Cave diving fatality at Cenote Odyssey, Sistema Ox Bel Ha,

on April 23,, 2022

by Gustavo Buenrostro and Martin Gaspar Ramirez

A fatal accident took place at Cenote Odyssey, part of Sistema Ox Bel Ha,
on Saturday, April 23,, 2022.
Location:
Cenote Odyssey is part of the Ox Bel Ha cave system, south of Tulum,
Quintana Roo, Mexico, and toward the sea. The cave’s average depth is12
meters/40 ft, with the downstream flow toward the ocean.

Figure 1. Stick map of the cave area. The entrance at Cenote Odyssey is marked
by the star.
The victim:
The deceased diver was a 32-year old Russian male who was an
experienced cave diver. His certifications included full cave, stage cave, and
diver propulsion vehicle (DPV) cave. He had been very active in the area,
training, diving, and surveying caves. He was a passionate diver who
pursued exploration while working remotely as a programmer. He had been
actively diving in the area over the last two years, staying for six months in
2021 and for all of 2022. He knew the cave area well and had done many
dives in this cave as part of an ongoing survey project. We estimate that he
had around 300-400 cave dives.

Accident:
The victim had dived frequently at Cenote Odyssey. He had become known
to the neighbors, who are building a house on the property next to the
cenote.
According to the neighbors, the diver arrived at around 10 am on Saturday
morning, started his dive, and never came back. They became increasingly
worried during the afternoon and evening. The neighbors contacted another
local diver, and the alarm was raised in the community. A first search team
was assembled with divers arriving from Playa del Carmen, Puerto
Aventuras, and Tulum.

The search:
A team of three divers, Lanny Vogel, Kim Davidsson, and Peter Broger,
conducted the first search at 02:57 on Sunday morning (Saturday night).
Robbie Schmittner, Alessandra Figari, and Hitoshi Miho provided surface
support. Due to the system’s complexity and amount of lines, the plan was to
try to retrace the missing diver’s steps. The team had no information about
the missing diver’s dive plan.
Each recovery diver used sidemount configuration, an extra stage tank, and
a DPV. We found the deceased diver after first searching some other areas
of the cave. He had done three jumps (navigational decisions) from the
entrance and was using REMs (line markers). He had conducted his
navigation properly and consistent with safe cave diving practices and
protocol.
The diver’s body was located at approximately 700 ft of penetration (seven
minutes’ trigger time using DPVs) from the Cenote Odyssey entrance. The
team photographed and documented the site and left the body and gear
intact. The team exited to notify the surface support personnel and the
authorities. Because the search took place in the middle of the night, the
team planned to regroup the next morning (Sunday, April 24) to complete
the recovery.
The deceased diver’s equipment consisted of four aluminum 80 ft3 tanks
filled with 32% nitrox as marked on the cylinders and a Blacktip brand DPV.
He was diving in sidemount gear configuration and with two stages.

The diver’s route

Figure 2 shows the victim’s route.The yellow lines represent the existing
lines in the cave, with the star denoting the cenote and starting point. The
red lines show where the diver traveled (based on his dive computer profile
and the survey data recovered from his Mnemo survey device). The green
lines show the jumps that he had placed to ensure his continuous guideline
to the surface. The blue circle indicates where he was found with his tanks
and DPV.

Figure 2. Stick map of Cenote Odyssey and the diver’s route.

The recovery:
After the call went out into the community, there was a great response
among local instructors to help out and assist.
A team was selected according to readiness, experience level, and
availability. The team met up at a local dive center, discussed the plan, and
coordinated with the authorities. The whole operation went very smoothly.
The diver and all of the equipment was recovered and brought to the surface
by around 13:30 on Sunday, April 24. Local authorities then took over in
combination with funeral services.
Recovery team members:
Alex Alvarez (surface support and point of contact with the authorities)
Arthur Nguyen-Kim (search and recovery)
Gustavo Buenrostro (search and recovery)
Marissa Eckert (search and recovery)
Martin Gaspar Ramirez (search and recovery)
Kim Davidsson (search and recovery)
Two recovery teams were formed after planning the operation. Team 1
(Martin and Kim) entered the water at 12:30 and exited at 12:53. They each
used sidemount cylinders and a DPV to scooter to the victim and to recover
his four tanks and DPV.
Back at the surface they informed Team 2 (Arthur, Gustavo, and Marissa),
who did a swimming dive with sidemount gear configuration and an extra
stage tank. Marissa and Gustavo recovered the diver while Arthur recovered
the jumps installed for navigation. Recovery team 2 surfaced successfully at
around 13:30.
What happened to the victim?
What we know. The diver was found within an arm’s length of where he had
“dropped”/attached his stage tanks to the line. Both sidemount tanks were
attached to his body. Both of these tank valves were fully open, and both
tanks were empty. He was positioned horizontally and face down. His helmet
was in place, and his mask was on his face (no blood was in the mask).
There were no apparent signs of struggle.
The stage tank valves’ positions raise additional questions as to what may
have occurred. Both tanks were attached/clipped off to the guideline per
standard protocol with hoses and regulators stowed properly.
One stage tank was found empty with the valve inexplicably fully open.The
second stage tank’s valve was closed, and the tank was pressurized with
170 bar/2500 psi of remaining gas. The DPV was clipped to the line at the
same location and was functioning.
The diver had perished within an arm’s length reach of his tanks and DPV.
He had a survey slate in his pouch and a wrist slate with many sheets of
information. He had most likely been working and re-surveying the lines near
where he “dropped” the stages and DPV. But we have no information about
his dive plan.
Equipment was functioning properly. The recovery team checked the
diver’s equipment with the police investigators as witnesses. Three of the
tanks were completely empty as described, and one still contained
170bar/2500 psi of gas. Analysis confirmed that the remaining gas was 32%
nitrox as marked on the tank. The team checked for malfunction by
connecting all of the regulators to a full tank. There were no signs of
malfunction of any of the regulators, hoses, or o-rings. They were all of a
high-quality brand and looked very new and well maintained. Lights all were
working?
Reconstructing the dive
Martin and Gustavo conducted two additional dives to gather more
information about the diver’s route and navigation. Their second dive
followed the deceased’s route based on the information retrieved from his
dive computer profile. They were able to find the missing last piece of
equipment, an Mnemo (mapping and survey device) that the diver had used.
During their dives, they were able to recreate his dive profile, which matched
the time, distance, and depth retrieved from his dive computer.
We believe that the diver had set up a “base camp” from which he would be
exploring and mapping the lines in that section of the cave. He would have
scootered in using a stage tank and may have clipped this tank off before
starting a swimming dive using the other stage bottle. He would have left his
DPV on site, returning to “base camp” after mapping the adjacent lines.
During one of those consecutive not-so short dives, he returned to “base
camp” to leave the second stage tank. We hypothesize that he recalculated
his remaining gas at this point. He continued to survey, probably because he
was familiar with his surroundings. At some point, he placed the third jump
(navigational decision) and proceeded to explore that section of the cave
using his sidemount tanks with the goal of completing the mapping of that
section of the cave.
The dive profile indicates that he had followed this jump line for about 10
minutes, during which time he found a promising crack leading to a deep
unexplored section of the cave. He decided to continue to what was the end
of the existing line (confirmed by the recon dives that were made). Then—
using only his two sidemount tanks—he proceeded back toward the “base
camp” using the Mnemo to complete the cave line map. His sidemount tanks
by this time would have been at his turnaround reserved pressure.
On the return trip, he decided to take a look into the crack. In this unexplored
section, he found himself in a very narrow vertical restriction (a confined
space that allows room for only one diver). Contact with the cave caused a
silt out and zero-visibility situation (confirmed by Gustavo and Martin on a
recon dive). These stressful events would have caused him to increase his
gas consumption.
Due to this unexpected situation, and in combination with the depth, the
diver most likely drained one of his sidemount tanks. He managed to find his
way out of the crack, rushing back toward his stage tanks and DPV. On the
way he dropped his Mnemo, which was later found just a few meters from
him. He drowned only one foot/30 cm from his partially full stage tank and
DPV, which would have gotten him out of the cave.
Hypotheses and Analysis
We hypothesize that the victim may have recalculated his available gas from
the “base camp,” raising the question of aggressive gas management as a
contributing factor This is a not-uncommon practice to maximize bottom time
for work. But recalculation requires caution and attention to managing the
risk: For every recalculation and restart, the “on board” reserve gets smaller
and smaller.
Why was a stage tank fully drained with the valve open but properly stowed?
We knew this diver to be conscientious. He would not have drained a tank
dry and risked damage to the cylinder and regulator. Possibly he used most
of the gas while surveying and forgot to close the valve. Or the attached
regulator may have free flowed and drained the tank. This remains one of
the accident’s unanswered questions.

A few words to fellow cave divers

We don’t really know the events that led to this diver’s situation. But what we
shouldn’t forget is that every time we decide to enter an underwater cave,
we are accepting the risk of what cave diving implies. We are diving in a
flooded overhead environment in which our lives depend on our training,
gear, and our own decisions. This environment has proven many times to be
ruthless and unforgiving.
One can become very comfortable and complacent in an uncomfortable and
potentially dangerous environment. Just because you are comfortable
doesn’t mean that there is no risk.
We must always be aware of our limits and guard against overconfidence
and our own egos. Saying “that will never happen to me” can lead to blind
spots and distraction. Accidents happen when least expected. We kindly call
upon all our fellow cave divers to review all of the cave protocols and safety
rules. Dive as if your life depends on it, because it does.
There is no shortage of exploration leads. Some of the important questions
to ask ourselves are
• Are they safe?
• Do I have enough gas?
• Do I have a support team to help me?
And there are many more.
Remember that there is always a next day to go back. It is always better to
call a dive before starting to bend the rules. Caves have been there for
millions of years and will be there for us tomorrow. It is well said: There is
nothing in any cave worth dying for.

Report made on June 14, 2022.