ZENAIDA E. SILVER v. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY, GR No.

219157, 2019-08-14
Facts:
This Petition for Review assails the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 05161-MIN entitled "Zenaida E. Silver and Nelson Salcedo v. Hon. Judge Marivic
Trabajo Daray, in her capacity as Judge Designate, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao
City, People of the Philippines, Loreto Hao, Kenneth Hao, Atty. Amado L. Cantos, Zenaida
Talattad and Maureen Ella M. Macasindil": 1) Decision[1] dated August 14, 2014,
sustaining the trial court's finding of probable cause for violation of RA 6539[2] or the "Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972" against petitioners Zenaida Silver and Nelson Salcedo; and2)
Resolution[3] dated June 2, 2015, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners now fault the Court of Appeals for sustaining the warrants of arrest issued on
them. They assert that the questionable ownership over the eight (8) vehicles subject of the
replevin cases, negates the commission of the alleged carnapping. Further, the trial court
did not make an explicit finding that it was necessary for them to be placed under arrest.
The purported existence of probable cause alone does not suffice to issue a warrant of
arrest.[33]On the other hand, private respondents riposte: the vehicles were under custodia
legis, thus, petitioners' act of taking them amounted to violation of RA 6539 or carnapping.
Intent to gain on petitioners' part was established by the act itself. By virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Assignment of Rights dated February 12, 2005, Zenaida Silver had
already ceded to Loreto Hao ownership of subject vehicles and spare parts. Zenaida Silver
was in fact merely Loreto Hao's agent per their Agreement dated March 17, 2005,
stipulating that Zenaida Silver would have a P20,000.00 commission or discount for every
vehicle she sold.[34]Petitioners' reply essentially repeats the arguments in the
petition.[35]The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Solicitor General Florin
Hilbay, State Solicitor Donalita Lazo, and Assistant Solicitor Ron Winston Reyes, submits
that the trial court's orders directing the issuance of warrants of arrest on petitioners, et al.,
on their face reflected that the judges concerned personally examined the evidence on
record before concluding that there was probable cause.[
Issues:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the trial court's finding of probable cause against
petitioners for violation of RA 6539?
Ruling:
Probable cause for the purpose of issuing a Warrant of arrest pertains to facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his or her knowledge may be nil.
Rather, the person relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable persons
have an abundance. Thus, the standard used for issuance of a warrant of arrest is less
stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. So long as the evidence
presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient
ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him or her.[
Section 5(a) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure grants the trial court
three (3) options upon the filing of the criminal complaint or Information. It may: a) dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on! the existence of probable cause.[
In sum, the judge must (I) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
A close examination of the assailed Orders shows that Judge Bela made a personal
determination of the existence of the probable cause by examining not only the prosecutor's
report but also the supporting evidence, documents and pleadings attached thereto.
Notably, prior to the issuance of the April 28, 2011 Order by Judge Belo, the court a quo
conducted a hearing specifically for determination of probable cause to issue warrant of
arrest against Silver, Salcedo and their companions. In the said hearing, the parties were
given opportunity to present their respective evidence and supporting documents.
Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their respective pleadings in support of their
positions.
Similarly in the September 14, 2012 Joint Order of respondent Judge Daray, she also
mentioned that she carefully evaluated the pleadings of the parties consisting of the motion
for reconsideration, the opposition to motion for reconsideration, Reply, Rejoinder, and the
respective position papers in issuing the assailed Order. Clearly, the assailed Orders were
arrived at after an independent assessment and careful scrutiny of all the documents,
pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties.[4
Records show that the ownership of the said, motor vehicles remains dubious. While Silver
anchored her ownership or the basis of the award given to her by the BOC where she
emerged as the highest bidder, respondents on the other hand are asserting owner hip
thereof pursuant to a certificate of registration issued by the Land Transportation Authority
(LTO) (sic) in their names. In Amante v. Serwelas, the Supreme Court has held that
between one who is armed with a certificate of registration clearly establishing his
ownership and another whose claims is supported only by unconvincing allegations, we do
not hesitate to rule for the former.Hence, respondent Judge and Judge Bela' before her,
cannot be faulted in finding probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest of
petitioners as it took into consideration the observation of the DOJ that certificate of
registration covering the subject vehicles are issued by the LTO in the name of
respondents, there is, therefore, a strong presumption of ownership in their favor vis-a-vis
petitioner Silver. We note further that the motor vehicles were subject of a replevin case at
the time they were taken out by the petitioners from the premises where they were kept for
safekeeping. Hence, at that time, the ownership of the vehicles is yet to be determined by
the court. We therefore find no error in the observation of respondent Judge Daray that the
arguments raised by petitioners in the pleadings are defenses which need to be proved in
the course of the trial. As it is, the court still needs to conduct a thorough hearing in order to
be convinced that indeed the matters raised are true and would really exculpate the
petitioners for the offense charged.[
Section 2 of RA 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of
carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the
taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.[44]As
found by the Court of Appeals and the Department of Justice, the vehicles subject of
Criminal Case Nos. 66,237-09 to 66,244-09 are registered with the LTO under the names of
private respondents.[45] A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle creates a strong
presumption of ownership in favor of one in whose name it is issued, unless proven
otherwise.[46] Evidently, petitioners et al. took away the eight (8) vehicles which Sheriff
Andres parked inside a compound on Diversion Road, Buhangin, Davao City. They did so
without permission from the court which itself decreed the eight (8) vehicles to be placed
under custodia legis. Nor did private respondents, in whose names the vehicles were
registered, consent to petitioners et al.'s act of moving the eight (8) vehicles from the
compound in question. In fine, probable cause here exists for the purpose of issuing
warrants of arrest on petitioners et al.