The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment

Author(s): Peter J. Schraeder

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 571-593
Published by: Middle East Institute
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 THE HORN OF AFRICA: US FOREIGN
POLICY IN AN ALTERED COLD WAR
ENVIRONMENT

Peter J. Schraeder

U S foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa between 1945and 1990was

guided by a series of Cold War rationalesthat viewed the region as a means for
solving non-Africanproblems.Specifically,US policymakersdid not perceive the
countries and peoples of the Horn of Africa as importantin their own right but,
rather, as a means of preventingthe furtheradvances of Soviet communism.As
a result, US relationshipswith variousregimesin the regionevolved accordingto
their perceived importance within an East-West framework. Emperor Haile
Selassie, for example, was courted from the 1940s to the 1970s because of the
importance of Ethiopia as part of a worldwide telecommunicationsnetwork
directed against the Soviet Union. After the US-Ethiopiansecurity relationship
was shatteredin the aftermathof the 1974-77Ethiopianrevolutionand the rise to
power of a Soviet-backedregime headed by MengistuHaile Mariam,the Somali
regimeof Siad Barreachieved greaterstatus in Washingtonbecause of Somalia's
importance as an access country from which the United States could counter
militarily any perceived Soviet threat to Middle Eastern oil fields. The US
preoccupationwith anticommunismnot only was manipulatedby these leaders to
obtaingreaterlevels of US economic and militaryaid-more than $600millionfor
the Selassie regime and nearly $800 millionfor the Siad regime-it also served as
an importantrationalefor Washington'sgeneral disregardfor the authoritarian

Peter J. Schraeder is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University
of Chicago. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Sixth Meeting of the Northeast
African Studies Association, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, April 23-25, 1992.
Its propositions were enhanced by the insightful comments of Daniel Compagnon and John Harbeson,
as well as two reviewers for the Middle East Journal.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 46, NO. 4, AUTUMN 1992

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572 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

excesses of these regimes, as well as for a host of interventionist practices

designed to maintainUS influencewithin the region.1
Radical changes in the Soviet bloc duringthe 1980s dramaticallycalled into
question these Cold War rationales and the policies they generated. In 1985,
PresidentMikhailGorbachevemergedas the undisputedleaderof the Communist
Partyof the Soviet Union, and his intentionto alter significantlySoviet economic
and political structures was captured in a variety of buzz words-perestroika
(economic restructuring)and glasnost (political openness)-which quickly be-
came part of the lexicon of the West. Of greatestimportanceto US policymakers
was Gorbachev'sdesire to move beyond the conflictualconfines of the Cold War
and seek a form of internationalcooperationreminiscentof President Franklin
Roosevelt's vision of a post-World War II internationalorder. Gorbachev's
adherence to the theme of novoye myslenye (new political thinking) was the
crucialingredientfor what became increasedUS-Soviet cooperationat the end of
the 1980s.
In the case of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev'spolicy approachentailed Soviet
tolerance for the fall of single-partycommunist states and a recognition of the
need to allow the peoples of EasternEuropeto determinetheirown politicalpaths
independent of Soviet control. Throughoutthe various regions of the Third
World, this new political thinkingentailed a rejection of revolutionarystruggle
and, instead, the need for political negotiations and compromise to resolve
ongoing regionaldisputes and civil wars.2
The irony of Gorbachev'sradicalinitiativesis that they unleashed a variety
of forces that ultimatelyled in 1991to the fragmentationof the Soviet Union into
a host of smallerindependentand non-communistcountries.Althoughthe largest
of these-the Russian Republic-pledged to seek further cooperation with the
United States in a variety of realms-including a resolutionof regionalconflict in
Africa-the reality of the fragmentationof the Soviet Union was a significantshift
in the internationalbalance of power as a former superpowerceased to exist.
Most important, this event underscored the end of the Cold War and the
irrelevanceof its relatedanticommunistrationales.Consequently,US policymak-

1. The study of US interventionin the Hornof Africaduringthe Cold Warera has generated
a tremendousamountof scholarship.For a generalintroductionto this literature,see David A. Korn,
Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1986); Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia,
1953-1991(Pittsburgh,PA: Universityof PittsburghPress, 1991);and HaroldG. Marcus,Ethiopia,
Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974: The Politics of Empire (Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1983).
Figures on US economic and military aid are derived from US Agency for International
Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Series of Yearly Data, vol. 4, Africa,
Obligations and Loan Authorizations, FY 1946-FY 1990 (Washington, DC: USAID, 1988).
2. See, for example,MarkWebber,"Soviet Policy in Sub-SaharanAfrica:The FinalPhase,"
Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 1 (March 1992). For the definitive analysis of Soviet
interventionin the Hornof Africaduringthe Cold Warera, see RobertG. Patman,TheSoviet Union
and the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement (Cambridge and New
York: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990).

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 573

ers at the beginningof 1992were embroiledin a fierce debate over how best to
ensure futurecooperationwith Russia and the other newly independentcountries
of the former Soviet Union. As debates focusing on US-Russian cooperation
continue to replace the former antagonistic relationship, Washington's Cold
War-drivenpolicies in the Horn of Africa have changed, and will continue to
change, accordingly.3

REASSESSINGCOLD WARASSUMPTIONS

In a move cautiously supported by the Departmentof State's Bureau of

African Affairs, and an important first step on the path to regional peace,
Ethiopia'sMengistuand Somalia'sSiad signeda historicaccord on April3, 1988,
in which both leaders agreed to reestablish diplomaticrelations and withdraw
their respective forces from the frontier of the Ogaden-the disputed territory
claimedby Somaliaand controlledby Ethiopiathat served as the focal point of the
1977-78 Ogaden War, as well as a variety of other minor military skirmishes
between Ethiopiaand Somalia.4The overridingconcernof both leaders, however,
was not the resolution of the Ogaden conflict, but a shared desire to defuse
conflictual external relations in order to free military resources for effectively
dealing with internal,regime-threateningguerrillainsurgencies.
In the case of Somalia, the stabilityof the governmenthad been threatened
since 1981 by the rising military successes of the Somali National Movement
(SNM), a northern-basedguerrillainsurgencyderivingthe majorityof its support
from the Isaak clan, as well as by smaller insurgent groups, such as the
Hawiye-dominatedUnited Somali Congress (USC) and the Ogadeni-dominated
Somali PatrioticMovement(SPM).5In the case of Ethiopia,the Mengisturegime
found itself increasingly threatened by what eventually became known as the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of
three regionally, and largely ethnically, based guerrillaarmies that included the
Tigrean People's LiberationFront (TPLF), the smaller and less active Oromo
LiberationFront (OLF), and the EritreanPeople's LiberationFront (EPLF), a
secessionist movement datingback to 1961.6

3. For a good general overview, see Michael Clough, Free at Last? U.S. Policy toward Africa
and the End of the Cold War(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992). See also Peter J.
Schraeder,"Speakingwith ManyVoices: Continuityand Changein U.S. AfricaPolicies," Journalof
Modern African Studies 29, no. 3 (September 1991).
4. See David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1987); and I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in
Africa (Oxfordand New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1985).
5. For the best descriptionof the evolutionof these guerrillagroups,see DanielCompagnon,
"The SomaliOppositionFronts:Some CommentsandQuestions,"Hornof Africa 13, nos. 1-2 (1990).
6. For a discussionof these and otherguerrillaconflictswithinthe Horn of Africa, see John
Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987). See also a special edition of Africa Today, "Eritrea:An EmergingNew
Nation in Africa's TroubledHorn" 38, no. 2 (1992).

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574 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Somalia

The April 1988Ethiopian-Somaliaccord would have generatedlittle, if any,

change in US foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa had it not been for the
unforeseen developments that accompanied implementationof the agreement.
Faced with the loss of theirbase of operationsin Ethiopia,SNM guerrillasentered
the Somali city of Burao on the evening of May 27, 1988, and assassinated all
senior governmentand militaryofficials. The first stage of a previously planned
"final offensive" designed to force the collapse of the Siad regime, the guerrillas
initiallyscored stunningsuccesses againstthe Somali armedforces; most notable
among these victories was the captureof large portions of Hargeisa, the second
largest urbanarea in the country. Whenfaced with tradinghit-and-runtactics for
the need to defend fortified positions, the SNM was devastated by Somali
counterattacksin July and August that virtually destroyed Burao and damaged
three-quartersof all the buildingsin Hargeisa.
In a wave of terrorthat followed the initialmilitaryassault, the Somali armed
forces reportedlyengaged in a "systematic pattern" of attacks against unarmed
Isaak villages, as well as summarilyarrestingand executing an unknownnumber
of suspected SNM supporters.7"It is conservatively estimated," noted one
Department of State-commissionedstudy of the conflict, "that at least 5,000
unarmedcivilianIsaaks were purposefullymurderedby the SomaliArmedForces
between May 1988and March 1989, in the absence of resistence and in contexts
which presented no immediatedangerto these forces."8
The intensificationof Somalia's seven-year-oldcivil war did not attract the
attentionof the highest levels of the US policymakingestablishment.Rather, the
initial US response was handledat the level of the "nationalsecurity bureaucra-
cies" comprising the executive branch: the Departmentof State, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and, particularly,the Departmentof Defense. At a
critical stage in the conflict, the Department of Defense on June 28, 1988,
delivered $1.4 million in lethal aid to the Somali armed forces, including 1,200
M-16 rifles and 2.8 million rounds of ammunition.
Although originallyauthorizedby the Departmentof Defense in November
1986,delivery of the aid hadbeen delayedrepeatedlybecause of the unwillingness
of traditionalcarriers to ship such a small amount of cargo.9 Thus, when the
Somali government requested air shipment on June 4, 1988, and paid the
extravagantprice that such transportrequired,the matterwas handledroutinely

7. Robert Gersony, Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in

Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others (Washington, DC: Bureau for
Refugee Programs,Departmentof State, 1989),pp. 60-2.
8. Ibid., p. 61. A more criticalreportplaces the numberkilled at 50,000. See Africa Watch,
Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People; Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict
in the North (London:Africa Watch, 1990).
9. US General Accounting Office (GAO), Somalia: Observations Regarding the Northern
Conflict and Resulting Conditions (Washington, DC: GAO, 1989), pp 7-9.

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 HORN OF AFRICA m575

at the lowest levels of the bureaucracy. 10As far as the Departmentof Defense was
concerned, Somalia'sstatus as an importantregionalstate providingaccess to US
militaryforces left little, if any, doubtthat Washingtonshould quicklyrespond to
Mogadishu in its hour of need. In this regard, the US response reflected the
Departmentof Defense's bureaucraticmission of ensuring the maintenanceof
stable, pro-US African governmentsthroughthe transferof militaryequipment
and the trainingof local forces in its usage.
Longtime critics of the US-Somali relationshipin the US Congress, most
notably the House Subcommitteeon Africa, did not accept the militaryrationale
of coming to the aid of a strategically. Rather, congressionalcritics complained
of US weaponry being used by the Somali armed forces to bomb urban areas
indiscriminatelyand to execute civilians whose only crime was belongingto the
Isaak clan. The Somali government'sresponse to the northernuprisingmerely
strengthenedpreconceivednotions of Siad's regimeas a gross violatorof human
rights that had lost the support of its people. In a hearing of the House
Subcommitteeon Africa hastily convened duringthe civil conflict, Chairperson
HowardWolpe noted that the uprisingin the northwas the outcome of "years of
political repression."11Having never fully accepted the idea of a US-Somali
security relationship, critics within the Africa subcommittee seized upon the
intensificationof Somalia's extended civil war as a vehicle for terminatingany
furtherUS security assistance to the Siad regime.
With the House Subcommitteeon Africa threateningto cut off all US aid to
Somalia, the Departmentof State touched off a bureaucraticconflict with the
Departmentof Defense in July 1988by "voluntarily"placinga hold on any further
"lethal" military aid to the Siad regime. Unwilling to do battle with Congress
againstthe backdropof widespreadabuses on the partof the Somaliarmedforces,
the Departmentof State rationalizedthe hold by underscoringthe need to protect
the far more substantiallevels of economic assistance. "It simply did not make
good bureaucraticsense," explaineda Departmentof State officialinvolved in the
decision, "to take a chance on losing all the economic assistance for a small
amountof militaryassistance."12
In the eyes of the Departmentof Defense, however, the Departmentof State
had caved in too quicklyto the demandsof the House subcommittee.Havingbeen
the most active proponentof the US-Somali access agreementduringthe 1980s,
the Departmentof Defense wanted to stand behind Washington'spromises to
Mogadishu,especially duringa crisis period in which US credibilitywas on the
line. "Either we're allies or we're not," explained one proponentof continued
militaryaid. "What is the sense of havingthis programif we're not going to give

10. Confidentialinterview,Washington,DC, June 8, 1989.

11. Quotedin US Congress, House Committeeon ForeignAffairs,Subcommitteeon Africa,
Reported Massacres and Indiscriminate Killings in Somalia, 100th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings of July
14, 1988(Washington,DC: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1989),p. 2.
12. Confidentialinterview,Washington,DC, May 31, 1989.

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576 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

them the militarysupportwhen it counts the most?"13 Despite such rhetoric, the
combination of congressional pressure and Departmentof State acquiescence
finally led the Bush administrationto reprogram$2.5 million of military aid
originallytargetedfor Somalia in fiscal year (FY) 1989.
In additionto the suspensionof militaryaid, Economic SupportFund (ESF)
security assistance to Somalia beginningin FY 1988was subjected to "6notifica-
tion" demands of Congress. In short, the Department of State was legally
requiredto give a 15-daynotificationto Congressof any intent to disbursefunds
to Somalia, duringwhich period any congresspersoncould request a "hold" on
the funds pending furtherdiscussion. Althoughthe Departmentof State legally
can disburse funds in the absence of bindinglegislation, congressionalholds are
generally honored as concerns those countries in Africa, particularlySomalia,
that are subjectto notificationrequirements.14 "Since Somaliais not of the highest
political interest in Washington," explained a desk officer in the East Africa
bureau, "the State Departmentwill not overridethe requestand force a battle." 15
As a result of this Departmentof State policy, $21 million in suspended FY
1988 ESF funds ultimately were reprogrammed,in September 1989, to other
Africancountriesto avoid their complete deletionfrom the Bush administration's
cash-starvedFY 1990foreignaid budget. Similarly,in a compromisesupportedby
the House Subcommittee on Africa, $15 million in FY 1989 funds were paid
directly to the InternationalMonetaryFund after Somaliaagreed in May 1989to
release a certainnumberof politicalprisoners.As of December 1990,there was a
hold on all security assistance pendinga significantmovement on the part of the
Siad regime toward greaterrespect for internationallyrecognized human rights.
The Africa subcommitteehoped that such a hold would place pressureon the Siad
regime to seek some form of "nationalreconciliation"with the guerrillaopposi-
tion.
The escalating civil war in Somalia that continued in the aftermathof the
SNM's failed offensive in May 1988contributedto an ongoing debate within the
national security bureaucraciesover the future of the US-Somali security rela-
tionship. Officialswithin the Departmentof State and the Departmentof Defense
who favored continuationof the relationshippointed to several political reforms
as goodwill intentions of the Siad regime to seek some sort of nationalreconcil-
iation. These reforms included the creation of a constitutional committee to
investigate the ongoing war in the north, the release of roughly 300 political
prisoners identified by the Department of State's Africa bureau, and Siad's
announced intention to establish a multipartypolitical system complete with
parliamentaryelections.

13. Confidentialinterview, Washington,DC, June 8, 1989.

14. Countriesin Africa subject to notificationrequirementsduringFYs 1990 and 1991 were
Burundi,Liberia, Somalia,and Sudan.
15. Confidentialinterview, Washington,DC, June 27, 1989.

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 577

Despite these actions, even Foreign Service officers(FSO) within the Africa
bureau admittedthat, aside from the initial release of several hundredpolitical
prisonersand some economic reforms,there was a significantgap between what
the Siad regimesaid it would do andwhat actuallyoccurredin the politicalsphere.
These same officers, nonetheless, noted that, despite continued human rights
abuses within Somalia, even gradualmovement toward reform, when combined
with strongDepartmentof Defense pressuresfor ensuringcontinuedUS access to
the port of Berbera, demandedcontinued US support. "We're stuck with the
relationship,"explainedone FSO, "and we'll stick with it and see it through."'6
Proponentsof disengagementfrom the Siad regime pointed to no less than
four major reports-including one commissionedby the Departmentof State-
that underscoredthe severe humanrightsproblemin Somalia.17 In July 1989,for
example, approximately450 civiliansallegedlywere killed when, in the aftermath
of the arrest of four prominentMuslim leaders, Somali armed forces fired on
demonstratorsemergingfromthe principalmosques in Mogadishu.This occurred
just prior to the Bush administration'srequest for approximately$20 million in
ESF aid to Somalia for FY 1990. Not surprisingly,congressionalcritics seized
upon this event and successfullyblockedthe administration'said request. Indeed,
members of the House Subcommitteeon Africa, perhaps the most vocal and
influentialopponents of continued US aid to Somalia, described Siad's reform
packageas "meaningless"in the absence of a sincereeffortto meet the legitimate
demandsof the SNM and otherguerrillainsurgenciesseekingthe overthrowof the
government.18
In the words of a memberof the Departmentof State's Africabureau,the net
result of the congressional-executive deadlock over the US-Somali security
relationshipwas a "muddle-through"policy. While opponents were unable to
sever completely the relationship,proponentswere also constrainedin what they
could do. In short, the United States continued to occupy an uneasy middle
groundthat neither completely supportednor opposed the Somali regime, while
hoping that political conditions in Somaliawould improve. "It's fine to say let's
cut off aid, even if that's what the Americanpeople want," explainedone member
of the Africa bureau in attemptingto justify having the United States remain
politicallyengagedwith the Siad regime. "But then what are the consequences?"
Reflecting the bureaucraticmindset, which usually favors the maintenance of
establishedties with a particularcountry,this officialexplainedthat the inevitable
result of cutting aid would be a loss of US influence.19

16. Confidentialinterview,Washington,DC, May 31, 1989.

17. In orderof publication,see AmnestyInternational,Somalia:A Long-TermHumanRights
Crisis (London:Amnesty InternationalPublications,1988);GAO, Somalia; Gersony, WhySomalis
Flee; and Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People.
18. Confidentialinterview,Washington,DC, June 13, 1989.
19. Confidentialinterview,Washington,DC, June 27, 1989.

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578 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Ethiopia

The controversy surroundingthe US-Somali security relationshipwas paral-

leled by an ongoingdebate over the futureof US-Ethiopianrelations.The primary
proponentof enhancingthe extremely cool, but correct nature of US-Ethiopian
ties not surprisinglywas the Departmentof State's Bureauof AfricanAffairs,that
portion of the US policymaking establishment that pressed the hardest for
strengtheningties with the Selassie regime from the 1950s to the 1970s.20 As
explained by a country desk officer within the Africa bureau, Ethiopia was still
considered the "most attractive" of all the countries of the region, inclusive of
Somalia.Among the reasons cited were Ethiopia'slargepopulationand economic
potential, the historic nature of US-Ethiopian ties, the efficient ability of the
Ethiopian bureaucracy (unlike "others" in Africa) to "get the job done," a
strategiclocation borderingthe Red Sea, a Christianheritagethat could serve as
a bulwark against Islamic movements, and Ethiopia's role as host to the
permanentheadquartersof the Organizationof African Unity (OAU).21
It was for reasons such as these that officialUS policy consistently reflected
the Africa bureau'sposition of supportingthe territorialintegrityof Ethiopiaand,
especially in the aftermathof the 1985-86 famine relief effort, the separationof
humanitarianefforts from the overall context of political relations between
Washingtonand Addis Ababa. Among the actions that demonstratedthe Africa
bureau'scontinuedinterestin promotinga thaw in US-Ethiopianrelationswas the
August 1989 visit to Addis Ababa of Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Herman Cohen. Cohen's visit constituted part of the Africa bureau's
sporadiceffortsto find a diplomaticsettlementto Ethiopia'songoingcivil war, an
issue that also engagedthe mediationefforts of formerPresidentJimmyCarterin
the late 1980s.
The mere suggestion of enhancing US-Ethiopian ties inevitably was chal-
lenged, however, by a conservative-basedcoalition within Congress seeking to
place the spotlighton the humanrightsviolationsof the Mengisturegime. Led by
Republicans Toby Roth and Jerry Soloman, this coalition expressed great
frustration with the House Subcommittee on Africa's unwillingness to seek
economic sanctionsagainstthe Marxistregimeof Ethiopiawhile at the same time
seeking additional sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa-
especially when both grossly violated the human rights of their respective
populations. In an April 28, 1988, hearingon proposed sanctions against South
Africa-the Roth-Gray sanctions bill, or HR-588-Roth reminded the House
Committeeon Foreign Affairsof the "double standard"that existed concerning

20. See, for example,JeffreyA. Lefebvre, "DonorDependencyandAmericanArmsTransfers

to the Horn of Africa: The F-5 Legacy," Journal of Modern African Studies 25, 3 (1987).
21. Confidentialinterview, Washington,DC, June 8, 1989.

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 579

the issue of human rights when applied to Africa.22This same theme had been
broached one week earlier by RepresentativeDan Burton in a special Africa
subcommitteehearingdevoted to the unfolding1988faminein Ethiopia.Accusing
the Mengistu regime of pursuing policies that had resulted in the deaths of
thousandsand "possibly millions" of its own people, Burtonclaimed that it was
"inconceivable"that Congresswould consideradditionalsanctionsagainstSouth
Africa while taking "virtuallyno action" againstthe Mengisturegime.23
Despite their failureto push a comprehensivesanctions bill againstEthiopia
througha largelydisinterestedCongress,congressionalactivists continuedefforts
to place the Mengistu regime in a negative light. For example, an extremely
watereddown version of HR-588finallywas passed in September1988as Section
1310 of the National Defense AuthorizationAct for FY 1989. Indicative of the
difficultiesof passing a bill in the absence of a crisis drawingsubstantialpublic
and, thus, congressionalsupport,the amendmentonly requiredthe Departmentof
State to provide quarterlyreportsover a periodof two years on the humanrights
abuses of the Mengistu regime. This relatively non-controversial legislation
received a boost as a result of an attempted military coup d'etat against the
Mengistu regime in May 1989. Responding to the widespread repression and
killingsof politicaldissidentsand universitystudentsthatfollowed the failed coup
attempt, several congresspersonsknown for their activism on the issue of South
Africa joined with the TransAfricalobby to denounce publicly the Mengistu
regime. Yet, in sharp contrast to the conservative coalition's opposition to
Mengistu's brand of Marxism, this same group one month later indicated a
willingness to consider a renewal of US aid to Ethiopia. The conditions for
renewed aid were an improvementin humanrightsconditionsand some progress
in seeking a negotiatedsettlementof the country's ongoing civil war.
Rather than seeking a negotiatedsettlement to what Assistant Secretary of
State Cohen in April 1990describedas the "most destructiveconflictin the world
today," the Mengisturegime continuedto seek a militarysolution, most notably
with the support of Israeli advisors and weaponry.24Israel traditionallyhad
supportedthe Ethiopiancentralgovernmentas part of a more than two-decades
long strategyof preventingthe creationof an independentEritrea.The reason for
this supportstems from a belief sharedby many Israeli policymakers,especially
prior to the 1990s, that an independent Eritrea undoubtedly would become

22. Quoted in US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on

International Economic Policy and Trade and on Africa, Proposed Economic Sanctions against South
Africa, 100th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings and Markup March 22 and 23, 1988, and April 20 and 28, 1988,
and May 3, 1988 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 467-85.
23. Quoted in US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Human
Rights and International Organizations and on Africa, Update on the Recent Developments in
Ethiopia: The Famine Crisis, 100th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings of April 21, 1988 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 6.
24. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Ethiopian Government Fights for Life," New York Times, April
17, 1990, p. A4.

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580mMIDDLEEASTJOURNAL

anotherArab-oriented(and anti-Israeli)state effectively turningthe Red Sea into

a hostile "Arablake." In short, the Eritreanconflictbecame a southernextension
of the Arab-Israeliconflict.25
The critical element of an Israeli-Ethiopianrapprochementin 1990grew out
of Israeli humanitarianand political concerns over the evacuation and resettle-
ment of Ethiopia'sminorityJewish population,the Falashas, more than 43,000 of
whom had successfully found a permanenthome in Israelby June 1991.A notable
episode in this process was a late 1984 secret airlift-dubbed Operation
Moses-of more than 7,000 Falashaswho had fled to the Sudanas a result of the
1983-85Ethiopianfamine;a smallerairlift,OperationJoshua,evacuatedsome 800
more in March 1985.26At the beginning of the 1990s, the more than 14,000
remainingFalashas, particularlythose who had fled to Addis Ababa to escape
growing civil conflict in the north, were at the center of an "arms-for-visas"
exchange designed by the Mengistu regime to obtain greater levels of much-
needed militaryweaponryfrom Israel.
The renewal of traditionalIsraeli-Ethiopianrelations was notable in that it
signifiedMengistu'sgrowingproblemswith his primarypatronswithinthe rapidly
changing Eastern bloc. In addition to the withdrawalfrom Ethiopia of Cuban
troops and East Germanadvisors, the Soviet Union informedMengistuthat the
Soviet-Ethiopianmilitaryagreementwould not be renewedafter 1990.As a result,
the Ethiopiangovernmentbegan looking, once again, to forge closer ties with the
United States. "We realize a superpoweris a superpower," explained Foreign
MinisterTessfaye Dinka, "and there is no conflict of interest with the US. "27
As far as Washingtonwas concerned,however, severalfactors restrainedthe
extension of a warm reception to Ethiopian diplomaticovertures at the end of
October 1990, resulting in a "wait-and-see" attitude that strengthened the
continuationof the established bureaucraticstatus quo. First, several conserva-
tive membersof Congress continuedto oppose any opening to Ethiopiabecause
of the Marxistorientationof the Mengisturegime. Then, after Mengistu'sMarch
5, 1990, announcement that his regime was abandoning its commitment to
Marxism,congressionalcritics discountedthe move as the superficialploy of an
increasinglythreatenedleader.
Even if it had been possible to overcome this ideologicalopposition, such as
was the case in the Reagan administration'swillingness to work with the
self-proclaimedMarxist regime of Mozambique,the issue of Ethiopia's internal
civil wars-most notably in Eritrea-remained an important stumbling block.

25. For a good analysisof Israel'srole in the Horn, see Lefebvre,Armsfor the Horn, pp. 42-3,
133, 161-3, 261, 263. See also, Victor Levine, "The African-IsraeliConnection40 Years Later,"
Middle East Review 21 (Fall 1988);and MitchellBard, "The Evolution of Israel's Africa Policy,"
Middle East Review 21 (Winter 1988/89).
26. For a general overview, see David Kessler, The Falashas: The Forgotten Jews of Ethiopia
(New York:SchockenBooks, 1982).For a discussionof OperationMoses, see TudorParfit,Operation
Moses: The Story of the Exodus of the Falasha Jews from Ethiopia (London: Stein and Day, 1985).
27. Quotedin FloraLewis, "EthiopiaPeersWest," New YorkTimes,January30, 1990,p. A15.

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 581

Although willing to make minor concessions, such as accepting Eritrea's long-

standing demand that UN observers be present at the negotiating table, the
Mengistu regime nonetheless was unwillingto budge on the matter of Eritrean
independence. As a result, negotiations with the Eritreans, especially in the
aftermathof renewed militarycooperation with Israel, broke down in favor of
both sides continuingto seek a militarysolution. As long as Mengisturefused to
seek some sort of negotiatedsettlementdesignedto bringajust peace to Ethiopia,
even US proponentsof respondingto Ethiopia'sdiplomaticinitiatives,such as the
House Subcommittee on Africa, continued to underscore the necessity for
restraint.
A final concern of critics centered on what was perceived as Mengistu's
blatant manipulationof Falasha desires to emigrate in order to obtain greater
levels of money and militaryweaponryfrom Israel. A coincidence of interests in
both Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa toward preventing Eritrean independence,
however, ensured that Israel was far from being a hapless victim of the Mengistu
regime. For example, the House Subcommitteeon Africaexpressed concern that
Israel illegally had transferred100 US-suppliedcluster bombs to Ethiopiaas part
of a secret deal to ensurethe continuedflow of Jewishrefugees.28Moreimportant,
influentialmemberssympatheticto the repatriationeffortdenouncedthe sporadic
haltingof an already tenuous process, which was handlingabout 500 refugees a
month. As underscoredby RepresentativeWolpe, it was obvious that Mengistu
was using the Falashasas "pawns" to replace stocks of weaponrythat the Soviet
Union would no longer supply.29

AN ALTEREDCOLD WARENVIRONMENT

A new chapter in the internationalrelations of the Horn of Africa began

unfoldingat the beginningof 1991:First the Siad and, subsequently,the Mengistu
regimes were overthrownby guerrillainsurgencies,followed by the secession of
northernSomaliaand the creationof a provisionalgovernmentin Eritreapending
a national referendum on independence. These tumultuous events began on
January26, 1991, when Siad fled to his birthplaceof GarbaHarre as victorious
elements of the USC guerrillaarmy capturedthe capital. The entry of the USC
followed nearlyfour weeks of increasinglybrutalurbanwarfarein Mogadishu,in
which a total breakdownof law and order resulted in the deaths of thousandsof
people.30
The departureof the Siad regime, however, did not mean the end of conflict
in the country. Rather than abide by an October 2, 1990, accord in which the
majorguerrillagroups agreedto decide the shape of a post-Siadpolitical system,

28. Tom Hundley, "These Days, It's EthiopianJews Who Feel Passed Over," Chicago
Tribune,July 15, 1990, sec.l, p. 17.
29. Quotedin ibid.
30. RichardGreenfield,"Siad's Sad Legacy," Africa Report, March-April1991,pp. 13-18.

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582 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the USC, by virtue of its control of the capital, unilaterallynamed a Hawiye, Ali
Mahdi Muhammad,presidentof the country. This move heightenedthe already
tense relationsbetween the Isaak-dominatedSNM, the Hawiye-dominatedUSC,
and the Ogadeni-dominatedSPM, as well as amongscores of other, less organized
clan groupings.
In a move based on a stronglyheld Isaakbelief that the northwould continue
to be victimized by a southern-dominatedgovernment,the SNM announcedon
May 17, 1991, that the formerBritishSomalilandterritorywas seceding from the
1960 union and henceforth would be known as the SomalilandRepublic. This
announcementwas followed by the intensificationof clan conflict in the southern
portion of the country between the USC and the SPM, which, in turn, was
exacerbatedby a regroupingof Siad's Daroudclan groupingsunder the military
bannerof the Somali National Front (SNF). In short, once the common political
enemy no longer existed, traditionalclan differences, exacerbated by the dicta-
torial divide-and-conquerpractices of the Siad years, made any hope of national
reconciliationhighly unlikely.

Somalia: The US Response

The intensifying civil war prior to the departureof the Siad regime from
power had the potentialof becominga crisis situationat the highest levels of the
US policymakingestablishment,especiallyafterUS ambassadorJamesK. Bishop
sent an urgent cable on January 3, 1991, warning that the lives of embassy
personnel were being threatened by armed looters surroundingthe 40-acre
compound. (All non-essentialpersonnelhad been orderedout of the country on
December 12, 1990.)Hastily movingup an evacuationplannedfor 5 January,two
rescue helicopters and 70 Marines were dispatched from the USS Trenton, a
warship stationed in the Indian Ocean as part of OperationDesert Storm in the
1991war against Iraq. In a 460-mileflightthat twice requiredmid-airrefuelingin
the middle of the night, the Marine detachment took up positions at the US
embassy and airlifted62 people out of the country on 4 January.The following
day, nearly200 morepeople were evacuatedby five helicopterslaunchedfrom the
USS Guam. At the end of the operation,nearly260 people from 30 countrieshad
been airlifted.31US officials were quick to note, however, that the operation
constituteda humanitarianrescue mission andthat, underno circumstances,were
US troops to become involved in fightingbetween government forces and the
guerrillaopposition.32
Despite the fact that PresidentBush had to authorizethe humanitarianrescue
mission, the decline of Cold War tensions ensured that the escalating civil war

31. French helicopters took part in another rescue mission in which 47 people were evacuated
from the town of Merca and transferred to a French frigate.
32. Confidential telephone interview, January 7, 1991.

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 583

never constituted a crisis situation with the potential of attractingthe ongoing

attentionof the White House.33Unlike the 1970sand the 1980s, when the region
had become an East-Westflashpoint-such as duringthe 1977-78OgadenWar,in
which the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt supportedSomalia, and the
Soviet Union and Cuba supportedEthiopia-the Soviet Union was pursuinga
policy of disengagementthat underscoredthe importanceof superpowercooper-
ation in settling the various conflicts in the region. In addition to ongoing
discussions, primarilyat the level of the assistant secretary of state for African
affairsand its counterpartin Moscow, a significantexample of how superpower
cooperationwas replacingsuperpowerconflict in a rapidlydevelopingpost-Cold
Warera was the evacuationof the Soviet ambassadorand 35 membersof his staff
by the aforementionedUS rescue mission. As aptly summarizedby one US
official, superpowercompetitionhad become a "thingof the past" in the Horn of
Africa.34
The net resultof WhiteHouse inattentionwas the delegationof policy toward
the Horn to the Africa specialists in the national security bureaucracies,partic-
ularly the Departmentof State's Africabureau.Severely constrainedby ongoing
congressional displeasurewith the humanrights abuses of the Siad regime, the
bureaubasicallypresidedover a reactivepolicy thatemphasizedthe internalroots
of the conflict and the need for nationalreconciliationthroughpeaceful means.
This stance was reinforcedby the simplerealitythat the guerrillagroupsopposed
to the Siad regime professed strong desires to maintainand, in fact, enhance
Somalia's relationshipwith the United States shouldthey emerge victorious. "In
short," explained a formermemberof the Departmentof State's Africa bureau,
"a kind of 'win-win' situationprevailedin which risk-aversebureaucratscould
count on maintainingUS influenceregardlessof whetherthe Somali government
or the guerrillaopposition emergedvictorious." 35
A decline in the perceived need for militaryaccess to Somaliain the wake of
decreased Cold War tensions constituted another important reason for the
less-than-enthusiasticbureaucraticargumentsfor shoringup the Siad regime. In
an interesting conclusion to a long-simmeringpolicy debate over Somalia's
strategic importance to the United States-which began in the mid-1970sand
heated up following the Carteradministration'sdecision duringthe late 1970s to
seek a security relationship with the Siad regime (a process that was only
halfheartedlyimplementedby the Reaganadministration)-the US naval facility
at Berberaturnedout to be completely unnecessaryfor the massive deployment

33. For a discussion of this theme, see Maina Kiai, "Perestroika'sImpact on U.S. Policy
towardSomalia," TransAfricaForum7, no. 1 (Spring1990).
34. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Heavy FightingErupts in Somali Capital," New YorkTimes,
January1, 1991,p. A3.
35. Confidentialtelephoneinterview,September15, 1991.

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584 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

of US troops and materiel associated with OperationDesert Storm.36Indeed,

althoughat firstglance Somalia's strategiclocation-the cornerstoneof globalist-
inspiredargumentsseeking close US-Somali security ties-made it a potentially
importantplayer in what in 1991 constituted the largest US military operation
abroadin the post-Vietnamera, the Berberabase was simply strippedof its fuel
stocks and left dormantby militaryplannersof OperationDesert Storm.This turn
of events seemed to validate the position of critics who asserted throughoutthe
1980sthat, even if one accepts globalistrationalesfor ensuringUS militaryaccess
to the region, the Somalibases were unnecessaryin lightof other, more extensive,
facilities readily availablein the region.37
The changing fortunes of the Siad regime within the national security
bureaucracieswas perhaps best demonstratedby growing criticism within the
Departmentof Defense, one of the staunchestproponentsduringthe 1988SNM
guerrillaoffensive of sendinga strongsignalof supportto the Somaligovernment.
For example, Colonel Alfred F. Girardi,a retiredmilitaryattache, who served at
the US embassy in Mogadishufrom 1987to 1989,arguedin congressionalhearings
against any further aid to the Siad regime on the basis that the Somali armed
forces were "poorly motivated" and "poorly led by inept officers."38This
increasinglypoor perception of the Somali militarywas matched by a growing
respect in some quartersfor the militarysuccesses and the pro-Westernleanings
of guerrillaleaders, such as Omar Jess, the renegade military leader of SPM.
According to another militaryattache who served in Somalia, the desire of the
guerrillaleadershipto ensure a continuedfavorablerelationshipwith the United
States was clearlydisplayedby an unwrittenagreementwith the SNM thatneither
Berbera nor US militarypersonnel would ever serve as the targets of guerrilla
attacks.39Such argumentsnotwithstanding,few, if any, career officerswithin the
Departmentof Defense foresaw an end to the internalfightingin Somalia that
could lead to a beneficialUS relationshipwith any futuregovernment.As Colonel
Girardi presciently warned in 1989, the most likely outcome of a post-Siad
Somalia was continued "turmoiland instability" as opposing clan factions vied
for control.40
In September1991,a thirdroundof fightingbrokeout in the southernportion
of the country. Unlike the first round (to overthrowSiad) and the second round
(inter-clan fighting) of the Somali civil war, this third round of fighting was
between warringfactions of the Hawiye-basedUSC guerrillaarmy. Specifically,
a brutal intra-clan power struggle erupted between forces loyal to interim

36. For a discussionof the evolutionof the policy debateover Somalia'sstrategicimportance,

see Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, pp. 175-264.
37. See, for example,PeterJ. SchraederandJerelA. Rosati, "PolicyDilemmasin the Hornof
Africa:Contradictionsin the U.S.-SomaliaRelationship,"Northeast African Studies 9, no. 3 (1987).
38. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Somalia, Abandoned to Its Own Civil War with Others'
Weapons," New York Times, January6, 1991,p. E2.
39. Confidentialtelephoneinterview, September14, 1991.
40. Quoted in Perlez, "Somalia,Abandoned,"p. E2.

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 HORN OF AFRICAm585

PresidentMahdi,a memberof the Abgal subclanof the Hawiye, and those led by
General Mohamed Farah Aidid, a member of the Habar Gedir subclan of the
Hawiye. Despite the effortsof outside mediatorsand, particularly,UN undersec-
retary-generalJames Jonah to establish a series of cease-fires, the fightingas of
February 1992continuedunabatedand had resultedin more than 30,000 (mostly
civilian) casualties in the Mogadishuregion. Althougha UN-sponsored truce of
March 3, 1992, remained partially implemented as of August 1992, security
problemswere rampant,primarilybecause of actions by the militiasof smallclans
who did not take partin the agreement,as well as a thrivingarmsmarketin which
even private merchants hired personal militia squads. These problems were
indicative of the disintegrationof the Somali state and the subsequent de facto
control of local areas by a variety of clan-basedpolitico-militarymovements.41

WhoseResponsibility?

A growingdebate in the US administrationover who should assume primary

responsibility for resolving Somalia's ongoing civil conflicts demonstratedthe
country's decreased fortunes within the national security bureaucracies in a
rapidlychangingpost-Cold War internationalsystem. Several membersof Con-
gress who from the beginningof the 1980shad never desired to pursue a security
relationshipwith the Siad regime decried the administration'sunwillingnessto
take a more proactive stance. "It is a clear failure of Americanpolicy, and we
should bear some responsibility,"explainedRepresentativeWolpe. "Now what
you are seeing is a general indifferenceto a disaster that we played a role in
creating.'"42In sharpcontrast,careerofficialswithinthe nationalsecuritybureau-
cracies placed the responsibilitysquarelyon the shouldersof the Siad regimeand
the former Europeancolonial powers. "You know, it's easy to blame us for all
this," explained one policymaker, "but it's also a situation where you have
anotherAfricanleaderwhojust wasted a tremendousopportunity.. . . They have
chosen to spendthe [aid]thatway, to hurtpeople anddestroy theirown economy,
and now they are reaping the consequences."43An importantelement of this
argument,which intensifiedin the aftermathof Siad's departurefrom office, was
that Britain and, especially, Italy, should take the lead in their former colonial
territories.
The growing tendency of officialUS policy to follow the lead of the former
European colonial powers was demonstratedby Washington'sresponse to the
secession of northern Somalia as the independent Somaliland Republic. The

41. See Said S. Samatar,Somalia:A Nation in Turmoil(London:The MinorityRightsGroup,

1991).
42. Quoted in Neil Henry, "Somali Civil War Slaughter:A Legacy of Cold War Feuds,"
Washington Post, January 6, 1991.
43. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Many Are Killed As Clan War Breaks Out in Somali Capital,"
New YorkTimes, November29, 1991,p. A8.

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586 mMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Departmentof State, as underscoredby the sendingof an officialUS observer to

"national reconciliation" talks held in Djibouti during 1991, favored the diplo-
matic resolution of conflict between northernand southern Somalia in order to
preserve the Republicof Somaliaas originallyconstitutedin 1960.In this regard,
Departmentof State officialscarefully avoided statementsthat went beyond the
desires of either Britainor Italy, the two countries takingthe lead in seeking an
end to clan fighting.Indeed, since neither Europeancountry had recognized the
independence claims of the SomalilandRepublic, Departmentof State officials
continuedto emphasizeduringthe firsthalf of 1992that they were seeking firstto
normalizerelations with a governmentof nationalunity that ideally would come
to power in Mogadishu. "We'll deal with a legally constituted government in
Mogadishufirst because this is what the Europeansand especially Italy wants,"
explained one official associated with the Africa bureau. "The most likely
scenario in which we would recognize northern independence," this official
continued, "is if both the north and the south extend mutualrecognitionof the
internal legitimacy of both governments, and this decision is diplomatically
recognized by both Italy and Great Britain."44
The extent to which the national security bureaucracies sought to avoid
taking the lead in Somalia was clearly demonstratedby the US response to the
intensificationof clan conflict in southernSomaliaduringthe first half of 1992. In
addition to following the lead of both Britain and Italy, US officials strongly
endorsedthe growingeffortsof Secretary-GeneralBoutrosBoutros-Ghalito make
the United Nations the cornerstoneof futurereconciliationefforts in Somalia. In
a move sharplycriticizedby Africannations, however, the US representativeat
the United Nations endorsed a Security Council resolutionon the civil war only
after languagespecificallycallingfor a new UN-sponsoredpeacekeepingmission
had been removed. Althougha Departmentof State officialclaimedthat congres-
sional concerns over "dramaticallyrising costs" associated with peacekeeping
operationsthroughoutthe world was a majorfactor in the US position, Africans
accused the United States of adopting a double standardconcerning Africa.45
Specifically, noting decisive US support for a UN peacekeeping mission in
war-tornYugoslavia,Ike Nwachukwu,Nigeria'sforeignministerand chairmanas
of 1992of the OAU, declaredthat "Africamust receive the same qualitativeand
quantitativeattentionpaid to other regions.'"46

44. Confidentialtelephoneinterview,September16, 1991.

45. Confidentialinterview,Washington,DC, March22, 1992.As of March1992,for example,
the United States owed $400millionin unpaidUN dues, including$140millionin peacekeepingcosts.
Moreover, Secretary of State James Baker reportedly received a "frosty reception" when he
requestedan extra $810 million-above the $107 millionalreadyapprovedby Congress-to pay for
peacekeeping operations, not including Somalia, envisioned for 1992 and 1993. See Paul Lewis,
"SecurityCouncilWeighsRole in SomaliCivil War," New York Times, March 18, 1992,p. A9.
46. Quotedin Lewis, "SecurityCouncilWeighsRole in SomaliCivil War," New York Times.
For two other very criticalopinions, see RakiyaOmaarand Alex de Waal, "Who ProlongsSomalia's
Agony?"New York Times, February26, 1992,p. A15;andNancy KassebaumandPaulSimon, "Save
Somaliafrom Itself," New York Times, January2, 1992,p. A1.

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 587

Ethiopia: The US Response

In sharp contrast to the largely reactive US response to events in Somalia,

policymakersadopted a much more proactive approachto resolving Ethiopia's
civil war.47When guerrillaadvances duringthe firstfour months of 1991made it
increasingly clear that Mengistu's days were numbered, the United States
intensifiedits involvementin negotiationsbetween the Ethiopiangovernmentand
the guerrillaopposition by sending a high-level delegation to Addis Ababa that
included Irving Hicks, deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs,
Robert C. Frasure, a member of the National Security Council, and Rudy
Boschwitz, a formerRepublicansenatorfrom Minnesotawho acted as President
Bush's personal envoy. In addition to meeting with Mengistu, both Hicks and
Frasuretraveled to Khartoumto meet with Isaias Afwerki, leader of the EPLF,
and Meles Zenawi, the head of the TPLF. The level of US involvementin these
negotiations intensified when, in the aftermathof Mengistu's departure from
power on May 21, 1991, Assistant Secretary of State Cohen flew to London to
mediate personallybetween the guerrillafactions and a rapidlycollapsingEthio-
pian governmentled by Mengistu's vice president, LieutenantGeneral Tesfaye
Gebre-Kidan.
The net result of US involvementwas a significantcontributionto a transfer
of power, which largely avoided the bloodshed and clan conflict still evident in
Somalia more than a year after Siad's departurefrom power. As part of an
agreementthat received the personalblessing of the United States in the form of
a public announcementby Cohen on 28 May, the TPLF took control of Addis
Ababa and began puttingtogethera broadcoalition governmentthat largely was
in place by the beginningof July. The most criticalelementof the May agreement,
however-which ultimatelyled to riotingin Addis Ababa-was US supportfor a
UN-supervised referendumin Eritrea within a period of roughly two years to
determineif the people of the territorydesiredindependence.The US decision to
supportregionalself-determinationthroughthe ballot box-fully cognizantof the
fact that the outcome most assuredly would be an independentEritrea-repre-
sented a significantchange in US foreignpolicy. Ratherthangiving unquestioned
supportfor the terrritorialintegrityof the Ethiopianempireas had been the case
from the 1950s to the 1980s, the United States became associated with a policy
that seemingly was calling into question the hallowed OAU concept of the
inviolability of frontiers. Regardless of the referendum'soutcome, the Africa
bureau made it clear that further US involvement and, most important, the
establishmentof a foreign aid relationshipthat went beyond humanitarianrelief,
was dependent on the establishmentof some type of legitimate democracy in

47. See Gayle Smith, "Test of U.S. Africa Policy: Birth Pains of a New Ethiopia," Nation,
July 1, 1991, pp. 1, 18-20.

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588 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Ethiopia. As succinctly summarizedby Cohen: "No democracy, no cooper-

ation. "48
Several factors accountedfor the extremely activist US reponse that period-
ically engaged the highest levels of the policymakingestablishment, including
President Bush, despite the fact that Washington never perceived events in
Ethiopia as constitutinga crisis situationin the Cold War mold. First, both the
Mengistu government and the guerrilla opposition favored a greater role for
Washingtonas a mediatorbetween their conflictingclaims. For example, in an
effortto demonstrateits willingnessto seek some sort of compromiseposition, the
Mengistu government announced on November 14, 1990, that it was willing to
revive previously stalled peace talks, subsequentlyagreeingon 18 December that
the guerrilla-heldport of Massawacould be used to transportUN relief supplies.
"I was very pleased in my discussions with the foreign minister[Dinka]and the
president [Mengistulto learn that there is a continuingcommitmentto the peace
process," explained an appreciativeCohen.49This cooperative spirit continued
even as the Mengistu government was confronted with growing numbers of
militarydefeats on the battlefield.As noted by a senior memberof the Ethiopian
Foreign Ministryless than two weeks priorto Mengistu'sdeparturefrom power,
"There's a big role the United States can play to moldour peace process and even
our future political system.'"50
Positive signals from the Ethiopiangovernmentcoincided with rising pres-
sures within the national security bureaucracies,particularlythe Departmentof
State's Africabureau,to pay greaterattentionto events in Ethiopia.51Despite the
reluctantrecognitionof Somaliaby US policymakersas Washington'sclosest ally
in the Horn of Africa during the 1980s, Ethiopia consistently retained a core
number of supporterswho continued to look upon this "lost ally" as the prize
piece for a rationalforeignpolicy beyond the Mengistuyears. The Departmentof
State's courtship of Ethiopia as an important player in what became the
UN-supportedmilitaryinvasionof Iraqin 1991offersa simple, yet tellingexample
of why this was so even during the final months of the Mengistu regime. In
addition to noting Ethiopia's UN membershipand seat on the Security Council,
its Christianheritage, and its shared Red Sea coastline with Saudi Arabia-all
variations of historical rationales for seeking closer relations-Department of

48. Quoted in Craig Whitney, "Ethiopian Rebel Chief Says He Will Form Temporary
Government,"New YorkTimes, May 29, 1991,p. A5.
49. Quoted in "Ethiopia Said Willing to Seek Peace: Eritrea Urged to 'Reciprocate',"
WashingtonPost, November 15, 1990,p. A3.
50. Quoted in CliffordKrauss, "Ethiopiaand Rebels Near Peace Talks," New YorkTimes,
May 14, 1991,p. A7.
51. See, for example, congressionaltestimony by Assistant Secretary of State for African
AffairsCohen in US Congress, House Committeeon ForeignAffairs,Subcommitteeon Africa, The
Political Crisisin Ethiopiaand the Role of the UnitedStates, 102dCong., 1st sess., Hearingof June
18, 1991(Washington,DC: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1992).

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 HORN OF AFRICA* 589

State officialsdesirous of enhancinggrowingUS-Ethiopianties especially touted

Addis Ababa's quick supportof US-sponsoredresolutionsagainst Iraq.52
An equally importantreason for the Africa bureau's active lobbying for
greater US attention to Ethiopia was a desire to avoid duplicatingthe policy
disasters that had occurredin Liberiaand Somalia. In both cases, US-supported
leaders were driven from power by coalitions of guerrillaforces which, after
achievinginitialvictories, presidedover the escalationof ethnicallyor clan-based
violence. Having "learned" that policies of inactionpotentiallyentail far greater
costs than initiallymay have been apparent,career diplomatsarguedfor a more
proactivepolicy stance that would avoid yet anotherdisasterin Africa. "We want
to see law and order," explained a senior US diplomat stationed at the US
embassy in Addis Ababa during 1991. "What we want to do is facilitate a soft
landing and prevent the kind of bloodshed that has affected Liberia and Soma-
lia."953

Implicationsof the End of the Cold War

The decline of Cold Warcompetitionin the Horn of Africawas an important

element in the calculations of Ethiopian and US officials. As far as several
segmentsof the policymakingestablishmentwere concerned,the hardlineMarxist
positions of both the Mengisturegime and the guerrillaopposition made support
for either side highly unlikely duringthe 1980s. The decisions of both sides to
modify their attachmentto Marxismin the face of Soviet retrenchmentat the end
of the 1980s,however, suddenlyremoveda majorobstacle to the reestablishment
of closer ties with Washington."If this had happenedfive years ago, we wouldn't
have been involved because in the Cold War, it would have been hard to work
with the Marxists," explained Cohen. "Even two years ago," he continued, "it
was hard for me to work with SWAPO [South West AfricanPeople's Organiza-
tion]," a referenceto the difficultiesof dealingwith the guerrillaorganizationthat
maintaineda strong attachmentto Marxismprior to taking power in Namibia.
"The big differencenow," he concluded, "is that people talk about Marxismand
people laugh.'54
The end of the Cold War was also an importantreason for the new US
position concerningthe territorialintegrityof Ethiopia. Duringthe height of the
Cold Warera, when unimpededaccess to the Kagnewtelecommunicationsstation
and other intelligenceandmilitaryinstallationsin EritreaguidedUS foreignpolicy
toward Ethiopia, support within the national security bureaucracies for the

52. See Jane Perlez, "Ethiopia Wooed as Ally by U.S. in Gulf Crisis," New York Times,
December 14, 1990, p. AIO.
53. Quoted in Clifford Krauss, "Ethiopia's Leader Agrees to Give Up Capital to Rebels," New
York Times, May 28, 1991, p. Al.
54. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Reversal on Ethiopia: Plight of Jews and the Prospects for Chaos
Aroused U.S. Interest in a Mediation Role," New York Times, May 31, 1991, p. Al.

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590 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

territorialstatus quo remainedvirtuallyunquestioned.It was greatly feared that

an independentEritreawould terminateaccess to what at the time was considered
to be one of the most valuable US telecommunicationscenters in Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East. Even after Kagnew ceased to be importantduring the
mid-1970s,as the result of advances in satellite technology and the development
of the US base at Diego Garcia,a varietyof Cold War-inspiredpoliticalrationales,
such as Selassie's staunchanticommunistcredentials,moved to the forefrontof a
foreignpolicy stance that still underscoredthe necessity of ensuringthe territorial
integrityof Ethiopia.
Withthe decline of the Cold War,however, the bureaucraticjustificationsfor
Ethiopia's territorial integrity no longer rang true. Although portions of the
national security bureaucracies, particularlythe CIA and the Department of
Defense, argued that an independentEritreawould be financiallyinsolvent and,
thus, susceptible to "radical"foreign powers (such as Libya), the Africa bureau
successfully arguedfor a policy that supportedthe pursuitof self-determination
through legal means-especially when one took into account that the EPLF,
which had been fightingfor Eritreanindependencefor nearly 30 years, militarily
controlled the entire region, and that the TPLF, althoughin favor of maintaining
the territorialintegrityof the country, was willingto recognize Eritreanindepen-
dence if a majorityof the populationtruly desired that.
An equally important aspect of the proactive US response to events in
Ethiopiawas the periodicconsiderationof the area at the highestlevels of the US
policymaking establishment, including President Bush and his most trusted
foreign policy advisers: Secretaryof State Baker and National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft. The involvement of the White House, however, was not the
result of the perception of a crisis in the Horn of Africa that requiredongoing,
high-level attention. Indeed, the demise of the Cold War-combined with the
pressing issues associated with the aftermathof the PersianGulf War, the decline
of communism,and the fragmentationof the formerSoviet Union-favored White
House delegationof the properUS policy responseto the Africaspecialists within
the national security bureaucracies.White House involvement, instead, resulted
from practical domestic political considerations associated with humanitarian
relief efforts and the emigrationof the Falashas.
The need to create an orderly transfer of power in Ethiopia captured the
attention of the White House, particularlyScowcroft, when it became clear that
a humanitariandisaster on a par with the 1983-85 famine was in the making.
Already faced with a growingdomestic uproarover the plight of Iraq's Kurdish
population-a group for whom no domestic constituency existed-the White
House sought to avoid the domestic outcry that accompanied the Reagan
administration'sslow response to the conditions contributingto the 1983-85
famine. An integral aspect of this approach was a political calculation that
domestic demandsfor greaterlevels of US humanitarianaid to Ethiopia, already
annuallytopping$150millionsince 1984,would multiplydramaticallyin the event

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 591

of ongoing civil war and bloodshed similar to Liberia's or Somalia's in a

post-Mengistuera.55"There are no geopoliticalstakes in Ethiopiaor the Horn of
Africa anymore," explained one Departmentof State official involved in the
policymakingprocess. "Our mission is to try to avoid a humanitariancatastro-
phe."56
Perhaps a more important reason for a direct White House role in the
policymakingprocess was the delicate politicalissue surroundingthe emigration
of Ethiopia'sFalashas, approximately14,000of whom foundthemselves stranded
in Addis Ababa while awaiting departurefor Israel. The White House began
paying greater attention to this issue not only because of ongoing congressional
concerns with the Mengisturegime's practice of tradingvisas for arms, but also
due to a private appeal to President Bush from Israeli prime minister Yitzhak
Shamir. Desirous of avoiding the political fallout that could have accompanied
any deteriorationof the personalsafety of the Falashasstrandedin Addis Ababa,
PresidentBush dispatchedSenator Boschwitz as his personal envoy and, in the
aftermathof Mengistu's departurefrom power, sent a letter to acting president
Tesfaye asking that the group be allowed to emigrate. The highly dramaticand
publicizedoutcome of this and other appealswas a two-day airlifton May 24-25,
1991,dubbedOperationSolomon, in which morethan 14,000Falashaswere flown
to Israel in exchange for $35 millionin "exit" fees.57

CONCLUSION

The evolution of US foreignpolicy towardEthiopiaand Somaliafrom 1988to

1990demonstratesthe type of bureaucratic-congressional stand-offthat can result
from low-level African conflicts that are severe to
enough cause internaldebate
within the policymakingestablishment,but not importantenough to warrantthe
attention of the president and his closest advisors. In the case of Somalia, the
fashioningof a correct policy response to the intensificationof the Somali civil
war was left to the Africa specialists within the nationalsecurity bureaucracies.
As a result, the Departmentof Defense initiallyresuppliedthe Somali militaryin
accordance with established bureaucraticroutines. Yet, the 1988 crisis also
attracted the attention of a small, but highly vocal group within Congress that
consistently sought to limit US involvementwith what it perceived as a corrupt
and illegitimateregime.

55. See, for example, US Congress,House Committeeon ForeignAffairs,Subcommitteeon

Africa,and Select Committeeon Hunger,InternationalTaskForce, Famine in Ethiopia, 101stCong.,
2d sess., Joint Hearingsof February28, 1990(Washington,DC: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1990);
and idem, Conflict and Famine in the Horn of Africa, 102d Cong., 1st sess., Hearings of May 30, 1991
(Washington,DC: GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1991).
56. Quotedin Krauss, "Ethiopiaand the Rebels Near Peace Talks," p. A7.
57. For a discussionof this operationand the politics of Falashaemigration,see TeshomeG.
Wagaw, "The InternationalPolitical Ramificationsof Falasha Emigration,"Journal of Modern
African Studies 29, no. 4 (1991).

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592 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Although unable to rupturecompletely US ties with the Siad regime, the

House Subcommittee on Africa, nonetheless, was successful in forcing the
Departmentof State to declarea voluntaryhold on US militaryaid. This outcome
was significantin that it was not the result of a highly attentive and motivated
Congress overturninga strongly supportedWhite House policy. Indeed, if the
White House had chosen to make an issue of Somalia and double the levels of
militaryaid, it is highlydoubtfulthatCongresswould have been able to musterthe
numberof votes necessary to defeat such a policy. Rather,the hold on militaryaid
indicatedthe unwillingnessof both the WhiteHouse and the Departmentof State
to expend valuablepolitical capital on a regime that had become only marginally
importantto US interests in Africa.
The evolution of US foreign policy toward Ethiopia during 1988-1990
similarly was marked by a congressional-executivedeadlock that essentially
resulted in the continuationof status quo policies. Despite small, albeit growing,
pressures within the national security bureaucraciesto seek a renewal of links
with what constituted a historical US client in Africa, any such openings were
thwartedby a small group of congresspersonsconcerned with Ethiopia's inten-
sifying civil war and gross humanrights abuses. An irony of this congressional
attentionwas that it was sparkedby the periodicfaminesin Ethiopia,particularly
the 1983-85disasterthat resultedin one of the greatestoutpouringsof US popular
support for a humanitarianrelief program.Similarto the case of Somalia, it is
highly doubtfulthat Congresscould have musteredthe requisitenumberof votes
to derail an executive branch initiative if that initiative had been strongly
supportedby the WhiteHouse. Yet, in the absence of some sort of crisis situation
capableof attractingthe extendedattentionof the WhiteHouse, US foreignpolicy
toward Ethiopiacontinuedto evolve slowly within the bureaucraticand congres-
sional confines of the established status quo.
As it became increasinglyclear during1991and 1992that the Cold Warfor all
practicalpurposeshad come to an end, events withinthe Horn of Africaprovided
the backdropfor a significantchange in US foreign policy toward the region. In
less than six months, pressures within the national security bureaucraciesand
Congressfor a closer relationshipwith Ethiopia,Washington'shistorically in the
Horn, were realized as a result of the overthrow of the Mengistu regime. The
renewalof these ties was accompaniedby a significantlyalteredofficialstance that
supportedEritreanindependenceif the people of that region chose that option in
a legal referendumscheduled to be held sometime in 1993. Similarly, growing
pressures to downgrade security ties with Somalia, a country historically dis-
trusted and disfavored within the national security bureaucracies,reached their
apogee with the overthrowof the Siadregime.Similarto a positionadvancedprior
to 1974, when Ethiopiaconstitutedthe closest US ally in the Horn of Africa, the
national security bureaucraciesat the beginningof the 1990s increasingly por-
trayed Somaliaand its internalclan conflicts-most noted by the secession of the

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 HORN OF AFRICA * 593

north-as the responsibility of the former European colonial powers and the
internationalcommunity,particularlythe United Nations.
The most notable aspect of the unfoldingpolitical upheavalsin the Horn of
Africa at the beginningof the 1990sis that these upheavalsdid not create a crisis
atmosphereat the highestlevels of the policymakingestablishmentas would have
been the case 10, or even 5, years earlier. Rather, the end of the Cold War had
relegatedpolicy to the Africa specialists within the national security bureaucra-
cies unless events touched upon a politically sensitive domestic nerve, such as
was the case when the White House concerned itself with the fate of Ethiopia's
Falashas. Most important,the terminationof a host of Cold War-drivenbureau-
cratic missions no longer requiredpolicies that once led Washingtonto disregard
the internalnatureof either regimein favor of that country's role within a global
East-West framework.

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