FO.

REWORD
for the .. of the U. S. Suategic
'IIliI """ ". ..m.a- fordaa' reporta of moM oompr&-
.. t' I s-w:r ia die .. nprefllJell in tbis report mWiL
.......... .., auI_ or 00....-'- and &II subject to
.. ,.... .tDdiescondueted by the Survey.
... I.'. ia tilt liP' of futJMI'
r
States Strntegic Bombing Sur"er
by the of War On 3
pUl'Sulint 10 II dirt<:ti"e from the
ROOSJI'l"elt. Its miS!lion Wall to
rtial and expert study of the
. 'attaek on Germany, to be u!ll!d
,nth .ir on J.pan .nd to
for e'-Illu.ting tbe import.nce
of air po"'er as .n instrument
for planning tbe futu", de-
U. I;nited States Ilrmed forcell .nd
future economic policies ...itb
Dational defense. .\ re-
200 supporting reports ronlaining
ttl the Sur.-ey in Germanr h...e bfen
I'ju
for 800

ci,ilillns. 3.iO offi<:ets. ailll 1>00 enli!lled men. The

rnilil.rr 5eb'lllenl of Ihe ..niZlltion was drawn
from the ,\rrnr to lhe extent of 60 perc@nl.nd
from the to the uttnt of 40 percent. Both
the Arm}' and the p"e the Survey.1I po;.
assistance in fllrnishing men.l!Upplies, trang..
port. .nd information. The SUrTey operated
from headqu.rters est.bli!hed in Tok)"O early in
Sel)lembl'r .... ith 5ubhea<iquarters in
O!!ak.. IIiro;;hima.nd .nd ...ith m0-
bile team.'1 01i'l'rII1iuJ;:: in other parts of Japan, the
j"J.n!b of the Pacific. and the .\mtic mainland..
It ...... I)(IlIli)ible to I"K'OllSlntet. much of ....nime
.Jal>llMtie mili'.", .nd uecution., M-
b}" enpf!tmenlnd campaign by cam-
paign, and 10 reasonlbly Slatisti($
on Jlpan',\ eeonom.' and .... r 1'l'O(luetion. pllnt
by 1.lant, and industry' by industry. In addition.
studies "'el'\! rouduetfd on JII>IIn'/I o'-er-aU Slra-
tfg: pl.us .".1 the backgronnd of her entry into
the .... r. the iuternal Ind Mf!Olilllions
leadiug 10 her .t:eeptance of unronditiollil sur-
render. lile (gurse of health and morale among
the d,-ililn IJOlmlllion. the ell'ecti\"l!'De:S!I of the
Jal>lll_ ci"ililll defeMe orpnization. and the
ell'ects of the .lornic bombs. Separale I'\!pons
,,-ill be issued nch phase of the study,
The Sun-e\" inlelTO/.... ted mOre th.n 700 Jlpa-
ne;M' milil.ry: 1l00-emment. and indlurill ofliei.ls.
It .lso 1"K'O\'eml .nd trllual.led IIlAnr documenUl
,.-hieh nOl onh' hln btlen lI!11!ful to the SIll"-ey.
bUI .1110 ...ill fumish d.ll .-.Iu.ble for OIher
stlldia ... m.llts h"'e btlen m.de to tum
o,'er Ihe mea to lhe Celltral Intelligence
Gro"I). lhroullh ,.-hid, the}" "'i11 bto .....ilah'" for
flll1h("r (";(Imi"alloll a"d difltribution.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Admo_)edpM!nt is ma.d6 to the in the bibliognph,.
.... ..-da of the buie data upon which this ",port is based-
IlOlliM wtn; uutiated under the onr-t.I1 direetion of Maj. (ftD.
OBvn. A.. A..'fl)ERSOS, with the eJ<tcUth-. assistance of Col. ROBERT
II. TERRILL &lid Col. R.UlSAY D. P(YITS.
This ftIlOrt, in both substance and final fonn, was p",pared by the
QIoand l.A:JPtics Brt.neh of the Miliar)' Division. The
of thit. brt.aeh, _00 _ith the }'acific IlS follo\ll'!l:
001. JEB]lAlS F. USER, Ord. Dept., Chief. Ground Logistics
Lt. Col EARLE Y. SHLloi"E, lnf., Combat Zone Logistics ()fIitler
Lt. Col DAVID W. SWrFT, ),ll, InWldanee OfIko,!r &: lnterp",ter
Lt. e-Ir. WILLLUI J. MeCL('SKEY, ('5SR, Ordnance ()lIicer
Lt. o-tr. GE!ITBY C. WALDO, USSR, Transportation ()f6cer
0Ipt. WALTER M. DROZD, )11, Medi.....1 Supply .l E,-..eualion Officer
0Ipt. PAUL W. ACRELL.lI1, lnterprtter
Lt. AlIOS K. SMlTII, US!<o'"R. petroleum. Oils .l. IAlbricanla Officer
Lt. OBBET N. REITZ, USSR SpllCial Projects Officer

TABLE OF CONTENTS
and LubnCllnt, _
;-
. al'anese planning --.----.-----.------------.--------
4. Comparison of requi",'DeIlt8 with reoeiptll -----.-.----- -
ll. Distribution--zone of communications ----------- --- -----------
6. Distribution of fu.,1 from Rabaul
7. Distribution of fu.,1 in Philippines --------.------------------- =
8. EfI'ecth.,nfJ8S of air alUCk ---.----.-----.------.-------------===-
ll. EtI'ecti.eness of blockade ----------------------------------.----
10. Reference note!! --.
11. I.ist of e:<hibits "A" lhrougll "1./' ------- --------------------=--:
1
1
3
"
"17
,.
"
38
"
"
..
"
"
"
"OJ
60
"
"
"
"
"
101
101
101
103
Hl<
166
'66
H'
166
'66
100
110
'"
'"
""
""
""
,
170
170
171
172
...
(continued)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
131
13'
131
131
I"
I"
I"
HI
1"
I"
HI
I"
I"
1"
I"
1'7
I"
I"
1'8
I"
I"
,"
1'1
III
III
'24
124
I"
I"
I"
I"
I"
I"
I"
127
127
--------------------_.---------------_._--------
.. ' ..... fIIPPI1 poIitioIl prior to Aprill
lM2
-------------
.... to 8oIItheU'-i inftde So1olnonll __ n_n '
.........Tnk _
............ Pbilippm. _
....... 1ft .T'uaa _
.... Bri.t .. n nn__ n_. '
aa-n, 'an, _11.1.,.. -----.----.------------.-
- .........--_.-_. __.---_.--_.----------
TABLE Of CONTENTS (DItinued)
II. Diltribulioo - _.- -- -----.---- --- - --- ----- ---- ---- --- ----------
cL Stoeb -- --- ------ ---.---.- --- ---- --- - --- ---- ---- ---_.---
.. ..__._. --- --- ---- --- -- ---------- ---- ----
a. FoJ"IIII - - -- ----------- ---------- --- -- ----- - --- - --- ---- - --- ---
.. C10thbal ---- --- --. --------- --- -------- -------- -_.-- --- ----- -----
.. Orpnisdioll --- ---- --- -- - ------- --- --!- ---- --.---- - ------
It. Suppl1 ------ --.--- --- - --- ---- --- ---- ------- --- -----------.-
II. Storb --- --- ------ --.------ ---- ---- --- ---- ---- --- ---- -------
6. S.t of air action ----------- --------------------.------.-----
.. LioI& of tlShibit- "A.," throasb "I" -------------------------------.--
T. Be'-- a;oteI --- ---------- --- --- ----- -----.----- ------ --------
11. .... Su.....,. IloIpi.talizaUoo, -----.-.--------------------
I. -- --. --- -------------- --- ------- ---- ----- - ----------
I. .....tc-J 111J1P11 --.----- ------ ----------- -------- ------ ----- ------
.. ------.-_.-------------------------------_._---

do ...ppI,. depGU ---.-----------------------
L BOIpit_U..,ion n._nu n_n_u__ un._n.n__ n nn__ n _
.. e-Iti- ----.- ---- --- ------- ------------ ------ ---- ------ -------
L e-bIl- -ppl* -------------------------------------------.
.. 0--1 ---- --- ---- ---- ------+------------- -+--- +------ ---
It. Philippine bIaDdI ----------------------------------------.--
II. Chm. - -.- -.--_.--+------------- ---- ---------+---.-----------
do u.- -------.- --- ---- -...--+- ----- -- --+-- ------------- ----
.. au .__. --- -.----- -.------ ------------ ------------- _.--
f. 8blppn.1bla,., 8umaUa ud Jan --------------'--.-------
.. u-... IUld bIaDd& --------------+--------------
.. c.w-. Halmaben. aDd Sortb_ SeW' Guinea -------+------
.. c..Ild _ ..ioa d.n_un_n_.n nn_.n n. _
.. o-u --.---.----- --.---.------ -----------+- -------. -------
........ ---_.--_._----------------------_.----------
.. l'IdIiJlIli- ------------.------ ---------- -------- --
.. (IIiIIa _. - --- _- - - ----+--- ---+.---- ------ -------
.. ... bJ air _n__nnnn_nn n __..__n.__._.n__ n
to _ __n n_un_.u.n_n nn_n. __n. _
.. I: ' tI ._n_...nn._n__ n __ n u_n.nn. __
.......... MAo" th'"Ib "0" - -++---------------.--------.-
RESTRICTED
CHAPTER I
SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS
ill similarl)" OOll!llnlcted ...ith minor \'ariatioIlS in
subdi ...isions for more elfective stud)" and presen-
tation. T1le!Ml !lUbdivisioll!l are:
(.. ) Tl'IlllSpOrt.
(6) Ordnllnce: To il>Clude """POns, lImmu-
nil ion. n>o/.or armored \"'Ilhi-
des, oomnmnicatioll!l equipment.., lind
spare parts.
(e) I'groleum, Oils and Lubriants.
(4) Intendlln: .To indulk dOlhing ami
ntio,l$.
(d HospilaJi:u.tion. E...acuation and :Uedi-
cal SUllpl)'.
III Con,bal i'_(llle lAll,oi3Iics.
Sotut:U 01 ;1I/.........t;01l.--Su'--tuent 10 sur
",ndn and prior to O<'('ullololion of lheir homeland
loy Allied fOrm! Ihe JlIpanese s)"SIemalically
destl'O)ed t!otir renUlining documents. Hence, in-
terl"llption of Jallololle!lll IlerllOnnel is
the 9OUn:e of dllta for Ihis reJXlrt. A
nry Iimileocl of documenu bearing on tbe.
subjK'l hll\'e been uIK'OI'ered; ooca.sional diaries
han been found: in C&!!elIlICI"al inventories
of suJlJllifli I,,'esentl)' on hand in particulu suppl)'
installa,ions han! been obIained. Every'effort. lollS
been made 10 e:l"ploit a,..iIJble Japanese infor-
mation to the muilulIlll, In addition llOlIlll intelli-
I'I'llOt18, Air Enlualion Board Reports, ""d
I'I'IXlrt!l b,\" OUler of the l"nited States
Strue!!"ic Surl"'r h\"e been "tiliud.
The ",ajor portion of the statiillical data has
been relll'OllueM from memorr lor ,Japane!ll'l per-
flOnnel ,,'ho ,,'<!re intimlltel\' oonllOCled ...ith the
aj:\'!"ties or Ihe aOI'ennuent and the
armif'll, It I'I'Rliud that mall)' inaccuracies may
he c.... flel:'lt'<l from such llOUr('\l malerial; ho...e"llr,
to the uten( IlO8!!ihle. cro!lll-che<'ks on ,he data
submitted ha\'e hfoell made. Also to pre\'Il1II po&-
sible errol'll and the oon8isteney of
data obtained from rl!lated but dift'erent
of the .JRllRllcse arm,\" lou bo!<!n t&n>fulJl ana,
Ir1ed,
A Ifl'lIel'lll oollsistenc)" hu been found throuab-
O\,lt. the data ob!aineocl enablinlf the development
hns
.Ionl[ the lilll.':!! of orgll"izntioll of
JacilltiCll"ft)"tl'lll. The report itself
de\-eIOllS the progre:ssil"e deu.ri
slIppl,. SJ-stem from Ihe
elfort.!! could be brought. to bear
fringes unlil the time when the
driYWI back to the poiJlI whenl tl,e
d tie elllplored with llluilllUIli
apiDRt !!very oorner of the Japa.
In short, the l'CpoM e",le.YoT'll to
rompetent. 10 IIl'rlllit
of llOund conclusions as to whB.1
lapa_ logistics forWIll'\1
production, were "tTe'{'ted 1l10S1
air 0pO;'rfttiolls "".d where the
of this elfort prodllt't-'(llh('
..., .cope 0; tile The oojec.
nport is to an a"al\"!li:!! and
tbIo e/feet of Ihe ,\l1ied '-ir effort
of the Ja.p,melle logistics s)"stem
ita f"''':lions insofar Il$ the.r per'
SIIPI'I)' of the ,hpa"ese I,:round
bulpitllliutioll and e\"aITualion of
01 rn.k. twMlilioos and o",nll 6il ...lions. The
.,. 11ft ,. .... obIai,..blf: undn- 1M circ:um-
__&Dd11"f roafidenlly beliued 1.0 I"fl..-nl
&irl, IoI:\'UJalel, tM piClurt of condltloJ\l! .s the"
wt..n,. nFlled IhroulthoUI the ... The per-
..lInel illler0Il"I....1 were nor, .nd
,..illinjZ 10 ll1nli..J, an.I' informal ion "'ilhin th.. ir
indiridual "I.. hili,i""" .\11 intel"l'Oplions uSNI
'ill I1M' "1>0" al"f,;,el: fonh in 1101' rtfel"fllCe nOl_
of inlerrop1ions are on iiiI' ...ilh
lIw l1liC1fd ....te>,' .... Dombil1f!" 5urTl'Y
Up''''' of floe Atlldy.-The Jap"_
""'14ic!- ....s 110 COml.lu and 1101' rfaSOlUI
for flO numerous and ,..r'e<l lha. it is
..ny dill'ic,.t 10 determine ,,hal 01 spe
rific ilenll! 01 aupplif'll .nd equipment weT'l!
M'!'atofoll al h. lila", fmnla di"""ll,. Ihrou, air
action. lllCui!Ren';' in ."'liI.ne9M:Onlrolll'd "lIn-
rhuria of. indu!Rrial poIenli.l
... n.h ('Offi .Jete di51.ribuliOn 10 h."dllo 1M
..",. lMOpoI'I Ihrou;h th.1 ."" is _11
kno..-". 1I ".."r. 10 Ihis 'er) impon.nl
a,," hall n deni....1. .nd reo:ords pertinenl
lhemo .... n n-ui:llenl in .Jnptlu ,'roper. II
tll.1 Ihis ...... <:ould nol be e.o:ploiled
to delinitel" wh.t pal1 il pla"ed in
1M functioninf[ of the J'llatl_ arm)'.
tM 10psIiCll IItlldy .Iwnpt.s a I"f.
fOMll"ldiom of tM $Opply during the
war illlllOf .,. ....ilable dat. permil. 1'he sue-
and failure. critical ph--. .nd 1101' pro--
.-i.... ,,""ionlion of 1101' a)'$Iem ..-ill be
lIbo...n 1000her ... ith deductions .s to 1101' ulti
mate failtlrl" of the s)lIIem based on lhe milit.r)'
""flU thai transpirecl in the <:oUI'lle of the war.
To eqkate intenillftlll, the ell'ects of .ir
lid..... 011 !be lJ1IleID we mWII lil"lt kno...
tile 11P' .f war It.,. pl.nned 10
ud tlII' 1lfP-tx- preparat"- that "'eft made 10
_pp:lr'I t'" plam. lIow broad .nd 1II1'OnjZ a
1oilIIi.- .... the Ja..._ .-1 I...
"'PJ'lIrt 1. their ,..idel,. _Itered fol'l:ft IDnlll be
.....il\llOl. u thf' efeclh-en_ and capabilitiell
of IN:. in the ptu.- of the war
cIapeod a11110111t entirel), on the It.bilil, .od
<I. the _pp1,.ltrutUlft.. 11La1 th;' .rue-
em. ...............", IOtvpe with !he
..... t1rowI> ..- " endtnl: 'rom the fada
....'.,..J III tile nport. 1'hIl failun of the lap-
_ ..,., iD ..rt attriblrtable 10 the short
... 01 .. -., imp'-meala of modem "'.r-
faN whWt dIftloped on _17 ....,. eomb.t
tn.t. Th..... of 1M 0 ..... againlt the

J.pa'_ homel.nd "'f'1"f i"c,,"!.ed bJ the eril i<:al

suppl)' siluation Ihal .h,....d)' e.tistl'd ..-1M'n lhe
full Slft"j.."h of Ih.t olfern;;'e began to be felt.
InadequlIll' from Ihe 10 fullill1he t"$U
,,ilh which il was oo"frot\le<l. the .J"I)aJlese logis-
tic collnl>Set1 clltirel,. IInder lite etrl'Cta
of tl....\llie<l elfOl111 lhrown ,,!:aiutiL il.
BlJI'ltqt'OtJlIll of logi,lir(lJ wh.t
period of ti",e Ihe .hJlil.nese h.d been planning.
.... 1' ... ilh the rnllofoll :'l"lft:.nd her allil'll is prob-
Iematical; ho",c\"I'r. il is thai for )"N"
.r.pa"_ milit.r, plalUlCMi Ilad bf,en formul..ting
plan,; 10 "'.....1 pDiemial enemie!! of lheir empire.
TIll"!/! pl.n$ ".1'..... stmlie<1 alld i",pro,ed upon con-
linuou.ly as n norn",l milill\r)' N!SJlOnsibility of
lbe !:cnentl stall. juqltesl;ou"hl) Russin, Ihe
1"niled nnd Grel'l 1I1itain ,,ere at lhe 101'
of 1101' list of Jap.nbl' polenli.l enemies, !lal1 icu
l.rI) from Ihe moment of J'I.. 'I;b"'-ion in
Cbin.
E"idenl't poinl,; dNrl, 10 1101' f.ct lhat the
l'!!I.imales of Ihe qu.ntit,. .nd
tn"" of equil,me"t .,,<1 supplies Juired to suc-
<;('$full) wnj..'Il a IImjor w.r we based largelJ
on exp"riences ill the Husso,Jnp"nesll and Sino
.Japslle-l' wars. Some small intluencc was ex-
erted by the experience!i of the major powe.. in
World War I .nd 11M' nr)' nrlJ part of World
War II.
n...inl! regarded Uu!llli. as her nun,ber one
enem, unlil 1941, "hen it..-as tbought Ih.t Ger-
man,: h.d dcfnted Rll$8i., the .Jap.nese h.d con-
centnlled their militar, sll'P.nj.... h both in troop"
and RUPI,lies in M'lllchuri" and Chin", Ilcllee,
when w"r wilh the lnile<l Stntes w.s undert.ken.
Ihe ./aPall\'!IC h.d Ihe<le re8QUt't"e!I on ",hieh 10
dn... immedi.teh'. In f..... , in 111 ."d early
1942. pnl(1ieall, .11 lrvop8 .nd suppliel! 10
pol1 Ille .nny in ilS SQUlh....nl .dnnce came
from )1.n<'11Oria and (11in. The ute/It of 1"-
is not delinitl'lJ kno,,n. but in the e)n
of Imperial General lIe"d'1ulll1el"ll in Tokyo ther
,,'e!'P- sufficicnt I... 1I,"(>.. ide !lw nt",.'SlInT) ijllPI'rl
.. thc type of OI'I>o!'ilioll the .)llpnlH'Se ex
peelofoll to ('nl"O,tIller. .
He... il shollid III' said Ih.t .11 Hidenee obl.llIed
poinh 10 tM f..... that lhe Slllllll)' lIl'n'ieer! of
tM
ann, "'el"f nOI oplimiJiIic in their .. ie"' ou tbe
adeoIUa<"' of I'I'ljDlln'8. Senrlhel . the uuhtary
operatio-ns were imllleme"te<1 all Illan"....1.
import.nOll of Ihis decision caullot be 100 W"'.ll!
INIIphuizeds Ihe attitude expressed therein I!
...,...-nl.li\'1! of Ihe thinking of Ihe J.plllle'!'l
the 'A'ar. As "I.jor
rat ll!lliislant chief of Sl.all' 10
ita, !!IatN; "]n our .nny the
1ike to Slud,. logistio-it dote not
Y 'A-.nt 10 stud)' onl) how to
our militar) aClIdemJ il is difficult
to slUlly logislics,"
IflllIl pOSlle!l$ed the world's third
fleet and h.d dill "orld's third
with ",hich 10 gua,..lltte safe pas-
... The J'I)flDl'l!ll' amlits had be.en
the )ears of comb.t in Chi ....
had been highl) SUCt:t8Ilful 10 d.te.
_r be more for a m.jor
Ihe was ill lhe earll' fall of 1941. On
, her enemiell were hal'der pressed
than they 1".1'1' hl\d been. In the
f.'oJ'llble <:onditions the J.pa,
could not I"frnin from 1I1e thought
D...u; do or die; no... is the time
of October 194\ ...Iations ..ith
8tates h.d deterionled 10 lhe point
bad decided on "'.r,
OOnC'elllrating our cITorts nnd allen-
Atl..ntic, aw.re thnt 10 cnrr), on a
the empire required readil)' .c
of n'" materials, the J.pan_
put. into 0l>enlion i... I.lans for
ion aga.il'lllt the Cnited Slattll
Britain.
Harbor, Ihrough Ihe Imtting out ot
of a pol1ion of the United States
"-t, the .'I\!'llnes<"- delllL the lint
.. hieh "'as designed 10 g;'e their
-97 time to sweep .lmO$l unmolested
to OttU,,)' the Phili!ll.ine'i. Indo-
Singa\>o1'e .nd the Selherl.nds
'Jl>e J.pall_ h.d lI"ined an em
nbber. till. rice. b.lIl<ile. and petro-
the resotlJ'Cel ,'it.1 to Ihe Japan_
Th.t thia NIlI.i .....
tIIlpopaphicllll,\' Sllilnblc fOl
ItronJ:" ftl!l:1'''l'll..i'-e '''111y s11PIXlrted
tIlat for Ihe lllQ",ent ftl least domi-
1'Idfir far from an "r",,>eoliS
., the J"p"'_.
lID beconM' SlI'OII!: e,>ough to defeal
rolmtel1hn,,;! Ih.1 mll!'t .....nl,,-
J'p"n_ pl.nned II> consolid.lc,
aploit their lIew /-",iIl8.
IUpplil'1'l IIltd It"d !ltoell
Ilarr)' tl,,ir ori/...;""I "J'j,"'li'",,; no'"
,
tbe Irodurtion .nd suJl!,I) m.chinel) must <:aleh
up-mll.>l. upJoit quickl,. .nd Ihh
1)1'''' ."" of .
The J'I"De9I' suea-e .n unpl"fpllred
had gained at leaSl 1>OI1ion of the lime
requ,r"d for consolidation of lhe conquered
areas. 1l,...,e'er, tltllllll lllllll6 incre.sed
the rolllidence of lhe militl\r)' leadeN! in their
.bilil,. to e..nend sUe<:essfullJ' their holdings.
The Jal' no... l.ullche<1 the Se'A' Gni""" and
Sok>mona OttUpations. Supplie8 .nd shipping
h.d 10 10c Btretebed to su"f'O" this fu"her I!l<.
pension. The pineh of di!R.nce .00 dispersion
the of Ollr submarine!."d lhe lirst,
but.1I llllportanl, effects of our Ilir attacks ""'b",n
10 m.ke inroads On the Jnl"nese lines of rolD.
munic.,ioll. The soulhward plunge of the Jllp'-
I1I!St! wu at laSl eheeked. Slo.l'I,. but steadil)' the
Allies SU'engtb ...hile the J'p"1II!8e po!oi_
lion entered 1M fim. of deterioralion.
Seill"'r side eould hope to assume.nd mainlain
lhe inili"tire without the right supplies, in proper
'lul\"lit)' .nd qu.lit)". at the right place for the
righl I_pIe al the right time, Too l.te did the
.lap re.lize thaI. he h.d o'creslimaled his
abilit)' to pro,'ide logistieal sUP1>Ort to his oper-
ations. Too late did the .1'11 re.lize thst he h.d
underesiimatlfd tbe t't!!lOuret'fulness. CApabilities..
and len.dty of his opponenls. lIeft. SJI,,"d out
lhrough the many isl.nds of the Pacific .nd
conntf"J"llUacked lDucb Nrlier th.n he b.d anlici.
paled. lhe J.p st.l1ed on the long, bani I"Ofld
bsck to bis homel.nd and defeat,
A SUllllUary of the (ailure of JI\I,a,,1lSI'! pl."s
"nd operntioJl!l through i"ade<JunI6 logisticlll
SUI'I>oI1 together .dlh th" oonelusions dra"n
lhererrom is conlained in the 8CdioJl$ of till'
rtpol1 ...hieh folio..
2. and Condusious
Tl"lll>Apqrl.-Jn 1911 .J'llan POSS0/811t'd Ihe
lhird me",h'''1 fleel (']lI)ro)[i.
mBtell' r..9:iO,OOO gr0s8 tnllS) hI! tlw
Illl"J,'1!.>1 !In,')' with which 10 l,rotl'Ct
her 8('1\ roUles. That, this st ...nj..'1h was adequ.le
10 Ihe illitial SUece!l!! .gainst .n u"I'rep."",J
enem" ill lite !lOulllenl'''" 11101' ..... nol1h of,"
.rc: from Hum'" lhrough 1M :SflMt
lands '-:a.<sl lndil!'<' 10 tM 'II"I'l'terll C.rohnl'o<} "-
.n escablishl'd f...... RN>"ret'full_, emp'Jn,ed.
this should b..e been s"lI'icil'nt 10 ex-
ploil e'lti ... 'reI!., as ,_b carr),illM
",ilit"r,l" to Ilw rich ""uthern a.,.' ....'uld
relurn ladeu wilh Iht' untin I'Mllu<'f' (n.lura]
I. _ ...- 1M 1...-. ---. ail .c_ .t
_....--,.__.. ..,., ....
_ 01 __tIoo _Jord_. __.. - to
)0 -" , .........
Hrt!ll!j. In Cliina lhe JIOJllllle9l! faeed with II
wh?II'SlOIl' of the rail system
... hRd l>eell b)' the re-
11'I'tl11llj! (1linese (Exhibit TI). The mllin line!!
hall be"'" restored in );orth and {'ent..1
C1tinR b,' but thOljC in South Cenlral and
Soulh Chilla "'ere "tglocll'd until .ir allllCu on
lIortl",r" Mlil lint>! a"d 0" Y."b"-ze ship-
pi"... (E:d,ibit :\1) IHlde imlM'rnti"e the
tle!!e dri"e on Our at Kweilin .nd
Liueho.... Thou!!,h these fields "'ere b)'
Ihe enem),. w,,'inued air operations from rear
ba.5e.'! limited Ihe eJltenl of ..ilroad reeoll5l.ruc-
tion anti ....tl,. impedetl ..tiOfl!l Will
o:ompletfoll l!ectiona of line. The elleet of thClle
.uacks "'Il!! 10 the of troops
.nd supplie$ ... hkh the coold ill .lford.
ltailroad.ol in Burma. :\1.la)'a, and the Philip-
pinet: "'ere too limited in utent .nd
to support sustaiM(1 rombat ope"lions but the,.
"'ere the prima", line of supply on,laod .nd
lheir disruption ronlriooted llUbi;t.nti.n,. to the
ultimate lol!Utic failu", of Ihe J.palle!!ll in theo3e
.-
,\ fter shipping incurred along the ,,est
of .:\1.la,.. fornd dill enemy to .bandon
,h., line of lIIIl'lllr in .I.nu.ry 19+1 it "'Il!!
1M!C'f!!!!!&1')' for the J.p111le!!ll 10 lll'nd an supplies
into Burma by rail. StHidy and
of lhe fe... rail lines eaU!ll'd drop in
tnllic 1'Olume from 8930 IIlCIrlc 10It!! in July
1943 to 3.900 metric tolUl in August 19-15.
In PhilippiJM>ll nil tran.sponation reacl>ed
critical SI.l:'" after our I.ndings on )'lindoro
in I::tect-mbfr 1!l-l4. In J .,u.ry' 1945 tral6c 1'01-
Ulllf! 10 6,000 mel ric tons from a monthl)'
... of 17.000 metric lOll!! in 19t1l.nd 16.000
.,""rir tOilS in l!lt-l.
.J.IWlns manufaclure of motor nhieles could
ne,...r InN" Ihl' demands of modem mech.
niud Rm"'. Wit hi" Ihe homeland mOlor road!!
we". few '-.U!le of lhe deJll'nd-
tllCll Oil nlil"a..!\. liN'!' the "lOSt critical faelor
Will! furl in the last )'ear of the war. l-II
untit Rmph' 1ll010r fuel was obt.ined ., a
b.... I')'o.hl('l from lhe of a,i.tion pso-
line bul, lIa Ihr SlIppl)' from thll southem ......
dwill,lled, lhe of motor, fuel fen from a
monthl)' al'er,,!-'e of 2'20 Wl1101111 Jll'r .. in
W-l2 10 20 /:nlll>ne in By the end of thfI
war nbout 50 I'e...:ent of .rlll)' ..ehielet!l in Japan
alld itl China hMd bee" to the IMli of
sllll!ltitute f"e!_IlSllall)' ehal'OOa!.
,
pl.nell was beb""1 in lute .\Inrch
of l1lSultAtll losses of shipping ill
Straits the Jnpanese lurtle<1 10
of the l>oris on the west of
M the major 1>0115 011 this ooast
the was foreed to U!Ie
with facilitie!! cven for
.-ounl of shipping left him. For
J?'y HH5 the enelll)' had brought
a to lhe PO" of );iigat. 0111)' 50
n>ount he had planned.
of Allied interdictiou of J.palle!le
11 are best in Table 6
n. ,,-herein _ tabulnr ill
_ llUpplies shipped to Nch m.jor
tholle ",uhing their destin.tion. n.e
... pn>sented graphically in abibiu
..
WlM)' beginning of the .... r there u-
Japan proper. in .:\buchurind in
"'1,. denloped system of ..ih...
&be mainstay of o..erl.nd transporta-
atent .nd in tonn.gti' capuitJ lhe
__ adequ.te to .- the
irrr"!,,- them in the pha-ocs of tbe ...ar.
our .ir .".cks beg.n on the home-
....lion.s suffered iucrea'>ingl, from
"., i m.inten.nce .nd from the 10!lII of
"1,. ....1 to the'ann)"s wnscriptioll pro-
... liUcb high WIl!!
7 t of il$ personnel .nd S11llplies lhat
, ii,
I of mililA')' supplies. l..ter. in
... of rolling t;I:<:lC"k OCCl,rred in in
.......-:aa. 11m urban a",AS bill there ...as 1>0
on Our pert 10 achine ron
i.:. fIli.1n of rail lines in J.pan or in
which , .mount of
-., thud food for .}apan,
..... iD. J.p.n and KO",lI would have
for .ir IIltack. The wlllinll.l
., IhIIlm "'ou1d nOl only hllve brought
'WIaIdt Willi highly depe;,dent on them.
ItaDd!llill bUI wnuld also ha"e ill'
t .....,. with pre[larllliollS to resi!l\ Ihe
of the homeland. Extremely
_____tiI:tacb on hie railroads. I he "nem)' had
-.eney repair methods to the best
iIlIiIt,; ho,,'ever, thl'Se would 1I0t have
til o'-t lJYllIemlltic and intensh'll effort.!!
...-::diction throu/(h air "lllIcks,.
I:Ituation howpyl'l'. lrl other
,
Ih..ir inability to pro"ide aJe<l'lllte 10jl:istill eup-
I"'" to their force!!.
,\11ied air foret'S were '1uick 10 llei1.e IIpon
e...,r\, ad'atltA/.'e in their de;,trllction of ''''llan_
shillilin.'!, .\fter the enrl)' da)'9 in the Solomon,
and :\ew GlIinel' we wer1l able to achieve local
air superiorit)' in e..er)' th"ater of operation..
Fro", a lactical ..ie,,-poil1t thi9 enabled 119 t.o
alla"k ea"h lIew obj""Ii"e hR,i".'! no hope of ob
IAinin!! funh"r snpplies.
From the broader strategic IlOint of ,it.., our
intudiClion of rear ba8e!I pro\'l!d mo",
irnllOrtanl. .\9 u.mllles in the earl)' I,hues of
tM "'ar. SUPlll)' from U."""I 10 the Solomone
.nd 10 :\e..- Guinea ,,'Il!! cut off .fler Jul, 1943.
It '-.une impollSible for shipping to nlOn
,he upper "'e!I C'Oa-'<I: of :\Ial.,. Penin-
".tiL. atu'r ,I.llua.. HIH and "'ith cominu",d
air .lIa"k,; on B,,"nl...-.e nil lines. ..-asthe princi-
pal callSI' of Ihe f.ilu", in thai .....
!lIlme UrulOund situ.tion continued
Ihe ...... r and Li our .d...nced
.C-I'08ll the P.cific the untimeliness .nd iOlde-
of .hl)tlne!ll' lopstic 8UPllOrt
""'ealed itself.
.\H.cks on Tn,k from ,he .i, earl)' in 19-14
redut'tO:l Ihat bastion 10 .n ompost ...hid, tM
J.IlIlllei>C found tOO to m.int.in.
.ur .uuks on and later occupalion of lhe 1\I.ri
.nll!! p",nnted .n,- further llUllplr of the Caro-
linl':!! arid. once the innsion of the Philillilines
"'Il!! 11 under ..-n in 19H. eff""ti .... mobility
bet n isl.nds of 'that "'1lII
lhe Japanese.
{'unin!! the line bet"'een the
.rea and J.pan ....5 one of thlll most
bl01O'!l of .11 and our .ir ettuks on sh,pplng
alonjt Ihe Chin. coast in conjunction "'i,h
m.rine aeli ..i" ,irtuall, blockaded th.t region.
Thi,. in .ddition to the of
Hi"er shipllinl! aeriel bambinI! and
wmpl"Iel.,' altered .'apam..... plnn., of opentlOll
in Olina. . .
Afler onr callture of Okinawa lin I't'malmng
J.llIlnese,slliPllinl!' was de"oh'(llo Ih.e
the homeland (olwiousl .. nul'
was limiled to transit' bel,wen llOrt.8 in
ami Honshu. Here hen"." inroads were made by
. I r 'rilll bomb-
!!ubm.rIllMi lind further <>AAe1l rom ae .
'"" princi,>ally olr Fll!;'lIn in ,\In)' ..',t
, . 1 WI",I
IIN._r)' for shipll to 1110... onl)' lit tHg It.-
lIIlrious retarding of turn_around time,
An intellllive aerial milling Ill"tlg
rnlO

-
no.-
llft'- :-'lO._
-- ,.:10._ .....-
-
-
'.1:14'-
n_
1,--
..-
u ......
...-s_"
IT__ T_I
...,.- - ..
It ill aprareflt from tM thn so much
Q.IO _'). for tM attemllted but
llUppol1 of combal 0p"'..tioTlll th.1
I .... balalt"t of .rmy shippinfl,' ..... il.ble "'all
o lItIpplyiJlll: ,...r '-- to an in.dequ.te
Th1lll. poor pl.nnina:. lack of fort$iflht
and failuoe to ooordinll1e pl.nned opt'..tibna
with the imi..tiuDa of tnlllBpOl1 re8Ulled in very'
.....,ieht ADd utrelDel,. rolIIly u_ of
fhippina:. .
Oar _1, oountnatta<'ks .1 Guadaleanal and
iii New (lui_ fOUlld thoalI outpollla illlllfticientl)'
prtIIIU'ed for a defeMe. So pnoearioTlll
and ......rate wu the Jav-nMe aupply eituation
that I'lI(*UId, ftrtile aUtomptil to reinforce thelle
poutlt del' tM1 had rome under attack l"flllultM
III tlIlIIJ)' Ie.. of peraonnel, auppli. and ehiJlll
bJ 011I' aircraft aDd 1'T boatoI. It Wall
at tm. JGbtt dtat tha J..,.,.. bepn to reUbe
.. IIIIIIU....."nd) which Wall vital 10 Japou,'ll ill-
daltrial anllmilitary b)' u-
teadinI her planned IlllnnCflll i"Io );ew
a," and illio
lapu di1'ded hu shipping btt"'eo!'H iml>Ort$
fnND the 'lUthem a," and IhI! suppl, of II,,
.,idjtiona], l-rrMI roml-t arMS from ... hich
IlUptI usual,. returned fnlpl,'. TIlls Ul'all$.l0l1
... beyond the of her ,"U'TI\'.
As a after our counteraH.cks
bepD. the J.panelle had to COnCl!ntrate
lhipping il the llUI,pL, of Ihe currentl}
-.lei' atta<k: The follo...Uljt fijturllll oliO,," t.he
biIb of IOIal anilable arm,. ,hIp-
ping ...hich ...Il!! to each n.ajor ,hHlter:
& "...... .- I.be _ of ....ilalHe motor
_ rvrt.i1ed by the limiucl utent and
pool' quality of Ihe roW&. Japan did not have
IbII .ipat'Cll or leehnique for road building or
npair ..... did not tab this into aoootlnt in her
.u. retlQlt. trucks of mferior ron-
lIInIdioa quiddy deurionud and Clftud an
problem.. f1Upply
of IDOln!' hel in comhat olher Ihan Chin.
was UIAl.II) adequale in tUlal but .'as poorly dis-
tribuud ard limited the of nhitles 10 the
nlati...I'l' fe'll" depots or dump!! in uistence
U'OOpI 'll"en!' foreed to _much pdt
clizta"""- tUtYilll as nll>ch eqllillRlffll U po&-
lIibla. R6ca1nIlIIO hol"!leS, o!ten, and coolies nenr
as lIUbl!tilule for tnlcu even in the
IDOIIt ady..ced po8ition.,
Sllbmarilll'lll hsYll ob\"ious inhen!'nt limitations
for purposes and U9l! of
tIlaa by de Japanese prom 100 upl':IliI;"e for
the ..-Itaadlinfii. _\t Ii ..... romhat IIUbmlIrines
_ elupkyed for trarn:polUtion of !lUpplie:!! 10
"efeusin pollilions cut 011' from their
(}1m lUrf.1e shipping b)' dominant fotuS.
Ho,",""'. cnft h.d muimum c.rgo
eaparity d only metric 10M .nd the navy
lata' ballt if ..bmarilll'!l for tnm-port.
0.. of th>a bad ......puit,. of 4l1O 10m. but for
IM'Ohne 0lIl,.. Sot only did the other n.\")
truIIIport aubm.ri_ h.ve muimum c.pacily
of 80 tolll bul they .fTe built to(> late to be a
ralbenefL TIle .'apa.- .ml)" .Ill() 1I1Ull"I1ook
10 .ild InDIpon !IUbmari.- bul the'!O:' pro.-ed
m..J dappoiDtmenUi in openlion. Of the
... -'py altftnpt.ed by lhem lIe",n
_ -"'I ..... onl, rsJI millPll from
T....b 10 H....hijo JilllL
The uleQin IQ@ of air tnnsport ..-hidl
PfO"lllIll 'IaIubie to 111 .... not. .ppreeiau.i by
.... J.-. That J.pu:r bad a muimum of
.,. 80 IrutIpoft pia.- .......1,. to
1M Ana,: Air Tnaaport IJrepuu-t is tbe belt
"". of n.. few p....
_ dmIed primuil)' 10 the lransportation of
putI UId were of \'irtually no Illlll
to 1M Il"Pd U'Illi&
J....- ...pply
.... 11ft to be ...... ill ita orpai.
................. UlII..-.uoa. PIamliIIg,
............ 4uiAt the wv, ... inadaqaate,
...t,opimltt",IboI't in ebaNeW, and in
...... """'i.... a1111lO11l
......, ......
,
in TokJ"o .nd "-ail Ih,,,; 100 Cf'l1tnhzed to pl':m.il
01'llOrumf ol'ention On the lIeale de
mande<1 hy 11 wnr of such nmgnitlille nnd in.
hmsil)'.
The 8\stem of .ud .<'COunts and CIIt._
.dmillMI) in.dequate .nd inefficient.
Ordnaun' 5llpplies rould be ordered in a very few
cue'!I by rode lIumber. _\. .,lal0f!'Ue containing
only t'll"O or IllI'l!fl JIl'geI to onlnanee
liRled certain items and their code numbers. The
..ode was mntle lip from fij!:lIn\S. KAIIIl, and Eng-
liM. oomhined. Ob"ioual)' Ihe bulk of ord-
n.""" ilel1l5 TlI'\"l'r IistM. This ml'thod.
adopted in 1937. nl.lSl'd illnUlTll'nble UTOrs. ron-
fUllion and inellkiency. )"1'1 nothinj!: 8 done
to iOSlaH a more complete .nd effici "t cata_
B)gtem.
Homclllnd depots were vcr)' pool"l)" pltllmed
and equipped. The two-storl' ....an!'I,OU;l68 wertl
small. narrow, .nd poorl)' lighted. "1111' interior
"'8 broken up b)' platfonrul nmning on both
aide:!! of a kmgitlldin.1 These
platforms or meUllllinl'!l ""ere about lllid....lll' be-
lWeo!lI tli.. tloor lind lh.. ,'eilill/,[, 12 alM}'f.
Aocess to the "I'COllJ floor Wll.!j by mew"s of st.ir
...al'!! at both end!! o( the building". With a '-ery
fe'll" UCf'ptions 00 form of or lift .u in
evidence.. One or t'll"O short spur tracks eonsti-
tUled the entire rail ....J"'SJ'Stem of depot
inll: pra.cticRlIr nl1 the warehouses inaco:e8!lible to
freight CIlI'8, The depots were inudequnte for
foC.le. wholetla.le handlinA: Rnd
of supphl'il .nd an!' .n I'.'<C'/'llent indication o( tbe
Japane'l6laek o( .I,preeiation of Ihe _Ie of ....r
in ...hich they in1'01'l'ed themselV1!!l.
Ordn.nce stocks actu.lly on hAnd .t the !II.rt
of the war .nd capable of being produced during
the ..'ar illalle<luete to meet the tOl,,1 de-
m.nds of Ihe military foKt!ll ... hieh lll'n"ladihem.
lIl!J.-es throughout Ihe \"ast. reachl'll of the I'acilie
and .\ai.. .\lIo...nces for ..-..staj::e ...ere .d
milledl, f.r too 10... ; no provisiolla for "pipe-
Jill/!" .upplie:s and 1_ in tnnsit, .ltlu'':lgh
I"IlCOgnized as necessary, "'ere made; efTecllfl',
",16cillllt dilllribulion of av"ilable suppliC!l "'all
lacking, particul.rl)' after the early
of the ,nr, Prodlletion, 1lI"'er adllQu.tt,
1..,:1 behind actual eontlImption .nd
At the end of 19-11, the J.panese had 108
bun (unit of ammunition per dh'i.ion). l)ul'\ng
lhe followin/l )'c.r there w...re 30 KaiscnLutl ('(Ill'
. I I For
the
RumKl bul onll' 25, Kallleillmll pro< lire< . llCf!lI
'_1' 1ll-f3 protlut!lon and oonsumption bal.
The collsumption jumped to 011
JIIoH ...hile produclion dropped off
and for Il).l1l, to the end of the
"as but. 8 K"illellLlIll whill! con.
16 K"iscnbull. fo'rom Exhibit. V it.
.t Ihe ...nd of 19U tile J.p"l_
103 dh'isions and 81,000 motor
the terminalion of lhe .... r lhere
:for 1().1 divisions and &1,000 motor
. this period t.he .JapallClMl had
.'be of their arm)' from 2,100,000
) at the end of 1l).11 to ::>,500,000
. ns) .t the I!Jld of tJle w.r, ThU!l
lNI the Japanese had lOS Kai!len-
'lion. weallOllS 10 equip 100 divi
motor ...hides while there 'll"ere
lllobiliwd. Whereas, at the enJ
they hlld but 11 KaiSCllbun of IUlllllu-
for 101 di"isions .nd 61,000
.hile Ih",n!' "'ere 169 dil'itIions
Ceo!!equentl)' man)' of the dirisioM
10 percent I'(juipped. This O\'erall
llIIllplies drnstiCllll)' limitoo Loth
and defcnsive cllJlabilities of the
of 1II11lre partR lllUt the m.l.dmillis--
!,rognll, for (Jle training of
m.de the suppl)' silu.tion
_te through ,''''r)' poor m.im...n.nce
I " oon.idernble qUllntit)" of
equipment. III lhe words of Lieu-
I K.n, chief of Ihe orduante ad-
beatlquartcrs, USSBS ImerfOj,....-
I: "There ...u .n ooer.ll ahol1.b'e
t-rt.s due to insuffici",nt production
.Illl poor distribution. \\llcn-
eomplcte items of I'(I"ipment "'ere
for curmibalizalioll in lieu of
The short.ge o( CMline<1 ordn.nee
IIooth oolllllli8llionoo and enliSlM .,-a!!
.. 10 a l.ck of .ppreciation b)' .11
of lhe imllOrtallC'/' of ,-agt numbers
10 llerviee modern arm)". Such
there .'as h"d 1ll'C" IlpJl"relllly COil'
by th.. O"I"Alletl Rdministration
in J.p.n. The "St'hool for prh'ates
"I 600 rear ..hile the
__ for ollirers .nd nonrommis--
did not u('I'('(l 400 oJIic,!l'8 and 600
ofticers Kf&dnnted per Jear.
.. a Rhol1ajlfl uf tflliue<1 insl111el0I'8,
faeilitii'll and mueh .dministra-
ne COlll'ilell "'ere not
,
as in Anll'rican schools. thU!l to make
llle rno;;t etrlCient lise of time. instructors, .nd
r.cilitil'il,
From the fOl"l'b'Oing it can re.dily be lleen
as f.r as onln.nee Stlilplies .n!' collCE'rned,
m the oonununi.....tions and eombat zonl'il the
hicbly lilICft$lful .ttack!! of our SUbmariDllll .nd
.!n:nft on tbe oYl'f'-I'-rtended, poorll' protett.ed
Imes or supply denied these in.dequ.le but
much needl'(l, criticlIl !!upr,lies to the ground
al'\nil!8 anrl where the)' were urgent I)'
needl'(l. III 1943 e"erJ thl'llter C.ltCl'pt China .\I.n_
churind Ko..... /IUft"en!'(! IOS'lI'S in lransit. TIle
situ.lion went fronl had to worse ... ilh O''l'r.l1
Iosies from 4 IlI'm"nt in 1942 10
.luloO$t :.0 111''''''1)( in t94a de'ipite the fact that
supply linp.!! w...re ellch Jeltr.
l.Al.ter. all the Japanese ...ere pusloal back to the
1"l!rJ shores o( their homel.nd, .ir po"'er coln-
bined with blockade eD"ett.h....1J" du;rupted the
prodUC1ion potenli.1 th.t OIhenrrise might h...e
provided lOOn!' $Ilppll' situ.tion
for the .nd defense lines of the
homeland, In JllnunrJ 10411, for the defenllll of
the homeland a 3 mouths' SUI,pl)' of ammunition
"'as plRnned bUI b)' the lime of $urn!'ndcr for
Ihe ;:;7 diI'isions &!! mbled for this purpose
"'en!' K.isecnbuD!l of ammunition ....ilable for
only 30 and "'eapoll!l fur only 40 di\"isions
(E:<hibit .\E). '\[ll")' of the ne... I..
""its for the defeu!lI! of the homelaud were con
9l"lIUelllly short I1S much as f,Q pen:ent of their
filuil,,,,,,,nt.
The etreoMs of .ir .ction. both direct .nd in
direct. colltribUled considenbl)' 10 the in.de-
quae)' of J.p.ne;;e onln.nee lilIl'l,ly:
First, throuJ!h the ,It'lltnlclion of I.rge
l\mo"nts of shipI,irlg and of the
transportation of url-'I'llIlr needed s"lll,lil'S lind,
Second. Ihe .ttllinment of aeri.l
auperiorily and the resultant isol.lion of I.rge
qll.ntilie:!! of suPI,lits in fonrr.rd .reas such ..
n.ha"l, load ilO '11"803 Ihro...-n upon
.n alre.d)" o.-erbllrdcned, ill.dequat" suppl)'
situation that Japanese military dedsioD!l .nd
actions ... ad,.. atrf'tl00 .nd Ihus hutened
Ihe fill.l coll.I*"
Third. ...hile "ome onlnance stocks .....
directly h)' .ir action, the hib priori-
ties assil,.,t>ed the produetioll of J.paneee air-
('raft weapon.'! RlUI amnlllllilion, and .ntwre!'aft,
,,e.llOl18 and allll",,"itioll 10 m..et lhe threat of
our .ir .ction ca..-l /l.u..h If'l"Iler ahoJtaa- ill
poand OKPiUlC'l'. Anli.ir<:nfl .ir
'- -JNDlI .Dd .ir .mmunition ..",re
JiqD C-l, C-2 and C-3 prioritie:e reilpeelively
in IMt. B! 1M2 they "1'I'e nilJed 10 B-1,
and B-3. For 1943 .i.. "'uPOnll .nd .mmu-
nition reoem A-I .nd A-2 priority and re-
tained this nil'" pollition of p""",minenCll for thll
_indu of the ...... Anti.in:nft ..e.ponll
were nilled to A-8 for 1943, A-5 for 1944 .nd
A-t for lDo.5. Al ...-ill be llII"i'n from Exhibit AJ
pound ormano:e accounted for 86.3 percent of
tlle lot.1 e:l:penditul'll for ordnanCll in 1941; .ir
forcf- trftoplll'!l and ammunition aocounted for 7.7
per<:fflt aM .nti.in:nft .UotmenU "e", 6.1 per-
",,"t. All. of tbe bigh priorities Uligned
them.ir """pllll'!l and .mmunition in-
<:ft&.--' until in l!U1:i they repreeented 3.'>.2 per-
rfllt of the total ordn.OOI! production ...bile .nti-
.in:nft ... .nd .nllnunition rellre!ltl\ted
.8 per<:'eDl This decreued the produetion of
pound onn.OOI! from 86.3 percent in 1941 10
pen:ent in t!U1:i. Of tll.e tot.1 .rtillery pro--
duced .ntiain:nft 1I'upoll'!l rep..-nted 30.4 per-
-.t in 1"'1 .nd &I",dil)' iocreased In per-
tftIt;oIM.
Foartb. the threal of .ir nidl nou!!td tbe dis-
of 1tocn "'itb confusion. IO!I!!
aDd delar in lIUpplying lbe ,round fol'Oefl. In
tlM4 the OnI....ooe Bureau ordered displ'rsal of
lIIocb in all in .nli<'ilntilln of .ir nids.
Thill reeuled in .na del.)' in
...-iou!Ily e-timaud from I ..eek to I
month. A the rji IJnoch Ibe eomm.nd-
iJl otIitft, admilted tb.t Ihe\' \osl Inck of Ih"
kJntioa <:l itfolDll Ib.t h.d dispe..-t. I'e..
_1'11'1 .n.I. tl"llt\llllOl1.tion ahonAJlf'll cau!!td b)'
l"MIlttd in funher dela)'. Alerts
..blr'h dis'uptfd tnllir in othe...reu cau!led de-
lay in of In tM .rM of the depot
the of t .....nd the ",int of 1lhe1ler
by pe..-ne1 e811l1M!. \oM of from 20 minulell
tn""" bon,.nd in IIOIIW' ........ thi. h.IIP.MlI 1"0
Of' thne timfIII dar durin,r the tprillff of 1941:i.
P tnJ..."" nil. aNi 1....&ril,mtt,--ln Iht ,t.n
Jl'**im, tbP OIIlbrNk of the ....r J.pan h.d
bacome ...holl,. d.pmclont on impon8 of ptlro-
IlIIun and pMtWlim protium to meet hlll' eivilian
Uld mili-_rr Obviou-l,.. thotlr on ...hom
... depeaded could ."eeI her milit.ry Opention8
Uld the ,IBllment of her ambitiona to c:onaid
-.b\e &pM. It was ...ithin the po...er of tbOll8
wkIt. wIrIm ... daak praetteall,. to dictate the
.... .-Ht1 and actioIlI of her military .....
lisll1nellt. IIl\d her lIIer<:hllnt Without "de.
qmwl oil sh'" wa6 ineffective: modern l"1
ui
pm"'nt
demanded oil in quantities.
this 10 the f"llest the ,J"panesenu"jll
everT effoM to lIecul1\ulate stock$ of this
vital eommodit} in onler to IIttain !lOme degree
of indellelldenec. when liS II l"efJult of
her action in China lind her alliance
... ith the en",millS of the Cnited StalfJ8 .nd Great
Britain. these COUlltrifJ8 refu>ed her fllrther sup
plies, the political .Ild militar}' leaden noll1i1td
the necessitr of inullf'diatel}' se<'llring II !lOun:e
of crude oil eon"enient to the homeland. Th"s,
it can be said Ihat oil ,,-"" or", of Ihe Ilrima..,.
objectives of ,,.r and ""'M.inl} Ihe m.in lire-
dpil.ting f.ctor leading to the in"&!lion of the
oil.rich Xetherl.nds East Indies .nd the :\1&1...
peninsul.. -
The logistic break-do...n in re!'peoct 10 oil re-
sulted from. combin.lion of f.cton ..hich in_
dudf'd f.ult} pl.nning. l"IOOr .dministration,
technological delici"'neie,;.nd nlO$l impon.nt of
.11 the .ttack b}' .i......nft .nd IAlbm...inl!l!l on liMll
of suppl}.
In 1941 rell..-nt.I;'"f:!I of the .nd the
1lI\'-}' met 10 determine the .ctu.l volumf' of oil
Ih.t could be rounted on for ....r. Th" n.vy ...u
that th",1'll W1l!I IlQlllUfficient oil .nil-
.bl" to oppose the Deets of Great Brit.in .nd
thll l"nited SUlles, but the .mlY "'&!l of lhe
opinion Ih.t oil eould be o,..,rcomf-
....ith the inusion of the Setherl..mls J<:.S1 111-
dies. This contention lat ... Ilroved 10 be true-
The faU..C} in pl.nning I.}' in the ann}'l f.il,,"
to I.k", into .coount delleienc}' in I.nk",ra plUl
.n ""H iocreasinj! ....te of from .ir.nd
I<\1bm...ine .nllekll Ih.t far ex...eeded thll IIui\d
inp: y.. ...:ls' .....pacit} to pr.wide hullil.
The .dmini5lrlltion of oil for ".r w.s l>oo
rl
1
..nized .. nd flliled 10 f"nclioll .... ith Ihe de-
sired smoolhnll!lS 10 pl'OdUl'e the \Jdl
I'eSIlltS. Major Tak.. h&!lhi of the W"r Miuistt1
liI ..ted thlll Ihere \l'U 1Il1leh over Iha
control .nd allocation of of thr 0'.......
l.ppinl:" lIutllOril}' of the vnriolls rollllllillOO!! .. nd
bo ...:!s., and becsuso! or the constr,nt bickering be'
t ..ee" Ihe ann}' nut! the nil"}" The rl'S"lt
that ma"imum efficienev in nmkinJ! nJlOl of
.ble SUlllllil'll 11",1 WIIS !ll\... r;ficed, 1'hl!
not ol1h' 11<!,cHleI .. lllf..... c<l Ilw rllililllry hut
civilian 'eeOnOlll)' w"ll. Elleh c!lli,,"ll,t Lli-",nrY
felt thai il did r101 I'l'Cri,'l' 1'l"IIO,lio,,"re
lIb.re of Ihe Il,"ilab''! s"l'pli,'s, Therr' IIPl'ea
rll

bt;, that lhe IIrm)' and

III the ;!r"lllest shore.
gtlll'nj!" what wos left.
. fl'Om Ihe SOuthern lIrell were
.,r lind sea blockade the Jain.
.!esIJen'lion to S}'nthelic llnd
. [nlrke GernlllnJ, howe"",r, the
enollgh
lIn DPIl.rec,able contribution. Ihe
pn>ductlOn reaching onh' 186.-
(E"hibit D). 1l.is ;"';ulted
of factors the most. impoM.nt of
tMir in.bilily to build 1l1.uta Ih.t
eol"" wilh the temperalures
res necessal)' in Ihe tiUtt'Mfiful
...h f..cilities. The Jap's fnntic
th", production of substitute
-,hods.s lhe distillation of pine
,..pone the in""it"bl", daJ hen
.. ","tirelr dissipated. "'&!l pu lv.
_...., .nd indicates their critical
the ... h.otic eondition of their oil
ud __ blockades throughout the
the effecti,.... u-J 10
.I.pane!lt oil froIIOm}'. In 19-12.
tankers plU!! thll blockade made il
the J.pane!lll to transpon onl)' 50
80uthem .rea oulput. .nd this
'--me .ppreci.bly 10...r in llllb8e-
Manufacturing in Ihe home islands
..,. .ir .u....k bUI the most 9I'rious
triI econom)' resuill'cd from thll sink
Of the ],004,750 poss tons of
during the .......1 le.st 1.264.000
The bal.1Ia! of 3-lO,6S4 tOIUi "'u
to supplr tl,e ann}' .Ione.
basis, e:<""'pt for .vi.tion t,'AllO-
.nned fol'Cllll ...el'6 ne'....r 9I'ri-
III motor fll",ls.. Tn tllis eonnectioll it
to oontriider tllll fact that the JRII.-
.. not. higilly mech..nized .. nd ita
..__mtll were eonsiderabl}' less thn
'WW'e mailS instances. ho...e'er,
PItiIippinl!ll, ",hel'6 the dispeTSltI of
th.t fuel wu.s not relldih' a,ail
umtll, and the resulting e'lred on
....tiOM ,,'u.s lantnrnoullt 10 Itav-
1& ail. Obviousl)', h.d fuel been
md traMpol1.tion less hazardou8
0:1 inslanCl!ll "'ould lta"1l been
(TahI1l41).
me be<:.. rne short 'Ille in 1043

(Tnble :l'l) I"",al- 'I .

. . '_ 0 I '""rea8mg difficultie:e
In slocks fnull Ih", southern anon AT-
l"elldr errl'....l. lhe silrraliotl continued to
tlte follo\\'i"/:" 2 )ean. To .l1e,illt8 the
sllllplS nf ):.'l\!lOlinll an edue.tional eam
p.r!:"n WL'! begun in 104210 indu"" pilots to
ooll!'@rve fllel. Ill' April planes were .1-
I?"'",l to fir onl}' 24 honn per month. In addi-
t,on as fllel _"illl' de,.i"" .11 ClIdels we",
t? lise. gliders dllrilljr th..ir fits! monlh of
tnrnllll', Combat pi""'" Il1Ilinin/:" "&!l reduced
from 500 to 12-S 1I)'inj!" hours. Durin!! lh", last.
weeks of tho war the lillie rnining !Wi"" on
to P:;VIl Ih". I_.experienced pilots.
,"-"prove th""r aklll for suicid.1 .ttack.
mUlmUm number of hours .ns m.n eould D,' in
month for tninin!! purposes 1I"A!I limited 15
dlle .to lhe fil<'l ehIln.,l!@. From. 1oj!i&K:
of ne'" th.. ahon.ge of ...i.tion gasoline
I'f!5lrtct...t1he protection vit.1 to tn.. he...ih bur-
dened lillflll of fillppl)", .... lIsin!! increased dis-
persal of stocks.. This rti;UltM in further COIlI-
plicati"!! 1o';Sl:ic suPPOI1 of Ihe .mlv.
Destruction of I.nkage .nd &lOCks of ga..oo"line
.nd fuel oil br .ir .ttack"'ll!I not ):. .......t in J.p.n
prop..r. M.nchuri Korea. Chin. or FoT1l\OSa,
the principal beill!!" inDicted 10 stocks
at nofineria .\ir .u....k did dam-
10 in lhe "'Outbem "rM
(T.bl.. 42) ""t h.d li"l", .fI"fd on milir.n oper
.. in tllis or .other .1'<'1.8.. Th.. short.ge of
lIb,pplll/.! I"fli\lhed III ......"mul.tion of surplus in-
in lho lIOUtl",m .rM lhat could not blI
moved ",I!!f...berf'.
SUI.pl., of Ilflrol,Ulll. oil .nd lubri nts ".hile
of t",m..ndOWI import.,l('(' in ulO<l",m rf."' is
only Inrt of Ihe im'''''ll9I'ly romplicatfJd. ",-gem
rKIuinod 10 maintain all ann,'" Oil. ho..ever. in
the ...... r ....ilh J.pRn. iIlUSlrau";s the f.i1ure of
.1I.p.n_ l'lO roml,l..telr Ihal in futul'lI
}'I!ltn it IDa}' ....11 be u'll"(l the c1.ssie uample
of tbRt f.. Oil refining ea-
p.cit.r adequRII!. .nd .r.l of fuel
....u!lN1 Ihe .ir fol"Cf"l 10 roo:l"ee operations.
crilll'l...1 the nt'll!. .nd lill,il""l. in eerl.in in-
stanl'l'S. tIte lllobilit," or /l'round fol'Oefl. Thll
,TRllanll!lll "'ere to fu..l ...here il wall
n......I...1. when it WRS n_iNl. in th" quantitiN
u{'C(led.
hrtfflduIIIV,-,\1 the outbreak of the _1'
tho llrovisioll$ .nd clothing depot eyttem eoD-
l"iUNl lWO mllin Ilel'olH in TnkyolId 21 branch
lIllll locllletlltl .-.riou.s pointR through_
0IIl J.pan prul",r (EJlhibilfl A .m! E) .. lIw
..,. in ma,ntllde and Jnte'lSLly.nd
ill 10 u!lNiu lAIpply ll!I ..ell lllI effect di>.-
.....1 in .1tidl'.,ion of .i.r "'.llnber
of unul, In add,tlon to the
two nlAill d.loutlI in were 133
.11, and .,.""nci .<>c.lI..red
1...."'/.""".. '1 1Iv: I,olllel.nd J) .nd F).
Thll whik air auacn in 1945 almost.
..Ii ly tie main depot at Tokyo lind the
brand. delots .t Osaka and Fukuob lIud par
11.11>- dNrn-ed ",,",...1ocher depots (Ref. 1), the
.of ",.risioM lhrough dirtct. .....
10 tbfl abortage of lllOCn ,n the
bombed ,II'IIOUl and Ihe dilspersal of the depots
(1M. :I).
('ontrol over !.he promiona and clothing depots
..... hi1l) eoenlnliRd in Tokyo. The failure to
de.te authority reduced oonside...bly tile
ell'fctinon_ of the llyStems by dl'nyinj! local
dellOt oonmandel'll the 0PllOrlUnily \.0 cXI'n:i!l&
judpnent and inili.tive in their ope"'lions
(Rei. 1).
From de ven OUl8ft of the ..ar clothing. in
....I, no llroblem "'hereM th.re
a chrollic of I'ro"isiolls which ILe<:f!!lSI-
laUd lhe adoptioll of lhe requirinj! o,..,r-
_ troopll 10 Ii,.., off the land Ih.y ot'tUpied.
Such IroopII "'ere L",ued a nlOnth. of
food 011 from the homelnnd. and th.n
only in ..- of .bHohLle we..., 'hey
permnu:..1 additional minimum 'lu.ntili"" frum
dIto bolnola.nd. Pnr.dit1llh .11 food "-ll!I Hr-
_rktd f..... umplion. Wl,ile in
Japan t Ie troop! ........ enjo)'ill": almost. fuJI
.... ioPa, ca.pturN tl<Jtulllenl8 Ihat III
.-rl7 .. 1M2 _ JallBIM"'Il' troops ill Sew
o.i__......iajr and .-.rtillj[ to ca.llllibal-
ialIIl in II' dO"- to ..rTi.... 1br follo.... ing u
ample u quoted &o<n a '-alllunt-l near
IURA (Sew Gui_l in 19-I1!. and mnsl.'ed by
ATIS, J. II. Q... SWPA, "Sonle compa.niell
bcpD -iD bllDlan lItoJI (AVBtralian);
daf ... ia -'d to _ ,;oo<I.-----Of COlI"" at th.t
ti_ OIl' IIUbrnar-iM!! .nd ai....,...ft had bejtUll to
-U IlroadJ on J.pa.new Mi!l!""lf; n....ertlt...
.... bad Illlptrial ('-.1 IINdquartlt'rs ill
1'aII:Jo .-r.d U. .-rl.... IIIOIllha, they might
_ .. '-ilt lIP the 0_ IItodu 1It1he
..... of aom.tMl IIUppliea. L.1fl', when our
r "i_ aDd lIiftnft bad p"';"117 iaol.ted
.. ,..... _ u M om- UId !be
nl , ... " .....
food nmj other in repeated futile eITorUt
10 relie\"e the plighl of their destitute forol'l&.
Ife.... is e"idence of poor planning, lack of
foretight. and a f.i1ure to understand and .i>'
l'Il'C-ia'e ,he rell"iren'Plllll of lI>od.rn wnrfnl"(!.
The mO,1 serious elrt'Ct of air nction Oil the
ho"'elnnd pro\"ision srst.em lar ill Ihe 10$IiI
of time en,.iled tbrouj:h lbe wide dispe...1 of
depou, the disruillion of tranaporlation, de-
lay ill receillt of I'll'" mntprials b) food pro-
the inlerruption of production caused
by .ir ...id .Ierts, ."d the destnLclion of work-
en' homes ..hleh resulted in the 1068 and _lUI"--
ing of peraonneJ.
While the intrinsic eIToct of Ihi8 time 1.- fae
tor OIL the Japanese Wllr effort cannot"" meas-
ured;n fi{r!-N'l!I, it to lhe
final collal_ of .'.pa'" All !jIM. forth in Table ,
the stock le..el of pro.. isiollll "'fl!I at ilS highest
in H/41 with 12'i.3 d.)e of Bupply
lind continuousl)' dt'Clined until in August. IJJ.l6
onl}' .n 18.8 da}" l.n1 uisted. lIod it become
n_l1 for our air fol'l:ell 10 rarrr out the
pl.nned llrogram for lhe df!itruction of the 19-15
rice crops, the ,JIllllllelle ....O\,I(! ha"e beeon in dire
straits fOl' fOOlI ill the fall lind winter of
1946. M.jor General Tllkasltima, Chid of St.1I
of Ihe Twelflh Area AmI)' in defel1!lll of 1M
Toho an'll. 51.ted that the deferu;e fol'l:ell '"'1"1I
the foods of rice and "'heat which
were 10 Ix. oblllille<.1 fmm Ihe NO\"l!-lIlbel' hnn'est
and "an .\merican laudinj:: befol'e NO"ember
....ould h.n' I'ad !ll!'riOllS ooll!le<1uence!l --'u"" of
{Ill'f. 2}.
Ilosl,itu!izal;,m. t:raroaJ.;oA aNd ,l/eJictJl Sit'"
ply._The Flllndllrds of mediclli SlIPlll)" etllilloyrd
b)" the arlll}' in IlCrvieillg i,s trllOpB
were ooJl.id....blr 1)('10 basic
efil.bli.<J,ffl for and p cuced br !lIe Om.led
Stales Artn\". O"cr-all re<Juirelllenls for medical
sUllplies the l'nited Stnte!! Al'm)" ill o..er-
_s areaS were 0.3 IlOullds per lIlan per day or
1Il9 pounds I)('r m.n
"or Jal'llle'll' ,roof'll requtrenlellLi varIed
I
t ,aPl
'M areaq of ol",rlltion; howewr. e,
((l'tler,,1 SltilllizlL. <"I,ier of lite arlllY llIetheal SUI"
II
uirelllCUIJ
pi)" burt'au. tlt"t .ll
IijtUrt' of I'J ller llIan ller da, "as a baI
Ilhumillj: figure. ThUll it appears t.
ll"""rall)" J.palle5(l "rmy llle<lical suplII)" requ,,'t".
t f what"
IIM'-IlIS pl'r llLan were only 27 soldier.
considered neeessar)" for an AlllerlCliIl. .
o.piu Ihill Io,,'er lIlandanl, during Ihe pr
..
It42 'f) li:i l!Hi:i. ""P""e5e
aUllpl}' ""!tid, totnlled
were ",et .wllh allOClltions of onl\'
or apJltllxlInatel) 50 IJercerll. O'f
UDOUtll onl)' 11 llen:ent "'ll!I dis--
dI. field, fot'l'M1 (TI,hle Xo. !Jo6).
prodnellon of mediclIl supplie!! in
the then existing require,nen!&,
oulbreak of the "ar in Deoc:ember
-'7 and civilian demands for medi.
iner:ased. Simultalll'Ously .Japan
apauslOn her medicol euppl)" in-
reached 1111 peak in 19-14. Ho....
.. II Wll!l able to catch up to
whIch increased .t a '1'ry
For 1943 olll)' 60 pct'l'f'nt of total
could be monuf.ctureo:1i in
t; and for that jlIIrt of tIle 194$
year .nding in AuguS! only 10 per.
"' iOJa of medical sUIII'Iies to Japa.
"
"- t'"?"ps ill the widel., lICaltered oomllJlt areas
"'as allir<1 air alld Ilea po"'l'r
,ts t1f\a.<Ia"1lg alladal on .'.panese ship.
llllllt Beginninjl" ll!I .. &$ Ihe .rm) "'as
to make 100 pen:ent distribution of the
"'?C'lul supplies it did It.'e. Deli'...,ri"" of sup-
plte:;c C9uld not be rarried OUI a.:eord;ng to
Il:!ledule ....ilable shipping "'as .110-
tated 10 .hlgh4';r priority items as ....eapons
and ammUmtton. "\pproximately 20 pe",-""nt
of. Ihe lolal medical supplies designated for
Slnpnlelltll lllWer left the home island$. In
addilion it "'ll!I estimaled th.t 20 percent of .... h.t
"'as shipped ....as sunk elll'Out.. The resull 1r1l!l
a of medical supplies through.
out lhe Japaneseheld territories. To supple-
ment lhe uisting !lUl'plil!\l in O\'erseas arras the
pol!c)' of local "'ll!I inaugural4';d
Th,s end....or met ...ilh SUCl:e'!S in China
Java, .nd ll.la}a. but then the problenlS of di;
triblLlion pnwent.d the front.li,," elementll
from l"ee<"i ..ing their sh.re of the supplil!!l
(Tahle So. 41).
The lo$s of medical !lUpplie!! in J.jlIIn proll4'.r
through the direct bombing of mediral sUllllly
depolS wItS reportedlr slight, being on I,. about
2 pe",-""nt. This fa\"o",ble llSpt!<:t was altributed
10 Ihll foresight of the mr<lical alfai" bureau
of the ....ar ",inislr)' in directing the dispersal
of medical deJlou ill the urly nlOtLths of
1944 (llet. II01e!! 1 and 4). How"",.r, in oomb..t
80 ....8..$ .ir action took a much higher loll of
stocks of criticalJ} needed mediral SUlllllies. In
China Ihe int.rdiction of J.pane!ll! lille9 of com.
munie-tion b)" the Fourteenth Air Force m.de
SUPIII)' of front-liue oombat troops genenll)"
difficult .nd nt lime!! almost impossible. T,,'o
hundred and ten lona of medical supplil!!l stoek
piled in :SoUlh and C.nl ...1 ('hina for lhe Hunan
operation "-err. deottofed bJ air .ction. In the
Y!M'how .rea 120 lOllS were de;;troyed as the re-
sult of two air iIIrikes in Jill}' 19-11. Such crili
call)' nl'tded ilelllS as quinine alld sulfa drugs
werr IOlII in th_ ;,trike.\. AI "otonj: in the
Canton .rea on ao ,hme 1944. 00 lOllS of medica.l
8upplil'!l were deslrllJr<1 throuj!h air aCIlOIL. TI,e
princip.1 items lost in Ihis actiOll "'err lrtallUS
8erurn, p.sbland. quini". atabnne.nd plBSlllO-
chin. aILd ,he available of itema
ill Ihat ...... "'ll!I reduced b)' 60 pIInle11t
(nel. note 13).
I" the I'ltilillllille!J "..-al alld .ir bornbud-
mem .eroul1lr<1 for the t1l!!11nJctioa of Iarp
..
tile di"illionll that went. in were 10
tl / ,beaten III the estimltion of th", Jallnnf:8ll
'a. t ICy had to 1.- , .
t . I "" Tl'1' .....,., ""th specially
.ralllf:l., mol'll. he.,ily equipped divisions." As
. relItilt of th,! it "'88 fI'(:O m' zed h
dwillioHI w " I g' t.t .Il
OUl 11'1! 10 he re-equi JIl!d ",' h
heavier .rtillery (10 cm, 15 till 2t
Colonel '''.d.
t..... "Thl!! "IS nev"'r .coolllpli!hf:d" I X
Gui,_. and in the SotOIllOns the
to rI'IhZl! w Ih", fullClt that Wilhout logistical
support th", moet dl!tt!rmined lighting man can-
not hope.to 5tIC:('lllll((. Li",ut",n.nt Colon",1 Yoyoma
l!IIteII: "Of the poemenl.gt: of IO!II in transit I
l!!Itim.te that not nlOre th.n 5/) poertf':nt reached
the troops on long hauls. Frolll We....k to 1AIl
"?' more th.n 20 poe"""ut arri'l'f!d.- Oor com
fonw i$ol.tM t"'" .J.I"nese from his life
Convoy dll'r con''')". .ftl'-r 11If!.!,"I'r.
dlSlppea.red before hlS nry ...ith the food.
lbe Wt!II(lOtl!I. the .n,muniIlOIl.nd the ;ouppliM
thlt "'1'"' .'10 ",1.1 10 tM JIJ'IIDt!ge'1I sum......
Each SIlrl:e9Ou'''' action bl'c:ame repetition
of It no 6lI1111!ies. "I........lion. dI'-
feal. dea'" or surrend",r: Ouf: 10 wr .ir .nd aub-
rnari"", intl'rdirtlOO tM .J.I..nl'l'e oould not
SIIPllOrI fo"""", The
m.nner III _...h,ch OUr .ir po...",r 'II"U "'Illplo,"f:d
In II"" trltlall of th........ r pIned
V1!1'}" JOmiDlnl rol", in I"'" .\lIi1'd and
def... t of till" ,'at..,_. The lil'-nial of .lop
IIClI suJ1llOrt 10 the J.paM8l' iu Guinea
the Solomons enabled us to gain the
11IIh.I,,e by thl'- ",nd of 1942. '111", J.pal\llSi5
und""''''''llIn.led the l"@'lOurttfuluess and
ClJ'IIbitilie of ,h", l'uitf:d St.lelI .nd MO(Ie w",re
counterau.ekl'(l much earlier lhan th",,' h.d .n-
ticiplted. .
Fin.. I'll hI'(' back '0 Ihl' I'hilil>l>ineo; (he
Js,..,,_ "'1_1 I"s l'l",ul-,,-h .nd prt'I'sl't'd for
deri.!ive bailIe. The 1.<;1 rt'llln.nliJ of his .ir
fot"Ct'. hi_ na,"" and his best lighling troops
were ""t to mil('! Bnd defl"Rt ,he .ntiri"all'(l in
uSlon of our rol'l"l"l. Il.,ing U;M the Philip
pille8 "'"lll SIIllplr point for Ihe 80uthem
In''' alld ha.-inl: beEou in ,he quantities
of supplil"ll Ihllt could be from the
Phitippinl'll to other .rt'Illl, thl' Jlpanese no'" en
I.M>st supply !,osition of .n).ra he hid
pnwiou.ly beEon f01'(l'(1 10 def",nd. ITe WlIllltrong,
nnd hn ....1I. 1''''t ...hl'll the -.r
struck III l.eyte, the .1.l"'n_ found that he
could 1I0t support his COlllbat troops. United
.,
, h handled tile most dimc"'" ..
'00 u. lUgl'
ellrr, On ud\'anced medical J1l-
plan ns a whole Will not fully
Ihe war and the war min.
to exercise control over all mili.
.Ithough to a lesser degnoe
LQgi,ti",._J nfluencf:<.\ f......atl h'
the A.!Iialic m.inllnd
on the traditiOla1 f.n.ti.
and staymg po"'el'!! of tiL",ir 8Oldi"'l1I
",nl"'fI'{l the war with the United
.llies without. full .plll'1!(:iation
tlf:ll and types of modem equipll1l'nt
_t the rombat ronditioos under
to fight_ While qu.ntitie of
phf:S W provide stIpport inili.lI),
IIfIp",pared .nd ...eak Ol.po;;ition h.d
Itf:d in Manchuria .nd Chinl .nd
b'oops h.d bl'en .-soned in 1"-
II. that liL", milillr)' ,",<1_
Y18tl.hze til... kind of .... rt.re Ihll
chvf:loped in tbe "outpost" .reas of
limited reservoir of equipllll'n1
and diriding foreet into 1m.1I.
non.mutu.II}
JTWI.e logistical support of for
.11 but imllOSSible .nd ",nabled 1m-
IlriO/ol" .bout tIle d",ft!llt of the Jlr*'
iP tIdlil. Such.ft!II.!I I!! Ind
built inlO bastions by I"'" J.pane'!t'.
tllI',r S1nl'lllrth both in lIlI'n .nd sup
..."'"' io",ffect.in bl'c:alllle
.ir and aurfltf! forces n",utraliud
them. .\ro:onling to U"'ut",nant
ki. thief of st.ff. in the Solo-
ions., Xovemlll"r l!1t2 til",
Di ..ision WIS in 1101' RIMUI lrea .nd
Di .. on Boupi",iHe.
UnJ'lSSllhle due 10 .ir attlck!!. TI,e
JIfObllom wu the loss of our npll'itr
troops 10 the 1ln'1\8. We
of ",lllkiug Guadalc.na1." As w'"
til Mjz", Ihe offe"sj,-", we were in pOlli
which J"p'"lese outpost!! would 00
when.
fought withont adl'<J
uDte
.mmunition: rl)C('ived litlle snl'port
.., forces or na'.I" SlllnN! Iliid falll.ti
in suicidlll
toe. l.i",,,lennnt Coloncl \\"nllll, Iil1lt
.1 SI.ff, IItales, "In Philip
oth",r stomach and illlest.in.l di!K:ucs. The
shonages of flUeh u,...... ieinllS aa emetinc, at.brine,
plllmochin, lind "itamins l"I':!lultt't.l in poor
1....lment .nd care.of I",tieill.'!.
The kill ...... llnd wounded clSunlti" ILUlUher...d
771lf,50 for the entire w&t. Of thill tOlal [t6 IlI"r
ttllt. or 442,;170. were killed in action. Of the
2l:Ii,M:> that 'were wounded 86 8uni'-ed.
It ...o"ld .ppear that Ihe tare llnd trestnlcnt of
th", wl.5 more ll8tisfartor)" than Ihat of
the lIick. lIowever. it is v"'r)" polISibl", that many
...ouuded became "ictim!! of the prenl",nt
di__ .nd their deaths Inll)' h.,"(' bef:n .1
tributed 10 their sickues!! .ud U<>t Iheir wounds.
,U!lO. it ill known fil'l Ih.t in .t IKM. llCveral
inst.neelI 1m- J.""nese ...o"ndl'd delU"Oyf:d
fhemsIolves or "'I're dl'!ilro)"f:d th",ir comradell
through th" Ilractite of finding honor in death.
In fo...... rd COmMt Ift!II.!I pl'n;iI!l'nt Allif:d .ir
.uackll on road. rail .nd ....Ier lil1l'Jl! of rolllmu
nira.lion limited ",vacultioll of rasnlltiefl to the
hours of dnknl'es. E,"('n lhen only lIm.1l
groups c:ou\d lII" moved .t 001' linll'. With
this l.tk of transport. f.cilit;f:!; th", lIick .nd
"'olmded piled Ull in fo...... rd .I'M inlllan.tioos
...here uisling re9l'-r'-es: of IJlI'(liCIII 8uPIlliel ...",re
limited .nd quickl)" uh.usted. Ueo::upoention
time "'I!! p"tienl.lI ..."' .... 10
.ddilional colllplicali()fl!l: .nd th", deatl, rat'" iu
,.......
_\s .,... il.ble shippinl!" throuf.houl tI,e empire
bl'pn 10 derrI'I.!IC tI,e ,I.p.n_ found it increal-
mono dillirult to u,.int.in eVllcu.tion
lIehf:dules. Th", H>ore nef:d for to
transport lIlunitions .ud n'd1'1,lo)" IroopS resulted
iu the con,"('rsion of IlO!!pital 6hilMl into ordin.'1
tnnlll>ortS- Fin.ny in the months of
1m- ,1.I.aoelle f!l"-" up further effort to re">o""
ealIU.ltics from o'er!!elll .",11 to hOllpitals in
,'.pall..-\1 Ihe !lime lime CISU.1tiCII increl!lf:ll
.nd became nr)" tro...dfJd in
inhorior t...,.lment .nd ellre.
In April 194&. in p",p"r1Itioll for the defcllllll
of 1M honll'l.nd, Ihe hospit"lization pl.u for
J.pan "." revillt'<l. t.:p to this time eontl'Ql .of
.nny hOlillilals wu vest.e<1 in lha ml"llic.l albH'S
bul'MU of the "'.r ,ninistr). The nell' plall
d..\efra.ted Ihill reflllOIlsibilil)' to the
partmtnts of the re81'l!dive milililry 1116I
rlc
.
t
a.
Each tIilltrict "... to funclion III II ll"]lnrutC clillty
with the lII!v",ral specillli .cd t)'11lIlI or
provided. The w.r ministry, howOl\"el", t1'talil
ed
rontrol of 110", first .ntl third Tokyo lIlil
itllry
.."it_0' medieal flUpplw.. completll
_ ... 8lIIleriem:ed in tha bonlbing of tM
0IIa1"" dI5fot. ...biitl .t T.dobe.n 011 I..,yte
10 d 1M lItOC& pile. ... dUlloliabed
_tt of nUll Ind lir bolllMrdmtnt
(Bet,""'" H).
X. BIlnIlI the actu.l '!UlnlllJ of u>edi<:ll
...,.... that the frontline troollll ..-15
-Uand ft'Ulted In inferior lI'Mtment 0' CIllU'
.... TIle I.ck 0' .I.brine, plll!lllOChinnd
,..ma. io 90 pl'n:ent of the co,nMt
tI'OOplI aa.edng mal.n. of ...hith 60
_ r:Ju-i< _ Sinety pl'lftT\t of the trooflll
d.JIpla,m of bt-r,lMori for lack of Vii.'
mm 8
'
I R.,t. note 10).
5torb rft')Iinina: in .nny depot. in lhe bome-
Japd II. the end of tM ....r "'",re reported 10 be
I.fI'P"Unaul, w,ooo bo:u!!I or 12.000 IOns of
ac=al IAlpplia .mount "'Ill
to bt- lAl&jmt w meet the .nny's de-
__ in t1ll' botPeland for tM M.'Et 6 months;
........ OOIIlparilIOIl ...ilh Ih", .nnllli require-
awntI _ klnh in T.bl", So.... indic.U!8 lhat
prutJably .. than I 4 monthll' reoeM"'" uil!iKI.,
putXu1arl} hesl lbr oUllllMor of tiriliaM
rec'l'Uited to. in lbr df:ft.nw of lhe bornf:-
Japd .....14 to IMo lIUpplioed from Inn}'
IlCIdm. PtoI_ fM thfo .nay oftr 1M civilian
popalatioa ill thfo prodQl1ion of lnedi
sI IAlpplill "";Ih tM .nny. inlbilit)"
10 diltribue to troopll undoubtedly Ie
___ lor w um"'s mmparaliftly f.vonbif:
...litslllll'JPly malion in J.pan proper. 110...
ner. lbr .mtribvtion of 1'-' Applies Ihrough
.. I'" homrlaDd "'11I not _I.flctory. Tha
.... of It", botDf: ialancb! C111J.d for propor'
,--.'" 6 -e Ikd pilr of mtdiH.I IAlppl_
.. -mofche 1 milital'J dillri<1 thill
J.d aot ... _plitlhed .. 1M tiDW of the
..-... The Tobi. .nd {"hllJO&1I military
dillrit1 dopJU bad pnttitally no nwdiCIII aap-
pl_by Ii A1IJllII IM6 (T.blr 411.nd Reof. .-
I aDd 6).
PriDcipd}y thrvuF Ibt inability of tM J.pa.
_ 10 diIm'bute the medinll IIIppliNI tbooy had
to their UOopll aeneral IImrtaee 0'
.... _WJM. iP 1M on_ areu
... ill 'fW1 hl,b Dllmbn' of lick tu\l.
... " .. tba pIriod of the Wlr 7_,787 tid::
....... _ tnIIed In hcJapitala; 0'
.. a ,.em 01' SIiI.UO died. PJoe.,rJant
..... _ ..a.m. tllbamalolil, pletlm,.
...... 11II1 ....... dJamterJ and
_.. _-.. -
.JULY AUG SEP
._-

-
-
"
u,.....
MIl.R APR MAY'"
_.
.
-
-
"
-'.
".
'.
'-
.
---
.
'--.
"-
....

....... .,..,
--.--
--
., .
-
--
......
..
-- ,

-
........- -
_.
-- ." .
-
...........
'"
-..
'" ...
-
...
,.

"

.".
-..
-
.'
0
I

._.
... o-.cc
'"
-
-
-
,IRI,aneole Inln'llOrl. of which .ir llOwer deet-ro,ed
ur damaj..'('ll approximately 30 percent., is - of
the single causes of ti,e defNt of the .I....
_ .\cwrding (0 Lieuten.nt GelM'n1
chief Qf stall'. SoIQffi()II!I operalion. '"Of"
000 men ()11 Guadalcanal, over 10,000 -
out of aC1Wn becan;:e of lick Qf food.
plies can", in fQr .. "mnlha. Ow'
... as
In areu such Ili! Iluml. Ind China air
wu n()! Qnl)" larj,.<el) responsible for the
of JII,.nest! logistiCS through Ihe d
supplies. rnilroods and lrallS!IOr(. but.18o
siugl). 1'l'SllOnsible for kClll,ing our oft
Allied ll'OOllS sUI'l'lit,<l in l'O\llltr)' R
nil' llIQne.. In fnd, ufter the \0Sll of the
HOI"" Chinn wns sUI'I,li"d h) nir and thul
in the war al II. wr)" critic"l time.
Till. air atUlCks Qn J.I'RII proper ell'
delrop'd tb" ..-ar polenti.1 of lhe oonnll'J'
cau!!e(l dispeN8.1 Qf industr)' aod
l,he;;. The additional burtl",n Ihus Ihro
already o'Hburdened Iran.sllOrtalWn f
cati9Kl much oonft.siOl'.
Indications are that interdictwn of the
municatiotlS s)-stem immedialel,. Iher tn.
of Okin..... "'ould ba\... impeded lhe
menl of I.rge numllera of trooll!l .nd qn
of llUllplies before their (O)neentntion
place for the planned defenlle of Ihe h0111fl
Th" force!l assil>rned 10 lhfl homeland d
h.d b) Hi Angust 191!i prepared
def"nsive posilions bUI had equipment and
l,li(OS adeo:\uute onl)' for an initial strong,
born defense. Major GellerRl Takashima
"As of August we had 40 of nl1l111U
planned, 00 percent of fuel, alld 100 pI'
food and'clothing (tbis does not include the
foods of rice and wheat ...hieh ....ere to bit
tailled from the SO\'embt'cr harvt5t)."

8taleI .ir ud surface action denied him Ihe

f,.doIa of nofttDftll IlO _nti.1 to
_ppon. He... in 1M ry midst of the
""- .e.1 ...i!tlOul. elfon 10 ......
.fOfU hil J>OtiitlOllS....-.ll frust ...lf<!. TIle decisi
ritton Df l-mled Stale;;; (O)mhu>ell forc:ell in the
PhiliMn- -ampaign ...u a major calastrophe
for the .lIp'''''' TIle)' iOIlI. "'hal ....-.ll 1",fl of
Wir na'"}\ I substanlial l)art of Ih",ir remaining
air foru, Ill. numbloTS of th",ir 6.- lroops
aDd equil,p",uL On I 19ft, General
ltfJ&dquaneos in Tok,o d""ided il wU hopelesll
to Iry 10 an)' j,..-ro.",d fort:e:!l in Ihe re-
maining oull)'in!!
11,Ull, in the East Thnilllnd,
Burnla. Chi,,,, and in the m"n)' olher "oulposl
.rMS" the Japllnt'cSe combol IlOhlin wnS com-
p,",ul)' eul .ff from his outside of suppl,..
In fact. lhe homel.nd iL""U hId no'" lJecon>e Ihe
combat 10'" of lhe ,,-ar. The air ... ids on Jll)an
proper had s"-,,,I\ed inlO sneh d$rueti"e force in
Ih.t ltIf' "'ar potenlial of Ihe rounlrJ had
beeIl reduced to impotellC)" E"en for a defense
01 h;' oo-land the Jlpanetle rould not suppl)'
bil fOI'ftS 100"' Iban the bI", neressilies for
I fanatic&:. !!Iubbon>. suicidal def",n:sM'.
Gtfteral ehief of filaR'. T...elflh ArM
Army, 1Ultil. "'We onl)' Ilat! ammU-
nitton for 1 ...eel< of l.u")' fight!"!!. our cannon
"'en' fe.... ri", "'as short but we UI'K!ed to Qb-
rain rice front the Sur'
-lfI; !he Qnl)' Bherlla!i.-e 10 u\timn!e
nllional 1.lieide.
11,e imoad. Oil Japnu_ millie b)
our BUb_rine .ml air 8trikell, bKominl! in-
creaBillltly fC"'Iler u Ihe ,,ar caused
not ooly It", 1011I Qf vilally needed sUI'plies bUI
UIo electivel)' prennted lit", pm.ep",nl of !lUll-
pli.. to._ .beft tbe\' needed to $U(U!II-
h.U, ..... OW' The f.ilu", of
...
... _.
"=-"\
..,
", -" _ ..... ....e...... _ ...
,- ..
'.--
.. -
__ .... 'T'"
_._-:-..
...
'.',/", ..,
..
.--
.. ...'
-- .-

'_Df'J.... t ..... _ .... ....... ...... soP ,

'R'"" h""
...1...- -
l- ! ..dr:p
"

._.. _....

-.
_.
PCLI11CAL--1
_,e
F-V?1
- -"
_.-
----
----
..--;,_.
AlA 'OI'C
NILITARY
CHAPTER II
TRANSPORTATION
RT FACfOR IN LOGISTICS OF JAPANESE GROUND
is treated in the follo",ing sub-
"erse fi,:, cau*<:l b}' the shipping shortage
"'as t,he mabllll_" to fortify quickl,)' the newly
estabhshed OUlJlO!;l;! and the initi.1 counter-
.tlsch by our pound forces (at. Guad.lc.na.l
.nd in Sew Guinea) found thest IJOllitiol18 vul-
nerable despite the desperate resist.nee of their
defender'$. Imn>edi.lel}, effort ....as made.
the Japane!!l' to reinfon:e Ihest theaters hut
with their leul shillping limited by the trans-
port requiremems of the Aleutian .nd llid.... v
operations (in .ddition to the other shipping d;
mands .Iready existent) these efl'ons "too
I.te .nd too little." P.rticul.rh did tbe lOS!! of
enemy earners" )lid....} help-us to gain ellrly
Ihe lIlasterr of the .ir which .ttOUDled for the
bulk of .Japanege IlhillS sunk in the Se.... Guinea-
Solomons .rea. Thereafter, .lthough the do-
mestic economy suffered from the diTt'rsion of
shillS to mililaf}' purposes. such SUllplS ships had
to be for the most part on thesf,
point ...hich "ere under direct .tbck-with
onls tnough supplies to mainlain garrison fOr0e6
deli-'ere<! to isl.nds in the wne of rom-
muni('alioll. 8Qon .Jallanese lor;:ses of trailS--
ports lind ships be<-ame Ilrohibitive .nd
were forced to an expedient which remained
II paltern through d,e w.r. Largt' ships from
the rellr IIreas would nnload at !lOmB point "'ithin
SIIlIlI1 hO.l ranJ..'t of the oolnbal lIrea lind sup-
Jllief! would then he forw.rded in Ih8lle small
Ob"iollslS such crah "'ere inadequate to
j.!rouml units in llUlltained oombat and
their 1()8!l('!I further reslricted their utility. ID
,ulditioll, the Iransshipping pointe were....u,
11180 within ranjrl' of our aircraft in the New
Guin(,D-Solomons area with the ..-uh that oca-
t illlll'll 1()Il.o\l'oj of hl!'Jll' lIhiJlll Wflt'fllIlIlIIaiDed. E_
Ilmlly it "lIlI to to
tu town nUlinlain an ineft'erluaI trieIde of
I,li_ .h onr foJUII ad'l'atlOed .. PMIAt
"
is typical of lhe
planning, as it ",lIS made in
. t 10 aCCOlllmodate
pment of ra"' materials (",ith
of the domestic industrial IlO-
tnnsponation of supplies re-
IlItahlillhment lind maililenance
line of defenses. Both of
required long and
for which Ihern were not
I discllSS.ion_ h)" major tlll'alel'S,
_ combat operations of the .-an
tnnsportation.
,
apparent that, &fler Iheir quick
easy conquest of the !;Outhem
Indochina. Thailand. )b.lan.
lands ElLSI lndies. Bom'eo.
hera) with the attendant bUI
..ptun'! of Burma and Ihe, PhiJi!r
military decided !.llat while
rieh natural resources of the 5Oulh-
would establish the defenses of this
positions mther i1lan 10000llr
. n rommon lIlllong
:rrr took !.lIe initiative in
IlI"eoftheJml ., \
. >erla ,rilly lIeac!lluarlers to real-
the elTeo:c of' I ..
. 1J11l( equilte Sll1pplllg Oil phl1lnoo
resnlted in requisitions of
s.ups from Other elull&'8 uud, when such requisi-
101;8 were filllllly ullpr<Jnld. belated chllnge8 had
o made In other operntional pInus. This
llsuall)' ended in despe.rnte use of all
lI"Udllble shipping to Sllllpl), combat areas lind
allelll1ate reinforcement of support
positiOns. One factor in fa''Or of the
.'aplIne,p wag tlillt when the presence of our
forces prohibited any further maritime supply
of l.he 1101Ilt.i under attack. originalh'
for tho;;e points "'0111(( be unloaded a"t
a IlOI'!llLon currentl., well in the rNr. For (hi;!
reason Ihe enernJ\ situation 011 targetil
lo...-ard the end of the ""I' .ras better ,han in the
earIY,llha.."I!S. Ilo,,,-j"'er. due 10 lad: of careful
planumg. It 1Ir&;l !l@ldom possible to m.ke the
IIIOSt elfectil-e of 11'001);; or supplie!l and it
"'as n.atural that IIlOrale suffered as a resull.
01 e/Q.06 ".1- 6liipr.-
,\t the of the "ar. 1M total ton-
nage of "'.\" was appl'O:>;imalel ... :?I.:iO.OOO
of which (60 lira;; (0
Ihe tnl1!'llOn.llon of combat and 10 the
replenislunMI of their supplies: the other
690,000 IOns ...ere u;.ed in the transportation and
of I'@Ir el!:helolls and in preparations for
the illusion of Jan. FoUollrin.g are the oper-
ations to ...-hich the 1.400.000 lOllS ...ere assigned:
llaLo.ra-llunna ._. _ ___ __ no.ooo
1...- _ _ __ s.-.o.ooo
South seu _. 50,000
Dua<>, Joio. al>ll Ta.t 'h.t so,ooo
Table 1 gi"es fUMber itemiulion of tonnagf' fig-
ures in tlec:ember 1941.
,!,he Rurma campotiW1 proved the first disap-
10 This
reqmred so lHuch retnforcemenl that .'.\" shillS
had to relum immedilltel}' 10 Japan for fuM.her
11
------_.. --------_. _.
0. 0 .Dd Jon __uno
I,u"u 1.10 1Io0lb l)N. .tId K_ CM... hlln Total
..._ .. 1 -.- . --.. __-. __ :.:__ __
110.000 130.000 '0.000 10.000 . 10.(100 10.(100 lIlI.OOO ".000
- ...-
:J:=;;_;;:--,,-c1 ..
flO.OOO 4W.OOO 110.000 100.000 230.000 10.000 lIIO,OOO "1-0.-
carj.,'O and passenger nl!iI!Il!ls
mlo IhT('{! groups---th0!J6 allocated
classified as "A" ships, th0!J6
"OM ships lind those for dvililUl
of non-militar)' IlUpplies as "C"
ion which existed in fran-
the higher commBnds 10 meet the
ill shown by the frequent diver-
:hom one class to anolher. -Fllil-
thf'. most item in
10J,l:IStU:!l IS e"illelLt in the fact
OCI:urred in el<tellsinl theu-
....hlch were separated from tlie
Iy wide el<pnllSl'!! of water.
of ,lnpanl!Se plannillj! is most
the Ilttision to etabli,h
Illle of defense for the rich
nther than to fOrlify the area
, done the laueI'. the .lnp.nl'l'Oe
e the most efficient u"!! of their
d haw found their men:hant '-t'\-
,000 !-rros'l tons sufficiNlt. since
ght militar,l' into th..
. beoen IISed 10 carr)' back Co ,/UJl1111
als needf.'d the U"llrlime in-
y.
illllpite the limited amount of ton-
" the heginninj! of the ..... 1'.
dpfetlSE'S ...-ere del!:ided !'I)On and
nel!:elSlIr)' to dh.. n. frolll the illl-
n ... materials n.... .11 ships u;oed
ation of mililal}' SlIllplitll. TI,is
, tme of the Kurile!l lind _\Jeu
re, as Ihe _\.Ilied submarine
intensified and our'aircraft pined
:ftnt (rom land b.ses and later from
I). attrition of Japan's shipping'
point fllr he)-ond her ability to
II
I'l*l building or repair and, in (lC(:upying terri
IIJr1 ,.here roads were noneJ;illtent or Imd onl)
the crudest of tl'i1s, the U!Ie of e\'lm limited llum
ben of trucb lI'U curtailed. Further
limiting factors were maintenanoo and motor
fDeL Even ..ben the over-all supply of the lat-
Ier ... ddent for an area, it "'all \lsually so
poorJ,- distributed that the operating ranb'e of
tMcracb .... confiDed to a fe.. fuel depots. 'nle
.. 01 draft and pack hones supplemented motor
v..port.. ....here climatic conditioN allowed but
in __ izIlItanoe8, sach all the Imphal ctUlIJlllib'll
in Barma, elephants _re the only means of
tnDIpOrtation The final result in
IllADI eue6 yu that the troop!:l walked and car-
ried all much equipment all pollSible.
SubmariDl' uamportation IIrU obviousl)' loG
limited to do more than delay the loes of be-
IIier;ed positions. At first. the anny
apoo the nayY 10 proYide submarines for this
parpo9l'J but latH, due to the 1(lQ!I!S of submarines
OD sach rni!Bions and the need of them for the
Inditional .....pport of thI'l fteet.," the navy reo
faIed to furntsh any JDOte submarines and tM
anDy undl'rtook building transport suhmariM!l
01 ita own. Tbege proved a dismal disallpoint-
..-t ill every rtllp!ct and lIrere only used on 1'11"0
'" 'OIlS Once, in attempting to reinfol"t'l!
LeyM, tllrO army submarines lIrere lost. On tM
..... 0CICa5i0n 8ItveIl wcoessful runs W(!te Illadp
rr- yokostJka 10 Hachijo Jima, an air
raid wvaing post 90_ 00 miles to the !IOulh.
Jl'be Anny Air Ttan!ipOrt Command collsisted
01 011I1 abou.t 80 p1an5 IIrbich wete uSt'd Ilri
...ariIl in the tI'UlllpOrtalion of aviation spare
paN aDd _ medic:alllllpplies on the outward
jouDlIJ from Japan to areas from which ferry'
pilaU wen retarDed- The llllljor u<oe of
U- pIaDes for other BIIpply was in
iDe _ aoo 10M of l!:ritical supplies to Ihe
pOlIDd annies early in the Burma Clllllilaign. 1t
.... ruely the practice to paf'aChuU> sUPlllies in
Ul)' and the only UlIII of Ilirborne HOOP!!
.... in tM capture 01 Palembang by puuCrOOllS
-Via 1MSL
In brief, it .... laek of distribution 01' lHaldi!!'
tribatioD rather than an over-an 8hortal;ll of sup'
plieI which proved the "oMIt iml){ldililPut to
pouDd operationL Failure of their transport
.... the great.eIt single factor in the of
tbe J.,...., fact which ill borne out b)' the
loIItnriDa studiee of th,e oround Logist
iCil
.......
.. ,....., tal' alwqs to lclc*
.............. .,..- ................ k
..-rr...u die'"JaDdiDaI for
.. k 1I1..-.pg lO.pply the
_ -.- .
-_ -_.....
.........e hich wen eurnatJ1..u
..... nut a .-k. the...,...pply.'
... within oar dIIriDI the Idta' pll.-
ot beUw &baD in the t.p.-
_ __..........
... of in ".. h"ClOp8 and of
....... of -wJ.i- 10
- .
........... the ..... uoportant IDIdaod of
........ ot. their OWD
....- ..... c:apdJ ... hiel of
..... ' ia J...... x-. IbDclauia. aDd
lhrda auu. 1be baited of IPO&OI'
..... the poor ia "..- ..
..u .... !hit ........,.. IU'MS -' the --
..... of ...-oItbelUP
JII'iIri&1 aI..,. ai- 10 ........
_ of aliIu'1 .-ppI8 01' iD .I....
...... s_IlIllt the .,.,. but ntber ....
UJ' .......... burdIa. of rail limit.....
Ia aa. 1M ""'- ..., t.oId wiIh the
.-..IIJ GIl ......,.... .-y -- of I'OIld-
....................... _...
... NIl ',. au-. thiI ,.... ..
...,. of their
IlIiI I:J die U1UIlId Air
1'_ cuWW opII'IItio- iD -aal 0._ by
..... IOs--L (N_At.,,-t. the ..
i JititJ of ....m. JhIIcImria -- --
............. atRei .u .....
... -'- ) lD the of oaaa-
tl W
bIe
ill
.... 1WIeM, ...,.. Ulll J'NICh ....
_.............. _--
................ ia diItribatiaI t:M
..........................) of the.
.. -. Ia ...... ""'" balk appIOZi-
...." of Mft'ft' nil.., ill ...
.'.8 1Il. !'!IIIippi.- bot1l
.. .,..q -. of niIro..JI .....
....... yel he .., .. d
'
17 of 1m. ad..,
........................ whWl
-..., -_...
_ ...
.......... _ iD
...... _of III .
.... _ ,......,iD
i
-:;: -:;
..' ::
!
i

.;
It
. ,
..
..
"
, .
, : :
! i !
;
,
,

,!
'j !

..
!
,

f
l
,

0
Singlt' "_Is we"" spl!t_'Ihd IIIl ill c,pry w>lf
sible to shorten the time' of the round trill but
the ronvot system b)' submarine ai-
htld all ships Ilown to the speed of the
.10.-, An additional attempt to ilQhe lhe
lIhipp
i
ll#t' problem Ihe ,.",amping of the
amlJ di14ribulion to sUIIJlliC$
by 1M $hortest l__ible route.
lWill#t' unablt' no"" 10 le\"J an)' mol'll "C-
ship<. the could nOl alford further sub-
..anlial 1_ of ..,,- shillS. The shipbuilding
indudf'd Ilf'" sn or ships (similar
to our I.STs) .nd lIe,'pral weir<l new t,',JeII til!"
sill:Ill'l1 10 !!II,e time alld mnterillls in construc
lion_with t"OIIlll!/llIe'lIl hl!<>l of <lu,l1ity nnd l,nj.
dW9" 1I0we,'er. Ihe tolnl of these WIlS not sum
denl for lhe ornl)"s lIml it I"l'SOrte(1 to the
ute of a"orships, llrineillllll" destroyers, to rUll
supplies from the main dellOt at Rabaul to
Ou.d.lean.1 and Sew Guinea. Pre\um.bl,",
ships "'el'll better able to defend themseh't'!l
frotn our planes. J>" boats submarines.
Ho...eftr. Ioeses of :Ii! destro)'ers on SUIlIlI)' mi.
siODll in this thester alone Ilrohibiled their fur'
ther I!te .nd the eoem,s i!lOlated posilions had
to dep"nd on the trickle of supplies whkh CIlmt
in at b) small ...ocxIen ships (usuall)' buill
locall)'). b)' landing craft. or by subm.rine. SOl
only ...ere heal')' 1_ sustained in tlll!:Se t)'ptS
but the limiled OIleJ'8tinlC I'l\dius of the first t1ll"0
brought the pointa uf transsllipment (from
larjlll \__Is) within the Tllnge of our Inndb"1ll'I1
"in"raft .nd T1!l!ulted in wntinued losses of the
precious trall!!llOrts.
When the Central Pacific !Je<:ll.me the main
theater towan! the end of 1943 our carrier task
fOmll had npanded to II point where their
pla_ could not only .ugrnel1t the hel\'y toU
tabD by aubmariMll in shipping lanes but .bo
C'Otlld dfIltl'Oy ships in shtlterffi anchorages bI!'-
yond the raJlg'! of our landt.sed planes. The
oriJjnaJ mrrier attacD on Truk .nd g.,ipt.n ill
February 1914. on P.lau in )brch 1944, 011 lbe
Philippines in Srplftllbrr Il). and on Saigon ill
JaDuuy lMS delItroyed many cargo ships .nd
auerely disrupted shipping plall!l and operatiOns.
Abo.., aU, our amen were able to Ilrel'ent any
furtheI' lIUppliN from rea-ching the oombat,
in appreci.ble quanlity afler our llltneks had
......
n- operalions rKiuired the diversion to
t'eDcral Pacific of nearly .11 "A" ships whldl
..
,... -
--
....
.at ........ JIftL-- U U
WD____ U U
"'V U IL2
"--I _ _ _ _ _
Bel1')' .p eBl*'ially ill the So1omool,
.... il to aequin from new confIlruc:-
lila or bJ r.di""" mm "C' to "A" ships up
ID l.aoJlOO .. Ill- the end of IM2, _beD one-
half of the toW was .-igDed to the Sok>moJlSo
5ew GuiDa lheaw. Table 21hoWll comp1ele de-
pJo,..nt at "A" ships ill 1M2.
8y April 1943 ahipping u.-. chiefly in com-
bat., hid reduced the totIl of "A" ahips to
1.100,000 111M IODlI .nd the army tried to meet
the IituaUaJ in various .ays. The extent to
_br.eb trampot18 oftrJoaded is shown by
chutp in the ,"'rage atDOWlt of groes lonI
... 10 tl'lllllpOrt -m 1O!die!' with full equip-
-.
_ or...r_
r...-.1M1 .._. .. _ _. A.O
_.- _. - - ..._.- _.....
r...-. ._. __. . ..
.r- . ..
...... _ .-. 1.0
ft. IMdiIt...... -'ted
.... ...mcintma
..,.... ............ bad been planned,
...... IIboIrd a earp of nw materialL Fur-
...... the au- -... fell bebiDd lICbed-
........ 10 aptan lila Jl'ijia Sutoa wen
........ atd __ tinaUJ ...a....d. ---
., ....,.,. diwened 10 IItd_y in JuDe lHi
........... nqPed to ..ppon taw Aa.u
__ ....... mel opentioba.
I. A..,- oar bepn witb the
A-xu a-lihJl' on Onadakanal and shortly
ta.-tt. i. N_ Guinea. To railIt tbe8e at
web tJ. army a I... amount
of lIbipping. beca_ of the ptelllring
dImand for importalion of raw materials the
anny hid _n fom!d to J1!IHolle considerable
10 the "e" e1-. Thl' dil1!nion of th_
ud IOIlll' 1_of ahips relIulted in the
foUo_iDf .ilUation of"A" ships in October 1942;
oa.b.......N_ 0..- n __ U _ o00.ooo
A20,OOO
01.... a_ _ _ __ _ -.000
t_ _ _ _ _ 8O.OOlI
,
,
!I
II!! !
Ii i i ..
, "
, "
, "
Ui
:
- !
: 1
:i '
, ,
: : '
! : i
Ii:! g
, " , .,
, ,
, '
, , , :
:: :1
" ,
" . , , . ,
, ' , ,
, ,
, ,
!
.........
.,- - ..
i
og ,: 2
;;; ,I ..
, ' , ,
if :
, ,
, ,
, ,
: :
"
: :
;
: i
, '
, '
, '
, '
l .
: . .. "
:1il
..
,'
n! i
g:'!:!.li
-, ,
. : :
"
Uii
i!
: 1
! I
HHI ii
1r
, ::III
I
6
,.
H
."
!J

100.000
100.000
--
...
11:_ , ___
...-i of the Philippm- 80,000 tollII of "C" ships
.... die _&herD IU'88 in IdditiOb to all shipe
pNrioaIl,-1fMd to lh. suppl)' of the RyuKyw,
... Fonnr-. Tabho " pt"f'RntB of
"","1IaipI in 1M4
...fter oar reo'II(Mtion of uUlOn it "'ILS im-
to .. lIhil- between the lIOuthem area
aDd J.,.a. It 'IrU 10 ]ef.\"C in the for-
mer .,. ..II shipl which hlppene<1 to 00 thel'll
liter February 11146 and the only "A" ships in
the ficinity of Japan totaled 22:1,000 gruilS tOllS.
All the invasion of the homeland beenme im-
minent, lhe problem W&II 10 get Sllpplil;'ll (food
in pertirular) &om till" .\sialic lO11illlllnd to
J..... TIle limited number of all ships ldt for
lb. Purpolle toUld not be 8uployed to the fulls
esteDI of lbe fmiher !()Sliol'S from A.llied
aircraft. ....bmarinea. and mines (I,id by pllllf'!l).
Afcer ., IIM5 rolleo::tinl Uge W'U
made of Ind ships..\1 that time
ODly f7f,ooo"gTOlII tOM of ,II clllsse!l remained
in open-lion. Table Ii prell!uts deplopnent of
wA" shipe in 1945.
;
;

i
, t

,

,
,

i

,
,
! i

I
"
,
' ,

: :

I
"
I

, , ' ,

, '. '
,
it
I
i ! i i
I
liB
IliI

.,
"' ....
l>
--
--
-
---
..---
1111
I
1m I
II
'H
..
I I
:it i i
, ,
.
,
.
,I I
'.;' I
I :: , ,
: ::
,
Ii]
!I j, I II! i I
I I
I ::
" , ::
I'
,
il!! I
t
' "
, :'

"
"
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I
I
II
It
I If

--
-
- -

...

.-
-

- -
- -
- -
-
, '''' ..
::.-
.:=' ....
-
-
-
--
-
-
.
...."
-
--
_.
-
-
.::::::.-
-
......
-
-
,... ,....."
--
- --
- -
- -
.... _-
- -
- --
- -
- - .. -
""" -
-
--
--
- .. -
-
--
--
..
....... -

----

~
--
- --
-
--
- ::::-
'--
--
--
--
--
...... '-
-_... - '=:-
--
-
--
--
--
-
--
--
--
-'-
-
--
-
-
--
---
-
-
-
-
..
- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - - .
-
-
- -
- -
- -
IE:- .:;
==
- -
- .- -
- -
-
- -
--
- -
-
- -
- -
- -
-
-
- - --
- - - .
- "
- -
-
--
- -
- -
- .-
.- -
- -
- -
--
- -
- - ._-
- -
- -
- ~ - : . : :
- -
., -
=
.. -
-
-
--
-
--
-
-
-
---
._-
---
-
-
.-
-
.-
-
-
-
-
-
---
_.
--
- -
- -
-
- -
- -
-
- -
- -
- -
---
- -
-
- -
- -
- - - ..
-
- .
.- -
- -
- -
.-
- - - .
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
=
-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
- -
- -
-
- -
- -
- -
- -
-
- -
- -
- -
- -
-
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
-
~
-
-
_._-
---
-
---
-
-
----
-
- ~ -
---
--
----
-
- ....
=.-
-- -
1- _
".
- -
,....
-
s_
--

.....
_.- '.-.000.
,-

:'_.000
E!hibit M IlO/"lra}'S graphically the amount
of military IIIIU civilian supplies ..hich moved
both up Ilnu down the Yangtze from 1938
through AUb'llst 1940, It will be noted that the
trend of the "olume ....1l8 downward ..ith the
ucelltion of a rise in civilian goods (principally
iron ore) transported uownstrtam in 1m and
a rille in military supplies carried upstream in
1944 when jl'l"tparatiollll were being made for tbe
Japaneet drives on American .irbasts at K..ei-
lin and Liueho...
Bombing by the Cnited StatM Fourteenth Air
Force caused the greatest direct 1<lSS of shipping
Rer. I'\Ot(o I.
u
on the Yanl-otze. and alllO to ot?er
10!l8tll, from collisiolls and b) fO":lng
Japane!!l' ships 10 nlO,-e only at mp;ht. Mines
laid b,' planeil cau!le(1 numerous 10lIIIl'lII, pat
ticula;h' among larj.-e ships Wilh stet.1 .A
summa;y of YlInl-otT... shippinl\' 1_ IS gln>n m
Table 10, , .
The ('fTt'<'UI of lIir IIttacks 011 Yangrze shlppmg
11rl' shown bl'low;
JUlie 11).13 <a) r.la)'liltht moremen.t of larae
shillS w"s ahon result-
in!! in !li!!h! opel1llLOllll UdUSlvely.
(b) I)a)'light, OIlt'l1ltioll8 of ,_1lJ weN
renderl'<1 IIl'lUlrdoUll .00''6 K1Ukl&ng.
"
l,4:lG
..
"
1,6:11
no
"
u
r.,1H

10,lfS
5,612

1.1'.\
l,H2
1,464
-----;30
,..

:fInw., ..hich is naris-ble by

upstream as Hanko.., repr&-
of traft'ie in a country ..here
Iy nonexistent and the rail
y disrupted. H01\'"ever, be-
of inland navigation
attacks by guerrilla fonllS,
and combat losses dill'tred
water shipping.
SllllJlltioll!l nt 1- .
brid,L.,'t' 11m lind Oil I
lJellv, lit. . 1. "r K'lg'lllhllllll (which /lut II
lllirt on tlol' 1,lrell I I
t titUlIPOtl) F ' Y o\"er )urdened motor
bOIllI.' ' n'IJul'11l ltaring ,md 1<1'0 n:co-'"
"lillo'll of 11101'1' " ""
little pmpl'rl) I HI! Ir,UII!! re:IIulled in vety
Ihun livl"l. llllllllJ.,'t' Inil look a toll of 1_
The m......l I-jllli lilt .
....el1! th(, K "J.,'f'l'f for bombing
S. lIn'nml I"nnl'ts under Shil110 k'
, ltnllll and thl" man' hr- 1 nO!!l' I
All COllnlermell 1l1'l'!l:1 ;( j!elI aud other tunutl..
nenl of OUt blockill:1' h
D
/
lIl

n
tSol' planlled, in the
unload I roo')II r t. I' KanmOIl 10
S
' rom tnllM bet1fflell Y , d
h'lIlonOlltki an I t anal lin
boau Ih; tra, Ihem in small
"
.. Dnl .,.,. 10 PO'" b...
OJI Ind Oil. S I toen
bee . 1I1'P Ii'll, of roUt!le. "'ould
To:rr':.e:.nUl:h
d
JIlore ditrlf'lIlt ilem to ltaR'" hill.
our lructlon of hill bridb'l'! the ene
fa) to build a"xilial")' bridges of heaIf\!
ron8lruttiOll. !!'lin!! !lO far as to di!tro'"
(Jnul' &I'1ual def"llie ijlnK:lurea 10 ohta?-
tht l_rJ limber. fbi 10 use lru<:b aroll m
damlj.'e(1 or de<ilro.led Lridj::'l'lB and (\') to rt
ment all boat.! 1fhich rould be used . j!1
ferritllL .... tl\'er
.Due 10 the DaIUrt of Iht damage actualh' rt-
Cl'Ind bJ the raill'Olld, lhe Jlpanese, u -;"111i1
1fert able to hold lnllic at sf 10 90
pel'Cl'1l1 of Ihe llCheduled le\-el b\' augment"
Ihe of emplo)"_ fmhaniea bK.::
ua, a e from bombed-oul industries) a d
doubllll!! their effotllO. !lowe\'" .f,. J " ':,
. . r nne. ral
0IJot"-:,,on, rapid I)' diilOrganized and it.
ImflOlilllble 10 fulfill any llChtdule. Exhibit.
lI!IO""lI lht !-lme...1 0IJotn.ting problWUi duting
IhO/!lll /1.'11. momh, of Ihe "-Ir when Ihe army
effecl or ran shortaj."eS. EJl:hibiu, P and
Q IIldlClle, for :Iune and respecti\'ely, the
bJ "'llldl JlIpanese nitroads flliled to
adl1el'e the lII."hedules which hid been lIet.
1,"he follo",inll" ubl6ll 1>or1r11J lhe e:ltenl 10
",11I1:h the .llllllIn_ amly used the nilroada.
Tobie 11 j!il"e!I the nllio of mililllry Slipplie!l kJ
lol.ll! lromc. Tlble 12 itemizes b)' month
thl'> u,"nlJ('r of rreij!"hl carll CllrrJ'ing milil.llrJ lI11p-
plit'>l Iliid l:l the 8lIme
for 1>lI!I8I'.u"... r I'll I'!!, "Idle Table 14 1'IIl1lllerates by
qUllrler JI'IIr8 the troops cnrtiod by rIIil. Th'o
on,ly I'ecord!! or lhe of IIrmy sup-
phell lI"lIlspol'ted b)' raIl pertained to provisions
fo<hll'r 1111(1 medicines. 'l'hf'!lll figures (which In:
olily 111'11 pteSellled ill 15,
"
',lled ",illi ll'ail,.
N
,. lIt'.,.'e!lBllt,
ot IInl11 .IUlill 1'/' ,.
,
' " I HI Iii,
I Ie (If tl ." '
hen I 1(' 1111
.. WI'I'I' 1 .
&hI" 1II1'\'illlbll'
numbers of tl'OOpa 'Uld ,lies
.... and 1lIlllllUllitinn) w, ,'.
TI . re o'-'Inl{
u. ct('lLt/'<:1 lin iI""
In'
. , ' "" lint'\!
IC \\'lIch \\'I fu""
" ler
: of IllLlooditl/{ Ihe ft('il{ht
eqlupped local SI"lion- 'rio
,
c" liS
III lhl' Oo>llka
l/1 IVIIJ.,>etioll III that point
heal'}' urnJ' catloadinJ1!l
lIctorll!S nnd wllt('hou..... ,
...... ....ron/{
was from Ilortllf-nl
a?d .\u.:nlst 1915 tht capacit"
railroads WllS 10 one-
.1 figure and open.liolt!l 1O"ere
WIth ronsequeJ1t effeea. on the
13 J"n
.Iu. IVIi
31 .I".
21 SOY, IVii
'" )1..,
l'nkaoWIl
.,000 1I<>..lIln.
_bin.
I'n_""_ ""...101".
1_1"1
II"'SKGW "'RICA
$ "",PO. III I.P. 2 (2 I', "'I....,.
_In. 2" roIll.'"n, b, ., .....11".)
...AIIT" ....
:l$ nIIl..... ,_. U a Junl<o, 2 ..'
_ .. (24 ., .._ t. 10' _blna, 18 h, oln""
117 ...."....n., I b, ."."W.., 13 .......
w
3, RAilrolUl
Thi", Iltudyhi...h ha'l I)l'('ll ptepll",,1 in ('tlll-
j'lllK1ion with of th.. Shippinlo: IIn,1 B.iI
Di,ision of n....... 8s. Ulldl'MlIke;l to shu'" thl' im.
of rail"ays in the rnO\'ement or mili.
lary suppliee and doe!! not. emb...ce Ihe
openlllllt problftnjl of the railroads. Such dltl
,,", to t.. found in thl" I'I'IMlM of the afOI'l'''lf'I'l-
tWl,wd di ..i'liOll.
",",Ullt of thPir inllel'l'nl differencN. Ihe lI1ili
tu)' U9t 01 niI1O"a)"! in Ihl' \"Btio'd theal"'''' III
llf'l forth in the follo..-ing .Jalloll\.
Korea. ("hina. RU"lla. and I'hilippines. For
JI""It'It. knowledp of 3lanehunan nil way
lionII must. remain
JIIPAN
In a country ..ilh " well-developed
rail"-a,' (ill conl rast 10 IU
and mediocre 11ifl'hwa)"1I and itll lill1l1td
motor "I'hklffl) n1ilroads lite n rih' Iht
IDOlII importalll fadlit)".
out Ihp GrealPt t:.ast War (1!l3i-l5) lhe
Japa_ u-.l thp clOIlll"'lic ... 10 mo\'I'
Ihe bulk of mili'at)" slIpJllil'!l 1'\'1'11 on short hlllll
and in otlwr tllil "IS 1I.'ltd
to 1m: masimmn extpl1t pO!l>iilJlc. The ,lnll'ul/"'II
rail IlJ1llflll df'leriotlllt'<;\ under 11m f!xCI'llSi\"f' ",'Ir
traft'ie and IIndpt Ill .. ItlH'r ail' lltllltks hilI. ht-
\,a_ of Ihe iJij!h prioril)" /linn to Ihe In"'"
portation of trooP!! and milltl.,..\' 8UIlplif>!l durinj::
n10III of 11K' "'ar, tllf' arm)' IIl1pply 1I)81,.m suf
fered only indiredl.l' (from Ihll Clll'Illilr.d tI1l11
5
'
portation of tllw' mull'rillls to till! lIIil
itM
Y
Iat'IQril'til). The nrlllY IIif',1 10 ill
demands on the nilrollll! h,' illlp"OI'ili/{ its .
inK Ind 1I111",l(!in.l1: ll'I'hlliqllc' but tho 1I\11TI'rl
ll
g
cauMolI 1,\ illlul"'IU"!I' rllil hlld til bl'
bo
. . .,' ,\l
rnt, all ill all other hI' tl ... P,,')
no time did the IItmy ""'111111" 'collln)1 of II",
. k t ( ,t
roads 01' approllrilllf' nn:" )(1
KoJ<> ......
-*-
Dep ...
ElIu ...
.... -
"
11 IlL _
1.,... - 1'I1u- _
.'".1'''
.....
IS_ I_
....
......
='"'

-
-
....
....
....
....
....
.... -
.- -
...1.1 _
..............
IIUJIlOWI ..au
.............. 1._1. 1"-111..,
__ If ............... _ ...... I .., NUl
....
_ ............. I "-1 11 ., .'_ I lor
-,.
1lI1..JQt1l'(J ..mu.
- .......... 11.., ....- .... ----
-,.
....RI' ..mu. -. I _ 1 ..-.. II .., _ ... 1 lor ,
.... 1 __1
_ 1_S....-.1,._ 14""-
, --. .... __1.,_'
81 ' 1 .AU of larp Ihipl
... 6contlaaed and ..tire
..... I i hI. _11 _It and lilhten.
I" (.) "inial of IIIW&eh between
........ R.... denied. P-II' to
... IIdpI. ftIlI'lirina not'turnal PI of
_....
It) S-I 1...111 plied. bet....- H...
Ianr ud Yoehow bat at. niP'onI1
..... INa. Futber min-illl limited all lhip
win.a' to wwdIa buill.

..--
--
.-

....... _..

...
-_.
--
....
-
-
....
--
....
--
_.
....
--
-
-..
....

....
--
.......
---
.-
--
.......
---
....
--
,.,... -
---
....
...-
- -
E::J

.--
-
II ..... ....
--
....
......
--
,..
"_,-
-- \-
--
--

181.844,04Q

'3'.510.318
43,317,448
T.'.l
T."'1
4,981,030,848
,
,
, 11,932,08,,8(18
,
"4,021,1811
100.288.043
11:10.181,338
12<,82'.S38

070,333.2<8
'.39;,9:1&.842
.9S3.2;3.1118

1,03;,388.008
,.,
nO_.M
T.t<>1
.8..... .. ./l.....
11.4\ ___ , __
144.000 4:1(0,000 ::;104,000 (lI.D(l(I _",. ,...)
11141.. _____
144,000 3(;1.000 (8.2W """"0 ,...) 1043_______
180,000 4&8,000 n_ """o,.na)
1944__ __
21'0.000 288,000
'''00
t o'
_____
484.000 l:!.OOO 498.000 (8,280 _ttl. '.no)
,.,
"..,
PASSE:SGEllS ICAll KlLOlflo-rERSI
_
11142.- _
111.3 _
11144. _
1945 (la' holf) _
IIIU
19.2 _
111'3 .'- ----
111..
(lo' 10010
FREIGHT TO:S KlI.olt!>-rJ,:llg>
'T.1/l1 rrom 11142 '0 IDol..... -r.......
,,,,Ilk, tho' ",bleh "",.1 10, ",(I t. K._D PO'" fD' ohlp-
IBM' ,. ar,", oblpplol ,_ p....oted ou,h , ..III.
tn>...rlfI I.l 10 ,b. uO""" PO'''' .D .1>0 01... <out.
U..drt r K...... ",II"'.,..,
S..ul, K.rea
:;0....."'"
KOREA
YJmlCAL TRA"SpoaTnl IlY RAil
(Ref. note 4.)
(1M. note 5.)
As in Japan, militar)' rail movementll enjo)'ed
. the highest priorit)" though the arm)' ne,'er a.s--
surned direct control of the roads, Th!spite de-
terioration of e<:luipment, this priority assured
smoothness of operations and traffic flow, In
addition to milit,uy troffie there WIIS the equally
"ita! "Tenka" traffic which consisted of that. vol
11m!' of materials which had formerly be<:!n
shipped from Chinese ports (0 Japan but, be-
cause of our submarine activit)' off the China
coast sillce llild been di"erted by rail to
Korean ports from where it would hll\'1! the
shortest \'oyage to Japau, Both military and
"Tenka" traffic moved primaril).o,er the Keifu
Keigi line.
That this would ha"e been lin stra-
tegic farl-'Ct is indicate<:l b)' Table 16. 1I0wewr,
"
3.121
3,38:;
4.221
4,100




(B4)
41,812
49.203
M,oto
86.6lI1
IQ1,m
99.243
88,4U
(2,848)
21,884
28,618
3M1S

39,624
38,166
'l6.2\l3
46,961
W,284
36,182
56.1162
64.133

688.0!lO 1,1101,100

SM.:l-lO
(169J
1943
l.804 2,384
\cIS. 3.200
1.9!14 2,639
un
1.177 2,880
I.:SOO 3,:l(),I
1,451 3,932
2.002 3,216
2.277 4,087
2.189 3.13
2.162 3.344
2.336 3,466
2'1.380 I 39.021
(61) (lOll
420,400
311.S'0
463.200
MO.l00
1.2Z9
U28
1,381
UlIZ
I.no
'" MIO
'" M'
un
uo;
,...
(otIl)
U,OOll
(47)
of pall""l1cr cooclle. in opera/ion.
195
_I:
, " 100
_________________________ 80
__ __ 120
e60
480
of /nifI1lI in oPC""I;"... 1942--15
-"."-1
10.414


21,2:12
21,022
24.IlJ"

23.814

29.3&8
2lI,1l9


..
_n
..

...:...:
-

",: ...
...
..
.. ;
,.

"I!
,;
,
E\1 L;
"
, ,
, ,
, ,
...
!!
"";I
"
I
I
.
.
i
j
i
I
1
i
,
i
l
11'1.300
...
a.tu,oo
1:1.'.300
IM;;.50


---
"'U1,

L<.:!OO
13.1113
le.IlIS
IS,::lI
.=

1OOr.;
.-.::0lI
.'.!U
1::.1
T ..I ...

'.IN.!U
5..w::011:11
<._':13

,.,
,.,
(Ref.
..
11<.1._ .
.......
0 .. _1"_
The number of ,,- I d
Ii dest. ,."""nne .11 amount of sup_
pes. ro.led bJ '11' anack al'll JlOl a'ail.hle
and ammunition lIS th ..
ble items, snffel"l'd the
..... !"Ucuon.
CE-....r .\L eIIlS"!U:CnJ1l
All railroad equipmwt "as under II . ,
of the Central China Uailroad Co'li
meL all f. . . which
I'l!qllesl$ or 11lIhtarJ lran;;ponat
Ho..-ewr. such '-'UesI$ ..-e- "1-.' b Ion.
. .., cu 81",,-, ). the
llMn) 10 lake 11110 a<X'OUllt the limited '"-
1(1(OlIlOlh.N. nllln....,r of
The Peillin/t-lillnko", ... ilroad .
I I "as opened to
tll"OU/t 1 whl'n Ihe re>.101'll1iorl of tbe
9l'Clion w" I' .
. , ..... comp eu'( III
U11( HlH. IUllllt'olliolelv we I.. .
,
,....,t...n IIlten"e .nd
re(luelit bOllibinj! of "I .,
I
.' 'M '- 1I1111 /'1Ill"OI\ds
",lIeh disrupted traffic se'erel, TI
f , I ). Lal seclioll
o. 110 Ille hnd Hllllko..- re.
CCl\eo:l lIw brunt of l!1tllcbs ... ith I ,
f L .... P
01'. "':'1Ilj.\" 1Il8de 011 lhe tl"iltng-Je formed OV
ClwlIghsiell and Kaifell" ',., ,. ,.
I 11 l ' .... Ie e
ow lI:CI' I I'idb'e between Hsillhsillng and
Chellg-hslell n frequent lllr.....t b , .,
U 1.s <.'(Ill
.qtrllclloll mhdo, il Il1l1lSlLnll.r l'CSislant to bomb
dlllllllj.."l'. Bomblllg hllllCks on this brid_ ,.
If .,. .._IJUlt
on 0 ge1'lce 1 tlllle.s--for 1I minimum of 1 dll .
llml II lI111ximlllll of 30. Tho bridge WIlS
(Uer,llote6.)
III addition 10 the obo'e mOl.
tar)" Ullits of JfJIl!l th ementa, small mili
ordinarJ trains. an 50 men were carried in
for coal to
llupplielJ traIlS rt' wages of specific types of
tot.1 tOllllllgtl :: n
l
?, available but lhe
pp les was as folio,,",;
T.&..IU 18.-Prril.! f
'""lie _ .\<WI. C/II'-o noiln>G4.
"
of troops trIlIlSp0I"!/)l.! .read.r is
The of Clll"!! illdi.:"led is
number of Imi'IiS is estiuHlled 011
ears per tlnin, whih' the IIUlUI"'I
imalt'(! frOlll IIIl IIH'I"I'l!e of M!
"'......"'.Of locomoti'1!l'I and rolling
Chllla R.ilroad for both mili.
needs.. .1I0tments m.de
a. trallSport.tion l'Ootrol group
Comp.o)".
fte::ubl!n.'" 10 Illt'el ch.nging
the cue f'
o ml SlIllplies pri.
-...II)" .ssigned in the following
and small arms. ammunition
d h '
ot mg-. oome ch.nl,,'eS were
meet situuiollli require-
18 10 militar}" supplies
b)' Jllpau's induslrilll K'GU
of the Yall/-'1-Zt' 10 rinr (nffic .
bloc-k8de of ';\011h llml ('en
sllbmllrinf'S 1111...... ltll 1111
of sildl Irllf!it' on the ;';orth
.tlwre lhl' ('(>r1stlllll problem
1.rI>C of Slillpl" "'ll8 more
Supplies for lhe civilinll I'opu
cut 10 lhe bone wilh 8<',ere
Oar landingtl on L1lIoOll outll.nked the Jll,PII _
__ in Southern China by providillg additional
hi.- from which Ollf Jandbued plllne8 could
COTM' landings on the China coast. Thus,
... no further rfteon for the to mnilliain
armies for the purpoee of holding the CIIJltUred
airfWds simply to deny their USll 10 Allied
planes. It wu decided, therefon', to withdrllw
the _them anm. befol'f the rllil situlltion
should deterio...te to a point whel'll II
would become a rout.
A report prepared in NO\'flmbt.r oJ tll11
United 8tatIlII Fourteenth Air Foree covers
tborutJPlly the detaih and re!lUlu of its lleri.1
iDterdidion of railroads in Chin.. llowenr, it
is inteacled herein to confine the lltudJ lIJ:c1u
liftly to the deeu on ground .nn)" 10giSli of
.-by,;=aft.
'nIe Ja..- estimate th.t aher Cktober HJ.U
appro:imately 90 Jlft'Cfl't of the damage dolW
to nil IiIWll 'Il"U eaawd by air att.ck with the
other 10 pm:st I"tIIUIti.ng from guerrillil optr
alioDa. Tbe e:wnalati", efed. of the tot.1 dal1Ulgll
... to redace ...il operations to 1_ than
percent of normal and this, to tllll! 10Sll 01
Yugtze Rift!' shipping, ftSUlted in a shortal!"
of IUppties that prohibited all but the nlO6t
furrlted operations. ln addition to tlUl dirt
d.-p dooe 10 tqniptrl@llt. bridges and llIainlt-
DaII08Ibops there was further disrul)(ion of rail
operations ea.-l by thenece;sit)' of mo,ing
tnirm only at night. of dispersing equiJlmtnl
aDd i ....Uat'ons and by the loss of man) mall-
boun of 1abor during .ir... id .Iert.s. In fact,!O
demonlizing wen the ..ir ... ids that many
au...- civilian workers de9trted their jobs,
quiring replaoemeDt by Japanese 1)t1'901ll1t'1 of
wtM.n there ...too few.
'ntougb Cbi_ civilian bodies had nominal
lIdminiatration of the railroads, finnl orders for
nil operations came frolll ,Illpllnese armY
hMdquart"" in China which IlIWIl}"S lha
hiabest priority 10 the arlll}"'s demllnds for
tnnIpOrtadOll, HOWfl",r, a sllOrtnb'1l of I'lluip-
ment prevailed throughout the Wllr despite !lIe
Bamber of locomotiTell and rolliog stock llClluired
from Japan, Manchuria, and Korcll.
quentJy, the army Wall ne,er llblo to
by nil the full amount of troops or SIiPphlll
required. During the comparativel)" quiet ,I'fa"
of lM0--43 troop movements repre.'lClltcd no
!em bat, with the increued militnry I\cII,,.tl
after mid10ft, it became necessllry 10 eJCI)lllh
ll
..
(Ilof._I)
To IIpIlftCiMe fUIJ the COIlfronteci b,.
... 1..... ill opentiDa the 01 China
if; _ ) to .... to the C2aiDa iDcideDt
ill 1II'l. .ukIi.- the 1fU' 00DIiIW primariI1
of .......1acal1ldioDl hlItwema the au-
... iDdmlhal __ eom-nden., with DO uniAed
_mpeip .... -.the 1aUer. Tbe t'hiJ.-
took achuIIp of all opportanitiel to damap
.. rail bit wbich -W impede Jar--
.a... birIdIr ..... oprntiooL Exhibit B
iMfireted tDe __ of tndr;:ap which.(he
1.-bUI to ftIIlon or baUd ill order 10 lap-
part their oceupallr1 of DOrth aDd ..
0en&raI CUa aDd their later e.mpaipl in Om-
tnl ud 80Ithena China.
........ iDYittd to the facta thai pnct;i.
.u,. .. nMJ:Ntittim of ...........
..- tHO aDd IBM aDd that the balk
of 1'IIiDbiJi!..... aft.- tHO _mel mINa
willa mlitarf eit-tiorl ...... 10 eriticsl
tIIIt it WU.....". to FYe the hjpelt prioritJ
to .-11"- of tM nil .,.... I>III'iJIa the
,... ltlO-4' .. in other .....
..au 1111 '...... from iIDproriq: the nil ..
atIaD III o-tnI aDd 80IItbem 01ina.
'DaiIe,II""", became -uaJ bera_ of CJIIII'
__.me KtmUeI ia the y.no_ ud ...
au- 8eu .... tM mtaI1 puaI,... 01 Vaqae
Biftr tnAc. on. TiIIIUlD-PuIrDa ....
BuIDInr .uro.a. ... fcned to .-.me the
..... of 1111 tnaa which bad formerI1 came
... 8wnct..t 8lm1lltueoall,. (m the g.
..... of :PM) aU' J'CllINWb. Air Foroi. opII'-
.. fNa K..uiD .... Li1lC!how, bepa ita
................. ....,up IIpiDIt u.etwo
tnIk ........ the I to initiate
..*"" OIl oar two air .....
...... drift iBmved the NIto-
.".., of track bet..... Yoohow
to III'ft both u of the
.... Uaebow uul u a belu.d
_ ............... IIIpPIJ mate
bloCh.
,
1
I
!
i
,
"
,
,
:
!
i
i
j
,
, I"
..::..L:...
. 1'0
,
,
!
i
:
!
:
!

&
I
,
1
I.
"
!
Air attackll neceeSitated niij:ht o)1flrtllions u
elusively. Efficiency dllClined noout 40 percell
t
when subetitule fuels (firewood lind ill ferior !(H;"l
coal) were ulili1.t'd bo,..,;-ause of reduced truns.
I
"'"
tation of hiljh grade coal for the IOCOIl1otn'eJ,
by United States planes und, though
the line was completed to Laipin, 'lir nlllu::ks
held OJ!'l'ral.iOllll to 8 low le\'eJ.
The entire railroad llOutb of 'VlIellllng was
under direct control of the army. Priority Wll!j
civen to the movement of supplies while thM of
1.1'OOpIl was given l:IeCOndary (,'OngiderlltiOIl. All
DleIoIl!l of transportation were lit i1i7.ed to offset
the limitations of tbf. ... ils but. the condition of
the ,.... roads limited motor transports 8ml in-
Iud ....Ienra)s were far too inadequate. Troops
man:hed to gtl!&l l!stent, l.king with them .11
possible pOl:uble and mobile equipment. Coolie
I.bor ...as pressed into to handle as Illllch
I.S pos!'ible of the supplies be)'ond the capadty
of pack ami drah hol'9l'S.
The line from Wuchang to Yochon carried
.bout 3.000 troops pet' month up to August 19+&
.. tHo" 100.000 ITlVl wue arTied south from Han-
ko... for ttHo dri."e on Kweilin and Liucho....
From lhen until March 1945 per90nn,,1 trafl$-
ported 5.000 per DIOnth aft"r "'hkh
about 15.000 Dlt'n per month were red"plo}'ed
to Xorth China. Th" IInt' from Yochou !IOuth
was only oomplt'ted in tlTllt' to llSl'liSl in th"
withdrawal of troops to Xorth China.
The amount.!! of military' suppJit'fl carried Of"I'
the ....ilroad from Wuchang to Yochou during
IN5 w""" (in mec.ric tOIt!l) : ammunition. 12.000;
provisions. 12.000: elothinl!", 8.000: medical snp-
plit's. -1.000: motor yehieles and fuel, -1.000. Of
tbe aoon supplies oW I"'rtt'm continued b}' rail
from Yochou to Changsha and only 20 I","",nt
from Changsha to Hengyang.
Thougb constantly interrupted by land mines,
rail fIIlrviee ...as ahrays speedi!.} restored. 110...
eftr, the speed of the trains was considerably
reduc:ed ...hen running Ofi!r newly repMired nNId
.....
Damage from air attacks after Jallullr)"
is aununariz.ed in the following approximate fig-
Ufl'll:
Br1da'oII oIMlro1ec1 __ 74
Stallou aDd fmlllie! da.....P<L ._ 8Ii
Tral'" "'ratoo _ ___ . __ 1f,
IJbos- bombed __.. __ _ 00
l.ocoIooll ... aDd carll d.....gell In tel>A1.. 10
ahop8 -- -- ._. ------
..

-
...

T....... 11.
I

'M'
-
1
.- .-
___

n

..
.
'Ill. _.'. .. n
-

_...-
n
-
-

n.
ao-...__

..
-
.. ..
---
"

......_---

..

..
..111 bn
---

B M

-
-_.

-

CB-f. DOle 8.,
'n. rIliIftMd between Yochou and lAipin ....
-..nt to IIpport the J...... occupation of
.... air6eIdIu Liucbo'tJ aad K".ilin and to at-
a-pI. tM tAn:I1 1lItab1ilbmebt" of an overland
IOUU from J'nodl Indo-China. From
......... tid. 1'fICODItI'UelioD PJ'OII'UI ...
Ahoat 5(lO troopJ 1I"fl'I' killed and 10,000
tom of miliary M1ppliee (apin. ammunition
aDd pmIiM. treI't delJtro,.d in air lu.du.
T.... 2l.-'" -'.,..uu.r,.",""",,f"
caw- (C'" 1M -.rk''''1
..."!'1 .......... IfNI by Chinele per-
........ tie pidaDte of O. S. S. oIIcera who
W ......._ behiDcI the enemy IiI'lflL
.... IborUp pnnnted the Foul1eePth Air
.... Ina making .....ined IUack. on the
9i&U bat IlION m.ec-ible Ti..nCain-Pukou rail-
.....
The m..-...tion of our air Inlckl caued
.0 &niD .... on the llOulh..m half of the
Peipiq-HlUlkow line to be mrode II nirrht .hich
recl-t by 100ft than Ml Troop
_.--. Iud to be I'8tricted in ord..r to ac-
_mod.t- Ue lIbipmmt of auppliell U
IbcnnI in Talle 20. Military llllppliftl
ao ...-- of total CorIIlq'e aPd ,*1 for militar'J
tnMport eom.pri-I anolMf 20 An
itemization miliury llllppliee lotMr Ibln co.l
and COOlIInaction matmalR) ypn" in Tabl.. 21.
Tbe nlllDbtr of atucb damaging to Central
Chiaa rail....... u _imat.ed by the Jlpa-.
.. Wow. FigarM aft only IPllroJ:imale.
Air attacks on lIle Luzoll rail linea resulted in
thorough. interdiction of them. An outlltanding
enmple 19 lhe bombing of the C.lunpito Bridge
on 6 J.nunry 1946. This caused the abandon-
ment of the northern braneh line from San Jose
1.0 S.n Quintin.
. of equipment Willi perhaps more ellec-
tl'\"6 In'Luzon than any other theater. The bulk
of .11 llUpplies on that island were coneentrated
in M.nila in J.nuary 1945 when the Japaneae
decided to withdraw to malee a lISt stand at
Bagnio. By that tilM the rail eapaeity had
shrunle to a mere 300 tOM per day (approximate)
&Dd only 6,000 tOM of !!Upplies could be ..acu-
ated from Manila befol'l'l our landings on Luzon
stopped all further rail traffic:.
"
used during the Jupanese nellu_
tl'l.n.6portation of 5upplillll lIud
Jt on Luzon.
.. found the estimated )curly LOlI-
., the Luzon railroads. Lack of
of equipment and inadequate
awed their effects on tl'llllic
1943 wd 19-W.
on the railroads had heoen
than desu-ucth-e prior to October
OW' Iindings on Le)'te such at-
threatening a guise that the
to use the most cautious pro-
M bridges .nd olher vitll points.
attacks were mllde the more lIeri-
based 011 aeri.l obsef\,.tiol1
'2uu: 22.-Vol_ 0/ .Ui'..... pPUu ........,....... iAuOOI noilToofN r_trie '''''J
N_
0- 0<

--


-
--
,- ".... ...
-.
H_
-
_.

la.:IlllI

-
_
:O<ortb
-
_.

"....
"
'M
-
,,-
:0<_
'M
_.
"
,-.... 0.-
'.....
.....
N<>l"Ib
_.
....
..... ,-

-
,
..
N<>1"Ib
M
1,370 _.- 11.- n
,- m
Plln.I"!INP.!I
(Bef. note 8.)
From January to September 1!H2 nnd IIrter
November 1944 the railroada wero under
direct control 01 the Ilrmy. In oilier J)lJrlodB thll
r
were Idminilltered by the Lund Trnnsp0l"t ,\(:
mini8l.rative Ikpartmellt but lit 1\11 timeR lhe)
BURNA
(Ref. note 7.)
[n this theater the Japlntll!le found rllil trnns.
port. indillpensable not only becaull6 of I he pauc_
ity of roads but alllO beclUlMl combined air nnd
submarine acti .. ity 011' the west COIISt of the
Halay Peninsula pre..ented sizeable ahips rrOln
.. Rangoon. An el!'ort WIUl mllde to
U88 small craft from the railhead lit Uanollg to
Rangoon but the preponderanee of aupplies hnd
to be brought in by rail from Singapore, Bang_
Iloll and Phnon Penh (fo'rench Indo-China). In
0I'der to accomplish this the Japanese built a
raiJr.-d mm Bangkok to Thanbyuz.ayat, where
it connected with an exi!lting line through Houl-
main to Rangoon.
At finlt, damage to locomoti \"ell Wll.'l the IIlO6t
MOns fft;Ult of .ir attacks in Burma due to
the fact that fe.... Ittacks ....el"6 made on the
bridges during the rainy seuon. repairs
could be made rather speedily in the dry lIell90n
and other rDelllll of transportltion could be
used to ""lly supplies past the point of damage
One delayed n'llUlt of bombing bridges during
the dry seuon was that the Japwege f"'lluently
ell'ected only ""pairs whieh ....uMd
out in the floods of the rainy season.
As Allied air ell'ort ....all stepped up and was
carried ont more ..ely in the rain)' SnllJOt1
the Japanese .... faoed with almost insuperable
diAkulties in repairing bridges on the :\litkyina
and Handala,. lines in July-Seplember 1944.
Exhibit X pnosentlla graph of rail trnffic
in Burma after Jwuary 19-43 when Allied air
raids first became IIIlrious.
So eu.ct figures II'l'I a..ailable on lhe amount
of military supplies destro)ed by bombing. the
nils but the following estimates ....ere suhmllled
on the major iteJn!l (in or Ihe lolal
of Mdt item transported) :
A..lalloD aDd motor fuel _
AmDnIIlIIIoD __._.______________ ___
ClotbID&' _. ____ _.
0rdDa.II..e _
-
1__1
___ . ......_ 71
....
,_.
INI _....._. .. _..
------_.__.
------_._--_.
--------_ .
-----_._ .
-
= :
...... "'Pain ...._. __.. _ 2D
.-1.. I'IpIln _. .. _ _._ I
...... ..-.. _. T
Rowenr. adoal rsullll -.n onl, 70-80 percent
of the alOOUltA plannN on ehe ..oon buiL
euualliell mm lir Itueb wen
lIowenr. the deltnKtion 01 critieal
milieU')" suJPliflI. lllOCor bl,
about 30 IonlI pPr month and proved I tenOUI
hand"'p.
Tbe Kow&ooo-Clnton line W"U In important
rail IlWry 10 the Jipanlllle in getting IJUppliM
inlaDd. Optrationll {undn direct anny
prior to ItH WW't to ifJolated sed.IonI
of the line to sabot. by guerrillu. Tbe
line Will to through ualk in I,," but-
by thea air IItKb and tu.,1 tbortape bad ear
tailed t .... volume ..riouIIy.
Tbe nUllbl'f of troope IOd
IDIOIUlIa of militlry suppliel e-rried are Ihown
below;
TnuIporiatioD priorit. were Rt'nerall, ..
... in the following 88qJJeI108: ammunition,
medicaJ IIIWu., food, .idea, elothing.
W"ttIa the IntemriAc.tion of lir nidi it wu
-.,. f1equentl, to altar train Iclledules and
after IH6 ,II train moYemlInbi had. to
be ...." Inadequate air !Jid
.... diIfenaIlDd. oonoeaIment laeilltiee, fur-
.... opentioDI. Few euualti......
, Ired from air aUIeb and only , ImIII
__of tIIpplill .... deatf018d.
..... oj npUr ........ the time
........ ,.. iWllI'NllIioa work.
... .... ,... planned on the buis 01
..... 'lee caaOa the following dedi..
.... ..-I capIlC!itJ.:
To..l
700
1,lI(I(l 13.,GOO
38,0;0
.

.-

-
.-
....
...
.-
....

-
.-
.-
..-
..-
.-
..-
- 1.-
-

..
3.430 10.100
2._ e.loo
I.ZJO 000
ptoper m.inlenance b)' skillll'd mechanics. Of
OOIlI'Sl', lhe Dfllld of maintena.nce _as incl"ll'llSed by
lhe se\'ere lGe of trueb of inferior consuuetion
?"er toUJ.rh roads. The following table illl'm-
lUll dlf' '-of motor vehicles by years, zones,
and causes.
<.120
.. ---------_.
oI..t ...... ._ eoo
I 400
ol<otIo... _
1$0
from inadequate pro-
aggravalll'd by wul 1_
ftbides from 1941 to 1945. OC
are the number (tI,980) 10iSt in
the number (38,670) lost. by
JIUl8 Cor repair or b)' lack of
- r:;;;;;.,;;------------ --------
------. .
10
, "';:;.,;;------------ ---------- tlo.. _
_____________ 200
T"..... 0/ _1M lnoch b,
J , (1957-#1
":=__17'_ "':: ":
1__._ s:KI t>OO ""
_____ to ott> 100 to
____. XI 4(1 "" :lO
__ ._ 8.000 8.000 :.000
200 1$0 800 8$0
I:::::::::
The Japall_ at'(luiretl Ilddiciollill mowr \.,.II.i.
e1es through their capture or approprintiOll 111
occupied territories, I.fI shown in the nul loble.
l'heitr orden _1I'1"e filled 10 lhe following 11'1,
lenl by dOmeslic manufactunor'S:
S4'nL- T1'w<'O 1_all ...... _. of ..bld> __
01 :.0_ "'"po (ntood 1'... , by'naT)
,
Ill'" 01
._,
Mo,or<r twolo,..
(1_. ,I... 00<1
-- ..-
.-,
,-"
. .I<Joon.ro '.hld..
IMI.
--I
1------;;; '00
IMZ._ z.ooo
'00
'M3._ 00 -
'00 '00
,....- --_. ..,00:
-
'00 00
INo\______1
,-
.... 00
'00
army wue based, nol on nCIlIlIII'e(lllirementll, bUl
on production c.padty in Ih6 1l1ll0111ll1l shown
below:
T"IILZ 28.-0""""" 0/ orlttv 11)1'
"'(11)1' f'O'A;N*,
..

--
-.....,.eteo _.,__
'-:'r
...-
-
-

._.
'l'"d11doo
.... ' ..... ....
-

..... ..... .... .....
-
,
..... ..... ' .... ,
,,-

I
.....
._, ,. ,
,.- '00
-
-,
..... 00
I
IMI _
_1.. __
-- -
---
-------
To IDMlI more nearly ill actual moIor require-
mealll the arm)' re9Ortll'd. II'.arly in the Gr'II'.aleI'
Ea8I Allia W.r (1937.....5). 10 lbe practice of pur-
clwPng b, trucks and can which
had hem Mliverll'd to cirili.n IIlIII'R in
JaJMon. 'IbeeII" illClllded a oonllidl!'rablt! numbfr
(prillCipdy ."orde and ) ..hich Japu
had importll'd. I.Il ,.)10_11 in T.hle 2li be........ When
hurritd preJMoral iOM Wfl'e bll'ing made to reP8I
the inraann of thII' bomel.nd, the army 0001'
mandetnc: 15.000 (flO JIl"rcent) of tbe tolal oper
ational Indu in JaJMon, 111_ tneb DOl
abo'lrtl in lhe followinp: tabl. beca_ of !.heir
..........
f. /tIiItIM" H.".
(alI. __',10,and II,)
tJloa.-,ll II"'" 0 .,.. ....... .DIl
,... an .. , fi1 AprU-lbrrh.)
.,. "-porlation.-J.JMon WIUI .nxious to
bep'" of tM _Mnigtron prugram bl!ing
...... in the arm_ of ttwo Jrl'ftt powl,ol'll bUI
bIr prodQl1kNa could .... an,.where
_ the of .n anu)' all as
JaJ-D' ani in llUCh extenah-e oper-
aliona. A propam 10 incrtat1e production wu
tJecun in Jll3I) and stinlUIU9 from lhe
Yukdftl intiMnl (1931) and Ihe China incid,"nl
(1t3i). 11>_"", pmk prodQCIron ,"cbed in
1MI _all mly 42"R13 trucks .nd 1.066 stand.rd
IJUllffiPr (SI"!\ for the entin' I."OUntry.
ord,"r'5 for motor by lhe
..
refining of ILvllllion gllsoline, but as shipping
from the lIOmhern area was pinched 0' in 19-14
fuel SIIPllIJ dwindled from a monthl) a"erllg8
?f 22() gallons lloer "ehicle in 1942 to 2Q gallons
III 1916, il)" the end of the war about 50
of the urlll)' 'ehicles hlld been corll"erted for the
use of suhstitute fuel-usuaJl)' cllarcoai.
7..o:'<l!; OF Co"un:SICATIOSS
. "Tab,le of Orpnization for Infantr)" Di,-i-
$IOTl'J 1l1'O"lded for each di"islon one traru;JlOrt.
of, thirty 11
2
-ton trucks with no repair
facilIties. tach ann)" WllS gl!:nerally authorized
.10 hal'e t,,o or three battalions. COII-
siSting of four lranspon companies ....ith 30
trucks and an inadequate repair !Il'!CliOIl_
The of "ehicles prohibited the lull rom-
plemenl of "ehicles in these trallSport units..
CoflSlM\uently. assignments "'ere made on the
basis of ",Iatl'l! imJlOnance in the various areas.
It is estimated tltlt 60 of the authorized
allowallCl!l!l ...ere actually provided in imJlOl'tant
areas and about 30 percent in II!SIS critical
",g!OllS-
About 60 percent of all anul' trucks were in
this zone ...here Ihe)" were used in transferring
sullplies from ships to trains to .... rebouses or
depots at main SUllpl)- bases and in delivering to
field depots supplies -.rhich "'ere beyond the
CllJlIIcil)" (either in extent or volume) of the loc:aJ
railroads. From these field depots supplies were
al,'llin distribUled bJ truck to Ihe depots or
dUlllps of dhisions or other tactical units..
Attention is in,iled to the losses in this ZOIlt'
Crable 23). Aj,...in, deterioration aoooWlts for tlloe
while infiltration and l,'IIerrilJa
result ill I,'l't'ater losses lhan those from air
.ttack.
,\laintenanl:e and repair of I'O&ds as "1'11 as
l!IJuipmellt were again the critical motor oper-
ating problems. the total fuel suppl)
was sullicient in each area of this zone but the
distribution of the fuel storage was most ineffi-
cient, and restriCled the operating range of \"1'-
hicles 10 the limitt!(1 number of fuel deJlOI$.
A/,,'liin, little cenlnl control of motor transport
"""8 lind the most ellicienl use of exist-
ing transport facililies was thus prevented.
Slrategic Ilir sttacks on bridl,'I'S toward the end
of lhe war t"really hampered motor transport,
lind strlirillg of motor vehicles, which toNed the
enelll), 10 reaort to night operations ... ithout
headlights, added a further obstacle. lneen-
"
Oommllnicutions--Arell between
disembarkation or bUlle depols
fleld army depots.
Combat-AI't'1I OOlween the field
and lhe supply of combat
and smaller units in the front
1IlIIl of trucks in Ihis zonl! WIS
usually for SllOrt disbnces.
between the following: .
or arsenal-railroad.
epot or \\"JlrehouSt'.
or depot---doek.
of trucks was the short haul of
al'8enals and factories producing
A few trucks were ret.ined in
tieing military supplies. A few
emplOJed in the interior for
and mechanics.
it became necessary to makf!
t use of tl'1lcks to relie'-e the
niI....ys .nd to fill parti.lly the
caused by .ir .ttacks. When
tated the dispersion of f.cto-
trucks were a critical trallS-
arm)' trucks 1Ie,-er a$isted in
but were fully ew-
military supplies in con
.... ('.lIrlier, some 15,000
ndeered from cili1i.n O"'n-
... deplo)'ment of forees 10 re!ilst
iIITuion of the homeland.
lite war there was "irtuaJl)' no
of military motor "ehides and
at the discretion of the in
Dit to which they were attached,
-. only in inefficiency but alllO
reached its height during tJlIl
of the war.
lltandards, oriental roads are
too narrow and too limited in ex-
nnw normsl conditions they
.. auxiliaries to an acellelll Mlil
OIl1y in the rural areas thlll roads
unable to support hea,'y mili-
Gail, of course, was a severe halHli-
program.
limitatiolls of the roads in
vely few trucks were needed
1943 gasoline WIIS no problem,
filI'I was obtllint'<1 from the
While the- Jlpanese 10l,ristical system contem
plated tbat ground troops -.rould be trallsJlOI't
in trucks, this '"""Y happl'ned. PraeticaUy
without exception, even in stratel-olC fl.nk .nd
rear attacks, troops ....Iked because of scarcity
of trucks. In such attlcks all a"ailable trucb
..-eft __ for Ihe nlO'-ement of _ I""
plim. Ind troops CllTied as IIIl1ch I!Illlipmel\l
poMible..
For the rea.8OnI
played I role
of the Japall_
(I) Inadequacy of 'ehidCll,
(b) Inferiority of
(e) Lack of proJloer IllllintenllUCll
pair.
(d) Generally poor roa,ls and
road-building "'Iuipillent,
(1") Guoline shorta"..'s,
(I) Tire .
Thl!' e'oct 01 thill nil "nll\' J.!r<>ullIl
iI the 8llbjl'Ct of thill is MulL with III
the folJo,,"inll
I(
Noru'
(a) Zone of lnterior-Japan, ore.a,
Chin&, and Southern ManchurIa,
Thia inTftltory "all diatribuIM u follon:
__ ..... lip.. ., _.- _ lo .. 01 _ .. 01 __, .101, 11"'- .u _ 1Ip_ 'm ,.10 .. lo _
_.
&ca.- of t1M! shortap' of tMlC'b
the- .. u_ 1!11!' Inuy UiIfOI ... -
nlilable from III _rca Generally tlUdm
maoufactutd in Jlpan of rapKily.
Ro_ver.1M anny filM thftn f". I planning
..oopoin u C8J*'it,. All ioptieal
tabJe,o \frt'le baaed 1De.....- for the-
in c:akulltil!d ..... that -..11
III 011 ... bich 1M Irmy _Id UIe trueb
_ poor. II "'u felt that t1M! infffior aprin,lll
oould nne !tInd bell.Vter Ioada. Hotft'"I'r. the po-
_I policy ..... to 1-.1 lIlititiry BUPPliM above
11w- fltil!d cal*"ily ...hmeftll' tM I"C:.ds W'OIIld per-
mit and uilitary demanded. Thus, in
attul pnt1.ice many ....f'A'I* of military IIUppliM
lmount.d to 4 toni per lnaclL.
InVflltiption re_h thaI lo.tical t.b,"
lvailablP in CINCPAC--ClNCPOA 8ulletin
88-410 dated T April IMli. U1d CINCPAC-
(INCPOA Speeill Tnnalation "SId 1.<JJ(iBtks
Manual" daled 6 NonmbIr 1'", wen tiled in
pknninl the ue of military vabielea. In actuII
open-tion., it il known tbat the lhortap of
trltelal plOblbited the actl1lol moftlllent of IUp-
pI_ 11K per.onnel in aeeordaace ...ith tlIe.
......
--
1-.<1"
,-
--
-
.-
.-
... L_'
,...
:::'

- - - ...
....
:::: I
-
.....
,... ....
... 1.1'"
-
.-
-
.... .... ,...
...
.. -
.... "'-,
.....
-
.... .... ....
...... 1._- .....
'-,
..... r- -------
...
,...
-
,
M. .M
.-
'M
.-.". til _
.-
.....
"...
81.:100
..--(1MIo:N1 .
.- .-
..... ,.-
r ,
1>,_,_1
.-
- -
. , ",_,_:11I1 - - ---_ .._--
.-
-
.-
..... ..... M ...
M_

-
.-
.....
..-
,
,
....
__.... tII_,..-111 ....... "'-'1 .....
"...
.....
-...-.....1 ,
.... ad tM limited production _lted in the motor tl'Snsportation situation shown in
.. _......

..
80",,11 ...
.....
t_trl.

.00
1_. _
1 __
1 _
1<0_.
110. _
(l_rl..
x......
-
-_.
-=-

-

(_rle _l
1____ _
1.701
"
1____.

I.TOO

.-
oU... __
101_1i0
'00 ..
Because tbe obvious limitatioll!l of the
above types of transports, the navy built 24 sub-
marines specifically for such service_ These were:
Most of tlll:ose craft were equipped with torpedo
tubes but ...ere ne,tr II-t 10 seoek out enemy
shillping.\gain, the)' 'Il"Cre manned by navy
cre'Q and 0llerated under na"y order.!.
Two uselJ of tn.nsport submarines were
in the refueling of lla(ml planes which operated
from Indispl'llsable ned to scout OUr shipping
bet"'een Soumea or E,,-piritu Santo and Guadlll
canal. This occurttd in late 19-1:! and January
1W3. III a submarine refueled at
French Frib..te Shoals. B)'ing boat which Ihen
reconnoilered Oahu Iud returned safely,
Other suppl)' missions of na'..,. submarines are
ollllintd ill Table 31. KnowlI losses of nan' trall!l-
port /Ire set fonh in Table 32.
OllarP('lui4tia alld of a1T1ty ",h
lIIa";nu.-BeclUse the submarines pro\"ided by
the n,,'y were not lnlllsporting sufliciu.t sup-
plies to satisfy the army, the latter started its
own progralll of submlrine constrnclion on 1
June 1943. The 1I1"y advised a/,'1linst tllis be-
cause or the nrmfs lack of a:perience but, ...!ten
the Iinny persisted. the lIa,'Y offered Its as!list-
"nee in plllllning. Thill offer WIIS uu ...isely nil-
fused lind the nrlll)' IlII early IIlI Julr 1943 reduced
to CO ill! originnl plnn for HO submarines, since
it. Illrendy 1'Ct'Og"lIized t.he construction difficuitillll
lind lho inellicienL desib'll. On llCCOunt of
sion of Ulilterilils to other indllStrit'8, only 42
Mutmlllritles .,.el'\I started by the arm)'. Of t.h_
32 "'eI'll deli,ered 10 the 11I'my, 8 OOIllI,leted sub-
"
supply of arroy gUl'riSOlls on
It WlI.S hopod either IhaL suffi.
ce would render the invllllion
isliUlds too costly or thllL at-
occupation would delay the
the evacuation of kilt personnel
pollilions. However, this proved
because 9f the limited capacity
and the haurds involved.
llIbmarines were sunk while el'lIeU-
from Kiska, no further ffillll'l
attempted.
&be supply of bnl8600 islands.
dIIllIe in Japanese hands
potential bases for the come-
everyone wishfull)' dreamed.
trip ....as made specifically ror
01 sick or wounded, such p!'f'!lOn.
..."" 011 supply submarines ...hich
have returned
iIiImI!I transported to combat artall
of their importance and \"olunle:
(rice, wheat, canned foods),
and ammullition for same,
IQPlies,
gasoline and lubricants).
bypassed islands or other posi.
supplies wenil preoedence
ammnnition.
of supplies were carried inside the
ID fact, the army ne\"l'r eonlem'
GIber method Imt Ila'-y submarinee
cargo capacity by carrying deck-
t lUbes were mounted on deck
-.11 arms were f>IlCked in .... ter
IMp or drums for stowlb"0 on deck.
. red safer for submarines to
rather than ill pllcks.
of submarines as trtlllSPOrts was
1942, during t.he Guad.leanal
enemy WIIS drh'en to t.his as a
. to losses of suppl)' ships
.arships (principally destroyers)
llll&d becllU.<;e of their grelltcr !Illlf
blockade-nl 1l11illg.
InUl employment of 1UJVoJ
first IlllV)' combllt. subrnllrillell,
aavy crews, \\"ero used 011 transport
no efforts at. Clllll'ersion for th"t.
of combat submarines known
ill ann)' l nlllsport !ll:rl'it'll were:
the navy had de"eloped sysU!lllatic UIlC of
its submariDell &II raiders on our lihipping. The
army wu able to lUle these filets in the highest
command levels to prevail upon the navy "(It.
only to provide combat llubmarines for t.rnl\spol"
lation of army supplies but also to build a fe"
transport submarinee. It iii likely Lhat. lhe 111'1
alao was influenced by the fnet that
ment 01 cemin island positions fitted generl
navy lItrategy.
Three main purposes were fulfilled by the .u9lI
of Illbmarine traIillport, First lind most 1111'
lines and ga"e to th.. enculIlioll of the wouuded
the highest priority pemlitled by the supply de.
mands of combat operatioIill. llowevl,ll', in Innny
_ such IIlI their retreat to lfllnkow llIld in
their defeat on Luzon, all ambulatory Cll.'le8 had
to walk great di!!l&nce8, aud tho condition of the
more seriously wounded was agb....avate<! by,th,
rough and inadequate transportation.
HOIIllB 'fu.:i'(lPOIITATlOY
The lack of suJ6cient motor tmnsport wu
realized in the bigher planning levels and lIlI a
result, horses were substituted in tables of equip.
ment IIlI urny personnel im;rell!led. HOrge!l WCtll
substituted primarily in infantr)' divisions on thlI
promise that their combat operations would
erally be conducted terrain unsuited to
motor transport. Table 30 shows the areas whetll
horses were U!Illd to any considerable extent.
As a last use Willi also llIade of O:ltll,
and, &II in the lmphal campaign. e"en
elephants were pte:!llJed into sen-iCC!.
51
(Ref. IlOtt P.)
l. s.bM.riu
(Ref. DOtla 12md 13.)
tJ-m "pfd6.-8ubmarinM _ere VIed for
tnnIpOrtLtion only in thole _aters which bad
.... rendered huardou to lbippm, by domi.
DaDt AU" air or aurfacl 10-. The Japa-
... nav:,. which provided DMIIt of the 1Ub-
IlIarinM thbi ptIrpo11t, cUd td relnctantly.
HoweYw. bee&.- of &be CDI'nIlt iDacti'fity of
toM II1II. ben ... no need of Illbmarinel in their
....1 .-ipment .. "-apport of the fleet" aDd

'-
-
-
-
-
......
.-
.-
....-
....
---- -------
.....
-
....... .....
-
,,-
IMJ______
....
.-
.M_
.....
.-
-
.....
.-...-..__.. --
-
n .... ...... .... ....
-
....
------- -- --
In.- ....... ......
.-
....
-
.-
.-
1. h , __.... CIoI-., 10,. -. ,.....,. -..
to I. ..... 10' -. n.
L _"!up _ 01 _ Od-. .... _, I. t.m of __%. Deuer ...nod '" tlIo
-- _ .. __., , .. _-u,._wl'-' ""lIJrlq .......
_1.- -
-.. _ tt ..- ponolttod ....., _ A... <l1_Tl......\1110.. I_
-. _-, -
7.0_ 01' CoKhT
n. ... IIbortcoming of motor transport
..,. ia the iDadequate delhery of supplies to this
... from. the depoe. of the fttold armies. Of the
IoIa1 Dum:Jer of lrucb about 20 pl'rcent ...ere
aDoued k 1M Combat Zone and it 'll"as in thill
.... of l'IMllIIe. that u.- ftprftlll'nted the lIigb-
lilt peroIIIllap of llu! totala\"ailabl&-particularly
iD t.be .-e of thoM! captured OJ' ab&ndoned.
G...n,. tntclm were burned before being abu-
doned but wben this ..as not feasible, they _ere
nadfJnld UlBlnicable by the n!moval of vital
......
0peratRg conditions _re tM DlO8t 8evere in
this zooe ;rith the repair facilities most liDlilM..
A1Io., foe! st,onp ...... diflicult problem.
The J.,...wet army had to supply trtteb
.. ambulancell 0tI their retW1l from the front
......... IDClIl ..1.uYe on motor OODYOy8 but
.'11 .. d parbd nbicl. reduced w-s from
--
M... or
-..
b
_e1SewGId_

--
,_Ito...
_.-
J.Q&O-Goor-.or

T__.......
l_b-t'fU

._w
_.'Tret
- .-
.-
...
I_po,.,
u.....,,"
..

1,1""
s ...
s ..

s ..
s ..
::.t e
:: .
Uet .
;0;....
s...
s_
r.t-.,
,-
s ..
s ...
,-
s ...
r"" .
,-
,-
s ..
s ...
,-
,--
::........
r.b..."

s...

::.t.....

U.t.....
Both transport planes and those hieb W't"re
being ferried to the forwarn areas ere used to
carr)' supplies. These were usually anatiOD spare
parts and OCC1lsiollall) IIOme medicines. The only
instance in ....hich other types of supplies were
curied was the air transport of 300 tons from
JSIISU to the Singapore-finnna al'll& in earl,
The bulk of this shipment. was antomohikl
and truck IIart8 10 replace tl105e "'hich the Brit-
ish had stripped from ,ehicles they had been
to abandon. The total nmounts trans-
ported "'ere aPllrflximatel)',
,.
1$12 _
1$43. _
1$.4.-.-__ --_.-_._-
ID'3. __ __ ..__ ._
About. 30 It'anspo:1J:l. were used to drop para
tN)OI>!I 011 SUrllatra, in February 1942

u._._===::::::::
U-... _
U
CIll<....IL
C-... _
1118
1131
"
, "
.3
..
"

"-
-
3 1'1.",, .


,
,

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."

so III
so1l3
1'311
1'3'13
."

....
-
._.
"
s.nnj. ne....er had air transport a3
tbst llen'ioo. In bet, there "'as no
IDilit.e.ry air transportation until
department (Koku YU90bu)
in early W43. This department
ClIIDcerned with ferrying of planes
rs to the combat units and
rt plnnes At ilS peak in July
divided into 8 squadrons of 10
the same month there were 315
to tbe departmenl. ,\ir crews
600 and grollnd crews consi!i1:cd
including wOlllen.
the 80 planes in tho nil' truns-
a few ""ere USIl/llly attnched t,o
(Hikodnn) or higher uuits.
uclusively for coRl11l11niculion8
the local theaters.
;O;0TE3
....... ........,- _ _net"' ......-....
................. tile ..., _ 00... to ........ IOoL 0.... _11_ ..Well ..... _ ..,.
_ _ ... br IotaI __wl'_. ,... .. -........... ft
___ Ud _.DOl _ ... opp_
....
10 ..
s ...
:'..00 , __
c_...
u.t.....
_ of
-
.-,

-- ------1
-
... 1....0011... 1
1 eteo".
:IOfl 1_1..1
,-
dispatching two of tllem from Luzon to Loyte
in November 1944. Both submarines were lost by
unknown caUllll9 before reaching their destiun
Uon. In February lind Man:h 1046, thrl:'e sub-
m&1'im!ll made ge,en sUccelISful trips from Koko-
mka to the air-raid warning center on 1(Ilchijo
Jima (90 miles to the lIOuth). On each of these
IIllvell trips 15 tona of food, radllr lind rlldio
parts we", carried.
-

,....., -



---
-.... - .. ,--
-.,. -.,. 1-
....... -
--- ....... -
...--
--- ....-
e , ,..... _
-, ......
p _ ...... -
-
___........... 1_
_0_,
a '., __

l.ftoI _ .... falIb'_

I. 0. _ u.- ...,. low , _ .-.. "I,. 1I<-"'1IOl, -""lr 01<1
........ _--.a. u.- "."""aee _u... f .... e......
...............
---..-.... _...........
e' '8 -' 1__
p' ' I_loMl
__I-
-, _EP __
-----
........ 1IDlIeIi-.d .... the end of the "&I'
... t "..1tW. 1UIIlIIr ClODI&rUdioa.
TIle ..... __ dilappoint-
..... ill duIr .. of mechanical eSciency aDd
of ......-.blti&J. Tbe tniniDa of the ere....
...... aa-IJ cliIBcWt problem. In fact.,
... 1M ... d &be WU' there _n tniDed ere....
<b:r arav 1taIMlanU) for onlJ 10 IUbmariDa
on. onIJ .. ..de of &rIIIJ "g in
'" uw. ......... made to drop IUppliee
......... thoqh panchuu. had been madf.
...... ..-
GIidIn ...... by Iarp bomben were uIId as
far JbD:1a but DO lip" are obtainable on
... ftIIIwae ,f IIllppn. 01' penonnellhu. carried.
F.. eftC1Illion of wounded 13 LockhMod trans-
JdU ..... _"..-ud inlo IJBlbula_ plal1M. In
.&.prill'" ateh p.... carried about 300 patieDta
from SUtpJOft 10 Jap&ll and aJlOlMr 300 0Tet'
... __ rolle in March 1M:i. AI ftrious other
tm- d..nn,r the war 400 tit:k or WOQnded
... enaated from 8aiJon. Ibnila. aDd Kinn
(F_).
".
fl. Caroll"e .lld )Iada"a 1.1."elL
J. 1ll."'R.-.:k Rnc! Sol"",,,,, 1.land&.
K. :'e... (lUI"....
I. Chl"a.
)1. (:rHI.h .., 1'.",I(t"" llivee IrRIlIe roluU>e.
K (.r.I,ll of CIn"'R d
HUk$. ge owe." J.I'''''"'Il ..11 .......<18 hy .Ir
Grapb ..f dlv"I"".1 11
JOllt! r. .mllle volume In J.P'"--b,
Q. tl ..pb or dlVIllI"""1 ..n t ..tIle volume 10 J.ptIn
JuIJ IIHJ.
Jl )IRI) ,,' Urood......,(>r<!o, .",1 l,ollt bl'tw- .1'1"_
In CllI .
ll. !<o:iortllatlt' ,IlRUllm C>f mllllacl ..II ...Iume I t.'hl
lll-li. " lUI
T. "",,",,-II. dl.....'o of "'lI1l11ry ..U v"lnme In t.'hln.
lll-l:!. ._
U. &1>e....U. dt.UIIm or mllll.ry ..U n.loJUol' In Cblna
IG-n . '
lkht....t1. tll."...m or mill..,. ..n volume In Cbl....
m
lkbemau. dlanlom of mJII...,. n111"OIn_ hi CIlIna.
,,.,
X. G..pb of mllll .,. ..II ...1Ik M1ume 10 IlUnDL
tlS!,;II.';; I"'.. Nu, 21l3-
.1. IrRnSIlUrt ur JUI'"
...... Arm)" lIlr fu.""
USSllS IIlte'rw:atlou No.
g ...euall"" of l'lI.URIU.....
USSIIS II1terrO\<lUlcm .-.r". 27S-
.....ulbI!8at ..uta ca"'INlla;n.
l"tpeIV"",,UUIl S...'1-11_
Jal'flllell<! ,\r"'l" nl""rMI a1l0UtJemR.
I. are lteallhl" l'"""",t.Uo... "r
11.'1 .uppll"" ...bleh "'ene requlrelL
b)' Nch of 'be foil_In", 'I'H.&)
1)."",pWot 00 lrar
ne ....1 J.Il".'Y Il).lll Col".
....1 tTr''''. JRva"""" Arlllj'
2d Rhlpplnll 'en".I....rt <.'O'IIII1RI1d.
Chl"a.
1.......;.....1 I'...
11>411 "" .1.""".- mlll'''"l" rail l.ft!
lie bJ Joll.).>r !lhl"IR. Tak"",hl. r.n
....d I ..napo" lM'I"Il,,".
_ ..I of Unell "f <.'O","",,,I,,,,U"b.
.1....._ w )1101".,.. Tuk)o.
I'..llbl' .... ej ....,>I>rt Qf .1,IJ'I(>lbll.
.1Ml ..n dl<I.lon of
tlSll.B8.
[)()c,u_.1t "" ",mla.,. r.ll t ..m.
In China Prel)...'t!Ol J."uary Il).l(l bl
Llft)1.....nl (.'(>1001" .'uJlbaJubl.
.1....._ ..I llal80ll oltlce (If tile
CI:lIDII ._In. (;bIn.
IJooxII......t (OIl ,nllleJ ..n l..fIo:
I. BUI"IlIIIl pnopart'Oi b,. )1""".
Ab, 1Il.1l' o/Ik'orr (If Ja....
_ Itu....,. A Am,,. In lta..-.
1""" In t",,",
a.,. ,9&6.
I .............. "'rill""
1046 OIl Ibnll,. ..II , ..Ilk In 1M
MIllllppl ..... b)' lJ""'t.....o. 00I0DI:I
b ..U........ tM I_
1',0, 'I\" ("ao,p So. 1. l.hU.........
",.If """""' "f I"" .1 ......- t'M/"
....... h A..... ,\,r1II)' 10 .he , ...Illp-

I...."........ pn'\)&1'O.'d
IUoW on ,nlll ) "'""0' '''llf-POI1 bl
lIIIJor Mal. T....1I1u' 'OOI()f" .-.-
po>rl --.\01., IO"f"'('l"....e .,........:J
nt 11_ <.>f ',"'Iuo.unlnltl<>n. J ....._
War ),(llllJotrj', T<.>l<10.
1",",_"1 Ion ",mlllrl
...,"""'" III ('Illu. p....,......1 J._
alT IlMG II)' 1.1,.,.'''''."' CoM.... :;..
Jlrl. J.I""...... 1'fI' 1 11.1...n ,.....
of tlor I'hloll II '..... )'illDklDlo
( ... 1....
1>"n,""'1ll un ",\lll.r)
It1lJUI{IO" In 10ff"
""...1 J.lluar)" 1\1-10 hj" ....l
Cui_I 1""lh"R. Klk"n. ,ull' ..m-
('f'I' lor lhr JIII)II,''''... ....'
A..... ",m,)' In ,he l'lllllpl,h"'" ,'UI'
W llor ..... n",1 ,u.....nny In I.......
I', .. \\' t'II'''I' 1'"". 1
I .... "n I'",,,'j' tr."'I"'''
'IIrn,,,,.I,, 1'"1".... ..."'I.r
by IJrm '" Cu,,,,,,,,,,,I'"
.......1. "n&uo. J"l""'....e :;"".1 11,r
0011...... T"kj'''_ t>
l>O<-Utuellt lIn Ar"'j' 1,,,o.l,,,r' I"
..... rlo"" [lo..,.",l... 11).1:.
U.....en.ul Culoul'l Iw"k""hl.
....ltn. lna"""I"r"le ,d
of l'OlnlIluol'RII"". J"l""""'"'
Mlntal rj. 'r"kj'''.
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,

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n
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jAll lid
..... _"' .............11.-.1 10 U.
..-..:0 "" I'" dla"-" l"llNlS
....... Il
_ III "",J
10 _1..........,,'"" bJ
1I./l..I'. k'UtIl-l
I_I '" .1 ..-
"""""'" tINS bJ' JiIII.)oI'
orc-K.. 1111_ *I...... ,........,
_.... '....,_1. _I of
11_ ,of __"1_ JapII-
w" )II"""'. ToQ&
'nolo dIIuI I. IW. -
dtlrllIiJ
.1Id 1015 wttll
I'" _ ......... III""""""
pa- ....I_11'd .n Nrb _
..... I"" ..,_ uI ,
..-.-. dal'bll: , ... _,
(laleMII
..... w., III ". 'fOIIs<t.
ee-ot 1iIuut.
_ "''''''u bNdqtIal'l_
,-
MaJw 11I1__ KMJirn. .,.,
....1IiJ ......n_ ItII-
....
1....-. ("*-I 01.. 1t1,....1.
11lIJ ...................l'lftll,
m_
eoar-""'" Ojlt'll, 'hdIIIIlr1,
..." I'J. ToltJo.
0._ 1101. y_t. 11119)
1Dl111tUJ'. TokJo,
o .......... Cl,......
_1Itr7. TI*Jo.
,.... PI"'PII* hi No....... 1015
llJ ""'-1 00'-1 lW111lotbI.
....... .-nI of
.... fit ( 1111 t1oa, 1_
....

,
I
_.
....".
SHIPMENT Of MILITARY SUPPLIES
,TO
BURMA

-- __ -_.
---- M. - ...
__.a1.e "!'HI. .-!!U-- _...
"_.
-- ....... IIUA5I __......
______ 0 __
_- 5 1. - __
-I---+--+--+--+-..j
..,.,..-".'c.--,..'.,.--,_L.--J
, ......, ' .....1
...
/,,/
y;'.
-"
...
SHPMElH Of MILITARY SUPPUES
TO
MARSHALL,CAROLINE S MARlANA lSLANDS
-
i
,
!
...
/
!
,.';"
-.
'..
/.
.......... ..,.. ,
i
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...
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... _..
,
,
,
I
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,
,
,
:
,
,
,
,
,
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-.
'-,
CF MILITARY SUPPLIES
TO PHILIPPINES
_.
_.
L.....
..... _---_. ... __.D_ __.
-"IQM. ....11 _ ....
H_.
__'00 ....
--,....." _""....
_ ..... _, "'.. "" ..u
Of MILITARY SUPPLIES
TO
IIDO-CHINA, SIAM, MALAYA, JAVA,
SUMATRA a BORNEO
..-.
-
-
--,..... _...._....
_' m "" ....
--_
-
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-
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-_1='1'- ....
.. ).. ::'-I,!..;.I-J
._-, "..-.,
,
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_l--l--l---k--t--

- -
-


Vi

stlPMENfOFMLlTARY SlI'f'LIES
TO
II'fI.ItYUS 81 FORMOSA

..
;

.......,. rlMII,.ITAIIY SUPPLIES
TO
1(!..IIt.E 81 M.UT\AN ISLANDS
,.....=:=;.:=;::=+=::;----,
-_.
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I

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if
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""""01' ..TNIT Il.Ff'LD
TO
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-
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---=...== ....-. _.
I
i
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........-
"""".M ......... """"".......
...
.,.
...
" .
.,
...
.,.
...
" .
...
l ) t
....
" .

Of TRAfflC VOLUME ON YANGTZE RIVER

IN UNITS OF 10.000 METRIC TO"'S
_.
\
/
\
1
\
.-
-
,- '...
"0""'''
-
------_....
._-_ ---""" .
_ _ "" VUO" ..
...,....

.-"--+--
$tIPMENT OF....'ARY SUPPLIES
TO
--,..:....
.-,
-_.
..
-
----_..-
--- ----
--- ._---
-
..-
-f-HHH-----1
-
-_.
j
i
- -
,,---
...
W8 ..MWtSUMDS
-
--_... _.....
._.. _- _...-
--_ ----_.

-
--
-_.
I
i

~ ' I f ,
1",9
, '4
+
LEGEHO OF IW.. 0f\'ISI0NS
a.'Mo.I .. OSMol
b . ~ f..--
C:MloGOYA 9_'"''
d. TOIC'fO h. __
I ,
I
I ,

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~
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i
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. ~
~ ~ ~
i
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r i 1

,tt, 12
4.4, n
..
... dou .......)
JUNE 1945
10 " It II I. " " ., " .. to U II ) H niH If II n
DIVISIONAl RAIL TRAFFIC VOLUME IN JAPAN
[)!HIIIT N
?
' ....
\\
;,-
\\
.
,
,a;-
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r'\,
I
- ~
~ -
.',
,
,
I

----------_..-
---------------
<[
W
11l
<[
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o
t--

W
EXHIBIT "
CHINA SEA
.-
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.
.
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,

.
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-

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,
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........
_.
QiINA
- '"'t-.
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-:'-::::;-. ...-.::;
_. -'- ....
...
- ...... -- .....
- ,
=-.:z7:
-Jll"-"-- --.... ":-.. -
_ ........ .... 1 ...
... ..' ..,- ....... -
.......... -
-
.-.-r--.......
.- -
-',- ..,..
"..

.'
!
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e.,,,,:
>
DIVISIONAL RAIL TRAFFIC VOLUME IN JAPAN
I
,
". Ii
I l I"
I'
I

I
o
I

I
I0
-
_____4
liN"'" ,
MlllTAJtY RAIL VOLUME IN CHINA, 1942
Uncludlnt Vonglalll.., I,oflic)
"
.... " _ .OT I ~ ' ...t ..
LOlOl. " _ 0 ""'01(.,
.. I/O'" '" ('" TOUL e (..OLllO'''' .no.,"," "0 '_01
".GOO'''"'' ,"I OfIOnt<
'... I<l '.00" (A_'.". _ Of ......."l
,00:'" T""" - "'W',, .".,. ""'"
'"'11_ ......" ,.,mo - ".u.n00 ",e .....
I"""T.'
.IUTUY MIL VOL_. ON,_A, 1141
t............. _'"' 'reff"l
- -
---
-

-
--
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lit
-
..
~ .,
YANnI[ AIlll
., ~
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-

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...
.....
... i'fi
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---........
-------
~ c = ......-----.
... .,. ---..
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------
--

UII..IT Y

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.,
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-
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,., ,.
.'
-
ia_
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-
... ...
rom
"IT m
".
"
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MILITARY RAil VOLUME IN CHINA,
(Including Yanglz, Aiv.r I,olflcl
u........ aCru ""'''_
l.OlOt" "._, _ .L OI """'VOl
.. _" .. (CAl '0.... .., ....00( ,IHCl.UOO... """.....Ge ."0._.11
10_,.,... 1.1 0.0",0(;1
, TO.. COl TOoon ,._...'I ........ orOU_1
LOCAL TIl"". _ 'IOUIU .".,. ',HolD
'N'C.-O"'."" ,.'"'. _ ......n 0<0 ."'L ...n

..-
c .
.-
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'HI
"
,"U
RAIl. TRAFFIC VOl.UME IN BURMA
TIlOiIPII
,...
MILITARY
"
'14.
,...
UHlIlT 'f/
.......
- - -
... ...
3
Ya.ant
-
-

-
;e.::
..

...
..
...
.LIT"" IIAIL VOLUIIl_ eM 1"5
( ................. lO)
-----
---...--
._.(.... _--1-..----.
.....- .,-
- __. :_._1
------
---_... _---
-_.
CHAPTER III
ORDNANCE
1'I.'{;ei'ed wI" ,
I lie I COil d lIOt 00 colllilleteh- 1iI1ed he
to refer tlte 1I111tte]" to lhe ror'de-
cISIOll, lie could Ilot act 011 hia own initialh'e
aU recorda or the dellOlS had been bur';ell
III' of the bureuu of ordnallce it WIlS
IlllllOS'<lble to obt' " , '
. . alll ll-'llrell lIS lo specilie (1IUUl-
lltJ of 8uPI,11es handled, The memories of ,','
officers " .
111 were 'l"a/,'lle and uncertain
HO\\'e"er, il 8e@me<.! in .U Cll.Sl!!l th.t supplies
not aceumul.tell at the depots but ....ere shippt'd
oUl pnlcticallJ I.!I soon lIS received; .nd in
Illan,' 1'a!:ieS of hu,')' equipmenL and critieal ilems
tl!e depots ,,"ere bJpt\.'i'jl'(1. and the items shippt'd
from .the manuf.cturer 10 the port au-
lhorlt) for slUIIlIlell1 o,e!'Sl'lil.
Til: f.cililies ., Ihe dellOtS were antiqtated
.nd llladequate. Thre \\"IIS a noticeable .bsence
of h.ndlinf!". l'(luipment. One or '''-0 short spur
traclG con..otllllll'(1 the entire nlilroad of
depot lu,ing all tht' .... rehouses
lll&ellSibli' to freight ars. The .....rehonsoes were
n.ITO.... pl.nnl'(1. and poorlJ
ht-r111f'<1. intl'rior ""as broken up plal-
fonl18 nlllnlllf!" on both sides of longitudinal
center plSSllge.....y. These platforms or meua-
nine!l ...ere .bout mid....,. bet ...een the floor .nd
the ceilinf!" 12 feet abo'l"e. "\co:ess to Ihe !'l!I:Ond
floor \\"18 b, means of stairw.ys at both ends of
tile building. With fe... exceptions. no
fonn of hoist or lift wa;; in eridence.
In 19-t-I. tllf' onlnillce bureau onlered dis-
pel'!lll of Yoeks in .11 depots in .nlieipation of
air ",,"ulted in confn:ion .nd del&\" in
filling onlers l"'Iimlled one
TO one rnomh..\1 Ihl' t-ji Branch Dell'0t.lhecom-
",.nding officer .dmitu,<1 that they IOSI Track of
the localion of ilelllS that had been dispersed.
Per:'!Ollnel and 1ranSjlOnaiiOn shon.ges eau!ll'd
by di'llI'rsion rlSultl"ll ill fUriher dela'..\lerU
whkh Traflil: in other cau!ll'd
in l'l'Cf'illt of In the area of the
depot. 1he st0I'!Jaj.'6 of trtl/lie and the seeking of
sh('her j)l!r:'!Onnel ('au,ed a loss of from 20
minutes to an honr. lind in 80me areas. this hap
1)('llf'll IWO 01' 1111"t'e tillles a dlly during the
"pring of tlWi.
Thll direct lOS/! of ordllllnce Cll"iprnem due to
Oorllbing curmot be es1i"uued liS II'" reconls of
supplies on h'lIld 1I1"{l ex111nl. The ollicel'>j inter-
,;e\\"I.,<1 insist lhM the disj)l!nlioll ...as highly ef-
rl.'C1i\"e. Of 1he depots ,isited, Osnkll "'liS COIll-
pletel.\ burlled 0111; Ozolle (N'llgoya) Wl\.S about
00 Ill"lill"'Ofl.'11; uul! al Iliroshima, about 50
"
Willi or GOO studtnlS <I \car Ill.
mher I!)H it WliS d,"., ,:_, '.
'"_ . ..... tO!ll_
wn""r of tr"1I1('('S bJ' '0
IJoeI'l1!n!
. on tank, truck, RUI! tracto;
lUling for 5 months, "'ere Open
uumber of gradu-
did not exceed 400 ofticers and 600
Clllldidllte school was also pro.
mg motor maintenance ofticers
l':lIndidates were selected mOf\l fo;
'Pro"'ess and leadership than for
I abilit)" and .daptability the
not too highl)' regarded as :nain.
I.
Ordnance &11001 in I!H4 trained
students ag blacksmiths. 30 per-
ans, 30 as .mmunition
10 percent as technical speeialisu,
as rnal:hinists.
&fI,e students were supposed to hue
'le for taking the course. eithr
I education'- ci"ilian pnu:tical u.
pre....iolls mil it aI'" technical train.
I aptitude of Ihe lrainees nried
WIS a shortage of trained instruc-
tJoaining materials .nd facilitiesnd
li\"'8 confusion. The COUI"9l'S ...ere
IS in American sen'ice schools,
to m.ke the most ellidenL nse of
u.:ruetors, and f.cilitie;;.
Ann)' did nOI te.ch or I'raClice
-.,.em of maintenance.nd Ihe fail
a IogicaJ sJstem resulled
.ttempts by unqualified
major repairs. 'nIl' lack of plan-
ist training on large _Ie sug-
h Japanege High COlUm.nd o,-eT-
ability of the :I\'eral-'e soldier 10
repair complex ordml1lC't' equiprtll'nl
tl"Chni('nl 1'"lIilliuJ! (lIef. il('1tl I).
depots in th{' hOlllelnnd were
ftlt:IIJ b)' the of ordnnlll'l!.
the .<:tunl 1ll1111UIII ol'l'rntioli of
eommanding olliN']" hAIl no 11i!!Cl"lllioll
in Ihe flow of tlmlll.l!h his
Be was not consIlhed !lor did he
Itoek It',\'18 WCI'tl desired 10 be main-
lfU nOlHied by the burellu wlmt Slip'
J!. shipped ;1110 llll' dep01, lI!ld he
III 10 wllllt supplies were to 00
In the e,ent shippillg were
coordinated lbe monments. When supplies "ere
deliverM to porte OJ' depots in openllionnl
they came undef' the jurisdiction of lhe line of
oomJDunications of the urny or the area com
1DI.Pderho directed their dislriblllion to di"i_
sioas or Io...n eeheloDII ag the ein:umslances
........... '
The liDllS of -.ad, requisitions.
etc.. 'and the depots in the zone of interior .nd
oftl'!INS .re !!hoWl) on the organization eh.n,
F.shibil .\.\t 1M of ItlU. the (11iblt.
and Ob,..rna dtpcll>I ...ere .bolished .nd 111$
s.ndai and 7....msuji depots est.blbhed to
the !litaalion of their .ml}' distrkts in .ntil:;r--
tion of an innllion. Exhibit B shows Ihe Iota
lion of Ol'l'l'!IN.lI depots. the .rmies in comm.nd
of \he am. aDd annits. Ih.t ""t're SUI,plifd
from lhe depotII.
1. Tr..uu.g
1'bf' shor1apo of lrained Onlll'lln" teclmki"
both oommi ioned .nd enlisted-....il. corltrioot-
ing bctor 10 the poor mainten.nre of ,Iapar
0f'l1Danl:e equipment. The shor1Ill-'e was 'Pllaf'-
eotl, due to a I.ek of allprecialioll by .11 (.'0lIl'
IlIIader.I of lhe impor1ance of .-ast 11lI1llbe"" of
t.edmicians to modern linn". 'n,UI'
ItO indieation of an}' schools or pfOl:"l"I
CODduded by tactial units or thealer colnmlll
l15
i
lIUeb trainilfJr I.!I Ihl're ".ll.S had been Ilppartll.
t
l
cond1ldl only by the onlllllnCl:; ndmillistra
llOll
t.dqual1en in JaiWon.
1be Miliu.ry Training School ill TokJlI
tn.ined Il109t of the oftieel"!! .nd
ItIOtor mt'It"hanica for both the 111'111)' 1I1ilithl' .rlllY
air foreell. QuotllS for studcnts WI"" III lolled I
an ami tal,tic"l but 11wir l"l1m
mandera showl"lllittle interest in Lilling Ihrlll.
The only l'OUtl!e open to pri "I,te!! 4
enul'lle in olle of tIll.' Sill
jectll: weldinj[", hlllCksll1ithiu!(, ehoctl'it:il.l" trt,"
, 1 .
all< tllllk Illlllllt('llunec. '.'"
tniDing ,.... offered in thellC ('11tel-'Orll!S. rl
eonsi8h'l:1 IIlostl} of pl'llcticIlI ,,"ork
51
J. Or,..aun..

the ,"'" the manubeture. nd
primar," di.4riwlion of armarnmt. &aununition.
and lIUpplite iDl-11Hlin,: lIipal foquipmwl,
tIlOIor t:.ll"l>t>I1. and .Jertronic ck.."-. It fUllC'-
tioJwI ... OOI'NU of .... lDini!!l:ry and with
in lhoe 10M!" J.OIW of tIM> empino bad authority
_ "tpoll .,n.1lo. brine.. Ind
wbirh II_I. ":0""1. .nd dj",peIHd "luip-
_1 ..tI "Upplw.. all di--,..1. 'J1tP nom..1
os. ....,. to I.... 11' of
the line of 1M t PlIIIlMoion to
&ekl OiJ&Iliatiom.
RNp_ibihty {ur tlw and ....pply
of ,loP J ..,..- .\rmy ....,. "",.-:I in 1M anny
deputnmt of I'" IIDI.ma1 cr.oenl Htadquar-
ter\l. 1hP mit-I of 11.. ......rnd as tbe
chiri .f tlw am.} ,!@pe.I1I1WflI. The main func,.
dora ilr ...hKch tIM' rhope.rtawnt .... I'l't<pOfItrible
_ dlf' plannilllf of IIllpply. rtqllirftllPfllll K"
cordia: to projfol1:.d army ....peasioa aDd ita
projerted tII'OfW of opt'ralioIa. the ftIC'l'ipt of li.1d
nq.- for mpplw... lhoe I_min.,: of nquoo.
tiobI t 1M "'-0' inillr)' aDd initial diliribulioD.
of _pp1_ JDadp il.ble by of tbe '-111'
miJUIIr1. The .noal bandJi of M1pp1y and
tnaIiplrt matt.-... of the arm1 MpartmNd _
andfto oontrol of IIw illllplll"tOr' ..nnal of line of
eGIDIDllIteatioDL
8ecpeIb for ordnanlle were noli.. hom
bi,het eclJe)om in ...... by the in-
II*fG' of the Iii'll of CIOIIUIlUDieat.ioM
who torw.rded t'- throaP to the .ar min
iItzJ, Tbe war miD"" att.r lCI'MDiDg the
nqQlllta dil'lllUd the bureau' of ordnance to fill
the O"dtn. The burw.u of ord_ illllrlkUd
its fad.oriea. Il'IMllte, depota. bnncbea, 01' ......
ciII to make deliverieL The .ar miDiItrJ in
Iol'IIMd the in.peetor pnenJ of thI line of oom
llIIIDMItioul ...... and d.UTVill were to
be ..... The iIlIptar IlIirtcDd tilt
taIIIportaUoIl ...... to fuIliIh heWU.. aDd

CUM by code number. A catalogue, oontuining

__ r three _ devoted to ordlll'nee,
....., .0 0 r -- . __.. l._ 'j"
lilted eemin jteIM and their cuull nUOl""rs,'E ..
Ide was made up from ficure8, Kana, RIl( ng_
Iiah lecters OO1llbined. ObTiously the great bulk
f
._a never eftI1 listed. This method
00........,00-. ,.
was u.opted in 1137. and. .llItOll!! 1 It \...
Imo1rn to have cau.ed mnunw...b1e errol'll, noth-
inr was done to conect it or imtal1 a more rom
plete and catalogue
,. F.wrs AI",",g Rrceipll
of "'oip.nt
()rdnaDce p......ing for the year 19-11 .,,u
IQ&inIy diftded to the rompletion of the orn
with ChiD&. and ho_r much elnphaai!l .....
on and t.dical planning for the
to 1M IKMItb. there is lillIe ",'idenct
to iDdic'ate that aDy .riowI logi!l!ical plallning
.. begun for this moftlUftlt prior to September
or Qdober of tNL. WbIot liule planning '/fIlS
dooe for the -uaem seems to han
ntber inadequate and o..-eN1lltimistie and
.... DO ptorillioa for &fly unfol"e!leen e.-eolU
aIities (R.I. itflDS 3. 4, 3. tI).
prioritim lIl:bednle for 1941 (Exhibitt E
ud F). which. of _n!!. @,1noll the b&sie dim::
tioD and iJrttcntion for the mobilization of
aa&ioual indu!ItriaI 1'1011. ill indicati"e of thl!
tnad-for d. pIaoecI the greatest emph.sis 011
.... production of all the ...eapons neceS6ar.r for
.... eooduec of a _(e continent.1 'lfar.
0... of INp, medium and sm.lI caliber
... of which ...as df'finite short'b'e In
1M!), taDb and tncton, and 'ehiel.llar radio&,
__ ,hen an A priority, as "'f're larb'e 10lli'
IUIp radioe for comrnuniCltions among the
widely ..uned foJ'e:!l in and
Motor tnttb and rail ....ay tractOI'$, fOf
_ in the conqueIt and denlopmcnt of China,
_ in the B grouP. as ...ell all. he..
-.,.;.......
Ordinary COIDDIunicatious equillrnellt.-lluch U
..u and medium BiRd radios, telephones, and
_U as "MpoIIB, ll.llImullitioll and
__for the air forces, ,,'cre ll.llparc
r,d
y
adequate (Ref. itcm 3), liS tire)' .1"&
__ DO hiaber than a C priority. Submarine
IoclMon, both BODie and otherwise, were
at .... bottom of the priority flCll.le. 'I'hertl IS no
mct.ce of an1 COlH;l8rted efrort. to Ilroduee land-
iDa enft or .... other usual concomitullts of alll'
---...
aatillfaction with the communi_
it ilIllvident from the available
its J and K) thnt on the aI'erab"il
electrical i.ndustry produced only
of the quantities of gign.1
The status of flre-wntfol equipment
(Exhibits L lind M). artiller)'
far as production is coneerned was
r (Exhibits G 'Ild II). with
of lhe quota being ,uained. The
t and medium tanks were uoeeded
'bit X). Ammunition I)roduction
anrage, up to quot., with t:l0l'JlllSllS in
and in others (Exhibits P
JBpUleSEl motor "ehiele production
peat in Hl-li (E:l:hibit R), I'f!SUlting
up.usion pl'OJ,rnm begun in
than 50 percent "'as being 11$ed
military' purposes I r<ef. ilem 7).
tion for a I.rge _Ie conti-
".. hampered in 19-10 lind 19-11 b)' a
machine tools and plant capacity.
than lhe of ra... materials
labor, ...as the limiting factor in the
the 19-11 ordn.nce program, although
of electric power and the usual ron-
'ties, contnlCU>, and specifications
iug factors (Uet. item i).
ion of the emph.sis placed on
operation, the Iliroshim. On!-
&hipped nearl)' .11 of its stock to
_ as it arrh-ed in the depot
).
DO gmt strides were made in 1941
ry solution of Ihe China incl
&Sill placed on its "ietoriou!l con-
DO immedi.te .d,erse effect on the
upllnsion. for bJ the end of
Japanese had both _\rn{'ri
!lea power in the P.cific, had
irnportllllt islllild bases. and under-
'on of Thlliland. .\laI8)"11. lllHlthe
"..,
expansion, 10 all appelll1lUces,
objedi"1l operation, in which the
rial General Ifelldquorters hoped
ya. lhe ElLst ludies, the
and islllild hllses ,ruarding- the Ill)'
these lIl"CIUl. There is no e,'idelll'tl to
the original plnn elilled fo_r lhe ill'
a, Allstl'l\lin. 01' Xew Guinell. Ir
the leallel's !lUlt
"
this !Ilpid aud suceessrul upansioll, coupled with
the unpotente of the "'estern powers follo..... ing
Pearl I rubor and their in\"olnment with Ger-
many, would mllke it po!l8ible to ne/,'Otiale a
peace. The Jap.n_ would then be free to con-
solidate this .rea, employ its reaouroes to build
up a war machine and finish off the China Waf.
It "'as thWl upected that the Pacifie War would
be a short one, and the hoped for its
conclusion in 1942 (Ref. item 9). Congequentl)'.
there appears to be litdl! change in the priority
!lChedule from that of 1941--Japa.nese industrial
effort "'as directed to the prosecution of the war
"jth Chin.
M an uampll! of this attitude, "'e find tanks
and tractors again the ..\.-1 ordnance priority
although there "'as little prospect of using them
in the c:ampaigns' through the Pacific islands.
In like manner, other ..eapoD!! for the conti-
nental "I"ar--truc!rs. quiek_fire b'llIlS.
equipment. 'ehieul.r radios.. ",-ihuJ trac-
tors, .nd f'xperillltntal -wf'&SeI--like. \"l'hicll'S
for croesinjj!" marshes and paddies-...efll
ginn 3 priorities.
Desllitf' this general "'--'Ilplying
of the war in Chin.----the firs! of a lrend
to.... nI meeting the prospecti"e threat of our
air po... .nd 5lIbmarine Be brcalllt in
the 19-12 l)rioritJ schedule. ,,"eapons and ammu-
nition for the air forne. as as ami-ail'rafl
WNpolll, were raised from C 10 B priorit)'. and
lIUbmarine Ioeators of all tn>l'l5 "'ere raised from
J) to C.
The need for additional large radiOl! to usist
in the den.lopment of d,e newly .cquired on'.r-
llIlas ba!llllS "''''"I': this item an A Ilriorit} for 1942
U WI!J1as for 19-11. while the IlrodlK:tion of radio
detectors (radar) hej.. ...n its tremendous expan-
sion ,,'ilh an _\-3 in HI42 as compared
with its C "tlltuS Ihe rear lx-fore. The dem.nds
for radllr ill this and Sileceeding year'S greatly
hamlleN'lI Ihe production of
'-"llIi,"l1('lIt 111.-f. irO'lll .
The of Cllnnon and
the helief in a lack of furl her use for them
rollo" illj.:" th.. nruieil)llted fall of Correjridor lind
SillgllllOI1' "I,pllr'ently ClItlSl'd !he I'l"iIUelioll oJ
their priorit)' froll1 ,\ to D in 1942.
Thl! in\lustrial IJottleuocks in the year 1942
wero still 1llllChiner)' aud N(uipmeIlt, lind expnn-
of pl'{)dllctiou WlIS thus limited 10
lI'ial 1)I'(ltlUl'linn of new ordllllllre items. Short-
uj:.'Il!I of copper lind higIHrlllllit) stet!l 1l1so pre-
.......pldllODl llltf. itflPl Th_ wer:e
... .... In IlJ*'ihtlolUl for
ClII eqmpment which tJowfd productJ.on
(&t..... Ill). Th. rh.1tJf" nf riB. eahbP In-
trodulldoB of ..I l'artridl(l!Jll fto IllIn b ).
UId prodKtioo of the hollow.rh.!'JP .hell a_
had the .IIU't t R,f. It11 3).
e.rtainIhortapt in the fitold d,""lopfd. There
... a p.ltk-uJu .tNm' of I.ndin...nit 13:1'
0' requirMJlMll I and f1.f _1nK"b. .ntl-
tUIk .-. anli.i......." .mmunltlOnnd futol
for boIh 1M Oaadak-anal and the Sew (;UI.-
_paip. The of ahippiRfl'
&rlIl IIIIdo ir.-If fell bPfol'P (illld.kanai. 11JP
'-.nl fC(uipmH11 employM in lhe
upalllrioo had J-n IIIOIIIly brou1t from Chm.
and 1I.nchurind they I'PIWeI on the 111-
lIIulaled on the rontilWnt fnr tbloir sup-
ply in lUI. In flit' ..10th -l6 pPIftfIl of lhe
lIl1UIitiom amP from lI'lll"huna. 311 perffftt
from Or....nd .. )Wl'\"Pnt hoIn as
aplMt Ii JlPn-mI from J.pan: but in 19012, U
.--. runt' from J'pIln and U pprtflIt froID
Kanrhuria l RPf. iteDl :.. }-:Ihibit l"1.
B1 the..d of 1M2 it beea!IlII! .pparent that
ptOlptl to.. a lIII!J'OCillit'd p.ce WPI'P DOt 1W1
prom_a,. }-unlll'rmono. lbe J..._ D\,!illry
JUdri-. it...tf in ,be _them
upuII<ion. "Ill nut ahIP 10 di_llI,llP it..-If ... bad
-. hoil and txpt'(1l The m....siall of
inilialed by a Ioeal oommander. bad
into operatioa. fn....hirb
110 ""var. had heM aocumulated. and
it '-- an txPfR"in and quitlo IlDprofit.abIe
draiD 011 the JINIly utmded suppl,
li_ CRof. itfom :'1. tbe .Ueutiao
_pUp. an e'ort to .....no tJw northPnr J.-
_ ... in tJw Parifk. mII" d.p and
tIIWlIteipted of ropsjdtnb)e
fore.. _ Ie-. in the
foroed tb& abandon_t of the amphim.... eam-
paip .-. Port 1I0Nl1by for the !oPticall,
UId "'.icaU, more diar:uJt optntion Oft(
the Owu SIanle1 IlIOUIIlaiDI. for wllkh DO re-
__tad lwn flI'C.hend (Ref. MIl 11). Finally,
the Batt e of Kidwa,. partially I"PWMJd Pea1
Harbor, ended the tbort-Iiftll J...- DlTlI
suJll'lllllM1. and CIpllQed the ..., for Amerkan
penetntim mto the W...,. PlICitIc:.
. "..
B1 the hetlDDllII of Ihe ,.., 1"" tlta Ja,..
D.e had 1011 the iDitia&lft. The OaadaJcanal
and Aler.tian CUI""'"" upIItIl.. au-
fo..-zr stalelllates and Ameriran sea power was
makinlt a strong bid fur the domination of the
Parific. f10pe fo.. a nepiated llntl 1\
short war had dilllll'l'enrcd, lind the
Jat-n_ were denied thei .. antidpnted l'e9pite
for co1UlOIid"tion. In fad. the} wei">! fon:ed al
IIIOM immediatel)- to IlO on the defensi'e.
there wu ....n danltP.. of " real di:!ILSter if the
IIOIIthem gamble we... 100II. il no be
.....mit'd as II "E'rOndary 0l'l'ratioli.
Thil< double treod-the ..hall/."e 10 the defensive
and I1M' ne" additinn.1 emphB"jis on the !lOuth_
11".,. notlmit'd in t1M' pl.oninl' of the JuI)lInese
p..iorititto for 19-13. The itellls
san for t1M' continental "-ar. ,,hieh 11lId hij!hest
in t1M' precedin" two no..
dropped n'")" 10... 1'ankll .nd tnartors fell from
to I) and ,-pry fe.. t.nka were 1)1"(1-
dured in t1M' lIP.J:t;l yPlI"'I iHef. item -I). Enjri.
-.. britIPnl! dropped from D 10 D.
l"p!C'ial fthides. rail ..ay tractors and e....'n 11101.0"
Ink"b III a ..hole "ere ..edUCPd from n to C'.
In 1'1_ of IIII'l1f' nrt-'-..ks. air force ,,eal'olll
.Dd ammunilinn l"t't"I!'il"Pd I1M' .-\-1 alld A-2 pri-
orities respectiveJ)"nd retained lilis new posi-
tioo of preemioel_ for the rem.inder of tm.
1rU. SiDcle there was Jalurally a greater prob-
ability that hip prioril) items would reach
wit qIl(ItUo el"Pll at t1M' Upell!!!! of lower priority
this .. meant thlll the .]apanf!!'le
....... mmpeU.d to risk t1M' 'l<Plkenillg of alllheir
forces in order 10 their air
fol'llllll to meet. Ampriran power in the .ir.
Ground did. in fact. sulrer a
curtailment. especially in ground ammunition
and mmbat vebidf!8. Onl" ordnance
equipment ..as produced to equip ne.dr
oraaniud units-unite in the field would
to fend for thelJlllPlveg as be!!t the)' could.
R.dio deteetors and locators, lind submnriut
kKoatOl"ll of .11 types 1I"en! al90 moved iuto the .\
priority lEfOuP. Antiaircraft weapons of
typt8 were p;iven similar dllS!lificatioli willie
-.rchliWibl 1I"1'f@ moved from C to B. For a
time, army ordnance undertook lhe prOlluclioll
of larp motorboats of the crnfl 1.'1)8
ud a1110 Clrgo These items were
aiTWI an A priority in view of the IIcce88ity for
IIIDIII tnllllport ,_Is for usc in the islnnd CHIl'-
.-i,rna in ord..... to minillli1.ll tim dlili/-"'I (rt/UI
Allied air and lIubm...ine action. .
All a fewlt of the greatl} illcrclljjL>{1 expeu(h
ture of supplies in the I' .-;ilic "'"r, il \\'118
"
Ie the KliisellbulL, the b"sis of
ply (Exhibit '1'), fDr til" (lIlil.ll
Ulat theater, while on the other
K.isellblln in lhe Chillll Ilrea
ndaced b" being extended to cover
inlltead of the normal 4.mollth
tripling of the Koisenbun for lhe
was lIe'er colnpletel, aceom_
iD !lOme cases il WI!! surc:essfullJ
item 3).
the shomge of raw materials
have a serious eWect on produc.
rapllcity began to aPlleD. .., as in
whose production potential Will
Iy utilized (Ref. item 12). A
ine tools for the increL.<e>:1 .i..-
resulted in tool priorities for
...ith a ad'erse
production of othe.. fOmt!l of ord
landing cnr.fi production
ftry slowly. As Japa.nese indll!-
.tIt1l8 approached tile: limiting factor
the army ..as compelled to
for general upllIlSion .nd from
WU a matter of apportioning the
among the .-arioW! Ihealers
For example wben more .rtillery
.. the Pacific, and it was impossible
..,. more due to high priorities fo..
defensi ...e weapoll!l, it became nec'
.rtillery from the ?lrallChu..ian
... in the Pacific (although mO!lt
enroute by subs Ilnd .ircraft)
_ The shorta/:,"e of fuses "as critical
iwn 12).
for the chllnge to a colllplete de-
became quite 1l1'pIIl'(!nt to,,ard
tN3. Both the GUlldalellnal and
igns had ended in complete de
Stales Na,-y had forced \\"a)"
I and "'estern PadIi.., 'lIiclillj.r
..umg TlIrawlI. In the !lOuth, il had
of the Bisl1l1.rck Sea lind isoillted
hue Ilt Rllbaut, whi..h WllS prllcti-
to ufle,. .\u):"usl (Hef.
While, the United SillIes Arm.\'
.. full-!llJlIle count(lI'()Irensi\"e, will
.nd Mundll, seizing BOU):"llill\'i11e
COIlst or New Gui"nell. IIl1d al lhe
.-ding New Brilain lit lind

"
.,,,
By the beginllillg of'Hl-!4, the JlIl,ancse ""ere
011 the defensi\e Oil e''Cry frout and had 110
choice hut to t<llltillue lind illlensifv Iheir ptans
In genel1ll, the Hl-l3' schedule of
l)rIOrltle8 was retained with conlinue(( ..urtail-
of ground ordllllllrll CIIU;;ed b) the eXpl111-
Of defelbin a,inlioll l nef. ilem 3).
The A priorities for 194-4 were l"I'Sl!"vl"(1 only
for the ai .. force ..eallOns, Illllmunition Ilnd ac.
CelIlOries, landing ..... ft, submarine and .ircraft
locator.!, .nd .ntiaircraft "eapol\S. The short-
agt= of sij,,,lal flCjuilllllent, caused by radar e.'fpan-
!lion, required the raising of the lelephone and
telegraph I)..loril)' from C to B. Similar action
"u taken for uplosh-es .nd shells, I!! the AJlitd
counleroll"elllli... drained oll" the stocks of th_
items.. The priorities for 'ehirul.r ...dios .nd
Iong.ranj,'e selS ...ere reduced from B 10 C. The
production of rannon, t.nks, and passenger cars
practirallJ cease<1. TIte true/,;- priorilies remained
at C and Ihe lruek .:Jwn.gt= shonl,- became
arute (Ref. ilem I). Due to lark of ..... materials
there ..as also a of mortars and SUIall
ranllon.ud of powder, pllns and fUlll'!6 (Ref.
ilPDIlI8 and 13).
The shon.ge of ....... materials and the short-
age of transportal ion ..ere t ..o bottlenecks of
the 1m production )Plr. Tn lhe I.Uer pa.rt of
the ,ea... ...1 decline in production be/:.'lIn
as l't"SUJr and was arcele...t.d bJ the SIIlllJl scale
disperslll program begun in llin:h u the insist-
ence of the ordnance .dministration hPlld.
qu.ners. This \\"as intended not to ron
aerle suppliea .nd fadlities but .I!iO 10 imllrove
(nef. item1l 8-1-1).
In ,\Joy, lhe prin..ipa.1 onlnance chiefs of Ihe
field annies and home installalions Illet at 1'01.")'0
to di1lCU.'l8 tIle impron-melll and reu"elldunelll of
the armJ ordnanee systeDl. They realiZoPd dillt
lhe "mililar}' situlltion was growing serious and
that wen! facing "an unpreredented crisis,"
but they al90 felt that a "golden opportunily"
for winning the \\"Qr WILS still possible.
Onl.l' 90 I'ercelll of lhe steet qUOlll was
pl'()Iluoed. 01' 4.600,()(XI tons, and of this amount,
lhe nir force rocei,ed 450,000 lOllS while ord-
nance adillinistrntioll headquarters W/lS IItlotled
oul" 210,()(XItOllS, or nl1oJ.lt 41 percent of ilS esti-
1II1lieil l"!uiremellts. It WIIS 1l('("eS8llry 10
/lud lower drastically; f?r ex-
llmt1le, in order to 81\,.", 200 tons of steel, It
plnlllwri 10 use bllmboo ror bnyonet
..
B .. -',ted tMt the IHI lent of .....u
__ .... be ,lnt&j.... bu, dial. .wi can-
... ud _.&uk ...-. _Id be nduced
.. ,... of eM 1NI IIpn, ud Iup can-
... .I..in'WI CIOIDpJeceI)'. On the other band
......... IUPl- of lOll DIm wapoDlL The
....tei -wJy of ..nllnmiuoD. in INt wouJd
..... dwa lWf of dIM .mlable in 1M&, ud
v.inin _uition for .niUu1 would un to
.. 1'nIdI: producdon
-W .,], equI U uf the .1043 1ot&I.
Dllpile the _p-.c m naawn
willa. __ quaIit;, bad dId_ &om to per-
lllIII In JIl'I'NII1. t Bef. ium 10). i' ... feh
eIemooi:B .-kI lie hmMd m
_ (fI8Ier qunlitieL New ud --
fur -.1"1'
w.woport of ordnaool' _ n4ertQea; .. m
...in ecbnkal 'ninm. ........... urpD.
Ded fur lIfJet'w....: aDd tnr1 dart .. =dB
to....rd .liminaliuh uf non-milltU1 i--. (Ref.
--I).
81 I.h.! eod uf 1Mo1 dlil' J ..- _ 1fIfW1-
when ia ret.-t. The1 I..d '- upeIW.
IDdia ald .... bUm. t.clI: in s.-. n.
Allied Iiun:elI in the Southwell hciAe W e.IIIa
m. Adainltiel<, Holiandia..... RaJ.abIn" ad
tMn in.... the Philippi..- .. Leyte .... )(ia.
doru. The __" rictorJ ill the r..,te C...
pUp vu 8"*1 drain UII tbe
dIpotII .It JIuilla, <::hina, and llulehuria, md
WI. I...- witJlI only t ...... Ml mppl1 of ..
lllllllitioa tRef. itml 11). It .... t-. eIli_,ed
thai in tbe Iawr -aM of llIoM uaJ1 10 ......
__ of t.be -appl, Ibi..-u to tJ.
Philipp_1IdaaIIJ raebed due 10
e:u air md..-...me lM'tiob (Bef. 11). III
Sinppon ... iIoIaI.ed. fI,a the ___
bad (i.ef. iIAlm I). In thI e-tnl Paciic, ...
fall uf 8t.iput md tile Gtbft Jiari.... ..
pI'deIl bl .... .J....- u the dIeiIift bdtk
of die .... (Ref. item- IT. 18, 18.IO)_{lu.
_! for dMi .....tar of ..... .J......
_"-'eed
.'"
PIuDinr for ClI'dDaDce m 1M6 .....
......6oetion of thlltHJIIUINID III llddi-
..... :.NId toward JlNPU'dIoa 6lr dMi Jut.
4iteb ....... of tha hms"lId ad. ttl -.e.u.
... approaob& Air IoIet _Ilion
... _-- -.
..... upbh... 01 III all ...w fIoIa
B-e 10 1\...... and ..iet An ,..
wil.h view toward bobteriug the defellsh'e
ItnDath of the ground fol"l)M, Antiuireraft
_p0n8 nDined their previous A-lS priority.
Truck:s were .d't'Ullld from C 10 B-lS, lind
tub and t.raeton hom D to 8-0&. In order
to imprun the homeland r:ning. lind
lIJllCeIn apinst .ir raids .Rd. tl.le prI-
ority for multiple communications eqUIpment
wall raiIad &om C10 B-
Aa the J.paDIIII a.rcllant llIarine melted
..., and their _theI'D .rmies "'ere aballdOlled
to dleU' own ....... priority for larb'6 motor.
holds dropped frotn A to B, .nd cargo sub-
III&I'D. frona C to D. Radio dete<:lors Wl'.f'II
ft!IdDeed from A to B, wbile the production of
anli-.abmariae de"'- Willi tTalll!fl'.lTed to the
u.,..
AImo8t all JIb- uf the 1945 oroll.nee pro-
grun 800D .- clinded by l"nelll) oombaL Ie-
tiTiti-. The II..- and Philippine campaigns
-re 800D eomplettd by the A.llies, .nd tbe
AmerieaD iII"-:- of Iwo Jimnd Okin....
SlOb W'Wtl followed by iJltenIIified .ir action onr
the entin J ....... as preludll! to
..
lIl.JanllUJ,. 1 months' llUppl) of ammumuol1
..... plumed for the dehMe of tM homeland,
but by the ti.- of ..rnondft' only 40 percent
W been at'Jl'IIUlI1l1a (including 40 perunt am
_nition and to pefftDt flM"l) (Rd. itenlS :J. 9.
... 20). Eadt Imit on Kyushu was 10 hll.rt
Kaebun. but it was impo!lflible to rNhxe
... &pre. ID .JDly only 200 rounds l)P.r nll&
... anilabllo and 1.,:,00 per fi.Jd gull (Rd. itl"1IIS
"I). .lbny di9ieioDs in the .nti-in,nion forte
_only 50 percent equipped (Ref. item 9). The
........ TVied but the Tokai defen!l' IIrmy
-mtion to be the princip.1 shoru/-'e while
.... 1Nnl oD.ly about. 3 ....,.,ks ammunil iOIl SUp"
pi;,- dlroupUUI the Empire (ner. ilems 13. Ill
"'-ican planes, hued on both land lind Cllr
,..., _,.eed their activity to such an estell
t
... the J.p.1lMe lIS mnn.\" liS 1",0
... three .lena uy in the sprin/o\". with cor
........ing elect on prodllClioll. ,\t
,... .&r.nal production WlUl reduced "'t ....l>en
.. })IftIeDt and as pe!'ttlnt by IIlerl.S With
oat the of a einlCle homb (H,f. it"IIIS \g
.. 11). Air bombardment ,lestr(l),etl 30 per:
do
. 'I 'l'(,kal
0IDt of II a.oeumul.ted suppllell 0 ! It! . k-
DdenI. Army (Rt>f. item 14). of "OT)
VII __ burned Ollt about 110 percent of tie
IDbcuDtneted productioll of the K1IWlIsilki elllC'"
plant, while the dire<:t bOlubing
pment Illallts dcstr"Oyed 00 per_
pro<Juction, 90 percent of lhe
production, and 20 perce:llt o( lhe
of "UCIlUIll tubes (lIef. items
Uj.
transport retllrded the mo'emellt
defense of the homel.nd_alld
y pl.nned on using the reserve
stored in its .rea lI.lI well lllI
to it, simply bee:ause the reser'11
not be rno"ed to another .re.
The Importntioll of .... r supphes
which began ilt Febru.ry.
when B-2!l m.ining raids
StTllits (Ref_ item Ii).
adequate reser... of .11 tnlt!!l 'l'as
of the ordn.1lCt! situ-
the war. Initi.lIy the reser\"ti
uri nd the homel.nd ...ere 0011-
ry to slliilain the 'l'ar in the
first .3 or 4 months (R.f. item 51:
..expected that the raw mat..,ialll
.cquired lertitories ...ould be
in .ny further operatiollS. AI-
..-.re on the J.p.llese for the
of the war w.s light,
-.mg this time to make ap-
in tellenes (E:dlibit \.).
it will be noted from Exhibit \\"
.nd oonSllmpt iOIl of .mmuni-
nellly b.lanced in the e.rl)-
.Ild no /-<reat .ccumul.tion ...as
tion for the ine"itable Allied
In this connection it
bered thai the Kai!ll'ubull ex-
de fire power for obolll 4
theory thllt of the 4
u.II)' "firinl! (Exhibit T)
eompllied from the eXf)('rienCt! of
t and the HlI!lSO.hrlllllfllSll \\'ar.
l\'orld \Vllr IT it becnnH'
b.'e to 1)(>'donl;leo-l or ll"ipll,<l for
MltioHs lind (or the "IAllchurilin
event of WI.I lh.. So,'iet
10....., in mo>;t. Cll!lell the I.dual
.mmunition 10 the
, on IUllid in ench theme". It
the nmount thllt would Im1"ll beell
it ha" beeu ""Ililllble, Il1Id lhe
"
amount that was thought necessary for the
I'roper l"OlIdlict of the cllrnpoibrrl (Exhibits AC
and AD). :rhus, from the logistical viewpoin,.
the productIon of ammunition Willi not sufficient
to. meet the ullnUll1 demallds for col\!lumption
qUite apart from any thought of increasillg the
amoullt of relIer'e!I.
Similarl,., while the.,., uppears to be an ade-
quate Ill6en'e of di'i"ision.1 weapollS during the
first JUMI of the war (Exhibit X). it should
.lso be ""membered th.t the Japanese division
'l'as grtfItly inferior to its Allied counterpart in
fire power.
The aharp increa!le of ammunition .nd ...eap-
0118 stocks in the homeland in the last 12
molll!Js of lhe .... r ill .n illdication both uf the
in.bilit} to ship out supplies to o.-erseas .reas
.nd also the decision to strellgthen the oolllf!land
defensell .gainst lhi! anticipated innsion. For
the 5i divisiollS llSl;4>mbled for this purpose.
lhere ..... re K.isl'.nbun ..... il.ble for only 30 and
...ea/101 for onl)' 40 (Exhibit .\E). "fanyof
the ne...l,. mobilized ullits "'ere thus shurt as
.nuch as 50 pera;1l1 of their K1uipment_
7. Shorlagn
"l.ile it may be said the Japanese
...ere short of pncticaU,. e\'er}" item nece!l'l&ry
to modem .... r. aile of the most. seriuus
..u the l.ck of sign.1 and equipmenL
At lhe beginnillg of the "'ar ..ith the westem
po.....N thl'.re "'as 110 surplus of signal equipment
but the Japan_ wen! confident that their ele<:-
trical industry 'lI'ould be able 10 meet the de-
mau<b of the Almost immediately the
tremelldous need for ndar equipment of all
t)'pes resulted in a curtailmellt of other types
of si!.'llal oommull;catiorl K1uipmelll Ild to...ard
the end of the w.r there was an our-all short-
nb'e of both sign.1 and radar instruments IllI
well as a general decline in the ellicienc)' and re-
liability. It was difficult through the war to
t!(luip 1ll0bilizt!(1 units. /lnd ill 19-14, it be-
clime impo$Sible 10 mnilllain existing di,isiolls.
111e ke\' to radio nud radnr production "as the
"IIt:uun;-tube illdustr,.. <\ fter thl! extensive bomb
iug of "ucumn-lube plllllts in the spring of 1945
thu shortllJ.'ll of all K1uipmellt 11'llS tre
mtllulolls. III JRllllRrJ ](145, R concerted effort
WAS mllde to collllCt \'RCUllrn lubes Rnd rRdio Pll.rts
for uso ill lhe derellso of tlie horne istullIls. A 3
months" WRS projecled, but in KJushll
onlJ 00 percent Willi aoc\lllllllll.ted, atld ollly
..
Jill-' W IiO ,.-to iD o&ber ptol11 of the Em-
..........."' IborP&'I of obIer-
wMiGD iIoItr...-ta for utiUerJ and antiaircnft
...... the adoption of a crude siFt
iaIIead 01 the 1DOI1I aeeu.rate panoramk models.
HiP prioritieII giftP to lircnft
.-d afurt.aIII in ..liaircraft _ponI which
_ futber agnnted bJ the ..-itI for d'
tcIIIi"' luiain'raf1 iDlIUlIl1ions on Ilhipe of .11
In-- Efortl"" made to ilKTftll' the produc.
tion of III Ultiaircnft -JllHI' and al80 great
,.-ationB takm 10 <Wnapo 10
u:.iDJ ""'flOIIIL
The aOllt crilical in d.. combat
__ ap_r to ha", ..... tub aDd aatitank
-JIOM and _unit_ for t...... On the
wtde iIImd of u.yt.. for there -
oral,. 10 IaPb aDd ; of theBe _ dNuoyed bJ
air adKIl bd'Oft IhII'y _ aw. to the
_,. ,aound trooJ& ADlitanIt pPI aDd ...u
nilio1l 1Ftl"il' ill pal1 by "htIIDI.D bombs":
ddill'n .bo hlll'kd ,,-I.,. apiDlil the taDb.
o:arryin ...._ ..11,. I.......rfd u:pJooU1'S tBef.
itnl 41.
n. rrod1M1 ioIl of IAOIOI' weIUr_ had de-
lIIlsdily l\incIiI' IMI, ..ltile the cua-mptio-
aDd ftIlPu-m. .-elily u.er-L in
the 6Hd by poor _i _
.,.-- poor and a aborta.,e of ...
puta. 1be Iituat_ II to .pan pull maI he
belt ..-.n-l ill the trorda of
o-u Kaa: '"'1'beft aD o.....u .oonap
of IpU'iI' putlI due to i_ t produet.iotr. IDIl
10 m.dlqaUe IDd poor dilrribatioD.. w-...
pl*ibIe _p&euo ilelM of erp.ipmeat wen
thippllll __ for caDDibaliatioa in .. of
......... A -"IerabIe qulltitl of materiaJ
trill de.llintd for lM'k of ...rt putlI" (ReI.
--I).
8. CNstri6111itn1
The __ aubmitted their IItima&e
of to OHQ bJ AapIt of eaeh JeU.
C'.onfeft_ of iDlet'elled aa-c* wen held to
pe-. OD and __0.. na p_
of .rahJH' operatiou aDd IhI of the
national f'IlIIOlU'ON aDd faoilltiII ...... 1Iwi-
ied. By ec..nber a plaD of IIIPPI, ". form.
IaI.t ,... tbI aut 1 ,... wbkh bapa ill
April (Ral. item 4) 1NN Ilm!I'
......... for a -..r Tbe
.... plua ".. PI '. tID ... W... IIIIdI&er fw
appronl and th.n IIent 10 the Muniti,ollS Min_
.". for incorporation in the o,er1I11 lIldustrial
mobilization plan (I.;:r.hihilM Y ami Z, Her.
item21).
In the pl"il'paration of Ihl' plan slO,;k levels,
pipe linea. and maintenanel' factoM! WeN! collsid_
e!'8d; bo_,oer. due to the of NlSerl"CS
and production lhey "'I'''' Ill"VI'r pro"idl'd for in
a<:1ual (Ref. item 11). TI)(' l>entmtl'g\'JS
all...-ed for "'_. 1I':lIhibil .\.\). haSl..:1 on the
uperil'BCftI of th8 Ilnd RuSS(>.
J....- ..ars. llOOD proYed to be far too 1o\\" for
lhe aUritien uperienad in the Pacific Will'. Thi.
situalion .... further complicated the inad..
f{uary of produdion beginning a8 early u IWI
..hil"h I'ftlUlled in inabilil} to N!place e,eell half
of the calc:ulated ..a>lI.. .h lou been men-
tiooM. it was decided 10 Iripll' the Kaisrnbun,
but the lack of production aad transponatio!l
madII' this From the I'eSlenes at hand.
lltOl'U of ra" materiab, and l,redUdion po-
lelltial. il .....,.idml Ihat requisilion from
the nrioull IhMtenI could not bee complet.ly
lillii'd. Each army in the field wu expeeled to
atisf} its requiretQil'lll" by local e.:l:ploilation to
I'" po;alllri:ba. I Ref. ilelll 21). TIlili
..... an JlU1 of 1101' onr-all Illanning.
and IhI!' _ of inurior o,ulljllied thO!lt ilelll!l
not polIiiba. of Ioral procUl"iI'menl. Thu,,- the
JaJllll'tR foJ"llell in IIOUIMasl .\sia employed cap-
lured Brit_ 1I'ftIponlI and ammunition almost.
udlZliftly in some l:Illi!I8; and it wu
p...... to manubctul"iI' ammullition for USl\ ..ith
eaptund FI'llIlCh ..eapons. 11ll' K\\llngtung
Anay ill M.ncbaria 11"88 considered practically
aa1f-stalltaiDin,: and reeeh'ed few supplies
from lbe Will" of interior.\rmies in Celll
ral
<.1lina. e:r.changM I"ke, ....ood, oil and other OOlll'
moditiea for 8tel'I, coal, a"d Olher supplies I)re-
dlllled in 1Il1l<'huria. TIll' Chilla anllY
howe"", ..... unable 10 panicip"t(\ in this u
mau.. dlK! to poor comlllimielltions fllcilities.
utd bad to be aupplil'd almost entiN!ly from tht
...........
Plutnina for thl!' future was done on Ihe loll.is
of _bat oould be proilu('t'(1 lind nOI wlll.1 ,,-u
needed. weN! Cllt. or tllilOl"cd 10 fil
th. plan, priorities 1111<1 to 110 es-
t&bliah.J. for IIII' (Exl,ilJit AII).
M the 80uthem operat WHll Ill"Ogl"flSSin.g
fa'fOnbly during the lil'llt haU of l!.l-12,
for ..pply pul'pOMfl Illilced 011 the 1311
rllll
_paipl, With the occuplltioh or :\dllk lind
.. Guadalcauill nnd TuJagi by
, tOll priority for the latter
was assigned the Aleutians and
With the defellt of the Jalla-
IJIS in the spring of IW8,.this
omons and Halmahera,
created by the continued ad.
f\"Om the south brought new
Japanese. The nl'CeS!lity for
d outposts placed the Philip-
Marianas, and Formosa at the
11 priority list for the first haU
Philippines recei,'ing first call
f of the Jear.
of Saipan. Tinian, and Guam
operations of the United StaleS
in the Philippines, .11 ellol1
"'..ard fortif}-ing the homeland
pi to partiall)" the de-
and }'ormosa.
that as early as December 194 1
of Ibe JIancburian and KOrl'lln
_ by li,OOO tOIlS. In Ihe follow-
the Iheatl'rs with top prioritie!l
"1 a percentage of the amounts
forther aggra"ate the shortages
theft were steadilJ increasing
In 1943 e,er)" thealer ucept
. and Korl'll suffered stich
ion ....ent from b.d 10 \\Ol'llll
JD.es caused submarine and air
from 4 pereent in 1942 to
t in 1945. despite the fact that
shot1l'tll'd each Jear 90 that in
....re made only to tile UJukJUs.
Dria. and Koril'8. Br .\larch
shipping was SIISJll'mled.
A1aJo" ",1I1I"r) at
U, W"r IlIIerr<ll:lI
q"".". LI""I"""'" COlo""I-I""I'...."wr.
Ill.... or I,,
N".4HI.
..,
67
$tt:llo", Eeal'ral 'lal't-USSllf, IIlINrogalioll :00.
40;.
7. I'rellllliaftr1 report-mllllar,. "UPlllle. braocb, US-
SHS.
8. Tar'lIft. Col00el-lllnlllhlma Ortlnaaee Depol-)IAD
:00. W No. 45-
tl. Ta .IIlIblllla. Tu,mhlko. )laJor General---e:blet ot
",It or 1'1r1'tftb A.... Armr-USSBS III..errotl'-
lIon So. 4'S.
IQ I\,....I-dyUI.n--prodoaloQ eqgloeer-Tokr<J Sill.
hoIllra Co.. In...tl p1anl. USSBS Inler-
l'OPlioo So. WI.
tt. Suo, III"", CoIODd-_ral atrall'B 1m..........n
millblu7 USSBS In''erl'(lplloo So. :!30.
l:t I\unlbw., D111ao. Lleulenant
tnl. ,......o\I"Il!n'1 USSBS So. 275-
13 TeI1I1moIo. Ueuteolallt-UJI Ord""llott
lnltn<lpUoo>:l3 S01". 45-
H. t'Unrara. 1I0I0I>1to. 1..I....t-...1 ColoIle!-mWIar'J"
.1101 <OCIUdll.llleall.... SUppl1. Tobl aMllJ".
15- SllIlllmnra. T08I>lo, )1'Jor
lanl 10 Ueut_1I1 Y,muI>ll.a, 11144
I'1UllRJIoe CII_1p USSBS 10terTtlP-Unn So. 418.
16. 1I1ra!, llalleri, 1IaJor-d>Iel". OsabKobe Port
.Al:eIIc1-)JAJ) .... =S01". f,:;.
17. SKI.. SbJaublto. Co'-'---dt1l!l' 0800e
)lAD 10..erTtlP-U.... :!II S". 4:>.
18. Kldoo. KoIebl, of ..., Pri.,.
SMl, 1jSSBS IlIliI'I'nlplloa So. llO8.
19. A_n. FWD!__...... Prioee-Pri_ 1I1111s1er 193':"-11
-USSRS hlltn<lplloa So. 373..
W SWDara. KIt;bIMIm........O\dmllllMral..... tOnt>ft' am-
bolNador to Unlled S,ale. (t1l411 Pri,.,. CotlodI
UGH) USSIIS lnli1'1'nlpllou So. 4:!9.
ZI. \"OOlbJaWDI. Ueul_ot Gft>eraJ--d>1et. mlli..a,.,.
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on c. 'OS
-
011 "n
(I...l1n"
100.000 Goooll ...
t..ndl on
,,_ t ...
ulloJ
".m.... _..
-
lHlO.ooo A.llto..... _ ..
""
E.plool_
AT )11_
. I .....
600,000 G".'I>..
.-
",<uu.. lu....
IOH
..
..
HI: FIELD,
OF THE
'"
..,
REQUISITION FLOW CHART
-----_...
a.-J""-l_._
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B:l:blbtl AA.
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OF 0l"PUlJl0Il. TIC
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OF OUTLYI
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OF """"'. AIID
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uetPT .....TUoOl K ellUllI III f
flit: "Ilfll"" _"__
nil ....-r OF lllllllOUI"fIOIl
0\lIO _TS """'-II ITI COII'f1IOl.
I'IlLD FOlICI:' " OICJDlD AnEIl ,

'lIYlS1'1tJ1l'm .., nc Cf.1l'lIIAL ..
AUT_,TllS
SO\lflct _GOl[lU.l. AFFAIRS, ORDNANCE 8UllEAU
a. ._._
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Arrm,rition
uplosivu
T_a
<'1;:"",_ I T " " ~
AflPORTIONMENT Of RESERVES FOR ANNUAL OROHANCE PROOUCTtoN
(Ven VoilII)
Sourct: AnlIIGI Priority Selledule
Atmy Ordl'lOnce Bu'eolJ
,.
.-
.-
DII1'IllIUI'Ie- til 01IIII-_. n-I.IfIID.errOll UelCUI
HTWRJl ~ AMlO\IPIUlI
IE....,..,I
----
..._cs_
.......
..
Dr. .'lI1'''1OI0. and his organiution
wu divided inlo IhTft as folio,",:
. Q'"ff-,n d.ilian.
b. lland",ri.China ,ann)').
e. SoUlhHSl Asi.
Of lh_ three di."iaions. the SoIltllE'llSt ,\si. sec-
tion. halded br '"ice .\dn,;...1 lIeh...., Wl.ll of
the importano:<! 10,> the armv bec:aU5ll of
tht: oil l>Olfntial in the East
Indifll. Admi ...1 U'eha....B !leCtion developM "
J:We...1 plan alllfd the Xanpo K..izo Sb.i Saku,.
whieh llIatfd thf f(ODOmic policy for tbis arM,
and includ", aueh matU'n1 as the ",pair of re-
fining and production faciJitiffl in Borneo, Su-
mat ..., and Ja....
The eabinet. plannillf! board ..ras rl'Sponsible
to tht: Prime :lolinistfr and ronsisted of
BU: main as follows:
a. (tfnfral alairs.
b, liff _ntials.
Co J'enonnel .
d. llaurials.
f- T...nsl>ol1 and I'Ommunkatiol1!l.
f. E.qH'rilnenu-
The fourth di ..ision of tht: board kno'll"n &!5 thf
materials divitlion "'I.ll di"idfd into t'll"O units.
On... uu;t,lmo"'n &!5 tht: Seisan Kal.-uju Han, ...as
re!iponsible for the formulation of plans
!Iignfd to ;ncrl'&8e production.. This unit pro-
dUOf(I tI.ll a"nual tOI> !If<:ret plan for produc-
tion and distribution ( i Aan Kyok Kakuju
l\eikakuJ. 11,e od,..r unit (Husudo HIUl) was
corlCfnoe.d ... ith anny, n...y, and civilian alloc:a
lion for the enli"", Jal)anellll eronom)', The
lIu_udo IIBn was orl-'lIn;zed into oommodit) sub-
unita of which one was fuel, It ...as in this sub-
unit thBt the d.imBnt ageRdes' dem&Rds ...ere
reconciled and aJloc:at;oR5 made. This planning,
hov.en!.r Wall only for domestic and imported
the 80uthfrn area f.uU. co,g.
rdzanee of "II I>roduction "nd refinmg "'Ithm lis
'"
CHAPTER IV
PEfROLEUM, OIL AND LUBRICANTS
to war, so-ealled cabinet
... eltablished to mobilize JafM.-
The Il:N'tral alJ.;rg bureau (Ex
ill special ad,'i!lOr)' capacity to
board and wa. specifically
formulation of an economic
Japan. Of greatesL concern 10
bureau ....ere tJ,O!lO mat(lriala
Iy in Japan proper. Among
petroleum T'llnked as one of the
'I'he burea" Wall headed h)' an
...
a.lTo 1(llI._ rs.-r
'''I "ta "" "l)
-:::r::-
'N,n". :..:Il
u.- :14."&, IUfI
_u
...... ..9..1"". USSII!l.
--
,...,..,..",
1 I .... l.f IAptJlolT11
...
_..-,.. ",411
'l
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-
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- - - - -
-----
.
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-
...

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... ..
"J .. ... _Unite Orl:HI &t.0(!
dlt. have been UDOO\'el"td thal would
eIther Ilro"e or dispro"e the &,uracy o( th_

While abo"e stoeq outainly do not appear
to bt SUll"lClent to ....goo lotal OUr it must be I'll-
th.t the Japanese Army "'1llI not
to a grellL extent ..nd offiCl!1'1l intel'l"O-
"'filed eXI're8Sll<t the opinion thllt lhe War Min_
i!ltr)' felt that the Rnn)"s stock IlOSition Wall
lIIlisfactor).
. Refim"fl oopacity.-J'rior to 111 the .nlll re-
hed I.rgely upon ci\'ilian rtfininl:' lO ita
Detw......n 1931 and HUI the army
el"fcted t ...o relineries. one at I kuni near Hiro-
shil1Ul lind another ,...ar Ki i, M.nchuria.
Each hlld lin annulIl capllcity of 300.000 kilo-
lill"l'1l. In Rdditiou II 10..lernl'erawre caroonim-
Cion plant was also built at KinseL
lhe w.r the amI}' ... ifll'(l extensive
crude production .nd .,.Iinin!! calw;ity in J .....
. BonlfO. SUl1Ultra. and Bunna. Thege lIOU1'C!lIl
,",l'f: potenti.lly cal,,",ble of prodllt'in!,!: -ufficient
crude .nd h.d tilt! n_ry manufacturing
CSlllcity to meet the .mlys requi.,.lIlell(;; o( re-
filled product.il but the shortaf,"l! of tllnkeN made
CIII/Ilcity OlleMLtion u;;ell'S!l.
("IJpadty.-The ILI'my built additional
f.cilities !Rfol'\" the war lind continued
the buildin/:" I/rogra.m Ihrou/!'h 194:;. This re-
sulted in eallic, far in UeM; of S1ocli:
requi",lllelll!l .nd rffioced the elfecti..eDl"'llll of
our oombiul!" .tta.cb Oil lank fann ."d OIher
!>l01'\\l-'l' in",.rhuious filer. note 9).
Exhibil C shows lucations and CI\,"citil'll of
the importRnt lanka.... "nder the of
the R""'.' nnd na,.' oil l"Ommillee in Tokyo.
SyntAdif. army did not coucern
itself ... ilh the de,-elo!>n""ut of fuels
until 1.93,. Dorin.!! Ihis ,_r the imperi.l fuel
de-.-elollDW'ut I.... "'u 1/I.S!!Ied IllI """'u1l of .-arch
carried on independl'ntl, by the .nny. n...y, and
certain d ..ilian PUlll" ,\dmiral Euomoto be-
c.me chief of the synthetic fuel section of the
rnunitionll ministr.l lIud Wl\S chllr..'I!d with the
re8l'onsibilitr of d....cloping a s}'nthetic indus
Ir)' U..t "'ould yield 4.000,000 kilo-
liters of IrtiflCi.1 ga.'IOline a .Iear. This fuel was
10 be I.roduced .... from 00101 b)' 10... temper-
aiure cuooniu.tion but 1/laDll were also made
fOl' the ereclion of .nd h)'tlro-
..tion pr.uti;. Sonl' o( tbe IllanUi e,,,r came
up to elqMlClatiolls, the largest annual prodQt-
htn>ln... 0111 aM It"'''''
.. ".,...
'0)
in Ihe abel\"ll (.bulation "'ere for
imported from the United Slates.
"'Il!! secured from .rm)' oll"i
to the oil seclion of lhe Wllr Minig.
were mill e the am)' lind nal')'
independenll)' operated the ton-
totMm.
OllIIlmittee production tsti-
.nn,., na....l., .nd fuel bureau.
were modified to rtflecc ,,"ai1able
1. Civilial\ estimates of produe_
ption were alll'a)'s known to this
on lUL unofficial basis), so
ible t<;> prepare tentalil'6 alloca-
the o\er.11 requirements. After
of production estimltes, civilian
aad .vaillble shipping capacit)",
..."}. requirements were
planning board where Iinll .11oca_
l1li pre\'iollsl}' descrihNl.
Army P/mmillg
1 the fuel bUJ'@aus of
the nil'")' lIlet to dele:rmine the
of oil thll oould bt counted on
....,. "'as oou"i"<:e<llhat there..-as
oil .vail.ble to oppose lhe f1fffi; of
...d the ('nited Slates, but lhe
the olJinion that alt shortnj..'tIi could
with the im'usiOIl of the Nether
ies. This contention Inter prow(1
The fallac)' in planning Ill)' in the
to .take inlo acoount delicienc,'
an e..er increasing rate of sink-
rines and air .Itlcks Ihlt far
building J.rd3' CIlllleit} to Ilrovide

1aJ
F.-cl> h.do-Cblna

S"""'tn
..."..,
Jua
..,....
Ne.. Ou\,,,,a
SQlolnon.
GllbeMI
_.......
--
.....
"'-
_....
-
-
c....._
Manh.lI.
N... BI'IIIIII
...... tnM"II: of the Tok}'o oommittee
__ lupIy with problems resulting from
..meJ of .bippill(l" facilities. TI,e arm)"'S
...,. of patI'OJeam products "-aIi nel"'er limited
pt'OlbM:tiaIl or n6nina: c.paeit)' but almost
tinly by its inability to transport stocks. for
IaIilple M.jor Takahuhi, a member of the com'
miUee. .iml'ed that it was Jlol!Siblo to lran.lJlCl.rl
0Il1J 110 ,.,..... Qf the lIOuthern area II
INI, ud thiI perr.n.tage became pprKiabl1
.... Ut. .....,t Jean.
Pn.u7 of tankers Illd oil bN
.... tid", ... in 1M handa of the Sen'1\if
UIIIibi of the T"t\JPOrtatiol\ Ministry.
tmit. ... the aetllli .lIocation of shippillg t<)l\"
..

.. __
......... The Ie-.
.... 'I.. .. the .. Chi,,', military aI.in bureau.
..
..... hill ..... of die mu-it..- __ third GlIQ.
_ ......., ..-.. of ad Chwf, lIliliW'J prep-rations buruu.
...:.., cnIII Gil ..... widro u g I.or.- NA\"T
...... Cw4a IS -- .... bJ"board. Chitf, na-...l .f!linburuu.
....... .., ....t.d_ .r the ... Chitf. naYal preparations bureau.
... fW WbIIII. the aUocatioIII - Chief, lraJIIPOrtaUon HQ.
IIId they were fonrarded to the elaimant .,... Chief, II8COnd eection Daml ORQ.
_ who tbereapoa made tMir own tub-alto.
cUe- in ... liPt of tWr 1'fIIII*li" require- While thi, mmmittN .&9 ehugOO 'With t
..... It. -.....me to ... thd .eta ...., onr-.ll reepoNibiJitl of allocation for aU lliea
.. &W it did .. "WI iW ten, in actual pnrlK. subcommittee wu
... of dill .waiIabIe _PPUa ,.,.. aPP-" tabliIbed '"' the PJthr,m area and was aUo
.... IiUIB t.o-. bat tt.t the _, toopentetrithah.ip.dqfteofautonom)'.
ud _"" ill pttiq: the pMteIIlbare -..""ntly the Tokyo committee made general
w'th the cirili_ .hat ... lett. II&jor plans for production in the Sumatrll, JD.\"., Do
1\bhuhi _ted in 111 interroptiOft, 21 Decem MO, aDd Burma ueu and worked on the high
blr lBe'. DOte 2) that anually there".. level allocations of Ihipping, but actual control
__ -.fusio!I Ofti' the ooatroJ and aJloeUiaD of shipping and authority for allocation 0)
CIt oil '*"-- of onriappill UIIbority of the petrvleum bet_ !.be ann,. and the na\')' ue
""- mm-;u.. aad boards ......._ of r_ by lb. was limited large:!y
tbl ClOIIItaa& bicbrirI& bet_ the amy aad the IKll'tlwro .,.. and the oommittee located .
ttl "''Y. 1'hII ... tbd ..ma..... SiDppon performed airnilar functions for
ciIDc1 in -.k:iDg _ of .gil'" ....ppI.. ..t The pognphical distribution <)
etp.em.w.. -n&ced. Thill DOt only authority w.. approltimatety all folloW!!:
d'ected the military but the civilian eeotlOnl1
.. well.
r.ce in INa the hmo:tiooa and __ of the per'
-.I of the cabinet pWmill(l" t.rd .... tnJ.
f..-l to the IDllbilizat. __of the
-mu.- iDdlllll'J.
of (wi" IM..,.fU'r ....
hy 1M "..., bfMrd.-YIeId aad
.IftDOB bus oornmanden forwarded tbtir -.i.
nated requil'lllNnt3 10 the centesl .uthority"in
":.'okJo via t.be boud 01' tbt ,ir aerritle
IlIIard.. The f1lIIII aec:t.taa of the..,1Diniatry ad.
;..a..d'" to GHQ
poIiciIaUld ....... the ...
.. '-vded to the _y .. _..,. oil _
IIiaee tot raYiaw befon pi ,...... to &be abi-
IIat pIaDDiq boud. Tbe orpnhec_ of eM
.my miniatIy IIhown in Edulrit B.
A""t' _ ftMY co_lUM.-In eM midcUa of
lNI the Rib Kaigwt8aki)'&liIl (...,. ..-"1
4il ;u.) tMt ......
Jf I"I6iiiIw. II' wtlitii.- at
......... .-riM. mUI. .. M .....
""_p ... to jDm&..,._..,. ....
tlit'iu.iI _ baud.
..,. -ile. -..... of foDowiq::
---
_P"
...IooIU.... 1
,_ M
,_ M
,- _
'ao.OOO
__ Z
1."0.000
..,
Tplat.
11011 _
,..
,.u:::::::
,..._------
__ _
The abo,. tabulation indintel; Ihat of
motor gD.-'!llline 0"1'. the -!-year period amounted
10 onll' 5:? pel"C@lll or re(lliiremelll$. Unlike ship-
mellU! of aviation $,'Looline ...hich until 19+4 were
grealer Ihan requiremellts. at no time did Ihe
amI)' rt<:eive sufficielll St'llplit$ of mOlor gasoline
10 sati.'lf) its needs. In both Ihe home islallds
and the Philippines it was nl'Ce!l5llry to COllvert
motorUed equipment from gasoline to ""generator
gas- (...ood, 00II1. and OOIIlite) ...hich drastinlly
reduced the efficiellc)" of such equipment,
' ...,........ for iIo!,..... , "'."''''.. __"
of , ........Uoe, ftTi
of boa '->lq. IDOl."", 0 __
... IIIJ' 0 .....ld lis 10 a _til tor ' ..'utILI
1I1t11t@d to 15 Iloo.. ""'"-1IIle of !be
rue! .borto.....
n,tre be Jilll", doubt but thaL 1m, air arm
of, ,he Jillartest .\rmJ' would hare bef:n seriously
as a result of fuel shortage jf the ....r
hid lasted another 00 dlY8.
...-......__
, -_.
a....._ ..
-..
_ .. t.
.., Ittloolltenl 01I0Il10...) ....1_..
18<'-_____
.-
.-
..
.8<:1..- __
,,-
-
..
1t>U.......___
,- ,,-

,..._---
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M
1--__-
,- ,- ..
'!'plat. aT.IOO 1I.(l(lO

The supply of ...iation lube oil Denr equalled

requirements and while there is no direct e"idence
10 prol'a that Ihis had an immediate
effect on air operaliwl5 it is _ f.ir aISIIlIIption
that the lack of oil decreased engine lif. and
doubtless ...as a primary' eanse of engiroa failu",
in a substantial nU\llber of insuncm.
'u
'"
".
"

-.blishes the ract tltal ..'ialio
n
critical rate in 1943, The silu,
10 through the following
Chiba, eXe<;uti"e officer of thi!
(Her. 110Ie 3) that the air ron'e
'-I unlil XOI'ember 1(143.Hter
I,. was curtailed And bJ AI)ril 1(145
actually acute. To alleviate this
edUClltionMI campaign "'as
pilots 10 eollllt'M'1' flll!l. By
were allowed 10 fly only :?i
(Ref. nOlI' 6),
0, senior st8ff officer in tha
nt of the air he..dquarters,
4) tilal as a fuel s&\"ing device
foreed 10 use gliders during Iheir
b'a.ining.
'CIItion that the short sUI'I)ly of
had .. signifinllt effect all air
foaDd in Ihe follo...ing direct qllll-
by General Kawabe. commanding
pn!!ral arm)' and i\hjor General
t chief of'staff, air general arm)'
of tha advance eehelon, FEAF,
.. that OrJ:!lnizalion's
No. 14 datl'd 2!l Seplember 1(I41i,
'"
OMnrtODal tratnlnx ...........led out b.r
... l'lIoI abort.,.,. C<lmtlled alt
.. matbo.t ltiPt&. Dartq .1Ie _
.... tile Uttle ,ra1al"l: la" .........
__ '''''''""rlpn'''''l "ItNo ....., IQ
If ci"ilian
.... the anal fnqIIlIItI,. pro'l'ided oonstl'1lc.
........... ...- emJian planl!! could not
.. tJ.a throqh onHn.ry channels. It 'Vas
aIIo for independtmt refillers to lII!<:ute
a....:iaJ IUIilII.ance through llUeh 'j..-eneie/l IS the
I.......-r Eqni,..-t: Holding Co. (SugJ"o
.Dd lbe War liml! Bank (Stnji
B:iIIJ'o Gmm). A8IiIIc_ .1110 "lIS forlhcominl;
u .. nsalt of the enactlnt'lll of 'he munitiolls
....
Major Tabb8Ibi h1rt..... ".'.d that the u-
..... PfVC'UII ... unpteW by tick of COll-
8II:ruedoIl mPeriais. mainly steel. and
1llIIOent. E:r:pt.DlrioD was to conform
with the armi11or:s1.iOR of materillis which
.....iDed by tM mobiliution plan bul
.m.I .-i.pl8 of materials "'as _lwa)'S deland
and tb. tendency I::o!nmt incl't'llsingl)' inle'llllt!
u the war An _uempt was made
to tt- bS sulostilulioll of
_____ .m wood for 8Iftl and b)' lo..
of Ihat inferior ",aterial
_Id be utw-l. In addilion other e1luipmelll
... diIoIantJed wherever possible and used in
fBef. hOle 10),
f. c..,.,.,. 01 Rlfllirnnmts
-".pIS
'I1le IDllIt d'eetive .....). to indicate Ihe CriliC'll1
.'jh m ..him the Armv found il<elf. a;; &
__.of .. of oil SIlPlllies b)' bomb.
I... and "lIaclt. i 10 ro11l11ltN! Ihe an
nual ._111 of Ihe ann)' wilh
NadpU. It IIbould be n"membel'("(l thnt
.......1'IIIIett tM shoM of oil. hen
dill minimiud and there nn be
litdI but lhat Ihe amI)' rollid and
-w. u ..demandl'd far /Trenter stocks h.d
dIIre lID,. Jl(8ible chance of hn\"itll:' tlleSe
--....
'n. ....... data 1I"fl't rompiled II)' o6iten
., ... 1...- Army allachl'd to Ihe arm)' and
...,. oil eDIIIDIittee durin,.: the period 1il41
....... lIU. on- fiJul'e!l "-ere rompill'll from
.. _ DDt be ronsidl'red accurate 10
...... IIJ cross dleo':king and
......., lim, bowever. it has been definilel,.
.... that the lrends ilHlicatell represenl a
nIIiIheIJ tne pbUN of eonditiolls a;; IIIfJ
-
-.....--
..
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.. ,. ....... _-" ..
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"raga tate of :16 Jill'I" per dnf.
rating- distrihutioll for
or "!tnched 1L!l Kl'
Colonel IWllkoshi further stilted
to nlllilltnin 11 4 months' sup,
army bnses in tloe islalllls, later
leYels to approach II G rnollths'
.tly days of the Wilt 00 IJen:ent
knl was allllined. Table
the amount of fuel demanded br
in the Philippines, Burma, Bit-
the SOlomon Islanda. Nc" Guinea,
IIl1d. (,1,111.111 0" 1I1l1l11llUul buie from llUI through
llH, . JhiS ["hie also indienles the shipped
Ill,d thll lonnuj..'l;l reeeinKL It is i'ltl'n!llling 10
note thll rt!liltioll hetween the demand curw'
III,d the receill( eUrl'll for fnel 9Uppl)' in the
Philippine area. In Wit the demand was 60,000
lOllS aud this alllOUnt "'as shipped .nd arrin!d
,del)' at deslinalion. Ih the demand hsd
illCl'l'll!>OO 10 lIDJIOO and 56.000 lOllS ...s
acl".lIr delivel'l'd. Durin!! this year 3-'1.000 tons'
\vu eitlier sunk Or I'l'lllloealed enroul" (Rer.
nOiIl 5).
T.o..n.t 4O.--Co..""ri_ 01 I""""" a_ 1'. O. .. ,",au-e..." a"" "'-I'l'
tt'IOII __1
.. .. .. .. .. __ __.
--
--
0UlIliDI aDd m..I fuel "'1'1'11 pllcJ,;a,......1 in Ill-
"*' ... for _VenieDCe in handling.
h IIir di...... rtquired approximately'
par DlIIth aDd an infantry
l,ODO IdIttUtIn. Lieutenant Colonel l ....
(Bel. DOte I) IIIaI8d that di"islons
fIIIl1llllll". &hair 1ItreJIgl.h. If a dIVIS."" ll)l'r
.... (ilia UIUa1 nlUPber Will! noollt 100 I
-
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.-
-

-
,-
- -
,,-
H_
-
-
.-

.-
-
-
:..-
-
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-

,-
-
.-
(1lief of Staif. 8I.ted (Ref. noll'. 1')
lb.1 llIocks of r....1 in .\lanila ., the tilDl'l of the
1.e)"le landinp ""e.re sufticielll to 1lI.'oI.in f"roM
in the Philippines for.n indefinile period. Our
in...sion of l.u1.On .."ag llOI ucpecled until lhe
end of .J_nuaT) or e\ITI)' in February'. Supplies
inellidinj! fuel were rail and IDOIDl"
transport alld total of 10.000 Willi had
he"''' mO"K! II Ihe time of our iln-Mion. ,U.
resull lhe one tank i1i,j!;on Oil Luzon
hMd only enou,e:h ruel for i h01l1'S of operation.
0/ fommtmkatlOfl8.-
'rrllical of ,/ap.llfSll lo/.";stics ill the zone of com
l11uniclltiOlIS \\"115 the procedure follo...ed by the
Eighth Area Arm)' at Rabaul., TIle {oJ.lowing
dala were through mlerrogatJon of
Il... al>d lola ""
K".... .."....
p..mppl ...
_ and
lIoIo_. 1.1.....
K ..- G.,.....

I.... IIIJ
......_-.._. _.._.._-_. "-I _________ I ....
..
--------- ----------..1=--------- ----
oorollllr)' io SUIIl,ly \VIIS
lapanese logistics to function in
IIb'l/IIII wheu supplies were n"ailable
at the right plaoo at the right tim(\.
Nishimura, .ssislant to Gelll'MlI
.,,"" ,..,
.""
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_ ................... 01' ......
"'1"'- at 1M J....- AnlJ. 18
..... v-I at ........ _ .. ........,. dowa-
......... W .. m...- ......,. -
.,.-........ tore. 01 the " A..,-
............. f.-l1ridl. __.......
BdaI* B iDaIItrWItbI of ...
......... 01 ... ....- ......
...... for ......,.... period.
lJbtri6oIN. z.o. oJ
( .pdt .
,... J Amq lit 1M ,..
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.. ... ,"", ''''u l\lrcratt
and from tl ,0 Imf'O of oil products
importllllt factor uTea, was the most.
supply of
Impeded hy lir lUI k b IC 10ille ....
on the oil ut the mOllt senous ef
l'COr\om)' resulted I I"
of tUllket1 or , rom t Le smkmg
. tIc 1001750
.nOllt duri", " "IOns of tllltket1
Ie ...... at least I 264 /\,,,.
sunk. The bal.l\C8 of 340 ,.. ,,,,,,, toWl "'CI'6
sufficient Co BUPIII,. lhe ,68-1 tons "'as hardly
to T arm}' .lone. Acconling
I
. IJor akahashi Ihe minis!r,. IUid abo ,
lOpe ooncerning . f ut OIIt
poillted oue how .n) I UIUTe supply of oiL He
hid not '. .rm,. operations.
the.ir. as jet beell serIOusly .lI'ected except. in
10. RtlUtllU NOltS
,..
n._
w_
,,-
,...-
lU'-
n_
11'.000
I'"
fact lhnt. 1ll000t -_.
Ih h
,.,
e ollle lsl"nds we,, "I
oon 1\\1'<. to
modern lhe ,\" \.
I I 1ll',lr
e 10 (eslrn)' "pproxinlillely C,
. ,_ "" per.
I m a 1'1' sl\"ely .hort. period of
of bombs were clrollllCd
In III. esillnatl"li dRlIIU!-'e of 100
of ",hlc!1 onl,. 15 flI'rct'llt is deemed
to I1'1'n'Sl'lItllliws of the "rlll\' alld
'ttee Ihe biockade.
'1Ift 10 note thlll Siugtl
the al the end of
of petroleum 10111led 31)(1,000
iug Ihal Ihe air .mock had little
operation.'! in lhi.'! area. TI,e
Ibipl'ing facilities resultl"ll in the
of this largo"! illlelliory.
T..- u.---("_ I ....' rtl/Mir_"""-
_"-'. O. ,. .,.,. Inc
_ I 1JI_h18 ...
I_I UlI""''''
Jffl
......
--

....... ...
-
'.-
.It'
..... ......
-

...... ...
..-
..-
n ..
=
... ..
n_
n._
..... .....
10.000
IItl
......
.....
- ...:::
.....
.'- ...
Iry 1946. In .n....er to tile qllll!lllOll '"'I\"linl
did theshorl supI,Iy of oil in the Philip.
pin" h...e on ,Jap.n_ ,"ul 1!",lllld
I.1eulenlnl Colonel IRhikllWn
1ItaI.d th.t Ihe Isek of ITIli1shility of r...
10 t.die.1 unitll ,-ery ""tillilelr RtTecled
lflt[illl:iClI pl.ns an'd combat operlltiou'I. lie fllr.
IbM' lItllted th.t sint'l' the l.ck of ,,,-,,ilnhl, llel ....
IeUID prnduc:u "'niP-TlPd
tion it eIIo_1 air and If"lllud lIlrt'IlJ.'1h In dedine
and .1'\ 0111' of tbe prineil)ll ..... ,,- of the def....
of tM J.pa_ Anny. in I'\'j!lIrtl to
klsti<'fl he stat.d th.t .1Ihoul!h lllilitRr)' SUllo
plil!ll in the "'1'\"1' 10 hll"e been Rhilllled
to northern Luaon Ind to Ihe III'1'R east of
)[aA1la. not n>O\"I' than 30 IJO"rcenl of the pl.nned
aJDOIUlt ...111 !!I'nl brn_ of Illek of fuel in th.t
.... Troopll in tbe )I.nill .\"1'1 were 10 han
dinrlfd 10 nortbent I uwn. Bec.use of the
lad!; of fuel in )lanila they ee forced 10 m.rch
deBpile the fac:1 that it '-alI nK"l"lSlr)' to make tM
moft in .. d.ya. All. "",,,It e''I'D' lo!t
aboul SO pelftPt of ill physical batlle stre.ngth.
R;'" W'Il'I to h.ft t-n transported from lhe
Gaaayan riftr nUl''' bul Ihis could not be -
CIlIDpIiBbed dill' 10 tlte fuel llellCf! 1M
lIl.l'I'IIJIb of theJ.panese troops in n.guio,
)(u\Ia. eU..... druti<:alh "-('likened.
TabR 41 i11l1l1lntM the f;<:1 111.1 P. O. L
and ...ere nenr in
etariutt: the period oio'upation.
Emibil L br !-ieulen.nt CoJonei
Iabib_ that. tot.1 of 23.000 kiloliten
of petroleum produd....-ere in s..ptrttl-
bK 1M4 by air attack.
Inftlltory of III:AlCb on h.nd It the time of lbe
1...- capitulation colI!!i!lted of OlliS 1,000
titen of SUOliue and 700 liler.l of oil.
01
l' ' . CDIoDII Ota. Shoji .1' o8ON' in
..... of -PfII1 fer lIMo Elpth A-. Army UlI
.... __nd of QIaIrIl I_rnGrI, Hitolhi.
It JilIIl.-I 0JI0nII Ott. urine! in Rablul 011 i1
X 1N1.
AM thI fael requi....... for the entire
Eichtb A.- Annyhith indudl In troopl
.. X"w (hi_ aDd the ScJ}omopS, were elll:d-
1iIIlIi ill with the ..-.1 quotI
..,.an prtrioudy deln'ibld requititionll were
....UW to OHQ. line of ('(IIDJlI...uc.tiom lee-
don,lt Tokyo.
Selppl_ ftIIleiftld It Rahlol were lIl:Of'Ml in
dept IUIit& rnlil I"" unitl '""' ",Wi...
I,. hw ill number bat ... bel..,. II.- from
.... lir Ittacb bepJl to ornar IlIllOll c1IiI,. It
... drcided 'to foel lIl:otD 'II ..en
III lIl:bK _ppUlII) aDd lDUC'h .. ,-ibJe
vndt>,.. ....nd. Deep j..,w 11e,... _ .Jected
lad Ililllnek 1'MlI'WlI1l,. Iboat e left .. IIDd 7
lett hiP' w.I'I! dU& by hind Ilbo1'. B,. )larch
1M- thirlyfour tn.1 dumpl ..-
ill _ in II.... "irinily of Kit-at. nw ftriogIloN
tion of dU>1'" 1ft indtratfd ill EdUbit I.
6. v;m;b..i.. / F..I I-' R.MJ
1be daa._11 of b1 _ppa,. rr- heIdqtIarWI
to &told onitl '""' in with that
outlined in tlw 1II1...twd flow m.rt (EDihit K).
It .... pointed oat by Colonel Ota dW --
duriDJ ('OlD'" ....t--. _ Iilllit ....
be p'-l onder the of uotlwJ' p;JaJI
ul-rft"l of .apply fw opentioaIl
..,.... d.. _ thI tIS
ratbet" thaJltbe rale.
An iDhteIIiDJ fad poitDd oat by coloael Ota
,.1 "- in. au-t .-kiDc
au air alta. ill 1111,. IMf - ....
m.ooo ... (100 lila's .ell).
nul k-. "- lir attatII: _ i_.... 10 III
MIl drwa. Tbil --.II IpiD
.... tht impotUlK'e of attatII: GIl ipp!Dr aDd
n&iDJ nther than III:ocb in. ...
..,.... eamou...... aDd __....-4 dtPaI-
... the eleeti_ofbaalbbtl-
7. lJisIrijlllitHl 01 ,,,,, ;" ,.
PbiIi"uu.
(lief. ROle 8.)
LieIIe-mt Col_I bbIb.., J[ibo, foraIIy
L ..... oIbr of the Fotart..ah ANa J.zmy
bcI&ed in thI Phllippm. IDd DOW .. pr\IoDar of
...,. in Lapow No. I, .... 16 I .....
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SOURCE:
MILITARY .."FA'RS IUlIl[AU
ARMY MINISTRY
'- ---------------- ----- --------- - --------------
ORGANIZATION CHART FOR ARMY MINISTRY

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T.lok A_n "'blt... 1 <_
runolr I
P... 30.000
Cb...u ZlI,OOO
---
TRENDS Of
RrCEIm AND REQUIREMENTS
(FUELS)
(WI 1IIouuftd, of kllohtr"l
-
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JAPANESE ARMY PROVISIONS
HEADOUARTIlS
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OF
AHMY
...

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:: DEPoT
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OF DISTRIBUTION
FROM AREA
- .....RU n."
.. _-.--.., ......=
- MARCH 1944
e- AUGUSTl945

..

DISPERSAL OF I.tlIlERGRaHI
FUEL OUMPS-RABAUL

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0
!%

0
{}
MIW.'TAUI
"
00
,-

----
thtir reports, the for th .. 5
in doubt. ell' I./lugnrnfcnt IS
chal'uuristie of ""ing unable to
UelTllIl' Inll,allve is clearly in the
to throughout the depot
lem. otIic:.:rs eommsnding branch depou
....t". In !'Mllty nothing more than gIori6ed ship-
ping clerks. Th.y could not enn chanp. the
amount of .. requisition without penni3si0n from
Tokyo.
all.d.ed (Exhibit A) .. chan
showmg the location of 1M nrious prorisions
d.tpolll I.' the of the The prori-
.fl(lll! UU11l1. depot In Tokyo "'as not primarily ..
!llonl!t pomt, bUI n1Mr !.he ftnlnl o&e of the
r!llem. lUi functions wue admin.
IIllnnn. and inch.dN! planning and 1"f'$N.rcll.. A
stall' of UJH'rtll ""as ms;nlained to de..elop ...
of field ntiolls. and mabooU of packing
foods for supplies Teo
at braneh and lIPb-do:opot.s from
lQurce.
10,
The pro..isiolUl hd no part in esublish-
ing annual qUoln Theee deto:orminl!<i b)'
the "-ar )linisLry in cor!Sullation ...ith tlllI )lin-
istr)' of ,\griculwre and Forest.ry. For staplll
foods the ;n"oh"1!<i ...as the "rice rear--
I to 31 OclolJer. )filil.r,' ration re-
qujrement' were roml,ute<! b)' multiplrin,;: exist
ing troop pla"nl!<i mobili!ation,
plus 10 percent re!Il!r\'e hy the stllldard dail)' ra-
tion times clars in'ol,I!<i. The chief of intendance
tlelern,ined thll troop 81ren/.,,,h for the romin,!!:
"rice on this, the Wllr prepllralions
!jOCtion of tloll Wftr demands "'ith
the MiniSH)' of Agricultul"\l Ilnd Forostrr, This
lllller ministry studied requirements PN!8f!tIled
by the IlrIllY, nll"Y' and ci"ilian /Iut,horities in
relation 10 (liI1;lIl1lled national production, and
CHAPTER V
INTENDANCE
(PROVISIONS-FORAGE-CLOTHING)
this report dne COfI!Iideration
to the follo...ing qualifying
-
'ur-'''''-'-
'.- .... -..--.. _-
.... I'Wi sa..-.
_.
,..-.........,........,............, ..................
... IF
,
"'\1;5
--
--

-
--
-
._-
-
,.ol_ .,
-
-
-
- -
.-
-
-,
-
-
-
-
-
,-,
--
_.
n_
..-
.,
-
..-
'"
.-
'"
--
.-
..-
'"
-
--- --
,,-

-
..
...
-
,-
-
.,
.-
'"
.-
.-
- -
-
-
.-
--
.-

.-
,9.:!' '0.3 'liH 1001>'
>1..,hn"o.__ 1(000.. n.____._
!lor ......__._.


"_.....n.

._.
, ,
"
..
T.IOI_
..

"
ChI .. 1I..1.,._
w.... ,._. ___ .
.__._-
.._--

_.._---
-
..
TolO'. __
During period co'ered. b' b
fo!lowiug ]lro ' . Ill. 16 44 aoo"e, th6
f
VISions Wenl ,m.....rted . t J
Or army use. ,_U III 0 apan
Tnu45
,'[" cndln":l(I Ort. 1042.
' , 1945.
table based on estimate of food d
e10thmg section, intendance bureau. an
A crit ical shortnge of sta]lle food . J
I] . III une
'" resu .m n 1 10 2 months' bncklog of un.
fined '"e4]lllSltlOns in the depols, lllllkin" it nocea
10 fin mOnlhl,.. allotments in se,er";.l smaller
shlpmeulS as stocks becnme n\"llilab1e. Allotments
were f1l11lter cnl ill order to I!i"e I'riorih- to
newly orl!lIuized comblll uuits which had I'll--
sel'YCS of pro"isions, The only "lIction'" tllken
10 situlltion "'liS to decren.sc thB daily
nllton SIllCll.' Ulere was uOlhinl!' else to Il6 done.."
e. DiJ/Mrsal
is hereto (Exhi!>it 0) 11 map
sholnng locat,on of the '<nriOllS units within the
pro,<isions delJoOt system as of the terminntion of
the war. ComJlllrison with lllap of depots nt the
outbreak of wal' (Exhibit .\) shows thnt there
were'
n;"" I. 1.000 '0.. )
Branch delJoOt slocks were spread 1,000,000
Tsubu = 6 sq it) I"....as N'quirillg Ihe
of many '0 control them,
Dispersal of stocks ig nUribu'ed to
(1) ll'creascd demands because of war.
(2) Locnlion of stocks in strategic positions
for home defenso sllpply,
(3) ,\nticipatioll of lIerial attack.
_\dllUl llerilll nUuck 011 SlomS'" lJoOints.
)..In
u.. _
...
-- -- --
A....'''''
To,.1
.....1""'.' or ...._
,

"
ol ..,,____

,
"
..
"

1..01 ..
"",,,In,
",..,,10
(d.,.)


"..
un".'
'0,000
..... n do"
H.
3,810 12.3
1:1(/,000 95.5
no,ooo 5,010
"'
5U
1$0,000 .'H

llKl,ooo 4,1N

no,ooo O,1H

...
u. Stoek gradually dedined
drop occurred III Ar,ril I'" f
tb I'
B Y situation deteriorawl
the on August 15th,
to " genel'al lTlRbilit)' on the II t
to meet Iheir columitmellts
on . liS
i,'o drafting of 1llIlIl["lOWe,.
of fertilize,'S.
'on of cerlain food products to
mallllfn.<:ture of liquid fuels.
of military pro,i.
III Japlln proper the consellsus
CBI'll who sen-oo in the provisions
lumn 2 were obtained b)" dividing
1 by 31.4.2, the bnsic daily tOll'
, 'Ollll required to feed 10,000 men,
obtained from u captured docu.
"Tables of QUlllltities for Line of
---Genel'nl Slatr Headquarters
POA Bulletin 86-4;;),
To.,
_____ __ .____ 10,000
1941 ._ 120,000
______________._. ._ 150,000
_________ ._______ l,O,OOO
._ 1[00,000
Dtli-======================
two reports do nOt seem to indicllie
level, it must be re.lIlembered that
'UUltion took place eurl\" in
'ng the military strengti, without
inerease in 8tocks of 111"O"isiolls-
itted herewith a tuble based on
submitted b)' Colonel Shilllokawa,
food and dothing sectioll, intendanee
Ministr)", and Oil home troop
itted by Lientenant Colouel Twa
line of comlllunications, "'lIr
illlll:anrel in ...hich a branch or SHU' depot chief
attempted to meet minor by shuOlillg
availablll stocks, or by rationing them among out-
standinJt' orders for overseas shipments, This
action Wll!l 80melimes taken on domestic orders,
though to no great utent without higher au
thority,
Ret!polUlibility of the various depots eensed
with de]i"ery of shipment 10 the specified unit
(of homl'" trool>S). or to Ihe I ranspOl1ation unit at
port of O"ehledS ..hipmen!. The pl"O\'isiol\s'main
del'0t waS )l:i\'en no dirllCt infol'IllOlion rl'l!ardin"
01' losses in O1'ehleas tn,nsportntion, nud
took no adion to replace them. Hepinceillents
were the resIJoOlUlibilit) of field commanders who
could file additional requisitions if desired, If
the additional amount came within the annual
quota of Ihe unit, the provisions main dppot tried
to supply it, If this caused all o"erdraft, it
referre<1 to Ihe War Ministry for instructions.
It was the polic)' to makP OYel'8Cas
troops as selfsupporting aa possible, Tho)' were
given one month's provisions UlJoOll departure,
and encouraged to ]i'"8 off the land. Tn Ji:orea,
Formosa, and China. 100 pllrt:llllt of the llrmy's
rice requirements were reportedl)' obtained in
the theater of linits were expected
to draw such items as they were ullllble to produce
from higher eehelons within the t hellter, De
ficiencies whieh could not be met withill their
theater were to be telluisitioned from olher
theaters, or from the wile of the interior. Only
when absolutely we", stll[)le prQ\luctll-
riee, wheat, Bour and SO)" bJ' the
zone of the interior, Secondar)' items were not
supplled, As a eoneequence, the arm)"s demands
upon I,onlllgrown subsistence commodilies were
mneb 1_ than would ordinarily be expecled.
The bulk of sneh commodities n.oquisitioued by
tbe anny was oonaumed by zone of the inlerior
troop&. Dilltrihution of pro\'isions 10 home lroo]l5
wu not eeriously l"elIt!'ided umil noont April of
1944, when the over-all fOOlI shOl1.age l>ei;nlM
.......
......
Fmm the outllllt of the "'ar Ihel'e waS n chronic
food IIboI'taf[e whkh became incr<:nsingly llcute
u the Annunl 1l1l0tlllCtlt!1 were
incnuillj{ly ba.aed on of pro,isionS.
I.e. and 1_ attention Wll!l pnid to the military
demanda, whieh could not be met ill nny cast-
Dllpobl Weft &8Iigned a 30. to GO-dn)' stock le,-el.
This 1I'U fail'ly well maintained dllriug the early
.......... pi.. of a1bation to the CIIbinet for
.,..enL In cue of dillpule, the final decision
.. Itapie fOOlb rested with the Ministry.
.. -
Upoo determination of the various annual aI
1oIIIM!Ilb. tM War Ministry filed its demands
with the HinietrY of Agriculture and Forestry.
which in tum notified the various producer'S
-----.ly thl'Ou,llb their local
their ..-menta for the following year. In a
panne' chain. th. Wu MiniBtry advilll'd the
provil'li_ lOam depot of its annual quota, and
thifl ofOOe in tum notified the branch depolll of
their .1Iotmenhi with 8(lUrotS from
..hieb lhey were 1-0 Ill' drawn (Exhibits B and C).
The fiu.] step lI'U 1M signilUt of contracts be-
tween Upots and !lpftlifying amounts
and Ue8 of delivery. Provisions were aocepted
"e:l WII'l!hot\llll" and taken to depot. or sent to
railbeaJ e109l'1llt to consumer troop unit.
The provisionB main depot determined the
monthly aUocatioll!l of pPOriliions to branch
depots by their demands to available
1Itocks. OVf'1'!llllIlI shipments were in strict coD-
fonnit, with Illltablished .Uotmentll, and we",
eontrolled by the nain depot. Urgent req1ltl8tll
oocuim.lIy receiftJd direct from the field were
refernd to the War Ministry for iristruicm&
:Domeltie requirements within luthoriud aUot.
menls were handled as J"ll!Ceived. Standard
operating procedure on overlleU lIhipmentll 11'''
.. fol.b1l'1l:
(a) The _in .... kept CUrnDtly
(D'IOJIthly, or IOOI"Il often if .-ry) .d.rised
of the IIllxk lritur.tion ... the nrious bruIchee.
(h) The _in depot ielIued "prepantory
oN.!" on bnncbee, indic:mnr items, UIlOUIltll,
MlCI data by whiclt the, 1I'VII to h& ..-Iy for
...-..
(0) the III&iD depot iMued "Wpping
orden, IIYJ1l1 due MlCI deItitWioD of shipment.
bfonWioD ooat&iaed iII tbipping orders vuied
b'IIlII port of IadiDI 0JI1y, 10 IWDll of _I to h&
bdel. IIDd IWDll MlCIIoeation of unit 0- WL'_L
OOMipwL ... ....,..
8in.le &ta. a.io depot _ llOpiant of atocb
.... lower ecbe10Dt oould. UllII&Uy 6JI orden
":: thiI ooald !lOt be
m ch.rp of the bnDob II!'
....... allowed AI) diIcIUm. Ilia CNII,J ..
__..tD IIIfw1M...uer back to Tok;ro for
..... ..." di... IDnll&ip&ion _loIed DO
It,.
6. List of Exhibits
A. Army dO\lOl. <1041).
II I'roeuremeot and dllnrlbullotl of 11",.",1.,...
C. Procu"'menl ODd dlolrlbullon or

O. Anti) dO\lOIO (U1451.
K ""myeJo,blngtlePOlS (11).\1).
F. tUJ.t5).
G. Anti) production lind tCOlt""A).
U. Army produeiloD lind Isalem
J. Army prodtl<1lon And repal' (l....
1. ShlmoBa,,tI. lIa,ao, (Ionel--.,blef. food .nd dtllb_
Ing lIeCtlon, JnleDd.Dce bUref;u, Wn
llADIl'"T. 6
2. nkMhlm.. TaUluhIBO. llajor
Ari'o. ArmY-USSIlS lnf, No. 478..
S. lohl",.""', SIIk,e, Colonel-In ..ge. Btl'Ollblllll
ocea depot_ldADIl'"T 20 4/1.
till'e ll",t on alerts was 2 houl'S. From
19.f.1 alerts OC<:llrred lM'veral times a
Increasing in frequcnc}' to daily alerts in
April 1.945. that time most depots adopted
the pollc}' of d,scontinuing work onl}' on receipt
of red alerts because too much time was being
lost.
"l'he denio.l, b}' air IlctiOll, of sea Io.nes to O\"er-
seas was considered 100 percent effecthll
earl} In 1945. Healizing the futilit}' of further
aUempll! to mo.ke shipments abroad, provisions
ellnTIarked for this purpose were retsined for
use in of the homeland. This was la.rgely
responslbfe for the wile of interior stock level
at approximately 150,000 lOns from
AprIl 11).15 to the end of the war as previously
indicated, '
7. Reference Noles
delay in filling ordel'!! had a deli.
"eet on the war efl'o,'t
precludl!fl all accunllc in
of manhour 108$e!j. I'hYlii_
.'11 the Precediug pan'f!l1Iph
Instance where "almost total
reported, in the practical SllSpen.
lIS for a month. This "'/18 due to
, necessity for moving to'other
of personnel through
th61r homes, and the difficulty in
both for building o.nd operation.
hi ordinar}' operations was due to
indirect effect of enem}' air actions;
'pta;
(1) Shortage of raw materials.
(9) Damage and dela}'s at oourcell
of production.
(8) Dispersal of personnel b}' air-
raid alerts.
(4-) Shortage of rolling a10ck and
motor vehicles.
(I) Damage to rosds lind rails.
."
(1) Additional time required to
rellSOOmble stocks.
(2) Additional burden placed on
transportation b}' reassem-
bly of stocks.
(8) Additional personnel required
for accounting Ilnd opern.
tions.
(ol) General inefficiency of trans
portation through lack of
maintenance.
(I) Time 10!l!l through personnel
taking cover on alerts.
ftrioaI depote ..en notifted of their u.lIotmenla
aad of the IIOUrtell frooa ...hich st.ocks were to be
n_ are attached hereto clul.ttll in.
dieating the supply and 80... of material throngh
tblrclothing depota (E:mibits 0.. H, Ilnd ,f).
,.......
Tben was no Jlud stock level for c10thillg but,
in practice. the depotl carried approximalely 1
year', supply. Thill ...as reporte<lIy lllllinto.ine(l
until the early part of 1941i ..hen shorllrges begsn
to appear. It ., claimed that 1 ;year's SUplll}" of
elothiQII: items of general wet.t was on hand in
August INri. Principal items in nitical short
supply as of the termination of hostilities Wllro
(I) Steel helmeta, due to shortllg(; of special
steel.
(2) Gas maska, due to shortage of aluminum.
(3) M_ kits and canteens, due to shortage
of aluminum.
To alleviate th_ shortail':eS, distribution of steel
helDIfItB and ... mub was limited to combat
troops. Distribution of' canteens o.ud mess kill!
was ellt from one per man to one per e\"llI"Y tWI)
DIIlD. It ie claimed that at the end of the war Il 1
ye&!' stock level wu on hand except for stocks
mlIbol't eapply u mentioned above. Stocks were
.. in the ease of provisions. At the
termination of the ...ar 10,000 square meters of
clothing BUppliea were stored undHground al
thouF thie type of storage was not considered
pnerally 8at.iefactOl'J due to clothing being
-""-
5. ED'" 0/ Ai< A,Ii..
Allied air Id:.iob caueed a twofold loss to the
Jll*iDland IltPPly qIteme: (e) ph}"sical loss and
(b) time .r-rt. The former was limited "'
nprds damap to 1It.ocb. Demage 10 property
darinc the period Mareb to AUj,Fllst 11).15 was 15
......,
(a) PtoYieions Depot8:
Tokyo Main Depot and Osaka and
J'ukuoka Branch Depots ".1
IDOIt totally deslroJ'ed." Sen'
dai Branch Depot, one building
deRroyed.
(1)) """""'"
Tokyo Main Depot had lh'e
and Bevero.l other bu,f,'
iDp dfllltroyed. Se,'eral
buildings destro}'ed o.t ..
d
jj
I'QS!tlnll.
NlI8Oya, Send8i, nil .,
-- -
- - -
-
-
......... .r ..._

..

"
_.r ____

n

.......................,. ....
.. 0ftM1l ... of proriliom ...
..... JiPL TbiI ., d1llll to tile
.... .., a. U- IIir actioP occ:urred
.............. .cl low that they ... beiJJg
........ abee& :rr- prod-. 01' imllll'dideIJ
.......pt It clepca, in 'fVJ low
......withiDt&rpt&
"-,.
J'oftIe handled .. an item Pf?risioo&
Darbtr a. it .... a ,.,. mIDOf' Item. It
barley, J1e, kaoliang
IIOIIhUB) and t-D cab. Hay aad Itla..
aIM -.'bat .... QOt BUpplied by the depot&
With rew the small amount of fonp
bandW Me f01' home eoJllIWDIldon. .... of
U nature, and the ehortap of .ruppinc
II*JlI ,.,. little torap .... For-
... __ oo1ltded locally and the borM lItl'I!Dgth
of unb ..... kept at mhWnUDl.
4, C;"m.g
"'-
Tbt mpniAtion of the elothiDJ' depot 'f'lCl
follow, the pattem of the prorilions depots,
botb *nc undeI' the food and elotJriDr IIlCtioB
of tbI iDtend'",. banan. Compan.m. of tM
a&tac::led _pe (E:mibita E aad F), Ji't'in kIca-
tioDI of anita of the clothiDa' depobI .. of the
.Dlh'lllld llftcI of the ...ar,"" the follow-
bla:
.-
III a-d .-bod 01. JII'Ol!GI'iuI eIoIIliDg
........... IIimD&r to that of the
...with t.ba IUIpfian tIlat .... oJaIhiDc .....
MI"......... l:D .., IiIdGrieI, or by ci'riliaM
.... direet ..., ...,.ritka Amaaa1 utDJ
..................... bythlW.16aiItrJ
......... tile IIiDiIRJ of O ud
....., to ....,., .. ." .......... At toM
.......of :r- JliaillirrofO. F7'
.-...., .......,01.
aa-- ClII the
CIOIIIIIIriII to 1IIlI11t .....
All ill. _of It I the
...

....
" ..".'
'00'"
'.""" ......
or
"COIU-
"L
.......
.....
co.....
...
.,.....
.....
o ,,,,u ....10
,.OU
t un
..
<cLOU
.....
...""...
....,
.........
G' .....
ll"O" H"-
...... .'U
.....
IT.
......
WAit "'''ISlilY
'0.0'
"U.,
",on
....
u...
'00.-
IT."

I."L.I
'L"'" ' ......
10. IItTENOANCE U"'.'T
AND DISTIlIBUTlON OF PROVISIONS ISU,,.LU
u .....
'.,nn .,
......UUU " _".Uu,
--

MiS_II
.......T
......I ..T
..... ..
Lit'UD

... LC*STteS NTNDAllGE EXM1I1T A

___DEPOTS (IMII

..... ,r.l.,
(1945)
'"
LE8END
MDCLOTH"CTIOfIIIlfTfJtDMOl ..AU.II MI""TliV
fiGS -lNTENOANCE EXHIBIT 0
PROVISIONS DEPOTS
_1 _

--
- - I
I -=:.-:-. I
-
I
___I
I
I
T
I...:"--.J I =I
1--1
__I.-
~
SlS
- -l T ~
....
-
~ _UoLt
/
_ ...om!
e=_ I
-
J-,
.11_'
-
-
-
- --
-
I
I
-
Y
-
lillY.
:.=J_ ~ o u ~
_.
-
UUI
U
... o'UI
I I
... ..-1,...,..,._ , , C
..1 , I .-- }
CLOTHIM' stCTIOM IMTIMDA"" IUltIAU ....IMIITIIY
LE:GEND
ISTICS-INTENDANCE EXHIBIT F
CLOTHING DEPOTS ( 1 ~ 4 5 )
-

LUIND
---
e... ""'
6- .
IIAD La.J'TtGS -INTENDANCE UH...T E
""'" CL01HlNlI DEPOTS I 11411
........ 00 uu.,...
......
...... u.
'"
.
.
,
:
!
i
. ~ .
,
I
,,,T[NDANCE EXHIBIT H
AIIMT "1II0DUCTION ,l,NO 111",1,1111 SYSTU' {WOOLNSI
-
-
--
1M
1--1 ~
..,.,..
-
-
----.
-
-
- -
-
-
- ~
-
-
-
-
-
--
-.-
--
--
-
_ ,,-..... ,_I..-T'
..., fA am I. _ ... l'iliiii ... i_i
hMd'luarto>l"!I in ..\t Ihe genenl head-
'1".tiel'll 111 the .noies "".. re rom_
pilKi ... ith the estimated l'K[uireml'Dt!I
of umies oolllemplatKi for acti ... tion in the rom_
. ing ),Mr. Th.t loul wu t.Mn prr:senled 101m.
medical .lfairs bu.... u of the War lLinistry.
There the rompoo.ile 6/,1U1"f!l "'ere IrilJlIlled. to
mett the .1Iorations of ....... malen.1s and .Ii-

It should be. IlOlM that oo....hece in the J.pa-
ne!IIl Arm)" ....as there. llI:lftning Or leveling oll"
of the of indiridu.1 .rmies.
Estim.leIi t.bn as submitted.. Weuten&.llt
General Sbimizu said Ib.1 there .... frequent
C&!leS of one .nny o...... requirement!!
....hile lhem. bul thsl
sucb _ert' IlOl by gen.
Or W.r 'The
.rm,' whkh would ob.. be b.ndicapPfd by
it!! . underestim.tlon of I'\'(jui ....mems "'nuld
probablJ be lW,naliud die War lIi?is-
tf}' in its proportlonatfl aUocatlOn of
.nd funds for the product,,:m of medical supphes
("d. note I).
From 19-11 10 19,14 productioll of medical sup--
lIlies in Japan increased progreai .....ly but .t a
mU<:h slower ratll than the ilKCre&se of yearl)
requirements. That laek bala!K'El foreed.
j.<enenll staff ill Tok)'o 10 dlStTlbu
tion of the a,..il.ble mf<hcal supphell to those
nlliellthat lhelll rno;,t (Hef. note 2).
a In 19t5 the dillieuhies in ",aking supply meet
demand Ill'Oml,[(<(1 the j.,\!,lt'rBl .to
the Slandard (or reqmre-
,
"
-'nblish the reqUIrements for Ihe
",enlS aHl ""
fo,' lhnl .,eHr itSt'lf (Hef. nOle. 3). .
.\ . joim rollferenee of the rnel!lcaJ
I f the War MinistrJ. the mah'l"la[s
!I)"','," 8l.'l:liou of lhe m;mitioll!l depart-
, .... ,
" "., Nnlionnl "e!fare llUIlIS ry ap-
mellI, llll" 1
,

o( RO percent of the tota

prol'l!{ I ..,. . ., .
, "',. nnd ei"illa" medlen reqUIrement.!
arlll). .
CHAPTER VI
SUPPLY, HOSPITALIZATION, EVACUATION
,\rm)' medical 6UPIII)' needs
on a Jear to Jear basis by the
field. 'nle .rnnlstick U!ll!<[ for
needs consisled primarily of
uperiences of pre"iolls JapllJl,es&
TIUll was SlIllplcmcntcd dUl'Ing
the WilT with "ctunl expcl'icne<l in
of lIUpply needs (or future open-
for medical supplies were for-
I'l1!II'Jedi,'c ''''ll1;l'8 10 the
..r.., ,,,,1
.........
.......
--t
--.....,..
"-
SYITI_
OlIN "

_......
.. I'
.-
....
a_
_".au
_...
"'u...
---
-,-
EJ
._<Ill ,
......,.. .,
..... 'U.
_.....
_lITUUP
.".
['util 191:1 olily 1'>000 I.-
3"" 100 r '1 I -'. UUXetl of the IICheduled
1.'" II... 10 Shl'I,led. In lOH 42000
,
IOK.o;s for Bhipnlenl nt"er left ho;ne-
'lIlu.
Tt
I .t !!l,ll WU tllOtit troubiellOI11e rQr ,J Bpa.
lese "'ere fe ... in number and
nn])' oould be .Flout<! for mNlical
or the initi.l m,400 OO.letl lICheduled
for !!hlp"....m O",f'l!eag 171.000 re:mained in J
In 191' h ',>aU.
" e1"tll en the small '1u1ntily of 711"WO
of med'ClI supplies 'llfel"l! scheduled for
olll}" !II pem'nt left the home Wands.
I1Il' abo,"t ItltistiCll are IlO$. mesn! to indiloate
that III 1ll1pplie!l I'NChaI their destin.tion.
Shll_nUl of lJW(lical supplif!!l to <:ert.llin of the
OttU,'ied n8 stopped
perIods durllll! the r. III 19-H .uempUl to $UP-
Illy the .. (fuIIIN and Rablul 'reas 1rU8
III 19--15 :S-onh China. )I.nchuna.
Korea ....e.... ssill open for deli",,"! of sup-
phs. In the 80tllhern of lhe J>aci6t only
1.000 hO.ltil Nch ...ere shipped to I.,d arrh-ed at
the of and Sinppon'.
I>....lr100tlOO or lIIedical !llippli<!!! ..iwin Ja!lIn
I'roper .... lK'OOlllllli:-lJf'd bJ' rail and moxor
lran;:pon. TIot'n' 00 I,robl"m II this le.-el of
dl.,ribullOlI. "o e,er. II "'as anticipued Wit
...nll the in...;:ion <>f the borne b1ands. roads.nd
railroood" ,,'oliid be bombed Ind Slrafed and
di>'lnLlllioll "-001<1 be interfe""l1 ...ith. In 1'"'pI-
ratlQll for Ihal probable IIl1'di<;a1
oulJlllJ' dep,xs throllghoul IIlI' island!l
tried 10 tIlailltain I G-n>Orlth $loci.: of media.l
prol'()nionate diSlrilJlIliol1 Wall
not Jel lerompli,.bed ...hen lhe "'ar ended. e.-en
though 11 'us tJai(llhal Ihe 611>Ont.h /iUI'IlIJ "'alI
nail.hle ill '/.11111,
tJ. MrtlirM Slipplylkpots
The .1.1'""....., m.inl.ll1ed medical SUI"
pi,' in ('.,,11 of ",ili'""r di$lricl$.
Mo..1 of the S!o''l''ll MI the TokJo
111(1 O",kIl 1I,(,<liCIlI SUI'I,IJ' depot,.. whkll
!Il!rn.d ,he IIIllin 111'1X"u,,",,"enl and di;;tribuliol1
Cl!nle1'!l 1m' III EUl'lllie>. ;:;IMlregicallJ
f''(>111 II IOjo:i,liclIl JXlilll of both had
'0 <hilll'"ljo:. we"" lIellr (Il('lori\'!! prodllcing
I11Niic,d '1I1'1,He<, Illld weN> aillllllNI III the hllbol
of "","'Uld '>lil'I'III1"IKlI" (IIrf. note 5),
In lUll ""pplie!i inllllll1ilitllrJ district d('11018
we..... retained lheir ('l!lllral
toc/uion", bill estnblishl,<1 waJ'l!hou!1e8 in tOWI1!I
alI(I cities throughout their Rssib'11ed areas. At
'"

u
..

M.

..
u

" ..
..
..
"
,
..
..
."
1:.1
..
.. .

"
" "

':'0
.. 1:'0
1:.1

':'1

13.1 ':'1
."
...
... 1'.1
0.1 ..
..
,..
..
100.1

_.

_..

(I
.. 1000
10.0 0
100 3.'.0

2<HI :!On
18,0
,'211.4 .OM T8.6
31a.. 3&3.. 111.0
&0.0 0 0
__M_'_ lOO.O+_---'"'---f---_"'-.

110 la.o
"0 1"0

o :10.1
:1&.0 13.0
.1 13.0
of the allied air .nd sea elrort!l in
Ihortll!,"6 in J.pan during the ".r
in the oomparison of tile. )'Nrly
in T.ble 47 (Hef. 'I(l(e 2).
ion. The 1l1'''',I''S I'0rlioll of
was smull liS OO'lI]lllll'<1 with iUl
., 960.000 All ProdliCliol1
army Wll.S des.ib'11ated for the
but supplies whicll had
ng )'eul'!l hto::auee of
to ship them were distributed
0lIIdrf,ted on the indlJlltrial c@nll'r8 of ,!nllan
propII'. The in,bility to .. raw l11ale.riuIM, with
&be Ibip abort.. and the actual dt'lltrncliOIl of
fadorieI alloYed for the production of only 10
of the total reqainrnPntM, Ilnny !'t.
ClIiftd 40 peromt of &a.- mo!'dicl\l Bupplies pro.
d..J la.f.aote4).
.. ."., ft. ,.,.,. II
". IIIIIIlkaI ...,., requ.il'PIlM'llt.B of
aad -....uc ..... for tIw Ile.riod
IcI&aIW __ For the !<IIrlie. pl'rio<llt
...... -wI7 ... able 10 procure
........ boxf!I, and of th'
I,,1lO,OOO t.- diltributf'd to trQOpII- Table
........ IItaliIIB &be )'Nrly arm)' Nqui
..... ........ alb-alion and the actull
diltnlllllioa to trollIJL
.....
'DsI.- -..oIt7 ....
...., et .,.
IIajlr Akilatl &If )
51 Ia dIia ,.. ,.' 9 _ ...
......... oIlMl1t ......
.., ..... o...a qp' , ...
.. 00\1 .. ..-"_ _
__ .....Iidd ..... IIWlpi. ttl.
..........................
Antr ....... - W __
.......... 01 ..
c=:..1a WtD
....... tile ....
........
...... Iu_
"'" ...
-
.....................
..... _ .. __.. ...... .-:r .I1_,,"'J_
_ .... _.............. ..______ S __ 10...' .... .101..-
Conlrol and 0llel'l.tion of rhe First .nd Third
,\r'rny IIOlll'i1als WlIII ret.ined b,' lhe W.r
,llIu.slr)'. The lSI handled the Illo& difficult
surgical. CII!le!I .nd its ,)atienls ..-ere sen-ed in rtl-
.nd rehabilil.tion b,' Ihe Third. Bolh
hospl.lals carried On ad'-'Ill'l'd medical researeh.
Thl9 of decentralizing responsibility
of hOllpit.lization "18 not rtIIlized completely.
At the tennination of the ....r.11 .rmy districts
...ere not fully prol"ided ...ith the speci.1
llI'CI!II8llrJ t.o h.ndle .... rious t)'pes of casu.ltil!ll..
)lulu.1 U!!lst.nce and cvope...tion ....u _ry.
.nd the meo:lical .lJ.it'll bureau conlinued to
cvonhnale the ho/;pit.lization of casualties .1.
thoulrh to hmil('(l (Ref. llOIe 7).
The J.pllle!ll! .rmy ho.<llit.lization program in
J.pan proper was nOl entlreh' dit'Ol'\'lld from
citil media.l orpniZAtions. Rehahilit.tion of
....r '-.terang wu carried 0111 bl" the X.tiona!
Welfare .\Iinistry '-Iliiais. ill5tiwl;ons
tilt .ick .nd ..-ounde(( from the .rmv
"l_i.1 .IMI f....,ll'ral u_unellt hO!1pitals. Ho";-
e'u. .hoo:e "'00 "'ere IlOI fJ:llftted to be r&-
lumffi to "'cre attE'IMed. _\onling to
.\!ajor )l.tsunal!'ll. of lhe Jnfdial alJ.irs bureau
of the War ,lIini'lry -enioc? Jlrot'ed in...lu.
able in lllI mIlCh b '-...:.. releasoed from lbe
.nll.' OOsllita/,.. a1tllQl'f..n "ell. often Meded fur-
ther reh.bilitalion 10 Ilref'll'" lhem for retnm
'0 ci,ili,n hfe (Hd. note 1").
Th.1 ...as lhe offici.1 relationship lh.t
nii>ted bet"'een the and ci..ili.n medic:al
.uthorities.' Domestic: c:asu.'lie,;.nll:," or civilian,
from aeri.1 bombings "'ere admined to eilher
.nny or chili.n hospit.ls. It ...as expl.ined by
Lieutenant Oelleral '\at.nabe tlllll tbis prooedure
de''I'lol'ed ,,'ilh thc of the ...r.
'" June of llUr. a 111.n .....s prepared by Lieu-
t('lIam G.. chief. ,nedical af
f.inJ bUrl'llll, Wtlr )lmi,tr.l.nd chier field medi.
cal directonue. in;'Il,-'CIOr j..'I!neral of lhe liu6S of
COllllllllnirtlliQIl. which .lronll'd aa:ess to arm}'
hospitals to ej,ih.ns \lho would panicipale in
fronl line rolllbar work durin.!! thl' dl'fense of the
hQII1l'ltlUII. pllln lll'\"l'r \ll'nt inlo eff('('l.
The oolllbinj.:" of 1lI'\>lIn areas in ,Jllpan .ffecled
lI'l' o"er"lion of:!3 army h{.!,illtls: however. this
WIIS Mid I" lon'-.. had no effect Oil tbe over
nil Qf those hil
\\"ere III lellst deslroyed, .Ict the resuh
ill!!' pl'Obil'",s nc,'cr bccRnw 100 !ll!rious (Ref.
note 2).
J'r,tient" Wert' el'Rrlll\ll'll,o schools, public lrall!l,
",
:ftl'Y elfect"e. It W.lI estimated ]j
...1 thot this
Bupplll!ll from the bctoriCII would
very obvious in O<.:tober HWi (lief.
medical supplies in Jal)an proper
rdment of sup!,l)" depots Wllll e6ti.
ten.nt General Shimizu .nd con-
tenant General Wat.nabe lllI only
Jt could not be detennill('(1 .. h.t
plies ""ere deslro)'ed bf.:all!!l' J.I)a.
reoonls ""ere not .'lIil.ble fllef.
f).
icated that the reason 1_ from
"lent ,,"ere pracliall}" negligible
on the pan of the medial supply
ordered the dispersal of IIUllply
of 1944. Sm.1I bnlH:h depotll ...ere
medial supplies "'ere stored in
pattern of reltou9a
tion.!}' 1IlC'I1IUres ere laken 10
losses of medial supplies Ihrough
nl. The use of a\"f'S .nd dug,
.nd Ihe cementing of reOOue
1101' cha!M'l' of loss through fire.
losses in finished medial supplia5
iIUlIting of J.panese shipping. 11 "'lllI
approxim.lel) 20 pero:.-nl of the
shipped from Japanese pons to
"'ere sunk. Lieuten.nt Genu.1
IlOt sa}" ... hich llSl:>ect of Ihe .Ilied
"'as most eH'O!CIi'-e. but indicated
.C1ion. _ milll!ll, as ....ell lllI .ir
1DIInunelLl.I in lhe sinking of shipll
alf.irs bureau of lhf War )Iin
.nd su llervised all arm.,' hO!i[litals
April 194$. "'hen h"lM'ri.1 (len
N dire<'I('(1 the grognlphical l"e-
of lhe hOl1le militrlr)' districts in
of .n a11i('(1 in"asion of the horne
.nn) districts wrre c",a1ed Ilnd
beoome a self-reliant entit)' ill the
defellS6 of its 1I11Sib'llell arell. The
bureau of the War ful-
tbis program of reor.l.'llllization and
oYflr'all responsibilities of t"Qlltl.-o1
to Ihe Il.l"IllJ n,cdicnl nutho,idea
"e milillu'}' Tbe ol'J!,uli-
boo.pill,11I tlremseh-e;j reumiued Ille
7)_
o-:rwtion of _tliNJ ... effect of
.. fnqueDt air raids oJl and O!:Illkp, the
c.sUn of mediealllUpply imhw_riel!, wall severely
f8h ba the sprin,: of ...hen it Willi renlized
that the nU1De1'OUll fal'toril!ll llrodllcin.!! !lOrely
-sed medical equipilRm, medicine>;, druWi .nd
numerous conllnmablP IIUppliPl hRd heen eilher
("(IIIlptrtely di'!<lroytd or dRlll.llj..oe<.l ..
'nJe follo... in, is a lild of Ihe mdu'lrlpl medical
iDlll:allllioDl' bombed (Ref. notl' ol) :
I. S_ltyo f8rlory--..::.hinRj.......-Il. Tok)-o area
--llrodllft'd l"it.mins Rnd
.f(I I1Mro}ed.
2. ('low.. f..-t01')'-lionjo. .rtII-
produeM nwdnl in<lrulllentll-IOll
pert'flIt deIltro,-...1.
3. RAW-gi ferlqry -J rtllr dqot
_.\mapsaki lliogo_ken. ();aka .rtII-
1'11_ materia\<! dellOt - 100 pen:ent
deIltroytd.
t. f..t......-<kak rea-(2) both
prod.-d medic:inl'!' .nd dnLp--otlll
fad..,- 100 deslro)-ed__her
fadory tIS perttnt
6. F..;u.- f.-tmoy-()sak
medic:,- aDd inlad:
00-. itll 1'11'" m.teri.11I dl1lO1 ad
jKmt 10 fadory 100 llero:.-nt t1estroJed.
&. ThIi Dnlg ('o.-Qsaka area-
prodQl'lld nwdi<:inell .nd dn'j..'!t---OO per'
Cftlt dNtroyed.
7. r"''';_je Co. Ltd.-
Tokyo .ra-produ<:ed iJaj..'lI .nd boxes
for medic::al .... Pllli_:'O perlll d.-
....,..,.
a. Slo........ Jlfg. Co,_K)"otQ-protluctd
X.ny equipment-no report u to df-
tlIIrurtioft.
t. SAw-,.. Elt. Co._Shin.j..'lI.wa-Tok)o
-pmdaeed X ... machin_HIQ I)!pr
--
10. Two fattoriM fOf
.-neal ---..both locll1ed iu Tok,"O
_100
Tbe bombinl of the Ele<;tric Co.Ild
tba Shan. X.ray pl.nt in April 11J.l5 cui th8
rep--"ts1 oJl X.ray The d,lSlruC'"
don of the Mitlui chemiclll pl""t nt Ohrllllill
01 the main llOlI1'Ce 01 disinfeCIRlit nlld the dol'
molition of the baRda,[t! ill Tokyo
"". one of U. IDllC fntitful 1lO1lN:('1l vf tl,(l9ll hll
III1lIIIIIll i&ame. Tbie over.all IIf l'n
prothaetioa capuitJ" lor mediclll 1
..
---
---
'1-._ 'sl' ., ....,....
.-... ., u ...,... II+'
-
,n .
-"'--'-
--
-
-
,-, ,-, ,-,
-
- -
-
:::;:-.::,:-.-.-.-
-
.-
... ....
n",
-
.,.
.-

,....
.... fl.l_ .....
,...

.....

=f-.:::.
"...
...... .......
......

;.. ..-
-
.... .- .....
...... .... ...... ...
---
...... .... ..... UI,nl
....:U-o-tI .......
In batfttt. W.r )f]1I1auT.
....10(''''' ''''"p.
,
KlllOIl
.-
I
c._ ot .... ,...
'..,- ,..,-

'QT... ,
,--
'031... ,
._-
'e-l_J
--
ICllIa)
--
_'I.... a...
"-
"- "-
- AItlIJ"'l" a..
".


-.--
. II '0 14.
:!4...
.-
>0. ... ...
--_. -

-..
o.
,.

'rMa'._ .

--
_..
--
lIoart., )l1PfI1fti .11'1.
'-n aijmificant in declftSlll;" tbe tot.1 number
of .1Ifl'IM:!ll' troops.
Combat Supply
II. GUO"_
11le lIyslpm of tbe Japa_ Ann,.
.. n to dPtprioraU! in 19-13. R.... D:I:I.h'riab .Dd
for production "'pre not anil.ble in suf-
Delent quantiti. -end .\lIiPd .ir and snbmarine
action .in tM ra.rilk "'as shIpping.
Dunne- 19-J.l. It. became dangt'1"OllS and di&ult
to lIhip nJedital snpplies 10 the numerous and
...idP,l,. llCaup,,"1 With American
atl.ingaren Lbe supply of the SoutbMsl.
A!lia. South...ftjl P.dfk. Philippines, and South
China .lft!IIall bur Slopped.
.Japan r/!I..liud the futility of h" vr:iJlting Stlp-
pro!-'TI.m and in 19t5....ith her production
capacit)" and lIhipping pradlcall,
throu!-ooJ. the of air and _
po"fr. she ..bandollel;1 in elffd her foreign hold-
inp and conoentratPolI on the defclISll of the
hOTrK':laml.
'n" Cllr1ailrnem of sUI'I,ly from Japan,gradu.r
Mt first aud compleu in 1915, foreed upon the
i90lalPolI troops I. program of IIelfsufficieDcy. The
War ill J"lnD enforoed thill through
orders. and dirocli,es. Fnlgality was emphasized
lliferior products were substituted 1.1)(1 local
produrtioll ,,-as enwuraglld.
The SUI)I,ly .itualion of the "ariou! actual and
potelilial ('Olllilal .. reas ill dillCUS&ed in the follow
iug 8ldiull$. l)elailed informalion on all
could uot 00 IleCUreJ, but it ill beli61'oo that. the
following dltla portray the characteristic sue-
ce>i>llOl and failures of tit" Japanll68 Army combal
zone medical SUPI,I)' fj8r\ice!.
T"".f;r,l)
..,
borne island!!, the pel'!li!ltent
IS killed and ...ounded a
y of army personnel; howevu,
dropped OD lIiro6hima and
,ftISPOMibJe for the grucer pan
.il..h similar figures for Cll8ual-
theltter from 1937 10 I
1941 the peroclllltb'tl killed by
had decrellsed ltlld t.he
bombenlmCIlt. and artillcry lire
,. The Sltl\U! is characteristic
but t.o II. lesser
_ llnny waS ooller defended
led Fon:os, the olislalll:'hi of air
'Dery !heJlilig appears 10 have

Jigures include total anny per-

wounded in the Japanese home
of :s"agasalci.
1.800 (1lI1"1)1.b1 MIlD)
__ (IIll"Olllll
for Nagasaki ai'll composite
,. No bl"llllkdo..n "1.5 anilable.
__
::!,tm
to establish the rerati,e ratios
velle86 011 combat. troops, only
of combat. results fur the !lO\Ith
anilable. These were 8lIid tu be
Ll.ti1"e of causes for killed .. lid
ut 0"" n.rious combBt .. rel..'l
batil-. I"aIher than the number of indi,idgaJ
....... tneted. ODly 40 ptt"(ll'nt of UIO!Ill Ill-
diaIt8d ..... iD Ezhibit ., hospltaliud.
e-a.t totaled ii8,550. Of Ih_
t4I,t7O (1lS,..,.at) killed in aetion,
diIll during or treatment aud
.-iftd their -00... or thll toc.l 33,J.!>SO
....... l....... d...
......... period of the ....r there ,,'ere 7/f'.J,
m tIoopI ...ted with ..rious diaeallllS and of
.... I ..-at or 223,620 died. TIlis "er)' hip
............. uplained by Ahjor Yoshinlu:,
ill jINU part from shorla,,-eIi
eritIIU __ of -ucinea, e(luillmelll, and food
ClIdUD tpeei& en-- carried II greAter loll
of ....... thaD others. All were lluribulllll 1.0
........ of eritieal items of medicill!:ll, ,'I:
__ ad foodItu... Of the
., kha, 1t16T,l06 weN afilicte<l With
..... -tor .... of lIIUllll'i"
't W. and pleurilJ)' (1,254,01J6);
'*'_" otbIr .hole bod)' t!illClI8l.!S (l,s.:i ,"
u."'" hand _ not tabu out of urbnn nreas
... tboagh nch plllJ\ll had been prepared.
llbOIt1ao tarrY out Ihill propol!Dl was nttributed
tD *-tap of Il"Ul8J'O'blion. Wa.
&uIahe furthn indieaud that lhe dispersal of
boIpi&aIa .. Il precaDtiob apinftl nir altacQ wg
lDrIIId COO 1* in the war (Hef, note 4)
T.w. to I.. oo.pitahl unavoillllbl}'
01' ....-oyed in Il'f attacks on Jilf/llll" urban
--

or-aD ...-...-., .. JG,....

f. (,=s'tfn
__01 .0.
... _(... , .--)
""D t uo Ieee_of.
......... Of ".
......t1 ""..., ...
.. "I -a-
..................... ...,.( !
......... DIa ' 'uMlIr
fe': ;,'
DI , -<JW. I).
...- -.. _.-
it! OJ 11I ......
::;O;i;-;;; - - - .\ ...
....
., 01 .... ,...
-"'--"-'"
_""! ......
_ .
....n"'''
Or '
-
-
-
1)__..
_u
--
_u

.............
--
_.R
_ .., ...
_a.
--
-
-.--...... -
alldoll...._ .....
_.. -
_u

-
-
_.......
I.1Jptl,_
_.. -
_aa ._-

'00" _ ..,...
--
-
__,,_.L'"
--
_'R
:all .. _ ...1<'l-
..... _a..

-
_.R 100" _..,..-.
-----_.. II-
-
-
_.R
._--
--
-
--- --
_'R
'011'" _ ..,...
........L ..
--
........... _--- 'OIl" _"*""'-
....................
--
__.... B. __ 100... _ .......
_u
--
__.... a. ......
,-_.-
.......................
--
___.... __.._____ 110,.. _..,...
_a.
-
1I1lo....... ---...
......Iu" ....
..... ' N .-....
........................
--
.... .-..1 01 _...,. .........
....... _10.,... "
_ .. WeoIIa ..n, .,
... ...
___ChIIIoa_-
Tilp abo." shil'lHl'IIl._ (!'Stinlated IS G:.I JX!'l'"(Il!nt
of I'IRtln('(1 1i('l'\NI to _uPl'lement or
I con'er8Ply "en' supplemented ,,-ith existing
';Iockpill"', loc,,1 procllrt'lIlent Rud production.
fl....l"in'm...tlH weTI' met in tOIO for R'eral
,"('Il;;oIlS.
BurJlIR dep\"lldl'fl prim...il) on shim"ng Rml
rnil for quota of medienl supplies.
l'I"OJ!:,"{'",;i,c depIction of JnllnnPSe shiIll11,,/.: lind
tho mining of the of llRIl!-'OOn. Rnd
Sinj!upo"Q Re<llltillUOU.'l tlow of medical
$ul'l'lil"'l f..olll tho!le Tn 1t).!4 shipments
of SUl'plil-S into 13I1"UIR wate.. had to he abnn
doned in f,,,,or of the l'llilwa)8 nud IIRrticurarly
sueh er;li,.lh need r .
11II S 1( I et ltel"S or medkal <;Ilppll"
U "( rlll.'lI 'Iuinine. .
Sl irl Ihe r.nton .rea. 00 lOllS of a
pI e 0 1,100 to'1$ were destto\"e<1 in the .ir
of :)() .Iull" H. It tras !'Iat;'1 b, Colonel
."ihnn.d. lhat ('(orl$iSll'<Ichi",fl . of
rnedil'll .iterllll !Ill tetanlls IlI'rum.
Habrm .nd IlluUlOChiu. 'That loss cut
a'a,lablp of Ihoae itelll!! in that arl!a
GIl llel'l'l'nt. 'WM! requested .nd
"'.d" to M!1.le"nbh Ihe supply in
(Illna br aIr from and
ho..elpr. Onl.l :'! Ions treM! 1("!11.11'l' red
Colonel :;;llImada U"1.lained thlt iheore he .
I r II
0 nft(l"d medi..-al supplies roold
hnp brl'n ob,iatl'd Or diminiBMd h.d ..
hl'l'n dis'JI!rsed .rKI l>Ilt unde'1!fOUnd. it
trill not: "mil the f.ll of !9.J./ lhat $U("h attioll
WIS lairI'll.
ti. Ihtr
IRff. not:l' 10.)
The Jalll.- in llorn.. mainllined ils
medical 111'01-'1'11_ throup. impon.tions
.00 IoCII procumnenl and production.
:\"0 dirPCt WII! made from Japan ptopi"r
for Ihe dist.llC'e ".11II Pftt and 1l1OM! efficienl
distribution could be n'ade from the suppl)
at .nd i'inJ:!'lllOll!.
For Ihl' llel'io<l 1!lE!4.:i the following qu.ntitie
of n>l'<liell supplies "I'M! shipped into the bIse
in Bunna:
T........ 00.-$.;,.....". 01 .,,,_, ...,pIta .'<1 B __
tl)lZ ._ &000
113 ZO,OOO
Itl-H lfl,l>JO
100 l,soo
""u...... I 0.,... ......". !lnrwa A ...... Irtlly.
'"
the \lIriolls .r'lJ'nru-S(> Rnnie!! in
number of 1111'S!' 'ehide!!

f Hur'plie!! nnd I'<IIIirIOlC'll
os "'1\1"1.,' as 1!l.1R. By I!HI. nu.
and lnborolOril'S "ert> "'anuf.....
ite.ms of Illl'<'i"'" slIppli@:ll.
from .r.r.. n all but
nt of 1101' re<J"irNl rn..dinr.l in_
petl'l'lll or dru:.'" R"d '1lI'<1i<:ine&
of items
I't..... ""eIV bein!.'" loulh.
lire belie'l'<1 to jnclude
""pplies procured ftom 1000l
.\rlll) t ..i...d to SIIJlpl) its trooPJ
.clnnced IOwan! l.ieng>lI1g. Some
were 'uade from Peilochi Air
I'OntinuQUS ser'l'iee rollid bll e61.b-
OU. the J.JlInese Army
Iish " Slockpile of 1,600 tons of
The)" succeeded in acc:ulllulat
tons lit K"eilin ond 100 Ions ot
.... roads .nd ...-.1"'.....1\"<1;
f...-ilit.te the delinr\' of med;';'l
plies do..-" . Ihe
m II.nko.... Yocho...-.and eli.Il/!_
11'<11,, bombed and Slrafl'<l.
in road tral\5pon. and
111 operations further ha1U!led
""l'llly mon'mentg in this .rN..
the Ja,..nese Ottupalion of K"eilin
lIII1Iic:ienl qll.mities of medinr.l suI""
be dl'li'enod to troop;; in Ihe
:Road transport was then (he most
11., of 1l1O'ementj ho..enr, few
....ilabl.... and of those, many ..-ere
ikes on Jupanese .\ rill) supply ill-
Chinn ...t'(l Rpproximllleir :!lu
lIy Ileeded medic,,1 SIIPI,lies. ThellC
ie6 had lM.... n storkpil ... 1 ill the .'wllrl.
Chin.. ,l ... pors;" p'.... rHll1llioll fo" rhe
ion.
.nko" '1I"{," ,,,,,1 "I
toM of medi"111 supplies we)"'" d,,-
July 1(114. to this dRte,
_re d"<;lI'O,e,1 ill Ih,- salHe alrR. In
the Jllpnllf'$C .\rlll)' losl
C. ca-
fRef. noll' I!.)
..p", 12.200 mel ric lOllS IIf
mednl.wpplie!l i" .hpanese .\rnl)<
ill ('bini .t the tennination of the ........\erord-
illl: to ColoDl'1 Shimada. L1,.t ....as ooll!lidenod !lUf_
fkienl for sis IIlOn'monlhs. .\clu.II,,, it "Ill; f".
shortl'r period. !<ino:e Ihe stockpiles ...ell! UD
b.Ja.nc,M in lbe proportion.te of
.-..rioruI mediall supplia fo'urthernlOrt',
.I.... soortll!t'!l of C!l!rtlin .::ritiCiI items.
In 1941. pra..-linllly no mi.::to!ll'O(lI'!I w.::rt' ....il
IIlIe in China for use of Ihe J.pa_ .
Their uquisilion ...s wtdllal for produ..-cion ill
J&J-I .... dirMed throughout the ...It to
priority II'N8. When tile Wit ended. ,0 llen:ent
of the required q... of mkrosrofleS had brPa
_J.ted. but the short.ge of oil immerilll
.. 2(l JX!'l'"(Il!nt of the!le from
I'IQpIoJ..I in .n.h"1'is.
X-ray apparat ..., !I$. lIu.::h WAil sufficient in
n..... 10 JUeel the existinll" needs, but lack IIf
eilll!ed m.n) of these mHchinPil to
..........
SwPeaI inelrumentll were local.
11 ud npW:emeliU ronld arWll)S be had.
inItnImeotI on thl' other hand had to be illlJl'l'"'ed
t-11plUl1UId were Ill"ayll in short sllppl,-.
..... period 1&l1...6 W!I$ chnl1lcl(!ri/.ed by.hol'!
... of IUcll drup and medicines IlS emelinr
)'atnn.1 Atabrin alld plaSlllochin weN!
UlI&il INa, ....bil'h time incl"t:llsed ]Jr<)Il"Cll
on
in llplUl for adllfJlllllQ shipmenrS 10
Chbla. Colonel Shimada "uted LhQ 8Upplr 01
qaiDiM ....I..ys llllflicieut.
O-.J. hospital equipment WIIB JlIll11l1fnctllreJ
10eIlJIr and cOllld 00 'llet. A",h"
..... however were alwl'}'8 SClllOO lind o,(In
I I "
Ihooah TO percent of tIn! rllfJuir."rncnts 1111< ,e<'
a tn40 ..._ ,&... ",...,1<'''' "oH I" "'" , ...,.
-.-
IIIllIt types of medil'lll ljupl'ly, inRbilil) \0 dis.
tri....te ...realed critkal
in 1i_lIId rlan'.
Attemptll 10 pl'I...u.11' ml'<lirnl sUPl'lips fl'lJll)
lbe in )I.nil. ".p"" lHll Sorllt
lIIIppl_ .. dil'trihuled to troops in Ihl! hm_.
but tllf' romhinPd f ..-lol'lr of lim.... shorh/-.... of
motor fthkk .en.1 homblltdllll'lll of ro.d .nd
rail tl'lJlSfl'Ort .lId hill"hpr II..iorit.\" of olher m.le-
ri.JI .,...ftnlPd tbe dl"'ired from IJI!ing
noIboi.
.. ..",.,...
(JW. ..... I'-I
n. ..tiN1 ..pply -.JIIePI in ,be Philippine
r.- fDnetiobed _lilIfroctorily from 1m lill
..... E_ tt-P ADied .bmarilHl alld air at'-
... I\'..tend .iIb lIhipplll beI_ J.JllUI
props ud tJ. prtrU of MalliR uId &II Fernaa
.... -'"' of __I_It. ... Il...,.. maiD
.....
I .1..... ltu, tJ. J ..- AMAy Itarted
.......... for tbto iom..blP Allied 1aPdinp
die Philippine arehiJlto.... The pin o:sIled
..... _ ,..,. of mtdiNl IIUppl_ in
....... ud. til.- D'Il!I.. ..pply.itb unilAand
bo.pilak.' 011 1M iMluld of 1_lhill plu "Illl
.Pel h ........... 1"M1iad. but ill lbe ..- of 1M
Thirt)-fiflb Anay oa'y lIJ p"......1 .... &<:aImll-
'-led ....m tM llliled. ale. '-landed
. 011 u.."f' To MnI", n loIIBqaaIe .-... for the
i.....i"..... in...... 1t-lDf'dnolllUppl_ in l!loI"-
....1lbe 1..lIi... II fo."..ndo.. 0...-.
,.., ladobn. ('tk. Bab.1od.. ud Iloilo depoU
_......
With Ih. .Ulied 1aPdm". III u.,-te. diltriIMI_
..... .. be -.IP. bat tIw J.p.- A...y COlD-
__ laM. failtd 10 aat.ae-ipac. tJ.
wiIb vhidI AIIWd -.rr &ad _ po..... _ldpatM
III nc- of tIw umi..... The..m tItOnp
depot! 1Ift't' bombtd. deot.royin I.... ql*UItitiea
of _ ....1 _ppl.. ..,. depcU d. Cap,-
NtablIbtd for tM _pport of J...- II'CIIlJP-
ill Ibr _ of 0.... _ pnwtio:aJly III ..
UoyI!I bilP d. T..w.n Ml perol!IlI of Ibt
lI&oekti_ deIaolilhed ... of ..J
mIl.r bombud-a. n...iM& -med ....
.....-..Iy Gpillred.
Diuib.Iioa Y1rtua1l, impo.ibJe. n.
'- -u.w. _pply tneb _tel 11IO", ODIy K
aipI. s-u _ Uld rh... a.ft .ttempud to
-.pplr ftbti...1y _J.Ied .,..on), dariqboan
of d.kJ-. Enn ..... Allied .ir. _ lIbd .-.
rm. IletiYltill toot their toll and MKliaibie
.-.JW-.... Ihroqh.
Frast 11M .apply .... 00IIItaDtI)'
ItrdId md bombed. Their __of IIIlIdDJ.
.-pp_... aU..... throqh _ ..cIIiItroe-

It IrU IIated by Hl.jor o-J. YClIIdki that
1M bWo __ for the failun of the IIlpplJ .,..
.. .... .... of forMiJht in prepant.km. R.
bIlJIaIW. that lIockpii. of 1IIpp811 hid belli
- Ihll:Wd.. iItrateIic RID
-. \My -uined .dfqu.te of
..-
uoo


'8,>(>0
'.-

..-
Q..."" '1>0""
T
Io.a__
..''''o..
lIal.,,,
J\O .
11., _
.......bl"'-'"l"1>I ....
8'...
/. Si"gapore, 1>'''/''1''. Sult,a/,a, atld I"""
(HeL HOle 12.)
:1-: .5e,(1)lh Aren Army "elld'lu,utetS re-
eel.'- . Its ordetS 10 function ns " Sl'lf-eOnln;lled
Ullit 1!l Deceml,.. f" ,
of . rOll: )l?wcl"er, prodllction
,
. needed medical supplies was started prior 10
, usdnle.
In lhill area at the ter'ninlllion of th6 war the
of substitutions Rnd local jll"OdUclion were
:I,SfIlCIOtj'. The following tnbl<l shows the num.
r. of boM'S planned fot and the qUDntity
".clBend through lOCal pl"OCurement and produc-
tion A","'<Ist 1045.
,.
III spite of the indicated efforts, deficiencies did
in certain items of medical supply,
rJicse wero atahrm, plll.$mochin, local anaesthet-
ics, X-ra)"s, n.nd precision and dental illsLnllnenls.
to manufacture those items in large
qnRntllles pro"ed unsuccessful. Their adequll.(:)'
depended on importations from Japan and these
wero not forthcoming.
As IIl6110w of medical suppliCll from Japan 10
the 90uthern region began to fall off, sUllpliC!l
produeed and procured locall)" had 10 be dis
trihll1e<lto the troops. During lhe period August
19M 10 August 194il (111)" 6,000 boxes of mooiclIl
supplies were deli"etW to the SinW'llOnl depot
from Jill'''''' Howe'-er, the reault of the selfsuf
ficient)" progralll illdieate<l "l)()"e nllo"'ed for ,he
followillg 1l1locntions:
..."" .,_.

Ploo_
P.""."""
Ill....) (bo... )
S'op-po". 1\11 ............'0. _.._._
S.... .. ""'_____ ____
11...., ... """,___.::::"'.
,-
.
.=
lI.I.,. .....,.____ _.
,.- lR.OOO
Tfltal________________
15,_
,......"'"
SoUtre: lledl""l deptlH.'ne"', ...... Ann
.... iJ3.-8cAohl"" 0/ ,"cd;",,/
/ro", 61"f/flp<m! /9H 't> .'"goo"
.....,
T.,.'
1""_.
c.. .0' __


110...... ,,'".
_
'R'b "....
,"
and
of Jnpllnese IlrlllY IlCl"SOImel
throulth deploJlncnt of troops
in the {lOll' of clLSu"lties
theatre becume ,oluminous.
priority for shipmelllS of medical
fighting troo[18 ill nurmn.
ion of rOllIes from Saigou
'mate 120,000 lroopll glLrl'isoned
of the WILl' it is estimilled llmt
total ,,'-nilnbl!> lIledicalsupply
VB {or anothcr (l month
10llet Shigllki thal thc
IlII ill SIOI"ge wcrt! IllIblaneed
me WCl"e pll'lIlifu) Qlhen:
nonexislent. lie lumpnred lhe
su1llhnte Imd variollS dis.
the eritical shorlllj.,'I'S of emetine
ochill. lIe concilided lhnt
f tl,,\ ""n-Illl stocks 10 maintnin
1_thlln one1ml f of whnt wall in-
tot.al stockpile.
IQH ... (low or medical sup.
was IlILtlsfncwlT. 1,'lull) this date
re difficult to keel) up lhe desired
The causes for this inability to
1 were ,'s follows:
I'nts of medicnl supplies from
n and Singapore) prnctically
. g of the poltS of BlLlIgkok,
'gon, and Singapore.
rine interdidioll of Ilhipping.
bing on til ,\ridl UHf> resulted
ion of medical tndories
ing de<:l'case in IlI"Odllction. (It
tI"tI 'IIII' 10SECll sustllined
of supply' dellOts lLS such.)
19411 the ,],.pllnf'!<ll AI'm)' iu Sium
prognm of ml'<.lielll supply
It '\l'B!! rellOrted by [,i,'utell""t
. thai by tI", end of the war Ollll-
ed i,ellls of medicines, "'luil"
aoquin;! II",mJ.1h 10....11 ['roduco
,...."i
'.000
4)
1,100
_ l.OOO
.-
-
-
--
'-'"
o!..ulcGl in 6i".' 0'
AIl/7M" 1915
'lobi .11.,.,.,.,..
.... IIIIlksI __"IIDI, ""'0 MOll'
stores with
.... irdIUIIJ p1aDned for Sloraf,'C it wllJl eS
u
....... tIaIt w!We the planned rescn'(l hnd
.fete.... JIl, BaP,Irok ill Ihe thre<l brlu"
........ tDIIowina: deftciellcies existed: tJboll,
...it that IIlorflll ill forwanl &n.088 WCl"O)
IIDll eould not be replenishoo.
In April 1m th" Ranaoon H\lIlPI.l' d"[)<)1
c.ptUJ'ed b,.. the AllieB ('uuinll' olr Itt :w lie".
...t of Japaneae rmy mNlie,,1 slIl,plies in
......
The al;'lual quantity of m...lie'll supplies that
ftI&Clboo the front line Inl()ps is "noi kllown, but
it small and I'elIUllffl in the inferior II"cal.
meDl of casulllu.. whirh ill turn ,drede<! t!lll
QOIIIbat 8l.renJ[th of unitll. Even the medical sup_
plies lhat IfO! tlu'Oulth to the troops were not
eomplettl in.their II8IOrtmen! for lIumerous short_
&pi plInrillled tbroullhout fhe wn'", Emetine was
The I.,k of atabrill, pl"sHlochi", ll1)(\
quinine I'tI8Ulud in 00 percent of tho COIll!t
troops eu'wing malaria of which 60 percent ,bIl
eame,ebronk l."8lIIiltl. Jo'urtherlllore 00 percc'li of
trvopll di8]Jla,yoo symptoms of bed-beri for lack
of vi"lIIin R,. There WI'n! shorlub'f!S of ,"'Ii-gas,
PJII"lHl and anti-Ielanus sera, and
dental inlllrummlll, hYl,odl'rmic uppa"lllllS, clini_
cal thermomelel"ll, ambulalLces lLlld nmbulunre
equipmenl.
It 'II'a8 indicated thai at the end of Ihe war
then WlIre availabk in Burma sunicient
of medical 8upplif/lllo maintain the 70,000 troops
there for anotlm' monlh of combat.
. -
(W, Dote 11.)
Troop. ill Siam like thOllll in Burml\ were Slip'
plied from the bale depotll at Snib'OlI nnd 5illga
pon. IIedioIJ ItIpplies IICheduled for Sialll from
II(lUl prope:r would be direcled through the
.... porta to Bangkok. ,"'rom Bangkok dis-
tribatJon fOr Itorap was made to brulLch dcp0t$.
At. She end of the WU' Ihell6 depolll contaillClI the
toDowbJ& qllalltitiel of medical supplies:
_ ftI......, .......
.... """. -- ".., .......
......... '-nw-.J
".IIIrdI2Mf ..
..................
a................ .
.... ttL ' AIa .....
......- _..-
dlf'I' 1JCIIIW
......... '1'>0 __..
1........... oftD. .... 01. _
- ...--
...
==::
..
""O&I ...rqo".olo
l_'''''1
h ..... lil-\
I.',
'''''
,
....... .........
1..... .........
.._.....
-_.
,

"
,

"

., SQlllwII ...
(Ref. UOlIS 10. II a,,<1 12.)
("RslIaltJ' e,..cuation routes from the 9l'1"eral
under lhe jurisdictiou of lhe Area
Anu)' alld Burma to the First Military
IIO!'flital in are ihown in El<hibit C.
The rlfeel of air and un"a! actio" in the re-
of tim Se,'elllh Area Arm)' ou the ...,'lLCua-
l iOIl s)'stem ns It "'hole begau 10 show in 1944.
,\ir plilrois nnd the plaut in/: of mi"es around
Siuj,'lll>ore, Ranb'OOll, Saigon, Soara-
bllJ'a, and Olher !>orl.ll, mad... na"iJ(llllon ha<\&rdoua
Rud elllr)' illto th086 l>orts Unlil
that lime hOSl,itnl ships were the onl)" l.rfJO!l of
"e!jSl'ls used in tl'lll1Sf>ortiug Ih... sick aud
be .disper!!ffi for protel:tion from air attaeb.
TIulI 9CJIllerinjt of installalions O""r large. areas
created a shortage, of manpo...er ...
lndl1"Mlua.1 hoEipitab. TMir rotleMlment further
.. tlf'd tM .situation for ambulanee colJl'S
had difficult)" in locating the insWla"
110M under e"'"I'r of darkMss. llutoal assistanoe
"'Ii dillicuh.
.\5" the flo... of c:asualtift '-ame ileariel'
patieutS attUmulated in the for...-ard area
$lallationz. TrealUM'nl ue,ertheles!l had to be
eontillued. This drained lhe rMel'W of medieal
sUI'plieol. Medieal COrp!! Ilel'!!Onnel .....re o""r-
"'orked and could not maiulaiu tM pruiousl)"
SlIlisfaelorr standard of medical More. Recu.
peralion lime of 1>IIIieillS inereased as ......11 as
th... dealh nte,
'"
field hOSl,illlls hnd to
.'2_,,,,,
12_,...
._- --:-'---J' ;:::::::::
_....... ,......,....,.
__ 12_,.
. 12_,.
____ 12_,.
._,.
,-,.

._...... 1_.... ' .....
, .::::-' of:N .._ .. ,....,.
Colooel Slllpltl. s..-ooo Ate. A...,.
the ind;';du.1 unilS in lhe field
,..i1ing situ.. tiol15 (Exhibit 8).
10 the nonnal arose.
the combat conditions e1"llI:ualion
forward area medM:.1 inst.l1a-
directl.' to the "field hospi
done to refie'-e con
front. In addition it flll:ililated
hos!,ilalizalion.
'on began to falter "'Mn
acquired col1lrol of the skies.
and 1-""'''' in imensin'
ri1"er traffic IOO"ed 0111.1" during
1n the Bunna theater
in the IntI' mOlllhs uf Il).ll!
till the end of Ihe war. n",' i'oulh
specificall.r Ihat !'Quth of
Wf'i1in expe:rie,,(1'(1 similu comli
194-1. E"en IhO!le mO"ementll
in Illiall gT'0"llS.
of motor \"ehic1l'll ",.. il"ble for
constanl1J "Ild what
rapidly be<:amll inOIM'l'lld\'e,
'WafIOns and bullock carts sUI'I,le
,",hicles, bllt lit that. !ronSI>O"
8Ilflieiel1l to ml'fll the demands
inl'J1!4Sing" Humber of CllSIII,lties.
othH snlllll riwi' craft and, in
hant weN! used wilh little sue-
and wouuded were fl"'fJUeIlIJr re-
from the frout liue!! to rl'llr area
procure medical RIIppliM locally. lltili1.ed what
eftr medicinal herbll wel'@ in lhe U'1!
and IIlll'd recl'imed bandalfP!l nnd e<jUipmen
a
nus a".-nIpl al w
oot nry SUC<'eMful,
b. UhH H ..Mwt.I MIll Norlb,u.' NIl<'
IBef. note 11.)
In OOPIn.-'ll: 10 the in.bilil.' of the .'apa
:\rm,. 10 mainl.in Ihe medi..... 1 $UPIlI)" 1'nlf!'1'I.
in the Bi9Dlardi: lind Ihe Solorno
lalands il has Iwotn indicaled bS I.ieulenant Col
nel Shipki thai the area indudin/r the Cell'
Iblmahera.nd S"orth'll"e'l!. Se'" G"inea ...
mono fortun.le.
endeamn 10 kfoeJl lhe See
ODd Area Army unitll in th... !IClluered bta
... with difticulty in Ih.. lale month! of I
." 1tiU1I of lhe in"bion of Ihe Phili
pines il '-an... ill1llOS'ible 10 deli
lhe much "UJlplie:; from Japan 10 t
llOUIbem ....eifk '-l"""l'ls laden
nwdM:.1 suppl'" deoillnaled for th_ I
<land not ""'lure !lOUlh of the Philippilll'S a
'I '-arne .-ry 10 direct "hif)ll",,,ts f
CJCblr _rem. n.e delai1 Wall to t
Seqa!h .\rea Army in 8in!fllflOre..... "0 direet
btatM-h depote in Ja'.. and Sumatra to BUPP!
10 _. 1o:'11n prior 10 this decision SOllie su
plia ..hipped 10 those areas from IIIe dtpot
at. Oaamo in J.... and the bnndl depol ia
SoBUajL 'IDe of that flro,trram is ill-
dilsted in TabIeM.
n..c. an abundant of Illedical $UI.pl
.. DOt. l'lOIIlpa.. in all items WI.!! al'parellt.
Chief aJDOJlg the shortages Wel'll tho ehar&d"
items of atabrjp, quinine, and hi"oramllL'
"l'he 1'11:1. of Allied air IlClion on Ihe Ilwdical
mppl,. siUtalion in !his arell W!l.S not wI")' signi6.
C&IIL Howevv, the constanl air 1,&IroI5 did
w.v.pt the ellorta of the .Japanese Arm)' to at'
compliM lCbedufed dilIlribulioll. Olle Sib'llifiraPI
... wtllI _HI to ha,.., resuill-d from Al1il't1 fUll-
marine action in the lorlll...loing of a .1&[1"1'-
2 mi. north of Hellado.
6. Co","" Z01Ie Et'acualioll
.""""'
The n&Coatiop 1I)stem fol' the .J"llIlIll'ill' ,\rllly
WIll eetablilbed by Ihe llJ('<lind "ff"'l'!:! blll'rAIl of
the W,:" Minilltr,. lllHI mud" sililicirutly
_ ....... I.,. ",,,,'101" u ....1
---
ta .... tit .u.&ala 6ienI opIIruionI ill
......... euppl' cIIpoIa .... -.blilbed fnJm
..... troopI ....... tfn,w .-r)' suppli-. lni.
tIIII1 ea. 1...- .,., plaaned 10 maintain
_.-h-"' '" tJM. d.pot& M.jor Aki-
lUi ....... thai .. as month .... the
IIlIIIcu'd. Ho.."', indiridual o:om.
__ woaJd rnq-tl, dulnp Ihis to
... .... wi of ,ituation.
b die _ of _eben upeditionat'y arml
... IJIIowiq' IWIlIank __..ablilbed :
.-
h.. .s
-.. .
...-. ._1
.......... M....-...... ,
_. .
At the ...... of 1M ..... tblo J.nJ of Apply ill
..__ iDdicat..t thai ....... ll.tiYe
.... I .. .I... only II. C'...
..n'S. ..pply de6cWhr_ _ ,ridmL In
s.-tn of I peftlI!ftI ip. __ppl,.
....... f-lIfIW...... ed __ .Iani' INS. n.
.... of,... .. _
,... -r-y...iIIth Army in Kala)' iDtftued
nqdI d......, .1_ 1m. bm: fOlIld lllll
.... ap to the d.ind By .... led of tile
wv. ib .ppros..... 10 peft8II. A

rnutJ.-ftmlh A.nnt) ,rw v..,.". tM6,
.... tIIat ........... .uriIJated diNetIy to die
.. of I. rr-:ta aDd
... Ii .....- .ax..u. abled.
"'" tip apply to tb6
of .......jn , ..1d ... )eM far
..... ftIlII*ti" -. or. abilitJ 10 -mtam
... .-ppIJ tu. bet_ ... dIpot at SiDppore

.........,..ue.& waaJd. be ......
b ... _It o, 1bip-
.....
-...w-",..
..till BU&aJ. dIpot till Bipth .u. Ana,
....--. to IaaiIdaiD in tile Plpe!iDe to aU jq
......... tID f.mcIIItb _ 0' medical IOpplilL
a.-.. willa pa , '. Allied all' au.eb, die-
tIibioD of ... IIlppU. .... YirtaalIJ impoa-
...
.... DviDa'" CUlpaip at OuadaJeaMlIUId
GaiDM aetlmpta ........... to Neb ....
..... woaadId fnJm the BU&W depot. v:
... ...lelo..,. the Allied air:::
.. Moa1& periock the 1....-
................ IIW ...
t, ''<<1<4/;(11) ., Ai,
(Ilef. note i.)
Ollly ll. negligible qUint it}' of casualties 1I"CTe
to by air, TIlese total 1,000 for
the eDtl1ll penod of war,
The greatest number were transported by 13
. trallsportll which had been oon.-erted
holiPltal plalll"ll. In April 1944 and again
m ;U.rch 300 casualties "'UIl to
Jll.ra,n from by way of Labuan,
Manl1&, and Tllholru. Intermittently, through-
out the war .wo more were encuated from
MAnila; ho...ever, in K.etlung Ind S.aigon, bomb.
en Ind transportll WIth little if any suitable
hospital acrommodatioM "'ere lLged.
7.
1. Iter. Ilem 1, CSSBS Inlerrogation No.
23:!,29 October
2. Rtf. Item 01, Document p""psred by
lleNOnnel of the medieaI &!fAirs bo-
mlU. Wit titled "Japanel8
Mmy-)Iedical Section."
3. Ref. Item 2. Docummt prepared by
pel'llOllnel of the medical affairs boo
mill. War .\finistry, Litled "Medical
)tinistry."
of. !ld. Iu,m 3. CSSBS Lnlerrogation 50.
Z59, l'l Xovember 1945.
5. I"'f. Item S. Table showing a..-ailahility
of medicalliUl,plies in the Eigh!b
tary di51ricu of Jal>aIl Ill! of 31 August.
1945, compiled by Lieutenant Genual
Shimizu. .\noy .\l.ain Medical
Suppl., Depot.
6. nd. hl'm G, USSBS .
269, W October 1943.
7. lid. Ilem i. ('SSBS Interrogation No.
26B, 30 (ktoblor 19U.
B, Ref. Item B, Tabulated statistial on
Japanese Arm)' casualties,. dated 10
I>e!mber and prepared by the
First l)emobili1.ltion Bureau, Tokyo,
Japan.
9. Ref, Item 9, Tables cauSlll'l for
nUlIlber of killed and wounded in
ChinA. and southern regiollll, Prtpared
b)' pel'SOllIlel of the medical affairs bu
rellll, War Millistr)', ,
10. nd. Item 10, Docllment 0" medIcal sup-
pI}' a"d e,'ncuatioll in Burma. PI'&-
Plred b)' pl'l'SOmlcl of the medical
department, Burma Are. Army.
...
able. to be moved fronl Cellu to
taJ III Manila. Both Lieutenant
Major General YO!:Ihiki
Umted Statea Air Forces com-
their evacuation system.
of casualties from the continent
a, Korea) was initially
out b)" hospital ship!! from the
i, Tsinglao, Tangku, Canton
in China, Dsi""n in :Uarn:huril
Korea. (Exhibit D). In
ion through Xorth Chinl porta
in b.'or of lhe eolliinental
to Japan "'ere but
to be consen-..d for purposes other
ualioll.
rail roule for lhe evacuation
from China cleared the Hanltou
IU'NS 10 Peiping and Tientsin and
to Mukden aud do...n Korea. to
distance across lhe Tsushima
ation hospitals in JIIlIn ...
by hospital ship. Sea evacuation
and Hong Kong ... eontinued
but bS June 1944 the destination
from Japan proper to For-
all evacuation of casullties from
to Japan stopped. Japan 11ad now
the Allied invasion of Ihe home
belore this order, vcrs fe... sick
were being mo,-ed 10 J811ln frolll
of the Philippines. .\fter!be
the onlS e.-acuatioll routell
open were thOSlO from North Chinl,
Korell, )'ct e"cn these "'ere find
difficultr in the on
air power.
lIftCUalion route could be used, but
UooIIS, ammunition. and gullS
ftitable in These were
over CASualties. Furthermol'C, the
homeland would n.oquire Inrgtl
of mpn and supplies, ClISulllti611
I) be hell")'; therefore, the
. Is for lhe treatment of sick and
the e:risting hO!:lpital facilities h8d
b July 19013 port of wns c1
10 hospital lIhip8, but transports
till SOTmiber. From Ulal time unt
lI'ebnaary 1944 only JIO"",red sailing \" Is
ned cMUaltil'll frum Ral1ffOOn to the hO!lpitB1S i
Siappore..
The BumlA-Siam nily ,;anI the Japan
Arm'! in BUnM uaother route for the I'l!cIIlO
of the iDlTN..IinI numbu of clisuallillll. Th"
ftIIlte ... not too saddactory. Trains ...en
able 10 Nn'J' numbiol"ll of patientll at an
_ time. FacilitiN for treatment and
an were poor and Allied air strikes delay
a.:- h1utntl,..
of during the pe'
April-Kay 1,... aIoDg the Burma-Si.m nil
.. utremeIy Bombings and Slnfi
deItroyed ra.Uro-dB and bridge! and the pe
WIt -u1 rr.ina delayed ""pairs. Motor I
port ... 10 but i18 ill!lUfficiellCJ no:sull
iD 1llaD1 c:..u.ltiell _!.king the diSl.')(e fro
)(oalmejn to Bugkok.
1lIII'iDA: the period June to Seillembl'r I
Ioods ....abed ....., nUIneTOll!! .nd
..... beds. MOftIIRIIt of casualties .IOllj!
B.--Siam nil...., ""t.rded, for
cou&d pt throuIth as .11ocated mainly
..witu1 DfIMtd for combat opent
..... dais pwiod oo.l)" 30 percent of the !IChedu
.-.at of -wtieB 1tall e,'&Cu.led from Bu
........
J'lUD 8lUIgtok encuation 10 Sing-llOrt COQ1
be falOIDPliIbed by hoIlpital ship or onli
tnMpoIt& n- __ not .I.... )s Il...
a1Ulllber of patien18 increa.9td, the
llIJI iJI BtaDpot had to be enlarboOO 10 all!'
.....,. three tm. their normal capacilY
81M) tincthe _ e"acuation to Sinb""rore
,... .... the overland nil mo'une
...the llaJay peniJulula but it goI"e iU
,-t Ie tile -cion progMun in thai Iret-
a- _eb" __ alllO e,.ellated froln Bang-
"toSUp..
r. PIIIII"..,
(Bet ..u.)
In &hit Philippine Iftlands after the
... forOII landed on Ley1.e, the
... boIpit&JiJation ot Japanese Cll!llln
ltlllS
__ 'fiIIu1ly impollible. Air 8trikes co:;
........... at ..a16l" and Innd
II ,mh-tioD. E'Ql:1Iatioll to Jnpan "'.1 II'
l' t _ during th6 cnmpnigll onl)' I

.. ... ..

... ... now
"... .. .. .. ..
.. UN .. ..
"
.. u
'...
...
- -

.... - - ... -
r.-" mon ........
S t .....
.......... .....-.,. fol'tIlI
... 'n"II 1IiIi. III J 10 CIllII--'
.,.__ -
'nil 10 eDDtiPI &he diItriIJgt.joD. of
...., W..,. bMl: 10 J....
., '.W Bfta ..
.............. --.._ i_....
..... of IafIPlM ud. 1M ..,..,..
.....,....WDOp&
........ baIpbaIIllWaYia 10 the F"mt
IIiIiM7 IIIIpitlII Bmppon ..;"",
of ItIee dined1 a6fted by air --
.. -ail hJ1 of 1MI. BY- d the ..
............ of , ';'---
-. .
n. t of Jtiee '"* s.-tn to
...... .. ......... widt 10 ...,.
-W V.-II -ad tra_ tb-."..
........ d-. ... .., ................
...........,lUI' IUMb.
.. ... __of_ ... -.w
_nWi...,..u cr-
pIIti put" E ' I iD n ........
....... of ........ ..-.n- MtiYIQ' ....
.. dIM ...
.................-t_
T.... 01 Itiee iIIIo ... Sifon nrc
IIIBuJ _ lIM .......
...... rr ...... ......
.._.ft8IIIIIfDr_ ! .0111._
..... Mirto"" Jed Ia ..... to
.................-..1bI J'int1lilituJ
IIIlIiI:Il Ina b
__of _ .. IJlIlOO
-
"IlirIt of I In.
... ', tn. _ ...
'-lit" U IF rr III I ....
__ '7 " fI __ ..
........................ JQI;I

'H' 'H' .- 'H' .-

.-
-

.-
".jIlJ(l I'!"I-I
"..
.... :I,Oe'.ooo
1,310 ,.,

.-
1-
31.!:II 'd.no
.... ......
.-
-
..... ....
..""
---
.H_
.-
..... ......

.,

------
....
- -------


113'- 'lUi.ISi
.-
,w'"' a.oXl,7.'
"'"
.....
.-
...... ....... ......
-
-
.....
-
- --
.....
-
..- .-
,... .....
.-
M_
.-
.... ....
..-
'.-
-
.... ....
...-
13.000 10.000
.-
- - -
.- .-
.....
-
13:'-
-
.... ,...
-
.."" "...
....
--
u. ....
-
.- -...
...... ...... .......
,-
....
.-
....
.-
....
-
.....
,....
,-
..- ...-
u_
.-
.,- 1110.000
"'" -
.... .-
....
.-
.... .....
-
-
... ..... ...-
.-
...
.-
-
....
.-
...... ...... ...... .... .......
2.000
-
10.000
--
.-
... .....
-...
"'"
...
.-
-
......
-
...... .......
-----
------ -----
I._
-
,...
----------
2'1.:.00 ..... .....
..... ,.-
31.100
UO,OOO
_.-
_...
1.+01.000
"'"
...
"...
..-
......
......
.-
.....
----
---- --
------

,....
101
..--
........ n..-
.....-
011,10'
J... 211 =,.
,--
2,1lP3.1..
I.UO. 1.;o:.:lIl
-
...,..13:
C(I/qMl 1_. Ktphmi._lledic.l
.-t. Bunna Arm Anny
ColoNl S...........-}[edical
ment, China t:speditinllllry Anny,
OolUMl Tak6J,uki, Ttt.ltlo.-M
cal .,.in burMu, War llinistry.
('oiOfid lJiNta..-)[edical de
IIIlIPt, 7tb -'ra ArIIIy.
cot-/ SAigaki, KQ..l:\<O.-Med"
del-rtment, Eighteenth Area Arm)',
Ctbtwl lighMhi, KaneylHhi.
Medtc:al deputmeert. Eil(bteenth Area Army.
JlMornip, Shig<!'mfcAi.-Mbdieal
pt.rtmftJt, China Exptditionu)' Army.
I/(ljur Yamagwhi. Togo.-)[ediCfll depa
JDeDt, Donna Area Arm)',
lIaior OU!4i. M_.-lIedical departme
Burma AJ"N Army.
A.a.n..n. G.mgi_:Medical lIffai"
rean. War Ministry.
If.jtw JlaLrwNI9l1, Tmlqmll.-:lledieal
baNaa. War Yinill:ry.
Jllljqr- )-odinwm, Natll/o.-:Medieal
buJoeau, War Ministry.
lI.jtw Ofllli4.-Medieal department,
_A=1.
9. l.bt ., &.6/1,
A. .. of -,,,CIl tbe
-' _ AlIa _r. PftPfored b)' tile Flnt
_IIMIIoa 1lI1D....,.. Tol<)'o, J_tIII".... 01
_....
B. .... .,._ 01 _II)' f"t_"""UOll-J_JIiI_
C. ea-a!11 _dOll """,-.I_pall_ Al1Il)'. '"
--
D. .1...- Ana'1 _It)' rout..
.............. perlodo of Lbe e' IlMt
J.." 1Mt, .1_.,. 19M 10 )1.)' 11M&.
... ....
..
11. ad. Ia- 11, J)ocn ...... --...
.., .._ tiM- iD s-. f'NIIu-l
., pw ..... of 1M -ncaa cIIpr'--
..... Eiaf't-"'h A.- AnBJ
II. Bet Ii, noe-era& OIl ....neal .ap-
ply ud .-..doa .. tbI ....
_ ...
s.-IhAnaAnq
11. Bet. 1l, 1II.... OIl iJd;wroptioDt of
Itd.-.of'"mIllieaI

u. Bel. l.- If., GIl IlIedXaI ....

by .--- of the JDIldicsl
putJI*lt, Fom-th Area AJm1.
8. , ......,.,-
a.pt.er VI, K. A. D. KedicU
bued 011 intanuptklwl of 1M foDowiDI J .....
_ penonoel
r..w-t o..-z 8........ B_ji.---Chid
.., .ppI,. banP, Uld &nil" --
..-ws_ill depot..
Lir'-' 0--' Koit'.\i.-Fint
n-cbilizatioD 8__ (u of Octobet' lid).
Prior to SepttmW UNA Chief JI.mcaI
..... EiPth AnoJ. (Lieat_1d. o-raI
W...... ....t.tituted iu illlft'l'OtPl-- fw
u--nant Genenl JUmit.,uhi. ehitt. medical
".u. bora... War Mi.u.ry. IUId thief 6eJd
..u.I dirertorate. iMpedor ...-at liM of
___...... who ... IItriduIa with .. -
bnI ill the -'1 ,.n. of Qd.oIler
....,
o-.z Nahii--......aaief-weaJ.
........... Fum-th A.- ArmJ
JI.,.fJ-.l y ..ww,Jt-.--Qaid....sx.I
....'_', 'l1Urt1
6ftb
.u.y.
-
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EXH1811 I
Rv,.."'''''''
C""...,I.K.,,
GM....I l,.." ...ft'
Hon>,tol,
,n
Tho"" ,""yO Hotp,ool
('K_.",,-d
",hobol,IOI''''')
No',o",,1 W.lfo,. M'"""1 HO,pllOI,
...d tho.. "",."ft" d'Kho".d
1,0"' the A,..y)
A...y (_I..,
Po",' -d C,-""" Stot_
Anoy """'-"
(H""",*_, OsoI<o, HoI.oIO,
Moj" r....yO, v....oI>o-)
,
(- - -
,
,
1_ _ _ _ '",o''''.ft' 0fICl
,
: - - - - - ; f,.1d Ho..o.lol
L,ft. 01 c-...... ..j s.-,,,,,,,
Ho\llMIOI
MEDICAL
THE SYSTEM OF CASUALTY EVACUATION
JAPANESE ARMY
CHINA
LEGEND
FROM
....-"',.._.
......_0 oop,,." <-&..
c(I:D) "0 ._'n ..
, .....fu l
o .,.... NUl
o .ULL .....
' 'l,LU
."""ToU
c "' ..... __c&T_
ill " ..
.;\ L"'.O t._....... _
!i. .op,,",
"" co_.".....
LI', '" ........".n... _.,
....".,
_OUI...
_o,'Un
...........

""""OO'
.. ..
"
.. .
,,,,,,.," '''' "
.oo ...
.... ,... '...
.......,
" "
'.
,

"

"

'"
EVACUATION
"
..........
CUO.'e .eALE
t. ", .. ($
CASUALTY
EXHIJIT C
t MoIttaty How, ...!
SoIt-. F. r (
11 ........., How,,.,'
10 ........ 1,,"- ......,
.._-
_....
-
JAI'- _<NJw..lY EVACUAlION
IIOUIII. - lEGIONS
,

,..". :"
I'"%trIi
_... ,
....... ,
,
, '
, ,.
...,
0Id_ HOIOlTAL Jo------,
lNWOE
111..........
......-..
111 .......... _-..
1_=::;::::;!=:;.:,::':::":::' '_I----
CASUALTY EVACUATION ROU T E S
CHINA FROM
LEGEND
_T
_0"", L......
C(C
I:) .".......1
e>
"'T" >IM',,-U
o .....- ._" ...._. -..
......'OL
_""",e.'_
<1'I.JOP.<C".C"" o. <.....co'_.
._IT'c
11'" ...... c,.,'" ..-......
,,_ _
.....''''C
.........'lOL
... ..,',':t ......_ "...
L...........
.....' ... .. .. ..
,. ,.
,.. .
."" '. '00' ,..",,,..000 ,0'0
......,..
"
..
.,6
",
'0
,.....I
"...
EVACUATION
ROU T ES
.nu ",y P9' lOUll"'S "", '(!bOO NO
[\IIo(IJ,\T1(lf< _CMl"'Ill __"tl'II01TTt:O
"U[ ."'[0 0HI.""A11 os 'M[
_Ul' 1M 1"1: ""UO'!SOIIL. &11(0'1
1IOU10 1M no"
...... INOII;..Tf! fIiO 'l,"'"
CASUALTY ARMY CHIN A
LEGEND
FROM

..
, ...

".
..' _.- ... ' ...
..
"
"
_Of"
I:l -.-0"OI''''C .... 01
0_
c _10....
o --._,.
.... '.1I1Cl.1I
_.
......... ,..., ..... 'nI ....
......_.-_TlD _-
__,.....--01"'.
-
...
CIfAPTI!R VII
OOMBAT ZONE LOGISTICS
'"
'"
o 1Il0"? ant! distribUUlthis trOOpS
un.d supplies, the Japanese 1>08!lt':S!led the world'.
third luerchant fleet. With the Japllne86
Navy In OOl1l1lllllld of the 8ell!I in th_ areas, the
ltl1lleared to be well on the way to a
sUe<:es8ful OOllqllest of great empil'l!:_ In euly
1942, their Ilre!lent and future sllpl'l)-, position
kenleU as'lured. Furthermol'l,', the Allies had
been unable 10 Oppose the SOllthw,n1 adnnee
with fOn:e& strong to check it.
3, The lapQlltse to Southeast;
11lvade Solomolls
B)" 19-12. the Japllnest pl1Jihing east of
their originlll objective hlld invaded the Solomon
Islands. This move W&8 made in onler to form
lin Ol1ler rin/! of defense to protect their gains
in Ihe !lOllth. SUPI,I}' base!:; .....I'l!: built up
throughOl1t the islllnd!. The usual prooedure
wu 10 hue IlIrl-oe bese on the islllnd ...here
the al'l,'S IInny headquarters 'Il1lS located: then to
iTl!ltall on the ...here subor-
dinate unit., "'ere located_ The pllln for
:I IIlOnths' lenl of supplies of all <:lasses in the
llrea ann.,- dtpot: !'illoon:linille IIaSl!9 were to
CIlITJ II like level of lIupplie;:. basted on their re-
specti,-e lroop .>trenj..'ths IE:thibit .\ gin!li loca-
lion of IM-. ("h,,"- 1 alld Ref_ note 3)_
OI1r .ir .nd SlIrfllCe activily IIpinst their
shipping illCrea!:itd the JIIllIlnege began to realize
thllt ... ith their I,resellt Slock I.. rels they ...ould
he unable 10 sustain their lroopS. They no'"
Illllnntd to stock II JeIlr's supply al tbeir
depot io Ih""ul. Sew Brilain_ This plan faJied,
due to our submuine and lIir aetinty. On 2
:\fllrth l!H2. durin/! the J.plll1eSll landing at I.e
'and Salamllnll_ Sew Guinell. our earrier planes
sank 15 ,e.--elq dell}'injZ the Jllpanese much
11\le(leo:l n>inrorcemNltli and SlIpplil'!l. In :\fa}' 1942
onr earrier pllll(';l I"OlIleo:l a larl->e .Japanesl! ron-
'-0,' ailned lit Port .\Ion"!lb}'. SlInk or damllged
larl-ot' ,'e".. thus atfon:linjZ Port a
111''' 11'11"'" 011 life. This "'IIS the first major de-
fellt for the ,'lLllaue<le. Colonel
,'Olila 'or the of loss In
i'1l11Sit. [ e;;lIl1l111e that not more tha11 50 yer-
cent 1'l'llcl1l'd the trool)8 all long" hallis. 1'.1"0111
\\'1l"'llk to 1I0t morc than 20 percent arrll-oo_
III l1\\' 0l'illion, the gl'l'atest of IOS!I
WIIS c'a1lsed br air attacks." Lieutenant
Shirai has this to Sll}': ':Thl'.l'e was
slock at Iloul.,,"inville, but It con.ld be dell\-
{.red 10 Torokilill IJ(!CllUS8 of all' actIOn. Wau
and equipment. wero light. III
and JIlVU. invasions the Jallll_
at rear Rrea8 much of their SUI)_
t and went in "light." l\l!ljor
,who was on the StRfI' of the
which invaded Java, statell that
enroute to Jan wel"O! stopped III
northern Rol"llOOllnd Indo-China
nt, WBb'OllS and horses wel"O! ofr,
the com'oy to truel at a fllster
,. none of the off,loaded milterilll'
ed later to the Sixteenth Army
farther statell lhaL opposition WII!!
maUt>r of about a week the main
W been secured. The forces in-
JIeh .reas "'t>1"'l expected to folio,,'
potic), of "Ih'in/! off the
t Colonel Wadll, first !'tion_
I Staff, who pnrticipllted in the
states that: "In Ih.. Philip-
lpIite a differtnt mIlUt>r: th.. first
..nt in were 90 badly bellten in the
the Japllnese thllt the}' wel"t' roe.-
lJIt"Ci.lly trained. more heavily
" _u result of Ihi! re"et"lll!'
thllt all dh'isioll5 would han
... ilh hea,-ier IIrtiller}' (10 em.
III em). no...e,-er. Lieutenant Colo-
:tIItber st.tes: "1l1is "'-as ne'-er 1lC'
I. order to 1"" tile r'dory
it leal alw "ue.ooary lor tile
iIIt-rwo_ tile ""ngtn 01 their air
for the first time, Ihe Japllnese
the short-('Orningll of Ultir pillns.,
..uipmtnt (Rtf. nolt'S 1 lind 2),
lava., lind the Jar-n_
suppl,}' position throu/!h Ihe
...,.ured. The Brilish eo:luiprnent
"ined to II larj..'t! de,i:rl't'
in the Burmll "tell Ih1"01I/!1i011l
"r. In the .h.-II-BornM 11M'S !lOme
hnd been de<;lroretl OI'I'l"-f'M'
l
r
ftr, n\lLllY wel1' found illllict or
loIaI,. repllirs. The .]aplllle5ll
uee clothes, shoes, Clln"IlS, Iires.
and mllny olher items of militar),
acquired, ill JU"f\, 8ll\'erul thou-
""hicles in '-III'ions oonditious of
The unSl'I-,'jceuble "ehicles ...er1l
of spare pllrls for 1I11,intClIlIllce
ler1'i,*nble piecl'S of Cf(.ui]lrnent.
..it" 011 this E:t!ljlJit ,\, Ifd.
bfen mu("h improvN. Se,'erthelelill. the
had _n to allnllllate 8uDicieni milil1r1
supplifOI in tM JIlSJ1I prior 10 the actulli Slut of
1M 1rar 10 ronrinct' the Imperi.1 General Stall
that plarnwd military Opl!ralions rould be 11Ip-
Japa_ tsIilllatell of Ihe qualltll,.
and types of Ittipnwnt and slllllilies N!qllirtd
to lIlI('CtiI5ftt1J,. a major ..... r wert ""!itd
larply on eJ:pH1enoe!I itt the
and the Sino-Japa.- Wan. Some smllll influ-
Ollt nerted bytbe uperiellce'l of the IIllljot
plwen itt World War J and the ,-er)' early part
of World War 11. It ill e.-ident that the est!-
mateI _I'll! not t..d on the I)'pe of ....1Or in whICh
the Ja..- finally invoh'ed themsth'_ .
regarded RU!8i. I.!J her most Illlllllllwt
_,.. Japan bad for several ,-elln ronceutrll.ttd
her military stftllllh in )bnchllrill and
II wu on 1M reIOIlf'll!fl in militlOr)' sllpplles u'
isille in this ... thai the Jllpanese depemlfd
for the initial support of their armies. III fllct,
ill ltil aDd arl,. 1M2, the bulk of the lrOOP!
and ",ppli.. for tbe penelratioll to til(' Southfl11
Pacific area came from lbnchuria lIud (1nn.
The uterlt of lhew raoUrce8 is nOI known. but
.., proYed to be lIUftkient. to provide
IU1 .apport ..ina the type of 0PI)O!lltlOll til
eouDtend (Rd. noe.. l, 4,6). . kl
". plan of the J.pan_ WlIS to seir.e qUle - y
the neotIl'CIIl mh arNll of Indo-C!lilla, Mal_?.,
Burma, Siltllllpore, the NetherllLllds EIIsI
and the Philippine. befure efTt..:ti.-e
00II1d he blilhed. Inll:!nsiVc C:tI'IOllllllO!l ,0
tJae. ..... would pruvide the ntO()eS!:lI,ry
.. , ,he
and materials With whIch 10 prolleC
ll
C b-
in ita lat8r llt&fif1llL From these wOlild 1/1' 0
. .. ,." ",,,"
taiMd Itleh lIONly NJl'I(led It ... rnB I,g rICe, ., I f
team, mbber. _USil.., lin, irV1I, lind COpl'1t (I r..
--1.,2). the
IJa all but the Philippine!! Iwd UUl"lua: ....
J
. IIdIIIU'--
met wllh euy 8I1Cce8ll_ ',:tl";'
1.1.........
..... foDolriac NpOI't OIl eombac __ JoPtim
.. ..,. 'A .... 1IliIitU)' ,fett of Allied air
aaaeb em tbII -wlJ of __t mUu of ....
1..- fWd dllrin pmod f..-
lIIonIy aftIr Itart of .... war lUltil the IIlI'-
...... 011 15A..,.e 1M6.
8lDoe tbe J.,.- Army OIl orden &om 1m-
,... lleld:(aan.- deItI'o)'MI an of it. recordI
1& .... tim! of Uta
e-W pat M obtahwl Ko.l of the data ,..
...... ha... t.. obtaiMd ..
...... and....-n 10 .....tonnau. MabaUtted
Ie JIlilitar'y In _ in-
.... .-rTI_ of ... of the maD1 ......
..u- _lIch were foqht ill the n...--t
..... Utd "ouIpoM anu" of the wuc. Pac:iIe
.."" DOl t.m ...i1ablt for in-.noptioD.
To 1IDdfIlIland ad aptm<'iatt- tt.. Itat. of
1lIPPI1 of 1M leld fOf'('S in the ..,.,
IIPriDI' of :Hi, _hen OW' lint -... bid. aU
imp:JrtaDt Ur auacb ...... b...d ....... of
the eftlDta and M'tton. that tnRllpired aDd .t
hcted 1.,..- prior 10 that is
forth La ta plln.,rrapbl wbich 'olkrtl' imIDe-
diUel,. Farther information on this period
will aJeo be fOUDd in Annu: i, a. and .. on ChiD&,
Barma, and Siam.
2. !lel_.' /.,..... S.ppl, P._
PriM I. Aprill9f2
The drah 01 the world', raw mawrial. 10
pm. the .,r In Europe. plWl the eronotnic laDe-
tioDI imp:-l on Jlpan .tt.r thl/' sijlnina of the
Triple Alliance Pirt in 1940, had diltinct ef
ta on thB accumulation of militar1 lappl_
bJ the JIIpUIeIe in the roonth8 immedllU11
Pf*'IlI1nI: Deaember tNt. Had the JaJlU*l
"- ....u.d to import raw maI.er'iU ad
r'd:b-:J lit will daring this period. IWr ...
pi, poeiliaD. ....... II.art of the WU' would ...
...
.... .a deteaM ..... ba&
.... ., ."., ,..... to
..... iD. tht 8I&Wuua W.
................ toholdW ...
8llIIIb' lM.. ww." It became IDQIIl
.......... for &he .1...... to kelp I.beir
....., ....... nmoritinaIlIotk 1eftII ....
_ &Iaat the CIOIDhat ....,.., of
........ _ Nd.-L Ala __pie of thiI
tW ill .........pt to I'UIlfuo ........ IIDlI
...... _ 1M ud Sal IUDI of their
.- s.:- of the tr'tIoI- .... able
to .... ..,. ))1_& ]11 aU equipment wu
..... Ill .... to p tt- tl'OOfl8., it ...
.-r'J to tUe eqm &om t_
pordJ --. lI'OOf& _at of
tI&iI, ., tr'tIoI- __ oDl1 about $0 pe!"-
e.- , E......... the .....,. .no- ebortqI
of t-l. --me.. U1tiaift:raf& ..... U1titaDk
PM... lad ......... eriUc:aI IiW. DOteI
"Il.
Bl the &iDe ... tot- IaDded Guad.......
1
(.bpI& lI42), ., "''''- _homed:
wiIEI __jor :optical plobJemL Oar air
...... Upir ..m IUppJl dIpoU tM
""'- to diIpIne their IkItb into _1
--",.......................,.
the -.NcpenhonI of the depot&. The __
did the "'..... __ takiq ... dPliWll!rin sup-
pH. m. Ueir 11.- to the flOIIIhet lroope IlUI ..
hiP .. 70 peraaL Qf .. fifoJd pta. _hidI
r.cbad &he Gaadabbal 'IleadIeI 1WIbP ..... "...
... iato poAIlOD ct. to Iadr of lnDIporbtioD.
to _ IJ.m .. the be.ma Vo.t of-u..
....... the dinrt ....tt of air UIiI Pl'1IM&
adioa,. Ordft wen ci- to lhe ....n 1.....
tJpI -a.. which wen ...... -t to -wJl
the oa&IJia--. to b.... the Ihon line to -...
die teDiq: lIow. of oar PT boaIa. Thil did aot
'-'. the eIottI of our air attack. In &ec., (11II'
... aeciTit7 ... beiDa iDleIIIiW. .... it ......
i ......... tlr die "''''- 10 pt eftIl -n
...... of -.pp1iel to the VoopL WbIII IhiI
p1UI. failed, the tl'oopI wen left 011 their on
.nth -JfMr WMplIU larpr Ihu riAL 'Ibe7
had to In. the Imd or perieb. Their IaclI: of
caued bJ the Ibortap of lOp-
pilei, it matter of reootd (Bet. DOl.- 1,").
.Aoclordq: to LieutaaDt GeDenI IIiJuUi,
cbWof lid, in the Solomon 0I*'ad0u'
.... criticaJ-.. bad 80,000 tIoope .... tUiItDd
........... food or ammUDitioa. Wd ...
.. to Toqo aDd Baballl that ...
food or starVe. III Oetobu and NovemOOt' two
CIlIUQJlI oonaisting of five or six Illl'g:e n:sscl!l,
.hb air and ... protet'tion, 'H're RCII1. 'I'he
UDiIId StatN Air Foree and Rurfllce CI1Lf! lit
aobd QS ,..ith thE' .-It !Jlat W\' 80
of ..... lIIppliel:l. We .... 10 lowel' our rite
ntioo to one GO llba nomlf.1 ration of rice is
eix GO) and ate IIIIId erabl.. alld ro-
...... this 10\ll.red eMU' roJllbat E'fficil'llt} at Il'pst
00 ,..emt" {lWf.1IOte 18).
"'We thE"n UIII1 fut. de8tro}"N"S. They ..ot
to the b.t_ wt ....re found bJ Your
PT boats and between your air forees lind' PT
...... our .... wen too Ir""I't-we gaye up.
Sed.. we put nee and _It in !j5 gallon drums.
Ullin :;o..eo to IIIab a raft. Thl"!'e were sent. to
CouadakaDal by fat deMroyE'rs which dropped
thE" drums ... the _ d.. to shore but most of
tJ- nits hu up 011 the llround 1M
iBIaDd. Two hundnd. thou....nd of thl"!'(' dnLtllS
0111,. permnl rE'aChed the lroops.
W.,.ve up this idea. SE'lIl."'E' uS('(l
foocb weft' put in rubber bags. 60
en. to the . on- weft ,..I..sed undu ter
and as they IIIoUed to 1M surface. men onld
....... for tJ-. This,..u not suCCtS!iful: "II"
Jolt 10.000 __ of llbippinp 10 air Illuck .nd
IIII'faN actioo.
Of the ao.ooo ..... on Guadalcanal. o\-er 10.
000 .- paL_ Of artion of laek o'
footL No IUJIPl!r- came in for 4 months. Qnr
Ijmy ... go1M'. An a!templ ..-.s
..... to aod two more divililions. tile Sixth .nd
&be 1'weDtieth. 1lIe Twentieth Division wu ill
the ...... ana aDd the BUlh Di ...is.ion on Bon
pUmUe. 81 thia U- both Ihe Ibbaul al1'a.nd
the ana het_ Boupinville and GUlIdllicanal
.... iJo..-bie due to .ir a1tacks. We had Joe;t
all :bope of ret.akiDt' Guadalcanal. The weal
... t1Ie _ of our clIpllcil}' 10 11I0
II:IMp to the tin,: a"ms' (Exhibil III.
Ia the .,,11 put of IN3, it 'beellme apparent
to .... "'''''- that they ,..ould be uu.ble to
maipllia aDd pnItec:t their lines.
Thil ... dOll to the initial of the Allied
tor... h1roada 011 the Japan_
bJ oar IIUbmariMs and aircrtlft ninde il 1111-
for the to rl!Suppl" man)'
ilJuttl bua As a of this. comblLt tl'OOp5
OOC1IP1ing thMI .... wIre left wilh i1l1ulcqllPte
IaIIPi* of ammunicion fuel uud rnnllY
. . ,....... ., I
o&b.- n.ma ftlIQired for maintl'IIlLllC6 of COlli':"
...... A. Japane. oonvoy on its WII)' to rtill'
on :'1 March 1:).13, "liS
all' !Lud the cnt ire l'Onl'O)'
lOS!! was I dcslt'O)'ers. 121mns-
as ','.ell us 15,000 troops. Th6
SlllPS slIlretl'(lthe S.nlue fate.
reinfol"(:1.'11lcnts from rellching
Toyanm states that in February
t of the original llumber of
Quadaleanal were serl'iceable aud
were upected.
0/ Air Action 011 Truk
of the war, Trllk was oon-
supplJ depot for the Japanese
Soutlr...est Pacific area and fur
to Rabaul, the Mars!laUs, Gil-
and .\larillnas. 1'nIk al!JO
for OOll\-O.)ll and fleet unila.
there were established the follo,..-
fourth fleet supplJ h..dqu.r.
fourth air arsenal. fOUrUl
Itores department. These uuits
1Irith appro][im.tely 50 of
personnel and 1,bOO c:iriliallB.
totaled around 160,000 !!CIu.re
as follows: fuel, 50/100: pro-
I aviation spare parts, gen-
; and ammunition. 38.000 8rJu.re
_lll.llned to carr" one ..tS
-.es of supplies for 100,000 men.
put'of 19-14 the J.panese had a
of the planned stock le,'els. As
'Ii!...... and ship siuking!; became
halIe 1Iras supplied directly from
.... its position as supply depot
attack in Februal)' HI4.... C.pt.in
. I JaplInese X."y. st.te!!: "-ne'
!IUds in February 1944 there ,,'ere
nd facilities.
an the pro"isions, clothing and
'INre lost, Most. of the 1I.,iation
remained, npproxilllntely 20 per-
ordnanee supplies, approxil1lntel)'
put underground. Bombs lind
1Irel1' dispersed throughout ule
the Saipnn cllmpuign 1her(' WIIS
11 of pro"isio1Js due 10 the JlIllll-
being cut.. The Ins1 ship
in June 1944.
the existing slock WIIS deS1l"oycd
earriE'r mid 01\ IG-17 fo'cb1'1IUl"}'
only about 600 IOns lifter 1hC$ll
qded lhe dcsnllcti"n of thl' fol-
",
l\1wilW I ..
_ .. 'II Il'>l: 7" IlClwnl' r".1
III IICr!"e. I '. ' u ,
"
I ,,' 111'11111\111 SI'IU1l !l1lr!S, 6:' lll'rl'l'nt'
U 1m", "" IlCl"(, I '" ' II" E'II nl\( 1l1ll1l1111111Lon.;I,) pereenl
! Ill'ill)' ." rtnlllined unda;uased
t lese and this completel)' eliminated 'rruk
as II Innlor baSI'.
further marked in the defel1sive
e IClencr of 'rruk was the lack of nntiaireraft
atlUUllnltlon; rationing" was. necessar)' from the
already low sUPlllr. Due to their greatl" de-
pIcted of anti.ircraft ammunition,
for .ddillon.l qu.ntities b,' dil'l!Ct ...ire ...
'1'_'. ere
Sl"nt to uoi.}'O. bul ucelll for some sm.lI ship-
menu. m;ell'ed b)' subm.rine (estim.(ed by
Captalft MiyuakL "only 200 rounds of .ntiair-
craft.ammunition \Il('.re deli"ered by this means.")
nohE'lpenrre.chedtllel1l. '
to our raids, 2.:i fishing boats of .p-
llroxlm.tel} !!.} tons capacity ..ere ..... ilable to
provide _food. During our .nack 23 of the 25
boats ...tre sunk. TIlis cut off the supply of fish
,..hieh ..as. badlJ needed .1. tbis time..
The J.llIIntse units pl.nted S1<eet pot.loes
..hich "'E're the sah'.tion of Ihe garri.-m. When
the s,..tet potato croll ..a.:. le:an and no other
foodStuffs "'('.11' .\..1I.ble. .nd rats "ere
e:aten for suninl.
The island itJ!lelf .-as on lhe brink of starT.-
lion after our .uaek, TIlE' destruction of sea
transport.tion prol'"ed most fatal to Tnik. It
IlJe.nl the ..nd of this isl.nd as .n operating
buE', The isl.nd. minus _ lransport.tion. had
to be (Exhibit C. Ref. notes i,
8.9) .
5, U. S, Foret'S Philippi,ltl
In .JunE' 19-14, the .Tapanese had suffered such
he."" losses in their isl.nd through
failure of Ihat the}' planned to m.ke
Sland ill the Philippine!!. TIle}' re.lized 1hat if
ther losl 1he Philippines our air po..-er would
be in a position 10 eut off completely their sup-
pI\' .ild SIOII all shipping to and from lhe south.
'rids wouJc1 mE'au that Ihe J.IIRnese troops in
1hc llQulhenl .rea lI'ould hal'e to "Ih'c off the
land" culireh' Rnd the homeland itself would
face cril i!"11.1 shorluf.'t9 of ,'ila")' ueeded materials.
'\5 for col1lbllt equilmJt>nl, such l\.!I mllchine guns,
Illltil,it"(,I1,ft /o,'1UlS, antitank guns, lind luger
ficlt! piccos.. II.nd the Ilm11llLII;1ion for these weap
ons, the olltlook Wl\.!I hopelcss,
l,iclllenll.lll Colollcl 'I'OJIlIlHl SlatE'S: "Thill up to
IOH i1 \\"115 llh,uncd to u!ll'Ithe Philippines to
..,
......, "d....... clown 10 N.... ow-
.. '-11M, _10 au' MtioD, it_..,..
... .,... .. U- GD all .uppIieI _ 10
............. ..
"" I.- ..... iD "'_ ltM 10 J.iId
IWrIlldl: 1Imrk in tIM ....rnw-, .... -.iD
....... IlIII .... MmiJa ana. ,... .-pply
.... _10 ...-..1 10 mpport the idud t..L
..............1PI-tI _10 be.-t to.p-
",. )&de.... Leyte, and 0Ibu. AI for I-,
.."... Wft to be lnIcbd &am the depot to
die combI.l troopiI (Rtf. nohII oi. 10, 11).
Up 10 AqaIt. I'" e9W)'1hiDg ..... going ..,.
ootdiDa to plan. bul in September our .ir force
and _ ,",wei' began to take hN.T)' toU of the
J.,.... I1pply shipll. AI the time of our land
ing on Le)te, 20 October 1fl.U. the had
Oft hand in Manila only eo per'l.'('hl of what they
had pl.nlllld. During .ir auadm on Marcus
laJand on 90rl0ber. Ryukywl on lhe loth. Fonno-
011 the 12th and. 13th. Kanila 011 the 15th and
17th. oar tlanee .uk 128 shipa of an kiDds and
a-pd 1l4. of tM ftIIDpply of llWly
Wly --.. iu.s. MOlIl of the IIhortaps _.
siQd of II gaDS. .\T guns. 6e1d pieces., and
lUlIIDwUtiol of all I,.... TnK'D and fuel 1I"ffl'
"Wai1abJe n limited quantitiM. AItboIlgb the
IIocII: 1Pe.. were far helow I.... plaDDed for
tb. mpplyiDtl' of the PbilippiftN r.nd the lIOQlh-
tom U"N, there with _ exceptions, suIl
CMmt unolntl on hand fol' the deten. of the
PbilippiQQ. Major '0.._1 Niehimura Illatee,
"At the btginning, in October 1944, we had suf
ficient suWlil!ll on Luzon. There were no short
... of uything. Since Manila wu the main
dtopot. fol' :he entire IIllIrthern uea, it w.. bJ far
the IlKllC. important. TIM. dumps contUMd
eIMJaIb fo)d and dothing to 1&IIl the orpniza.
tioaa tht7...-l froIa I to 2 moratha. We al....,.
triIId to IMp at Ieut 2 1DOath8' 8IIpply of n.-
011 Roef. OOU'II". 10. 11).
"' he'ore the inftSioll. tJwn .... oDly _
laJlU*8 (tlda) Oft u,te to oppca
die Cnitd States JaDdiDc. Thia dirilioa ....
-n-eqain-d and IlIppIjed. n-.-ppIiea iDA
ebIdId -all I.IDmllDit.ioa for _ week of in
...... ftPating. and food for _........ ......
..., thoI1Ip at this time ..... in rkiL In ordlIr
to cl8f8Dd uyte, it ..... n--.zy to .ad addi-
tioDal mel and suppliefJ to that polnL ar.t d.
tort. ....... made to _d mlllD. and llUppIieI to
I.yte. but molt of the _Is ..... ..u bJ air
actioIL CD. 10 SoYeJUber OODWOJ hound for
Ormoe '11'&8 .ttacked by our aircraft lind thil
in the sinking of Ihree Japanese trans-
and siz eIItOrU. The next day our N.vy
pi.- lIIJl&8hed .noIher Ormoo bound COMo,..
OD T Deeember, our air force bombers sank an
-at in a 13 ship oonvoy and 4 days luer de-
lIbOyed moJ!ll of another. both ner.r Ormoc. Soll'lll
of tIMe troops from ships reached shore by
swimming. bot all the equipment was lost in tbtl
-. T.doban had -. Ill!l up as the headqulr_
ten and main sqpply baa for Leyte, but ....hen
our Na", opened up with her.ry bombardment
and our foreell her.vily bombed this arna, the
Ja..- troops fled from Tacloblln into the
hilla. Thus, the bulk of the supplies Oil Leyte
....ere loel. to the Japanese from the beginning
(Rtf. note II).
The Japanese made a determined effort to re-
supply from Manila by using small ,ts
.,1., moIlt of Ih_ were sunk by our air action.
o-n,l Nishimura Qtee, "our loss of SlIllply
r.nd troop t1'allBpO!'Q in the Le)-te operation ll"U
We Iotlt 19 of the 25 tranBpOrU and
molt of our very best. equipment. About all ll"l!
cat weft men that S'II'am ashore: for install(ll'.
on 10th October, IN-I, we had onl)" 30 field guM
of 'j'nn or abo..: by the 3OtJ1 of November, 'll"e
had onl16 remaining (Chart. 2) . .A.lso b}' the
of :DreoMnber IN-I, we could no longer gl!t sup-
pl_ from Japan: 110 Wto kne.... we did not.
enou,[h supplies for the operntion:' The}
lried moving small _Is by night, bllt only
a few of these got through. Ammunition wa"
one of thto many items that wero critica1 and in
the burry of lIlmdinlt 8upplies of nmrllunition,
DO plans were made in ad,anoo to get il to the
troope. On landing ammunition at Orlnoc,
lapaDeM did not hr... Ihe transportation ....11
abIa 10 carry il Oft to the troops in the hills. Tbe
0D6 road was ., poor that of the tnll'ks u!lt.ll co
haU l.IDmuitioD. a larJre werl' de-
IbvJed by air aetioa.. This action is heW'r de-
teribad. bJ o-aJ Nishimura in .....e
did pt m J.,.. -u. and abollt tOO slll.1I oo-tJ
ad Jaauw throqb, but the problem of supply-
m. our ton. ..... solved. The Wf!ach,e
r
..... twrible and daily attacks b) eneln)' .If
craft me-Jetl iD inflictinA' hea'"y losses
...- I rod
WlJlI ro.d. Of the trucks wrecked along t llS '
to pertlImt were dtlll:royed by nir action lind 10
peremt by gtlllrrilllUl" (Ref. lIOles 4, 10, ,11)'
B
."-' th d 'ed 11110
J WUB tmae, eo .fapanese hll 100'
the hiIIa, and tMir supply lines were cut. 1"he
.Is, especially fOOt.!. reduced
Japanese trool)8 50
well-equipped force was no....
(Cllart :l, Hef. llote;; 10. 11).
offenshe SO Illuch
_n lost in the delermined ef_
e Ihat Ihere shoM._
ill IrnmUllition of
CIllbduct II sllcce<;Sful defense and
on Luzon. the .laplln_ decided
lhe :lllInihl arell to the moull_
B.,tilio. lind the to the east
to let the nanll lind air forces
of Clllrk Field ( Hef. note II).
t WAS Uej..'1.111 nbout the 100h 'of
The .Jllpllllefil> lij..'lIl"t.,<:1 they
M 1I11};; in whicl, to IIC<:Olllplisil
of lK>th troops und out of
iOIl of Luzon WIIS not ('l[pected
of January or the ellrly part of
IDOve from the depots in
were onl,r 300 LOllS per of rail
toO Ions per of motor trans-
Thus. in 54 25.000
btoen mO\"i'd: this repfe'iOOts
of the tOlal suppli6!l in :lr.nila.
...1)" inusion. about 10.000
1.\' mO'etl. The railroads were
and bombed and the guerrillllll
..-ith the Illovement of trains.
oould travel only at night and
thlI dll}time. Our nir attacks had
lal"j.. 'll qUlllltilies of Japanese
aDo tlisrupted lheir supply lines
down of supplies to the combat
II).
till. situalion. a large convoy con-
Pir'lll and T\lenty-third Divisions
Bripde from Manchuria (these
InTice in Chin,,), and the Tenth
Divisiolls from Formos*,. were
-.them Luzon our air foree
w-ere sunk. Some lroops man-
Mhoft'. but apin all equipment
__ The of romoot troops
_inl. The lone tallk di"ision on
enough gus for' hours of opera
of railrollds and ll'urk trallSports
Jo-s of et]Uiplllenl. the
beeaue ni,' nClil>ll the
adl'(llIlIte SlippOI'1 (Ex-
_11).
Niahilllura slPte.-llhat: "Bomb-
'"
;n
g
of inslall.lious did not ('&1I.'le much
-..,.nl)" bel"eIln 5 and 10 percell!' Ho....ever
SIn of our lroo I . ,
. I) IIll rllUIPIOl'UI transporU
.'<fIY from :llauchuria Ind China '<fag
'<fea,). ".e. lOS! t....o-thirds of The lrooJl!l
'11'111I but did 001. h.ve their
eq.ul.pment. TIte Xinel.eIlnth .nd
for in&ance. luId no field I"l'*
'll"hen IInded:' It L, also inte.rest-
IILIt co lllXe 'll"hat llajor General Sanad. has to
say on this subje<:l: In 1(1.13. divisional a'lil-
ler}' ....s onlered Wilhdl1lwlI from Ihe llanchuri_
au aN'a bllt few of these weapons e\'er
renchetl dt!Slinnlion dlle to ship sinkings.
AmnlUlll!loll for artitlen became so
nit ita] llial no I raininl!' allllllunition '\\"as allowl!<1.
Some al'lillu)' units \\"e"t illlo combat ,,ithout
having fired round from lheir \\"eapons:' ,\t
this Slajre. the Jall&lleSl! 10J!istical problem h.d
beoome impossible. The decisi'e defeat of the.
J.p.nese in the Philippines "-as m.jor cat.a!l-
trophe in Ihat greal qUlntities of Iheir fine:sl
troops .nd equiplMnt "ere lost. ,,"luIt re-
mainell of their .ir w.$ and their
n.'"y ....iped out. TI,e .J.panese an bUI
countell out as a result of the Philippine cam-
pai&ll..\11 chat rem.ined was suicid.1 .ttacks
alld before npillliatioll. The Philip-
pines defeat cracked the backbone of Japan.
6. Okillawa. Saipall, 111'0 lima
informalioll of the supplr statu.'! 011
. Saipsn, Iwo Jillla, and Okillllwa \\ns not obtain-
able. It is known the .Japanese had for
years been preparing lh_ Jloinl8 for the Isst-
ditch stand. _\Itllough lhe logistical support of
the Japanese in Ihe field had broken do....n,
thl"'(' "ere clOS(' ellOlIJ!h to Ihe home-
land to be supplied wilh .nil.ble equipment_
the importance of making a suicid.1
st.nd in onler 10 b&S6'I for our land based
pl.1l1'!" ,,ithin reach of the homeland. the J.pa-
nese used meaN ..-Ithin their 10
bolMer the defell>'eS of Ihese points.. Pflor to
Ihe ["nited SI.les 11nding", the Jall&.nest
fending the!le isl.mls ..-ea: well 5upphed
food ammunition. and aM.lllel') .lId other eqOlp-
"
lit faet ron.siderablto quantities of sup-
men., . I d
plil!ll were found when these IS an s were
clIplurt'd (Hef.uotes 12. t3).
Tt is known that mnlLJ' pieees of and
other hea"r equipment lind weapons
wert- 1I:'1e(1. In fact, il WllII OIL these ,slands th.1
0 .....

'00

..
00
"

,oo
0", ...
,.
,.

..
"..
00
00
00
,oo
"
..

<, ,
,.
1'011'.10<"1 .1"" _
'''.,. -----
"'-'C"Ubl..__ _
S.IL_. _
lIl lma.ht;I bN..)
Sb (N .,.) _
,------------_..
011, food _
1-'10"' _
I 'I rkl... _
This lable shows list of foods ill groms ullowed
1"'1' perSall, per dll)' as Sl!t fOl'lh b>' the different
departmenl:!! b)' columns.
Column A. Wartime figul'ell fixed b,l' the War
Minist]')' (9-42),
Column B, Fixed by the colHlUlI.mler of rhe
Southerll tll'llIY (1-43).
Colullln C. Fixed b)' the collllllalHler. Se,'enth
Arell Arl1l,l' (3-16) (for Singa-
pore, II.co;:()rding to l'C(juire.mcnIS
of 1he Si1Ulllioll; howe"el', to lhe
troops in .JIII'1i and Sumatra,
Column B will app[)'),
Table B is all example of the '(ixed amount"
srS
lem
"S set up b)' the War .\Iinistr)'; it bose<.l
on III'my strenj:,'1h lIS of AUj:,'1lst This t"ble
is based on the requirements of 250,000 arlll)'
Ilt:l-,;Qnllel for one )'6ar onl)', dOCll no( lake
iuto t'OlIsi\knltion lhe appl'Oxllllllrel)' I.UOO.llOt)
Cil'ilillll lllitihirr (ahorers lI.ml lhe ll>. be
...1 "nnu"l1.I' uS well as SUPllly (he CII'II1"1I
poplll"iioll,
Allied ail' aUa ,k. I . ..
, C ,t Ie rath)ll or I'll'll 11\ Mllla.r
ll
lind r'l 11'11" "I .., ',",
, "\ uc,.... to lvv p..'r Illllll
pel' dlly ill JlIIIUnr)' in Februllry 10 000:
",lId after to 500. The same held true in
Surlllltl'll, Il'Ith all allowance of 700 ill J"nuary
1945, and dter .\llll'C1I nn ,,1I0Wllllce of only 600
grams per pen;on per da)', This resulted ill the
lowering t>f the mornle of the oc<:ul'ational foreea
as well as " marked detl'rioralion of their physi.
eul .u'<:llb'1h estimated at between 10 percent nnd
2tJ [lCI'(;ellt (Table A ).
The following tablc shows f"clS oblained from
Lielltt:lllLnt Colonel Tobit" Captain Asnmi
Lieutcnant Yobi, all mcrnbe:.s of the
dt:partmcnt of tbe Se,'emh ,\rea Armr in Singa_
pore,
'"
1. Sumalrtl, /(w(J,
Japane.'lll took oolllr'Ol of the
Unlatrll, lind the ,111 important.
ya ill 1012, they felt the oe-
Id IhemSl!h'es, lIS well
8 and other commodities to
Indi".s hlonds Imd to .J"pIUl.
in Tokyo set lip II basis for
ns, 1llothing Hnll the daily
on the lIumbel' of al'm)' person
and civili"l1 lllborers in these
were t6 be built lip to scI'eral
pendillg on the ability of the
to producc. For example, rice,
the Japanesl.: people, was pleHti_
there "'He shortages in Malaya
in Sumlltm of 10 percen!. In
MalaYII lind SUlllatrll were illl-
Siam and French J ndo-China,
tion of rice for militllry and
continued Ilt the rnte of 11,000
and for Sumatra, nn Il\'erab'll
per month,
also short in these areus, lind
nt of the fixed IImount WIIS
'00 of shorl.iLge was from Ihe
until the time of sUl'1'ender,
had to be shipped in from
nation was limited, sufficient
not be brollght in, B)' Oetober
for the production of these food-
'Were under de,'elopment, but. by
'ties to pro"ide self-sufficiene)'
"ar ended,
was lacking in muny items
. g, dail)' nOCl'ssities aud ollice
Dary 1fl44, this nl'<:" \\'us con-
rtages of 10 percelll foodsililTs
clothing.
for this lack of Sllpplies was
port. Up to JUll6 liHI, Allied
attacks were Ilcconnl.illg for
shipped from .Iapan to
July 19-1-1, 40 percent to 60
to survil'Q thc Allied bloeknde,
true wilh IIll shipping from
various armies in .JIll'll llUri
area "Iolle, the over-all rosa is
10 lM"rt:enl. The h"n\'iest. losses
pet'eellt occul'l'('\l l>etll'l"-'Il .\pril
ISH. Dile to losses by
from the rail head to the division dumps. Th'
.-nent. " .. to be done at. night. The Jap
... a11lO planned to IIf1ll cm'ts, Li
llJeI..drawn ('1m and hand-druw" l'al'!>j liS 1\101
.. trucks in the division areas, When ll", Unit
St&teB WII intlknll..I, ""PilI]
planned 10 move up III DiUl'h allllllllniti'lll
poIIible.
There wu a pneral of lielll pi
ammunition, fltlll, and food. Allhough artille
pieclll were \11.,. limited, I'tleh di"isioll had a
ample llUpply of mortars (man,r of them im
"ronl!led) and ammunition. The plllu was
hold tbe Alliell in ehf<.'k wi'h hl'll\')' mOl'tar ft
then to infiltrale It nilCh, (ner, !lote Hi),
Bllbe end of 1945. Ihe .Jnpnuese re-
sponsible for the defenae of th(' Kunto "I'e" had
on hand only 90 percent of tlte fllel the)' had
planned and 40 pefCl'nl of 'he lllnlllU"ition 111\(\
100 percent of Ill' food ami dothinl!' This llid
not include the ba3ie food of rice "nd wheat,
whieh .... 10 be obtained from the Imrl"est in
Sovembo.-r (Ref. note 111).
About half of the ,Tapallese llivisions in the
homeland were wl'lI.equippl'd, but the othel'll
were ebort manl items of equipment, In some of
lb. Ihore defenle divisions, the)' hlld very lew
cannon and no artillery regiments, The)' hnd to
rei,. on mortars that qre improvised by tits
unlta from bombs thst we", 1I0t beinJ! l1Sl!d (!lei,
note IS).
The Japan_ ellpecled the Onited St"tl.'!!
fOl'CelJ to land on Kyoshu and in the Tok)'o "ret!.
but I'ftII 'With. priority Ihe .Jupanese in th
"pns _re poorly equiPI)('<.1. os brought out hy
the lollowinpo lIIateInenl of "hjm' Gen"r'll Tn-
kaabima when be Rid, "Man)' of the
wen newly formed. and inl'xl)('rienced in cOlllbat.
n- divisions were on[,' about 51.1 pcrcent
eqmpped on the tilth of '.\ uJ:"USI, These were
priDelpall,. suieidal outfitll. There no doubt
tbat the force. _JPIl'd 10 the of the
homeluKI bad adequate to supp<>r1 Ii
.nmg, stubbom initial dl'fellsc' howe,'er, lhe
Iaclr: of ftIIIllrVflfI of all of sllpplitlS
and aquipmenl, particularly the shorlage of rl)Ol[;
would hr..,. brought about Ihe fillltl collapse 0
O1'pIIized 1'IIi8t.ance. Our l'OmbiHed fon:eS hnd
effeetn'8ly reduced the war polen1 inl of 1he .Iapn-
DIIt Empire and dictaled the terms of slirren
der
,

...
............ ftnt came. iD .....
iN to &be CllIl-
01 ClIIlI' OWD artiller1. TIlt J......
,. .wdI1 .......11' to bold U- .....
iii,",,:at Wltboat them .II ... Joel (BeL
",II).
7. D<fm. _/ th;
ThI plumed O1'pIlizatm of ..ppl,. of the
1....- !nI,. that ... to drfend the 1unneJand.
1fII bued ClII. a situation that .Mdifferent from
.. ODI III the IIWl,f iIland hues to tba lIOUth
Ul that the J ...... home anniell were in a
lIIatic ... aIld not undef' pnIBUre ROept from
air raide. Sappliel, therefore, oould be bandJed
011 a mote .-tiIfactory bui& Plans bw. been
made iD IIH6 to 8lore lIIlIk:ient llUpplie& of .II
et... In forts and at &OCI/'l:lBibl. llUpply pointa
for divisitna in __al defenae and in counter-
auaek TIle probability of air activity
dunn, an invasion, when it wu expected that it
would nol be tll move up llUppliell by
rail tll the forwanl areas. wu the factor
in determining the focal supply -pointa and the
amount tc hi' stored. However, tlwre was a oon-
lJidenble difference between Ihe planned llUp-
pliee aDd the actual llUpplilll on band. They
"Ire ebolt of rice but espected 10 harvtlllt the
rice erop before the anticipated invasion by the
t'llited Slalell armed forcell (Ref. notes 14, 111).
WbeD the Japaneee atarted to pu' the supply
plan inlo effect all IIUpplitll were to be hiply
<hcenlrali!oed in Each
diy_ion 1'U to baV1l in iUl own zone of reapon.'
sihility, Ole month'lIll'vel of all e1_of supply,
and IllIOIlf;b ammunition for ODe week (24 houl"l
per day) of intensive flgbting.
Our ai' attaco Wllre upeeted to iDt4Irrupt
the transportation system u "ell u Imoek out
the ,.,.u and bridges IMding to the fonrard
..... Up to August 19411, no utenBi.,. damage
bad been done to the railroade. An earlier at-
tack on Wmelaod ooJlUDunications woaId haft
been impeded brfore their CODomtration took
place. ne uaed a larp Dumber of
nnlian hborers in the prepantion for the de-
faMe of !be home isIande. They did 1l'1Irlt aueh
.. rtpair roads, bridpa, CODIUIletion of under-
Il'OUnd lItJrap for IUpplilll, and pneraI let-
m..unlll (Bef. notelJ 14. 16),
1'be HiP Command planned to haul _ppl..
.., tniD *-diltant poinU ...... _ ta'GIIb
F..t.bl......, I .,..
........, So 1 I .
1:.,.bH.hl f..l .,..
S" ..'.bI......, f......,..
Co.ltl'.'''' <0 _
Col ... Ch' 1,"01'1.
Sl, ... 1."'0....
......, lIebl, .....ble 10.
.......,P ....
II....... "'" ..."... ..no.
p f '.'.1
'_0'-
-------------.-100..101'''' _. U 7< peol&
...---.
S.. _.... _ l"ooIo1 f... -... _ oob'
Sol __ OorMllllJ' _. I l"',: ...
___:-..af... -..
_.,
Sot ____ l:othI .. __
_ _. QoobQ _. "*"dlI' ....
t... _
(" , ._.t
_ UOO.OOOI
_
"ot ._. ... Ootal>ll", _ . ....,. ,11I1Ie.1t ..
...
.1_. . __._.llol..... .. ...Ip .0<1 ._
..'
,"
:H.OOO , _ "'.... _
100 _ , d1 : 100 _
100 ", _, =0 _,
,0 .... __.: 110
HIo, 18 _ 1_... :
-
:.0 "'.. _
<40-000 _
J lllll .. : !I...po
ZOO.OOO pol ...
..._ -.1 3.000 .-.. _
Slo..,..,... ao tllo : )lo
_ tllo : ! ...
lI(llllo_
:100.000 ....... _
Tjlrobo. T..,.. ...<l....
1Iaro<J....lJ,pj m _. _
Boufou1 II.,.., Tack "".lO....--
1Mo.o". )It......,t.... ------.-
Pa '" CbuMlP 1'." ---
K I.uml'u, <-"'nd, """ .,.--
K_ l.un>PU' )1100 """0'1 ---
_d C......... (;0. flO I<l1o _ ...__ 1-'" fot ..... " ...., - .... "..
..., of .-.-.1_ 1,.,....
ao..-__d Co (;0.---1 _ ....., -'J" .... --1 ,,";,':.._-'1-.-r.-
Qd..........d CoO<l, F'a<'lo"' __1, ..... -. _ ._: ...- .0 , ..... CId_ <Ud:llo<U<7
..-
...... _ R..d CoDd, Foct...,._ 1I0rd We -....ocI t..- -
.000 _ --.-----.------- """"'--
......... -----.----------- .... _. flU'" _ kilo ,oa: II....... ,....... _ t.<&o'7.
_. 1'Imob Yo"'",., _+ )l f
f.... ...
Coo""" _l, ,0 tllo '0.' 1.-. .--. ......_ I........
_t. 1::::1 ..10 '0"
Co__t. 80 _110 ,... 1A..I>II_ I.......... t.
1I"'''' I .....'. tl .no Il'''': , I 04 ...,........ b.-p,
Ut.... f lOpe"
n."" ...._. :.0 Ullo ,"": .. Dd..... 10 ' ..'.1>11...., f......,.
I<llo '0- _0 '_ .-- -----.--- --
Clp....U 100.000 ." --.--.--.--
lIl1oc1 _. .n -.. -.-
H.,.., 10. .110 ,-- - .- --- ..-
M... 1__ ....1.). ,OIl kilo '0.---'-'
V_..bl. _ .. kll. '0" - -.---.--
",'''' , _. tno '0 ---.--.--
flO' Iloo._ ...".,. IlO _I'. , :
Sho,. , ","),.'1(1"10 '0 ---- ___

"
,
For numboo,
..-... of 'M"'h.
-
tIIIIIir ----

-.--_ _-
----_.--_ .
Table E lists. few ill'ms used for 811
IIdtateB. tho qlWltity produced. romptll"ed wit
tile total amount ...-.t.
Tbe J ..._ to fqrthu aUain their /.'0&1 0
lIIf....-neney..... (OIIIJIf'lIed to either N!Wlln
_lilt up III'W &nori81 to produ<'e the IIUlnem
it.- that were needed and Sl'1 a
doiIl this by importinll trhlll lOachilll'-r)' lhe
COIIId &om 1.ptIn.and utilitinJt 1111 the IInil.b
OD IIand. Table F I_II a fe'" of these (aden
priDl'iptll m.. nuf..clun!(1 and til
productioa forOlM' _tho
t. SillpJI'O"'. aad J ...... ,h_ factories 1I"l'
able to..-. 100 pn'ftIlt or more of the dema
wIIiIe in matn.nd )bl.. .. "-ere onl
able to IDl'Irt about 10
From ttw time of OlTUp.tion of thesi' arNS. b
the Am .\rm)". until l'-nd of I!
.1wJ df.pPnded 00 the homeland for thin
.... .....eu. D\L;;b,. "lICks. ;rlo,t<l. a
.....lIIito "'6 for .bout :,0(1.000 peDIlII". .\ ft
1MB. wy relied ttltinol,. upon Ihe maleriab tilt,.
protJ-:I in tt- ..I'ft$.
1here __ 3.000 packAJ."e'!l of m..chine
pub for lIpiftDiJll( indu..tril'-S. 21 c..nnin/!" w..
em- with aU _". pal1.Jl 10 C1I/l .bout
kilo tons.- IDOIll:h and .dditional parts
for lD&DufacturiDtl: cans imported from Jap&l'o
UIIIItiI the mel of 1M3. supplies
baa 10 be imported from Japan, but .fter Ih.t
U- they re lDUaufactured in sufficient (I".nti-
a..to .
IIJ 0et0I:.r 1'", with ...hllt ...... maleri.l,
thq could obtaiD in thelIe arens, plu! lhe mI'
ehiDery sad n", alrelldy imported frOlll
the w..J'nd, the weN! at long lIS!
,,..mina: II degree of llelf-SllDicienc)'. Howe,,.r,
duI to their manl revel'W'!l in tl16 olhel'
of opentiooa, tbi8 drnm "'all 110"\'('1' full)' relllJzed.
Allied air auaets an,1 lIulmllu'ille8 cllw,ed the
"'...... 1Odt .'_of IIhip", Ihill. thel' were
abII to tnnIport from Sinj.."Lf){)I"{l Wlilit 8111'P!I
tber wen able to produCll Ilild Ilir I\tlllCk5 on
their lhippmg a1Io lItopped thl' lIow Qf rllW l\ln
l
e-
riaIII from Burma., J.va, alld sed
.AaDIher contributing rador thllt e/lll
..
_a
:-: 0:
--
-
-
-
-
--
-- -
.-
...
-
...
-
.....
...... 'u
-
.....
-
...
T... C. .......... ,., ....... .,....,
- .--.,.-
-.-. ....-
--- .,..... ............. .,.....
_1llliIrr. .,...,
,.,.....- ---
- .-
- .-
_.... 1-'"
..- ... 11,...
.... _ .,.18_
e.- ... __
....... _ 1 .. 1 ....
--.. : .. ,,...
...... . ,...
...... . ....
...... e- ,
... . ....
A&: &InDiDItion pf tbI ...., of cIotb-
iDa Ihown m Tllb1t D Wow, ....
........ eo tbe.,., ....g t -na.
............ hIad .. ot ..' ......
.r- - ..
AI' .. riee "OIl ,.rI1 ill ...,.. 110,-
WIt s.-an. lO0,O0O IdIo ted; ..
laft" ...,.. kilo __ bJ far tIaaa
.............. 01 .,..' ...
.... tt.. ..-. the prodDttioG WI *'"
........... uoo.-
.. eiftIiuI. -1it:ar1 riril 1i'riD
......... __ tM sportalioa .......
.........- .. at_thMten u -n.. to the
.. 'ed
...........
A. lGta1 of .,atW -.,pI, 0' dotJaiaI' ...
__ Th" _ brobD. doWlI iIIto I .......
.-ppIy with tile b"Ollp. ... ill r-ud ...
...............' .pply iD _ iB NU'
_ ..... to the -wort of .......
.......
n. ... for _ppI)iac dothiJI&: ill .. funh
T.we C niudi.... the qtWltity aUond per
..-. &pro. .... lilt .., the War JIDt.
iItr)' Mad 8wpt-l-lMI. ........... ..
.at --. die _ l/ID8b'OIW .., the &n-th
_A=1 __br ...........
...... bill ill am- aDd 80IatIMn JIorDIo.
.......... ahoat TO peneIlC. Ii-. 1la11JH.
corridor which N!tluired 23,000 of supplie.'l
per month. The l'oil lines that mn as fill' south
liS lI,eng)'llllg cOlild handle this lind 0llerate only
at !rowel'el', our oil' power ond Chinese
guerrillas be/!lln to work on Hie brid/,'I!S a9 well
as the rolling stock and by Augnst this line had
lost .57 perecut of ilS cllrr)'ing capftcity, Thill
slowlllg o.f the JapftllllSe supply system
II tIe-up Jll the campaign to capture the
!unerlcan airfields. The .lllpanese had supplies
m Honkow, bul could not "et it to the troops.
They had some trucks but aol opernte them
on account of II shortage of gas. The losses from
air power on the milroad and Yanb'1ze Hiver
in ll'ying to supply their rIln as high as
50 percent. The .I:1I1111l1lSe 11'1l1'e short of artillery
ammunition, antiaircraft b'lms, ant! ammunition.
The shortage of fllIllHlIIlition WIIS beginning to be
felt bll"k in the tn,ining areu. P. O. ,r. inter-
rogation stuted thllL new recruits had the oppor
lunity to fil"e (111)' II few rounds of Ilmmunition,
The issue of rille Illnllluuition for tmining "'lIB
"lit fmm GO to 10 rounds. What tanks tltey had
they could not keep in repair on account of a
shortul;!:Q of sp<lre parts. Ail' power was cllusing
the .JaPUIIIlSe plenty of trouble. The Japanese
suppl)' lille hlld been cut IIlld they co\lld not sup
port, u Iuq..'l'- scftle opel"lltioll. They knew thut
they were short of supplies but mO\"l!d on the
airfields with what they could calT}' on their baeks
and captured them 10 NOI'ember This de
la\' of 2 months plus the loss of supplies
throu.!1h IIiI' oombilll! cost the Jftpal\ese much of
their beSI l':(luipmellt. with no replaeemeHt e:\,
pOCled.
:\ ftel' the [,Ulon landillg, 9 ,Jauullry and
Ihe Okinllwa Inuding. 1 .\pri! the Jllpllnese
Ilb"nin cl>"I1)..'1'd ,heir IllllM in ('eu,mlnud South-
ero China. Ther sent troops ond supplies
Chiua to the onl)' to be sunk b)' Illr
IIclio!l. 'I'his caused II shortage of China.
Our nil' IlOwel' fnun bllses in t.lle PIlllippme8 cut
the Japanese suppl)' line 10 Canton and a
few small boats through. In 8 endmg
in lhe wring of 1!l15, 10,000 lOllS of SIIP-
plit'S were able to b<et through.
The Jal'lIll{';jl! thought the Allied Forces
going to 01\ the 'southern coast of C
I
lln8
lind also in the Shanglmi area. The phlll
.11 I ,,-,. from Southwell( Cluna III
WI lira'" .,
order (0 stn'nb"hell the collstlll llrea. > rede-
I
f 1--p' IIIHI SUPlllies to tho I nelhe area
]J O}'lUg 0 'vv
'"
was taken frol1l the troops
in ("hina. This ellused II short.
equipment with little chance
the homeland_ 'rhe Chinn
would ha\'olo along with
order lo meet this situolion,
their' supply system in
tach IIrmy responsible for ils
, centm! and south urmies
ofl' the lund lind produce their
the JRI'IInese completlld 1116 caUl'
the Ilttuko"-Peiping Rftilroad
to mOI'o on the United States
ow_Kweilin al'!!ll. The Japa-
men in tile Hankoll'Lillcho
lV
Americnn nir Ilction was laking
Ihipping on thll Ynngt7Al HiveI'.
Id only mOI'e lit night. The
rt Rntiai!'CI'loft guns and could
line of eommunication. The
was heuI'il}' mined around Han
JapanesE; mllny losses. Most of
operated by Chinese news ",ho
the bonts in the face of ollr nil'
ese only had" few men to
1 route. '''hen Ihe hoats 1I'0uld
, the Chinese crews 1I'0uld steal
hide the bouts. When the Japa-
the boats, 1111 supplies were /,'One,
boats werc sunk by bombings;
as 90
United Stutes Ilirf\elds W,IS now
"must list," By the time the
8hallghlli WIIS cut, only 10,000-
month Wet'\} getting t.lll'Ough.
and matedal rrlll liS high as 95
lublllllriues IIcrounl.ed for most
the l'Oute from the hOl1lo-
of milrQad equipment,
unable to Illaintain their sup-
PIlOn IIIl}' 1111'1,'0 sclllo
United Stutes air bllses in the
area was now II threat to !Jle
eounnllnicnliOll. .'\lllericftn IIiI'
to bomb tho muchneeded rail
eoastal shipping. Tokyo mllde
knock 0111. these !lir bnses and
r'llute to Jndo('hinll. First,
_ hud 10 seeure the Ilallkow-
in ordcr to support; campaign
111111 WIUI long .llIpa
troop!! wert' in thl' IIreo. As n whole tIL
J*!'iflcation PT'Ol[l'llIll failed !x>CllUge ftS MOil
the Japanl'lle mmf!d t'heir trO<)Jffl, thll (,hin
would takl' ",er.\8 I.ieutPllllllI Genlll"ol Kohfty
ubi AlIabnnl upt'll8fll"(l it: ""'hen 0111' tl'OQi
would lea'p 011 llrea. the (1line<;e would not c
operate and would make trouble for ew!rrone.
Wba.t the JalllUll!l!:J8 Wl're trying to do was to /.,'I!
the Chin_ 10 produCf' war equipment lind Slip
plies of all kinda to maintoin their llll'ge IInny i
China, as well 8R ship some materials 10 Ih
hOlD8land. They did mllke n few hlllld g'relllld
small arms. ammunition, ,!.l\lpowder, und cloth
They wert' al!lfl ablp to p:et enough fO()(I to Clln
on.
Befort" IM1. the Chinll!;l! upeditional'r fON:
depl'l1dl'll on' the- homeland for most of l1wil' BU
plies. For the northern army, supplies we
shippPd to Korea then O\'erhlllrllo the t roollS. For:
('entral ('hina, 8Upplies were sltipI:H!lllo :;hllnl!hai
and for China. Clinton II'IIS main bose.
By 1M2, when our submurines 1)('J!Iln to
their toll of .Tapanese. it upset th
whole .Tapan_IOJtilltic plan for Chinll, The SII
pl1 line to RhaIl#[hai Rml ('anion was 1111 bu
eut. The 8b.ippinll losaes were so g.... they
.Tapan_ planned to mO\'e their supplies Ihrollgh
KOt'8a then overland to the. south. The SlIpply
situation at this time WIUI l'elT llnfa\onlble.
There was a fCE'Ilt'ral short/ljZe of equiplllellt I\lld
anuno; about the onl.v Ih,,1. \\'IIS not sho
wu food. TIlt' "live off the III)\(]" polie)' was not
'frOII'kihll for items other than food. Ii is esti
mated that 70 to 80 pt'rcent of: th(\ ratioll5 ;Ind
foraMe Wtlll pJ'()('llred by rOllslIlllilll! units.
shipmenllll of food from J"''1)1ln Iintl Ii:orel
eeued in 194.1. The ,JuplUlCse forces ill In05t
lIIdioTIII of ('hina mId Illuinlnin themseh'e'j for
a pericMl of months with little resorl. to milwa}'S,
motor tnIeb or laq[tl ships. In Older fOI' the
Ja(llN88 to be .ble to ship supplies ol'erland,
t.heT &nt had to IIllCUre the rllil lines, the I[,lllko""
&ipiDa and Tientsin-Pttko\\' leading south.
When the United States Forces IlInded on
Guadalcanal, in 1942, it chunged the pietlll'll in
ChiDL The Japaneee were plunning Oil " 1;11'10'8
..... oft_n to take Chungking; this \1'!llI
&lid IlOIne of the befit troops and lllllCh of
..._ " th
_ bait equipment were redejJlo)'ed to the:;Oll
.......
BlPt to laD di'fisiollll lind all a""illlble sllil
lS
".. withdrawD from Chino ill the fnll of
.... OIl opentioDa was !.he Jack of
_.... -'1"'-
I' 'm.... Tbie it furtlaer .,.
.....Irdie foIIowiDalItUemllat of LienleDaDt
...... 7obita, llliltlnt ebiet' of intendlUlOll de-
....... of the Stnnth Area Army. "When
.......... are to be carried out. notice will
....... ,... fIum the Ita. department IS to
wW 1lIllabwl. ......ben aDd where. As ..
.-It ....-Ied trsMportation will not beo anil
.... in tiI& Should inteRdarKeofIkoers be allowed
to partXijlUe ID the plahninlt of opentions IIlI
lid .... better rlllIUltII be obtained."
9. _N. 2.Cbhu
(Bel. DOtt 17.)
ID 19ST, when hostilitiefl broke out in North
ChiD&, the Japanese bad planned on .. limited
__ of oterationa. However, the liJlttin,lr apnoad
to the SJanghai area and betor-. the Japaneae
could lItor their Held commanders they 1I'E're at
war with Chin.. At tbis time each area was un-
der ......te commantWr. all takinll orders from
Tokyo. An attempt WlI8 made to ld:op Ihe whole
aim but failed. The army bl_ml'd it on the
diplomatic COJ1I8 bUI at the same time the Japa-
..6e1d tOIDmanden were lIpreadin,: oul and en-
larging their operations. LieutRlant General
K'AlbI.yuhl AlUJIll'O had this to flaY: "nil! 1Mden
did not lave the proper /UUP of the situation
and could not handle the iMue: thl' field com
IIIUIden lO1Ild not el.rT)' out illlltructiona of the
1mper:I1Il General Her.dquarterB."
B,. 19, .U elol18 bavibK &;Ied to end hOlltiI.
idII, the JlpaI*M plumed. to hold what they
had IDd 10 atop the fto. of IUppJiee mto China
from oatIide IOU....... This required the JapaI*ll
to 100ft .. and. oecupy thole key point. to cut.
01' the .... of lhIppU. through India., Freach
IIalIo-aUJa and. IhOllt of the _pomto the aoutb,
In Od.her 1t3O, the flltablithed tha
CbiDa force with at
1faDkiD&' _ pl...t all of Centnl and Southmt
CbiDa wder one 00IIIlIlUld. Their inteDtion at
tIUI time ... to hold "hat they had and tr:7 to
.... ,.,. throu,da diplomatic eb.n......
Dr lilt, the J...... IwI DIOftd iDI:o r...
in order to IIop til. fknr of IIUpptieI
..................
Ja IMJ, til. J...- embuW OD. Pft:IInm
to plIl'ifJ that .,. of ChiDa tW ". 1UIder
till dlreoI CIlIIltroI of the J..... .lnnJ 'l1dI
......t .. PfVINID PIYOted IIIOUII4 the :rapp"
,.
..... c:JIma ...."_'1 fwce IIIort of -
..- ............ u. et.ptaNof
.... _()Idu... tbI J..... did. _ bow
.... _ "OUld IuKI DUt. 'naey felt lIIl1'8 ".
waUl _ .and in Southern China 110 apin they
...... &bUr p1aDI. This time they _t troopa
-. _ppl_ to Kora aDd tba aDd
riIIdnw zoopa t:r- the -.th to e-tnl
au-. In Ibrcla the Japa.- lltuUd to
...... tHT -wI1 w- to .......- tba
.......... At. u. ..... ..wtnJOpa remainiq:
ia China -ere left to their own r-.ourct8.
10. Aa No. ,. BonIta
PrioT to Pearl Harbor tM ('niled Statfll ...
-wlJinl China with al"lD8 and equipmtnt with
whitoh to _fIIId. __If apillllt tM Ja.._
.,..-.. Si_ J.pan had at thill limP pi_
matrvl of naet of the tuCem and mall.
of China, Sippi.. had to brouJht in throua
IDdia and BunDa.. Du& to uiflting water and
nil faciliti-e, the materi.ls of war .rert' broullht
into Ragoo,. where they wen! tnnsferred to the
raill'oad l'Ullning to I.-bio. Rl'N. at the _th-
.-a termilr. of 1M famous Burma Road. the
III)I'PIifII Wire loaded on truU:!! uti tnosported
to the baIearaend Chi_.
0bri0asI7. the Imt of this lui _in art87 of
IIIIpplywottd __ tM f'nd of OIi,.. rflIilcanoe.
With this in mind, tM ,Iapallflll' launched the
Burma OC'C'1".lion l'llpftlition.\uJ[Illtnting their
own IUppli'll with the booty they captured aDd
uperimeinr 1'BY '- l'JlePPt in motor
ecpIiJlllBll (Exhibit 0), the Japa.- WWI'
-rul in l'qry in the H_-
_. IS ther moftd oorth, their .pply W- ...
CDlI.......-dmaty aDd the probJIm of
tnnIipoIt ...... iDcnllliDlly dillC'alL
Burma ronn a Iarp .... within whk:h ea-
iliad a ftI} poor road Ind nilroad network. The
lIbort.ge 0' IlIOtor equipment and ri'rel' ......
tJanw the _rden of tramport 011. a iN"" nil.
"* _hidI ... i""""" to -...Be tha Iup
..a.- of .ppI_ To keep ow- thia IiDe of
IS wei' IS , to U.
au-, th! Ja..- nqaired to dinI:&
_, 01 tbair combat and railroad tIoopI to
lktnu which could han'been u.ed pl'06tabI,m
.....-
To add b tha biuen- of lbia glt......,. ..
hi ........ U. UDited S&ataa ..A.aQ' Air
.......... 0 .. ..."..iD ... r'" ,
tba famous air rolltl' oq-r thl' ""umll:' to t.ke
tbI plate of the Burma. Roul. Im(108llible IS thia
.....1'01" .ppearfd, _ more tonnage "'IS being
daIi..-ed to China by air thin hid been ClIrried
Ofti' the HUml. Road in its best da)'8. The Jap.,
n_ had filiiI'd to their primat')' obje.::tivl).
Due If) tile Ilrompt. use of vl't'SIItile
TIailed St.teJ .ir power, (1linll ,,'as still in the
_.
During the l'ppR &lw"'11 opel'lltion .nd the
AkpIb operatjoa, the J.panese began to feel the
e4't of our .ir poWft". Bombing oflhe nil
road and rivera WIS beginning to tell on tllll
Japat\flge. With of antiaircraft /,,'11118
and the increllSl' of Allied air aClivit)', the Japs-
nee Anny knew it must with whut it had
011. hand. for it could not u:pect to rec:ei1'e Illy
!IUbltantial amount of SUIlPlieJ and equillment
tro.n the rear. The dl'Cline ill fighting s!lirit on
the part 01 the Japan_ troops became e1'ident.
Due to lhe short.ap of otdn.nC1' supply, as rom
pand with the abund.nce on the part of the
Allied Forces, some units undertook to cllll!ure
the mucbneeded weapons and Rl1IllItltlition of
the Allied Fol'Cl'S, by s@nding out suicide squ.ds.
withoatlOeCe89.
After the Imphal IIId Ifuk......ng operalion.
the in ordnanee supplies became Slrin-
gMIL Allied air and _ power had cut. the Jlpa-
_ rail and rift!' IIUpply routes.
Afttr the ..tion of MeiktilR b)' Allied
Fon:etl, the actual ordnance (.>(luipmellt of the
diriBiolUl under the Burma Art'n lIveraged
onl, 23 pera!DI of the reguhl.r .mount used by
the w!wD fully equipped.
Ulliled Statl'!!t lir po.....er. through diril'Ct supply
and aupport. of .\lIiN. ground force'S and .ggres-
sive. highly .nlcks on JlIpRIle;jl! linfe
of -.monication. w",re responsible f?,
thedefMt of the J.pan_ in Burma. As
Biraide Hiraklzu UPre8lM'(! it: "The desl ructiOn
of OW' equipment and the delu)" in lhe transport&-
\ioa. of lIIunition&, due to the blockade, caused
by 1M Allied. air on both trunk and
rail..,., ..loo muda. -
U. Aan No.4. Su.m
(lief. DOle 18.)
Up to the ftnt h.lf of IllU. lLside from
iDe SiDppore, MallY, ll.ntl the homeland
&on,: tOM 0' ril-e monthI,., Stl
W
pIaJItI. ftrJ _II part. in SUllplying tlui Jlpa'
_....,. on. moM important insull.tio
ll
"'
as
ion nt BRIlc:kok.
tion between French Indo-
.
"" IMlw('r bPpn 10 further
Oil th(' "'Outhl'nl I'('doll, il
more difficult fol' the ,JnpnnCSl'
from Ihe homelatul. 11.1' the end
8nt port of 101", it hlld
Japalle"l', in Rllll llI11tl'rial,
entirely off thl' (M'('upierl
bein/!" <'tnt rally located.
in importalloo ami a
Burma nnd tp 10 this
of lroolls in Siam small
til.. lund wus no pmhll'tn.
the I"E'sponsibilit,l' for stll'l'l,vill;!
). wilh flMM-1 Rtlll thl' other
_lImt'" upon them. IIII' .T.pa
faCt"{I with 11 10l!"io;tieal
p"lil">'< in :-iiRllI "'1'1"(' now ",-
till' addilional h,r;.."!' numbl'r of
'ff' llnd (olllbat. !'I'llt illlO thl'
in Oil! 1111' pr0/trtllll as
rt Ihl' fOJ'>.:I'>I in BUl"Hlll unci
till' f'l[ceplion of fooo:l. shorta)..'t'!\
01 "al' immeo:lilltel) IlKUlI1l' up
\ in "I1\'h a" rmmnmition.
rill(k<. 11l()l or f'(lll i I"UI'Il!
111' and oil}. Tu add to un-
ition. 1Ill' (ll,('lopttl('ut of in
n,r in I he 1".' \\ t'XI '"(,-lilely
productioll of tilwh Hellis arms
,....M ultuO>-t till
011. IIII' prodUl1 iotl WIlS
ll.nd food "'tllained Ih"
two roullleo:l on ill
....ith ,,-hidl Ihe ""1111- had
... bo;ence uf j:..'OOd hie-I", IU'U
that "liS in,uleo:1Ullte to !lalHlle. a
of Sil,m had fOIll" tllllttl
OUl of lInugkok. I':usterll
Phanon Penh), (Bung-
Xorthern
and the Burma ::ii.1lI I.ml!. .
Wllll the life lint of
in t'rt'a. Wilh Ihe one
lI11t'nlll. huulill):!" !I()() per
I'"rt of W ..... 1101' job of
",,-I H'I"\ ,lillklIlt. 1,:,,"1 "tlh Ihe
'"111 fl'OIlI
HIt:,. tl ... 11,,\\ "f lO
boo lllainlultl....1UlIC (0
11M' I'tfl't1in' tlir uf thf .\Ilif,< (t:dliblt t:).
8lam bt<..me iT\("l"H...ine-h importlnl 10 lOt
..\lIiOO Ilr 1'01rtr .." lht
d""lnlrllUll of rail linK rollin):!" 'lIlCk.
and Sllllllly Ilcl:llnlinl:' thf I'tff'oCt of lhis
Ilit aClioll Oil the IIl1t"nm l"llil lille.\Iuj. Gen. It
Ohllnt II"'t "Tloe CIlITyill;( C"lJllrity "f
'tlill lill\\ 1'111 jt) percem." Bombing .nd
of rh-tr tranil' abo coet: the ,Japanest:
m.ny badly neetled "'tPl'lie-...
'1'1.. ntHill):!" of tl.. "" routt from i'illgapore
to nlnt!kok sea .nd air po"-fr m.df' !.he rail-
road culltlel:1lng th_ 1110 IlOinli! a ,tQ' import.nt
link ill the .Iapnlle"o(' linl' of ('(,mnHllliclltion.
.\Inlay" \lttS depemlill!! 01\ tiiam rot" II per
\'('nt":,,oe of ilM food-thi.. e-pt.'t'.'illlly trlle of rice.
:-iialll atld Burnlll Wert II percent.
lll-'l' of the,r medil"':ll from .\1.1. on lilt'
I...("k h"'lIl. In HH\. l..f,,1"l' .\merinm lir Iloo<er
htlrJl-n 10 bomh Ind -(nlfe .., tht J.panflllt
,,trt' C"lIrryinl-' on an of i,j() tOllS per tI.)
Ol"('r this n,utr. On I:, .Iftllttlrr I!lU. Ollr Ill.nes
dr;;II"Oleo:l Ill/' I...idl-'l' nl J:njbn..i, which ..educed
rhr of fmtll ,\I"la,l''' 10 Siam lInd
IIl1nna and (rUIll :-;;:ltlI tn .\lal:l)"n lor (j(I percent.
The Jo:s" of food 10 'us a ttlling blo....
The re<.l"ctil)!l of llll'tlieal to Silm ."d
lIunn" 1111('f'(1 t1..."11&1_ in a L.d spot.
'1.f northenl 1.,.1 "'lenl rail litll"i
the .;;anll' f.lt. '11,1' 11I-OUl air a(-tion on lOt
Siallll':il' lin.. (If ('(llIl1l'Uni"lllion<
1I h'"(,;lkdoWIl (If .j"pl'"l''ie "hal
""l'l'lies were in and IlI"tJund !l.ot
be ,leli"I'l"('l1 10 the '.....mbo( troops
fuilure in logi.tical for troops
. ,., ". __' " drop in Ihl'"r romL.t
111 "nnl
ettkienc\". . ..
\. "ar elided, lhe "Ii,t off Ihe I.nd polJC)'
. I:>' U o. hnh' III I_rt .
mlll$ll'.......
12. ReJertl/{t' Noles
'"
" ...
.............. -
.
(:::J .. - .. ----
1!r-4---._'---
- - .. -
_......... ""'..
-
.=
,.. ..
..,
,
" ". _.....
---

. '
.....,-

_.... ART SHOWING 'lRtENTAGES OF SUPl'lIS
- _. AMflIUNTION SHIPPED FROW filES[ "IlUS
_... 10 THEATRES Of OPERATIO,"
) "'.':'::'':'". <t ......... ,,,. " ..
:::.:.
, _...
t .. _'..
_.-
..' "-'" ._...
..!.
1_1. \
MA ;,"-
... , L,
,I _ ...
....... ....
),
)
,
,
.... _ "... - ,...
_ -_.,_ .
JlDi ..
.. ,....-....-..,-::...:....:...-, .
111. ... ....I data oo<:.tDed frorn l!let' "r
'.1'" .lId IlIt..,..rt't 077(). Tuk)'
Estratia''''''' rapl" ' <llarl ... ""d ,I.."",,,,,,,
11. rlll')lS ", 1.l""lO'n,,,n (;.."" ... 1 "
ba,JUbl......IMI..... 1.\ Jan"ar)' ll).HI,
II,.... C1ll..... ... or (:hl""
ary ot IIw J.fliI_ ",.n.)..
18. l'$lB$ Sota 8&.......1<. 12 ..........'nlll'r
port Oil " ..._ Arm)' In ;<1.".
)laJo1' a-al R. H.....
ttl rSSBS Urdu_ llQ. 11..\_,
!li:.......... ltra" 0' flrdn....... :<"1>1'1)' r...
""II" tvI' .... m"lJIlon.
c._
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--
2. fteM Iaf'IIl'I" l.Ilaa -: ..... IIlIed III 1.e)I" ""UI...
,......ed ......... ..1 "";0I1.1l'I
dIIoef of ala" I" h1l7pplneo.
.. eI d1...-.- partkl",Unj: h' Le,.t" ...,DI_lp
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tio aIllppfd rr- ,.....i8lI 10 t"""te "r
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1i'i1t11!'il .., l.letiNUIill r-..l lUI....III. Sbuicll
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C, Loral !kIf-liUllI'0rl.
M
110<. ... """', ...
Rftd_ Sa,....
D. Ilhr- .7IIt .,. lJtIJlPlIeo Oil I........, blJl
(Od'" 19M 10 A_ 191;;1.
E. of .-pp1M 'i1 '0 !W:" """
puN II)" Ya.Joo" It. Oba... El.s:lo' .....,b .\-

p, __ .-d or and ......11"'_1 f ...
......,. I. 8 01 Jill)" llJ4:1.11<1 Au::t$ 100
(l 0lIUIaI ." rapl.iftl onIll.l_ '0 the lIhorl
.. ...t ._lIDllloiiB, IInrtll I!H2 h. lGlJ.
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4 u.II-.,qaI"" at, if N 1NO-
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AItT SHOWING I'ERCEHTA(lES OF SlIP"....ES
A/lllllUNlTIOH SHIPPED fllOH T!'lESE AMU
TO THEATRES OF OPERATION

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OF JAPANESE ARMY PROVISIONS
ARMY HEAOOlIARTERS
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DISTRIBUTION
FROM AREA
OF
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17'
_..
PERSO AL EXPERIENCES DURING THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN
I.L GaL A6yua1ri, Shuichi.
DepUcy ClUef 01 SCalI, Imperial Geoera1 SCalI.
Jformerly 0Uef 01 Sal. Solomons operations
!llInd
other
1'''I'r .\lm'r,lor 11"119 II I' ,
hllll" F'" S ' 'I'." 'Jl'('IIl'l' lind 111\ Ihe
rJl, .Iunoa rlllt! N C I
wen' 10 be l\(:('lII
1
ied 1\ I'll' a edollia
, III nrsl Ihe sea I
lempl 10 ClllltUrP Port \1 I . lOrne at
lhe Corrll g.. W. I 01'(' ',1' in
Mill I; IIII', and,lhen. lI'hile an airfield
. Iller rOl1,rrrlC'llon on (iuallatea I'
11I'l'jlllMttlon for tl F'"'" tta In
I' ,11'. IJr, and \'ew C' I
'0111. otTen 1\'1', ehe ,\.mtrican Foreee
counleratt.ck in Ihat a," TI I .
h' I I ' HIS t II1l opennons
re 1 lad 1,lattlled lIS indi"idalll campaipts
)f('llrne caml'aij:11, ,,'ith Itabaul lIS the
a of lIlt! ,hllerican oounlero/fen_
snK III l!lt2, nabaul was made
lhe headfJlI.rtetS for the fol'Cl'S en I' ...
.. .> III tnc
11lOn\l .... , m taStprn Xe'C" Guinea, .nd thi.'!
l)f('llllll' a camllall:,'1t ,,'hitoh had L ... _ ,
....... """" .nllCl-
br Iht Jajlalll"'l' .\rmJ beaUSil" il had 1I1IIdi!'
II'n mrorl'l'(1 I rmalP of the /renen! n.ll'gie
!rtuation. ThaI IS 10 $ll,l'. had thi!' Jal'lIl_ .nn"
madl!' a rorl'l!'C1. of till!' tnemJ's abilily
I.unch COtlllltraUlek. and had a !lUitab"" rom_
m.nd ..niUliOIl....ith IhI!' 1_1"1' fol'Cl'S al_
lotII'd to il. bl'ton Mabli!!hed ill Ihe .-hen
the !!Oullll'!rn "'118 planned. I
Oelit"e lilt! .Iaparll""!' .rm) oould hne n.rriI!'d on
tht .'.r ..ieh .1111111" III'l'llaraliom to IDftI the
.\Jlll'!ricans rounlerauaek. ! lIleall Ihat lhe oooth-
eMI o/fensh,t ha1'l' been n.rried OUI
Cl'>O;ful1,1' if onl)' ..t had l'Slimaltd Iht enemy
Siluation rorl"t(1l.l .ntl made 1'l"Oj)l'r dll'('isioTL'! on
the basis of thai tstim.lt. In realit\ it can be
$llid Ih.1 imo.licall!'d b)' earl_r
ill Ihe "'lIr. failed co IlI'OCftd ...ith I_rycall-
lion in tht imptndin/! taSl"ard adnrlCe. .\.1
l'I"';ull, 1101 onl)' ....s ,JIllIIn unable 10 make up
for IIII' lime 10;,1 in CMlcial half-rear. btlt
lhis inilial time disadnm./re bl'eame I'TO-
j:'l'1'arrr as Ihe "'-ar COlllinutd.
Afrer chI' of I!H:? ,,'hfon Ihe rn.re n.tu",
of the :-'ol01l10n9 Se'" Gtlillea 01'-
Clime appllTl'ul. rhe .Iapan_ ,\rrtl,l' il.'l
b",t ('OnlllllllHleMl nnd its lllo;;t
rOI't-'l'l!, and ... st qUHulilieli of mililllr,\' SIOres 10
Ihe one .fter lire other. from
the 901l1b. of CQlIl'll('. nnd from ('hilla /lnd .\lull-
c\lurlll. in 0.111'1" til cur.I' on thl'lie Ullphlllutd
OP"l'llt;OIl1' 011 "u," becnu.'ll!
Illl' 0PIl()I'IUllC lime for rrnn,portlllj:' the;16
rOl'(;l'l! nnd lIlililr"'." hlld hcell n
j!n'llt ItIlU!lIl1l IMI lit "ell I' I,he sceul" of
bntlle. due 10 enern,\' lIir nnd ijubmarille attncks;
lIlUl h'OCllUilI' of Ihis \Ie nlso 1081 II great dl'llt of
,'err M.'il'tltinl I reclln, bel\leen
'"
(/1/(/
in tllP SolomorlS Ilild in
h., M'J.(unll'd uS IInll ('lllllpllij1n
link,..1 in!lI'pul"l,bl)'.
r, in the sJlrillA' of lilli?, Jh,'ge
pl.nlled liS enlil'ety BeIlUl"lllll
10 !lever oorllllluniclltiollll be..
IIml '\1I9ll"nli", Ou one
Iy, Lunle for (lundrll_
. harW!-sclllll t:Ollnlel'otTeIlSi"1l
,,ilh el'il;elll silrllltious on
Thus, the Jupllnese
not. onl)' lit. tire SllI'!lIrhend
taut .180 along the /IrlUks,
of our roTt:l'l:l
&l8M of battle 011 !) October J
to m.inta.in li.ison "'ith t'he
mellU for suppl), rmd 10
for the New Guinea 0lll'!ra-
to be continued ufter the oon-
nal lIowe\'"l'-r,
., our defeat. 111 the decisire
r, I ".1lS seriously "'oTried
depressed. Therefore, deter-
t:IDIWllander and reorb'llnize our
I proceeded with all pOS'l:ible
.nd, there from a
of 29 October, participated
cl.perate for aboul
ear encuatiOIl of th.l b[.nd,
IN&. I I.nded on Bouf:llill\'i!le
t.mporarily until j re!urnM 10
of lIay. .lly GUlldakanal battle
lastin/! imllressioll on me .nd
IIUa _as the first time the J.p-..
ftft' bl'l':u ellf.'1I.!,oed in ampllibious
nature. Though I m.de c.re-
I!:I:perience;11 Ill)' I"l'OOrds
at thi!' lime of our ... ilhdra.....1
.. I am hel"l' I"l'OOIlSlructing
record of th09l,l expl'.ril"nOOB.
U- .re Ill)' person.1 OIJinions,
disagl'\'l'lIlents with Ihe actual
ion. Moroon'r, since thl'!ll
a sea arell l\IId ill\'olnl<1
011 "llrious 8Clllll'1"l'<1 i.'lilluds.
1 Illa)ed n Pllrt; but j
1IbdeMOOtI thnt Ihis is lin llCWllllt
....peripnces "nl[ thel"t'fOrt.'l ill
1 th09l,l f"ctors which iuf1l1enced
in this oreu,
and our morale 11'1.11 n'n' hill:1I, Ilo"'el'l'r. i
Toho at the time 01 Ill)' to Ihi.'l dut,
I ..as \'en' Dluch tl'OublM b" one 'Illest-ioll, and I
.id to my.lf: "Does the .\meric.n force ...hie
landN on Guaaalc.nal on 1 I"l'Il..-nl t
elll'my rommittl'd co thi.'l carnpai
or is it Ihe of II larj..>e COUIlII'
:l8'ell!lin! If it is the fomler. ollr openeio
will most C'l'rtainlv be RUI if it i II
latter. viC1on' or' defl'lll 1Ianj.."i in the 1.11111"'.
I (iiseu_ fl'l'linj..".'I with tllOlill' I
Tok\'o direeth' oom:ewed .-ieh the
aid': "We Illu';j( have .crurate intellij..'l'-rlC'i' I'l'PO
if ...t a"" 10 l'uluatt Ihe eTlelll)' ion 00
1,.- I !!Ilid this bteause al Ihal lime "I' hid
IOl'llns 01 &>In'r1aininll: aclual facts rej..'1lnliul:" t
01 Ihe elll!'lll)' oounlerolfell.'li\'I".
)fOTl.'C)\'er, .t Ihis time we wen'
o8'ensi", in (ju;nea frolll nUlla 10"IlTds 1'0
Mol'l'!lb)', emplo)'inJ! oul)' 0111' delllehment. I
lIP
ite
difficulties encounteTl'd in I
jUIlJ!les. the of the Monlle.it
and Ihe lack of lIUlllllif!!l.. lhi.'! f{)1'ft' fluslrl'tl
until b)' the end of it hrld ",ach
Kokoda .nd could look down 10 I Ill' ('01"111
bl'.Jond Port llur","}\', BIll ill elJis 1I1'l" I
enemy Wall ablp 10 II III
this countenlllaek fiJ(hter plane!! werellarticul.
I, elfecti\'e: they attllck..d our n'111" linl'l! of
lUullil;.tinn, nlld IIltlldn
for,IH. Our det4c11llleuL "'"l! grlllhudly ,ll'<:irll
nl
.n,1 IVW OT tllrt'(' rO!'
weTtl rnt-e;,'ed from lire detlldlmelll conllllru,dc
r
bUl due 10 Ihe olll'!l'lleiomal delllllllds in the Glial!
.lean.1 Clllllpllign, noL II wllh!l,ip 01' pia
or transport oould be Sllllrtlli for this 'U"ell, ,\11
therefol"l', it "'as de,.';ded that. nothing
, HIli'
done .bout ihe New Guinell operll!lOn r er
't'ictory had been "'Oil on (lulldlllcrllllll, lIowe" ,

A Iiw:lrt II...., 0' the ......1.itllalion durin,::
.y parUripUCIa in the
V- .n, ():taIIIr IHI aDtiJ )by lM3. I
........ ClaW of StaI' in the army ill
&be c:u.pail;n- n .... an utnon..ly
.;an pM. ill the J,..-.Amerif:an ....r
... it thP roI'IClusioG of the J.,.-
.AnaTt ..thnIttm olmllivt' and llhift
of ... iait_....id1 t OJIftlilljt' of IIw Anwr-
ir:ul Armr'1
J'".....1. in 1M RiJanarck
... 0I:klbIr lr2. AI I.... ti_ Itt. Js...-'-d-
....,... .. p!umi powutul rountl'n.uack
.. o-da...... h...irlft' .1,"-dy IsulI("hP!l .wo
-neoam-n..u ftIIldtin,: in 1M 1_ of 1M
.... iJI9Ol..... ()nf ..hil"l. wu to be
-t PI tllil operation haiti alrally lanftd on
Qed."'.! aod ... ..riJtl[ 10 snack. At
... _1_saodwr dil'u.too. 110_ bf.avy Il1il
..,..... tulk forcf' WP", p-adual1y bPinll ...
..........ul.
on. Il'fMI'I of tl}@ anny _&II on
..... of ... for OlWlsltanal ill unitt to
.... ,...JClOIIUJWId of 1M 0I)lO,.,lion. MMD-
.......... _Ill and sin-raft of our Davy
..,. CIlllpII'Ilm, by ..-ortinll fulUill to Ciuadal
....... .,bcabin lbe t'0"1I)' sirfl"ld .t I'ort
TIaAe of ...".),illfl 111<1 tra"MI"'1111 in
...... of"ol HarlJor ..... hMvy and Illsny
.., It anchor In lh. bay. "'roOl W to l!l)
pi... made niJ(htly .U.ckB on BII;)I-
harbor every or 3 dayH, "ilL the
llIIIaiMd wu not lJI'I"&l. HydMY ....dio
NIeeted anxiety and fear concerning
0:1 &be Ouadaltanal ope....tionH and
.uln 01 't'ictory, All oIBcen
........ to -.rn in thl. 81'8t line
fir IIIDOftd from thll Fatherland
Although Amerit'flP Air Fora' acti"ity hflll II
tr.nIDdous on the outcom@ of. the Wllr, n
peat deal of eredit mUll al80 lll' .1!1"lln 10 the
_vity of the Army and Nary, wluch, coopernt-
ire with Air Foree. pla)'fll s;jlIlificllnl .roles
in the ('Ounterofl'ensift, As a former 80lther l
mUllt ..y respect to the Amtorit"1.11 infnnlrylDl'Il,
utll1er'ymen. and taDk corp81n@n who atllu::ked
the Ja.._ Army. BQlltaining !It"HOC Iossell in
..eh _ule. wbile- Id'ering the hnrdships of
.aria and aIIIOde d,..mtery in lhe GUlulal,
CUUlI Sew Gun- iuDtfle& .\S It former sol,
dMIr I.....,..11. __ today am nlttural1y, llnnly
cool"iaced that J..-r- oIicen ami men are to
be reprded .. UIllDC the TU'Y best in world,
Toda,.. wben the _bole J..._ Ami)' hIlS l'ftn
dImobiliad. this -....,. of nllor on It-
bJIone J..ttle6elds is my l)D@ Jf'8tifiCtllion: and
I ..lUll ..y infinite respect 10 our fallen ollieen
.... -
3. The GIMIIlJ&... 0Ju'rlll;on
The battle for the Solomons can be dil"ided
into three phueI: the Ooadaleanal.
.....n,..... and Botapinville phues. .\ml it call
aid that IIDID, lar'r:- aDd lJD\an na"al
...... Wft'e fouPt towards the beJrinning of tKh
,... oeateriDg aroaDd the points of landinI!"'
1'hef'e were abo three phues in the Bailie of
o...daleanal: the A..,.... ,IlI@mber, Ind
October ,..... The ... Wllll the most crucial
__ ill the deBpente battle which took plate on
()rdobw 9t-2fI .. hMl ,.-t hopes of ""inning
.. dIll:ilift rietory.
Immedistel, .A. our failure in this It
GeDera.I u.dquarten in Tokyo decldtd
10 carry out anodIer oI'_ive larger and more
powerful thaP the adlen.. The plan for the new
o-ift wall" fo1Icnra: ,
(.) t_ welI-tnirIed and balt Ie-tested difl-
....... quantit, of ..",. artiller)'. a tlnk
fIDroe wen to he .....Ied ;
(6) suitable adftDCe air buts were 10 be COil'
IItrUt1ed at Kunda;
. (c) the final. attack Wllll to be launched ill the
n
(ci') .. for the final IISSI.lolt, af
oI'lIlIift .... to be carried out ill thll mHldle e
. till!
1II'0ftIDber to capture the enenl) salient III
.alol"wellt ohheKatanikau lthcr. lit
Bo1J8Ye1" the problem 1JeCn
J
......... :0.... dillcult our shipping
m.tUld daily to IlIth an thnt h)' t
the nil'" "enture WIlS given up
1M3, Utll Japnnese troops on the
; and therefore, one of the
bled at Raballl \I'M dis-
Guinea. and the helll")' nrtillery
at Rabau!. .
in the o.-er_all plan. the
lID Guadaleannl were still antiei.
hi. the scheduled attack Ind
aIlout the delll)' because the)'
of the plan to e\'"Bellate
almed into effect. On the
... subjected to a determined
on 10 Januar,. Our front
bombarded for'2 or 3 dllYs:
infantry launched conCll'n-
_rious points. spear-
ns. important poei-
and Ihe general !lituation
Ihat the linn)' commander
.. 10 the western hills nur
_mble and reorganize his
..... continu@ a desperate resis-
the area anny comm.nder
US to el"Beuale, Thel"l'll.fter.
successfullv withdrawn to
destroye'; in three !il'parate
lasting from the 1-8 From
h.alf-)-ear of llIiq-rable war-
fort'eS had at !!Ill'
American rounterotTensi'e.
in in dNail tlle WIlS in which
lU8'eJ'l!(1 (rom the shortlllZl' of
am be said tliat til is
of our failnre.
after the .\Illerican on
&paDeIie detachment named tbe
rompo9t'<l principllllJ of one
was 10 trle SC('ne
dftd:ro)eN. It landed at Cape
and on 20 humched
ap;aim,-t Ibe I'astt'rn !lnnk of
near LUIlp:!I; but it was al-
utd the detachment oormnander
177
I)etllchrnent launched lin attack on
ern tht.southern lind WeIlt-
This att k, s POSitIOns.
ac lias lery nellrh' successfull
8eCtnrs, lind SOlne of onr 1n certam
t 1 were I most able
o cut t tht lir ha- L_ t' 1
1
. .,... '1\1 m t Ie end even
t liS Rttempt failed and our troopa scan red .
the thIck and lost contact w tb tnto
mluder. I err com_
".'he Second DiI'ision, supported b" hH.
'11.Itler)', a tbird Iltaek in the iL.<t. p.';;"
. of October. wltb bopes of l"ietoT)' due to t1H!
near SUCCl!S!l. of tbe attack. The plan of
at!aek \\as for a lImlll fOra! to divert tbe enemy
wrtb an assault on hill front ncar the beach, wbile.
the foree would follow a circuitoD;; route,
liS ....ay tbroui den..o:e jun!!le in sin!!le
file, In order to launeb a major allaclt: on the
fl()uthwCIllern fronl. But tfl"n this luempc: ended
in failure.
,\ II Ihto lroop" ....hich look pan in tlle$e auxb
""ere 10 Guadakanal abol.rd dt'stTOf_
ers and landin;r bal'!!a 'nlel't'fol't'. lbe o&e'rs
Ind I\lf'n wel'l! ficlu .,.-jlh only !he pro-
risioru; alld ammunition ....hich tbe, could cur"
on their Ourinl!' lbe I ....
alltllllll!! ""ere made 10 in but
Ih_ ....tre PaniClilarly the supply
operation in wbich six transports ll"tre used to
bring" down store<; in preparation for
Ihe I"aek ....hil'h took in October:
most of 1111' transports ....ere !'iet on fire and de-
stTOn'd b" I'llI'm,' air aUllcb and on lOp of Iha.t
the ",hieh hid been landed It
such W'l'lIt' OO'it wert! destro,ed or burned up
lIear the shore' b)' air auaek: .\gain a similar
supply operalion b)' trallSllOn com..,. was at,
ternptl'<.1 in So,ember. but it unfortunllely
resulted iu the loss or the whole el"Cry
ahip ('itber by fire or sunk. AIl
thCSl;! 10"'<eS WN't the result of Buaeks enenl)'
plnnes: thus we were forecd to abandon the idea
of in supplies b.I' trllllS]lOrt Iessel;;.
Since tlte situntioll w.u as oUllinl'<.1 abon'o from
about the beginning of SOl'ember the Japanese
Al'm\" on t1lllldlllc"nlll was nnturall," e.dl'l.'mel)'
hlll"(l lll't'$'ll"ll for the wt'lLllOlIS "lid ammunition
lIretled fol' bailIe, Rnd 1l"NI found it extreme!)'
ditlieuh to obtain dail.\' rations. The and
mell ill the real' 11\\'11)' from the fn:'nt hnes
Il
l
ll"liulh. able to \\'ard olf starvatIon by eatmg
<"OI:oanu'U:! and crabs and.!lO but
. ,1-- ., the front who were l!l dIrect com-
Sl!l<'''' I.......
----.."
!!impl}' Ill.'Cn 11;;(' .J" p" 111';;(' U itel' 'Ill Olll" I
(") , '_ IlUlllln,
w 'lilt! lPCl' f
MInck: . Ituque 0
If .ron \\'el"l' 10 liSP one to d '
,\meriean mellu>dsof lip-hting a wa,'
have to ellll lhrm "ext"a"u"all(' I
I",yoilil an,\" comllal'ison with OWlI lech .' Ill'
Bill to be .,. I mfjacs.
, SPCCl Ie, 1 logkili. s)';;lematic
lind alld Ihes(' ell'mcnts lire ill'
Itl!o II well.org'ltlized IIl'i"e towlirds the
hllal ohJCl;tn'e. they are solilld methotls.
Geucralll' spellkillj.!. the ,lapallt!Sl' had 110
COlil'Se hilt to comhat these methods ItS JleSl they
desllite jhe odds. We ourselws were 1I0t
'g'llorllllt of the of the .\merican
of warfare. nor call it be said that we
rlliled to do our IIlmost: the of the matter
is .'lillOI'll' thllt we wel'(' complejel}' otllclasstd in
el'ery I'CSflllCl in to 0111' IIbilit), to make
use of such techniques,
T described the Alllel'icltn methotls as:
(a) 1.
(b) R.I'stellllltic, and
(r) scient ific.
I shllll now whUl r melln b}' that:
(a) Logic: III landing operations the ,\meri
cans would first we:lkl'n lhe br lIir at
tacks, liS eXI,llIined previously, and would lhl'n
estllblish a beachhcad lind stal'j constructing' an
l.irfielr1. Wheu first stal'ting construction of the
airfield lhe}' wOllld secnre onll' lhe beachhead
alrellrl" establislwr1. and thl'n only dter gather.
in'. U 'sulliciellt qllantit}" of troops and supplies
\\,;'Ild the}' attllck the When opeoing
an nttack on cnem," positions ther would first
o\'CI'whrlm tho euem)" with II hell\"}'
then mOil up with lllnh 01' infllntry, Til plan
ning' islaudhoppillj.! opcmtions. the ,distunce of
rach ad"'lIlce "'IIS fil'St of all, determml'd the
"l'eI11t;onal N\lll!" of fightcr plnnes so that their
l'ITecti,'encss ('oultl 00 used to thc fnllesl
all IlttllCks were IUllnched onl)" lifter full
hllil OC'en made for an,'" emer!-"nc}': lind
"I'eu if u flyer lIl"de n forced lundinll' or was
shot down el'er}' possible WIIS mllde to
''t'!lClIll him, lind SO forth. ,
(b) The most importllnt fllctor
,\ ",erie,,'n methods of wllrfllre was lhe systematIC
.' f I b',,-" ntlwCI' of land. sea
Uppllclllion 0 t 16 com I "" ,'-
11I\d air forl1li5. In this respect the srstem Will!
thol'<lIIgh Itnd IInswered e,'cry greal
01' smull denllllld, iUSlance, the,enemy cttr
ried out l'Ont inllollS IIl'rial n!IOOnna,S'llUll'& lI.ud
''''
8Iratelril' do<;lI'ines could be
e"enls or tI'l\' ,Japanese. Allier.
10 lilly thaI the Illoot irnpor.
O"urTf'd this eltd)' pt;ri.
Bhonld Iikl\ to discuss SOIl)e of
t tlll'l kill ,Im'elopmeuts since
nd influenCi} 011 m)" military
the IImltel' from the defensi"e.
J1o....illjt 1I1"l onl)' m)" pt;rsollfll
ould like to IIpologize for them
there Inn)" be difTerrut nnd more
'OIlS 011 lhe subject.
nofthestl'CIl,!!1hoflheJlIpn.
forces:
forces ill caeh operation were
Japanese forces thllt it is hurd
compare their rrlati"e strength,
t siul!le flictOl' in the Amcr!'
th., o\'erwhchnhll! strength of
Air Force and its oontinllons rein
after all. if JOII do not hal'e
atr you cannot have control of the
hi operutions taking place in II
with islands. supcriorit), in Ihc
lute ool1tro1. In rep-un! to lhis
case of New Guinen, which
..king oollid be l1lgllrded liS II
acute shortage of o\"lwlnnd trans
. mllkes ench locn1it)" exactly
hi the middle of an ocellll. :\nd
impossible to Illnss t mops and
el1ts and supplies in n. region
:BOt have ool\lNll of the nil' :lud con
MOl"P(lver, since superiority in
be used not only for IIttllcks bnt
'88IlnCll, plttrol, 'nnd speeding up
of lroops and tuilitar\' StOl'l'S, it
makp the best possible ;Ise of time,
ely "ilal hctol' in wnl'. Since
it is perfect]" clear thlll the
areatly in carrying'
and fighlinl-': battles, In IldditiOIl,
'cans were 011 the olrcnsi"e the.\"
folX'l-'" for utuck whe'1lI'er lind
wished, which thenl the
dlllrllctel'istic of ",hal migltt
'n-defensi"e wndllre.
Army 11Ml COllfidellCI' thut to II
it could ('lilT}' Oil clegpitt, II short.
and chllt it could enduro a mil
rit), of ,'neilly iii'll POWI'I', but
unable to /'1))'1'\' 011 [,('I'OIHI n
the fill'll or odds;
4, Analysis of lhe Campaiglf
The operational plan adoptcd the Alueri
cans lit the beginning of the GUlIdnlclll\a) caUl'
paib"ll, and laler repealed in the SoIOIllOIlS lind
New Guinea operations, was lirst 1.0 deono,l' the
enemy's air fol't-"l'S and naval rOI't:e'l by lIir lIt1l1ck,
to inler.:lict Iheir _ trtUlSI>OI'llltion, IIml then:
O
launch islandhopping llielics, howe\'cr,
tltem 10 a TlItlJ(e of 16u-2oo kilomelc''!I in <Jrde"!O
utilize full)' Ihp eft'ecli\'e of lighlcr I'h,nes,
IIlI "'as the case in the Munda lIud HOlIg"i'1\'ili
e
ope",lioll9 in the Solomon", and the I... ",. :;"In'
'" , .' "" Guill
ell
, mOll. Sllu m'llaven 0l'el'lt!lOns In "e' ,
But wadually the distallce.'! co\"cl'ed h.I' Illis
Il'I"lllli'llle j!'l'ealt'l'. pro])'
ob'
L. . r I il'
of tile explllls'OIl 0 I, II.''' _""d
I thmk 11 may be Sllid lhut the
.. (" . f . jfiCLlIICll
,n'" .umea cllmpal/l11s we'1l full () 9,g"
. , , . I I gh mallY
In ""11l!ct to IIulltllQ' IU'Itol'.l", '1I1( 11011
fronl 3-4 or (iG unloaded trool)g lil\(1
supplies uncollcempd in the vicinity of the pier
at Llln/VI Cape; the barro,,>e8 laid dOWll dlly
and ni,l!ht Amuiclln ,,'1Il1S IIllfll.'ellch-IllOl'lal"ll
"en! tert'ific. wherells el'en ir JapllUese
could siJl'ht choice laTjZt'l<l, Ihere was no lImmuni
ti011 10 hllrl 'II Ihe Ihe Arnct'icall troops
which di!lelllblirked nellr lhe nil' base advanced
in J.,rrflnd to tile front Hnl'l-; Iloout 10 kilo-
meters distant riding in mOlt' thall It hundred
while on the Olher haud. Japanese office1'8
&lId .nPtl hll,l to mo\'e cautiousl)' along the jungle
in sinj,tle file, with intel'l'1I1s of 10 10 20
metel'!l helwl'Pn each 1lI11n. hiding from enemy
planes. I that by Iloonl Decembe., the
American!! IIlIlSI hal'e thollg:ht all the Japanese
....pre deal!. sim,e there was no I'eturn fil'e from
Ihe .'apane"" Aml.I; but the)' must ha\'c been
astollmll'(! when, if Ihey tried to Muck, they
were shot dOWII by rifle or light mllchine'gun
fin> from the secret deplhs of the jungle, or
,..Ileu in the pilch blackness of night their air
base ilU\1hlhllion'l or artillery positions
blown up,
And !In. while the .Japanese fOI'CC!l w('l'l'sutTer
inA' chese eXlreme hllnlships, we ente'''ld thc new
year. 11).13, lind then lit dawn ou 10 .]:lunary
there ....as a withering attack along the front
lines and the ellem)"9 heal'y offensive had 1Jt.gun.
Thus, after Ihe American hMI fil'st used
its air fOI'<;(>I; 10 weakeu the .]llpllllese ,\nlly, it
then launched its /(Nlund aUnck, havlllg made sllf
fieil'nt PT<!Jlllrol ions,
171
with tN enemy had no food whataoeftl',
lIlreqlh gradually wal'lted a.ay
died of lItarn.dOll.
The u1tiIIate reuoo for th. desperateness of
mpply situation wu tb. interdicti0!i. by
......., pi... of our surf_ O'allllPO
rtatlOll
.
WJ. it t-une impossiblf to carry out supply
operationB lI'ith tral1RJlOl't8, 1ft' .Ifcted nights
.hIlI then W1I8 no moonlight and rarried out
.pply I'QI UlIin1t dl!8lroyerll, but even the df-
iItroYeJlI -...e auaeked by enemy ftOlIt-planes or
torpedo botU all l!OOn IIlI Ihey callH' dCll&
along the island aod il bel'UlU' esCftfhngly
dalJl"'OUll 'or IhNll 10 come to a' lIfop. :-:;.0 at
about Ihe (nd of Sovembl'r we de\'i!Oe(1 a new
melhod of .nloading Rice Willi Ilaeked
ill nd about I/O drum& were thl'll bound
wilh roJll' i,to one balch; a destFO)'er "'ouklload
aboul four of Ihftlt' balchM on deck. Ilroceed to
Ouadaleana!. and drop the t1ntmS on!rboard
while emil nit 1I101l'ly aloull a selet.1et1 pllrt: of
the 00IIlII. Then mo",rboalll would tow tile drUnl!!
ashore, whfT@ waiting ,..ork-cn!I'"S of Ilbo.1I 200
men would pull them up on the beach. This !!18-
tem "'1IlI caTied out !le'\'eral limes, hUI often Ihp
drtllllll 'ullt' up on ooral J'e('fll, til.. tow ropt!S
would breat. and when da,..o came enem)' planN
would do a thorough job of strafiulr the Rooting
druRlll. (ollll'qupntly, aitholllfh II 10Iai of over
2ll.uoo were ITlInllllOrted iu Ihis fallhion, I
recallillalllnly about 20 to 3() Il('r.,.'elll,. WPl1' 111'-
tnally reroe",,1 on thp beach. There"'tpr. aub
marillllll we"1" uhPd 10 carr)' or metl on
ollfl!Jlt milllionli. and it WM customllry for these
IUbmarilllllllo from Ihe Truk naval baae
to either labaur or Short land." pick up Iheir
Cl&rJ'llelI thlre. and then pl'OCel'd 9ubmerlfl'd as
far all Guadalcanal. Thia mpthod "'II!! inefficient
and in IdcItion to that, by Dto.cember it had be
come yery daBg\lrollll to tJUrf_ alon". the coast
of Guadalcanal80 we had Iiule llUl'l't'lIIl in our at
tetnptl to Iring in food mppliefl.
D.pite t.heee varions attempl$ to eft'l'd food
Apply the Japan_ fortell on OnWalcanal IIlli
fend .." ..-aaltillll becallllP of the food short_
ap. Of a totaJ force of 80.000, about one.third
..... killedor "ounded in battle, about ODe-third
.-.nad 10 death, and the remaininM third "ere
:0 BoUR!'inTilJe. But eTen the oftkel"ll
"ho 1I'ere tlTII!IlI.ted "1Il'll all terribly
from OMr lIt&rvation.
la"""""l0 thia, my diner. obeenation of
..a.--.Iltut.ion 1I'U u follo1l"ll: each day

....... Then JIG tia. to JneIltion them

_ aftw the othIr. 1Icnreww, due to this
tiIo IlQperiorit,.. the Ameriean Army wag
to obtain not only ..at quantitathe superio
1m aJIo an importaDt qualitatiYe superio
..... with the ...... of time the stn:!
of 1M J...- u.r padaall,. declined q
_..._...,..
NatanJIy it ia plaiD that logical lind
tematic opentioD earri_ out on the bnsis
qulitatift and quatitative scientific superio
II boaDd to ..... Keady and sure eu
rieb:II1 CUI .. _ while Pf'l"!JOnnel casu
.. .. wripjmi-' So that Amf:rica with
adnrdaps .... sbIe to 8ght the war economi
Iy from the perllOIIIMll point of view. Quit
the acNltrary, the Japaneee Army was foree
fIcht NIJiDg maiDIJ on the individual bra
of jg 06:801 aad IIIlI!D and on their eodu
IUd fwtibMle ill the face of !Jll\We shortages.
I heIieft it _, haTe hem result of this
JlUil1 that CIII1ain tragic incidents occur
unfortunate incidentll which might be conside
iDhuman. I am firmly OODvinced that the t
J...- cbaraeqr and tnditions of long st
iIlc would. DeftI' toJerate such violence or
-..
ColrCLtlStON:
I am indeed lOrry to have stretched Illy 0
btioIII in tbiB RIIlIlI&J'y to such great leu
hilt I baft au.pted to discuss my own 0
... aDd feeliDp fnely. At pnoeent., thou!,!h
wfIoIe .,.,. ....... demobilized and UIO
we haft .... deprind of (KIf' productive caps
to W&f8 war, I am not in the least dO"'uhca
about the future. Beeauae I do not even II
...... moaId -.m attempt lo expand
eomdI7.., .......... I myself sincerely
IIlIber apeet, tW the whole Jllpan_
wiD IlXlIl NY.-t to their true nature und
ClllIIll&nIat. 1lI'W, peaceful nationfll WII)' or Ii

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STAT '" IOU,." Iy ...
US O ~ J.P.,.
SUPPllU 010 !Sf ""lITARV
OCT I LUZON ISLAf'lO
'44 - ,"Vi; ''''S

till
-
...
lUI

XagUlIO. Chuichi
Conllualuling
CP.\F
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t:lbllJll
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d ,WooI", 01 _. "'II' , _ ."
no. 01011' "',_ 01 __.. _
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tt ...., .... U.. lI....._'h_ ,......,
leu. ,,,,I .. ,..... 40,
, "01. ,... ...,.
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10<1. , ,,,,, 10'< III'
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ll,,'" (I 1'1I ..1I"loLl:
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,10.. ""mi., of
1>' .....'". "",10'.
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."1'\"._01..,
'_.'un'
M ThlnlMh 1111...
CAPTURED ON SAIPAN
Regula(ions for Local Self-Support
(S(amped: Vcry Secret)
CErrrRAL PACIFIC AREA FORCE QRDI:R NO.4
for use ill local >;elf-gup-
requirecl of ch'ilillH 1I,l,'\'nci('S,
T" 01010'-
,,,1,,,,<1.,,,1.,,
"""",.."d to,
,..",.1. ('(o,,'ml.
II". ,,111>'(',.. I'
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oIVII
I.".
_, 10, ... I" . .. _,
futlltl' prospects,
d of (he cellll1ll
l':lI:hau,;ti"e methods for
To this end. local ci,-ilillll
this term will include lhe
Will be utilized and directed
... same time. each force ,,'ill
....pplies it..elf for its local
-.rr1us manpower alJo,'e de-
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CAMPA'GN LlYTE
ZONI: l.OGISTICS
PIICES LARGER THAN

O.TaINI:D nOIll IIIAJ fiI[" ",SIIIIlUflA. INT[flflOIATION .11

.p..... -
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In lhe Imphol opention, 10 of our
ol'(lnollce eo:luipment WI.S cnplur-cd ,\!lied ord-
IUUlec.\mmuuitions left, l.lehjnd by the ,\l1i
FUI"Cf!S could be immeo:lintely used when our
fort':l'S penetrnt.etl ,Jeepl)' into the Allie,J Ii
Illlll "",peciolly when the supply of the ammuni-
lions from the re-t had Ci!llsed. At the fOMlla
lion of the J. 5 .\. as well llS the B. D. A.
....tre able to arm them "'illl caplllred onlna
Ik-fote our "Urtl':ndet, ho..-e,er, the onlna
of the .1. E. f, S. It ,,'as chieOy u..otd to
""",Ilj.'the'l (he fij."htillj:!: poWtr of the :\&Ia)' A
anll), . \t tIl(' of the _\
.trtll)', ;JlJ 1lt'K(>llt of the ordnance
'1.... 1 of Ih(' ordnan("(', caplurt'(1 b)- Ihs
litem of lhe F....nfh _\"ml' in Frellch Indo('hl
The of the AlJieo:l lIircr:dl!:l
.1",1 do,.-n 01" loudetl were r-elilted as 111\\1-
nil'('rlL!l j:!:tlllS llnd ....He vet), eJTectinl in iucl1'all-
inl{ the ,\. ,\. VOliN' of (he ,Ii,isioo.i itt lhe
front.
llubn,hltd 10)' Capl. Illrnh!e llI,nlm,n, On!IlRtt'-" Dr
P1tnlt",nl, lIurt". " .....
T ........
,-.. "" ..
I,"","" tahl
(ll...........IO<I _bJ
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pn. (10 .-. fo<' 10'- -'1-
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Itf'IMort
,"III I, TI''Ct, '"I II
AREA STUDIES DIVISION
'31 ..... Stutlll."ll 1l.epQ1'I
3Z A Del:.lled Stlldy of the t:ll"tll of A,,", Uombtlll:
ou Hamburg
33 A Oet.lled Slud)" of the Ell"CC1. or A..... HombtllJ:
on WlIl'perlltl
31 ,\ Oetlliled Stud)' of tlte Ell"l'Ctll 0' '\refI Ilomblnl:
nn l)uilllI;l(/or'
,'J,1 ,\ D"tllllf'd SlUdr 0' Ihe or .\rea Uomllllll(
"" >l<I1I1Ij:l.'lI
so ,\ r"'talled Slud,. of Ihf' Ell"P(1" or Aren Ilombllll:
nn II..Dl>It'lletd
3; A lloo>talled Stud,. of the ot .\rea llombl.
on OarntS1.dt
38 A DetAiled Study of 1,"-, t:ll""'I1l1 of ...... Unmblntt
on Lu'-k
3D A Briel" >ltudy or tM t:tl"P('fjo M AI'CII llomhlnl: on
llerUll, ,\"",buflt, llochutn, 1... 1".111:. 1I.g;'n. llorl
IIIUlld, (JI"'rh.ll""", &1>I'11I'un, "ml 111"1'0]"11
ulthl Me<al 8ran<h
2Q LIJ/;bt MNI.I$ r,UIUJltr){ I'nrl l. Alulllinum
or Oertllllll)' I'art II, MalJllCfllum
21 Dellt8<'1le ... HlldCflbclm, Ger-
man)'
22 G m b lI, Lelpz1c. GenllaA7
23 Alumlnlum"'crlle G m b II, I'laut 2, Bluerteld,
Gennan,.
24 Gebrueder (lllll/ol G m b Ii, l.ud..lpbaten., Ocr-
-,
25 Luftachllfbllu i'...eppeIlu G m b II, t'rledrlcbahAfeo
On Gennan,.
26 Wieland Werke A G, VIm, (ierm.uy
27 Uudolpb ltautenbach Lelchuneullgt_reten, Solln_
gen, (:.(ormauy
28 l.tppewerke Verelulgte Ahlllllnllllllwerke A 0,
Lunell, Germoo)'
2l) Verelnlgte DeUlllehe lletoll ...erke, lte(l(1eruh.. IUl,
(:.(ormao)"
30 Duerener lll't.tt ....erke A G, Du",n \\"ll1eDau-Herlfn
io. WIII'(>1', Germ.ny
CIVIUAN DEFENSE DIVISION
rl,.r"11""
41 {'ol"!:IIf' 1"If'hl iI'1Mlrt
of:! """11 1I",,,,rl
t'I"hl 1l"I)<1r!
H lI"'''bUri: 11<1M>rl

lta.I' ./tko-hot" t'leid 1I(1)<.rt
10
."
lINlTED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
UST Of REPORTS
....._ IIInhldc Bolnblnjr Snm-

....... _ Bomblnlt Surre,., O..er-
..... ,.......W.r)
... ae. ., Itntelrlc IIombllll: on Ille Oer....n
--
AIIlQAFf DlVISJON
fBI DlYlIlO1l Ind Brallcb)
.. Dad: llt..... lDdlllllrr 1le!lOrt
............. lID V.r1Ol18 T.rgeflt (Special Reo.
...
....... <>f ....
.,.. ....,.. .... ot 1M Ellrol.'I'" ",.d PaClnc
........ _rbd ",lIb an (oJ lOay
- ...... __ tbe 8UPl'rlolendl'n! or Document$
II.. 7 ......... omCli', O. C,
30 "011' 20 NOV 10 "011' I "011' 20 OCT
,..
nnllAUO ..tlK. OF ..... OIVISIO'"
........ OF JA"'''IEst: OIVI"OtI'
120 OCTOBER 1944 - 30 NOVEMBER 1944)
"LIVTE C-AIlP,,18N
NUER OF DIVISIONS 'ARTICI,,,TIN8 IN

,i-+--+-+-+---t-+--
. I-+-f--
.1---+-+-
.I-+-f-+-+--
.I-+-f-+-+--
ZOIC LO(II"JCI
-'
lJJ1unES DfVlSION
0 ..."",.. ll:1l't'lrIC UllllllN It'dU$l'y Report
I IV III I.. \',,1 1 ''IT.lIlll.. n.."I.... PItIul
1/I4l 11.."",..11... lI"'lld.lnll: !!I'.II..... B..a.
..,,11...,
1""'11'>1, :-.lIholl....ba.lI. n1
1118 llan y Imt ll<>ad IIrhllft'. Had 11" o.m..D1
100 1I<oll1 ,. F.11"., (k.",.. oy
100 (lu81101'l'""..'k" \\""1",,,., Wt>i ....... 0....... 01
161 Ilrl\flf!lil'l oud """u, (; ,n h II, "_I. (;"rmo"l
1112 ,\ ...... l'lrma""..... (:'-mlllny
168 "_"MI.,,,. lin....,'.... fl<o.,nanJ'
164 )l A S W"tk.. AUl:llhu!1'". Aul:"buo:, (',('rIUllD1
Yrl<'(lrldl "row A U. (:<>muon,.
UIS ':rlll lh.l<hl ....n.erk... (; m b II. Hetll'.bLlek.
-",
UI'; A T (; .\luchl ban G m II 1I. llockaa, <:erm.Dl
168 1:.1. ll.IlI"""' k.. {; m II II, lloebu. Germo.llJ'
100 U.,.....'''''l.. llow n rk.. nu.......rl>ofl'. ( Of
IIO lllll..I.llo'D'''''bI' 110(o n.....t .. G III b H. T.t>t.....
' Dr
1,1 !luhman ''"'" lloo.u",,-ho-Wl"rlt. ''-mban:. ('oK.
-"
lr:l llulltS,ori<'d $,l"llCIurea. H mburg. Germa..,.
103 Conlln".11 1 (:lIlllD1lwfft... H O'er. Germa..y
1;4 KiI_1 ll IUnl' Germanf
H:; AmlDOOLltwffu .YersbulI-1ellIla" GenaaD,.
H6 Ilrowu Ik>"ffi ft cw.. ll...nnbel... Germany
I;; Ad...m A a. .... German,.
In! A a. [''''o>nortbelm, eer-..,.
HO \.Jtonllu $ ..1>.....-1"" AMembiy. F ... rp'. GenIlanJ'
180 Volbwaqoa...-", Falleraleben. GenDa..y
181 Il1.llwltY nadOt'l: t Bielefeld. GenDany
182 !lblp l'...rd8 lI(lW H&IIIburI', GenDallJ
1&1 BI""'" and \'""" H.mOO"", Gen:u..,.
1$4 1",lml..... 8eoJ, A O. }J.I.Ilnbel.... GenDanr
18:> 011 I'lalli. GenDaIlJ'
186 ('..........ue....1t ylet.,.., CuuopRa1Del, GermaIlJ'
187 KlocltD ltlllllbloll Deul.l.. ['lm, Genoa..,.
188 RlIhl'Ot'i Ilfdroceruo,loa P1anl. 1:IeItrop.lloJ. (' .......
-"
18[1 Setltlreben .\ G. Sentlrd>en, 0......
,,,,,nf
100 Ilalh,'U' nad.." .1.1 AI'ea.!>t..... Gel'D:lll."r
IllI ltall .....,. \'Iad1K'l t Mmbul'l:. ('''''''''''''f
192 1:lP"e.tS.....ll ItioII r!t"t<. llbb"ll:. GenDanJ
1113 n,.,; ltal<h> on Gem C'lileol
1M I (: ... """"'I..dU$lrl". LudwlgMaf"". Gennans. Yol
1&\'0111
In:; I....""dllou In )lal'llh... lIlnl' 1'..11. nm. Geemany
lOG 1 n rl "h,dlll"rl... I '....tu Geemaof
11); C""tul I W..,k... HUl'l ('",rlu n)'
1tJ8 \',.,.ml"'rj:: M..... \'at"d. G mbell:. Germa"y
IflU I.......""""".. ":bOl'" and Ilel'li:<'ll ... , lI... mm, (:er.
UUl "."
TRANSPORTAnON DIVISlON
'rlw .:ft'toe or !:!tr.'''1lk Iloblbl". 00 a....lIIlIn Tr ...-
1.....'"1110"
nan Operlll",r.e tb" n",nner I'a""
.:ft'"",. of lIolubl"ll on Ilallroa,1 Inat...lla""'" In
;"'u,,,lIl't1: "nd Munlcb DlvloiOtUl
(ler",." I..."""'"th'" I"du ,' I)uetllll .he W.o.,
Ue''''.'' )l1I1y Ki\ll......d T lIlc
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..
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(MI!I? E.-.r u:)
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J'..-- TraDllp(lrulllon, HUI,
OIl UlP CUr of S.....j,
CID o.b.Kobe-KJOlo
CID tile 011,. or N'pallkl
0lI. tb& a,,. or HI..,.blm.
SlIlell In Ibe
'Dd Tulle.
OD I.PlI_ around Army
10l
llG The St"'fCIe AI. 0pe11_ of Veq 0.., .....
"".dIDHlI In the W ApIIQt J.pa.n (orw-t.....
AI. t'om!)
61 AI. Ope..ll..n. III Cbln., 110........ India-World War
"
118 The AI. Tni""POrt Com....lld In the W...
J.pan
00 Tbe TlIlrteo;ntb AI. t'OrM In l.be W Api...
"-
10 The Serentll .nd Elerentb .-\1. Forte! In l.be W
Api ... J.pall
n The Flttll AI. FOra! In the W AplMl J'pan
N...... AaoIyoio DWioioa
'1':! The Inrrrrop,t1ons or J.pa_ 0lIIcl.l:! I
.lId III
0';3 Campalgn11 or I.... f'arin., Wa.
0jt Tbr 1t.>.11M'(1on or w.lI:r I.l.nd
...:; Thr .\lIifo,l ('alnl"i"" .\J:;aill${ lta....n]
76 C.mpaiEn Apln;n \\'01", :Ya.IoeIap.
1111.... and J.lull I. II and Ill)
71 Thr or TnII1:
78 The 011'.......... Laylnl CampaJp Api....
,_.
19 n.port or Sill... IlomboInhnent Sn.-y Partr-
Fo........onL '''trodnelloll, Condnalons, Illd Genftoal

110 or Sbi.. Boml>ardmen{ P.rty (En.
A), ArM
81 of !l1I1J* Romban:lmr<lt 811"""" Part,. {Eo-
HI, 11.........001 ArM
82 Report nr Sbi .. 8oI:Ilbanl.ment SIIT"1"t'T Party (Eo-
c....... CI. IIn.dl .-\ ....
83 Rrp:m. or !lhlJ* IIo<nl>ardmen\ !:'''l"'l"''r P.rt,. (Eo-
cloi<nl'fo Ill. 1I.lI:odal.. Area
It.port of !lbl!", llombanl.ment Sn.-y P.rt,. fEo-
..lo.urP .:1. llu...,.." .\rM
8S or Sblpot Homban1_t Su.-y Party (F.n.
('IOIlU... F),l\b.lml.U Area
8ll Ilrport or Shill" Hombanl"""'t Sur....,. Part,. (D:>.
riOll".... G and III. $hloooml-saki .nd :-0011....
!'Bkl A'-I
87 IlrtlOrt or :;hlpot Uombanlmrrlt Sn.....y f'lIrty (!!:n.
ch.ul'\' I). Olw..-II and 0..11 011 ElI'eoeIl..-
or AmmunltlOll
8S 1I"l,,,n or !lhll'l! IlomhlrdllM'llt !lu......y Piny (Ea
el"""r., J1. Com....... l. and 0..1. 011 ,-\CC'IIrllCY or
.'I.ln(
Iltl II'-1lOna or Sbill" lkotllbartlmem So...e,. 1"1'11 (!!:n.
dOllure K I of SurraCO' Hombardlllftltll ..
Japa_ W'T 1'''I('flU.1
I'hyoical 0-,. nrw-..o
00 .:ll"..et or II... 1"......"lIary Bomb Mlacb 011 J.pan
(a Itrpo'l (On .:11:111 cm...)
III Th" .:" 1. nt lh.. Ten Tbot1llalld Pound Bomb. 011
Jllt..n 1'arll('ll (a IWport on Nine 'nehleng)
lY.! .:" 1. "r lhr Aloml,- IIOlnb on 1I11"01<b1..... J.pan
00 t:tr I. ,.t lin' Atomle 110mb on Naputl, J.P8t1l
IN KlJ,'<."!1I or II t"u. Thouu.lld ......nd Bomll 011
J.pa..- T (. I!ep(N't oa FI.-e IIId<leng)
9Ci J.:1I'0I<1. or Two TlIoaaand. OIM! Thouaand, aDd rift
lIund"", l'(lund 110111" oa Jlpa_ 'I'arpb (.
!Wporl 011 Et.c!ll 10ri<lenQ)