SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 214435. February 14, 2022.]

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION , petitioner, vs.

DAYAMON DIDATO ALO, respondent.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J : p

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 12, 2014 Decision 2 and
the September 12, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 129993.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 5, 2011, respondent Dayamon Didato Alo (Alo) was formally
charged with unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable conduct before the
Board for Professional Teachers (Board), which operates under petitioner
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), for using fraud or deceit in
obtaining a certificate of registration and professional license, allegedly
committed as follows:
You used a falsified Board Resolution No. 671 dated September
28, 2000 when you registered as a professional teacher on
September 14, 2007. The original Board Resolution No. 671 dated
September 28, 2000 does not contain your name as among those
who will be registered as professional teachers without examination
either in the elementary level or in the secondary level. 4
For her defense, Alo alleged in her counter-affidavit 5 that she is a
holder of a degree in Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education and had
been a public elementary school teacher in Kalanganan Elementary School
from 1995 to 2006 before she secured her certificate of registration and
professional license. 6 She is currently a public school teacher in Tambo
Cadayonan Elementary School, Pantar District, Pantar, Lanao del Norte. 7
Sometime in September 2007, Alo allegedly went to the PRC Head
Office in Manila to apply for a Professional Teacher's License based on
Section 26 (C) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7836. 8 RA 7836, under certain
conditions, grants a certificate of registration and professional license to
qualified applicants without need for examination. 9 Alo, who was not a
passer of the board examination for professional teachers, claimed that she
knew of some professional teachers who were granted permanent
appointments under the said law and believed that she was qualified to be
extended the same privilege since she has been teaching in the public
school from 1995 to 2006. 10 She averred that when she went to the PRC,
she was given forms to fill out and was made to pay various fees. 11 A few
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 days later, she was issued a professional identification card, followed by a
certificate of good standing and a certificate of membership in the National
Organization of Professional Teachers, Inc. 12 CAIHTE

Alo maintained that there was no iota of proof that she used the
alleged falsified Board Resolution No. 671 in obtaining her certificate of
registration and professional license. 13 She claimed that she never knew of
the existence of such board resolution, and that it was the first time she
heard about it. 14 Also, she never attached the said board resolution to her
application for registration, and noted that the accusation against her
belittled the efficiency of the PRC personnel, wondering how the latter could
have been easily defrauded into issuing a professional license based on an
alleged falsified board resolution when they could have easily checked or
verified with their own record or office the authenticity of the said document.
15

Moreover, Alo argued that she already enjoyed security of tenure

pursuant to Section 5 of RA 4670, 16 otherwise known as "The Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers," which provided that "teachers appointed on a
provisional status for lack of necessary civil service eligibility shall be
extended permanent appointment for the position he is holding after having
rendered at least ten years of continuous, efficient and faithful service in
such position." 17
In her position paper, 18 which Alo filed in lieu of her personal
appearance during the trial, she bolstered her allegations in her counter-
affidavit. 19
She stressed that she never submitted the alleged falsified Board
Resolution No. 671 and even tasked the special prosecutor to present in
evidence the said falsified document; if she actually submitted a falsified
board resolution, the prosecution needed only to request from the PRC all the
papers and documents she submitted before it when she applied for her
license and certificate of registration. 20
Alo also pointed out that there was no need for her to present the
alleged Board Resolution No. 671 since she applied for her license and
certificate of registration on the strength of Section 26 (C) of RA 7836. 21
On September 11, 2012, the Board rendered a Decision 22 against Alo,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board hereby declares
the respondent, DAYAMON DIDATO ALO, GUILTY as charged and
accordingly REVOKES her certificate of registration and license as
professional teacher.
Respondent is hereby ordered to surrender to this Board her
Certificate of Registration and Professional Identification Card as
Professional Teacher within fifteen (15) days upon finality of this
decision and to desist from the practice of the teaching profession
under the pain of criminal prosecution.
SO ORDERED. 23

Dissatisfied, Alo filed a motion for reconsideration 24 which the Board

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 denied. 25

Without elevating the case to the PRC, Alo directly filed a petition for
review 26 with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 27
On September 3, 2013, the CA issued a Minute Resolution 28 requiring
the Board and the PRC, which was impleaded in the petition, to file their
comment on Alo's petition for review. 29 However, since the Board and the
PRC failed to file their comment within the reglementary period, the CA
deemed that they waived the filing of their comment and submitted the
instant case for decision without comment. 30
On February 12, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, 31
granting Alo's petition for review and reversing the ruling of the Board, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for
review is GRANTED and the September 11, 2012 Decision and March
15, 2013 Order of respondent Board for Professional Teachers are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner is EXONERATED of
the charge against her.
SO ORDERED. 32

In ruling for Alo, the CA held that the evidence on record was utterly
insufficient to sustain the Board's finding that Alo committed fraud or
falsification in securing her certificate of registration and professional
license. 33 The special prosecutor in this case failed to present not only the
alleged falsified Board Resolution No. 671 used by Alo, but also the authentic
and original copy of the said board resolution itself. 34 The said documents
were never a part of, or attached to the record of the case. 35 Given this, the
CA gave credence to Alo's assertion that she never knew of the existence of
the questioned board resolution, more so her assertion that she never
falsified the same. 36 Therefore, not only did the prosecutor fail to prove that
there was falsification and that Alo was the one who committed it, the
prosecutor also failed to present in evidence the corpus delicti of the alleged
falsification. 37
Moreover, the CA ruled that the Board was wrong in applying the
disputable presumption rule under Rule 131, Section 3 (j) of the Rules of
Court, which provides: 38
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercise acts of
ownership over, are owned by him or her.
The CA held that the Board's application of the foregoing presumption
is fundamentally flawed because Alo was not accused of falsifying her
license, but an alleged Board Resolution No. 671 submitted by Alo to secure
her license. 39 Given that the license was an authentic document, the
prosecution failed to prove by substantial evidence, the falsification of the
alleged Board Resolution No. 671, which, as discussed earlier, was not even
presented as evidence. 40 DETACa

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 Lastly, the CA took note of Alo's assertion that she did not need any
board resolution to apply for a certificate of registration and professional
license as she applied for the same under Section 26 (C) of RA 7836, which
provides: 41
Sec. 26. Registration and Exception . — Two (2) years after
the effectivity of this Act, no person shall engage in teaching and/or
act as a professional teacher as defined in this Act, whether in the
preschool, elementary or secondary level, unless he is a duly
registered professional teacher, and a holder of a valid certificate of
registration and a valid professional license or a holder of a valid
special/temporary permit.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Not qualified under paragraphs one and two but with any
of the following qualifications, to wit:
(1) An elementary or secondary teacher for five (5) years in
good standing and a holder of Bachelor of Science in Education or its
equivalent; or
(2) An elementary or secondary teacher for three (3) years
in good standing and a holder of a master's degree in education or its
equivalent.
Provided, That they shall be given two (2) years from the
organization of the Board for professional teachers within which to
register and be included in the roster of professional teachers:
Provided, further, That those incumbent teachers who are not
qualified to register without examination under this Act or who, albeit
qualified, were unable to register within the two-year period shall be
issued a five-year temporary or special permit from the time the
Board is organized within which to register after passing the
examination and complying with the requirements provided this Act
and be included in the roster of professional teachers: Provided,
furthermore, That those who have failed the licensure examination for
professional teachers shall be eligible as para-teachers and as such,
shall be issued by the Board a special or temporary permit, and shall
be assigned by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) to schools as it may determine under the circumstances.
The Board argued that Alo's right to apply for a certificate of
registration and professional license had already prescribed, pursuant to the
last paragraph of the aforequoted provision and its own Board Resolution No.
600, Series of 1997 (BPT Resolution 600-1997), which provided that "those
who fail to register by September 2000 shall forfeit their privilege to practice
the teaching profession for abandonment of responsibility." 42 According to
the Board, since Alo only applied in September 2007, way beyond the
prescriptive period, she already lost her entitlement under the law. 43
However, the CA ruled that this issue was never mentioned in the
formal charge against Alo, and stressed that she was charged with
falsification only. 44 Therefore, she was not apprised of the Board's foregoing
reason for the revocation of her license and certificate of registration, and
consequently, her right to due process was denied. 45 Given this, the CA
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 exonerated Alo of the charges lodged against her. 46

Aggrieved, the Board and the PRC filed a motion for reconsideration,
wherein they attached a copy of the original Board Resolution No. 671. 47
However, this motion was denied in a resolution dated September 12, 2014,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to disturb Our assailed
decision, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 48

Hence, the instant petition, which essentially raises following —

Issues
1) Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to directly review
the Board's decision, considering that the same belongs to the PRC;
and
2) Whether or not the Board correctly found respondent
guilty of falsification and accordingly revoked her certificate of
registration and professional license. 49
Our Ruling
The petition is granted.
The CA has jurisdiction of the
case.
The PRC argues that the CA has no jurisdiction to directly review the
September 11, 2012 decision of the Board. 50 To support this contention, the
PRC cites Section 9 (c) of RA 8981, 51 which enumerates the powers of the
Board, including the power to make decisions, and the mode of appeal of an
aggrieved party, to wit: 52
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Various
Professional Regulatory Boards . — The various professional
regulatory boards shall retain the following powers, functions and
responsibilities:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their
respective laws, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
and their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose, may issue summons,
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or
witnesses to compel their attendance in such investigations or
hearings: Provided, That, the decision of the Professional Regulatory
Board shall, unless appealed to the Commission, become final and
executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of judgment or
decision;
The PRC maintains that it implements the above provision through
their own Resolution No. 2013-775. 53 Section 1 thereof states: 54 aDSIHc

Section 1. Appeal, Period Non-Extendible . — The decision or the

order of the Board that completely disposes of the case shall be final
and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof
without an appeal being perfected or taken by either party. The
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 aggrieved part may file a notice of appeal to the Commission together
with appellant's brief or memorandum on appeal, copy furnished the
adverse party, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision or
order, n and shall pay the appeal and legal research fees.
The period for perfecting an appeal shall be non-extendible.
(Underscoring supplied)
This argument holds no water.
Preliminarily, it must be reiterated that jurisdiction is defined as the
power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. 55 In order for
the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on
the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. 56
This Court has long held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court
that it exists. 57
The above-cited provisions by the PRC, while showing that they may
have appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the Board, does not
divest the CA of its own appellate jurisdiction. To put it simply, there is no
law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by
the Board, nor is there any law excluding such cases from being taken
cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, as will be discussed further below.
A cursory reading of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 58 (BP 129) or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, would show the extent of
the CA's jurisdiction. Section 9 of BP 129, as amended by RA 7902 59
provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus , prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgment of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and
the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
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 hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals
must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice. (Underscoring supplied)
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is consistent with the aforequoted
provision, particularly Section 9 (3) of BP 129, which grants the CA exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders
or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 43
Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to
the Court of Appeals
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear from the above provisions that a Rule 43 petition to the CA
includes all awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions,
except those under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Pertinently, this Court
has ruled that the list of quasi-judicial entities found in Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court is not exclusive. The case of United Coconut Planters Bank
v. E. Ganzon, Inc. 60 explains: ETHIDa

Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure

merely mentions several quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in
the phraseology. The enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned
is not exclusive. The introductory phrase "[a]mong these agencies
are" preceding the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies
only highlights the fact that the list is not meant to be exclusive or
conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges the
existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included in the
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 enumeration but should be deemed included. 61 (Underscoring
supplied)
With this in mind, the question now is whether the Board is considered
a quasi-judicial agency that exercised quasi-judicial powers when it issued its
Decision dated September 11, 2012. Jurisprudence provides a guide on what
may be considered as a quasi-judicial entity and what it means to exercise
quasi-judicial functions, to wit:
A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being
vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of
powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters
calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial
function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 62 (Underscoring
supplied)
As applied in this case, the Board is clearly vested with quasi-judicial
power. Section 9 (c) of RA 8981 provides:
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Various
Professional Regulatory Boards . — The various, professional
regulatory boards shall retain the following powers, functions and
responsibilities:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their
respective laws, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
and their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose, may issue summons,
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or
witnesses to compel their attendance in such investigations or
hearings: Provided, That, the decision of the Professional Regulatory
Board shall, unless appealed to the Commission, become final and
executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of judgment or
decision; (Underscoring supplied)
The Board, by virtue of the power vested in it by the provision above,
clearly exercised its quasi-judicial functions when it investigated the case,
held a hearing, and issued a decision that affected the rights of a private
party, herein respondent Alo.
Given this, there is no question that the September 11, 2012 Decision
of the Board is covered by the jurisdiction of the CA and can be subject of a
Rule 43 petition.
While the CA has jurisdiction,
Alo failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies, and
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 thus, under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative
remedies, her case must be
dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
Despite having established that the CA has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, the question of giving due course to the Rule 43 petition
is a different issue.
The PRC laments the fact that Alo disregarded its procedural rules as
quoted earlier, and that it was not given any chance to review the decision
of the Board. 63 It argues that under the rule on exhaustion of administrative
agencies, courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence; premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the cause of action. 64
The Court agrees.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on
practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned
to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the
litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative
processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts. 65
I n Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, 66 this Court explained the
rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
follows:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the
same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot
or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact.
Of course, this general rule allows for some exceptions, which have
been repeatedly outlined by this Court. The case of The Roman Catholic
Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. The Heirs of Mariano Marcos , 67 citing previous
jurisprudence, provides: cSEDTC

However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several

exceptions that include situations where the very rationale of the
doctrine has been defeated. The Court has taken many occasions to
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 outline these exceptions, including its observation in Samar II Electric
Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Seludo, Jr., to wit:
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion
of administrative remedies are subject to certain
exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where
strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
However, the records would show that none of these exceptions are
present in this case. Alo filed the petition for review with the CA on May 2,
2013 without any justification or reason on why she did not file an appeal
with the PRC instead, considering that the latter is the proper procedure and
it was still within the 15-day reglementary period. Not only is this a blatant
disregard of procedural rules, but also a denial of an opportunity for the PRC
to review the Board's decision and if necessary, correct or modify the same,
without resorting to the judiciary and unnecessarily adding to the courts'
already clogged dockets. This is definitely contrary to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies, and thus, the CA should have dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action.
Alo was never qualified under the
law to obtain a professional
teaching license and certificate of
registration. Moreover, she
applied for registration way
beyond the prescriptive period
under the law.
In any event, even if we consider the merits of the case in the interest
of substantial justice, the PRC is correct in pointing out that Alo, who is a
non-passer of the professional teacher's board examinations, was patently
not qualified to obtain a professional teacher's license and a certificate of
registration tinder Section 26 (C) of RA 7836.
Section 26 of RA 7836 provides:
Sec. 26. Registration and Exception . — Two (2) years after the
effectivity of this Act, no person shall engage in teaching and/or act
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 as a professional teacher as defined in this Act, whether in the
preschool, elementary or secondary level, unless he is a duly
registered professional teacher, and a holder of a valid certificate of
registration and a valid professional license or a holder of a valid
special/temporary permit.
Upon approval of the application and payment of the prescribed
fees, the certificate of registration and professional license as a
professional teacher shall be issued without examination as required
in this Act to a qualified applicant, who at the time of the approval of
this Act, is:
(a) A holder of a certificate of eligibility as a teacher issued
by the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports;
(b) A registered professional teacher with the National
Board for Teachers under the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1006; or
(c) Not qualified under paragraphs one and two but with any
of the following qualifications, to wit:
(1) An elementary or secondary teacher for five (5) years in
good standing and a holder of Bachelor of Science in Education or its
equivalent; or
(2) An elementary or secondary teacher for three (3) years
in good standing and a holder of a master's degree in education or its
equivalent.
Provided, That they shall be given two (2) years from the organization
of the Board for professional teachers within which to register and be
included in the roster of professional teachers: Provided, further, That
those incumbent teachers who are not qualified to register without
examination under this Act or who, albeit qualified, were unable to
register within the two-year period shall be issued a five-year
temporary or special permit from the time the Board is organized
within which to register after passing the examination and complying
with the requirements provided this Act and be included in the roster
of professional teachers: Provided, furthermore, That those who have
failed the licensure examination for professional teachers shall be
eligible as para-teachers and as such, shall be issued by the Board a
special or temporary permit, and shall be assigned by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to schools as it
may determine under the circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
In implementing the above provision, the Board then issued BPT
Resolution 600-1997, which provides that qualified applicants under Section
26 (C) of RA 7836 must be incumbent teachers, full-time or part-time, in
public and private schools at the pre-school, elementary and secondary
levels as of December 16, 1994 and have at least five years of experience. 68
SDAaTC

Evidently, since Alo only graduated from college in April 1995, 69 and
she admitted to have commenced her continuous service as an elementary
public school teacher also in 1995, 70 she could not have been eligible to be
an applicant under Section 26 (C) of RA 7836 as the basis of incumbency is
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 reckoned as of December 16, 1994. 71

Moreover, while under Section 26 of RA 7836, incumbent teachers

without examination were originally only allowed to apply for registration
within two years from the organization of the Board, BPT Resolution 600-
1997 extended the period of registration for those teachers to September
19, 2000. 72 Failure to register by September 19, 2000 shall forfeit their
privilege to practice the teaching profession for abandonment of
responsibility. 73
St. Mary's Academy v. Palacio 74 expounds on the history of BPT
Resolution 600-1997, to wit:
Pursuant to RA 7836, the PRC formulated certain rules and
regulations relative to the registration of teachers and their continued
practice of the teaching profession. Specific periods and deadlines
were fixed within which incumbent teachers must register as
professional teachers in consonance with the essential purpose of the
law in promoting good quality education by ensuring that those who
practice the teaching profession are duly licensed and are registered
as professional teachers.
Under DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998, the Board for
Professional Teachers (BPT), created under the general supervision
and administrative control of the PRC, was organized on September
20, 1995 so that, in the implementation of Sections 26, 27 and 31 of
RA 7836, incumbent teachers as of December 16, 1994 have until
September 19, 1997 to register as professional teachers. The
Memorandum further stated that a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) was subsequently entered into by the PRC, Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and DECS to further allow those teachers who
failed to register by September 19, 1997 to continue their service and
register. BPT Resolution No. 600, s. 1997 was thereafter passed to
provide the guidelines to govern teacher registration beyond
September 19, 1997. Consequently, the deadline was moved to
September 19, 2000.
Pursuant to the aforestated law, resolution and memorandum,
effective September 20, 2000, only holders of valid certificates of
registration, valid professional licenses and valid special/temporary
permits can engage in teaching in both public and private schools.
Clearly, respondents, in the case at bar, had until September 19,
2000 to comply with the mandatory requirement to register as
professional teachers. As respondents are categorized as those not
qualified to register without examination, the law requires them to
register by taking and passing the licensure examination. 75
(Underscoring supplied)
Given the above, even if we consider only for the sake of argument
that Alo is a qualified applicant, then she must be deemed to have forfeited
her privilege to practice the teaching profession for failure to register by
September 19, 2000. She admitted to have only applied for registration in
September 2007, 76 seven years from the deadline provided under BPT
Resolution 600-1997. Clearly, she cannot anymore register as an applicant
under Section 26 of RA 7836, and thus, if she wants to register as a
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 professional teacher, she can only do so by taking and passing the licensure
examination, which she did not.
Alo's right to due process was not
violated when the Board declared
that she was not qualified for
registration under Section 26 of
RA 7836.
The CA erred in ruling that Alo's right to due process was violated
insofar as the Board declared that she was not qualified for registration
under Section 26 of RA 7836.
While the formal charge was for the use of fraud or deceit in obtaining
a certificate of registration and professional license, constituting
unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable conduct, particularly in using
Board Resolution No. 671, the records would show that it was Alo herself
who brought up her qualification under Section 26 of RA 7836. 77 Given this,
it makes no sense to argue that Alo had been denied due process with
respect to her qualification under Section 26 of RA 7836, when she was the
one who raised the issue in the first place, and because of this, the Board
had to rule on such issue as the same was tied into Alo's defense.
It must be emphasized that administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. In Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations , 78 the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in
administrative proceedings, summarized as follows: acEHCD

(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision; and
(7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered. 79
As applied in this case, administrative due process was fully observed
when Alo was given full opportunity to adduce her own evidence, present
her side, and expound the same in her counter-affidavit and position paper.
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 The CA erred in reversing and
setting aside the Board's decision.
To reiterate, the formal charge against Alo was for "use of fraud or
deceit in obtaining a Certificate of Registration and Professional License,
unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable conduct." 80 This was allegedly
committed when Alo "used a falsified Board Resolution No. 671 dated
September 28, 2000" when she registered as a professional teacher on
September 14, 2007. 81
A copy of the original Board Resolution No. 671, 82 which was attached
to the Board and PRC's motion for reconsideration filed with the CA, provides
a list of professional teachers without examination who have applied for
registration pursuant to Section 26 of RA 7836. The list does not include the
name of Alo. 83
While it may be true that there is no evidence that Alo did attach a
falsified copy of Board Resolution No. 671 in her application, she
nonetheless falsely represented that her name was included in the said
board resolution as evidenced by the fact that she deliberately wrote the
notation "671 s'2000 E/C" at the dorsal portion thereof under Board
Res./Approved Letter (Number & Date) when she filled out the Registry Book
for Teachers with Serial No. RS-AA 0080206. 84 Alo, by writing such notation,
clearly represented that she was qualified to be registered under such board
resolution, even though she was actually not.
Logically, the mere fact that she represented herself as one of those
who have applied for registration under such board resolution, despite not
being on the list, would mean that she either 1) relied on a fake/falsified
copy of Board Resolution No. 671, or 2) deliberately misrepresented her
qualifications when she applied for her professional license and certificate of
registration in September 2007. With respect to the former scenario, even if
she is given the benefit of the doubt that she relied on a fake or falsified
board resolution without any intention to deceive the Board and the PRC, the
fact that she alleged to have never known that Board Resolution No. 671
even existed and that she has only heard of it for the first time when she
was charged, 85 despite the records showing that she wrote a notation
referencing said board resolution on the registry, is already dubious and
shows unprofessional/dishonorable conduct.
Considering the above, there is no doubt that the Board's Decision
dated September 11, 2012, finding Alo guilty and consequently, revoking her
certificate of registration and license as a professional teacher, was
supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, there was no cogent reason
for the Board's decision to be reversed and set aside by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 2014
Decision and September 12, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 129993, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September
11, 2012 Decision of the Board for Professional Teachers is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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 Perlas-Bernabe, Inting, Gaerlan and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 16-36.

2. Id. at 40-47. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and

concurred in by Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of
this Court) and Pedro Corales.

3. Id. at 48-50.

4. Id. at 40-41.
5. CA rollo, pp. 32-34.

6. Rollo , p. 41.

7. Id. at 18.
8 Entitled "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE
PRACTICE OF TEACHING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND PRESCRIBING A LICENSURE
EXAMINATION FOR TEACHERS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved
December 16, 1994.
9. Id. at 41.

10. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Entitled "THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS." Approved: June
18, 1966.

17. Rollo , pp. 41-42.

18. CA rollo, pp. 35-39.

19. Rollo , p. 42.

20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 69-74.

23. Id. at 74.

24. Id. at 75-78.

25. Id. at 75.

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 26. CA rollo, pp. 7-18.
27. Rollo , p. 19.

28. CA rollo, p. 47.

29. Rollo , p. 43.

30. Id.

31. Id. at 40-47.

32. Id. at 47.

33. Id. at 43-44.

34. Id. at 44.

35. Id.

36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id. at 44-45.

40. Id. at 45.

41. Id. at 46.

42. Id.

43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id.

47. Id. at 48.

48. Id. at 50.

49. Id. at 21.

50. Id. at 22.

51. Entitled "AN ACT MODERNIZING THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

COMMISSION, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THREE, ENTITLED 'CREATING THE
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION AND PRESCRIBING ITS POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS,' AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved December 5,
2000.

52. Rollo , p. 22.

53. Id.

54. Id.
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 55. Foronda-Crystal v. Son, 821 Phil. 1033 (2017).

56. Id.
57. El Dorado Consulting Realty and Development Group Corp. v. Pacific Union
Insurance Company, G.R. Nos. 245617 & 245836, November 10, 2020.
58. Entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: August 14, 1981.
59. Entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION NINE OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
129, AS AMENDED, KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1980." Approved: February 23, 1995.

60. 609 Phil. 104 (2009).

61. Id. at 121-122.

62. Id. at 122.

63. CA rollo, p. 23.

64. Id.

65. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. The Heirs of Mariano Marcos, G.R.
No. 225971, June 17, 2020.

66. 546 Phil. 87, 96-97 (2007).

67. Supra.
68. Rollo , p. 105.

69. Id. at 248.

70. Id. at 253.

71. Id. at 106.

72. Id.
73. Id.

74. 644 Phil. 532 (2010).

75. Id. at 545-547.

76. Rollo , p. 254.

77. Id. at 253-255.

78. 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

79. Id. at 642-644.

80. Rollo , p. 30.

81. Id.

82. Id. at 221-224.

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 83. Id.
84. Id. at 301 and 303-304.

85. Id. at 254.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "oder" in the official document.

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