JD4B 2022
JD4B 2022
JD4B 2022
QUIOYO JD4B
1. Substantive Law
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer." (Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, citing Primicias v.
Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446, 452 [1953])
Procedural Law
The Supreme Court has also given a definition to remedial law, also called
"adjective law" or "procedural law." It is that branch of law which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion. (G.R. No. L-2068. October 20,
1948)
2.
2.1 Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953
FACTS:
This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with
the trial of two criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the
assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a
writ of preliminary injunction issued so that the trial may be held pending until further
orders of this court. On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner
filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court
ISSUES:
II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive right, cannot be
impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.
HELD:
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law
and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is
so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a
party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched is such a
manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid
may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right
has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid
of assessors had been invoked (Berbari vs. Concepcion, et al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de
San Jose vs. Sison, 54 Phil., 344.)
Thus, it was there said that these provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the intervention of the assessors is not an empty formality which may be
disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law. It is another security
given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they
cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings. Were we to agree that for one
reason or another the trial by assessors may be done away with, the same line of
reasoning would force us to admit that the parties litigant may be deprived of their right
to be represented by counsel, to appear and be present at the hearings, and so on, to
the extent of omitting the trial in a civil case, and thus set at naught the essential rights
granted by the law to the parties, with consequent nullity of the proceedings." (Colegio
de San Jose vs. Sison, 54 Phil., 344, 349.)
DANNY DY C. QUIOYO JD4B
FACTS:
from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or
where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before
the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extra-judicially foreclose a mortgage
under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for
extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee's
claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of
the fees.
ISSUE:
HELD:
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner's foreclosure
proceeding. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA
6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in
this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an
action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which
can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of
cooperatives.
Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En
Banc has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees on the issue of
legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity to reiterate our En Banc
ruling in GSIS.
2.3 Re: Petition For Recognition Of The Exemption Of The GSIS From Payment
Of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010 March 20, 2003
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on
government-owned or controlled corporations under Section 22,1 Rule 141 (Legal Fees)
of the Rules of Court.
The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS
Act of 1997):
Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets,
revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all
taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds
The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and
proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes,
assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. For this reason, the
GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees.
The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the
exemption of the GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under
Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to
repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure promulgated by the Court. However, the
Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction such view.
ISSUE:
May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
from legal fees imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations
and local government units?
HELD:
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes
the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal
fees.
DANNY DY C. QUIOYO JD4B
FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial,
praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of
Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of
which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that
denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can, as a matter of right, compel the complainant and
her witnesses to testify anew and be subject to cross-examination.
HELD:
We made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the
complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the
preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention
to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section
13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that the rule in question deals with
substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule
108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive
right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
(60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the
procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a
crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
DANNY DY C. QUIOYO JD4B
FACTS:
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the
three equal branches of the government.
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits
plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
ISSUE:
HELD:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by
deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one
body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing
a " stronger and more independent judiciary."
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do
so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to
always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.
DANNY DY C. QUIOYO JD4B
Remedial Law
(SY 2022-2023)
ASSIGNMENT 1
Objectives
To Identify grey areas in the distinction between substantive law and procedural
law
To better understand the rule Making Power of the Supreme Court under the
Constitution
A. Be able to distinguish between substantive law and procedural law by the following:
2. Submit case digests of the following cases (Grey areas in Substantive and
Procedural Law, Rule Making Power of the Supreme Court)
2.3. Re: Petition For Recognition Of The Exemption Of The GSIS From Payment
Of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010 March 20, 2003