IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

The Hon’ble JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI

CRR 2911 of 2019

Chaitanya Singhania & Anr
-Vs-
Khusboo Singhania

For the Petitioners: Mr. Sabyasachi Banerjee, Adv.

Mr. Anirban Dutta, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Jain, Adv.

For the Respondent: Mr. Sanjoy Bose, Adv.

Heard on: July 22, 2021.

Judgment on: September 27, 2021.

BIBEK CHAUDHURI, J. : –

1. The question that requires an answer in the instant revision is

whether an order passed by the learned magistrate in a proceeding under

Section 12 read with Section 23 of the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence act, 2005 (hereinafter described as the said Act) on the

point of maintainability of the said proceeding can be quashed under the

provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter

described as the Code).

2. The above question would have been answered considering the

provisions of the said Act and the Code but for the conflicting decisions on
 2

the applicability of section 482 of the Code in a proceeding under the said

Act. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in Dr. P. Pathmanathan v. V.

Monica: (2021) 2 CTC 57 pronounced an order on 18th January

2021 holding, inter alia, that the petition under section 482 of the Code is

not maintainable. However, the petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution is maintainable if it is found that the proceedings before the

magistrate suffered from patent lack of jurisdiction. The Jurisdiction

under art. 227 is one of superintendence and is visitorial in nature and

will not be exercised unless there exist jurisdictional error and that

substantial injustice would be caused if the power is not exercised in

favour of the petitioner. In normal circumstances, the power under article

227 will not be exercised as a measure of self-imposed restriction in view

of the corrective mechanism available to the aggrieved parties before the

magistrate, and then by way of an appeal under section 29 of the Act.

3. In short, the Madras High Court said that the relief under the said

Act will be granted by a civil or criminal or family court. Further there is

no application of service of summons under the said Act upon the

respondent as under section 61 of the Code. It also held that an

application under section 12 of the said Act is not a complaint under

section 2(d)and consequently section 190(1)(a) and sections 200-204 of

the Code have no manner of application in such proceeding. Further,

there is no concept of an accused but a concept of the respondent in the

said Act and finally in absence of the concept of commission of an offence

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in the PWDV Act redressal in terms of Section 482 of the Code is not

available.

4. It is true that the above-mentioned judgment has no binding force

on this court. However, in view of the persuasive nature of the judgment

passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge of Madras High Court, this court likes

to revisit the issue in order to come to a finding as to whether section 482

of the Code is applicable in relation to an application under section 12 of

the said Act.

5. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was

enacted to protect women from being victims of domestic violence and to

prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in society. The Act is enacted

for eliminating all sorts of discrimination against women. It is the

bonafide legislation to render justice to the women who suffered domestic

violence. The Act states in its preamble:-

“An Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights of

women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of
violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

6. Section 3 defines Domestic Violence as hereunder:-

3. Definition of domestic violence: For the purposes of this

Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the
respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb
or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved
person or tends to do so and includes causing physical
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abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and

economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved

person with a view to coerce her or any other person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other
property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any

person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a)
or clause (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or

mental, to the aggrieved person.

7. Thus Domestic Violence constitutes both a criminal act and civil

wrong perpetrated upon a woman who is in a domestic relationship with

the respondent. The respondent may be the husband, parents, parents-

in-law, maternal or matrimonial relations with whom the woman is in a

domestic relationship. It is needless to say that the victim woman is

termed as the aggrieved person in the said Act. The phrase ‘victims of

violence’ indicates the incidents of physical harm and injuries caused to

the victim. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, VIOLENCE means

‘Unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment

of vehemence, outrage or fury’.

8. Definition of Domestic Violence is inclusive in nature encompassing

“harm or injuries, endangering the health, safety, life, limb or well being,

whether mental or physical”. As provided above, the criminal nature of the

specific acts committed by the respondent(s) is to be construed as

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domestic violence is crystal clear as it includes bodily injury as well as

physical harm. Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code defines injury in the

following:

‘Injury-The word ‘injury’ denotes any harm whatever illegally

caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property.

9. Theoretically, there is no difference between domestic assault and

non-domestic assault. While the two types of assault are legally identical,

they are sociologically distinct. Domestic Violence, perhaps cannot be

disputed to be different from most other crimes, at the root of which is the

power theory of violence. Domestic Violence is an amalgamation of

criminal offence and civil wrongs. A lady at the same time may be treated

with cruelty, sexual abuse, or subjected to a criminal offense under

Indian Penal Code, POCSO Act, etc. And at the same time coupled with

the commission of offence she may be denied of having her stridhan

properties, residential rights in the shared household, monetary reliefs,

and custody of her children.

10. The said Act speaks of the following reliefs for an aggrieved person:-

i. Protection Orders(Section 18)

ii. Residence Orders (Section 19)
iii. Monetary Reliefs (Section 20)
iv. Custody Orders (Section 21)
v. Compensation Orders (Section 22)
 6

11. Section 23 empowers the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte

orders on the basis of an affidavit of the aggrieved person providing

temporary reliefs under section 18-21 of the said Act.

12. Section 27 lays down jurisdiction to adjudicate an application

under section 12 of the said Act the provision runs thus:-

27. Jurisdiction.—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the

first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be,
within the local limits of which— (a) the person aggrieved
permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is
employed; or (b) the respondent resides or carries on business
or is employed; or (c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be
the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders
under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable
throughout India.

13. Section 28 speaks of the Procedure stating:-

28. Procedure.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all

proceedings under sections 12,18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and
offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from
laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application
under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23.

14. The Act also provides the provision of appeal against an order

passed by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class or a Metropolitan

Magistrate before a Court of Sessions. Non-compliance with an order

under sections 18-22, 23, and 29 is an offense under 31 of the Act.

 7

15. The above, being the provision of the said Act, confusion arises in

the mind of the court to negotiate the two provisions contained in the said

Act, namely Section 26 and Section 28. While the provision of Section 28

prescribes the procedure to be followed in deciding an application under

Section 12 read with Section 23 of the said Act, Section 26 states as

follows:-

26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief

available under sections 18, 19,20, 21 and 22 may also be

sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family

court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and

the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before

or after the commencement of this Act.

(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for

in addition to and along with any other relief that the

aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding

before a civil or criminal court.

(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved

person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this

Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant

of such relief.

16. If the scheme of the Act is taken into consideration, it would appear

that Section 26 is an enabling provision empowering an aggrieved person

to seek reliefs under Section 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 in a pending legal

proceeding before a civil court, family court or a criminal court between

 8

the aggrieved person and the respondent. The said provision states that in

a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation or divorce

pending in the civil court or family court an aggrieved person may file an

application under Section 12 of the said Act claiming one or different

reliefs as provided in Section 18-22 of the said Act. It is needless to say

that notwithstanding Section 26 being in the statute book, general

provision as to the procedure is laid down in Section 28 of the said Act.

17. There cannot be any dispute that the reliefs under the said Act are

civil in nature and protection order, residence order, monetary reliefs,

custody order and compensation orders are the reliefs for violation of civil

wrong of an aggrieved person by the respondent in course of domestic

violence. Since domestic violence infringes several penal provisions and at

the same time civil wrongs, an enabling provision has been included in

the statute by the parliament while enacting the Act.

18. However, the general provision as to the procedure to be followed

for reliefs to be provided to an aggrieved person, Section 28 in

unequivocal term states that it shall be governed by the provision of the

code of criminal procedure.

19. A distinction is sought to be made by the Higher Judiciary and

interpreters of the statutes that Sub-Section (2) of Section 28 speaks of a

non-obstante clause empowering the court to lay down its own procedure

for disposal of an application under Section 12 or Sub-Section (2) of

Section 23 of the said act.

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20. In my considered view, Sub-Section (2) of Section 28 cannot be read

separately in isolation of Sub-Section (1) of Section 28. The trial court is

empowered to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application

under Section 23 but such procedure shall not be dehors the provision of

the Code.

21. The Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the procedure for trial of

different types of proceedings and cases.

22. Chapter VIII deals with the procedure for passing an order for

maintenance of wives, children and parents. Chapter X empowers the

Executive Magistrate for maintenance of public order and tranquillity,

having three distinct parts namely (A) Unlawful Assembly, (B) Public

Nuisance, (C) Urgent Cases of Nuisance and Apprehended Dangers. The

Executive Magistrate is empowered to follow the procedure under the

Code under Chapter X while passing the order. It is important to note that

under Section 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate is

empowered to pass even an order of injunction, which relief is absolutely

civil in nature. Apart from the above-stated proceedings, Chapter XVIII

delineates the procedure regarding trial of offences before a Court of

Session, Chapter XIX lays down the procedure for trial of warrant cases.

Chapter XX states the procedure of trial of summons cases and Chapter

XXI deals with the procedure of summary trial.

23. Since section 28 of the said Act authorizes application of Code of

Criminal procedure so far as the procedure to adjudicate all proceedings

under the said Act, it is specifically stated in Rule 6(5) of the Protection of
 10

Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006, that the application under

Section 12 shall be dealt with or order is enforced in the same manner

laid down under section 125 of code of criminal procedure. Section 126 of

the Code prescribes the procedure for adjudication of proceeding under

section 125 which runs as hereunder:-

126. Procedure.—(1) Proceedings under section 125 may be

taken against any person in any district—

(a) where he is, or

(b) where he or his wife resides, or

(c) where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be,

with the mother of the illegitimate child.

(2) All evidence in such proceedings shall be taken in the

presence of the person against whom an order for payment of

maintenance is proposed to be made, or, when his personal

attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader,

and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed for

summons-cases:

Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that the person

against whom an order for payment of maintenance is

proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding service, or wilfully

neglecting to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to

hear and determine the case ex parte and any order so made

may be set aside for good cause shown on an application

made within three months from the date thereof subject to

 11

such terms including terms as to payment of costs to the

opposite party as the Magistrate may think just and proper.

(3) The Court in dealing with applications under section 125

shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be

just.

24. Within the meaning of Section 2(e) read with Section 6 of the Code,

the High Court is the highest appellate court of the State. Section 6 of the

Code recognizes the High Court as a criminal court within the meaning of

the Code. The High Court is, therefore, a Court created under the

Constitution and recognized under the provision of Code. The High Court

has therefore to act within the parameter of ‘Law’. Being a criminal court,

the jurisdiction of the High Court is to determine the existence of a

dispute in the nature of domestic violence between the aggrieved person

and the respondent. Similarly, the High Court has the jurisdiction to

determine the existence of a dispute within the meaning of the said Act

while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code when the

High Court finds that no dispute between the parties or no offence has

been disclosed, it ceases to have its jurisdiction into the matter any

further. The High Court is equally bound by the written law like any other

ordinary criminal law. The only exception is that the High Court can

interpret written law when ordinary criminal courts denude of such

power. Nevertheless, the High Court must act within the four corners of

the statutory provision. For example, the High Court cannot impose

sentences less than the minimum sentence as statutorily provided. Nor

 12

can the High Court waive the requirement of pre-deposit in preferring an

appeal/revision in case the pre-deposit is the legislative mandate. Under

Section 482 of the Code, the High Court exercises the summary

jurisdiction. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S.R Rangadamappa

reported in AIR 1982 SC 1492 it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute without

providing for an exception and without conferring any discretion on the

ground to award, a sentence below the prescribed minimum is not

permissible.

25. In Ajay Kumar Das vs. State of Jharkhand, reported (2011) 12

SCC 319, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that the

purpose of Section 482 of the Code is to find out the existence of an

offence. In such determination, it is the rule that the averments of the

complaint are to be treated as the gospel truth. Generally, no defence of

the accused, however plausible the same may be, can be considered by

the High Court. Hence, in coming to the conclusion regarding the

existence of an offence under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court

decided everything from the point of view of the complainant or the

informant. It is a complainant or informant’s centric approach. Since the

defence of the accused and his private documents are beyond the scope of

consideration of the High Court, therefore, the High Court under Section

482 Cr.P.C. does not adjudicate upon the defence of the accused.

26. The principle set forth in article 482 of the Cr.P.C. based on the

maxim “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit , concedere videtur ed it

 13

sine quo res ipsae esse non potest”, i.e. when the law gives anything to

anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would

be unavailable (Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC

570). The concept of inherent powers depends on the distinction between

powers expressly set forth in the Constitution or laws and powers vested

in the government, constitutional official or individual government official;

tacit possession, whether because of the nature of sovereignty or because

of the easy reading of the language of the Constitution or statutes. Black's

law dictionary defines it as “powers over and beyond those explicitly

granted in the Constitution or reasonably to be implied from the express

grants”. Webster's New World Dictionary defines inherent power as “a

power that must be deemed to exist in order for a particular responsibility

to be carried out”.

27. Section 482 Cr.P.C. stated three conditions under which the

inherent powers may be exercised by the High Court, namely:-

(i) in order to give effect to an order under the Code,

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court; and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

28. The three conditions are mutually not exclusive, rather the

application of these conditions would necessarily overlap. For example,

preventing the abuse of the process of the court cannot be distinguished

as a category different from securing the ends of justice; in fact,

preventing such abuse would be with a view to secure the ends of justice

only. Likewise to give effect to an order under the code also serves to
 14

secure the ends of justice. It is very clear though, that the ambit of

“securing the ends of justice” is a very broad term, broader and inclusive

of the first two conditions. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down

any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent powers of

the court. Undoubtedly the power possessed by the High Court under the

said provision is very wide and is not limited in nature. It has to be

exercised sparingly, cautiously and carefully, ex debito justitiae to do real

and substantive justice for which only the court exists. [Jefrey J.

Deirmeir v. State of W.B., (2010) 6 SCC 243 at 251].

29. Inherent jurisdiction of High Court is not part of the ordinary

litigation process. While exercising powers under section 482, the court

does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Appeal and revision

processes are creation of statutes and not contemplated to be the part of

inherent powers of the court. The High Court while exercising its inherent

powers would not enter into the appreciation or re-appreciation of

evidence as it done if a case would reach the court by way of a statutory

appeal. Again the scope of revision is different from the inherent power of

the Court. In revision, jurisdictional error, illegality of an order and

material irregularity are the issues. But under the inherent power in the

High Court, the Court will see if continuation of a criminal proceeding

shall cause abuse of the process of the Court and cause of justice shall be

defeated, if the proceeding is allowed to be continued.

30. The orders passed by the High Court in its exercise of inherent

powers are not appealable by way of a provision for statutory appeal.

 15

Against the order of High Court the affected party can take up the matter

to the Supreme Court by a special leave petition under Article 136 of the

Constitution.

31. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC

460, the Supreme Court held that there may be some overlapping

between the power of revision of High Court under section 397 Cr.P.C.

and its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. because both are

aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of

discretion. But, at the same time, inherent powers being an extraordinary

and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are

specifically provided for under other provisions of Cr.P.C.

32. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in (1992)

Supp (1) SCC 335 the Supreme Court has gathered broad guidelines for

the exercise of inherent powers with a view to quash criminal proceedings

under section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Article 226/227 of the Constitution from

the different legal provisions and the pronouncements made by the courts

in India. Identifying those guidelines by way of illustration while saying

that an exhaustive list is not possible or desirable, the Supreme Court

stated as follows:-

(i) Where the allegations made in the First Information

Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
 16

(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.

(iv) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are

so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.

(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.

(vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
 17

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.

33. In Pepsi Food v. Special Judicial Magistrate reported in (1998) 5

SCC 749, the Supreme Court held that though the magistrate can

discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charges

to be groundless, this does not mean that the accused cannot approach

the High Court under section 482 to have the complaint quashed if the

complaint does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence

against the accused person. The Court, therefore, concluded that the

order of the High Court refusing to quash the complaint on the ground

that alternative remedy was available under the Code to the accused was

not proper.

34. I am not unmindful to note, that the above discussion in the

foregoing paragraphs is in relation to offence within the meaning of

section 2(n) of the Act. Since the said Act clearly states that the Code of

Criminal Procedure will apply while adjudicating the dispute under

Sections 18 - 22 and 23(2) of the said Act and the applications are to be

filed before the court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate of 1st class or the

Metropolitan Magistrate. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence

Act, 2005 is predominantly a criminal act.

35. In this regard, I am tempted to record the observation made by this

Court in the case of the Deputy Legal Remembrancer vs. Upendra

Kumar Ghose reported in [1907] 12 C.W.N. 140, wherein it was observed that
 18

the function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate it.

“Judicis est jus dicere, non dare” which means it is the proper role of a

Judge to state the right, not to endow it. Generally, interpreted it is the

duty of the judge to administer justice and not to make law (Black’s Law

Dictionary at page 1727). In interpreting a statutory provision, a judge

can iron out the creases but “must not alter the material of which the act

is woven. Therefore in interpreting a statute, a court cannot import any

foreign material into it which is not in the Act.

36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of

T.N reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533 was pleased to hold that it is well

settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a

statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statue is an edict

of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative

factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is

that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by

the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has

been intended but what has been said, “Statutes should be construed, not

as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be

construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them’.

37. In D.R. Venkatchalam v. Dy. Transport Commr [AIR 1977 SC

842], it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori

determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own

preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the

 19

provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to

usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

38. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and

cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the

abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal

it, if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied

by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and

unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was

done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further

stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High

Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of

Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be

covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section

6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the

legislative intent.

39. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and

the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well

settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by

the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is

found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus

omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts

of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a

section should be construed with reference to the context and other

clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular

 20

provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would

be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly

absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the

legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said

Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou [(1965) 3 All ER 539, 544],

“is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction

available”. Where to apply words 21 literally would “defeat the obvious

intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”, we

must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious

intention and produce a rational construction. 16. The plea relating to

applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The

decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder [AIR 1980 Mad 251], was rendered

on 22-6-1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the

legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the

declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could

not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the

legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or

injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded

and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The

maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of

the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this

case.

40. Again in D. M., Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass : 2007 (14)

SCC 1, the Supreme Court observed hereunder:-

 21

“18. Judges must exercise judicial restraint and must

not encroach into the executive or legislative domain vide
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. The Workman of
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007)1 SCC 408 and
S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, JT 2007 (10) 4 SC 272.

19. Under our Constitution, the Legislature, Executive

and Judiciary all have their own broad spheres of operation.
Ordinarily it is not proper for any of these three organs of the
State to encroach upon the domain of another, otherwise the
delicate balance in the Constitution will be upset, and there
will be a reaction.

20. Judges must know their limits and must not try to
run the Government. They must have modesty and humility,
and not behave like Emperors. There is broad separation of
powers under the Constitution and each organ of the State '
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary ' must have
respect for the others and must not encroach into each others
domains. 25

21. The theory of separation of powers first propounded

by the French thinker Montesquieu (in his book The Spirit of
Laws) broadly holds the field in India too. In chapter XI of his
book 'The Spirit of Laws' Montesquieu writes : “When the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the
judicial power be not separated from the legislative and
 22

executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and

liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control;
for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to
the executive power, the judge might behave with violence
and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were
the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of
the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting
laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying
the causes of individuals.” We fully agree with the view
expressed above Montesquieu's warning in the passage above
quoted is particularly apt and timely for the Indian Judiciary
today, since very often it is rightly criticized for 'over-reach'
and encroachment into the domain of the other two organs.”

22. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [AIR 1996 SC

11], this Court observed that the modern trend points to
judicial restraint in administrative action. The same view has
been taken in a large number of other decisions also, but it is
unfortunate that many courts are not following these
decisions and are trying to perform legislative or executive
functions. In our opinion adjudication must be done within
the system of historically validated restraints and conscious
minimization of the Judges' preferences. The Court must not
embarrass the administrative authorities and must realize
that administrative authorities have expertise in the field of
administration while the Court does not. In the word of Chief
Justice Neely: “I have very few illusions about my own
limitations as a judge. I am not an accountant, electrical
engineer, financier, banker, stockbroker or system
management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect Judges
intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the
 23

intricacies of a public utility operation. It is not the function

of a Judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a
pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of
the administrator.”

41. The English Law has also enunciated the same principle as

narrated above in Inco Europe Ltd. vs. First Choice Distribution (a

firm) reported in 2000 WLR 586 observed as hereunder:-

“I freely acknowledge that this interpretation of section

18(1)(g) involves reading words into the paragraph. It has long
been established that the role of the courts in construing
legislation is not confined to resolving ambiguities in
statutory language. The court must be able to correct obvious
drafting errors. In suitable cases, in discharging its
interpretative function the court will add words, or omit
words or substitute words. Some notable instances are given
in Professor Sir Rupert Cross's admirable opuscule, Statutory
Interpretation , 3rd ed. (1995), pp. 93–105. He comments, at
p. 103:

“In omitting or inserting words the judge is not really engaged

in a hypothetical reconstruction of the intentions of the
drafter or the legislature, but is simply making as much
sense as he can of the text of the statutory provision read in
its appropriate context and within the limits of the judicial
role.”

This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes.

The courts are ever mindful that their constitutional role in
this field is interpretative. They must abstain from any course
 24

which might have the appearance of judicial legislation. A

statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by the
legislature. So the courts exercise considerable caution before
adding or omitting or substituting words. Before interpreting
a statute in this way the court must be abundantly sure of
three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or
provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman
and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the
provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision
Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the
precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in
the Bill been noticed. The third of these conditions is of
crucial importance. Otherwise any attempt to determine the
meaning of the enactment would cross the boundary between
construction and legislation: see per Lord Diplock in Jones v.
Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] A.C. 74, 105–106. In the
present case these three conditions are fulfilled.

Sometimes, even when these conditions are met, the court

may find itself inhibited from interpreting the statutory
provision in accordance with what it is satisfied was the
underlying intention of Parliament. The alteration in language
may be too far-reaching. In Western Bank Ltd. v. Schindler
[1977] Ch. 1, 18, Scarman L.J. observed that the insertion
must not be too big, or too much at variance with the
language used by the legislature. Or the subject matter may
call for a strict interpretation of the statutory language, as in
penal legislation. None of these considerations apply in the
present case. Here, the court is able to give effect to
construction of the statute which accords with the intention
of the legislature.”
 25

42. Section 5 of the Code is saving clause which reads thus:- “Nothing

contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the

contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any

special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure

prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.” The

interpretation of the word ‘affect’ came up for consideration before the

Division Bench of this Court in Anand Singh Bisht vs. Union of India :

1985 (II) CHN 447. The Division Bench of this Court observed that

Section 5 does not provide that if there is a Special Law the Code will not

‘apply’, but it says that the Code will not ‘affect’ the Special Law unless

there is a specific provision to the contrary. ‘Affect’ means to produce a

material influence upon or alteration in ; to prejudice ; to override. In the

context of the plain meaning of the word ‘affect’ and the interpretation

given by the Supreme Court in Section 5 of the Code, in the case of Maru

Ram vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1980 SC 2147 in the following

words that anatomy of this saving section is simple, yet subtle. Broadly

speaking, there are three components to be supported. Firstly, the

procedure Code generally governs the matter covered it. Secondly, if a

special or local law exists covering the same area, the letter law will be

saved and will prevail. Now comes the third component which may be

clinching. If there is a specific provision to the contrary then that will

override the special or local law.

43. It is needless to say that the Protection of Women from Domestic

Violence Act, 2005 is a special law. At the risk of repetition, it is recorded

 26

that Section 28 of the said Act clearly states that all proceedings under

Section 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall

be governed by the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Thus, when the Special Act clearly lays down the procedure of trial of the

proceedings under the said Act, there is absolutely no reason to apply any

other procedure. The only exception being in Section 26 of the said Act is

where a civil suit is pending between the parties, the aggrieved person can

pray for relief under Section 18-23 in the said suit.

44. It will not be out of place to mention at this stage that the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Savitri vs. Govind Singh Rawat : (1985) 4 SCC 337

and Vijay Kumar Prasad vs. State of Bihar : (2004) 5 SCC 196 held

that proceedings under Section 125 of the Code are quasi civil in nature.

In Sanjeev Kapoor vs. Chandana Kapoor and Ors reported in AIR 2020

SC 1046, the Apex Court held that a petition under Section 482 is

maintainable against any order given under Section 125.

45. In Rafiq Ahmedbhai Paniwala vs. State of Gujrat : (2019) 5 SCC

464, it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that an order passed by the

Executive Magistrate under Section 131 can be quashed by the High

Court under Section 482 of the Code. The orders of Executive Magistrate

in cases of Public Nuisance under Section 132-143 of the Code, though

being quasi criminal, can be quashed by the High Court under Section

482 of the Code. Decision of the Allahabad High Court in L.J Bhatthi vs.

The State of U.P & Ors : (2014) 1 ALL LJ 527 may be relied on in this

regard.
 27

46. In Kanak Deka and R.M Deka vs. State of Assam : (2012) 5 Gau

Lr 415, an order under Section 145-148 can be assailed under the

provision of Section 482 of the Code.

47. Similarly, there is no bar in invoking Section 482 in the cases under

Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In Suresh

Ahirwar vs. Priya Ahirwar [M. Cr. C No.22777/2017], vide order dated

11th November, 2018, the Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed a

proceeding under Section 482 of the Code where aggrieved person

impleaded some persons as respondents in a proceeding under Section 12

of the said Act with whom she had no domestic relationship.

48. This being the interpretation of the statute, a court of the Judicial

Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate cannot pass any order in a

proceeding under Section 125 of the Code or under the provision of

Protection of Women against Domestic Violence where there is no relation

or domestic relation exists between the parties. For example, an order of

maintenance cannot be passed against a stranger. Similarly, an order of

residence under Section 19 of the said Act cannot be passed against a

landlord under the instance of an aggrieved person. Even a residence

order cannot be passed against the father-in-law of the aggrieved person if

the residence is not a shared household of the respondent along with his

father (See Satish Chander Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja reported in (2021) 1

SCC 414). If such application is filed by an aggrieved person, will it be a

logical proposition that the respondent will not be able to nip the

proceedings in bud without waiting for a prolonged trial or otherwise wait

 28

for a considerable period till the disposal of trial? My considered reply is -

such questions affecting the maintainability of the procedure itself can be

decided by this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

49. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Bijoy Verma

Vs. State (NCT Delhi) reported in ILR 2011 Del 36, by Rajasthan High

Court in Nisanth Hussain Vs. Sima Saddique (2012) SCC Online Raj

2873, by Karnataka High Court in Smt. Nagarthama Vs. M.S.

Valithasharee (2016) SCC Online Kar 1437, Avinash Madhav

Deshpande & Ors. vs. Madhuri Satish Deshpande & Ors. 2018 SCC

online Bom 17170.

50. The next point for adjudication is as to whether an appeal under

Section 29 shall lie against an order passed by the learned Judicial

Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate upon an application filed by the

respondent(s) challenging maintainability of the application under Section

12 of the said Act. There is again divergent opinion of different High

Courts. It is, however pertinent to note that difference of opinion arose on

the question as to whether ‘any’ order passed by the learned Magistrate

on an application under Section 12 of the said Act is appealable or an

order adjudicating the right to relief under Sections 18-22 and 23 is

appealable. In Avijit Bhikaseth vs. State of Maharashtra : 2009 Cr.L.J 889

(Bom), the scope of appeal has been formulated as under:

 29

(i) An appeal will lie under Section 29 of the said Act

against the final order passed by the Magistrate under

Sub-Section (1) of Section 12 of the said Act.

(ii) Under Sub-Section (2) of Section 23 of the said Act, the

Magistrate is empowered to grant an ex-parte relief in

terms of Sections 18-22 of the said Act. The power

under Sub-Section (1) is a granting interim relief in

terms of Section 18-22 of the said Act. Before granting

an interim relief, under Sub-Section (1), an opportunity

of being heard is required to be granted to the

respondent.

(iii) An appeal will also lie against orders passed under

Sub-section (1) and Sub-Section (2) of Section 23 of the

said Act which are passed by the magistrate. However,

while dealing with an appeal against the order passed

under Section 23 of the said Act, the appellate court

will usually not interfere with the exercise of discretion

by the Magistrate. The appellate court will interfere only

if it is found that the discretion has been exercised

arbitrarily, expressly, perversely or if it is found that the

court has ignored settled principles of law regulating

grant or refusal of interim relief.

51. Therefore, an interlocutory order passed in a proceeding under

Section 12 of the said Act, like that of issuance of notice upon the
 30

respondents, summoning of witnesses, personal appearance of the

respondent etc are not appealable under Section 29 of the said act.

52. The order on an application challenging maintainability of a

proceeding under Section 12 of the said Act by the respondent or any of

them is final in nature because if the learned Magistrate allows the

application, it would mean dismissal of the application under Section 12

of the said Act by the aggrieved person. On the other hand, if such an

application challenging maintainability is dismissed, rights of the

respondents are affected. Therefore an order passed by learned Magistrate

upon an application challenging maintainability of the proceeding under

Section 12 of the said Act is, in my considered view, appealable under

Section 29 of the Act. An aggrieved party may challenge the order of the

court of appeal under Section 29 of the said Act in revision under Section

397 read with Section 401 of the Code.

53. A respondent can challenge maintainability of a proceeding under

Section 12 of said Act without filling any such application before the

learned Magistrate, in the High Court invoking its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Code. In other words, in order to invoke section

482 of the Code, it is not required as a precondition that the respondent

shall have to file an application challenging maintainability of the

proceeding before a learned Magistrate and then appeal and finally an

application under Section 482 of the Code.

54. In view of the legal provisions and statutory right of revision, appeal

etc contained in the said Act as well as the Code, invocation of Article 227
 31

of the Constitution is illusory because of the existence of specific

alternative remedy provided by the said Act and Code. The decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.N Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B reported in

(1972) 3 SCC 424 may be relied on this regard.

55. For the reasons stated above let me summarize the findings herein

below:-

(i) Respondent(s) can challenge maintainability of an

application under Section 12 of the said Act filled by
the aggrieved person before the Court of the learned
Magistrate immediately after appearance in the
proceeding by filing appropriate petition.

(ii) The Learned Magistrate shall dispose of such

application challenging maintainability of the
proceeding under Section 12 of the said Act after giving
the opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved person.
An aggrieved party may file an appeal under Section 29
of the said Act against the order passed by the learned
Magistrate under the provision of Section 29 of the
said Act before the learned sessions judge.

(iii) Against the order passed by the court of appeal, a

revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the
Code shall lie.

(iv) Alternatively, a respondent may file an application

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
challenging maintainability of a proceeding under
Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the proceedings
immediately on receipt of notice before the High Court.
 32

(v) An order upon an application challenging

maintainability under Section 12 of the said Act shall
not be assailed under Article 227 of the constitution.

56. In view of the above discussion, with all humility, I respectfully

differ from the decision of the Hon’ble Single Judge of the Madras High

Court in Dr. P. Pathmanathan v. V. Monica: (2021) 2 CTC 57.

57. Coming to the instant case, it is necessary to narrate in brief the

factual situation involved:-

The aggrieved person, the opposite party herein is the wife of

one Pravin Sighania, son of the present petitioner. Their

marriage was solemnized in 26th June, 2004 and in the said

wedlock the opposite party gave birth to a child on 8th

December, 2005. It is alleged that the aggrieved person was

abused by her husband and the parents-in-law (petitioners

herein) and was finally driven out from her matrimonial home

on 20th January, 2014 as she could not fulfill the demand of

dowry of the petitioners and their son. It is also alleged that

after marriage the petitioners compelled the opposite party to

handover of her all stridhan articles. The said stridhan

articles are in the custody of the petitioners. Allegations were

also made against the son of the petitioners that he openly

stated to the opposite party that he would completely

abandon her and remarry. She also filed a written complaint

 33

before the police on the basis of which Phulbhagan P.S Case

No.116 of 2017 dated 20th August, 2017 under Section

498A/406/34 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was initiated

against the petitioners and their son.

58. In the said proceedings under Section 12 of the said Act the

petitioners and their son filled an application challenging maintainability

of the said proceedings stating, inter alia, that the petitioner has

simultaneously moved two forums claiming for identical relief of

maintenance, one before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Bidhannagar by filling an application under Section 125 of the code,

which was registered as M-22 of 2017 and the proceeding under the

Domestic Violence Act. According to the respondents/petitioners the

petitioner/ opposite party cannot claim identical reliefs in two forums on

the selfsame cause of action and continuation of the proceeding under the

Domestic Violence Act shall cause double jeopardy.

59. The said application was disposed off by the learned Judicial

Magistrate, Bidhannagar by rejecting the same.

60. The said order of rejection of the petition challenging

maintainability of proceeding under Section 12 of the said Act is assailed

in the instant Criminal Revision under Section 401 read with Section 482

read with Section 397 of the Code.

61. Without going into the merit of the instant revisional application, I

would like to record that I have already held that an order allowing or

rejecting an application for maintainability of a proceeding under Section

 34

12 of the said Act is final in nature affecting the rights and/or liabilities of

the parties in relation to the question as to whether the aggrieved person

is entitled to get relief under Section 18-22 and Section 23(2) of the said

Act.

62. In view of my specific finding made herein above, the impugned

order is made appealable under Section 29 of the said Act.

63. For the reasons recorded, I don't find any merit in the instant

criminal revision.

64. However the petitioners are given liberty to file an appeal before the

learned court of sessions subject to the Law of Limitation and while

computing the period of limitation, the period from the date of institution

of the instant proceeding and date of passing of the order shall be

excluded.

65. The instant criminal revision is thus disposed of on contest,

however without cost.

(Bibek Chaudhuri, J.)