THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES, KOCHI

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree
of

MASTER OF LAW
in
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
on the topic

ANTI DEFECTION LAW: A BANE ON DEMOCRACY

Under the Guidance and Supervision of

Mr. Abhayachandran K
The National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi
Submitted by

ISHA
Register No.: LM0120019
Batch: 2020-21

1
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Ms. Isha (Reg. No. LM0120019) has prepared and submitted the
dissertation titled, " Anti Defection Law: A Bane On Democracy" in partial fulfillment of
the requirement for the award of the Degree of Master of Laws in Constitutional and
Administrative Law, to the National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi, under my
guidance and supervision. It is also affirmed that the dissertation submitted by her is original,
bona-fide and genuine.

Date: Mr. Abhayachandran K

Place: Guide & Supervisor
NUALS, Kochi

2
 DECLARATION

I, ISHA (LM0120019), pursuing Masters in Constitutional and Administrative Law do

hereby declare that the Dissertation word titled ‘Anti Defection Law: A Bane On
Democracy ', submitted for the award of L.L.M Degree in the National University of
Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi, during the academic year 2020-21, is my original, bona-fide
and legitimate research work, carried out under the guidance and supervision of Mr.
Abhayachandran K . This work has not formed the basis for the award of any degree,
diploma, or fellowship either in this university or other similar institutions of higher learning.

Date: Isha
Place: Register No. LM0120019
Constitution and Administrative law

3
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I thank God who has enabled me to complete this research work amidst
all the odds posed by the Covid situation, by giving me all the necessary health, strength and
resources.
I express my profound gratitude to my research supervisor, Mr. Abhayachandran K , for the
crucial role played by him through his guidance, ideas and timely insights in all stages, from
the framing of the title, planning the scheme of my project, till the final submission. I also
thank my teachers in NUALS whose insights have helped me in the course of the research
work. I further extend my gratitude to the Vice-Chancellor Prof. (Dr.) K. C. Sunny and
Prof. (Dr.) Mini S. for their support and encouragement.
I take this occasion to thank my mother, Dr. Archana Katiyar who saw me through the whole
year with her love, prayers and counsel. I also thank my brother Mr. Amritanshu, and my
aunt Dr.Kumkum Rai , for their encouragement and support.
I am immensely thankful to my friends and peers who helped me in a variety of ways, from
sharing ideas, giving motivation, to proof reading my chapters and giving their valuable
comments. Special thanks in this regard, to Ms. Devanshi Singh, Ms. Simran Kaur
Isha

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 CONTENTS
Preliminary……………………………………………………………………1 - 9

Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………. 10 - 24

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Defections in the United Kingdom

1.3 Defection in India

1.3.1 Fourth General Election

1.3.2 Committees and Bills

1.4 Provisions of the Tenth schedule

1.5 Research problem

1.6 Scope of the study

1.7 The objective of the study

1.8 Hypothesis

1.9 Research Questions

1.10 Methodology

1.11 Chapters

1.12 Survey of Literature

Chapter 2: Anti Defection Law And Horse Trading……………………… 25 - 47

2.1 Horse Trading

2.1.1 Karnataka

2.1.2 Manipur

2.1.3 Telangana

2.1.4 Uttarakhand

2.2 Role of the Speaker in Augmenting Defection

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 2.2.1 Detailing The 'Merger' Clause

2.2.2 Judicial Review of Speaker's Decision

Chapter 3: Anti-Defection Law And Dissent…………………………….. 48- 67

3.1 Analysis Of Intra-Party Dissent

3.2 Intra-Party Dissent In India

3.2.1 Understanding Dissent in the Light of Pragaraph2(1)(a)

3.2.2 Paragraph 2(1)(a) and Freedom of Speech

3.3 Role of Whip Under Paragraph 2(1)(b)

Chapter 4: Anti-Defection Law In Other Countries……………………… 68- 83

4.1 Countries Dealing With Defections Without Legislation

4.2 Countries Dealing the Issue with Legislation

4.2.1 Voluntarily Giving Up Membership of the Party.

4.2.2 Split/Merger

4.2.3 Independent and Nominated Members

4.2.4 Expelled Members

4.2.5 Excluding the Presiding Officer

4.2.6 Presiding Officer as Deciding Authority

4.2.7 Time Limit

4.3 Intra-Party Dissent in Other Countries

Chapter 5: Conclusion And Suggestions…………………………… 84 - 90

5.1 Findings of the Study

5.2 Suggestions

Bibliography……………………………………………………………… 91 - 94

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 List of Abbreviations

ADL- Anti Defection Law

BJP- Bharatiya Janata Party
BSP- Bahujan Samaj Party
C.J- Chief justice
CBI- Central Bureau of Investigation
CLP- Congress legislature party
FIR- First Information Report
INC- Indian National Congress
INC- Indian National Congress
J.D(S)- Janta Dal Secular
M.P- Member of Parliament
MGP -Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party
MLA- Member of Legislative Assembly
MLC- Members of Legislative Council
NCP- National Congress Party
NCRWC- National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution of India
PSP- The Praja Socialist Party
Pt- Pandit
SC- Supreme Court of India
TPCC -Telangana-Pradesh Congress Committee
TRS- Telangana Rashtra Samithi
W.P – Writ Petition

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 CASES REFERRED

Amar Singh v. Association of India, (2011) I SCC 201

Amar Singh v. Union Of India, (2017) SCC Online SC 405
Balchandra L Jarkiholi & Ors v. B Yeddyurappa and Ors, (2011) 10 SCR 877
Barley v. Luzerne County Board of Elections, 937 F Supp 362 (MD Pa 1995).
D Sudhakar v. DN Jeevaraju, (2011)3 K.LJ 437
G. Viswanath v. Honorable speaker Tamil Nadu legislative assembly, (1996) 2 SCC 353.
Gewertz v. Jackman, 467 F Supp 1047 (DNJ 1979).
Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi , (2015) 12 SCC 381
High Court of Bombay in Indian National Congress v. Province of Goa, 2017 SCC OnLine
Bom 8817
Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 1
Julian Bond v. James Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966)
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. the Hon'ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors,
2020 SCC Online SC 55.
Kuldip Nayar v. Union Of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors, AIR 1993 SC 412.
Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8 SCC 747
Mohd. Fajur Rahim  v.  Manipur Legislative Assembly, 2019 SCC OnLine Mani 127
Orissa Legislative Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida, (2013) 11 SCC 794
R. Sakkarapani Whip v. T.N. Legislative Assembly, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 1247
Ravi s Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641: AIR 1994 SC 1558
Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prashad Maurya & Ors, AIR 2007 SC 1305.
Romila Thappar v.Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4683
S.A. Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1875
Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly and others,
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1454.
Shah Faruq Shabbir & Ors V. Govindrao Vasve & Ors, 2016 (5) MahLJ 436
T.N. Haokip v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, 2017 SCC OnLine Mani 137

8
Vijay Namdeorao Wadettiwar v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2100
Washington Legal Foundation v Massachusets Bar Foundation, 993 F2d 962, 976.

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 Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The politics of defection is considered to be a bane of parliamentary democracy in India. The

instances of defections have been on the rise in India for quite a time, especially at the state
level. Defection is also commonly known as floor-crossing, which involves a change of
allegiance of a member of a political party to another party. Defection is the main reason for
government instability. A functioning government may break down due to defections of its
supporters to the other side or another political party which might leave the active
government with a minority leading to its defeat. Defection defies election mandates and is
thereby rightly described as an undemocratic practice. A party that could not come to power
through elections fairly can use such means to maneuver the majority in the house to form the
government against the election results defying the very purpose of holding periodic
elections, which are considered a benchmark for democracy.1

The term defection seems to owe its roots to the Latin word 'defectio,' which means a
demonstration of relinquishment of an individual or a reason to which such individual is
bound by the bond of loyalty or obligation, or to which he is wholly connected himself. It,
correspondingly, refers to an act of revolt, dissent, and insubordination by an individual or a
party. Defection in this sense indicates the abandoning of a reason or pulling out from it or
from a party or program. From one perspective, it has a component of surrendering one and,
on the other, a component of joining another. When this process of deserting one side and
joining others is complete, then a person is named a deserter. Defection is, thus, a process by
which a person changes his allegiance from one party to another and abandons his duty.
Generally, this marvel is known as 'floor crossing,' which had its starting point in the British
house of Commons, where a lawmaker changed his faithfulness when he crossed the floor
and moved from the government to the resistance side vice-versa.2

1.2 Defections in the United Kingdom

1
Prashant Pandey, Anti-Defection Law : A Critical Analysis, Anti-Defection Law in India, (Feb.23, 2021, 4:30
PM), https:// vbook.pub/documents/anti-defection-law-in-indian-mo80p0nz7gwn.
2
Id., at 12.

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In this context, it could be referenced that in the beginning phases of their parliamentary
battles for political force in the United Kingdom, members turned to defection most of the
time and surprisingly in huge numbers. William Gladstone, viewed as the " Great Old Man"
of British progressivism, started his parliamentary vocation as a Conservative member when
he was duly elected to parliament in December 1832. During Peel's subsequent Ministry
(1841 - 46), he moved over to the Liberal Side and was made vice-president of the board and
later secretary of state for the colonies. In 1886, there was a mass defection from the Liberal
Party. Joseph Chamberlain was emphatically against the Irish Home Rule Bill and crossed the
floor alongside 93 other Liberal and Whig MPs. The deserters formed an autonomous party
called the Liberal Unionists, but they voted alongside the Conservatives. The Home Rule Bill
was crushed at the subsequent reading stage when the Gladstone ministry had to resign.
Winston Churchill's political profession was set apart by rehashed floor crossing. Churchill
started his parliamentary life as a Conservative. In 1904 he deserted from the Conservative
Party and moved over to the Liberal Party. From 1904 to 1922, Churchill stayed a Liberal. In
1922, he contested the election polls as a "Lloyd George Liberal.3

1.3 Defection in India

The historical origin of defection in governmental issues in India can be traced back to
Rama's times in ancient India. Indeed, even in Ramayana, the same incident of defection can
be tracked down, Vibhishana, the sibling of Ravana, abandoned him and joined Rama.4

In the 20th century, During Montford Reforms, Shyam Lal Nehru, an individual from the
Central legislature who was chosen on the Congress ticket; however, he crossed the floor and
joined the British Side. Around then, Pt. Moti Lal Nehru, who was head of the assembly
party, emphatically reprimanded and denounced him, and Mr. Shyam Lal Nehru was ousted
from the party. 5

Political defections have been a part of the Indian political defection even before the 1967
general elections. In 1948, the Congress Socialist Party left the Congress party and guided
every one of its individuals to leave their seats in the assembly and look for re- election.
However, this incident did not turn into a precedent. Later, In 1950, 23 MLAs left the
Congress Party and established the Jana Congress in Uttar Pradesh, Again in 1958, some
ninety-eight members of legislative assembly (MLAs) straightforwardly resisted the public
3
G.C. Malhotra, Anti-Defection Law in India and the Commonwealth, 3 (Metropolitan Book Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
2005).
4
Supra note 1.
5
Moolchand Shyam, Politics of Defections and Democracy, 13 JCPS 328, 329 ( 1979).

11
authority, which prompted the fall of the Sampurnanand Cabinet. The Praja Socialist Party
(PSP) also provides a good study on defections. In 1953, the PSP pioneer Prakasam defected
from the PSP and joined the Congress party to establish the government in Andhra Pradesh 6.
Thanu Pillai, a Chief Minister of the state of the Travancore-Cochin, is one more example of
defection from that party. Pretty much a few defections were occurring in every one of the
states however didn't prevail to make in excess of a wave. For example, during 1957-1967,
97 members abandoned the Congress party, and 419 joined it. While in 1967-68 (one-year
time frame), 175 absconded from it, and 139 joined it.7

1.3.1 Fourth General Election

In the fourth general election, the Congress party secured majority seats in the Lok Sabha by
winning 283 seats out of 520 seats but lost an outright majority in eight of the sixteen states
of the union that went to the polls. Even in states where the party held control, its solidarity
was much depleted. However, in the eight states where congress failed to get outright
majority seats, no single party could take its place. As an outcome of the fourth general
election, the political force displayed by the Congress party so far was broken away. The
opposition parties viewed this as an opportunity to get hold of the power. The political parties
which contested neck to neck against each other at the polls kept their ideological differences
aside and came together to share power on the basis of what was named as an agreed
minimum program. Along these lines, the significant advancement post fourth election period
was the formation of coalition governments of widely heterogeneous components in some
states.8

The other remarkable change that happened post fourth general election was the large
migration of legislators in various states, to and fro, from one political party to another.
Predominantly to acquire profit office or other personal benefits, if necessary, by assisting the
bringing down of progressive governments and framing others in their places. The incidents
of defection became more intense and clear after the fourth general elections in 1967 with
regards to which the figures represent themselves. Up to the fourth election in 1967, there
were only about 400 defections, and within a year from the election of 1967, there were alone
500 odd defections, of whom, the figures also say, 118 went on to become ministers or

6
Paras Diwan, Aya Ram Gaya Ram: The Politics of Defection, Vol.21, JILI, (1979).
7
Id.
8
Supra note 5.

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ministers of state. The issue turned out to be so significant from the perspective of saving the
practices in a democracy and laying down certain standard guidelines of political behaviour.9

1.3.2 Committees and Bills

Committee on Defection: On August, 11,1967, a conspicuous Congress legislator from the

Lok Sabha, P.Venkatasubbaiah, a secretary of the Congress Party in parliament, moved a
resolution for the formation of a committee on defections. The Lok Sabha examined the
matter in detail, and finally, on 18th February 1969, the report of the committee was laid for
discussion on the table of Lok Sabha. The committee suggested that a committee of the
delegates of the various political parties in parliament and state assemblies be comprised to
draw up a set of principles for the political parties to follow with specific reference to the
issue of defection and to carry out its implementation via an agreement among themselves. It
also suggested that no individual who was not a duly elected member of the lower house
ought to be designated as minister/chief minister. The committee further suggested a
constitutional amendment without influencing the current office holders in Office. The
committee further suggested that a defector ought to be prohibited for one year or till such
time he resigns his seat and seeks re-election, from holding any office of a minister, speaker,
deputy speaker or any such post conveying profit and salary to be debited from the
consolidated fund of the union or the states or other government undertaking funds.10

The constitution (thirty-second amendment) bill, 1973 : As the YB Chavan committee's

suggestions couldn't give a sufficient solution to the issue of defection, the constitution
(thirty-second amendment) bill, 1973 was presented during the fifth Lok Sabha on 16 th May
1973, which sought to frame constitutional regulations for the issue of defection. The Bill
provided that a member shall be disqualified from holding his seat as the member of either
house of parliament if he voluntarily gives up the membership of the political party on whose
tickets he contested elections or if he votes or abstains from voting according to his party
directions, without seeking prior approval for the same. The bill also provided an exception
from disqualification in case the defection happened because of a split in the political party.
The minimum strength for a split was, however, not made clear in the Bill. The provisions of
the Bill were not to make applicable to members of unrecognized political parties, nominated
members, and independents.

9
Diwan Id., at 3.
10
Subhash C Kashyap, The Politics of Power, Defections and State Politics in India,89 ( 3rd ed., 1985)

13
The bill vested the power to adjudicate the question of disqualification on a reference made
by the political party or any member so authorized by it, in the president for members of the
central legislature, and in the governor for members of the state legislature. On 13 th
December 1973, a motion was passed in Lok Sabha to refer the constitution (thirty-second
amendment) bill, 1973 to a joint- committee of the houses of parliament. On 17th December
1973, a similar motion in this regard was passed in the Rajya Sabha. However, the
committee of the houses of parliament became non -operational upon the dissolution of the
fifth Lok Sabha session on 18th January 1977.

On 28th August 1978, one more endeavor was made toward this path by presenting the
constitution (forty-eighth amendment) bill, 1978 in Lok Sabha. The bill received severe
criticism at the introductory stage itself from the ruling and the opposition sides. The
members disagreed with the supposed distortion of realities in the statement of objects and
reasons because the members were not counseled over the provisions of the bill, though the
statement of objectives and reasons of the bill stated: the issue cuts across all political parties.
It has been analyzed in consultation with the chiefs of the political party. Some striking
provisions of the bill were as follows:

1. After the elections, independent and nominated members would have the opportunity
to join the political party for one single time.

2. The bill provided two situations for disqualification. First being, voluntary giving up
of membership of the political party to which the member belonged, and second being
casting a vote not in accordance with the party directives, without taking prior
permission from the party and subject to the condition that the member was expelled
within 30 days from the party to which he belonged.

3. The bill carved out an exception that in case one-fourth of members of the political
party or where the political party is comprised of 20 members than not less than 5
members form a new party and if such party receives recognition from the presiding
officer and is enrolled with the election commission, then such members can not be
disqualified.

4. This bill was supposed to be applicable to the recognized political party. However,
even this bill failed to see the light of the day as it faced stiff opposition, following
which the minister withdrew the motion to introduce the bill.11
11
G.C.Malhotra, Anti Defection In India And The Common Wealth, Metropolitan Book Co.Pvt Ltd ( 2005 ).

14
Finally, after the general elections in 1984, The anti defection law was introduced. The
president of India said in his address to the two houses of parliament gathered in one place on
17th January 1985 that the government expected to present in that session a bill to ban
defections. In furtherance of the address, the government presented the constitution (fifty-
second amendment) bill in the Lok Sabha on 24th January 1985.

The statement of objects and reasons affixed to the bill expressed: The evil of political
defection is a matter of public concern. In case it isn't fought, it is probably going to sabotage
the actual pillars on which our democratic setup is based.The Bill intended to outlaw
defection and satisfying the above confirmation. To achieve a national consensus on the bill,
the prime minister held detailed conversations with the heads of opposition
parties/gatherings. The government consented to the demand of removing the provision from
the bill about the expulsion of a member from his political party on the ground of his conduct
outside the house. The bill was approved in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on 30 and 31
January 1985, respectively. It got the president's consent on 15th February 1985. The act,
which came into power with effect from 1st March 1985 after the issue of the important
notice in the Official Gazette, added the tenth schedule to the constitution.12

1.4 Provisions of the tenth schedule13

The constitution 52nd amendment act introduced amendments in four articles of the
constitution viz article 101(3)(a), article 102(2), article 190(3)(a), and article 191(2), and
inserted the tenth schedule thereto. This amendment act is called the anti-defection law.
Under article102(2) and article 191(2), a member is disqualified from either house of the
parliament or state legislatures, respectively, if he or she is disqualified under the tenth
schedule . 

This schedule has eight paragraphs- the first paragraph sets out the definitions of the terms
used in the schedule . paragraph two of the schedule sets out two grounds for disqualification
of the members of the legislature. It states that a member would be liable to be disqualified
from the membership if they voluntarily give up his or her membership or votes or abstains
from voting in the house against the direction issued by the chief of the party under whose
banner he or she was elected, and the political party has not condoned such an abstention or
voting within 15 days counted from the date of voting or abstention. It further provides for
12
Id.at 10
13
The Constitution of India, 1950, Tenth Schedule, inserted via the constitution ( fifty-second amendment) act,
1985 (w.e.f March 3rd, 1985).

15
the disqualification of an independent candidate who joins any political party after getting
elected to the legislature. However, it gives a window period of six months for the nominated
members to join any political party. Following this, any change in the membership would be
seen as defection. 

Paragraph three of the tenth schedule as it originally stood stated that in cases where there is
a split in the original party, and at least one-third of members of the original party is in favor
of the split, then no disqualification would be incurred. This entire paragraph was omitted
from the tenth schedule by the constitution 91st amendment act 2003.  

Paragraph four provides protection from disqualification under paragraph 2, where the
original political party merges with another political party and the members claim that they
have become members of such political party formed out of such merger or have not accepted
the merger and have opted to function as a separate group. In such cases, the members would
not incur disqualification. 

The fifth paragraph sets out exemptions for the speaker, deputy speaker, chairman, and
deputy chairman of a house as they are allowed to give up the membership of their respective
parties after being elected to the office of the speaker. 

Paragraph six of the schedule provides that the chairman or the speaker shall be the final
authority to decide the question of disqualification of a particular member of the house. The
duty of the chairman or the speaker is to find out the relevant facts. Once the facts have been
collected, or it can be inferred from such facts that the act committed by the alleged members
fall within the ambit of para 2(1), (2), (3) of the tenth schedule , then disqualification will
become applicable, and the speaker or the chairman as the case may be will have to take a
decision to that effect. 

Paragraph seven of the tenth schedule is a finality clause that excludes the jurisdiction of
courts in respect of any matter coming under the tenth schedule .

Since the speaker or the chairman acts as a quasi-judicial authority under paragraph 6, the
fairness rule dictates that the member who is guilty of defection should be given an
opportunity to put across his stand. However, where a member has not suffered any
prejudice, the claim of violation of the natural justice principle will not be maintained. 

16
In Maha Chandra Prasad Singh versus chairman Bihar legislative council 14, the member
who belonged to Indian National Congress (INC) was alleged to have incurred
disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the tenth schedule by contesting elections as an
independent candidate. The chairman, in this case, relied on the letter given by the chief of
the Indian National Congress (INC) in the council, which stated that that the particular
member had stopped being a member of their party for going against the party and contesting
the election as an independent candidate thereby breaking the party code of conduct. The
petitioner admitted these facts in his writ petition and did not dispute the same. In the light of
the facts in the above case, the non-supply of the copy of the letter to the member seemed not
to cause any prejudice to him and was therefore not held to be violative of the principle of
natural justice. 

 In Kihoto Holohan's case15, the constitutional validity of the act was challenged. While
explaining the objectives behind the tenth schedule , the supreme court high lighted the roles
of political parties in the political process. The court explained that when elections are held, a
party goes before the electorate with their manifesto, which enlists their programs and
policies. It sets up its eligible candidates to contest elections and deals with all the expenses
incurred in the process; therefore, such candidates can be rightly set to be elected on the basis
of the party manifesto. The political propriety and morality underlying tent schedule ,
therefore, demands that if such a candidate, who gets elected as a member of a political party
subsequently changes his party and joins another party after the election, then such candidate
should lose his original seat in the legislature and contest by-election again under the banner
of the new party adopted by him. The court by 3:2 majority upheld the constitutional validity
of the law but at the same time held that the speaker's decision to disqualify the member
under the tenth schedule cannot escape judicial review and will be subjected to it whenever
needed. The majority stated that the tenth schedule 's main objective is to curb the evil of the
unprincipled and unethical practice of political defection. paragraph seven of anti-defection
law, which bars judicial review, directly affects articles 136, 226, and 227 of the constitution.
Thus, in accordance with article 368(2) of the constitution, for such a law to be valid, it
should be ratified by half of the state legislature. As it has not been so ratified, it is invalid. 

14
(2004) 8 SCC 747

15
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors, AIR 1993 SC 412.

17
The court, through its majority, further explained that paragraph seven contains provisions
that are independent and can stand separate from the main provision included therein.
paragraph seven should be severed from the remaining provisions, which are complete in
themselves and should stand valid. The majority judges ruled that the speaker under
paragraph six acts as a tribunal while deciding on the rights and liabilities and therefore, their
decision would be subject to judicial review under article 136, 226, and 227 and that the
jurisdiction of courts cannot be taken away by the finality clause included in the schedule .
However, the majority also made it clear that judicial review shall not arise prior to the final
decision of the speaker or the chairman. "The only exception for any interlocutory
interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have
grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequences." Thus, prior to the final
adjudication by the speaker or the chairman, judicial review is possible on two grounds a)
speaker suspending or taking action during the pendency of disqualification proceeding, and
b) grave immediate irreversible repercussions. The majority has also affirmed that the
speaker's decision can be questioned in judicial review on the grounds of 

A. Jurisdictional error based on violation of constitutional mandate, 

B.  Mala fides   

C. Non-compliance with rules of natural justice  

D.  Perversity. 

 On the other hand, the minority judges' view was that the consent of the president to the 52 nd
amendment was void and non-est as the bill was required to be ratified by half of the state
legislatures, and that had not been done. The bill was supposed to be presented to the
president only after such ratification by the state legislatures, and as the constitution was
amended not in accordance with article 368(2), the doctrine of severability could not apply to
the 52nd amendment act. Further, it was observed that the speaker could not be given the sole
responsibility of an arbiter in the defection cases as it would go against the basic structure of
the constitution. As the speaker functions continuously on the support of the majority party in
the house, so he cannot be regarded as an independent authority, and making him the sole
arbiter in defection cases would amount to a violation of the principle of natural justice. 

"The minority judges observed democracy forms a part of the basic structure of the
constitution and free and fair elections with provisions for resolution of disputes relating to

18
the same and those relating to subsequent disqualification by an autonomous body outside the
house are essential features of the democratic system in our constitution. Accordingly,
independent adjudicatory machinery for resolving disputes relating to the competence of
members of the house is envisaged as an attribute of this basic feature." 16

The apex court has, in various cases, interpreted different provisions of the law in different
ways in different cases. For example, the law provides a member to be disqualified if he or
she voluntarily gives up his or her membership; however, in Ravi s Naik v. Union of India 17,
the apex court interpreted that in the absence of formal resignation by the member, the giving
up of membership can be inferred by his conduct. In G. Viswanath v. Honorable speaker
Tamil Nadu legislative assembly18 and Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prashad Maurya &
Ors,19 the supreme court ruled that members who publicly express opposition to their own
party or publicly demonstrate support for another party shall be deemed to have resigned.

In the wake of recent past years, incidents in Karnataka, Goa, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh,
and several other states where extensive horse-trading toppled the democratically elected
governments in these states; display a blatant abuse of the law by the political parties for their
greed. Ironically, changes in the government have also, in some cases, involved a change of
speaker, thereby indicating a blatantly partisan manner as regards the issue of testing the
legality or illegality of defection, dictated largely by whether the defectors were changing
over to the speaker's party. This biased conduct has raised questions on the dignity of the
office, which is precisely the reason why their decisions are challenged in the court of law.
Apart from this, the law does not mention a time frame for the presiding officer to finally
decide on a disqualification petition. As the courts cannot intervene before the presiding
officer has given the final decision on the matter, the petitioner seeking disqualification has
no other option but to wait for the final adjudication by the speaker. There have been many
cases in this regard where the courts have expressed concern about the unreasonable delay in
deciding such petitions. In this context, it becomes imperative to critically analyze the tenth
schedule , its objectives, and to what extent they stand fulfilled.

1.5 Research problem

16
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors, AIR 1993 SC 412.

17
1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641: AIR 1994 SC 1558.
18
(1996) 2 SCC 353.
19
AIR 2007 SC 1305.

19
The working out of the law in recent years clearly suggests the law has failed to achieve its
purpose. The anti-defection Law, when it was passed, it had aimed at bringing down the
unethical political defections, but due to ever-increasing political dishonesty and power-
hungry legislator, this law failed to achieve its desired goals. Politicians found loopholes in
this law and used it for their own personal benefit.

The law and its subsequent interpretation by the supreme court have made the provisions too
wide. It considers the expression of dissatisfaction and strongly worded opinions against the
party leadership as defection. It restricts the internal democracy within political parties, which
prevents a member from expressing dissatisfaction against party leadership and policies. This
law also indirectly stops a legislator from voting in line with his conscience, judgment, and
interests of his electorate which impedes the oversight function of the legislature over the
government by ensuring that members cast votes based on the decisions taken by the party
chiefs and not what their electorate would like them to vote for, this weakens the vertical
accountability of the legislators to their constituencies.

1.6 Scope of the study

The process of defection has continued to formant political instability and electoral volatility.
The law, as contained in the tenth schedule , is replete with challenges and has failed to
achieve its desired goals as the same law is being misused by the politicians and political
parties to carry out defections. This research seeks to find out the defects in the existing anti-
defection law by analyzing its provisions in the light of various incidents of defections and
various judicial decisions.

Political parties are considered to be drivers of engineering defections and destabilizing the
elected governments. The study, therefore, in addition to focussing on the immediate,
palpable concern of defection, also deals with a deeper analysis of the dissent within a
political party, which is necessary to unravel the fundamental factors that create breeding
grounds for defection. The study also suggests changes to revamp the anti-defection
legislation to make it more effective and stringent without eroding the democratic fabric of
the country.

1.7 The objective of the study

The objectives of the research are :

1. To identify and study the emerging issues and challenges faced by anti defection law.

20
 2. To study anti defection laws in other countries and identify if provisions could be
drawn upon, with or without modifications.

3. To suggest recommendations to make the law efficient in curbing defection and

establishing political democracy.

1.8 Hypothesis

1. The law has failed to keep a check on the rampant defection.

2. There is gradual erosion of democracy at the hands of the provisons of tenth schedule of
the constitution.

1.9 Research Questions

1. Is the current anti-defection law effectively preventing horse-trading in India and

other similar anti-democratic experiences?

2. What is the extent of judicial review of the speaker's decision?

3. Does the law restrict the internal democracy of political parties, such as freedom of
expression and right to dissent?

4. Are there any changes in the anti defection law to ensure the internal democratic
practices of political parties?

1.12 Methodology
The method used in the study is doctrinal research involving the interpretation of relevant
primary and secondary sources of law and synthesizing those sources to suggest ways in
which the law should develop. The researcher has collected information and data through
secondary sources like books, websites, articles, journals, judgments, and internet sources.

1.11 Chapters

The first chapter, titled ‘Introduction’ , gives an introduction to the whole study. It gives a
succinct introduction to the topic, statement of the problem, the scope of study of the topic,

21
research questions, objectives of the study, study hypothesis, and methodology adopted for
the study.

The second chapter, titled ‘Anti Defection law And Horse Trading’, deals with the definition
and in-depth analysis of the causes of horse trading. It further examines the provisions of
anti-defection law in the light of increasing horse-trading incidents. It explains how the
provisions of law can be misused by political parties and politicians to achieve selfish goals.

The third chapter, titled ‘Anti Defection Law And Curtailment Of Dissent’, analyses how
anti-defection law provisions suppress descent and erode the working of internal democracy
within the political parties by giving unlimited power to party bosses to issue whips, thus
going against the ideals envisaged in our constitution.

The fourth chapter, titled ‘Anti Defection Law In Other Countries ‘, deals with a comparative
study and analyses the anti-defection law prevalent in advanced democracies, neighboring
developing countries, and other undeveloped countries.

The fifth chapter deals with conclusions, findings, and suggestions drawn by the researcher.

1.12 Survey of Literature

Anti-Defection Law And Parliamentary Privileges (1993). By Subhash C. Kashyap. Nm.

Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bom: The book is an excellent treatise by Subhash C. Kashyap and seeks
to investigate and decipher the provisions of the tenth schedule to assess the working of the
anti-defection law; and also identifies the basic flaws in the current law. The author defines
defection as indicating the "relinquishment of reliability, obligation or rule or of one's leader
or cause." Chapter I succinctly describes earlier ways of checking defection. Chapter II is
essentially dedicated to an analysis of the supreme court's decision in Kihoto-Holloon versus
Zachillu. Chapter III and IV give exceptionally helpful data about the occurrences of political
defections in different state councils and the Lok Sabha. The author accommodatingly
clarifies how in specific states like Nagaland, Mizoram, Tamil Nadu, Manipur, Goa, and
Meghalaya, the legislatures were brought down through defections and how in some cases,
the speakers acted in a sectarian and impartial way. Chapter V named "The Case of the
Twenty in the Lok Sabha speaker’ deals with the provisions of split and merger. In Chapter
VI, named ‘Improving the Law: A case for Amending the tenth schedule’, the author brings
out a few ideas for transforming the anti-defection law, which as indicated by him was

22
carelessly raced through the two houses when the ruling party had a greater majority in the
Lok Sabha.20

G.C Malhotra in his treatise Anti-defection Law in India and the Commonwealth,21 has very
elaborately made a comparison of anti-defection laws in different countries. The treatise in
the beginning very succinctly explains the definition, history, and development of the law.
The author has dealt with the law in 65 countries, out of which 40 are Commonwealth
countries. The author additionally discusses the changes required and amendments made by
the parliament every now and then by investigating the experience of the world parliaments,
especially the Commonwealth. The book also discusses various cases on defection, drawing
incidents from parliament and state legislatures in India.  

 Dharmadan N, climate choice of the speaker of the lawmaking body justiciable, AIR, March
2004, Issue No.03, pp.81-85. This article discusses the various provisions of the anti-
defection law in detail and discusses the various decisions rendered by the apex court in this
regard. The speaker of the house is a constitutional authority, and whether his decision on
disqualification is amenable to the judicial review of the supreme court and various high
courts has been explicitly dealt with in this article.22

 Karthick Khanna and Dhvani shah, Anti-Defection law: a Death toll for parliamentary
Dissent: The article contends that constitutional amendment is required to paragraph 2(1)(b),
which should only allow members who defy party whip to be disqualified very restrictively.
The article argues that the wide terminologies used in the provisions pave the way for power
to be misused by higher echelons of the party by overlooking the freedom of speech and
conscience of members which are totally influenced and not permitting them to work in light
of a legitimate concern for individuals who got them elected. Thus, it is undemocratic.23

 Nitika Bagaria and Vedika Shah, 'Decoding Intra-Party Dissent: The Lawful Undoing of
constitutional Machinery: This article discusses in detail how the provisions of the tenth
schedule impede intra-party dissent and takes away the right to conscience of members to
represent the will of their constituency, and reduce their role to a mere rubber stamp in the

20
Kashyap S.C., Anti-defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges, NM Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, ISBN: 81-
7118-054-X.( 1993).
21
G.C.Malhotra, Anti Defection In India And The Common Wealth, Metropolitan Book Co.Pvt Ltd ( 2005 ).
22
Dharmadan N, climate choice of the speaker of the lawmaking body justiciable, 81 AIR Issue No.03 85
(2004).
23
Karthick Khanna and Dhvani shah, Anti-Defection law: a Death toll for parliamentary Dissent? , NUJS Law
Rev. Vol.103,.103-112 (2012).

23
hands of political parties. The authors have also discussed in this article how to improve the
law by digging into the practices followed in other countries in this regard.24 

24
Nitika Bagaria and Vedika Shah, 'Decoding Intra-Party Dissent: The Lawful Undoing of constitutional
Machinery? 7(2) NLUJ L Rev 115 (2021).

24
 Chapter 2

Anti Defection law And Horse Trading

2.1 Horse Trading

The term horse-trading was brought into use in the early 1800s. It owes its roots to the
infamous tactics of horse traders who purchased and sold horses.25 Macmillan English
Dictionary defines it as a troublesome and sometimes unscrupulous negotiation between two
people trying to reach an agreement. In political terminology, it is a long process involving
negotiations portrayed by hard bargaining and settlements. It is often practiced in democratic
institutions like legislatures when a parliamentarian or lawmaker upholds some Bill or trust
vote for his personal gains.

Representative democracy, which is consistently thought of as an appropriate type of

government for exceptionally populous-cum-diverse nations like India, is essentially
embraced to ensure proper representation based on popular sovereignty and secure an
equitable and relentless voice of the electorate in the government. The quintessence of any
democracy lies in having different political parties having their separate set of ideologies. The
presence of one single party might lead to autocracy, which is the antithesis of democracy.
However, the haste with which parties in opposition seek to capture the power is a serious
problem which the Indian political system has been experiencing for quite a long time. This
issue of political defection, propelled by political and financial bait offered by opposition
parties popularly called 'Horse Trading,' before the completion of the tenure of the ruling
party, is representing an imposing obstacle before the democratic system of India.26

Once the election process is complete and the results have been declared, the formation of
government takes the form of a game of manipulation of public opinion. It occurs more often
in the case of a coalition government as well as a government that has secured a very less
majority. Only that party can form the government, which is able to prevent any type of
political defection, resignation, etc. For this purpose, parties nowadays commonly turn to

25
VK Handa, What Is The Origin Of Horse Trading, T.O.I, (May.22nd , 2021, 10:00 PM),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes/ what-is-the-origin-of-the-term-horse-trading/3286161.cms.
26
Hardik Batra, Defection And Horse Trading In Indian Politics: Constitutional Framework And Challenges,
H.Y.D.R.A, ( May.22nd , 2021, 10:00 PM), https:// hydratrust.in/defection-and-horse-trading-in-indian-politics-
constitutional-framework-and-challenges/.

25
'Resort Politics,' where the party keeps its members at a hotel or resort under tight security to
prevent any manipulation.

27
The tenth schedule under paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 provided an exception to
disqualification on the grounds of defection by incorporating the concept of split and merger
of political parties in the following words-

" 3. Disqualification on the ground of defection is not to apply in case of a split. 28- Where a
member of a house makes a claim that he and any other members of his legislature party
constitute the group representing as a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his
original political party and such group consists of not less than one-third of the members of
such legislature party,-

(a) he shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 on the ground-

(i) that he has voluntarily given up the membership of his original political party; or

(ii) that he has voted or abstained from voting in such house contrary to any direction issued
by such party or by any person or authority authorized by it in that behalf without obtaining
the prior permission of such party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not
been condoned by such party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such
voting or abstention; and

(b) from the time of such split, such faction shall be deemed to be the political party to which
he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 and to be his original
political party for the purposes of this paragraph.

4. Disqualification on the ground of defection is not to apply in case of a merger.-(1) A

member of a house shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 where
his original political party merges with another political party, and he claims that he and any
other members of his original political party-

(a) have become members of such other political party or, as the case may be, of a new
political party formed by such merger; or

27
The Constitution of India, 1950, Tenth Schedule, inserted via the constitution ( fifty-second amendment) act,
1985 (w.e.f March 3rd, 1985).
28
Paragraph 3 omitted by the constitution ( ninety-first amendment) act, 2003, sec. 5(c) ( w.e.f. Jan 1, 2004).

26
(b) have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group, and from the
time of such merger, such other political party or new political party or group, as the case
may be, shall be deemed to be the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-
paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 and to be his original political party for the purposes of this
sub-paragraph.

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the merger of the original
political party of a member of a house shall be deemed to have taken place if, and only if, not
less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such
merger."

Though earlier anti-defection law was successful in curbing individual defections, but
because of the provision of exemption from disqualification in case of split as provided in
paragraphs 3, it failed to check upon bulk defections. On account of this destabilizing effect
on the government, paragraph 3 received severe criticisms, and therefore the parliament,
following the recommendations of experts committees and commission, omitted paragraph
329 from the tenth schedule by the constitution (ninety-first amendment) act, 2003. It also
accepted the recommendations that a turncoat ought to be punished for his defection by
suspending him from holding any open office as a minister or some other gainful political
post for at least the remaining tenure of current legislature or until the following fresh
election, whichever is prior.30 The parliament, through the same amendment, also introduced
that the absolute number of ministers, forming the council of ministers combining the chief
minister in a state shall not surpass fifteen percent, thereby amended articles 75 and 164 of
the Indian constitution. This was done to curb the practice of Horse trading on account of
profitable gains and remunerative posts.

Despite the law, unbridled political defection characterized by horse-trading and

acquiescence of members of the ruling coalition or ruling party is lamentably an ordinary
action in India. members of the ruling party are lured by offering a gigantic measure of cash
and relatively high er post in exchange for them deserting their political party.

29
Dinesh Goswami Committee , The Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990), 170th Report of the Law
Commission of India, Reform of Electoral Laws (1999), and the National Commission to Review the Working
of the Constitution of India (NCRWC) in its report of 2002, recommended abolition of said paragraph 3 of the
tenth schedule relating to exemption from disqualification in cases pf split from the constitution.
30
The NCRWC was of the view that a defector should be punished for his action by prohibiting him from taking
charge as a Minister of any public office or any other profitable political post for at a minimum period that is
the remaining term of the existing Legislature or until the time of next fresh elections whichever is earlier

27
Some politicians who enter politics merely for gaining money and become representatives
with the help of muscle powers accompanied by the criminalization of politics and
politicization of crooks are easily swayed because of the satisfaction of their craving for
profitable posts and getting a major measure of cash. Thus the dread of cancellation of
membership of the concerned legislature has no impact on such representatives.

The defectors have devised new and unique methods of bypassing the anti-defection law over
time. Rather than casting a ballot against their political party in the confidence motion or
officially crossing the floor, the legislators nowadays essentially leave the party membership,
which cuts down the complete strength of the house, and in this manner, disturbs the ruling
government. Whenever the next by-elections are held, the same MLAs are set up as
candidates on the tickets of opposition parties and return to the assembly. This technique has
to a great extent, been effective in toppling state governments in the recent past.

Horse- Trading though difficult to be proved as such, is significant cause running behind the
political defections and can be inferred from the breaking down of governments carried on by
the opposition parties by taking in the members of the ruling party into their party. Such
incidents which happened in Indian states in the recent past are explained below.

2.1.1 Karnataka

In the 15th Karnataka legislative assembly, though the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the
single largest party, its attempt to form the government was not successful. A coalition
government of Indian National Congress (INC) and Janta Dal Secular (J.D. (S)) was formed
under the leadership of Mr. Kumaraswamy. 31This Congress-JD(S) government in Karnataka
led by H.D. Kumaraswamy was brought down in July 2019 as 17 of their MLAs resigned and
joined the BJP. The crisis started on July 1st with the resignations tendered by Vijayanagara
MLA Anand Singh and Gokak MLA Ramesh Jarkiholi. Ramesh was already suspended from
Congress for alleged anti-party activities. Within a week, about thirteen more MLAs from
Congress and J.D. (S) resigned. They were reportedly camping in Mumbai in the security of
the BJP-led government in the state. However, the speaker of the assembly did not take any
decision on the resignation of the above persons. In a counter-offensive move after the MLAs
resigned, striking a blow to the 13-months-old government, a group of Congress leaders

31
Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly and others,W.P (CIVIL) NO.
992 of (2019).

28
approached speaker K R Ramesh Kumar and presented the petition seeking, under the tenth
schedule , disqualification of the rebel legislators. As the resignations of aggrieved MLAs
were not accepted, and the trust vote was impending, most of the MLAs approached the apex
court alleging that the speaker has failed in his constitutional duty and is intentionally
procrastinating the acceptance of their resignations. The bench headed by then Ranjan
Gogoi, C.J., issued a direction to the speaker to take a decision in the matter of resignations
forthwith and further directed the same to be laid before this court. The speaker, on his part,
refused to be pushed around by the court's direction, and argued that he had the
constitutional duty under article 190(3)(b) to ensure that the resignations were voluntary and
genuine, and that the rebel MLAs are not attempting to avoid disqualification by giving in
resignations and that the speaker has to enquire on whether they have incurred
disqualification as per anti-defection clauses under tenth schedule of the constitution, which
cannot be done in a hurried fashion. Later, a whip was issued by the INC and the J.D. (S) on
12.07.2019, directing their members to attend proceedings, and cautioning the members of
disqualification if they failed to attend the same. After an extensive hearing, the court had on
July 17th directed the speaker of the house to decide on the applications of resignations by
the fifteen members of the house "within such time period as the hon'ble speaker may
consider adequate". The speaker thereupon issued urgent notices between 18.07.2019 to
20.07.2019 to all the MLAs regarding the pending disqualification petitions to stand before
him on the date of hearing fixed (23.07.2019 and 24.07.2019). Later, the INC on 20.07.2019
again issued a whip requiring their members of the legislative assembly to attend the
proceedings of the house on 22.07.2019. The trust vote was finally taken up for consideration
on 23.07.2019. The rebel MLAs did not attend the house. As a result, the INC and J.D. (S)
coalition government, under the leadership of Mr. Kumaraswamy, was in the minority,
resulting in the resignation of Mr. Kumaraswamy as chief minister. Following the trust vote,
the then speaker disqualified the MLAs, ruling that they ceasde to be the members with
immediate effect till the expiry of the term of the assembly (in 2023). 32

The supreme court seconded the decision of the former Karnataka assembly speaker to
disqualify 17 rebel MLAs on the ground of defection. However, it also held that the duration

32
Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly and others,W.P (CIVIL) NO.
992 of (2019).

29
of disqualification could not be till the end of the term of the house and permitted the MLAs
to file nominations for the by-polls.33

2.1.2 Manipur

The election for the eleventh Manipur legislative assembly was conducted in March 2017.
The said assembly election results delivered an uncertain outcome as none of the political
parties won a clear majority with 31 seats in a legislative assembly of 60 seats to form the
government. The Indian National Congress ( INC) arose as the single biggest political party
with 28 seats. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came next with 21 seats. Thounaojam
Shyamkumar contested election as a candidate on the ticket of Congress party and was duly
elected from his constituency representing the congress party. On 12.03.2017, following the
declaration of results, Thounaojam Shyamkumar, alongside other BJP representatives, met
the governor of the state of Manipur to stake a claim for forming a BJP-led government. On
15.03.2017, the governor welcomed the group lead by the BJP to form the government in the
State. Around the same time, the chief minister-designate sent out a letter to the governor for
regulating oath as ministers to eight chosen MLAs, including Thounaojam Shyamkumar, and
on the same day, he was appointed as a minister in the BJP-led government. Between April
and July 2017, as many as thirteen petitions for his disqualification were sent before the
speaker of the Manipur legislative assembly expressing that he was excluded under passage
2(1)(a) of the tenth schedule . Thereafter, no action was taken by the speaker on the above
petitions. Due to this inaction of the hon'able speaker, the aggrieved party filed a writ petition
in the high court of Manipur and asked the high court to direct the hon'able speaker to
decide on the disqualification within a reasonable time period. On 08.09.2017, the high
court refused to interfere in the matter, stating that the issue regarding whether the high
court can direct a speaker to decide disqualification petition within a certain time span is
forthcoming before a bench of 5 hon'ble judges of the supreme court, and till then the high
court can't pass any order.34

Later, The supreme court held that the high court erred in holding that the issue in regard to
the court's ability to give direction to speaker was forthcoming. The bench said that the issue
was explicitly answered in 2007 in Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swamy Prasad Maurya 35,
33
Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly and others, 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 1454.
34
Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. the Hon'ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors, SLP (CIVIL)
NO.18659 (2019)
35
AIR 2007 SC 1305.

30
wherein it was held that the inability on the part of the speaker to exercise his jurisdiction
would attract the court's power of judicial review. The court further explained that the
speaker is a quasi-judicial authority who is bound by law to take a final decision within a
reasonable time; and such reasonable time should obviously be a time should be less than
five years since the tenure of the house is five years.On 21.01.2020, a three-judge supreme
court bench headed by Justice Nariman opined that the act of voluntary giving up of the
membership of a political party may be expressed or implied by conduct, 36 and that the
unequivocal conduct of Thounaojam Shyamkumar of becoming a minister in a BJP-ruled
government after winning the election on the ticket of the Congress Party would make it clear
that the disqualification contained in paragraph 2(1)(a) of the tenth schedule is clearly
attracted. The bench further held that the speaker of the legislative assembly should give
final decision on the petition seeking disqualification of a member under the tenth schedule
of the constitution within a reasonable period of three months, in the absence of exceptional
reasons and on this note directed the speaker to decide the disqualification petitions within
four weeks. On 18.03.2020, when the hon'able speaker failed to comply with the deadlines
given one after the other, the apex court, in its rare move, invoked its plenary power under
article 142 and ordered forthwith removal of Thounaojam Shyamkumar from the cabinet and
restrained him from entering the assembly till further orders. Following this order, the
speaker disqualified him on the grounds of defection.37

2.1.3 Telangana

A few months after elections were conducted for the Telangana assembly in December 2018,
12 of the Congress party's 19 MLAs and four members of legislative Council (MLCs)
announced the merging of the political party into the ruling Telangana Rashtra Samithi
(TRS), which had won 88 out of the 119 assembly seats. This merging of the Congress
legislature party (CLP) with the state's ruling Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) gave a major
setback to the national Congress party and robbed it of its opposition status in the state.
Following the notification, the legislature secretariat in June 2019, on behalf of the assembly
speaker, issued a bulletin recognizing the merger without acting on a petition filed by
Congress seeking to disqualify those members.38
36
Ravi.S.Nayak V. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641: AIR 1994 SC 1558.
37
Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. the Hon'ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors, 2020 SCC
Online SC 55.
38
C.R.Sukumar, Telangana Speaker Okays 12 Congress MLAS’plea For A Tie-Up With TRS, ET Bureau,
( Jun.7th , 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com news/politics-and-nation/telangana-speaker-okays-12-
congress-mlas-plea-for-tie-up-with-trs/articleshow/69684784.cms.

31
Later, the constitutional validity of this bulletin issued by the speaker allowing the merger of
12 legislators with the ruling TRS was challenged by Telangana-Pradesh Congress
Committee ( TPCC) president N Uttam Kumar Reddy and CLP leader Mallu Bhatti
Vikramarka before the Telangana high court. Subsequently, the court served notices on the
Telangana state assembly speaker Pocharam Srinivas Reddy for assenting to the "merger" of
a group of 12 Congress MLAs with the TRS. The court further served notices on the
assembly secretary, the election commission of India, and the 12 MLAs who had announced
that they had merged the CLP with the TRS legislature party, as they constituted two-thirds
of the party strength in the assembly. On 13.03.2021, as the court did not receive any counter-
affidavits to two notices served in June 2019, a division bench, comprising Chief Justice
Hima Kohli and Justice B. Vijaysen Reddy again served notices on the state legislative
assembly and council, demanding an explanation within four weeks on how 12 MLAs and
four MLCs elected on Congress tickets were allowed to join the ruling Telangana Rashtra
Samithi without relinquishing their legislator posts 39. Following this, nothing has been done
in this case up till now.

2.1.4 Uttarakhand

In 2019, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had recorded an First Information Report
(FIR) against former Uttarakhand chief minister Harish Rawat and his then cabinet minister
Harak Singh Rawat, who is currently a member of the state's BJP-led government, for alleged
attempts at engaging in horse-trading in 2016, which got recorded on a tape by an editor of a
news channel40.

The agency had conducted a preliminary investigation into the alleged horse-trading attempt
on March 23rd, 2016, when the state was put under the president's rule. It sent the recorded
tape to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Gandhinagar in Gujarat, for examination, which
reported that the tape was "certified" and there was no proof of any
"expansion/cancellation/addition/altering/transforming" in the video documents.The video

39
Srinivasan Rao Apparasu, High Court Notice To Telangana Speaker, 12 Congress Mlas On Merger With
TRS, India News,(June.12th , 2019), https://hindustantimes.com/ india-news/high -court-notice-to-telangana-
speaker-12-congress-mlas-on-merger-with-trs/story-RAfA4sq4jyd83fYnWlmguM.html.

40
Vineet Upadhyay, CBI books former Uttarakhand CM Harish Rawat in horse-trading case, The New Indian
Express, (Oct.23rd, 2019), https:// www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/oct/23/cbi-books-former-
uttarakhand-cm-harish-rawat-in-horse-trading-case-2051910.html

32
purportedly showed the Congress chief talking about cash to win back the support of
disgruntled MLAs who had moved over to the BJP so that he could get back to power. Later,
the Uttarakhand high court gave its consent to the CBI to proceed further with its
investigation in the case and file an FIR against Rawat after the agency furnished a report in a
sealed cover on the preliminary investigation. Besides Harish Rawat and Harak Singh Rawat,
who joined the BJP later and is presently a minister in the Trivender Singh Rawat-led cabinet,
the CBI also booked editor-in-chief of Noida-based Samachar Plus channel Umesh Sharma,
who had purportedly carried out the sting operation in the airport lounge. The CBI slapped
the Indian Penal Code section pertaining to criminal conspiracy and bribery provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act on the trio.41

Over the past decade, new challenges have been coming up. For the lure of offices and
different contemplations known to all, MLAs have begun jumping on to a trip to some distant
hotel where they are held under close security even from their relatives and afterward made
to send in resignations "voluntarily." These resignations are essentially to avoid the tenth
schedule , which otherwise would have been drawn in the event of group non-attendance.
However, such truancy doesn't draw in the tenth schedule in the event of the election of
Rajya Sabha. Such a circumstance may likewise bring forth the notorious act of kidnappings
or political homicides as found in history across the jurisdictions to compel truancy.

It is interesting to note that the MLAs who resign contest by-elections on the political party
ticket, which profits by the resignations from their earlier connection. Truth be told, a ton of
such leaving MLAs are granted imperative services in the recently shaped government, at
times promptly and in some cases on the off chance that they effectively win the by-polls as
its candidate. Such practices have made resignations an incredible asset for elected legislators
to carry out remuneration bargains within their political party and, if the need be, with the
party in opposition which is already power-hungry42.

Such practices mock the current democratic constitutional setup and deride the mandate of
the general public. They seriously tend to play a fraud by bringing in a lost party to power, as
41
Special Correspondent, CBI books ex-Uttarakhand CM Harish Rawat, others on graft charge, The Hindu,
(Oct.23rd , 2019 17:11 IST), https://www.thehindu.comnews/national/other-states/harish-rawat-case/
article29777590.ece.

42
Ajay Gupta & Aryan Gupta,Defecating The Defection Law: A Tale Of Strategic Resignations, The SCC
Online Blog,(May,26th , 2021, 8:30 PM), https:// www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/07/25/defecating-the-
defection-law-a-tale-of-strategic-resignations/.

33
against the desires of the governed. One may contend that there isn't anything amiss with
such practices since, supposing that the rebel MLA is re-elected in the by-poll under an
alternate party, it would be automated endorsement of the defection. However, this is a
fraudulent contention; dissident MLA, previously having been a part of a successful
campaign, has a reasonable advantage as against any other applicant which the defected party
will set up for that electorate. In this way, defection in any case via resignation is a
misrepresentation of the trust of the public, which places such a candidate in power by the
righteousness of his association to a specific political party.43

Pundits may likewise contend that individuals vote in favor of the up-and-comer, in light of
his individual merits as a public figure rather than on the basis of the political party to which
he/she is associated. Anyway, this holds great only in principle. It is notable that in every
political election, a symbol is allocated to each candidate according to the provisions included
in Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968. Such symbols might be either
reserved or free. 'Reserved Symbol' is reserved for a recognized political party and can only
be allotted to candidates set up by that political party, and 'Free Symbol' is a symbol for up-
and-comers other than those representing the political parties. A recognized political party
implies either a national party or a state party. A definite technique is given in law for the
acknowledgment of a national and state party. Thus, a person can contest election under the
'Reserved Symbol' only when he is set up as a candidate by a 'Recognised Party.' Thus, it can
be perceived from the above that a candidate of a recognized party gets the privilege of
contesting an election under the symbol of a recognized party44.

In our parliamentary democracy, political parties play an important role. The tenth schedule
to the constitution perceives the significance of the political parties in a democratic based
setup. It is open for the parliament to provide that the members of the political party elected
under the party banner act according to the directions issued by the party and not against it.

It is, in fact, an advantage for a candidate set up by a recognized political party that he gets
votes dependent on the popularity of his party, including the altruism of star campaigners of
the political party who solicited votes in favor of that competitor. The political party incurs
huge expenditures on account of election campaigns for the candidate. The candidates are
additionally profited by the philosophy of the political groups, which is reflected in their

43
Id.
44
Id.

34
election manifesto that plays a crucial role in soliciting votes in elections. Hence, it is not just
the candidate, but it is also the political party that is put to the vote of electors. In the event
that the opposite views were to be accepted, there would not be any distinction in the
achievement rate between the candidates put up by political parties and independent
competitors.

Throughout the entire existence of parliamentary elections in India preceding the 2019 Lok
Sabha elections, a sum of 44,962 independent candidates have contested polls; however, just
222 of them have won to become member of parliament (M.P.), delivering a simple 0.49%
possibility of accomplishment45. In the first political elections in 1951, where 37 independent
candidates won, the number has tumbled down to 3 in the 2014 elections. These always
declining figures even incited the election commission and law commission to suggest that
independent candidates should be suspended from contesting elections by and large. 46
Therefore, it is very evident that people do vote for the symbol of political parties, and there
is not really any uncertainty concerning the imperative role political parties play in the
success of any candidate from any electorate. The supreme court has additionally observed
that political parties are sine qua non of parliamentary form government.47

Hence, recognized political parties are at a high er standing than an independent candidate,
due to which the claims of recognized political parties must be recognized upon the seat of
the concerned MLA, even in the event of a vacancy of the seat under any circumstance
(resignation, death, etc.), until the results of the by-polls are declared.

2.2 Role of the speaker in Augmenting Defection

The office of the speaker in legislatures occupies a pivotal role in our parliamentary
democracy. It has been believed of the speaker's office that even as the legislature members
represent separate constituencies, the speaker represents the absolute authority of the house
itself. He symbolizes the honor and strength of the house over which he is presiding.
Consequently, it's far predicted that the holder of this office of excessive dignity must be a
person who can fairly represent the house in all its manifestations48.

45
Ghazanfar Abbas, Since the 1st Elections, Only 0.49% of Independent Candidates Have Managed to Enter
Lok Sabha (news18.com).
46
Law Commission Of India, Electoral Reforms, ( Report No- 255, 2015) Chapter XVI.
47
Kuldip Nayar V. Union Of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1.
48
Correspondent,Office Of The Speaker Of Lok Sabha, (Jun.21st , 2021, 2:00
AM)),https://speakerloksabha.nic.in/roleofspeaker.

35
The responsibility vested in the speaker is so laborious that he cannot afford to neglect any
issue of parliamentary existence. His actions can be brought under scrutiny within the house
and extensively reported in the mass media. With the broadcasting of proceedings of the
legislature, the small screen brings to tens of millions of families in the country the daily
trends in the house, making the speaker's undertakings all the more critical.

Even though the speaker rarely speaks within the house, while he does, he speaks for the
house as a whole. The speaker is regarded as the natural guardian of the traditions of
parliamentary democracy. In India, broad powers are entrusted to the office of the speaker to
help him carry out smooth functioning of the parliamentary proceedings and for protecting
the independence and impartiality of the office via the constitution of the land, the rules of
procedure and conduct of business in legislatures and through the practices and conventions.49

Independence and impartiality of the speaker sine qua non of the speaker's office as it is
vested with great prestige, position, and authority. However, the office of the speaker has
been criticized over and over for being an agent of partisan politics. The supreme court raised
a similar allegation on the lack of confidence in the role of the speaker in matters of
impartiality in Jagjit Singh versus State of Haryana.50

In Kihoto Hollohan's case51, one of the judges observed that the doubt of predisposition on
the speaker's job couldn't be precluded as their election and tenure depends on the will of the
majority members of the house (or specifically of the ruling party). The speaker is considered
an impartial arbiter. But the conduct of speakers in the recent past has left much to be desired.
A lawmaker elected as speaker/chairman is permitted to resign from their party and rejoin the
party on the off chance that they might demit office. Be that as it may, speakers have
perpetually permitted themselves to be utilized for gain by their party or leader.

It appears from the recent toppling down of various governments in the past that defections
have become an easy affair. Lately, the legislators with the speaker are misusing the merger
52
clause enunciated in paragraph 4 of the tenth schedule to give effect to their ulterior
motives. To repeat the provision for reference - para 4 talks about an exemption from
disqualification on the ground of merger. It provides that where an original party merges with
49
Rishi Mishra, Power Of Speaker Of State Legislature In India, Legal Desire, ( Jun.21st ,2021, 2:00 AM),
https://legaldesire.com/power-of-speaker-of -state-legislature-in-india/.
50
(2006) 2 SCC 1.
51
Kihoto Hollohan V. Zachillhu & Ors, AIR 1993 SC 412.
52
Supra note 3.

36
another political party and a member claims that he and any other member of his original
political party have become members of such other political party formed after the merger or
of a new political party or; have refused to accept the merger and opted to function as a
separate group; then such member would not be liable for disqualification under sub-
paragraph (1) of paragraph (2).Such a merger of the political parties is considered valid only
and only if two-thirds or more members of the political party concerned have assented to
such a merger.

2.2.1 Detailing The 'Merger' Clause

It can be implied from the above reading of paragraph 4 that the provision was not to sanction
splits of the political party and regard such split as a merger of political parties. This
provision also does not express an independent standard for the valid merger of the political
party.

The provision aims to protect the elected representatives from disqualification if the original
political party to which they belonged merged with another political party and provides them
the freedom either to be a part of such merger or to operated separately from their group in
the house. If the MLAs or M.P.s choose to become part of the merger, then it is imperative
that the merger be valid only if it is supported by not less than two-thirds of such political
parties. The essential condition for a valid merger to get immunity from the anti-defection
law is the merger of the original political party into another political party 53. Not less than
two-thirds canon is the adequate condition for the merger of the legislature party. The merger
of less than two-thirds of a political party into any other political party or the establishment of
a new political party on such ground has no legal standing without the necessary condition
being satisfied.

It would be wrong to presume that the original political party on whose election symbol the
candidate contested and got elected as the representative has given an unlimited free pass to
their MLA to encash it with some other political party. It is awful to infer that a political
party stands merged into any other political party on the unrivaled premise that their chosen
MLAs have consented to something similar. Such a perusing isn't just outlandish and is even
impermissible as it humiliates the public picture and fame of the political party alongside
subverting public trust in it.

53
Shah Faruq Shabbir & Ors V. Govindrao Vasve & Ors, 2016 (5) MahLJ 436.

37
The first incident in Goa happened in March 2019, where two MLAs out of the three of the
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) revolted and merged the MGP into the BJP. Both
were granted ministerships, and one was even raised as deputy chief minister. The speaker
opened the chamber at midnight and acknowledged the split as merger. A disqualification
petition is forthcoming and gathering dust before the speaker.54

Recently, ten Congress MLAs gave a one-page correspondence to the speaker of the Goa
state assembly that their political party has merged with the BJP. In practically no time, under
the bearings of the speaker, the legislature department furnished seating arrangements to the
ten MLAs as was provided for the prior two MGP MLAs professing to have merged along
with the treasury benches. In other words, the speaker decided from the conduct of these ten
MLAs in the assembly that they belong to a political party other than the one who gave them
the ticket to contest the election and set them up as its candidates. This decision taken by the
speaker ought to be coming in the area of the quasi-judicial function exercised by the speaker
as is the plan set down under the tenth schedule of the constitution. In the event that the
speaker had made some other separate seating arrangements for the gathering of ten MLAs, it
could have been inferred as an impending determination, pending the use of mind on whether
the Congress Political party has merged and whether the same establish a legitimate merger.
In the current issue, the speaker offered a new identification to these ten MLAs and
recognized them as MLAs of the BJP on the declaration made by them. This was carried out
against the due process of law without even conducting a minimal fair hearing. The non-
application of mind is precisely illustrated in this case. It was evident from the direction
issued by the speaker that he assented to the merger. This decision by the speaker stems from
the quasi-judicial power vested in him by the provisions of the anti-defection law. Thus, as
such, these decisions of the speaker ought to be open for legal review by the court and can't
be covered as coming within a non-justiciable legislative region.55

It is a well-established precedent that the speaker as the head of legislature and being a
constitutional authority is not amenable to judicial review exercised by the courts. However,
such an interpretation is only limited to the area where the speaker is acting regarding the
authoritative business of the house, where the speaker is preeminent and last authority, but in
areas wherein the speaker is relied upon to work as a quasi-judicial authority such as under
54
Prabhakar Timble, Anti-Defection Law: A Tunnel of Darkness, Live law.in ( Jun.5th , 2021, 10:00 PM).
https://www.livelaw.in in/columns/anti-defection-law-a-tunnel-of-darkness-146522?infinitescroll=1.

55
Ibid.

38
the tenth schedule , it would welcome judicial review and the office of the speaker can not be
granted any special privilege in this regard. The pith and substance in these issues fall in the
domain of the tenth schedule , and the direction of the speaker making the seating
arrangement along with the treasury benches is per se a determination that the MGP and the
Congress party has merged into the BJP and that the merger is valid. The speaker might not
have expressed it explicitly in exact words. The implied decision is unambiguous and clear,
and nothing else could be construed from the same.56

The anti-defection law clearly states that the issue concerning disqualification or otherwise
under the tenth schedule is to be adjudicated by the speaker or the chairman. The courts can
exercise power of judicial review only after the final decision of the speaker, and any a priori
intervention is precluded57. The petition for disqualification of the two MGP MLAs is
forthcoming before the speaker. The inquiry which needs a new look is whether the speaker
has effectively settled on the issue by a series of actions and hearings and stamped that the
MLAs have not brought about any disqualification.

Taking a different circumstance, if it is assumed that at a similar pace, the speaker doesn't
consider the correspondence of merger from the revolutionary MLAs as valid and disqualifies
them from being members of the house in the absence of any pending petition for
disqualification. Under such a circumstance, almost certainly, the courts would allow interim
stay on the order of the speaker, awaiting the final disposal of the appeals by the aggrieved
members. Going by the same logic, it should be considered that the speaker has given his
decision consenting of the merger and that the questioned MLAs have been qualified as BJP
MLAs, and they cease to be the MLAs of their original political party under which they got
elected.58

Through his outright conduct, the speaker consented to the altered composition of the house,
which means there is nothing left to be called interim. Under this setting, the courts need to
accept the petition of the aggrieved from such an order of the speaker, as the same acts as a
conclusive 'unspeaking' order without following the standards of equity as needed from any
official acting judicially. On the off chance that the speaker had embraced some other choice,
presumably, it might have been regarded as an interim order.

56
Ibid.
57
Kihoto Hollohan V. Zachillhu & Ors, AIR 1993 SC 412.
58
Supra note 27.

39
The hands-off approach of the supreme court and high court under the guise of the
supremacy of the speaker being an established constitutional authority is altogether in regard
to all legislative process and work. Legal infringement would be ultra vires the constitution.
In any case, the same can't be valued in issues wherein the speaker deals with legal issues
where the judicial intervention is required. The political predisposition and party interests
can't be completely disassociated from the speaker. It is here wherein the courts are required
to step in on the case-to-case premise to keep up with the aims and objectives of the anti-
defection law in letter and soul. The current issue of the anti-defection law through the abuse
of the provision of a merger, which specifically talks about the merger of the ‘Original
political party’ and not a few members of that political party without having any legitimate
dissent within the party, calls for the immediate intervention of the courts. The object behind
the provision was not for MLAs to engineer defections for the greed of power and office and
continue to be protected under the merger clause. It was to protect the MLAs from
disqualification in case they wished not to join the merger of their original political party and
decide to split from such merger. Unless the high er judiciary intervenes and sets down
guidelines for the quasi-judicial authority, the speaker's activity or inaction will cultivate
illegality and misrepresentation on the tenth schedule .59

With the office of the speaker turning out to be sectarian, the dutifulness to the anti-defection
law is demonstrating bad and defiance pulls in benefits for the MLAs. With the emanation of
being a protected position and the 'sovereign' of the legislature, the speaker sits in the
authority with the false teeth given by the ruling political party to whom he belongs.

2.2.2 Judicial Review of speaker's decision

Just as a coin has two sides, distinguished jurists also have their distinguished views on this
subject. The first type is of the view that on careful analysis of the judicial decisions on the
anti-defection law, it has been made explicit by the supreme court in what is known as its
authoritative precedents that although the high court doesn't usually sit to review the
decision of the speaker, in some exceptional cases such as those involving malice, it can. 60
However, in cases where no final decision has been taken by the speaker, the question of
judicial review does not arise. To cruise further on this view, para 110 of the case Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu is stated:
59
Id.
60
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651; Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar
Legislative Council, (2004) 8 SCC 747.

40
110. Considering the restricted extent of judicial review that is available because of the ouster
clause included in para 6 and furthermore having respect to the constitutional intendment and
the provision which vests the adjudicatory power in the speaker/chairman, judicial review can
not be used at a phase before the final decision of the speaker/chairman and a quia timet
action would not be passable. Nor would any interference be admissible at an interlocutory
phase of the procedures. However, an exception must be made in regard to situations where
expulsion or suspension is ordered during the pendency of the procedures, and such
preclusion or suspension is probably going to have grave, prompt and irreversible
repercussions, and consequences.61

It can be induced from the above that the final adjudication, as well as quia timet actions, are
not allowed to be exercised by the courts. The term quia timet in a real sense signifies "in
light of the fact that he fears or apprehends." 62 It is equivalent to pre-emptive or prudent
action and, it would not be the right methodology given that no decision has been taken by
the appropriate authority under the schedule , not even interlocutory. The last part of the
passage essentially talks about an exemption for the said pre-emptive relief to be given in the
event the speaker disqualifies members as an interim measure, and no reverse way around is
possible. In the event that the opposite view is permitted, whereby the high court begins
conceding interim relief without there being a final decision by the speaker, then that action
would be hit by the settled rule of our constitution, in particular, separation of power that is
the autonomy of every organ of the government from each other. This would commensurate
to bypassing constitutional principles and would further add to the allegation of judicial
overreach, which the Indian courts are confronting today. The seeds of this specific idea
developed in Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi63 ( referred herein as the Haryana
assembly case). Adding further to the above contention, this school of thought states that
there could be some factual inquiries needed to be determined via oral evidence, which the
high courts are not competent to exercise under article 226 of the constitution 64. Albeit this
bone of contention appears to be interesting however is simply procedural in nature and,
along these lines, warrants no further discussion. Hence, as per this view, the courts can
neither decide the petitions finally by usurping the authority under the schedule nor can give
an interim relief disqualifying the accused till the time the speaker considers their petitions.

61
(1992) Supp (2) SCC 651, 711.
62
Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Edn., (1910) 
63
Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi , (2015) 12 SCC 381 
64
R. Sakkarapani Whip v. T.N. Legislative Assembly, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 1247.

41
On the contrary, the other set of jurists think that the speaker has a solemn obligation to
decide the issue of disqualification petitions within a reasonable amount of time regardless of
the fact that no such time limit has been provided in the tenth schedule or the rules thereof.
The expression " reasonable time" should be understood as any time much before the
completion of the tenure of the house or the assembly. This class advocates that to ensure
constitutional and democratic ethos, it is essential for the judiciary to treat the decision of the
speaker as a simple "alternate forum" in such cases. The main legal precedent to validate this
view is the prima facie observation made by the high court of Manipur to the fundamental
issue of jurisdiction of the high court.65

However, recently it was partly reversed by the supreme court in Keisham Meghachandra
Singh v. Manipur legislative assembly66. Even this proclamation of the supreme court is not
liberated from antagonistic issues because it took a sharp turn by relying upon a constitutional
bench judgment named Rajendra Singh Rana v. Master Prasad Maurya,67 (herein referred to
as constitutional bench judgment), which came before the decision in the Haryana assembly
case. The Haryana assembly case experienced this exceptional set of facts for the first time.
The court was approached to decide the delay caused by the speaker in deciding
disqualification petition against five (5) members from the legislative assembly (MLAs) who
were neither the ones upon whom the sustenance of the government depended nor the state
assembly elections were soon to be held. The court derived mala fide on the part of the
speaker, who was keeping interests of his group ahead of his constitutional obligation.
Therefore, the court inspected all of the authorities regarding the matter and reached the
decision that the Kihoto Hollohan case68 cuts out alone exemption in the event of suspension
made by the speaker of the house on the grounds of mala fide, perversity, rules of natural
justice which are accessible after the official decision is made by the speaker. Accordingly,
whatever may be the facts, if the speaker has not passed any decision discarding the petitions,
the power of judicial review does not arise. Here, it would not be outside the subject at hand
to call attention to the view of the bench of two judges who without a doubt took into
consideration the insignificance of those five MLAs in the stability of the government and
remaining period for the next state election, however, limited their inner voice to cut out

65
Mohd. Fajur Rahim  v.  Manipur Legislative Assembly, 2019 SCC OnLine Mani 127.
66
2020 SCC Online SC 55.

67
 (2007) 4 SCC 270
68
Kihoto Hollohan V. Zachillhu & Ors, AIR 1993 SC 412.

42
another special case qua situations where the conditions may arise per contra. The court,
however, set a phenomenal measure by guiding the speaker to discard the forthcoming
petitions within a time span of four months. This was plainly in the nature of issuing
mandamus. This strategy is surely not without inherent issues, which are discussed later here.
Then onwards, the supreme court experienced this issue, among different cases, in Orissa
legislative assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida,69 where again it gave a timeline to the speaker
to finally decide the petitions. By that time, the issue had found profound roots in the
democratic soil of India. Considering another matter, a two-judge bench of the supreme court
referred this issue to be decided by a constitutional bench to lay down finally whether such
timelines can be outlined by the high court under the prevailing scheme, alongside the
bigger question of setting out the judicial review power of high courts over the speaker under
the tenth schedule 70. The warrant to refer the matter emerged when the speaker questioned
the actual authority of the supreme court to engage in such issues.

In the midst of the pendency of the issue under the watchful eye of the supreme court, Few
high courts came across the same issue. A division bench ( two judges) of the High court of
Bombay in Indian National Congress v. Province of Goa,71 held that "courts can't meddle in a
procedure under tenth schedule before the speaker gives his final decision under para 6 of the
tenth schedule which is certainly not a substitute forum but the only legitimate forum. One
more division bench of a similar high court observed that the power of the high court to give
timelines to the speaker couldn't be inferred from the schedule or the rules outlined by the
speaker thereunder.72 Similarly, a division bench of the high court of Madras in R.
Sakkarapani Whip v. T.N. State legislative assembly 73 dismissed the petition on the
fundamental ground of judicial restraint to take up the matter while the decision on these
questions was forthcoming before the supreme court. It is appropriate to mention that most of
these decisions followed a similar path of not settling the lis between the aggrieved parties as
the final determination of the law by the supreme court was awaited, nor was any kind of
relief granted to the applicants (not even, guiding the speaker to decide the petitions in a
specific time span).

69
(2013) 11 SCC 794.
70
S.A. Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1875.
71
2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8817.
72
Vijay Namdeorao Wadettiwar v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2100.
73
2018 SCC OnLine Mad 1247.

43
Out of these cases, the Manipur legislative assembly case is somewhat unique. A writ petition
seeking direction to the speaker to decide the disqualification petition within a reasonable
time frame74 was filed before the high court. At first, noticing that the issue was pending a
decision before the supreme court, the high court kept the matter on hold till any significant
orders were passed by the supreme court. Later, another writ was filed praying for final
adjudication of the dispute without any orders from the speaker. The petitioner broadly relied
upon the constitutional Bench judgment. The high court, in a surprising new development,
though ceased from giving any relief to the parties, but recorded a solid observation that
prima facie, provisions of the para 6 of the schedule , indicate that the power so vested in the
speaker is that of a tribunal and the remedy thus available is discretionary, which can also be
availed by approaching the high courts. It proceeded to observe that " where the members are
found to have incurred disqualification under the tenth schedule , the court can't be
anticipated to sit as simple onlooker and ought to come to save the intention of the
lawmakers, and perhaps, protect the ultimate goal of the law." 75

This matter came up in appeal before a bench of three judges of the supreme court; the
decision was given recently. It set aside the high court's Opinion and partly allowed the
petitions concerning the issue of directing the speaker to decide the disqualification petition
within a reasonable time. The court differed on the stand of adjudicating the matter itself but
held that a direction to decide the petition within the reasonable time frame could be issued.
The court further dropped the reference made to the constitutional Bench by categorically
mentioning that the issue was well settled in the Swami Prasad Maurya case76 (constitutional
Bench judgment). It appropriately quoted paras 40 and 41 of the same, the precepts of which
are as follows:

40." In the case at hand, clearly the speaker, in the original order, did not decide the question
of disqualification. Therefore he has neglected the constitutional obligation bestowed upon
him by Para 6 of the tenth schedule . Such an inability to decide the issue can't be held to be
covered by the provision of Para 6 of the schedule . He has additionally acknowledged the
case of a split based on a mere claim in that regard … it must be held that the speaker has

74
T.N. Haokip v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, 2017 SCC OnLine Mani 137.
75
T.N. Haokip v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, 2017 SCC OnLine Mani 137.

76
Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prashad Maurya & Ors, AIR 2007 SC 1305.

44
made a mistake that goes to the foundation of the matter or a blunder of such an extent that
even under the restricted power of judicial review, the decision of the speaker must be
meddled with… "

41. … It is unquestionable that in the order that was initially subjected to the challenge under
the writ petition, the speaker explicitly ceased from coming to a final decision regarding the
disqualification of the 13 MLAs. According to our reasoning as above, obviously, there was
a mistake attached to the jurisdiction of High court while exercising review in this
matter".77

Analysis of Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Manipur legislative assembly case78.

With such importance being appended to the constitutional Bench judgment, it is imperative
to look into its factual findings to better understand this issue. In this case, a disqualification
petition was filed against 13 MLAs of the ruling party who approached the governor and
requested him to invite the opposition party to form the government. It was contended that
the MLAs formed a part of (37) members, and together they comprise a genuine split as per
para 3 of the tenth schedule and hence can't be disqualified. The speaker, while keeping the
petitions ( placed prior to the contention of the split) under para 2 of the tenth schedule
waiting, acknowledged the necessities of Para 3 and held that the liability of disqualification
couldn't be enforced on these members. This decision of the speaker was challenged before
the high court. The speaker, at the outset, deferred the adjudication on the pending petitions
till the time procedures were held before the high court by specific order; however, after over
a year, the speaker, at last, dismissed the petitions for reasons well known to him. Taking into
consideration this turn of events, an application to alter the writ petition was presented, which
had a harsh spell at the high court. The writ was at last decided by a full bench of the high
court, whereby it guided the speaker to consider the disqualification petitions against those
thirteen individuals. This decision of the high court was appealed in the supreme court,
wherein the bench of five judges held that para 3 (split), as well as para 4 (merger), are
defenses available to the accused under the tenth schedule while the disqualification
procedures are conducted. Any endeavor to decide such cases of split or merger separately
goes to the foundation of the matter and, in this way, is unlawful. The court proceeded to
disqualify the accused members on the ground that they couldn't demonstrate the case of split
77
(2007) 4 SCC 270.
78
2020 SCC Online SC 55.

45
prima-facie before the court and furthermore, the assembly was at the last part of its life,
which didn't give a lot of time to dispatching the petitions for fresh consideration by the
speaker.

The question whether in the absence of final adjudication by the speaker, the high court under
article 226 of the constitution has the power to direct the speaker to dispose of the
disqualification petitions within a reasonable period of time was neither under consideration
for the constitutional bench in Swami Prasad Maurya case nor any contention to reject or
support the said issue was at any point raised before the court. The issue from the beginning
was whether paras 3 and 4 could be said to work freely of para 2 of the schedule , which the
speaker assumed as affirmative and immediately passed a decision under para 3 recognizing
the split. Therefore, in the light of these facts, any comments, coincidental or co-accidental,
upon the current issue can simply be said as passing observation by the court and, in this way,
can't be declared as conclusive.

Lastly, non-determination of the issue on merit may potentially prompt uncertainty in the
future. The court in the constitutional Bench judgment recognized the right course yet
proceeded to decide the petitions without remitting it to the speaker to protect them from
being declared infructuous because of nearing end term of the assembly, and in this way cut
out an exemption for the overall law. The supreme court judgment in the last section of the
Manipur assembly case explicitly mentioned that the assembly was not approaching its end,
and subsequently, no direction of such nature can be allowed as was conceded in the Swami
Prasad Maurya case. If this view is permitted, it would not be astounding if high courts start
to accept charges and decide the petitions where the assemblies are going to reach their end.
Thus, such a view would be at loggerheads with the decision in the Kihoto Hollohan case79,
which has additionally been asserted in various decisions and is the main authority of the
subject. Therefore, clarity on the issue is the need of the hour.

The anti-defection act is entangled in this quagmire of a speaker whose first priority is his
party interests and the higher judiciary using the hands-off approach citing precedents and
conventions. Unless the courts expressly clear out the provisions of the anti-defection law on
the issue of the merger of the political party, the law will keep on being a sword with level
dull, sharp edges. The speaker has put the law in the tunnel shrouded in darkness. Without the
intervention of the higher judiciary, there is by all accounts no promising end to current
79
AIR 1993 SC 412.

46
circumstances. However, the supreme court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. the Hon'ble
speaker Manipur legislative assembly & Ors.80 case gave significant insight into the
disqualification powers of the speaker and gave the following recommendation: The court
recommended the parliament to review the constitutional position regarding the duty of
speaker as a quasi-judicial authority while deciding the disqualification petitions under the
anti-defection law (when such a speaker does not sever his ties and continues to belong to a
particular political party either de jure or de facto). The court prescribed that an independent
and impartial tribunal be established, which will be the substitute of speaker of the Lok Sabha
and legislative assemblies and shall specifically deal with disqualifications under the tenth
schedule . The court further observed that the tribunal could be headed by a retired supreme
court judge or by a retired chief justice of a high courts. The court also proposed that some
other external independent system can arbitrate on such matters. This will guarantee that such
questions are decided both swiftly and impartially.

Chapter 3

Anti-Defection Law and Dissent

The quandary that had immersed the state of Rajasthan in July 2020, with Mr. Ashok Gehlot
and Mr. Sachin Pilot's camps jousting for supremacy and power, was out and out dramatic.
Nineteen members from the legislative assembly (MLAs) of the Rajasthan state assembly
were on the verge of disqualification for not going to two meetings of their party and ignoring

80
2020 SCC Online SC 55.

47
the guidelines issued by the Chief of the Indian National ("Congress Party"). 81 These
activities of the MLAs resulted in the Congress Whip documenting a disqualification appeal
against them under para 2(1)(a) included in the tenth schedule of the constitution before the
speaker of the Rajasthan legislative assembly.82 The speaker after that gave notice to the
supposedly delinquent MLAs to show cause against the complaint within a time of two
days.83

It was argued by the Gehlot camp that Sachin Pilot and a few other MLAs had, by not
attending party meetings and based on their conduct, voluntarily given up membership of the
Congress Party. Subsequently, they were liable to be disqualified under the anti-defection
law, as envisaged in the tenth schedule . This was emphatically opposed by the Pilot camp on
the ground that voicing different opinions on some of the policies or decisions are taken by a
party whip, with no intention to relinquish the political party to form a part of another
political party, doesn't add up to defection or willingly giving up of the membership of a
party.84

This interior quarrel between the Congress Party had additionally reached the doors of the
court of law, with petitions, inter-alia, questioning the show cause notice issued by the
speaker was filed under the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan high court. Furthermore, for the stay
of procedures petition was filed by the speaker before the hon'able supreme court of India
(SC).85

In spite of vigorously defensively covered contentions and charges from both sides, neither
the Rajasthan high court nor the SC decisively solved the matter. Hence, the two fighting
groups decided to stop fighting, putting this political fight at rest.86
81
Co., Disqualification Notices against Sachin Pilot, 18 other rebel Congress MLAs: Rajasthan HC likely to
pronounce verdict on Tuesday, The New Indian Express,( Jul.7th , 2021,
10:00PM),https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/jul/21 /disqualification notices against Sachin Pilot,
18 other rebel Congress MLAs: Rajasthan HC likely to- The New Indian Express.
82
Outlook Web , As Congress Sends Disqualification Notice to Sachin Pilot, All Eyes set on Leader’s Next
Move, Outlook India,(Jul.7th , 2021, 10:PM), https://www.outloo kindia.com/website/story/india-news-congress-
to-send-disqualification-notices-to-sachin-pilot-other-mlas-for-skipping-clp-meet/356719.
83
F.E, Rajasthan: Sachin Pilot among 19 MLAs to face disqualification from Assembly for defying Congress
whip, Speakers issues notices , Financial Express,( Jul,7th , 2021,10:00PM),https://financialexpress.com/india-
news /sachin-pilot-disqualification-rajasthan-legislative-assembly-speaker-notice-congress-mlas/2024631/
84
SNS Web, Rajasthan Issue: HC Verdict on disqualification of Sachin Pilot, 18 rebel MLA’s on Friday; no
action until then, The Statesman (Jul.7th ,2021,10:00PM), https://www.thestatesman.com/india/rajasthan-crisis-
hc-verdict-disqualification-sachin-pilot-18-rebel-mlas-friday-no-action-till-1502910364.html.
85
The Wire, Rajasthan Speaker to Move SC over HC’s ‘Intervention’ in Rebel MLA’s Disqualification, The
Wire,( Jul.7th ,2021, 10:00PM),https:// /thewire.in/politics/rajasthan-speaker-supreme-court-mla-disqualification.
86
Harsha Singh, Smiles, Handshake as Sachin Pilot, Ashok Gehlot Meet After Congress Truce, NDTV,( Jul.
9th ,2021, 6:00PM) ,https://www.ndtv.com/ /india-news/rajasthan-ashok-gehlot-ahead-of-sachin-pilot-meet-
spirit-of-forget-and-forgive-2278840.

48
The questioning in Rajasthan may by all appearances appear to be another endeavor to
overturn a fairly chosen government through horse-trading and designed political defection as
have happened in various other states in India. However, on a nearer assessment, the
Rajasthan constitutional impasse was extraordinary. This tussle was not between two
opponent political groups but rather between two stalwarts in the Rajasthan political field
belonging to the same political party, viz., the Indian National Congress. The emergency that
broke out in Rajasthan has brought to the front an inquiry into the essential precepts of the
constitution, i.e., what are the established corners of intra-party dissent in the Indian
democratic government?87 An effort has been made in this chapter to dig into this inquiry and
to interpret the law dealing with it.

'Defection' comes from the latin word 'defectio,' which means conscious deserting of one's
loyalty or duty.88 Under the constitution, the law dealing with defection has been capsulated
89
in its tenth schedule which contains within itself the following acts which lead to
disqualification from the house of parliament or State legislative assembly :

1) voluntarily giving up the membership of a party;90 or

2) defying the orders of the Party whip on a vote.91

In the background of the aforementioned arrangements, this chapter tries to interpret the
essentially inborn inquiry relating to the extent of intra-party dissent under the constitution.
The intent is to recognize and segregate the concepts which are intrinsic to anti-defection law
and the principle of intra-party dissent. Furthermore, the aim is to show that despite being
distinct and separate concepts, intra-party dissent and anti-defection law are frequently
considered as being interlinked, which harmfully affects a democratic form of government
operative in India. This chapter explains the significance and extent of intra-party dissent,
diving into the benefits thereof and analyzes the transaction between intra-party dissent and
paragraph 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) individually, exhibiting the way where dissent is cleansed in
the Indian political field under the attire of defection.

3.1 Analysis Of Intra-Party Dissent

87
Nitika Bagaria &Vedika shah, Decoding Intra-Party Dissent: The Lawful Undoing Of Constitutional
Machinery, 7(2) NLUJ L Rev 115(2021).
88
Ibid.
89
India.Const. sch. X.
90
Id., cl 2(a).
91
Id., cl 2(b).

49
Dissent is often defined to mean “contrariety of opinion” or “ to differ from the established or
official opinion” Justice DY Chandrachud, a sitting Judge of the SC, has perceived dissent as
"a symbol of a vibrant democracy."92 Dissent may take various forms; it may find expression
in the voices of individuals who put across their causes against those at the helm of power in
the government or may show itself as discussion and conversation between different political
parties on the parliamentary floor. Be that as it is, there might be times when members
belonging to the same political party host contrasted views on internal party matters,
arrangements, or choices, which may not conform to the views held by those in the echelons
of power.93 Such difference of opinion among members belonging to the same party or
association is popularly termed as 'intra-party dissent.'

In numerous democratic systems across the world, intra-party disagreement is seen as an

augmentation of the fundamental freedom of speech and expression allowed to
parliamentarians and is perceived as a pivotal component that fosters free discussion and
trade of ideas in parties; however, the same is not the situation allowed in India. Today, the
topic of intra-party dissent holds more than simple scholastic and hypothetical significance.
There are multifarious reasons as to why intra-party dissent is imperative in principle and in
practice. To begin with, the benefits of giving intra-party dissent to the party members at an
individual level have a huge impact on intra-party relations. Second, taking a gander at its
anything but a full-scale viewpoint, intra-party dissent plays an important role with regards to
improved debates and dialogue in the assembly, which leads to discussion and formulation of
better laws and enactments in the country, which in turn improves public accountability of
the political party members and also improves the Indian democratic system in toto.94

Pushing ahead with explicit reasons, first, promising intra-party dissent would dynamically
affect the role played by individual members in their political party. Allowing intra-party
dissent gives party members the freedom to isolate their perspectives and assessments from
those of their political party, giving them an individual voice and permitting them to bravely
represent what they have confidence in, this would encourage a suitable climate for the
advancement of fair and equal participation of the representatives within the party and
ultimately in the houses of the parliament and state assemblies. Representatives would be
more sure that their ideas, if commendable, would be considered and pondered upon by their

92
Romila Thappar v.Union Of India, AIR 2018 SC 4683.
93
Christopher Garner & Natalia Letki, Party Structure and Backbench Dissent in the Canadian and British
Parliaments, 38(2) C.J.P.S ,463(2005).
94
Id.

50
party.95 Thus, they would be more spurred to participate in the onerous exercise of gauging
the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative strategies and providing carefully
considered innovative policies and solutions.

Giving such stimulus to members of the party to transparently voice their assessment within
their political party would, by implication, counter the danger of largescale fragmentation and
polarization of various political parties, as this would make an affirmation among the
members that making their very own ideological party isn't the solitary manner by which
their voices might be heard, and their vision shared.96

Frequently a few members belonging to political parties across different parts of the nation
have felt the need to stop being a part of the party, which is non-inclusive. An illustration of
this can be seen when the chief of Congress Party in Haryana, Mr. Ashok Tanwar, tendered
his resignation letter in 2019, wherein unequivocally communicated his disappointment over
the way that regardless of his voice being a statement of the yearnings of millions of ardent
Congress Party allies, citizens and neighborhood pioneers, it had not been paid regard to.
This was the case despite him using each conceivable road to cause himself to feel heard, so,
all in all, he chose to leave his duties in different boards of committees of the Congress Party.
He additionally expressed that it was horrendous to watch a limited number of members
within the Congress Party taking all the decisions instead of allowing simply, free and fair
procedures.97 Thus, if such members feel that their voice is being heard in the first place, the
probability of fragmentation would decrease enormously, and members would make
optimum use of the position in their party itself to attain their political aspirations and goals.
Second, at the intra-party level, extensive discussion on elements of policies could ensure that
a larger contribution of the party members in the entire approach of decision making,
contrary to a decision being taken exclusively by the higher-ups' elites and echelons of the
party, which are by and large a smaller group of people. When all member's views are
included in the process, it will lead to a larger exchange of ideas and perspectives that were
earlier not considered. Unlike single-issue pressure groups, Indian political parties are multi-
layered, and nuanced divergences are naturally bound to arise within a similar ideological
95
Ruchi Singh, Intra-Party Democracy and Indian Political Parties, 71 Hindu Centre for Politics and Public
Policy (2015)
96
P. Bhanu Mehta, Reform political parties first, ( Jul.10th 2021, 10:30PM),https://www.
india-seminar.com/2001/497/497%20pratap%20bhanu%20mehta.htm.
97
PTI Correspondent, Ashok Tiwari resigns from Congress’ election committees, says will work as ordinary
party worker, The Economic Times, (Jul.10th ,2021,
10:30PM),https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/ashok-tanwar-resigns-from-congress-
election-committees-says-will-work-as-ordinary-party-worker/articleshow/71428007.cms?from=mdr.

51
frame. Further, different and unique opinions, trailed by examination and discussion, ensure
that fair and wholistic policies are passed, taking into consideration the multitude of
stakeholders included.98

Third, in addition to the aforesaid, allowing members to express dissent would prevent
dictatorship from acquiring a foothold at the intra-party level. Usually, for the passage of any
enactment or law, the party which establishes the government depends mostly on the majority
strength of its own individual members rather than on the members of the opposition party.
For instance, if a party is able to gather the support of more than half of the members in the
house, they can have the simple majority which is needed for the passing of various bills such
as finance bills, constitutional simple amendment bills, and ordinary bills with ease, on the
basis of the votes cast by their own party members without asking for the support of
opposition members. This adequately removes the consequences of external dissent and
contrary views.99

The position deteriorates where there is no intra-party dissent as this leads to laws being
passed without any thorough discussion or consideration, with the members merely adjusting
their own preferences to mirror the majority decision, which they are bound to support.
Therefore, intra-party dissent in such circumstances would prove helpful, as the ruling party
would then have to ensure to take into consideration and satisfactorily address all the valid
concerns raised by its own party members, and surprisingly go to the degree of convincing its
individuals on such issues without a wrong assurance that the law would be passed at last
with no blockages, as found in the norm.100

Fourth, it is important to note that inclusivity plays a crucial role, not simply at the intra-
party level but also at the larger level in a parliamentary setting. One of the chief purposes
behind which the legislature stands firm as a supreme and holds a central place in a
democratic system is because of its huge size and the varied interests that it represents. 101 The
legislature is living proof of the principle that an individual member or small group of
members, no matter how competent or abled, can not be a substitute for the aggregate

98
Supra note 73.

99
Id.

100
Id.
101
Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking , 89 B.U. L. Rev., 335 (2009).

52
wisdom of hundreds of members representing varied interests, bringing a multitude of
experiences to the table.

It is for this very basic reason that the legislature is made responsible for the task of holding
debates and discussions and passing laws and acts for the country. When there is an absence
of intra-party dissent in a large nation like India, the Lok Sabha, even though physically
composed of 543 persons, would effectively be working with only a small-closed group of
members who would have all the power to discuss and assess all important decisions being
taken, with the remaining members of the legislature acting as a mere dummy in the hands of
their political party, voting only in accordance with the direction issued by their party leaders.
This basically diminishes the range of problem solvers for the country to a specific class and
kind of legislators. On the other hand, if intra-party discussions and trade of the opinions are
encouraged, then it would benefit not only the party but also the legislature. The party and the
legislature could both benefit by drawing from the experiences and lessons of a considerable
number of parliamentarians of differing ages, stature, foundation, and identity. This would
ensure comprehensive deliberation and reflection on a broad spectrum of varied interests that
numerically large legislative houses intended to achieve. 102 Further; this would to a great
extent upgrade the nature of discussions held in the house, in turn advancing the nature of
draft legislation tabled that ultimately become the law of the land.

Fifth, allowing intra-party dissent would also, in the real sense, uphold in letter and spirit the
primary purpose for which bicameralism has been embraced at the Centre by the
constitution.103 The bicameral parliamentary framework in India targets getting an extra layer
of investigation to each bill passed via the Lok Sabha or the lower house. The Rajya Sabha or
the Upper house, even though it consists of only 250 individuals, assumes an indispensable
part as a reconsidering chamber in giving due recommendations and proposals to different
bills passed by the Lok Sabha104 and acts as a check on political parties having an absolute
majority in the Lok Sabha.105

The substantial advantages of having this house will be perceptible only if intra-party dissent
is allowed to flourish and members of the Rajya Sabha are allowed to viably satisfy their
102
Ajay P., The Politics of Parliamentary Disruption, Live Mint, (Jul.10th ,2021, 10:30PM),https://
www.livemint.com/Opinion/Vf3anAosbfd9A6TJJiYFHL/The-politics-of-parliamentary-disruption.html.
103
Supra note 73.
104
Id.
105
Pavan Kumar Verma, Why Rajya Sabha is essential: It represents the states and balances an impetuous Lok
Sabha, Times of India Opinion,( Jul.10th ,2021, 10:30),https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-
page/why-rajya-sabha-is-essential-it-represents-the-states-and-balances-an-impetuous-lok-sabha/.

53
executive obligations and mandate. This protective measure will lose its motivation totally if
members of the upper house indiscriminately follow, rehash, and repeat the perspectives and
position of their party leaders. For example, Udit Bhatia, in his article named 'Cracking the
Whip',106 has most compactly embodied this situation by expressing as follows:

"Distinctiveness cannot be merely about the physical presence of two different sets of
legislators. If the only allowable view they can voice is the one directed by the party's
leadership, and if they lack the ability to form views that are different from that opinion, then
distinctiveness no longer remains. We, then, miss out on what the epistemic case for
bicameralism suggests, is the value of having two chambers of parliament."

Sixth, this will bring about more responsibility on the political parties, as residents and
electors would now be sure that their chosen delegates, at the national and local level, are not
simple instrumentalities in possession of their party leaders but can efficiently deliver on their
mandate and can successfully advance the cause of their constituents, being in line with
public sentiment.107

A clear disadvantage of not allowing intra-party dissent was recently witnessed when Dr.
Shashi Tharoor, Thiruvananthapuram agent to the Lok Sabha, transparently went on to
oppose the position taken by his own Party, Congress, on the question of privatization of
development of an air terminal in Thiruvananthapuram, an issue filled with political clout.
Tharoor made a public articulation explaining his enduring position that he would not follow
the direction given by his political party regarding this matter, as he ardently upholds
privatization of the air terminal development work108. The Congress Party leader faced a lot
of criticism for not following his party on this issue, yet he stood firm, saying his position has
been consistent and is in consonance with what is to the greatest advantage of the residents of
his constituency.109 Thus, if intra-party dissent is allowed, MLAs won't be conflicted between
picking what is best for their body electorate and following directives of their party heads, but
will, in fact, they would be able to harmonize the interest of all the individuals involved while
at the same time instilling and furthering public trust in the party.
106
U. Bhatia, Cracking the whip: The deliberative costs of strict party discipline, 23 CRISPP,254 (2020).
107
Stefan Rumens, Staging Deliberation: The Role of Representative Institutions in the Deliberative Process, ,
20 J Polit Philos, 23 (2012).
108
Fatima K. , Why participate in bidding, then question the game – Tharoor asks Kerala govt on airport, The
Print, (Jul.11th ,2021,5:00PM),https:// theprint.in/politics/why-participate-in-bidding-then-question-the-game-
tharoor-asks-kerala-govt-on-airport-row/487855/.
109
Express News Correspondent, Tharoor embarrasses Congress leaders in Kerala by backing
Thiruvananthapuram airport privatization, The New Indian Express,( Jul.11th , 2021, 5:00 PM),
https://www.indianexpress.com/states/kerala/2020/aug/20/t.

54
 A completely inclusive intra-party deliberation on policies could mark the end of dynasty
politics, a phenomenon that is very commonly observed in the Indian political arena. Dynasty
politics is not peculiar to any political party specifically, as both local and central parties
manifest varied dynasties at different levels of hierarchy. Dynastic governmental issues host
an adverse consequence on the Indian political arena in general. This can be better
comprehended by analyzing a recent occurrence of August 2020, where 23 members of the
Congress Party wrote a dissenting letter to the Interim Leader of the party, Sonia Gandhi. 110
In this letter, they communicated solid sees against limited members of the party forming a
majority, along with their loyalists ending up getting important portfolios and better
promotional posts. The article was a cry for internal democracy, genuine contemplation on
issues faced by the party members, and collective party leadership. The signatories, in
different meetings, explained that their aim was not to attack the political party or its higher-
ups but was simply to resuscitate the Congress Party. Amidst this unrest, a Congress Party
meeting was held, wherein the letter was recognized, yet none of the solicitations or concerns
voiced by these individuals were really talked about; indeed, a majority of these members
were additionally blamed for being double-crossers to their own party. 111 Thus, it is obvious
that intra-party dissent within such dynastical political parties would be significantly useful,
not simply in advancing perspectives of members outside the 'majority within the party, but
would also contribute to the democratic distribution of power and influence within the party,
preventing separation of parties.

In this way, it is crystal clear from the aforementioned that intra-party dissent is the substance
of a parliamentary democratic government, being irreplaceable in forestalling majoritarianism
and authoritarianism, from taking traction and strength both within the political party and in
the house. Being a basic moral guideline, it can forestall the centralization of force in the
hands of a couple of individuals framing the majority. It is recognized as a distinguishing
feature intrinsic to a democratic government and works as a safety valve for democracy.

3.2 Intra-Party Dissent In India

110
OpIndia Correspondent , Read the full text of the letter written by dissenting Congress leaders demanding
sweeping changes within the Congress party, OpIndia, (Jul 11th
,2021,5:00PM),https://www.opindia.com/2020/08/the-full-text-of-congress-letter-written-by-dissenting-leaders-
demanding-structural-overhaul-party-leadership/.
111
Rajdep Sardsai, The myth of inner party democracy, Hindustan Times, (Jul.11th , 2021, 5:00PM),
https://www. .hindustantimes.com/columns/the-myth-of-inner-party-democracy/story-
xdmcW9Ch0b3CI1wJqpyOCN.html.

55
 The working of the Indian parliamentary framework, in practice, has on several occasions
curbed this valuable right of dissent available to the members. Despite India being renowned
as the world’s largest democracy, intra-party dissent is far from being recognized in the
country. Instead, it is seen to be hampered by several restrictive practices. Usually, intra-party
dissent is smothered under the clothing of defection as engrafted in the tenth schedule . In
this context, it is pertinent to take into consideration the jurisprudence surrounding paragraph
2(1)(a) of voluntary giving up of membership and intra-party dissent as separate concepts,
which are being nowadays wrongly entwined by political parties for their benefit. In addition
to this, there are certain loopholes in the schedule which systematically restrict and curb
intraparty dissent.

3.2.1 Understanding Dissent in the Light of Pragaraph2(1)(a)

Pragaraph2(1)(a) of the schedule states that a member from the Lok Sabha or the Rajya
Sabha will be precluded from being a member of that specific house if the member willfully
and out of his volition decides to give up membership of the political party by which he got
the ticket and was set up as a candidate for election as a member of the lower house or the
Rajya Sabha, as the case might be. It is imperative to note that the contours of what is
considered as a legitimate avenue of dissent and what sums up to voluntary giving up the
membership of a political party under paragraph 2(1)(a) are patently blurred. A three-judge
bench of the hon'able supreme court in the case of Ravi S Naik v. Union of India 112 (“Ravi
Naik”) has clarified the ambit and scope of paragraph 2(1)(a) to mean conduct of any kind of
a member of a political party which may cause to infer that the member has voluntarily given
up membership of the political party to which he belongs. The conduct of voluntary giving of
membership of a political party may be either expressed or implied, and a formal resignation
of membership is not a hidebound necessity thereof.

On the premise of the ratio given in the Ravi Naik, various personalities, including the
honorable speaker of the Rajasthan assembly in the Rajasthan political issue, have rushed to
contend that voicing questions against one's own political party or condemning any choices
taken by the political party is a searing assault on the party solidarity and cohesion and is
nothing less than an attempt to challenge the party and government. 113 Thus, according to this
school, the conduct of such a delinquent member would rightly be said to be voluntary giving

112
AIR 1994 SC 1558.
113
ET Correspondent , ‘Ruling party as opposition’ Economic Times, (Jul.11th , 2021, 5:00 PM), https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-editorial/ruling-party-as-opposition/articleshow/6640457.cms.

56
up of membership under paragraph 2(1)(a), and consequently, he should be disqualified from
the house.

Nonetheless, this slanted understanding of paragraph 2(1)(a) appears misleading if the statute
encompassing it is dug into. The fact is true that the term 'voluntary resignation of
membership’ has been subjected to an extraordinary measure of legal investigation and talk.
However, most of the judgments on the subject dealt with factual matrices which involved a
member of a political party, whether explicitly or impliedly, leaving the membership of that
political party and clandestinely joining hands with a rival or an opposite political party.114

The facts, inter alia, engaged with these cases are following: In the Ravi Naik, two MLAs
of the Maharashtra Gomantak Party ("MGP") had met the Governor of Goa in the
organization of Congress officials, wherein they had admitted to not supporting the MGP,
and wishing to stretch out their help to the Congress Party to shape another alternative
government.

A similar circumstance had emerged in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana & Ors v. Swamy
Prasad Maurya and Ors,115 in the Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly. and again, in the case
of Jagjit Singh v. the State of Haryana,116 an MLA of the Haryana legislative assembly,
chosen on the ticket of the National Congress Party ("NCP"), based on a supposed split in the
NCP, joined an ideological group called Democratic Dal. Soon after its inception, the party
members of the Democratic Dal, including the earlier NCP MLA, joined hands with the
Congress Party (the ruling party in the state).

In all the above-mentioned cases, it is the dishonest strategies of the MLAs that have exposed
them to the afflictions of paragraph 2(1)(a) and has, at last, prompted the courts to uphold
their disqualification on the ground of defection. The SC has, in all these cases, hammered
change of political hues in a quest for power and pelf; however, it has not addressed whether
or not basic intra-party dissent would add up to the voluntary surrender of membership.

While the SC has neglected to give a legitimate finding on this angle, Justice N. Kumar of
the Karnataka high court, in his contradicting judgment in the case of Balchandra L Jarkiholi
& Ors v. B Yeddyurappa and Ors,117 has discussed this question, paving the way for future

114
V Venkatsean, ‘Why Congress Rebels in Rajasthan are justified in saying dissent is not defection’ The Wire,
( Jul.11th , 2021, 5:00PM),https:// thewire.in/law/congress-rebel-mlas-rajasthan-dissent-defection-case-law.
115
AIR 2007 SC 1305.
116
AIR 2007 SC 150.
117
Writ petition. No 3260-32670 of 2010 (high court of Karnataka, 15 November 2010).

57
discourse on this aspect. In this situation, 13 MLAs of the karnataka legislative assembly
having a place with the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) composed indistinguishable letters
("Letters") to the governor of Karnataka demonstrating that they had been chosen as MLAs
on the ticket of the BJP however had gotten disappointed with the working of the Karnataka
government headed by Shri BS Yeddyurappa, and therefore pulled out their aid to his
administration. In view of the aforementioned Letters, the governor of Karnataka tendered a
letter to Yeddyurappa, asking him to demonstrate that he continued to command majority
support in the house.

Consequently, Yeddyurappa, as the head of the BJP in the Karnataka assembly, sent a
petition to the speaker praying disqualification of the 13 MLAs on the ground that they had
voluntarily given up membership of the BJP, and hence had incurred disqualification under
the schedule .118 The thirteen MLAs had, all through the procedures before the speaker kept
up with their contention that their intention was not to pull out their support to the BJP, but
just to the government headed by Yeddyurappa, as they considered his style of governance to
be bad. They contended that pulling out backing only to the Yeddyurappa government didn't
fall within the scope of defection under paragraph 2(1)(a), stressing that prima facie
‘defection’ means leaving one's original party and joining another political party, which was
not the situation. with the MLAs since they had not left the BJP by any means. It was over
and again asserted by them that "as focused soldiers of BJP, they would keep on supporting
any government headed by a spotless and proficient individual who could give great
administration to individuals of Karnataka. The speaker of the Karnataka assembly,
notwithstanding, held that the 13 MLAs had intentionally given up their membership of BJP
by pulling out their support to the government headed by Yeddyurappa. 119 Subsequent to
this, the aggrieved MLAs filed an appeal against this decision before the Karnataka high
court, where the majority of judges, in this case, upheld the decision of the speaker. However,
Justice N. Kumar, in his dissenting judgment, contrasted with the perspectives given by the
majority bench on the understanding of paragraph 2(1)(a), holding that the demonstration of
the MLAs communicating no trust in the government framed under a specific leader doesn't
amount to voluntarily giving up party membership. Justice N. Kumar further drew a fine
differentiation between what adds up to leaving the head of the political party who has
framed a state government, as opposed to acts adding up to abandoning a particular political
party completely. The two demonstrations are not equivalent in any way and are, in fact, very
118
(2011) 10 SCR 877.
119
Id. at 10-15.

58
different from one another. What establishes defection under paragraph 2(1)(a) is abandoning
the political group in its entirety and doesn't cover within its ambit the conduct of forsaking
the government led by a particular member of that political party. 120 He perceived intra-party
dissent as a real exercise of the opportunity of free discourse and articulation conceded to
parliamentarians and held that the schedule simply denies acts of defection, not genuine and
honest dissent. In conclusion, it was held that "the right to dissent is the foundation of
democracy, for the vibrant and efficient working of democracy and democratic institutions
honest dissent must be protected and respected by Individuals in authority”.121

In light thereof, N. Kumar,j., held that the directions of the speaker were needed to be set
aside. On appeal thereof, the SC held, with respect to the question of whether the MLAs had
voluntarily given up their membership of BJP, that the substance of the letters obviously
displayed that the MLAs had not removed their support to the BJP, however, had just
communicated their absence of trust in the Yeddyurappa government, and were willing to
help any BJP government led by another leader. The SC further went on to recognize that by
the actions of the MLAs, the BJP had not been bereft of an opportunity to establish a
government within the state of Karnataka; they could still by all valid means, together with
the support of the MLAs, form a BJP headed government within the state of Karnataka by
changing their chief ministerial candidate.122

Further, without dealing in depth with the technicalities of dissent and based only on the
material present before it, the SC arrived at a conclusion that the speaker had acted in a
biased manner and therefore, the proceedings conducted by him failed to meet the twin tests
of natural justice and fair play. Following the above reason, the SC set aside the decision of
the speaker sanctioning disqualification of the 13 MLAs under paragraph 2(1)(a). Further, it
also quashed the majority judgment passed by the Karnataka high court.123

Balachandran L Jarkiholi and Ors v. B Yeddyurappa and Ors is one of the important
judgments where clarity has been given with regard to between intraparty dissent and
defection covered under the tenth schedule of the constitution. Though the SC did not
explain in detail the concept of intraparty dissent, the minority judgment of Justice N. Kumar
has clearly and in a comprehensive way reinforced the fact that parliamentarians’ right to

120
Balchandra L Jarkiholi, supra note 104, 45-46.
121
Id.
122
G.O.I, Report of Committee on Electoral Reforms (Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department,
1990).
123
Supra note 73.

59
dissent is sacred in a democracy, denial of which would itself be equivalent to choking
parliamentary democracy. Intra-party dissent, however sharp it may be, cannot solely result
in disqualification under paragraph (2)(1)(a) unless it is accompanied by other conduct such
as ‘crossing the floor’ or ‘giving support to a rival party. The position taken by N. Kumar,j.,
was that it is vital to draw out a distinction between what constitutes a permissible dissent and
what goes on to become defection had previously been discussed by a five-judge
constitutional bench of the SC in the Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillu and Ors124 (“Kihoto") to a
great extent. In this case, while settling down the question of the constitutionality of the
schedule , the Bench expressed: Not halting at this and staying consistent to their earlier
statement, the SC, though not exactly in the paradigm of paragraph 2(1)(a), went on to
observe that the provisions included under paragraph 2(1)(b) of the schedule , which provides
for disqualification of a member from the house on inability to cast a vote according to party
directions, must be interpreted in such a manner to not unduly encroach on the freedom of
speech given to the members of parliament by virtue of article 105 125 of the constitution. The
provisions of paragraph 2(1)(b) should be interpreted harmoniously with the other
provisions, and its phrasing must be appropriately contained in its scope by keeping in view
the objects and purpose of the schedule , i.e., namely, to curb the evil or mischief of political
defections because of the lure of office or other similar profitable considerations.126

Following the reasoning given for the interpretation of paragraph 2(1)(b), it would, as an
undeniable corollary, follow that provisions of paragraph 2(1)(a), which come before the
provisions of paragraph 2(1)(b), should likewise be harmoniously construed in order to
ensure that the schedule as a whole does not violate the freedom of speech guaranteed to
members of the parliament. Thus, the words 'voluntary giving up of membership’ would
fundamentally require to be interpreted strictly in a manner to ensure that it does not cover
within its ambit cases of genuine and free dissent, which is the sign of a true democracy.
Thus, Kihoto has made it incumbent upon the speaker and the courts of law to distinguish
between cases of genuine dissent and defection camouflaged as dissent, Protecting the former
while squashing the latter with an ironclad hand.127

In summation, one might say that even though the SC has on multiple occasions impliedly
indicated that paragraph 2(1)(a) ought not to be utilized as a medium to stomp the intra-party

124
AIR 1993 SC 412
125
India Const., art 105.
126
Kihoto, Id. at 49.
127
Supra note 73.

60
dissent. In the absence of an explanatory judgment on this aspect, political parties have tried
to benefit from this ambiguity and have time and again viciously used the arrangement laid
down in this provision to stomp upon intra-party dissent, and drive fear of being disqualified
in the minds of their own party members. Thus, given the crucial role played by intra-party
dissent in a democracy, it is absolutely necessary for the legislature or the Judiciary to clear
out the area of ambiguity surrounding the extent of voluntary giving up of membership
which is a ground under paragraph 2(1)(a), to open the parliamentary gateway and party
doors to intra-party dissent, empowering parliamentarians to voice their opinions on the floor
of the house and also within a political party, without any kind of anxiety or fear.128

3.2.2 Paragraph 2(1)(a) and Freedom of Speech

One may be slanted to accept that if intra-party dissent is determinately held to fall outside
the extent of paragraph 2(1)(a), parliamentarians might have the option to practice and assert
their right of speech and expression to the fullest, which would eventually lead to free and
fearless debates on the parliamentary floor and amongst political parties. Tragically, this
myth would soon be busted if one investigates the schedule as it stands today. Under the
tenth schedule , even if a person manages to escape the bounds of paragraph 2(1)(a), his
party may still win by taking advantage of the loopholes in the schedule , put a quick finger
on the lips exercising unwanted freedom of expression and dissent. This position can be
better perceived by way of an illustration to explain the provisions included in the schedule .

Assuming Mr. B was elected to the legislative assembly of any particular state as a member
of Z political party for a period of 5 years. During his term, Mr. B realizes that the chief
minister of the state, also belonging to political party Z, is involved in corrupt activities. Mr.
B raises his voice against such corruption and refuses to attend party meetings. The other
members of party Z may first try to get Mr. B disqualified from the house, framing him on
the ground that he has voluntarily given up his membership under paragraph 2(1)(a). Mr. B
may be able to escape the rigors of paragraph 2(1)(a) on the ground that he was only putting
forth his genuine and honest views against the chief minister, and such intra-party dissent
does not amount to a ground for defection under the schedule . However, this escape of Mr.
B might be short-lived, as members of party Z will try to counter their defeat against Mr. B
by expelling him from the party on the ground that he has violated the guidelines of the party
Z, inter alia, relating to discipline or attendance of meetings. Further, Mr. A, regardless of

128
Id.

61
being expelled from party Z, would continue to remain bound by the wishes and fancies of
the president of party Z if he wishes to protect his seat and his tenure in the legislative
assembly because of the provisions contained in the explanation (a) to paragraph 2 of the X
schedule of the constitution ("Explanation") and its subsequent construction by the SC in the
famous case of G Vishwanathan vs. Hon'ble speaker Tamil Nadu legislative assembly,
Madras, and Ors129 ("G Vishwanathan”).

The explanation, therein, states that "an elected member of a house shall be considered to be
the member of the political party, if any, by which he got the ticket and was set up as a
candidate in the elections." Based on the deeming fiction contained in this paragraph, the SC
in G Vishwanathan had held that an elected member would continue to be a member of the
political party that offered him the ticket to contest as a candidate for the election despite the
fact that he or she had been expelled from that political party. He will continue to be a
member of that political party regardless of the fact that he is treated as unattached. 130 The SC
has basically held that a member expelled from his political party, albeit not from the house,
would within the house continue to be subject to the directions and orders of the party, which
in fact has removed him. In addition to this, if such an expelled member, in any event, tries to
join another party or ignores any direction or whips issued by the party that removed him, he
will become liable to incur disqualification under the tenth schedule .

Thus, along these lines, in the previously mentioned example, Mr. B, despite the fact that he
was expelled from party Z, would continue to remain subject to the directions and whips
issued by party Z within the house and would have to comply with their orders and
directions even if he strongly resents the same, as not following such orders would mean
disqualification from the house. Taking all things together, his right to dissent, however likely
protected from the compass of paragraph 2(1)(a), has been totally choked by G Vishwanathan
and the Explanation131 attached to it.

At this point, it is appropriate to allude to the parliamentary debates regarding the constitution
(52ndamendment) bill 1985("Bill") by which the tenth schedule was added in the constitution.
The bill, along with paragraph 2(1)(a) and (b) (which have been fused into the schedule),
additionally comprised of a clause (c), which said that if a member were ousted from his

129
(1996) 2 SCC 353.
130
Supra note 47.
131
V. Sundaram, ‘Amar Singh Expulsion Case: SC Misses Chance to Interpret Anti-defection law, the wire,
( Jul.11th, 2021, 5:00PM),https://thewire.in/law/amar-singh-expulsion-case-scs-refusal-interpret-anti-defection-
act-missed-opportunity.

62
political party, that member would be disqualified from the house. Clause (c) was explicitly
erased while passing the bill. In such conditions, the expectation of the parliament is
sufficiently certain that no disqualification would connect to a member who has been ousted
by his political party, and consequently, no act of his post-removal would open him to
disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) or (b). Moreover, addresses made by prominent
parliamentarians, including Sharad Dighe, make it amply clear that clause (c), which aimed to
disqualify persons who were expelled from their party for their conduct outside the house was
explicitly done away with as the said clause, if left to operate, would create several practical
difficulties such as making ministers subject to the arbitrary decisions of the party echelon.132

Prof. Madhu Dandavate, during the conversation encompassing the bill, had in support of the
deletion of clause (c) expressed that "there are sufficient occurrences in this political life of
our nation were only for expressing political dissent from a leader, Individuals have been
removed.133 G Vishwanathan case is in the teeth of the previously mentioned authoritative
goal and has indeed brought in through indirect method, what was unequivocally excluded
from the ambit of the schedule . Moreover, the high court in Kihoto has, as iterated
previously, explicitly expressed that the provisions of the schedule must be perused in
consonance with and in light of the objectives and reason for which the schedule was initially
enacted, which was never in any way to take in its ambit the expelled members of a party.
Additionally, a division bench of the SC, on account of Amar Singh v. Association of India134
shed enormous uncertainty on the accuracy and relevance of G Vishwanathan, keeping in
mind the legislative history of surrounding the enactment of the schedule , parliamentary
discussions in connection thereto and explicit deletion of clause (c) in the tenth schedule, the
SC has gone on to observe that "what was tried to be avoided by the law making body has
now been brought into the tenth schedule by virtue of the said decision".

In light thereof, the judges referred to the questions of law, inter alia, including whether the
provisions of the tenth schedule would include in its ambit a member who had been expelled
from the party which put him up as a candidate to contest the election and whether the stance
taken in G Vishwanathan regarding the status of expelled members was in consonance with
the provisions of the tenth schedule to a larger bench of the SC. However, a three-judge seat
of the SC, at last, declined to decide on these issues, as the petitions had become invalid at

132
LS Debates 30 January 1985, vol 1 no 11, series 8.
133
Id.
134
(2011) I SCC 201.

63
that point of time because the petitioner had completed his tenure in the Rajya Sabha during
the matter being sub-judice.

Interestingly, a similar matter has indeed come up before a division bench of the SC, 135 as the
petitioner was elected again to the Rajya Sabha seat, for a tenure up to 2022. This bench had
also referred the questions of law raised previously for consideration to a larger bench of the
SC. While an authoritative ruling of the SC on this issue is eagerly anticipated, it is
abundantly clear that imposing punishment on parliamentarians who are strong enough to
stand up for what they believe in, even at the chance of incurring expulsion from their party
and suffering embarrassment and attack at the hands of their fellow party members, is
draconic and unbalanced.

3.3 Role of Whip Under Paragraph 2(1)(b)

In addition to the aforementioned, it is suitable to consider paragraph 2(1)(b). According to

this provision, a member may incur disqualification on the ground of defection in the event if
they vote or avoid to cast a vote in the house in opposition to the directive or whip issued by
their political party, or by any other individual or entity authorized by the party in this regard,
without getting any prior allowance of such party.This ground is considered absolute , with
only the exemption being of a prior permission. Thus even if a member has a legit
meritorious views on any matter which is contrary to his party's views, he can not be
permitted to go put forth the same under this provision. Here, the person issuing the
directions is referred as party whip.

The term 'whip' refers to the chief of the political group who goes about as the party's 'master'
inside the legislative assembly or house of parliament, who is answerable for the party's
discipline and conduct on the floor of the house. 136 Thus, basically a whip is the
parliamentary functionary who issues directions and orders that should be obligatorily
followed by the party members in the parliament, and thus ,looks after the attendance of
members also, ensures that the voting is done according to the party loyalties. Neither the
rules outlined under the tenth schedule nor the rules of procedure and conduct of business in
the parliament accommodate or manage the issuance of whip.137

135
Amar Singh v UOI (2017) SCC Online SC 405.
136
BS Web, Explained: What is a whip and what happens if it is disobeyed in the house?, Business Standard,
( Jul.12th , 2021, 6:00PM),https:// www.business-standard.com/article/politics/explained-what-is-whip-in-indian-
politics-and-what-does-it-do-what-happens-if-it-s-disobeyed-119112600362_1.html.
137
Supra not 73.

64
Para 2(1)(b) is the sole empowering provision providing for a whip. The whip is endowed
with foremost powers, however there are no relating governing rules on the utilization of this
position. This unchecked power bestowed on the whip is often used as a means of
establishing complete control by the ruling party over its members, impeding their free will
completely. There are multitude of occurrences in India where the whip has given a
command to the parliamentarians to act with a specific goal in mind, as coordinated by the
decision of the party. This covers occasions like whips to go to political party meetings, vote
for majority part, prevent meeting people from other parties, etc. While this is expected to be
a disciplinary activity, it tends to be utilized as a tyrant method for smothering dissent by
members. Such whips, because of the explanation and G Vishwanathan, can likewise be
given to expelled members of the party.

Various political parties have time and again utilized the whip to fulfil their own political
plans. For instance, the Karnataka assembly gave an ignoble example of the same when
certain BJP members were excluded for challenging a party whip guiding them to cast a vote
for a specific member for the postion of speaker of the assembly. 138 Mamta Banerjee chief of
the Trinamool Congress had, a couple of years back, issuedd a casual whip to her party
individuals to cast a vote for Dinesh Trivedi, the Trinamool contender for the Rajya Sabha,
failing to do the same would cause disqualification. 139 The latest illustration of the whip being
utilized to curb the right to speak freely of discourse, is the whip given by Mayawati Prabhu
Das of the Bahujan Samaj Party ("BSP") to 6 ousted MLAs of Rajasthan, who had been
chosen for the Rajasthan legislative assembly on the ticket of the BSP, yet had been
subsequently removed from the Party. In spite of the expulsion, they were ordered to cast
their votes against the Gehlot government in the occasion of a trust vote being held in the
Rajasthan assembly.140 Thus, it is obvious that while the whip is a fundamental method for
keeping up with discipline in the house, it is normal utilized as a medium to take advantage of
the constitutional machinery and can damage our democratic system.

Such callous exercise of the power by the whip has been questioned on numerous events. For
example, the 170th Law commission Report on Electoral Laws has highlighted the way that
the whip was being utilized in the Indian parliament at each conceivable stage, ruling out
dissent. It expressed as follows:
138
D Sudhakar v. DN Jeevaraju (2011)3 K.LJ 437.
139
Supra note 73.
140
Sahay Abhinav, BSP issues whip to 6 Rajasthan MLAs who merged with Congress, instructs to vote against
Gehlot govt, Hindustan Times,( Jul.12th , 2021 6:00PM),https:// www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bsp-
issues-whip-to-6-rajasthan-mlas-wh.

65
A comparative view was likewise taken in the Dinesh Goswami Report of 1990. 141 Further,
this position got legal support in Kihoto, where the SC remarked that disqualification forced
by paragraph 2(1)(b) due to rebelliousness with the directions given by the whip should be
allowed just in the accompanying cases: (I) where a change of government is probably going
to be achieved or forestalled, or (ii) where the motion under consideration identifies with a
matter which frames a fundamental approach and program of the political party . Further, the
SC also explained that, where such instructions are being given as a whip, the defiance of
which would lead to disqualification, the outcome should be plainly phrased and read to the
members to enable them to choose wisely.

Although neither the suggestions of the Law commission nor the legal explanation has been
consolidated in the schedule , and the whip proceeds to partake in a free hand to suppress
even the slightest difference of opinions expressed by the members. Thus, reading the
pronouncements and provisions of the schedule aforesaid in cohesion and harmonious
manner amount to systematically impeding dissent at every stage and in every form, in the
process, destroying democracy and free speech.

While the limitations contained in paragraph 2(1) (a), the explanation and G Vishwanathan
case have a malicious effect on dissent, paragraph 2(1)(b) may in all likelihood be the demise
of it. Further, it would likewise be relevant to explain now that while the researcher perceive
the significance of ant defection law in keeping up with parliamentary discipline and party
union, she is completely against it being utilized a device to smother and choke intra-party
contradict in the country. It is justifiable that the essential intention of enacting this anti
defection law was to handle obstacles, for example, keeping up with severe party discipline
during the time when India was newly formed democracy, with a newly written constitution.
During those times, intra-party dissent was not a pressing priority in the bigger plan.
However, more than thirty-six years since, the political scenario in India has advanced to a
larger extent . owing to this, such blatant use of anti-defection law has been the stripping
away of individual inner voice and circumspection of parliamentarians which the researcher
objects.

141
GoI., Report of Committee on Electoral Reforms (Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department,
1990)

66
 Chapter 4

Anti-Defection Law In Other Countries

Party law varies efficiently amongst well-established and nascent democratic governments.
Perhaps the most unconventional difference lies in the existence of laws against party
changing, abandoning, or floor-crossing in nations' governance. Laws that disqualify
representatives who change parties are commonly called "Anti-defection" laws; however,
they have different names. G.C Malhotra's, in his 1,200-page composition on the point, said
that in various Commonwealth countries, the law against political defection from a
parliamentary party is known by multiple terminologies, for example, 'floor-crossing, 'carpet
crossing, 'party-hopping, 'dispute' and 'waka jumping'-142. While in some of the countries,
defections are not considered as an issue and not seen as a problem, at the same time, in some
nations, defections have now and again compromised the actual stability of the government.
Accordingly, while a few nations manage instances of defection with the assistance of

142
G.C.Malhotra, Anti Defection In India And The Common Wealth, Metropolitan Book Co.Pvt Ltd ( 2005 ).

67
grounded customs, conventions, and parliamentary practices and strategies, others have
outlined well-defined laws and rules to handle this issue.

An independent research conducted in 2009 utilising a 2007 data on party defection in 41 out
of 193 Nation brings this issue to the light of the day. Findings of the research reveals that
several countries have enacted laws with the intention of either controlling or prohibiting
defection of members. A note-worthy finding is that the more politically advanced
democracies have less stringent anti-defection laws.

Table 1: Nations with Laws against parliamentary Party Defections143

Type of democracy, Number of nations Those with Floor - Nations with floor-
2007 crossing laws crossing laws

Older democracies 36 5(14%) India, Israel,

Portugal, Trinidad &
Tobago

Newer democracies 54 13(24%) Belize, Bulgaria,

Ghana, Guyana,
Hungary, Lesotho,
Mexico, Namibia,
Romania, Samoa,
Senegal, Suriname,
Ukraine

Semi- democracies 58 19(33%) Armenia,

Bangladesh, Fiji,
Gabon, Kenya,
Macedonia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Nepal,
Niger, Nigeria,
Papua New Guinea,
Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore,

143
Kenneth Janda, Laws Against Party Switching, Defecting, or Floor Crossing in National Parliaments, The
Legal Regulation of Political Parties in Modern Democracies, ( Aug.1st, 2021, 10:00PM),
http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp0209.pdf

68
 Sri Lanka, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia

Non democratic 45 4(9%) Congo (Democratic

Republic), Pakistan,
Thailand, Zimbabwe

Total 193 41

The above data reflects that party switching laws are not very popular practice in most of the
developed democracies. The data reveals that none of the countries that are considered as
advanced democracies have laws against defections. These include the UK, USA, Canada,
Belgium ,Germany etc. This position is backed by research that shows that anti-defection
laws are rather traits of bad democracy than ideals of good democracy. This is reflected from
the words used to describe countries with defection laws as newer democracies, semi
democracies and non democracies

4.1 Countries Dealing With Defections Without Legislation144

In the United Kingdom, there is no practice to stop individual members from changing their
party affiliations. A member who switches is not needed to resign. Seating in the house of
Commons is determined by established practices and not rules, but a member who defects
usually sits independently from his original party members. Occurrences of fence-sitting
legislators, the absolute most eminent public men and parliamentarians abandoning their
political affiliations, and the entire group of lawmakers changing their political loyalties are
not obscure in British parliamentary history. Pioneers like "Edmund Burke, William
Gladstone, Joseph Chamberlain, Winston Churchill 145, and Ramsay MacDonald" also
defected from their own political parties.

In the Australian parliament, too, there are no laws or rules to oversee defection other than
inside party arrangements and procedures. On similar lines, the parliament of Canada also has
no restriction - whether statutory or constitutional - against the act of party switching or floor
crossing. The member's right to sit inside the house as a member does not depend upon his

144
Malhotra, Supra note 128.
145
Churchill switched his party thrice in his entire political career: from the Conservatives to the Liberals in
1904 in support of free trade, from the Liberals to an independent candidacy in 1922, and back to the
Conservatives in 1924. He claimed to make these shifts on an ideological basis.

69
political affiliation. The Whip makes the provision for seating arrangements of a member or
members within their party and communicates it to the speaker. Where a member makes a
decision to switch the floor and sit with another party member, then his new Party Whip
would determine the seating arrangement for him.

In Malaysia, likewise, there is no law to deal with instances of floor-crossing; however, there
have been instances of defection, and there has been an interest to establish enactment in such
a manner. Truth be told, there a Private member's Bill was introduced in 1978 to check
defections of duly elected members by requiring the member of parliament to vacate his seat
within the period of 30 days of his defection or removal from the party on whose list he was
initially chosen.

Aside from these, various other countries like Namibia, Seychelles, Bermuda, Tuvalu,
Botswana, Grenada, Cameroon, Jamaica, Cyprus, Dominica, and Anguilla, where there are
no laws or rules to manage the instances of defection.

4.2 Countries Dealing the Issue with Legislation146

Turning to the nations, which have instituted enactments or outlined principles to manage
party switching or defection, an endeavour has been made in this section to give succinct
information in brief under specific parameters and thereby draw out the position prevalent in
various countries comparatively. The position of the law in India is taken as the reference
point to bring out a comparison.

4.2.1 Voluntarily giving up membership of the party.

In India, when a member of the parliament or state legislature voluntarily gives up the
membership of his political party, then he shall incur disqualification under the tenth schedule
of the constitution. A similar sort of situation is found in the constitution of Bangladesh,
which says that a member shall be disqualified and vacate his seat if he resigns from the
political party on whose tickets he had contested the elections. Under article 70 of the
constitution of Bangladesh147, a person who is elected as a member of parliament on the ticket
given by the political party who set him up as a candidate at the election shall be disqualified
and would consequently have to vacate his seat if he decides to resign from his original party
or casts a vote in parliament against the direction of his party. After the introduction of the
12th Amendment, a member of parliament can incur disqualification on six grounds under
146
Supra note 128.
147
Bangladesh Const. art 70, pt.V.

70
this article.148 This article which initially had only seven lines in the original constitution now
spreads over an entire page.

The constitution of Ghana under article 97(1) inter-alia states that a member of parliament
would lose the seat in the parliament if he or she resigns from the party on whose list he was
a member when he got elected to the parliament, to join a different party or to function as an
independent member in the parliament.149

In Nigeria, the term 'Carpet-Crossing' is used to denote defection. A representative in the

house of Representatives or the Senate will vacate his seat if his membership to the house
was supported by one political party, and he joins another party before the termination of the
period for which that house was supposed to operate. 150 The constitution of Sierra Leone also
states that a representative in parliament would have to vacate his seat in parliament if he
stops being a member of the party on whose list he contested to become a member of the
parliament.151 Similarly, article 46(2)(b) of the constitution of the Republic of Singapore
states that the seat of a member will become vacant if he ceases to be a member of or is
removed or resigns his membership of the political party for which sponsored his election.152
148
Article 70 has been incorporated in the Constitution of Bangladesh as an anti-defection law and has been
designed in a manner to prevent party-switching of the members of the Parliament. In the original Constitution
of 1972, there were only two conditions under which a member could be disqualified: 1) If a member resigns
from his party; or 2) If he votes in Parliament against his party. By the 4th Amendment, another two conditions
were added by inserting an explanation of the words ‘votes in Parliament against his party’; These are: 1) If a
member, being physically present in the Parliament, abstains from voting; or 2)If the member, ignoring the
declaration of his party, absents himself from any sitting of the Parliament. Again, by the 12th Amendment, two
more conditions were inserted. The effects of these conditions are: 1) Formation of a group within the
Parliamentary party was made impossible due to provision in Article 70(2). 2) If an independent elected
Member of Parliament joins any political party, he will come under the purview of anti-defection provisions.
149
Ghana Const. art 97, “a member of parliament shall vacate his seat in the parliament- 
(f) if he resigns from office as a member of parliament by writing under his hand addressed to the speaker; or 
(g) if he leaves the party of which he was a member at the time of his election to parliament to join another party
or seeks to remain in parliament as an independent member; or 
(h) if he was elected a member of parliament as an independent candidate and joins a political party. 
(2) Not withstanding paragraph (g) of clause (1) of this article a merger of parties at the national level
sanctioned by parties constitutions or membership of a coalition government of which
his original party forms part shall not affect the status of any member of parliament

150
Nigeria Const. art 68, cl.(g).
(1) A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House of which he is
a member if - (g) being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a
member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected; 
Provided that his membership of the latter political party is not as a result of a division in the political party of
which he was previously a member or of a merger of two or more political parties or factions by one of which
he was previously sponsored; 

151
Sierra Leone Const. art 70.
152
Republic of Singapore Const. art 46, cl.(1)
(1)  Every Member of Parliament shall cease to be a Member at the next dissolution of Parliament after he has
been elected or appointed, or previously thereto if his seat becomes vacant, under the provisions of this

71
In Samoa, Section 15F of the principal Act, which was inserted by the Electoral Amendment
Act, 2005 to Part IIA, which came into operation from the first of April 2005, provides that
where a ballot form of a member who is elected to the legislative assembly clearly states his
membership of a political party, then he shall sit in the legislative assembly as a duly elected
member of that political party for the entire term for which he was so chosen. Where the
ballot form of a candidate shows that he belongs to a particular political party and upon
election, it is found that his party has not secured the minimum seats required to be
recognized as a political party, then according to the Standing Orders, that candidate will
have a choice to join another political party or to function as an independent member as per
the provision of the standing order, and from that point, the chosen up-and-comer will sit in
the legislative assembly as a member of the new party which he joined or as an independent,
as the case might be, during the term for which the up-and-comer was so chosen. However, if
such a member subsequently leaves the new party or becomes an independent member before
completion of his tenure, then the seat of such turncoat will become vacant, and such a
member will be disqualified from holding such a seat.153

4.2.2 Split/Merger

154
the anti-defection law in India as included in the tenth schedule in the constitution stated
that there would be no disqualification in cases where split within a party or merger of a party
with the other party was asserted provided that in the case of split in the political party at least
one-third of its members decided to resign from the membership of that political party 155 and
in the event of a merger, the decision was upheld by not less than two-thirds members of the
political party concerned. However, later the Split Provision was deleted in India as it was
severely criticized in India on the ground that while on the one hand, it tries to curb
individual defection, on the other hand, it supports mass defection. Therefore, the provision
regarding split was omitted by the constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act 2003.

In Bangladesh, there is no particular arrangement for split and consolidations in the

constitution or any other law or Rules of Procedure. In Ghana, if the merger of parties at a

Constitution.(b) if he ceases to be a member of, or is expelled or resigns from, the political party for which he
stood in the election.
153
See Also, Western Samoa Const. art 46 cl.(3).46. Tenure of office of members: (3) Despite Articles 13 and
15, an Act may provide that the seat of a Member of Parliament becomes vacant during his or her term of office:
(a) where in certain circumstances the Member - (i) resigns or withdraws from or changes his or her political
party;(ii) joins a political party if he or she is not a member of the political party;.
154
Added by the Constitution (fifty-second amendment) act, 1985, s. 6 (w.e.f. 1-3-1985).
155
Paragraph 3 omitted by the Constitution (Nienty-first Amendment) Act, 2003, s. 5.

72
national level is endorsed by the constitution or by a coalition government of which his
original party is also a part shall not in any manner influence the seat of a member of
parliament.156

Section 47 of the constitution of South Africa, as was amended by Act No.2 of 2003, states
inter-alia that a member loses his participatory seat in the National assembly if he resigns
from the membership of the political party which supported his election to the assembly,
except if that person becomes a member of another political party in accordance with
schedule 6A. Likewise, Section 106 mutatis mutandis with section 46 states inter-alia that a
member loses his participatory seat in the Provincial assembly if he ceases to be a member of
the political party which supported his election to the assembly, except if that person
becomes a member of another political party as per schedule 6A. Schedule 6A formulates a
mechanism of window period which provides for saving of membership of provincial
legislature or National assembly, in the cases of 1) "change of party membership," 2)
"merger between parties," 3) "subdivision of parties, 4) subdivision and merger of parties."
The terms of the legislation allow the member to defect from the time of the 15-day window
periods which starts from the first of September to the fifteenth day of September in the
second year following the date of election to the legislature and from the first of September to
the fifteenth day of September in the fourth year following the date of election to the
legislature. The Act also has a provision for the members to change their party affiliation
within the first 15 days immediately following the election. Nonetheless, it must be noted that
in order to save the seat in the legislature in the case of change of membership of the party,
merger, subdivision and subdivision and merger of parties, a member of the legislature who
joins the membership of a new party other than the party which supported that person as a
member also called as the nominating party, irrespective of whether the new party took part
in an election or not, continues to be a member of that legislature provided that such member,
whether by himself or herself or together with one or more than one members who, during
the window period left the membership of the nominating party, represents at least 10 percent
of the total number of seats owned by the nominating party in that legislature.157

156
Supra note 136.
157
Floor crossing was abolished in South Africa via fourteenth and fifteenth amendment bills in 2009 ( https://
ullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/local-government-bulletin/archives/volume-10-issue-5-november-
2008/vol-10-no-5-the-end-of-an-era-the-abolition-of-floor-crossing.pdf.

73
In Nigeria, exceptions have been provided in cases of splits and mergers. However, there is
no water-tight limit as to what constitutes a split or a merger. 158 In Sierra Leone, both types of
defection, whether collective or individual, is penalized.159

In Guyana160, New Zealand161, Sri Lanka162 and Tobago163, there are no legitimate rules
governing splits and mergers. In Mozambique, the law doesn't officially sanction splits within
the party or parliamentary alliances. In Zambia,164 a split adds up to an adjustment of party
composition and is managed as such under the provision of law. In Zimbabwe, 165 no
exception is made in cases of splits and mergers.

4.2.3 Independent and Nominated members

Another significant element of anti-defection law relates to the situation with nominated and
independent members in the event of them becoming a member of a political party. In India,
an independent candidate elected to the parliament or a state legislature incurs
disqualification if they join a political party after they were duly elected as an independent
candidate. A candidate who becomes a member of parliament or a State legislature through
Nomination and who does not hold a membership of any political party at the hour of their
election and who does not turn into a member of any political party before the expiry of a half
year from the date on which they sit down in the house, incurs disqualification in the event if
they join any political party after the expiry of the fixed time of a half year.166

In Bangladesh, if a candidate subsequent to being elected as a member of parliament as an

independent candidate joins any political group, then he is deemed to have been chosen as a
candidate of that party. There is no provision for the nomination of members to the
parliament in Bangladesh.167 In Sierra Leone, the law is similar as in India that is a member
elected as an independent candidate to the legislature would incur disqualification if,
subsequent to their election as an independent candidate, they join a political party. In Sri
Lanka, an individual cannot contest an election independently. However, they can contest and

158
Supra note 135.
159
Supra note 136.
160
Guyana Const. art 156, para 3.
161
New Zealand ,Electoral (Integrity) amendment act,2001,www.
nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/eaa20012001n105328.pdf
162
Sri Lanka Const. art 99(13).
163
Tobago Const. Sec 49A vide amendment act No. 15/1978.
164
Zambia Const. art 70.
165
Zimbabwe Const. sec 41(e) vide constitutional amendment No.9,1989.
166
India Const. sch X.
167
Supra note 133

74
participate in the election under the symbol of an independent group, and consequently, they
would be subject to the law against party switching. In Trinidad and Tobago, there is no
provision governing independent and nominated members. In Uganda, 168 any member of
parliament who leaves the political party on whose list they contested the election to the
parliament and joins another political group or stays in parliament as an independent member
would incur disqualification. In Zambia, if an independent candidate joins a political party
after their election, they automatically lose their seat. In Zimbabwe, independent members of
the parliament do not get disqualified if they join a political party after the election.

4.2.4 Expelled members

The situation concerning members who have been ousted from their political party varies
from one country to another. The anti-defection law in India does not clearly express the
position and status of individuals who are expelled from their political party. Nonetheless,
such a member continues to be a member of the house and is made to sit separately from the
bloc of seats reserved for the members of his original party. 169 In Bangladesh, if a member is
to be removed from a political party, the 'question' alludes to the election commission, whose
decision is conclusive, and no appeal can be preferred against it.

In New Zealand, if a member is expelled from his political party, then his seat becomes
vacant. The practice followed in Sierra Leone is that when a member has to be removed from
the party, the speaker sets up an advisory group that enquires into the matter and reports to
the speaker depending upon which the speaker takes a view in the matter. The speaker's
choice is, nonetheless, appealable in a court of law. In Sri Lanka and Singapore, if a member
is removed from his party, he will lose his seat in parliament. In Zambia, where the speaker
gets insinuation from a political party regarding the expulsion of a member from the party, in
such a circumstance, the mandate of the law requires him to inform the president and
electoral commission that there is a vacancy of the seat in the National assembly. In
Zimbabwe, the situation under which a member is deemed to have ceased to be a member of
his party is not well-defined, which implies that it can be through resignation, expulsion, or
via defection. Thus there is a lot of discretion between the parties and their members. In the
event, if the seat of a particular member is declared vacant, then an election has to be
organized to fill such vacancy.

168
Republic of Uganda Const. art 83(1) (g).
169
Refer G.Vishwannthan case.

75
4.2.5 Excluding the Presiding Officer

In order to ensure the efficiency of the working of presiding officer, they should be absolved
from the thoroughness of the law if they cut off their political association with their political
party after being appointed to such a post. Under the anti-defection law in India, a unique
arrangement has been made concerning presiding officer and the Deputy presiding officer,
which empowers them to cut off their associations with their original political party without
incurring any disqualification. They can re-join their political party subsequent to laying
down the post. 170

Under the significant law in Guyana, Singapore, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka, no such
provision for an exception is accessible to the speaker or the Deputy speaker. In Belize, the
speaker is also liable to incur disqualification as a member from the house of Representatives
in the event if they cross the floor. In Kenya, 171 an exception is given to a member who is
appointed as speaker, and he does not attract the law relating to the disqualification in this
regard. In Mozambique, the speaker and the Deputy speaker of the assembly are not required
to act in unprejudiced nature or discord with their political party. Further, they reserve the
option to cast a ballot, which on a fundamental level, has to be consistent with the party
through which they were chosen.172

In New Zealand, presiding officer (except if initially elected as an independent candidate )

are not treated uniquely in contrast to other members of their parliamentary party. In
Pakistan, like in India, the law as established in article 63A of the constitution is not
applicable to the hon'able chairman or the speaker of a house173. In Zimbabwe, the topic of
defection or change of party alliance in the case of the speaker doesn't emerge on the grounds
that the speaker is not considered a member of the assembly. article 69( I) of the constitution
of Zimbabwe states that there will be a speaker of the National assembly who the members of

170
India Const. sch X par(5).
171
Kenya Const. sec 40.
172
Supra note 128.
173
Pakistan Const. art 63A, “If a member of a Parliamentary Party composed of a single political party in a
House : (1) resigns from membership of his political party or joins another Parliamentary party;(2) votes or
abstains from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by Parliamentary Party to which he belongs,
in relations to Election of Prime Minister or Chief Minister, vote of confidence or no confidence, a money bill
or constitutional amendment bill. He may be declared in writing by the Party Head to have defected from the
political party, and the Head of the Parliamentary Party may forward a copy of the declaration to the Presiding
Officer, and shall similarly forward a copy thereof to the member concerned:
Provided that before making the declaration, the Party Head shall provide such member with an opportunity to
show cause as to why declaration may not be made against him.”

76
the assembly will choose from among people who are entitled and qualified to be chosen as a
member of the assembly however are not actual members of the assembly174.

4.2.6 Presiding Officer as Deciding Authority

While in a few parliaments, presiding officers are considered as competent and final authority
to make a decision in cases concerning defection, in certain nations, an appeal can be
preferred against such decision to the court or the election commission or some different
bodies. The situation in India is that the chairman or the speaker of the particular house
decides the inquiry concerning whether a member of the house of parliament or a state
legislature has become subject to disqualification. The presiding officer, be that as it may,
can't take any action suo moto. It must be based on a request or a petition filed by the
members. Where the inquiry is regarding the chairman or the speaker himself, a member
from the concerned house, chosen by the speaker or the chairman, for that case would decide
the matter. Although anti-defection law in India provided a finality clause that no court shall
have any jurisdiction regarding any matter related to the disqualification of a member of a
house under the law. But, the hon'ble supreme court of India has held the provision, which
bars the jurisdiction of courts in such cases, as ultra vires the constitution. 175 Hence, members
on several occasions have moved to the concerned courts in appeal challenging the orders
issued by the speaker. The court's judgments in some cases have also been implemented. In
Bangladesh, the election commission takes all decisions concerning disqualification and is
conclusive, and no arrangement for appeal against such provision has been made. Whereas in
India, a petition for disqualification can be brought only by a member of the house, in
Bangladesh, any individual or member can carry the petition of disqualification to the
speaker. The speaker then prepares an assertion containing all the statements and sends it to
the election commission. In Malawi, the speaker's decision is followed after a motion from
another member. The Presiding Officer cannot take any action unless there is a resolution
moved for the removal of a member. 176 In Mozambique, a decision regarding disqualification
is taken by the Standing Committee, a body which is chaired by the speaker, which ought to
be reported and published in the government Gazette. The discretion is given to the Standing
Committee to decide upon the sanctions in consultation with the chief whip of that party to
which such member belongs to. Further, there is also an option to appeal against the sanctions
imposed by the committee to the plenary within eight days of such notification. In
174
Zimbabwe Const. art 69.
175
Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu And Others, 1992 SCR (1) 686, 1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651.
176
Malwai Const. sec 65.

77
Singapore, the constitution completely vests in the parliament the power to make a decision
on any question pertaining to the disqualification of a member. 177 The decision of the
parliament in such matters is considered to be final. In South Africa, a member can resign
from his original party during the window period to form a part of another party by writing an
application to the speaker of the legislature. A new party within the legislature that had not
been enlisted according to the law is expected to apply for enrolment within the window time
frame officially provided. Such registration of the new party should be affirmed by the
appropriate authority (for example, the Independent Electoral commission) within four
months after the expiry of the window time frame. Seven days after the expiry of the window
time frame, the speaker would report in the official Gazette the details of the adjusted
composition of the legislature. Where relevant, a party should submit to the secretary of the
legislature the new list of members within seven days after the window time frame.

In Sri Lanka, there is no provision for a member to file a petition or complaint about
disqualification against another member. Similarly, the Presiding Officer does not have the
authority to take up a matter relating to defection. However, in a case involving the expulsion
of a member, his seat would not be declared vacant if he moves to the supreme court by
petition in writing before the expiration of one month. The supreme court, upon such petition,
decides that such expulsion was invalid. Nonetheless, If the court holds such expulsion to be
valid, the vacancy shall occur from such decision date.

4.2.7 Time Limit

Under the anti-defection law in India, no cap on the time limit has been specified as such for
deciding the pertaining to defection. There is an inclination in certain quarters that there
ought to be a time period fixed within which a decision under the anti-defection law ought to
be given. In Bangladesh, unlike in India, the speaker should set up a statement within thirty
days after a question has first emerged and send it to the election commission to hear and
decide the matter. Where a such a matter has been referred to the election commission via the
speaker for conducting hearing and investigation, the commission shall, unless it is of the
view that a reference on any point relating to the matter is needed to be made to the speaker,
convey, within the completion of 14 days of the receipt of the statement, to the aggrieved
parties to the dispute requesting them to submit their claims in hard copy, if any, on the
matter within such time as may be directed by it. The election commission is supposed to

177
Singapore Const. sec 46.

78
give a decision on the case and communicate the same within a time period of one hundred
and twenty days of receipt of the statement. The decision of the election commission is
conclusive, and no appeal can be preferred against such a decision. In New Zealand, when a
member is ousted, he is given 21 working days time to file his response, and after having a
discussion on the response (if any), a minimum of two-thirds of the member of parliament of
that party should support that the leader of the party should give a notice in writing to the
speaker that such a member has been removed from the party. In Pakistan, upon receiving the
intimation from the chief of the Political Party addressed to the Presiding Officer relating to
the defection of a member, the Presiding Officer of the house has to within two days of the
receipt of such intimation refer the matter to the chief election commissioner, who shall then
lay the matter further before the election commission for its determination which shall, in
turn, give a decision within 30 days from the date of receiving such intimation by the chief
election commissioner. A party not satisfied with the decision of the election commission has
an option to raise an appeal in the supreme court within thirty days of such decision, and the
court is further bound to decide the matter within three months. 178

In Sri Lanka, where an individual ceases to be a member either via expulsion or resignation
or otherwise of a recognized political which supported them and on whose list they became
an elected member, shall lose their seat upon the expiration of a period of one month from the
date of them ceasing to be such a member. As already mentioned, in Trinidad and Tobago, a
member who has been pronounced as having resigned or been ousted by the party has the
privilege to initiate legal actions challenging his renunciation or expulsion. However, if
within 14 days of such a declaration by the speaker, the concerned member does not
challenge the allegation of his resignation or expulsion. In that case, he shall vacate his seat at
the end of the said period of 14 days. And if within the given period of 14 days, the aggrieved
member initiates legal proceedings questioning his resignation or expulsion. In that case, their
seat shall not be declared vacant until the proceedings initiated by him are taken back or the
question raised has been finally answered by a judgment upholding their resignation or
expulsion.179

4.3 Intra-Party Dissent in Other Countries 180

178
Supra note 128.
179
Id.
180
Nikita Bagaria & Vedika shah, Decoding Intra-Party Dissent: The Lawful Undoing Of Constitutional
Machinery, 7(2) NLUJ L Rev 115 (2021).

79
Different nations throughout the globe follow various systems for intra-party dissent in the
house. Many nations, including the US, Australia, UK, and Malawi, grant intra-party dissent,
casting a ballot against the party's beliefs and floor-crossing.

In the UK, a member of the house is allowed the freedom to vote in favor of any bill unafraid
of incurring disqualification from either his political party or the house. 181 The absence of
prohibitive guidelines on expressing dissent has been helpful in advancing the discussions in
the house and permitting significant debates at the hour of policy formulations. For instance,
at a few phases of discussion and deciding on Brexit, the UK parliament saw interior conflict.
The previous Conservative Party Prime Minister, David Cameron, was involved in bitter talks
with his party chiefs, famously Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, over the Brexit debate. 182
None of these occurrences was viewed as demonstrations of disobedience towards the party.
members who were reluctant to lend support to the majority approach could desert and sit as
independent members of parliament. This demonstrates the degree of freedom enjoyed by
members of the UK parliament, who can't be constrained to fall in accordance with the party's
position simply because of their political association with it. 183 Further, in the UK, there are
three sorts of whips which can be given, as follow: (I) one-line whip, which is advisory in
nature, (ii) two-line whip, which is directional in nature, and (iii) three-line whip, which is
mandatory in nature,184 which is the position approximately followed in India. The three-line
whip is only issued cautiously by the parties on important issues such as those pertaining to
votes of no-confidence, unlike in the situation in India, where such whips are used by the
political parties at the drop of a hat. Likewise, the US also practices a relatively liberal
political framework, with no specific legislation on the defection. Each member of the house
is guaranteed the freedom of speech under their constitution, and this right encompasses the
right to speak or not to speak in support of any matter and to the right of forming associations
freely and without fear as per the wishes of the member. 185 The American legal experts have
likewise assumed a vital part in guaranteeing that this right doesn't remain only on paper
however does indeed see the light of the day. For instance, in the milestone judgment of
Julian Bond v. James Floyd,186 where the member was prevented from taking a vow in the

181
Id.
182
Bhopindar Singh, Political Dissent, The Statesman,( Jul.27th , 10:00 PM), https://www.
thestatesman.com/opinion/political-dissent-157097.html
183
J. Marshall, The whipping system and free votes, Institute for Government,( Jul.27th , 10:00PM)
https://www. instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/whipping-system-and-free-votes.
184
Id.
185
Washington Legal Foundation v Massachusets Bar Foundation 993 F2d 962, 976.
186
385 US 116 (1966).

80
house and censured for his reservations on certain US international strategies executed by his
own party, supreme court of the United States (SCOTUS) held that a lawmaker couldn't be
precluded for communicating authentic opinions about foreign or public approaches of the
country. The US supreme court further held that members had a commitment to take a
position on disputable issues and to unreservedly take part in the debates on strategies of
governance, given that they are considered to be the best judge of the interests of their
electorate. Further, in another case of Gewertz v. Jackman,187the US District court held that
the right to freedom of speech and articulation conferred upon parliamentarians is so
sacrosanct that ordering disqualification in the face of debates and discussion brought up in
the house would be malicious and infringing upon a parliamentarian's established rights.
Taking the aforementioned recommendation further, one more District court in the case of
Barley v. Luzerne County Board of Elections,188 explicitly explained that if a member decides
to go against the perspectives of his political party on a matter, he is completely protected
from disqualification. He might be removed from the political party however can not be
removed from the house. Thus, through a multitude of legislative acts and judicial decisions
in the US, parliamentarians are guaranteed complete freedom to express their views within
the walls of the house, which thusly is helpful for encouraging better conversations and well-
framed enactments. A few instances of intraparty dissent have been witnessed in the USA
history during the official residency of Former President Donald Trump. For example,
Senator John McCain clashed with Trump and his kindred Republicans as much as seventeen
percent of the time during voting in the Senate, 189 while Texas Senator Ted Cruz openly
rejected the nomination of fellow Republican Trump as the presidential candidate at the
Republican public convention.190 Furthermore, his extreme thoughts on the economy, medical
care, and especially foreign policy was not greeted wholeheartedly, and indeed a few
Republican pioneers straightforwardly condemned his interpretation of issues like the Covid
episode and 'Black lives matter movement, to the degree of restricting his 2020 bid for re-
elections.191 However, the disagreeing parliamentarians of the two houses have neither needed
to endure the worst part of offering an opposite viewpoint nor have they needed to confront
187
467 F Supp 1047 (DNJ 1979).
188
937 F Supp 362 (MD Pa 1995).
189
M. Zeeshan, India’s anti-defection law needs changes to promote party-level dissent on issues like CAA, The
Print, ( Jul.27th, 2021, 10:00 PM), https:// theprint.in/opinion/indias-anti-defection-law-needs-changes-to-
promote-party-level-dissent-on-issues-like-caa/382505/.
190
Ried J Epstein, Despite boos, Ted Cruz Won’t Endorse Donald Trump, The Wall Street Journal,( Jul.27th ,
10:00PM), https:// /www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/24/ted-cruz-donald-trump-president-endorsement.
191
Leigh Ann Caldwell and Josh Lederman, Trump's foreign policy faces growing dissent in Congress, NBC
News,( Jul.27th ,2021, 10:00PM), https:// www.nbcnews.com/politics/.

81
critical outcomes like exclusion. In these cases, the disagreeing parliamentarians can hold
their own positions and views, and their difference was not translated into showing
disobedience towards their party. Likewise, the situation in Malawi concerning intra-party
dissent is note-worthy. The constitution of Malawi explicitly gives party individuals a flat
outright to practice a free vote in any procedures of the house, and such member's seats will
not be declared vacant solely on the ground of their inconsistencies to follow the orders of
their parties. Further, a member ousted from his party for reasons other than switching sides
doesn't lose his membership and can proceed as an independent member in the house, 192
unlike the position continued in India attributable to the Explanation and G Vishwanathan.
Further, the position that exists in Australia relating to intra-party contradict is noteworthy.
Notwithstanding an absence of a reasonable enactment relating to intra-party dissent, the
Australian government has allowed it, yet has also handled the issues emerging because of
intraparty dissent through inner arrangements and practices. In the Australian parliament,
disagreement is frequently resolved within the party rooms, at its underlying stage, and not
heard or seen to cause disarray in the house.193

This helps in putting across a united front and fortitude within the party members in front of
the public, and at the same time guaranteeing and ensuring the right of the members of a
party to openly express themselves in the political domain. Thus, from the above-mentioned
examples, it can be concluded that several nations have dealt with the matter of party
cohesion vis-à-vis intra-party dissent in a wholesome manner, through various tools such as
judicial sanctions, legislative enactments, customs, and practices. This demonstrates that
there exists a transaction between conceptual intra-party dissent and its pragmatic
applicability, which is fairly allowed by the governments of various states. The political
design and legislative enactments in these nations set out the high est quality level on free
discourse as a significant feature of popular government, which is incredibly different from
the position followed in India, where dissent goes unnoticed as well as forestalled and
rebuffed.

192
Lok Sabha Secretariat Mr GC Malhotra Report of Anti-defection Law in India and the Commonwealth
(2005).
193
Supra note 166.

82
 Chapter 5
Conclusion and Suggestions

The anti-defection law (ADL) was included as a schedule in the constitution in the year 1985.
Since then, around thirty- six years have passed; however, the law has failed to keep a check
on the evil of political defection to its desired extent because of certain inbuilt loopholes in
the law. The primary plan of the law was to battle "the evil of political defection." The
objective behind the law was to save the democratic structure of our legislature and to defend
the political morality of its officials.

The tenth schedule governing the law has 8 paragraphs. The First para sets out the
definitions of various terms used in the schedule ; the second para talks about the grounds of
disqualifications; the third para was about split, which was erased in the year 2003, the fourth
para accommodates an exception from disqualification on the grounds of a merger of the
original party. The fifth para makes an exception for the speaker, Deputy speaker, chairman
and deputy chairman of a house, and permits them to surrender their membership of the
political party to which they belong in the wake of being chosen for that office; Para six
names the people who might adjudicate on the issues within the under the schedule ; para 7 is
a finality clause which bars the courts to exercise jurisdiction in regards to the supposed

83
inquiry of disqualification of any member, and the last para 8 enables the speaker/the
chairman to make rules for a house to execute the provisions of tenth schedule .

Provisions of the tenth schedule have been questioned before the hon'ble apex court, and in
high courts over and over for its interpretation and application, the different high courts just
as apex court have discussed and examined the matter and gave wide interpretation to the
meaning of different provisions of the tenth schedule to the constitution.

5.1 Findings of the Study

The anti-defection law was supposed to be the means to stop the evil of unscrupulous
political defections. However, since the hour of its inception, the anti- defection law has been
exposed to various criticism and analysis, and many loopholes have been found to exist after
this process. The researcher has, on the basis of the analysis carried out in previous chapters,
carved out the following issues:

Voluntarily giving up membership: When an individual member of the political party

voluntarily gives up the membership of that political party, then he is liable for defection
under para 2(1)(a). However, the term 'Voluntarily giving up membership' has not been
explicitly defined, which creates disarray regarding its application under the Act. According
to the supreme court, the term has a more extensive meaning and isn't limited to
"resignation." Even in the absence of formal resignation, a member may be deemed to have
voluntarily given up his membership if the same can be inferred from his conduct.

Whip: After the introduction of the fifty-second constitutional amendment act, 1985, which
incorporated schedule tenth to the constitution of India, the word 'whip' has gained a vital
role in our parliamentary democratic system. The use of the words "any direction" under para
2(1)(b) gives extra tyrannical authority to the heads of the political party, which is contrary to
the standards of parliamentary democracy followed in our country. If the term "any direction"
was deciphered in its literal sense, then it would make members who are representatives of
the people agents of the political parties to which they belong, reducing their role to mere
rubber stamps in possession of the political parties. Such translation would disrupt
parliamentary democracy, which is the essential element of the constitution. Thus, any such
directions issued by the political parties to its members, contradiction of which might involve
disqualification under para 2(1)(b), ought to be restricted to a vote of confidence or no trust in
the Government or where the motion identifies with any monetary or finance bill.

84
Adjudication of disputes: Under the tenth schedule , the speaker/chairman is trusted with the
adjudicatory duty to determine questions emerging under the said Act. However, whether the
speaker is a suitable authority and meets the essential criteria of being impartial and
unprejudiced to act as a tribunal under the act is a question that is still doubtful given the
recent roles played by the speaker in state assemblies. With due regard to the high office of
the speaker in the nation and after going through some of the occasions in the recent past,
different doubts have been raised with regards to unbiasedness and neutrality of the speaker
in his ability to act as a Tribunal under the tenth schedule of the constitution. The speakers
are seen acting in a hardliner way which is regularly reflected in their working as a court, for
example, in Goa, Manipur, and Karnataka. The speaker in the Indian setting is the delegate of
the political party who is not needed to leave their party connection after becoming the
speaker. speakers being political characters and being candidates of the political parties don't
meet the necessities of an impartial arbiter to act as a tribunal. There is sufficient force in the
decision given by the minority in Kihoto Hollohan case that vesting of adjudicatory powers
in the speaker is violative of the Principle of Natural Justice, and the speakers being political
characters can't be anticipated to discharge duties and functions of the quasi-judicial tribunal.
Previous Lok Sabha speaker Somnath Chateerjee observed that ‘the need to decide the issues
arising under the tenth schedule need not keep on being exercised by the presiding officer
and the power ought to be presented on some other authority like an autonomous tribunal
containing members knowledgeable in law or authority like the election commission’. When
we investigate the authentic foundation of the anti-defection Law, it is discovered that though
the constitution (52nd amendment) act 1985 gave the dynamic force on the topic of defection
to the speaker/chairman of the house. The preceding bills had vested such authority with the
election commission. Thus, according to the researcher, the time has arrived for parliament to
think for an alternate adjudicatory forum to decide the question of disqualification on the
ground of defection under the tenth schedule.

Merger: Para 4 talks about an exemption from disqualification on the ground of merger. It
provides that where an original party merges with another political party and a member
claims that he and any other member of his original political party have become members of
such other political party formed after the merger or of a new political party or; have refused
to accept the merger and opted to function as a separate group; then such members would not
be liable for disqualification under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph (2). Such a merger of the
political parties is considered valid only and only if two-thirds or more members of the

85
political party concerned have assented to such a merger. Lately, the legislators with the
speaker are misusing the merger clause enunciated in paragraph 4 of the tenth schedule to
give effect to their ulterior motives. The provision has been wrongly assumed that the
original political party on whose election symbol the candidate contested and got elected as
the representative has given an unlimited free pass to their MLA to encash it with some other
political party. It is awful to infer that a political party stands merged into any other political
party on the unrivaled premise that their chosen MLAs have consented to something similar.
Such a perusing isn't just outlandish and is even impermissible as it humiliates the public
picture and fame of the political party alongside subverting public trust in it.

Expelled members:The anti-defection law is quiet in regard to the position and status of
individual members who are ousted or expelled from their political party. Such a member
continues to be a member of the house and, however, sits independently from the alliance of
seats reserved for his political party. The question that emerges is whether removal from the
political party can be the reason for disqualification from membership of the house. Whether
the party whip would be applicable against such ousted or expelled members? What will be
the situation with such individual members? In this regard, the view of the Apex court in G.
Viswanathan Vs. speaker T.N. Authoritative assembly 194 was that an expelled member is
limited by the party's whip even after removal from the political party, and inability to abide
by such whip would bring about disqualification of the member from the house. The
important question – can anti-defection law be summoned only against the members who
defect or resist its whip while still in the party or will it also apply to those members who
have been removed from the party again came into consideration for the supreme court when
Amar Singh and Jaya Prada were removed from the Samajwadi Party? In Amar Singh Vs.
Union of India though the court at first held that the decision of the G.Viswanathan case will
not be applied to their case195 yet the larger bench of the apex court refused to re-examine the
law set down in G. Viswanathan case and the decision of G. Viswanathan case still holds the
ground196. This methodology of the apex court has made the provision of the tenth schedule
obscure and dim. Considering the current situation, the researcher begs to submit that it is
time to enquire into the questions raised in the Amar Singh case.

194
(1996) 2 SCC 353
195
Amar Singh vs. Union of India, 2010 (12) SC 451
196
Amar Singh v UOI (2017) SCC Online SC 405

86
Dissent and defection: 'dissent' is a hallmark of vibrant democracy and isn't equivalent to
'defection.' There is an exceptionally thin line between an act of 'defection' and an act of
'dissent.' While all instances of defection would also include acts of dissent either sponsored
by lure for office or for different contemplations which may not be called 'moral', however ,
the opposite isn't true for every case and all instances of 'dissent' don't really fall in line with
the meaning of the term 'defection.' Under the current anti-defection law, an official can
practice his dissent just in two circumstances – if the member takes approval from his party,
or when the activity is condoned by the party within a time period of 15 days from the date of
such conduct or voting. In such cases, he won't be viewed as a turncoat. Otherwise, even their
valid dissent might be named as defection, and they might be disqualified from the
participation of the concerned house. The ADL, which was carried out to check defection,
has completely reduced the scope and importance of considerations and discussions in the
house, particularly when a single party has a larger number of members in the house. A Bill
can easily be passed in the house regardless of individual views of members of the ruling
party and interests of their constituencies since abstention or casting a ballot against party's
(whip) will be classified as defection. This also unfavorably influences participation in the
house and increases interruptions and walkouts.

In a parliamentary framework, the objective of the representatives is to accomplish the

conceivable interest of his/her constituency through effective deliberations and compromise,
and with this in mind, intra-party dissent and democracy become urgent, which is seeing a
precarious decrease in our framework across parties. Abraham Lincoln said that the
"government is of the people, by the people, and for the people," and since political parties
form the core of the government so it can rightly be said that "political party is of the
people, by the people, and for the people." The anti-defection law shifts the centrality of
democracy from people to party and to the high authorities within the party. Thus, in
essence, it is a yellow flag on democracy and has failed to check defections.

5.2 Suggestions

In the wake of considering the above study on the researcher begs to present the following
suggestions:

1) Adjudicatory Power under tenth schedule : The researcher prescribes an amendment

to the tenth schedule of the constitution which will vest the ability to settle the

87
 question of disqualification under the tenth schedule , in the president or the governor
(as the case may be ) who would act on the advice of the election commission. This
change of vesting the ability to decide the matters dealing with defection in the
president/governor would also help in safeguarding the integrity of the speaker's
office.
2) Definition of words "Voluntarily giving up membership": The words Voluntarily
giving up membership of political party should be exhaustively defined in the
explanation.
3) Issuance of Whip or Direction under tenth schedule ought to be restricted to
decisions on which the stability of the government depends such as confidence
motion, finance bill and not in every other case. It will reduce the interference with
the member's freedom to vote in the house. However, to prevent corruption in voting,
a provision should be made that where a member of the political party decides to vote
against the party, he must have valid reasons, and he should give the reasons in
writing to the chairman or the speaker as the case may be.
4) Specific time limit for decision: The tenth schedule ought to be revised, and
arrangement ought to be made that any disqualification petition under the tenth
schedule on the ground of defection ought to be heard and decided within a
reasonable period and shall in no case exceed one year.
5) If a member decides to voluntarily give up his membership, then instead of
conducting the by-polls, the other candidate who got the highest number of votes next
to such a member at the elections should be declared elected automatically. This
measure would act both as a check as well as punishment and would deter members
from taking their membership for granted and encashing it for money and other
material gains.

The issue of defection should not be seen in isolation. It is not an issue that can be resolved
with single legislation; it requires perpetual measures from the government and people's
careful vigilance. Defection is a problem that requires a systematic and long-term solution.
The undemocratic functioning of political parties is the root cause behind defections. It is
suggested that the logic that applies to the system of democracy should also apply to the
internal affairs of the political party organizations themselves.

88
The NCRWC, in its Report on “Electoral Processes and Political Parties” 197 and the 1999
Law commission Report,198 strongly recommended institutionalizing and making of a
regulatory framework governing the internal structures and inner democracy of parties. These
suggestions were made on the premise that a political party "can't be an autocratic inside, and
democratic in its working outside. Aside from the reasons given before, the NCRWC
suggested: "The standards and by-laws of the political parties looking for enrollment ought to
incorporate arrangements for (a) A declaration of adherence to democratic values and norms
of the constitution in their inner party organizations."

Inspiration can be taken from the law operational in Germany in this regard. With the
inception of the German constitution (the Basic Law) in 1949, Germany turned into the
principal European country with a constitution that regulated its political party to safeguard
democracy. article 21 of the Basic Law works with the guideline to organize the political
parties to adhere to democratic standards and states:

"(1) Political party will take part in the development of the political will of individuals. They
shall be freely established. Their inner association should conform to democratic based
standards. They should openly account for their resources and the utilization of their assets.

(2) Parties that, by reason of their behavior or the conduct of their followers, look to subvert
or abolish the democratic-based order to jeopardize the existence of the Federal Republic of
Germany will be unlawful. The Federal constitutional court will be the authority to rule on
unconstitutionality.”199

It is open to India to follow Germany's example and to formulate a law ensuring internal
democracy within political parties, which includes provisions governing internal elections,
candidate selection, secret ballots, and provisions ensuring that valid dissent is not hampered.
Where the members within the party are not discriminated against and the organization as a
whole functions in adherence to a democratic standard. Such a step would, in the long run,
help in reducing the problem of defections which is a bane of democracy.

197
Supra note 5.
198
Supra note 5.
199
Electoral law reforms 2015 ( https:// lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report255.pdf).

89
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