1. AGABON VS NLRC (GR NO.

158693 NOVEMBER 17, 2004)

Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling
and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon
and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23,
1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the
monetary claims. It was found out from the investigations that the abandonment from work by
the petitioners was because they subcontracted with another company to which they have been
remanded before when they committed the same initially. The petitioners alleged that due
process has not been observed.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners dismissal are illegal.

Whether or not they are entitled to pay.

Held: No. To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer:

(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or the latters representative in connection with the employees work;

(b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his
duly authorized representative;

(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the
employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present:

(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and

(2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employees has no more intention to work.

The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate
and unjustified.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must
give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes
under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

The dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not
invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with
the procedural requirements of due process.

Yes. The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but
did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will
be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated
Due Process Rule.

An employer is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has
been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of due process.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants
the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a
vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules.

2. ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC., ET AL.

GR No. 167614 case digest

FACTS:

Serrano signed a Contract of Employment for Chief Officer, with basic monthly salary of
US$1,400, with Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd for 12 months.

However on the date of his departure, March 19, 1998, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second
Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Petitioner had only served 2
months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims, for the unexpired portion of his contract plus adjustments
to chief mate’s salary, totaling US$26,442.73.

The last clause in paragraph 10 of RA 8042 states that “In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”

Relying on this, the LA based his computation on the salary period of 3 months only rather than
the entire unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days of the petitioner’s employment contract.
Thus, the LA awarded petitioner monetary benefits in the sum $8,770.00.
ISSUE(S):

What is the source of authority of the state to protect seafarers?

Why is there a need to protect workers and eliminate discrimination?

Who bears the burden of evidence in proving some labor standards claims?

RULING:

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. To address these inequities, our Constitution, has adopted the policy of social
justice to guarantee social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law.

While these provisions on social justice are described as nonself-executing and does not directly
bestow on the working class any actual enforceable rights, the provisions urges not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living
reality.

The law guarantees equal protection to all – that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW.

Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. To
Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.

Laws are presumed constitutional until they are proclaimed by the court to be otherwise.
Generally, the petitioner has the burden of proof in proving that a statute is unconstitutional. But
if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation
of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, it is incumbent
upon the government to prove that there is a compelling state interest for the denial of such right.
 3. National sugar refineries vs NLRC GR No. 101761

FACTS: Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO), a corporation which

is fully owned and controlled by the Government, operates three (3) sugar refineries located at
Bukidnon, Iloilo and Batangas. Private respondent union represents the former supervisors of the
NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery.

On June 1, 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees,
from rank-and-file to department heads. As a result, all positions were re-evaluated, and all
employees including the members of respondent union were granted salary adjustments and
increases in benefits commensurate to their actual duties and functions.

For about ten years prior to the JE Program, the members of respondent union were treated in the
same manner as rank-and file employees. As such, they used to be paid overtime, rest day and
holiday pay. With the implementation of the JE Program, the following adjustments among
others were made: (1) the members of respondent union were re-classified under levels S-5 to
S-8 which are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and benefits; (2) there
was an increase in basic pay of the average of 50% of their basic pay prior to the JE Program,
with the union members now enjoying a wide gap (P1,269.00 per month) in basic pay compared
to the highest paid rank-and-file employee.

On May 11, 1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union as the
bargaining representative of all the supervisory employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar
Refinery.

Two years after the implementation of the JE Program the members of herein respondent union
filed a complaint for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of
Article 100 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: W/N supervisory employees should be considered as officers or members of the

managerial staff under Article 82, Book III of the same Code, and hence are not entitled to
overtime rest day and holiday pay.

HELD: YES. Article 212(m), Book V of the Labor Code on Labor Relations reads:

«(m) ‘Managerial employee’ is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharged, assign
or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees of this Book.»
Respondent NLRC, in holding that the union members are entitled to overtime, rest day and
holiday pay, and in ruling that the latter are not managerial employees, adopted the definition
stated in the aforenoted statutory provision.

A cursory perusal of the Job Value Contribution Statements of the union members will readily
show that these supervisory employees are under the direct supervision of their respective
department superintendents and that generally they assist the latter in planning, organizing,
staffing, directing, controlling communicating, and in making decisions in attaining the
company’s set goals and objectives.

These supervisory employees are likewise responsible for their respective departments' effective
and efficient operation. The members of respondent union discharge duties and responsibilities
which ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the managerial staff, as defined in
Section 2, Rule I Book III of the aforestated Rules to Implement the Labor Code, viz.: (1) their
primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of
their employer; (2) they customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
(3) they regularly and directly assist the managerial employee whose primary duty consist of the
management of a department of the establishment in which they are employed (4) they execute,
under general supervision, work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training,
experience, or knowledge; (5) they execute, under general supervision, special assignments and
tasks; and (6) they do not devote more than 20% of their hours worked in a work-week to
activities which are not directly and clearly related to the performance of their work hereinbefore
described.

Under the facts obtained in this case, the union members should be considered officers and
members of the managerial staff and are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82
hence they are not entitled to overtime, rest days, and holidays.
 4. JESUS G. REYES vs. GLAUCOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., EYE
REFERRAL CENTER and MANUEL B. AGULTO G.R. No. 189255

FACTS:

On August 1, 2003, Reyes was hired as an administrator of the Eye Referral Center of Glaucoma
Research Foundation, Inc. He performed his duties as administrator and continuously received
his monthly salary of P20,000 until the end of January 2005. However, beginning in February
2005, the respondent withheld his monthly salary without notice but he still continued to report
for work. On April 11, 2005, he wrote a letter to the Executive Director, Manuel Agulto,
informing him that he has not been receiving his salary since February 2005 and his 14th month
of pay for 2004. Petitioner did not receive any response from Agulto and on April 21, 2005, the
Assistant to the Executive Director as well as the Assistant Administrative Officer informed him
that he is no longer the Administrator of the ERC. His office was padlocked and closed without
notice but he still continued to report for work until April 19, 2005, when he was no longer
allowed by the security guard to enter the premises of the ERC.

On the other hand, respondents contended that there is no employer-employee relationship

between them. Petitioner was hired as a consultant or adviser in the formulation of an updated
organizational setup and employee’s manual, upon his representation that he is an expert in
corporate organization structure and management affairs. Based on his claim that there is a need
for an administrator for the ERC, he later designated himself as such on a trial basis. According
to the respondents, they had no control over the petitioner in terms of working hours as he
reports for work at any time of the day and leaves as he pleases; they also had no control as to
the manner in which he performs his alleged duties as a consultant. He became overbearing and
his relationship with the employees and officers of the company soured leading to the filing of 3
complaints against him and he was not dismissed as he was the one who voluntarily severed his
relations with the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was hired as a consultant or an employee of the respondent
corporation

RULING:

The test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as
to which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were given. In an illegal
dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an
employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove, by substantial evidence, the existence of an employer-employee relationship
in filing for an illegal dismissal complaint based on the premise that he was an employee of the
respondent.

The four standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship are: (a)
the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of
wages; (c) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (d) the presence or absence of
control of the putative employee’s conduct. The most determinative among these factors is the
so-called “factor test.”

This test is premised on whether the person for whom the services are performed reserves the
right to control both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve that end.

In the present case, the respondent’s power to approve or reject the organizational plans drawn
by the petitioner cannot be the control contemplated in the “control test.” It is only logical that
the one who commissions another to do a piece of work should have the right to accept or reject
the product. What was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that the petitioner was
never subject to definite working hours. The Court held that there is no employer-employee
relationship where the supposed employee is not subject to a set of rules and regulations
governing the performance of his duties under the agreement with the company and is not
required to report for work at any time, nor devote his time exclusively to working for the
company.

In addition, the designation of the payments to the petitioner as salaries is not determinative of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

The fact alone that the petitioner was designated as an administrator does not necessarily mean
that he is an employee of the respondents. Mere title or designation in a corporation will not, by
itself, determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

5. ROYALE HOMES MARKETING CORPORATION, vs.
FIDEL P. ALCANTARA

[deceased], substituted by his heirs, G.R. No. 195190

Facts:

Petitioner Royale Homes appointed Respondent Alcantara as its Marketing Director for a
fixed period of one year. Royale Homes reappointed him for several consecutive years,
his last position as VP Sales.

On December 2003, Alcantara filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against Royale Homes and its
corporate officers alleging that he is a regular employee of Royale Homes since he is performing
tasks that are necessary and desirable to its business; that in 2003 the company gave
him P1.2 million for the services he rendered to it; that in the first week of November
2003, however, the executive officers of Royale Homes told him that they were wondering why he still
had the gall to come to office and sit at his table; and that the acts of the executive
officers of Royale Homes amounted to his dismissal from work without any valid or just cause and in
gross disregard of the proper procedure for dismissing employees.

Royale Homes, on the other hand, vehemently denied that Alcantara is its employee. It argued that
the appointment paper of Alcantara is clear that it engaged his services as an independent sales
contractor for a fixed term of one year only. He never received any salary, 13th month pay, overtime pay
or holiday pay from Royale Homes as he was paid purely on commission basis. In
addition, Royale Homes had no control on how Alcantara would accomplish his tasks and responsibilities
as he was free to solicit sales at any time and by any manner which he may deem appropriate
and necessary. He is even free to recruit his own sales personnel to assist him in pursuance of his sales
target.

Labor Arbiter:
For Alcantara. Heis an employee of Royale Homes with a fixed-term employment
and that the pre-termination of his contract was against the law.
NLRC (appeal): For Petitioner company. Alcantara is an independent contractor of Royale Homes. It
based its ruling mainly on the contract which does not require Alcantara to observe regular working
hours. He was also free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective and can even recruit
sales agents to assist him in marketing the inventories of Royale Homes. He was also
paid on
commission basis.

CA (Petition for Certiorari):

For Respondent. Applying the four-fold and economic reality tests, it held that Alcantara is an
employee of Royale Homes. Royale Homes exercised some degree of
control over Alcantara since his job, is subject to company rules, regulations, and periodic
evaluations. He was also bound by the company code of ethics. Moreover, the exclusivity clause of
the contract has made Alcantara economically dependent on Royale Homes, supporting the theory
that he is anemployee of said company.

Issue:
Whether there exists an employee-employer relationship between the parties?

Ruling: NO.

Alcantara is an independent contractor.

The primary evidence of the nature of the parties’ relationship in this case is the written contract that
they signed and executed in pursuance of their mutual agreement. While the existence of employer-
employee relationship is a matter of law, the characterization made by the parties in their contract as
to the nature of their juridical relationship cannot be simply ignored, particularly in this case where
the parties’ written contract unequivocally states their intention at the time they entered into it. In this
case, the contract, duly signed and not disputed by the parties, conspicuously provides
that "no
employer-employee relationship exists between" Royale Homes and Alcantara, as well as his sales
agents. It is clear that they did not want to be bound by employer-employee relationship at the time
of the signing of the contract.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, a

mong the four-fold test, the most determinative factor in ascertaining the existence of employer -
employee relationship is the
"right of control test".

" It is deemed to be such an important factor that the other requisites may even
be disregarded." This holds true where the issues to be resolved is whether a person who performs
work for another is the latter’s employee or is an independent contractor. For where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but
also the means by which such end is reached, employer-employee relationship is deemed to exist.
In this case, the Court agrees with Royale Homes that the rules, regulations, code of ethics, and
periodic evaluation alluded to by Alcantara do not involve control over the means and methods by
which he was to perform his job.

Understandably, Royale Homes has to fix the price, impose

requirements on prospective buyers, and lay down the terms and conditions of the sale, including
the mode of payment, which the independent contractors must follow. It is also necessary for Royale
Homes to allocate its inventories among its independent contractors, determine who has priority in
selling the same, grant commission or allowance based on predetermined criteria, and
regularly
monitor the result of their marketing and sales efforts. But to the mind of this Court, these do not
pertain to the means and methods of how Alcantara was to perform and accomplish his
task of
soliciting sales. They do not dictate upon him the details of how he would solicit sales or the manner
as to how he would transact business with prospective clients.
Notably, Alcantara was not required to observe definite working hours.
Except for soliciting sales,

Royale Homes did not assign other tasks to him. He had full control over the means and methods of
accomplishing his tasks as he can "solicit sales at any time and by any manner which
[he may]
deem appropriate and necessary." He performed his tasks on his own account free from the control
and direction of Royale Homes in all matters connected therewith, except as to the results thereof.
Neither does the repeated hiring of Alcantara prove the existence of employer-employee
relationship. The continuous rehiring of Alcantara simply signifies the renewal of his contract
with
Royale Homes, and highlights his satisfactory services warranting the renewal of such contract. Nor
does the exclusivity clause of contract establish the existence of the labor law concept of control. In
Consulta v. Court of Appeals, it was held that exclusivity of contract does not necessarily result in
employer-employee relationship.

The element of payment of wages is also absent in this case. As provided in the contract, Alcantara’s
remunerations consist only of commission override of 0.5%, budget allocation, sales incentive and
other forms of company support. There is no proof that he received fixed monthly salary.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that Alcantara is not an employee of Royale Homes, but a mere
independent contractor. The NLRC is, therefore, correct in concluding that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over the case and that the same is cognizable by the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 23, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 23,
2009
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
6. EXPEDITION CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, SIMON LEE PAZ, and JORDAN
JIMENEZ,* 
vs.
ALEXANDER M. AFRICA, MARDY MALAPIT, JESUSESER, JACOB
RONGCALES, JONAMEL CARO, ALFREDO RILES, * REYNALDO GARCIA,
FREDDIE DEI.JA CRUZ, JUNIE AQUIBAN, CRISINCIO GARCIA, * DINO AQUJBAN,
SAMUEL PILLOS, JEFFREY A. VALENZUELA, ERWIN VELASQUEZ HALLARE and
WILLIAM RAMOS DAGDAG, G.R. No. 228671

Topics:Elements of Employer-Employee Relationship; Granting Separation Pay as a Measure of

Social Justice even if no Dismissal; Garbage Collectors

Facts:

1. Petitioner Expedition is a domestic corporation engaged in

garbagecollection/hauling. It engaged the services of respondents as garbagetruck
drivers to collect garbage from different cities and transportthe same to the designated
dumping site.
2. Respondents filed separate cases(which were later onconsolidated) against Expedition
for illegal dismissal, etc. Respondents alleged that they were illegally terminated
from employment whenthey were prevented from entering the premises of
Expeditionwithout cause or due process.
3. Expedition countered that respondentswere not illegally dismissed. It averred that it
entered into separatecontracts with the cities of Quezon, Mandaluyong, Caloocan, and
Muntinlupa for the collection and transport oftheir garbage tothe dump site; that it
engaged the services ofrespondents, as dump truck drivers, who were oftentimes
dispatchedin Quezon City and Caloocan City; that the need for respondents’services
significantly decreased sometime in 2013 after its contracts with Quezon City and
Caloocan City were not renewed; and, that it none theless tried to accommodate
respondents by giving them intermittent trips whenever the need arose.

4. Expedition denied that respondents were its employees. Itclaimed that respondents were
not part of the company’s payroll butwere being paid on a per trip basis. Respondents were
not underExpedition’s direct control and supervision as they worked on theirown, were not
subjected to company rules nor were required toobserve regular/fixed working hours,
and that respondents hired/paidtheir respective garbage collectors. As such,
respondents’ moneyclaims had no legal basis.

5. In their Reply, respondents insisted that they worked underExpedition’s control and
supervision considering that: (1)Expedition owned the dump trucks; (2) Expedition
expresslyinstructed that the trucks should be used exclusively to collectgarbage in their
assigned areas and transport the garbage to thedump site; (3) Expedition directed them to park
the dump trucks inthe garage located at Group 5 Area Payatas, Quezon City aftercompletion of
each delivery; and (4) Expedition determined how,where, and when they would perform their
tasks.

6. Respondents also adverted to petitioners’ counsel’s manifestationduring the mandatory

conciliation proceedings,regardingExpedition’s willingness to accept them back to work, as
proof oftheir status as Expedition’s regular employees.

7. LA dismissed the complaints, ruling that there was employer-employee relationship.

NLRC affirmed LAruling. Later on, however, NLRC partly granted respondents’ MR. It
ruled thatrespondents were employees of Expedition in view of Expedition’sadmission that
it hired and paid respondents for their services.

TheNLRC was also persuaded that Expedition exercised control onwhen and how respondents
would collect garbage.The NLRC, however, sustained its earlier finding that there wasno
illegal dismissal ratiocinating that respondents were merelyplaced on a floating status when
the contract with Quezon CityandCaloocan City expired and thus were merely waiting to
bereassigned to other similar work.As there was no dismissal to speakof, the NLRC ordered
respondents’ reinstatement but without thepayment of backwages.

However, due to lack of clients where respondents could be reassigned,the NLRC opted to
awardseparation pay in lieu of reinstatement.CA dismissed Expedition’s petitioner.

Issues:1)Whether respondents are regular employees of petitioner.2)Whether respondents were

illegally dismissed from service.

Ruling:

1) YES. Jurisprudence has adhered to the four-foldtest in determining the existence of

an employer-employeerelationship, to wit: (1) theselection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment ofwages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4)the power to
control theemployee’s conduct, or the so-called‘control test.’All elements are present
here.

First, as clearly admitted, respondents were engaged/hired by Expedition as garbagetruck

drivers. Second, it is undeniable that respondents receivedcompensation from Expedition for
the services that they rendered tothe latter. The fact that respondents were paid on a per trip
basis isirrelevant in determining the existence of an employer-employeerelationship because
this was merely the methodof computing theproper compensation due to respondents. Third,
Expedition’s power to dismiss was apparent when work was withheld fromrespondents as a
result of the termination of the contracts withQuezon City and Caloocan City.Finally, Expedition
has the power of control over respondents in the performance of their work. It washeld that
“the power of control refers merely to the existence of thepower and not to the actual exercise
thereof. As aptly observed by the CA, the agreements for the collection of garbage were
between Expedition and the various LGUs, and respondents needed the instruction and
supervision of Expedition to effectively perform their work in accordance with the stipulations of
the agreements. Moreover, the trucks driven by respondents were owned by Expedition. There
was an express instruction that these trucks wereto be exclusively used to collect and
transport garbage. Respondentswere mandated to return the trucks to the premises of
Expeditionafter the collection of garbage. Expedition determined the clients tobe served, the
location where the garbage is to be collected andwhen it is to be collected. Indeed, Expedition
determined how,where, and when respondents would perform their tasks.Respondents should
beaccorded the presumption of regular employment pursuant to Article280 of the Labor Code
which provides that “employees who haverendered at least one year of service, whether
such service iscontinuous or broken x x x shall be considered [as] regularemployees with
respect to the activity in which they are employedand their employment shall continue while
such activity exists.Having gained regular status, respondentswere entitled to security of
tenure and could only be dismissed for just or authorizedcause after they had been accorded
due process.

2) NO. In this case, there was no positive or direct evidence tosubstantiate

respondents’ claim that they were dismissed fromemployment. Aside from mere
assertions, the record is bereft of anyindication that respondents were barred from
Expedition’s premises.If at all, the evidence on record showed that Expedition intended
togive respondents new assignments as a result of the termination ofthe garbage
hauling contracts with Quezon City and Caloocan Citywhere respondents were
regularly dispatched. Despite the loss ofsome clients, Expedition tried to accommodate
respondents andoffered to engage them in other garbage hauling projects with
otherLGUs, a fact which respondents did not refute. However, instead ofreturningand
waiting for their next assignments, respondentsinstituted an illegal dismissal case
against Expedition.

Note that even during the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference between the
parties, Expedition manifested itswillingness to accept respondents back to work.
Unfortunately, itwas respondents who no longer wanted to return to work.As a measure of
social justice, the award of separation pay/financial assistance has been upheld in some cases
even if there is no finding of illegal dismissal.Here, Expedition expressed willingness to extend
gratuitous assistance to respondentsand to pay them the amounts equivalent to the
separation payawarded to each respondent in the NLRC’s Resolution. In view of this and taking
into account respondents’long years of service ranging from four to 15 years, the Court findsthat
the grant of separation pay at the rate of ½ month’ssalary for every year of service,
asadjudged in the NLRC Resolution, is proper.
 1
7. SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. and/or ESTANISLAO
AGBAY,
vs.JESUS J. COMING, G.R. No. 186621

Facts:

Petitioner South East International Rattan is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and exporting furniture to various countries. Respondent Coming was hired by
the petitioner as Sizing Machine Operator whose work is initially compensated on ‘pakiao basis’
but some time was fixed per day and a work schedule of 8:00am to 5:00pm. Without any
apparent reason, his employment was interrupted as he was told by petitioners to resume work in
2 months time but was never called back. Respondent thus filed a complaint before the regional
arbitration branch. The Labor Arbiter ruled the respondent as a regular employee of petitioner
SEIRI but on appeal, was reversed by the NLRC. CA then reversed the NLRC decision and ruled
that there existed an employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent.

Ruling: YES.

We affirm the CA.

To ascertain the existence of employer-employee relationship jurisprudence has invariably

adhered to the four-fold test, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s
conduct or the so-called “control test.”

x x x As to the “control test”, the following facts indubitably reveal that respondents wielded
control over the work performance of the petitioner, to wit: (1) they required him to work within
the company premises; (2) they obliged petitioner to report every day of the week and tasked him
to usually perform the same job; (3) they enforced the observance of definite hours of work from
8 o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon; (4) the mode of payment of petitioner’s
salary was under their discretion, at first paying him on pakiao basis and thereafter, on daily
basis; (5) they implemented company rules and regulations; (6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid
petitioner’s salaries and controlled all aspects of his employment and (7) petitioner rendered
work necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company.
#9
10. Delos Santos v Jebsen Maritime, Inc GR No. 154185, Nov 22, 2005

Ruling: At any rate, factors obtain arguing against the notion that respondent
consented to contract extension under the same terms and conditions
prevailing when the original contract expired. Stated a bit differently, there
are compelling reasons to believe that respondent retained the services of
the acceding Delos Santos, as the Court of Appeals aptly observed, but
under domestic terms and conditions. We refer first to the reduced salary
of Delos Santos payable in Philippine peso[23] which, significantly enough,
he received without so much of a protest. As the respondent stated in
Its comment, without any controverting response from petitioner, Delos
Santos, for the period ending October 31, 1995, was drawing a salary at
the rate of P8,475.00 a month, whereas the compensation package
stipulated under the POEA-approved contract provided for a US$613 basic
monthly salary and a US$184 fixed monthly overtime pay.

And secondly, MV Super RoRo 100 was no longer engaged in foreign trading as it was no
longer intended as an ocean-going ship. Accordingly, it does not make
sense why a seafarer of goodwill or a manning agency of the same
disposition would insist on being regulated by an overseas employment
agency under its standard employment contract, which governs
the employment of Filipino seamen on board ocean-going vessels.[24]

Petitioners submission about the parties not having entered into another
employment contract after the expiration of the POEA-approved
employment contract, ergo, the extension of the expired agreement, is
flawed by the logic holding it together. For, it presupposes that an
agreement to do or to give does not bind unless it is embodied in a written
instrument. It is elementary, however, that, save in very rare instances
where certain formal requisites go into its validity, a contract, to be valid
and binding between the parties, need not be in writing. A contract is
perfected when the contracting minds agree on the object and cause
thereof.[25]

And, as earlier discussed, several circumstantial indicia tended to prove that a new arrangement
under domestic terms were agreed upon by the principal players to govern the employment of
Delos Santos after the return of MVWild Iris to the country to engage in coastwise trading.

Given the foregoing perspective, the disallowance under the decision

subject of review of the petitioners claim for maximum disability benefits
and sickness allowance is legally correct. As it were, Delos Santos right to
such benefits is predicated on the continued enforceability of POEA-SEC
when he contracted his illness, which, needless to stress, was not the case.
Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorneys fees, the
NLRC having failed to explain petitioners entitlement thereto. As a matter
of sound policy, an award of attorneys fee remains the exception rather
than the rule. It must be stressed, as aptly observed by the appellate
court, that it is necessary for the trial court, the NLRC in this case, to make
express findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception. In fine, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award
must be set forth in the text of the decision.[26] The matter of attorneys
fees cannot be touched once and only in the fall of the decision, else, the
award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.[27]

In the absence of a stipulation, attorneys fees are ordinarily not recoverable;

otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate.[28] They are
not awarded every time a party wins a suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
11. INTERNATIONAL RICE INSTITUTE VS NLRC GR NO. 97239
12. BAGUIO WATER DISTRICT VS TRAJANO GR NO. L-65428

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-65428, February 20, 1984 ]
BAGUIO WATER DISTRICT, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND BAGUIO
WATER DISTRICT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the public respondent which affirmed that of a
Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election among the regular rank and file employees of the
Baguio Water District (BWD).
The Baguio Water District was formed pursuant to Title II - Local Water District Law - of P.D.
No. 198, as amended. The BWD is by Sec. 6 of that decree "a quasi-public corporation
performing public service and supplying public wants"

A part of the public respondent's decision rendered in September, 1983, reads in part:

"We find the appeal [of the BWD] to be devoid of merit. The records show that the operation and
administration of BWD is governed arid regulated by special laws, that is, Presidential Decrees
Nos. 198 and 1497 which created local water districts throughout the country. Section 25 of
Presidential Decree (PD) 198 clearly provides that the district and its employees shall be exempt
from the provisions of the Civil Service Law and that its personnel below supervisory level shall
have the right to collectively bargain. Contrary to appellant's claim, said provision has not been
amended much more abrogated expressly or impliedly by PD 1497 which does not make
mention of any matter on Civil Service Law or collective bargaining." (Rollo, p. 59.)

We grant the petition for the following reasons:

1. Section 25 of P.D. No. 198 was repealed by Sec. 3 of P.D. No 1479; Sec. 26 of P.D. No. 198
was amended to read as Sec. 25 by Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1479. The amendatory decree took effect
on June 11, 1978.

Sec. 25 of P.D. No. 198 was originally written as follows:

"Sec. 25. Exemption from Civil Service. - The district and its employees, being engaged in a
proprietary function, are hereby exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law. Collective
bargaining shall be available only to personnel below supervisory levels: Provided, however,
That the total of all salaries, wages, emoluments, benefits or other compensation paid to all
employees in any month shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of average net monthly revenue,
said net revenue representing income from water sales and sewerage service charges, less
pro-rata share of debt service and expenses for fuel or energy for pumping during the preceding
fiscal year."

After P.D. No. 198 was amended by P.D. No. 1479, Sec. 25 now reads:

"Sec. 25. Authorization. - The district may exercise all the powers which are expressly granted
by this Title or which are necessarily implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes
herein stated. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is hereby
granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall, however, be subject to review
by the Administration."

It is obvious that the public respondent erred when he said: "Contrary to appellant's claim, said
provision has not been amended much more abrogated expressly or impliedly by PD 1497 which
does not make mention of any matter on Civil Service Law or collective bargaining."

2. The agencies of the Ministry of Labor and Employment do not compare notes.

In NLRC Case No. RAB-I-0053-82, Beneco Employees Labor Union, et al. vs. Baguio Water
District, the Second Division of the NLRC held:

"Upon absorption of herein complainant by BWD by virtue of the terms of the aforementioned
agreement, he automatically became a government employee. As such, his terms and conditions
of employment are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and therefore any
dispute or controversy arising from such employment status is removed from the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter and this Commission pursuant to Article 277 of the Labor Code, as amended,
which We hereby reproduce below:

'ART. 277. Government employees. - The terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by
the National Assembly as provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be no
reduction of existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being
enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of the Code.'

"As one of the issues raised before Us in this appeal is one of jurisdiction, We rule to dismiss the
above-entitled case based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
"WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby Reversed. Case dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction." (Rollo, p. 64.)

The Union appealed to this Court but in G.R. No. 63184 a resolution dated April 24, 1983,
dismissed its appeal for lack of merit.

3. The BWD is a corporation created pursuant to a special law - P.D. No. 198, as amended. As
such its officers and employees are part of the Civil Service. (Sec. 1, Art. XII-B, Constitution;
P.D. No. 868.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the questioned decision of the public respondent is
hereby set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
13. CHAVEZ VS BONTO-PEREZ GR NO. 109808
14. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency inc v cabiles GR No. 170139, Aug 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement

agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy
claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed
the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed
and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her
repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s
salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this
court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive
due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no

rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the

government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless
of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by
any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act.
No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as
well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
15. Skippers United Pacific, Inc v NLRC, GR No. 148893, July 12, 2006)

FACTS:
Lagne was hired by Skippers United Pacific, Inc. to serve as Oiler on board the vessel "Nicolaos
M" whichis owned and operated by its foreign principal, co-Skippers Ikarian Moon Shipping
Co., Ltd. On September 14,2009, Lagne signed his employment contract which included the
standard terms and conditions governing theemployment of Filipino seafarers as prescribed by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

The contract has a duration of nine months with basic salary of US$465.00.Part of his
pre-employment requirements, Lagne was subjected to a Pre-Employment MedicalExamination
(PEME) where he was declared "fit for sea duty."

Thus, on September 25, 2009, Lagne boardedhis assigned vessel to commence his
work.Sometime in January 2010, Lagne started to feel pain on his anus whenever he carries
heavy weights orperforms laborious tasks. He also experienced chest pains and difficulty in
breathing during his work which hetried to endure. However, his ailment persisted as he even
experienced intolerable pain even during defecation.Later, Lagne felt that there was a protruding
mass on his anus which he noticed to be increasing in size.

Alarmed,he reported the matter to his supervisor.On May 12, 2010, Lagne was brought to the
clinic at 51 Rue D'ansou 66600 Saint Nazaire, Montoir,France, where he was attended by a
certain Dr. Bourgois. He was diagnosed to have a "rectal mass" and wasrecommended for
medical repatriation after having been declared "unfit for duty." Based on said findings, onMay
17, 2010, Lagne was repatriated to the Philippines.Upon his arrival, Lagne was referred for
medical check-up at the General Med Health Services.

After aseries of laboratory tests, he was advised to undergo surgical evaluation and biopsy of the
rectal mass.Subsequently, Lagne was endorsed at the Metropolitan Medical Center, under the
care of Dr. Esther G. Go (Dr.Go), the company- designated physician, who conducted
colonoscopy and biopsy on Lagne.

The resultsconfirmed the presence of "anorectal mass." Lagne was also subjected to CEA
determination and CT scan ofhis whole abdomen and chest. While his medical assessment was
ongoing, Lagne filed a complaint before thearbitration branch of the NLRC claiming permanent
total disability benefits, sick wages, damages and attorney'sfees against petitioners.Dr. Go
diagnosed Lagne as suffering from "Moderately Differentiated Rectosigmoid Adenocarcinoma.

"Lagne was advised to undergo Abdominal Perineal Resection of the Rectosigmoid Tumor
which includes theplacement of permanent colostomy as management for his condition. Dr. Go,
likewise, recommended transfusionof two (2) units of packed red blood cells in preparation for
his surgery. Lagne, however, refused and manifestedhis desire to seek second opinion from his
private doctor.Lagne then sought the expertise of Dr. May S. Donato-Tan
(Dr. Donato-Tan,
a specialist in internalmedicine and cardiology at the Philippine Heart Center, for the assessment
and evaluation of his health condition.On November 30, 2010, Dr. Donato-Tan found Lagne to
have sustained a permanent disability due to
"Moderately Differentiated Rectosigmoid Adenocarcinoma and Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular
Disease" and declared him "UNFIT FOR DUTY in whatever capacity as seaman."In his claim
for disability compensation, Lagne asserted that his illness, rectosigmoid adenocarcinoma, was
directly caused by his employment with petitioners.

He alleged that the food regularly served in theirassigned vessel involved mostly carbohydrates
and meat, usually with saturated fat. He also averred that his duties as an oiler exposed him to
manual and laborious tasks such as carrying heavy equipment and othermaterials which
contributed to the worsening of his condition.Lagne further claimed entitlement to sickness
allowance as provided under Section 20 (B), paragraph 3of the POEA Standard Contract for
Seafarers, to wit:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowanceequivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessedby the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

LA dismissed Lagne's claim for total permanent disability benefits for his failure to substantiate
his claimthat his illness is work-related. NLRC reversed.

CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision.

ISSUES: WoN Lagne is entitled to permanent disability benefits

o YES. Lagne was able to meet the required degree of proof that his illness is compensable as it
iswork-connected. In his Position Paper dated December 8, 2010, Lagne stated that he
boardedthe vessel on September 25, 2009 where he proceeded to work on his duties as an oiler.
Heenumerated his duties and responsibilities, to
wit:

(1) performing general duties, including wiping oil, maintaining tools; cleaning, preparing,and
painting of machinery, equipment, and related spaces;
 (2) lubricates moving parts of propulsion engines and auxiliary equipments; (3) pumpsbilges,
and cleans strainers, filters, and centrifuges;

(4) checks, during the scheduled rounds the proper operation of machinery; maintainsproper
temperatures and pressures; and records data in engineering log;

(5) assists engineers, while in port, with maintenance and repair of engine room equipmentand
spaces; loading freshwater, stores, and bunkers;

(6) connecting to shore side power and water, and maintenance and inventory of spareparts;

(7) keeps the log of all watch operations and conditions, including unusual occurrencesand
emergency signals;

(8) may stand engine room watch, and generator watch in port; and

(9) may be assigned day work and performs other duties as required.
o
Considering the manual and laborious job that Lagne does, we surmised that he was able
toreasonably prove that his working conditions exposed him to factors that could have
aggravatedhis medical condition. We give credence to his positive assertion that he felt pain on
his anuswhenever he carries heavy weights, chest pains and difficulty in breathing during his
work, andthe increasing size of the protruding rectal mass. To note, petitioners have not refuted
havingassigned to Lagne such task of carrying heavy weights.
o
We likewise give weight to the NLRC's findings that his work conditions caused or, at
least,increased the risk of contracting the disease, to wit:

Being a seafarer, We can take judicial notice of the food provisions on a ship which are
producedat one time for long journeys across the oceans and seas. The food provided to seafarers
aremostly frozen meat, canned goods and seldom are there vegetables which easily rot and wilt
and,therefore, impracticable for long trips. These provisions undoubtedly contributed to the
aggravationof appellant's rectal illness.

O Moreover, as pointed out by both the NLRC and the CA, the compensability of colorectal
cancerhas already been ruled upon in the case of
Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v. Heirs of the lateCatalino V. Villamater, et al.
O Even Dr. Go, the company-designated doctor, while declaring that rectosigmoid
adenocarcinoma is not work-related, she, however, admitted that rectosigmoid adenocarcinoma's
risk factorsinclude age, diet rich in saturated fat, fatty acid and linoleic acid, and genetic
predisposition.

o As to the second element (the work- related injury or illness must have existed during the term
ofthe seafarer's employment contract), we find the same to be likewise present in this case. It
isundisputed that Lagne boarded the vessel on September 25, 2009. He began experiencing
painin his anus sometime in January 2010. Later, on May 12, 2010, he was in fact brought to a
clinicin France where he was attended by a certain Dr. Bourgois after he complained to his
superiorabout his condition. It was also during said time when he was first diagnosed to have a
rectalmass and was recommended for medical repatriation on May 17, 2010. Clearly, from
theforegoing, it can be assumed Lagne's illness started to exist or developed during his
nine-monthemployment contract.
NOTES
: Petition
DENIED
16. People v Goce GR No. 113161, August 29, 1995

Facts:
On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large scale,
punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed against Dan and
Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about during the period
comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the City of Manila, the
accused conspired and represent themsleves to have the capacity to recruit Filipino workers for
employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was arrested.
Hence, on February 1989, the RTC prdered the case archived but issued a standing warrant os arrest
against the accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the
warrant of arrest and eventually Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque Police. Agustin's
counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing for purpose of due process
and for accused to immediately have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin pleaded not guilty
and the trial went on with four complainants testified for the prosecution and reciepts of the
processing fees they paid.

Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her
participation in the recruitment and denied knowledge of the receipts as well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale with sentence of life imprisonment and pay P100,000.00.

Issues:
Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to the
couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13 in
relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is no proof
that appellant offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling:

The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment because, the complainants had a previous interview with Agustin (as employee of the
Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral. Agustin collected the
payments of the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees, medical tests and other
expenses.On the issue of proof, the court held that the receipts exhibited by the claimants are clear
enough to prove the payments and transaction made.