When the software is running on a virtual machine, all the advantages are lost and the result more often than not is either a bottleneck that slows down databases when positioned inline (all database transactions pass through the virtual appliance), or missing a large percentage of the transactions when positioned outside the transaction path.
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If virtual security appliances are far from an ideal solution for enterprise networks that run on virtual machines, they are even less relevant in cloud-based applications where networks are dynamic, hosts come and go, and adding virtual appliances to the mix is virtually impossible. The only solution that works in all environments, including Cloud environment is a solution that comes up (and down) with every database a solution that is based on sensors that run side by side with the database on every host machine that runs one database or more.
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Sentrigos solution was designed to meet these database security needs by utilizing a softwarebased sensor, a lightweight add-on that gets installed on the same virtual machine where the database or databases are installed. The sensor adds a process that monitors the database transactions as they occur in the memory. The memory-based sensors cover all the security requirements without the drawbacks running with insignificant performance impact and no changes in the way the network is architected or how the databases function. In addition, by monitoring memory, the sensor protects against all attacks. Whether originating on the network, from a local privileged user, or even from inside the database itself via a sophisticated intra-DB attack, in the end, Sentrigos local sensor will see the attempted exploit, and take action. While the sensors are lightweight, they have all the logic required to make split second decisions on the legitimacy of databases transactions and can monitor, prevent attacks and audit database transactions in very much the same way they protect databases on regular servers. A sophisticated central management controls and receives information from all sensors. The only information that a new sensor needs is the location of the central management server. Whether the database is on a virtual machine, directly on a physical server, or somewhere in the cloud, as long as a sensor is installed on the same machine and the sensor has logical access to the central management, enterprises can enjoy a monitoring and attack prevention system that is not influenced by the underlying network or servers.
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