PD 1829 Digest
PD 1829 Digest
PD 1829 Digest
FACTS: Acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities, a joint team
composed of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly
cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of
the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay
Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and
Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or
license. Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for
safekeeping, some were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay
and left under the custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
Acting upon the orders of Mayor Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC
Compound accompanied by two fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took
possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.
Subsequently, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon file an information for violation of
Section 1(b) P.D. 1829 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
RULING: Yes.
Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which
they were indicted, arguing that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of
P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law
enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere executive officials of their respective local
government units with entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation against
them is not in relation to their office. Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code
Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against
them for instead of showing that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section
1(b) of P.D. 1829 (obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that they
are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 – the offense subject
of the investigation which petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners’
argument that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out
of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249 provides that as long as one (or more) of the accused
is an official of the executive branch occupying position otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officials whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees in relation to their office.
For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is
whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of "Grade 27" under the Local
Government Code of 199147 , committed the offense charged in relation to her office. For an
offense to be committed in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office
must be direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction
of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of
the offense alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the
offense may not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As
found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as
Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local
police forces, used her influence, authority and office to call and command members of the
municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an
investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the information. The averment in the information that petitioner
Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the
lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705
effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000
FACTS: Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines,
was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity. Herein petitioner Posadas,
the then Chancellor of UP, asked the Director of the NBI for assistance in determining the
persons responsible for the crime. In response, officers of the NBI went to U.P. and attempted
to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris
Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. However, petitioners objected on the ground
that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them and promised to take the suspects to the
NBI Office the next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested
by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal charges were filed later against the two
student suspects.
Petitioners were then charged with violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to
obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of
P.D. No. 1829
RULING: No.
Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without
warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the
question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto.
Further, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that herein accused knew or had
reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters
had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on
campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the
commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that there is no probable cause to charge
Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D.
1829. The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on
the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any
law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient
ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances
show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of
law.