Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Egoism in Ethics
Egoism in Ethics
Egoism in Ethics
Author(s): Kai Nielsen
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Jun., 1959), pp. 502-510
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105117
Accessed: 02-12-2015 15:03 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley, International Phenomenological Society and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EGOISM IN ETHICS
502
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EGOISMIN ETHICS 503
II
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
504 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
contention. True enough, people often do seek their own good and neglect
what is called "the common good." These two things do not prove, how-
ever, that all people always do so or even that they ever do what common-
sensically would be regarded as paradigm cases of altruistic behavior for
essentially selfish reasons. The egoist must supply some evidence that some
people do in fact go to their death willingly because the prior anticipatory
good is so great that it outweighs the resultant evil of death and violent
destruction. But such a proof even if it were forthcoming is not enough.
The psychological egoist must prove that it is at least probable that all
men always act on such egoistic motives in such contexts. I do not see
that there is the slightest evidence for this contention of the egoist.
Without this proof the psychological egoist's contention is mere dogma.
There is a Freudian tack the psychological egoist might take. It might
be possible for a psychological egoist to argue that unconsciously each man
is seeking his own death. There are in all human beings, according to one
theory, "two fundamentally different kinds of instincts, the sexual
instincts, in the widest sense of the word (Eros) and the aggressive instincts,
whose aim is destruction." 5 The so-called death instinct (Thanatos) as it is
fused (as on Freud's theory it always is) with Eros is exhibited in sadism
and masochism. Man's altruistic behavior is really, on this theory, a form
of masochism (pleasure in self-torture) erotically bound.
While the phenomenon of masochism is too well established in psycho-
logical theory to be reasonably denied, it is wel1to distinguish this frequent
clinical phenomenon from a metapsychologicaltheory which would argue
that there is this form of self-aggression in all human beings which,
together with sadistic impulses, constitute an all-pervasive impulse
toward death. If this theory is used to bolster psychological egoism, it is
not conclusively refutable, but it is also without a crucial test that
would establish its truth. Overtly, egoistic behavior can be explained by
the pleasure principle, and all exceptions as cases of either sadism or
masochism. But if this "theory" is to be more than a dogma, we must be
able to say what it would be like for it to be wrong.
The skeptic might say at this point that although my reasoning seems
plausible I must have missed the point of psychological egoism. Psycho-
logical egoism has occurred and reoccurred throughout the history of
ethics from Democritus to Gardner Williams. And in addition to the
philosophers, it is a "theory" that frequently recommends itself to
reflective common sense. If it is so patently absurd, why has it been such
a hardy perennial and why has it seemed so plausible to so many "tough-
minded" people? While neither longevity nor common consent is a good
test for truth, it is the better part of wisdom to pay close attention to such
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EGOISM IN ETHICS 505
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
506 ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
III
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EGOISM IN ETHICS 507
bondage" and have an "adequate idea" of their own needs and the means
by which they are realized. In short, they have become "enlightened"
egoists and realize that their personal good can be insured in the long run
only if at least occasionally they do perform "altruistic" and "non-
egoistic" acts and urge others to do likewise.7
An ethical egoism would not have to explain away instances of what
would ordinarily be called altruistic behavior as disguised instances of
egoistic behavior, but could simply assert altruistic ideals are mistaken
moral ideals and that we oughtto seek only our own good.
It is plausible to contend that an ethical egoism of ends could justify a
goodly number of our obviously nonegoistic acts as instrumental to an
enlightened self-interest, but again the difficulty returns of explaining all
nonegoistic ethical action on this basis. It is most paradoxical on such a
theory to say that a man who volunteers for a rear-guard action that will
most probably result in his death considers this as a good instrumental to
his welfare. This might be plausible if the egoist in question were also a
supernaturalist and felt that this action would be instrumental to his
reward in heaven. But it is at least thinkable that the egoist might be an
atheist and how, if he were an atheist, this act could then be viewed as
personally instrumentally good is far from clear.
When Professor X (an ethical egoist) claims that the end of all moral
action ought to be the self-interest of the individual involved, what is he
claiming? He may be taken to mean that all men ought to seek their own
self-interest as an end, but how then will the fact - if it is a fact - that all
valuings terminate in the immediately prized help him. The latter is a
factual statement, but Professor X's statement is a normative statement
stating a moral criterion. The fact that all valuings are "for me" in the
sense that all value is derivative from direct prizings does not entail, in
any usual sense of 'entail,' that "all men ought to seek their own interest
as an end." From the factual premise about valuings we could with as
much (or as little) justification derive the normative premise, "the only
worthy moral end is the cultivation of a Good Will," or any other normative
premise that might be desired.
Alternatively, Professor X might be taken, though with less plausibility,
to be asserting not the universal statement that all men ought to seek their
own good, but only that he, Professor X, ought to seek solely his own good.
But then his statement would only tell us what Professor X ought to do
and not what all men, a group of men, or even any other men ought to do.
A moral criterion is public. Thus his statement could not possibly serve as
a moral criterion for any morality no matter how iconoclastic. The very
7 This type of view has been briefly but baldly stated by Gardner Williams in
"Ethics for Scientific Humanists" and "The Relativity of Right" in Humanist World
Digest, November 1956 and February 1957, respectively.
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
508 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
uses of both 'moral' and 'criterion' make the above egoistic use of 'moral
criterion' completely unintelligible. The egoist's use of 'moral criterion'
does not even bear a family resemblance to the ordinary uses of 'moral
criterion.' We have only similar tokens (sign vehicles) with completely
different uses.
The final alternative for egoism in ethics is ethical egoism as a doctrine
of means. As a doctrine of means, ethical egoism could be completely
compatible with an altruistic doctrine of ends or with an objective ethical
theory. This last variety of ethical egoist (Professor Y may serve as its
protagonist) need merely assert that good-on-the-whole or what is
commonly called "the common good" can best be achieved by each man
consciously seeking his own good. Yet in the face of the above-mentioned
exceptions to what would normally be considered egoistic behavior, an
ethical egoism of means is also difficult to hold. It is usually felt that
certain acts involving self-sacrifice ought, under certain conditions, to be
performed to insure the common good. An ethical egoist of this type might
argue that a common good that is nobody's individual good would not be a
suitable ideal and would not be in fact what is usually meant by 'good' at
all. This seems to be obviously (and tritely) true. Certainly, it is important
to take proper account, in constructing criteria for good-on-the-whole, of
the goods of particular individuals. Yet if psychological egoism is given up
and an ethical egoism of ends is given up, an ethical egoism as a doctrine of
means seems at a loss to explain the obvious "fact" of everyday moral
experience that self-sacrifice - and sometimes even extreme self-sacrifice
- is upon occasion necessary for the common good. Ethical egoism must
contend that it is never right for a soldier to volunteer for a rear-guard
action that will almost certainly mean his own death. This must be so, no
matter how just the war or how great the needs of his comrades and
country. An ethical egoism of this type makes the factual claim that
the exclusive seeking one's own good always best contributes to good-
on-the-whole. We are not dealing here with purely moral principles but
with whether certain moral principles will be more casually effective
in achieving certain goals, e.g., good-on-the-whole. Yet clearly sometimes
in cases like that of a man or group of men fighting a rear-guard action
more total good is realized in the universe than if the rear-guard fighters
had followed through on egoistic principles.
The ethical egoist can save himself here only by offering some bizarre
persuasive definition of 'good-on-the-whole.' Yet, at least within Western
Culture, there is, generally speaking, a fairly stable conception of the
common good. If this last extra-ordinary kind of egoist denied this con-
ception and redefined 'good-on-the-whole' in some other fashion to make
it consonant with his theory,his critic might finally have to smile tolerantly
and grant him that this, in some "Alice-In-Wonderland world," is a "con-
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EGOISM IN ETHICS 509
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
510 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
10 For the conception of the mode of ethical reasoning relevant here see Stephen
Toulmin, An Examinationof the Place of Reamonin Ethics, pp. 102-4 and Chapters 9,
10, and 11.
11 I have argued for this as againstToulmin and Meldenelsewhere.See my "Is 'Why
Should I be Moral?'an Absurdity?" Australa8ianJournal of Philosophy,Vol. 36, No. 1
(1958), pp. 25-31.
12 For my remarks about the relation of philosophy to language I am, of course,
deeply indebted to LudwigWittgenstein'sPhilosophicalInvestigation8.For an elaborate
and brilliant defense of a "linguistic method in ethics" see Everett W. Hall, What is
Value?,Chapter7.
This content downloaded from 193.0.65.67 on Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:03:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions