American Wasteland: A History of America's

Garbage Industry, 1880-1989

William P. McGowan
Universityof California - Santa Barbara

Unlikemanyindustries thatdevelopedintomodernbusiness enterprises

over
the last century, the nation'sgarbage industryseemsto have followed a
path-dependent development patternfar differentfromthestructuralismemphasized
by AlfredD. Chandlerandhisstudents.Ratherthanencouraging thedevelopment
of a moreefficientindustry,the increasedmanagerialattentionthe wasteindustry
receivedat thebeginningof thiscenturymay haveactuallydelayedits integration.
In 1900, America'sgarbagetrades weredividedamongmanysmallfirms
usinga varietyof technologies to handlesociety'swaste. Recoveringor utilizing
materialsothersdeemedworthless,thesefirms remainedprofitableby keeping
overheadlow andexternalizingtheir costsas muchaspossible--sometimes to the
extentof sortingwasteon city streets. Seekingto endthissituationandimprove
service,between1900 and the end of the First World War, a groupof private
citizensand municipalauthorities(hereafterreferredto as the "modernizers" of
waste management) successfullyimplementedgarbagereformsdesignedto
integratethe industrythroughcentralizedmanagement. The vehicle for this
integrationwas the municipalrefuse department,which broughtprofessional
engineeringand managementknow-howto the garbagebusiness.
Professionalizationand the creation of managerialhierarchiesdid not,
however, createa more efficient wastemanagementindustry. Rather,these
attemptsat rationalization delayedthe industry's integrationby creatinga setof
institutionalrigiditieswhichprecludedmarket-drivensolutions.Theserigidities
sprangfrom the socialandpoliticalattitudesof the individualsreformingthe way
Americansdiscarded theirwaste,whooftenembracedsophisticated collectionand
disposal technologies to eliminatea hazardwhoseexistence waslargelypolitically
defined.In morethana few ways, the institutionalrigiditiesof the modernization
movementaffectedtheshapeanddirectionof America'swasteindustryuntil well
into the 1930s, when depression,and then war finally forced the adoptionof
market-driven solutions.
The Chandlerianapproachpopular with those who study the rise of
America's "big businesses" does not lend itself well to the garbageindustry.
Thoughseveralfirmsfolloweda structuralist development patternin thepost-World
War II period,theindustry's earlierperiodlackssucha preciseevolutionary pattern.
This is not to say that the garbageindustry'sfailure to integrateinto a modern
businessenterpriseat the beginningof this centurycan be explainedusing

BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Volumetwenty-four,no. 1, Fall 1995.

Copyright¸1995 by the BusinessHistoryConference.ISSN 0849-6825.

155
156

traditional interpretationsof the period. Unlike other industriesattempting

integrationat the turn of the century, wastemanagement had bothtechnologies
suitablefor economiesof scaleandmanagerialstructures to exploitthem. Yet, in
spiteof theseorganizational capabilities,
by thedawnof theGreatDepression waste
servicewas improvedbut the industryprovidingit remainedfragmentedand
inefficient--theresultof whatseemsto be an over-abundance of managerialcontrol
in an industrynotyet preparedfor it.
By focusingonthecreationandultimatedestruction of institutional
rigidities
in America'sgarbageindustry,this paper attemptsto createa historicalbridge
betweenthe two periodshistoriansof this industryhavestudiedmost. Martin
Melosi,whosework Garbagein the Cities is perhapsthe best-known,focuseson
theindustry's earlyhistory,whenthe institutionalrigiditiesof modernization were
just forming. Scholarshipon the industry'spost-WW II period often takes
integrationfor granted,usingthe existenceof garbageoligopolieslike BFI and
WasteManagement asproofof theindustry'scorrosive effectsontheenvironment,
workers'rights,and the ethicsof local officials [2]. With no clear link between
today'scorporatemonolithsand yesterday's newly createdpublic agencies,this
study provides an institutionalframework to understandAmerica's waste
management industryasit developedin whatwasperhapsitsmostturbulentperiod.

Before beginning,the useof two wordsrequiresamplification.Though

normallyusedin connectionwith advancedor improvedstandards of living, the
terms"modern"and "modernizer"are usedherein a pejorativesense. As the
staunchestadvocatesfor wastemanagementreform, "modernizers"like George
Waring developed"modern"wastemanagementsolutionsbasedon nineteenth
centuryassumptions aboutsanitation.Even thoughgermtheoryprovedthat the
aesthetically
unappealing did notposea threatto publichealth,the "modern"waste
systems built between1896 and 1914 continuedto reflecttheir designer'sfearsof
disease-carrying garbagegases[7, pp. 431-440]. Needingto eliminatethese
gaseousthreatsto society,the modernizersbuilt incinerators,reduction,and
recoveryplantsall overthecountry,oftenusingdesignsthatweremoretheoretical
thanfield-tested. Thesefacilitiesprovedto be the baneof theengineerscharged
with their operationin the 1920s, as they consistently failed to live up to their
designer'sexpectations,while the cost of replacement,political and otherwise,
made their abandonment unthinkable. In many ways, the systemsbuilt by
modernizers embodiedthe institutionalrigiditieswhich delayedthe industry's
integration,the physicalconsequences of compromisesworked out among
reformersactiveat the beginningof thiscentury.
The wastemanagement systems reformersbuilt at the turnof the century
reflectedan ideologythatemphasizedimprovingpublichealththroughefficient
publicadministration. Basingtheirplansonthesuccessful examplesof America's
big businesses, the modernizerstried to control waste like Andrew Carnegie
controlledsteel. While a relativelystraightforwardprocessin a theoreticalsense,
themodernization of America's wastemanagement industry wasmorecomplicated.
As Melosiandother"garbage historians"ablydemonstrate, thegroupspushingfor
thereformdid notnecessarily wantthe samesolutions,makingcitiesadoptwaste
systemsdrivenlargelyby political,ratherthaneconomic,considerations.
In Garbage in the Cities, Melosi identifiesthe tenuousalliancebetween
municipal engineers andprivatecitizensinterested in sanitaryreform. Hintingat
 157

the complications createdby its breakdown,Melosiclaimsthatby the 1910sthe

movementhad "splinteredinto two distinctivethoughnot totally independent
factions.... [One] dominatedby sanitaryengineerswho functionedwithin the
municipalinfrastructure anda second... composed primarilyof citizens,[who]
operatedin thepublicrealm"[8, p. 72]. Engineerssawtheproblemprimarilyas
one of properorganization and adequatefunding. A 1901 wastemanagement
handbook suggested that "[a]nengineerwhois willingto studytheproblemcan
disposeof thesewastesin a mannerthatwill be sanitary,provided,of course,that
hismunicipality will grantthemoneyandthepowerto accomplish hisideas"[9, p.
9]. Privatecitizens,whosepoliticalsupportmunicipalofficialsneeded,demanded
that their wastebe "sanitized" just in casegarbagegasstill poseda threat. As a
resultof this pressure,municipalengineersdesignedand built facilitieswhose
primarypurposewastheeliminationof a threatthatdid notexist.
The move to improve the country'swaste managementwas further
complicatedby the conditionof the industryto be reformed. As it existedat the
turnof thecentury,the waste"industry"wasin realitya collectionof trades,each
cateringto differentpartsof the wastestream. Swineandtruckfarmershandled
mostof society'sgarbage,or "kitchenswill," scavengers focusedon rubbish, and
generalhaulershandledashes.
The privatesector's advantage overthemunicipalagencies mimickingthem
wascost:while scavengers reliedon 1ow-tech,low-costmethodsof recoverythat
externalized as many costs as possible, municipal engineersdesigned
capital-intensive facilitieswhoseinternalizedcostswerejustified on extremely
optimisticlevelsof recovery.As municipallyownedfacilitiesfailedto producethe
revenuesmodernizers promised,blamequickly fell on private-sectorcompetition.
Arguingthatscavengers were"creamingof•' valuablewasteandleavingmunicipal
agencieswith the dregs, municipalofficialscampaignedfor the abolitionof the
privatesectorin favor of a moreefficient,professionally managedpublic waste
agency.The deanof wastemodernization,GeorgeWaring, wasmostexplicit on
thispoint,arguingthatthe "push-cart manwhojangleshis stringof bellsthrough
thestreet"carriedon "a moreor lessillicit traffic...thatthecity fatherscouldbetter
control[in a mannerthat] wouldnot onlyenrichthepubliccoffersbut wouldalso
increase... publicsafety."
Like engineersin America'sheavyindustriesat thistime, municipalwaste
officialswereimpressed by the efficienciesrealizedby exploitingeconomies of
scale. In steelandrailroading,the key wasloweringper-unitcostsby spreading
fixed costsas widely as possible. To accomplishthis with waste,modernizers
favored systemsthat relied on technologicallysophisticated machinerywhose
theoreticallyhigh-throughput capacitywouldmakewastedisposalfaster,cheaper,
andmoresanitarythanpre-industrial methods.Incinerationwasthe darlingof the
modernization movement, sinceitsofferedthemost"sanitary" methodof disposal
and becausemunicipalengineerswere confidentthat they could operatethese
facilitieswith big business-like efficiency.
Throughoutthe 1900sand 1910s, innovationsin incinerationtechnologies
emboldenedpublicofficials, as eachrefinementpromisedto makeincineration
cheaper.The resultingincinerator-building crazeleft its mark,asmostcitieswith
populationsexceeding50,000 listed incinerationas their primary methodof
disposalon theeve of the GreatDepression[1, p. 100].
158

A lesspopular,but by no meanslessexpensive,technologyinvolvedthe
"reduction"of waste. Embracingthe modernizer'sideals of sterilizationand
maximumreutilization,
reductioncapturedgreaseandotherby-productsby cooking
wastein vatsof benzeneandmineralspiritsandthensqueezingtheresidualout in
hydraulicpresses.This methodwaspopularbecausethe saleof liquid andsolid
residuemore than coveredprocessingcosts.
The final methodembracedwasresource recovery(or as it is knowntoday,
recycling),whichwasessentiallyscavenging on an institutionalbasis.Influenced
by a tour of processing facilitiesin Europe,in 1896 GeorgeWaring built the
nation'sfirstrecoveryplantin New York City, wherevaluablesweresortedoff a
conveyorbelt driven by a garbage-burning steamengine [10, pp. 93, 114].
Becauseof theirhighoperating costs,thesefacilitiesfaredpoorly-- victimsof the
changing composition of America'swastestreamandtheunpredictable natureof the
nation'ssecondarymaterialsmarkets.
Eachof theprocesses themodernizers endorsed seemeddesignedto further
theirgoalof centralizing controloversociety's waste. An escapehatchfor system
designers whosefacilitiesfailedto live up to expectations wasto blame inadequate
volume--asituationcitiessoughtto avoid by passing"flow control"ordinances,
lawsthatgavemunicipalagencies theexclusiverightsto controlwaste. With their
facilitiesandordinances in place,citieshadthe managerialcontroltheythought
they neededto maketheir systemsrun well. But eventhenthingsdid not go as
planned.
Part of the problem lay in the characterof the wasteitself. As the Great
War drewto close,theconsumption habitsof Americanschangeddramatically, and
sodid theirwaste. Greasecontent,a keyelementin theprofitabilityof the nation's
reductiontrade,droppedprecipitously duringthe war and neverrecovered[5, p.
41]. The advent of conveniencefoods reducedwaste'stotal organiccontent,
making it less usefulas swine feed or tillable fertilizer. The wastesystems
modernizers built, however,were designedaroundthe very characteristics that
changed
mostat war'send(i.e. moisturelevelsfor incineration,
greasecontentfor
reduction)--characteristics
whichweredirectlylinkedto thefinal costof disposal.
As theproperties of America'swastechanged, thecostsof operatingmodernwaste
disposalfacilitiesgrew.
The secondproblemmunicipalwastemanagement programsfacedwasa
lack of standardization.If anything,this wasthe creationof the modernization
movementitself,sinceeachcitybuilta slightlydifferentwastemanagement system.
Demonstrating theircommitment to modernityby employingall thelatest(andoften
untested)wastetechnologies, citiesspentmillionsmodernizingtheirwastesystems
[4, p. 208]. Unlike the private-sectorconfusionthat had encouragedthe
modernization movementin thefirst place,thisfragmentation waslongerlived, as
small,under-capitalizedfirmswerereplacedby agenciesbackedwith resources of
the state.
The modernizationmovementalso stimulateda kind of systembuilding
competitionbetweenmunicipal officials.Ratherthancooperate,
cityengineers
tried
to outdo each other by building more elaborate(and more expensive)waste
systems. Drivingthiscompetitionwasa questfor the universalsolution,which
municipalengineerschasedasa kindof Holy Grailwell intothe 1930s,hopingthat
theirinventionwouldsolvethenation'sgarbage problemsandmakethemrichin the
process.
 159

Modern wastesystemsreinforcedsystembuilding,as eachcity designed

aroundlocal needs:New York usedincinerationand openseadumping,while
Philadelphiarelied on incinerationandreduction.In theory,the systemsbuilt in
New York, Buffalo,SanFranciso,andelsewhere shouldhavebeenableto exploit
economiesof scalefar beyondthe reachof the privatesectorby concentrating
controlin a few handsandspreading thecostof capitalandlaborovera largewaste
stream.
There can be no doubt that consumers benefited from the creation of
municipalwastemanagement agencies. Beforemodernization, fewerthanfifteen
percentof a city'spopulationreceivedwasteservices,andeventhis"free"service
came at the costof allowingscavengers to sort wasteon one'ssidewalk. After
modernization, regularcollectionwasnearlyuniversalin America'slargestcities,
andrisingin medium-sized citiesaswell. Thisincrease wasundoubtedly theresult
of professionalmanagement, as municipalwasteagenciesintegratedbackwards
fromprovidingdisposalservicesto offeringcollectionandtransportation, thereby
bringingthe previouslyseparate tasksunderthemanagement of a singlefirm.
The justificationsfor public-sector monopoly(or oligopoly)controlof an
industrynormallyrevolvearoundmarketfailure;thattheprivatesector'sinability
or unwillingness to providethe level of servicedemandedcompelthe creationof
publicagencies.As thetargetsof thesemodernization programs,in thefirstyears
of thiscenturyprivateoperatorscouldnot hopeto meetsociety'snewlyelevated
expectations. Thedecisionto stayoutof disposal alsoreflectsthechangingnature
of waste managementtechnologyin the 1910s and 1920s, when designsand
operatingprocedureschangedconstantlyin effort to obtain the theoretically
possiblehigh levels of throughputrequiredto offset the high cost of modern
disposalequipment.While localofficialsinterpreted thisfailureasjustificationfor
their own agency'sexistence, it also reflectedthe underlyingweaknessof the
systems theybuilt:theircostswerejustifiedontheneedto solveproblemsthatwere
politically defined. Throughoutthe late nineteenthcentury,the construction of
sewersandwaterworks wereaccepted asthecostof preserving scarceresources for
thecommongood. The samelogicheldfor wastemanagement, andthroughout the
firsttwodecades of thiscentury, societywillingly paida premiumfor methodsof
collectionanddisposalthatprojectedan imageof municipalmodernity. As the
depression took its toll, however,society'sability (or willingness)to pay this
premiumall butdisappeared.
Efforts to perfect modern methodsof disposalevaporatedwith the
Depression,as citiesslashedtheir budgetsto accommodate the contractionand
municipalwastemanagersweretold to makedo with what they had. By 1936, it
wascommonfor city engineers to discusstheirbudgetsin percentages of theirlast
"real"budgetof 1929-1930,whentheylasthadenoughmoneyto run the systems
theybuilt[6, p. 74]. Budgets
thataveraged $300,000in pre•Depression yearswere
a fifth of that by 1934, and while the volumeof wasteAmericansgenerated
declinedduringthecontraction, therewasstill enoughto posea seriouslogistical
problemto thosechargedwith its management.
The reduction of public funding changedthe industry,as practices
previously rejectedreappeared
asexpedientalternatives
in a time of crises.One of
the mostnotablechangeswas the rise of single-cancollection. Before the Great
Depression,wastewascollectedin one of threeforms, eachrequiringseparate
methodsof collection which in turn placed heavy demandson labor and
160

transportation.To cut thesecosts,cities like Worcester,Massachusetts began

collectingall of theirwastein a singlecan [3, p. 57].
The collectionof mixedwaste,however,pushedthe costsof operating
disposal facilitiesskyward.Reduction plants,alreadymarginalized by thechange
of dietaryhabitsthatfollowedtheGreatWar, ceasedto be viableevenwherecities
werestillwillingto subsidizethem,with the lastof thesefacilitiesclosedby 1935
[10, p. 114]. Comminglingwastealsomadeincinerationmoreexpensive,asthe
waste'shighermoisturecontentmadeit harder-- andmoreexpensive-- to burn.
By theendof theDepression, engineerscalculatedthatincinerators
costan average
of twodollarsa tonto operate,while buryingwastecosta meretwenty-ninecents
a ton[12, p. 70].
The moveawayfrom tryingto recovermaximumvaluefrom wastesignaled
the end of the modernizationmovement. Rather than viewing waste as a
commodityto be minedand sanitized,municipalofficialsworkingin the Great
Depression sawit asanexpensivenuisancethatcouldnotbe ignored. One of the
firstto rejectthemodernizers' approach wasNew York City'sWilliam Carey, who
beganusingdumpsout of expediencymorethananythingelse. Recognizingthat
he lackedthebudgetto burnall of thecity'swaste,Careyestablished "fills"in the
FiveBoroughs,wherewastewasburiedin undeveloped areas.By committingthe
heresyof authorizing landfillsfromtheofficethathadfurthered thewasteindustry's
modernization most(it wasspeciallycreatedfor Waring in 1896), andproducing
substantialcost savingsin the process, Carey exposedthe gap betweenthe
modernizer'sidealsandpracticalreality.
For defendersof the waste modernization,Carey'sactionsthreatened
everythingtheystoodfor -- onewentsofar asto accusethecity'sSuperintendent
of Sanitationof threateningto "nullify the progressiveactivitiesof all sanitary
engineers[by] returningusto primitivemethods...."[13, p. 100]. Indictedby a
grandjury for endangering the public'shealth, the Superintendent defendedhis
approach byemphasizing results:in 1939,he savedthecity overa milliondollars,
and given half a chance, would improveuponthat numberin 1940. What was
more,Careynotedthathis"sanitary" methodof sealingdumpsprevented themfrom
emittingnoxiousodorsor attractingvermin, therebyallowinghim to recoverland
while simultaneously disposingof wastein a costeffectivemanner.When asked
whathe thoughtof thecharges, New York Mayor FiorelloLa Guardiacommented
thathis Superintendent was"beingindictedfor doinghisjob."
Reductions in municipalrevenuesbroughton by the GreatDepressionalso
providedan opportunity for entrepreneursenteringor alreadyin the business.As
thelevelof municipalservices declined,privatehaulersexpandedtheiroperations
by offering serviceon an informalbasis. One of SouthernCalifornia'sfuture
garbage"kings,"Elmo "E.J."Harrison,gothis startthisway,drivinga Model T
downalleysin VenturaCounty andofferingto haulwastefor a fee. Operatingin
marketsthatwereeitherunderserved or unregulated,Harrisonandhundreds of
independents like him hurriedthe wasteindustry'stransformation throughthe
adoptionof pre-industrial technologies, themostcommonof whichwas"filling"
land.
The returnto landfillingby bothpublicandprivatewastefirmsheraldeda
newageof industry
integration.Thelowerbarrierpresentedby landfilltechnology
openedthe industryto private competitionand pressuredpublic agenciesto
competeon a costbasis.The technology aroundwhichmostof thiscompetition
 161

tookplacewasthe "sanitary"fill, whichseemsto havebeenperfectedlate in the

Depression by Fresno'sPublicWorks'manager,JeanVincenze. Electedto hispost
in 1931, the formerconsultingengineerimmediatelybrokewith thetraditionsof
modernwastemanagement by cancelingthecity'sincinerationcontract.Claiming
thatthefacilitywascapableof only "warminggarbageover," Vincenzeput his
energy into perfectinga methodof disposalthat would be both aesthetically
pleasingandeconomicallyacceptable.
Vincenze'sbreakfrom modernizationcamein theway he approached waste:
ratherthanseeingit asa hazardousmaterialcontainingsomerecoverablewealth,
Vincenzetreatedgarbageas a commoditywith zero or negativeeconomicvalue.
This approachalsoweakenedanyremainingjustificationfor modernmethods,since
removingassumptionsaboutrevenuegenerationforced advocatesof incineration
or reductionto examinetheirprocesses
on a strictcostbasis. Unlike incinerators,
which took months to build and hundreds of thousandsof dollars, landfills had a
shortstart-uptime,oftenlessthana week,while a singlebulldozeroperatorcould
entomba days'worthof garbagefor penniesa ton.
Unlike New York City, whereWilliam Careyencountered hostilityfrom
localmodernizers, Vincenzehadtheluxuryof experimenting in a growingcitywith
an abundance of surrounding land. Improvingon techniques he sawusedin the
San Franciscobay area, Vincenzedevelopeda methodof "cut and cover"that
reducedverminandoffensivesmellsat minimumcost. By 1938,theEngineering
News-Recordextolled the virtue of this simpleapproach,emphasizingthat as
Vincenze and his departmentbecamemore expert at runningtheir fill, their
operatingcostscontinued falling. Between1934 and 1938, Fresno'swaste
collectionratesdroppedthreetimes,whilethelevelof serviceprovidedrose.
Theseresultswerenothinglessthanstartlingin an industrygrowncynical
aboutsure-fireschemes to makegarbagemoreefficient.That Fresnocouldexpand
the numberof residentsreceivingwasteserviceby thirty-fivepercentduringthis
period was proof that somethingdramatic was taking place. Rather than
concentrating on throughputandeffectiveprocessing, the low costandsimplicity
of landfill operationallowedofficials of wastemanagementfirms (public and
private)to concentrate their effortson cuttingcostsin the laborintensiveareaof
collectionandtransportation.
The mainweaponshaulersusedto combathighlaborcostswasthe packer
truck-- a Depression-erainventionthatcameintoitsownastheSecondWorld War
began. Designedto carrycommingledwastein an aesthetically pleasingmanner,
the packertruckrevolutionized the wasteindustryby establishing standards in
collection while re-enforcingtrends towards comminglingwaste and mixed
disposal.The prototypefor the collectionvehiclewe seeon the streettodaywas
developedin 1938 by Detroit's Gar Wood Industries. The "Load-Packer"
revolutionizedcollectionby compactingwasteas it was collected,increasingthe
amount of territory a single crew could handle, and thus increasingworker
productivitywhilehelpingprivateandpublicfirm cuttheiroperatingcosts.
The dramaticshiftin technologies andprivatesectorparticipation makesit
clear that by the end of the Great Depression,the institutionscreatedby the
modernization movementwereweakening.Thoserunningmunicipalwastesystems
in thelate 1930sweremorethana generationremovedfrom the idealsof maximum
reutilization and sterilization, and increasinglyembracedthe very technologies
modernizerssoughtto eliminate. While thereis little doubtthatthistrendwould
162

havecontinuedabsentwar, it is equallyclearthatwithoutwar institutionalchange

in America'swastemanagement industrycould not havebeenas completeor as
far-reaching.
Thetwinpressures of laborandcapitalscarcitythataccompanied America's
mobilizationaccelerated thetransitionfromcapital-intensivemethodsof disposal
to the more cost-effective techniques mastered during the Depression.
War-inducedlaborshortages affectedcitiesup anddownthePacificCoast,forcing
citieslike LongBeachto adoptlandfillsandtwo-mancollectioncrewsasnecessary
expedients,a patternthatrepeateditselfthroughoutthe country.
The shortagesof manpowerandcapitalwereno lessacutein the military,
whichwasin theprocess of buildinghundredsof campsto houseandtraindraftees.
Needinga wastemanagement solutionthatcouldliterallybe built overnightand
lackinganysingleorganization thatcouldhandletheprojecton a contract basis,the
Army Corps of Engineersdraftedmunicipalofficialswith experiencein waste
management andchargedthemwith designing a universalsystemfor militaryuse.
By throwingmunicipalengineers from aroundthe countrytogetherandfoctlsing
themona singlegoal,the ArmyCorpsof Engineersachievedin a yearthatwhich
a collectionof professional managers hadbeenunableto do in thirty. By making
consensusa mandatoryresultof the debate,the Corpsencourageda furious
exchange of ideasto findthefastest, simplest,
andcheapest solutionpossible.By
1943, landfillingwas the military'sofficial solutionto handlingits waste--
incinerator-building wasprohibitedfor theduration-- andwasquicklyspreading
to theciviliansector. Citieslike LongBeach,New York, andHoustonall operated
landfillsas war-timeexpedients, thougheachkepttheir "temporary" solutionsat
war'send [11, pp. 84-85].
The trend towardlandfillingwas reinforcedby the thousands of camp
engineers returningto theirciviliandutiesasofficialswiththenation's citiesand
counties.While manycitiescontinued burningwastewell intothe 1950s,it is clear
that the institutional
consensus aroundthisexpensivetechnology no longerheld,
andofficialsnolongerfearedprofessional censurefor usinglandfillor single-can
collection. Thesetwo basicsimplifications provedkey to the industry•s later
integration,for asthebarriersto entryfell, competition increasedandthe industry
began integrating into regional and national business organizations.
The storyof thewastemanagement industry's
delayedintegration provides
insightonthelimitsof thestructuralistdevelopment modelin explaining theriseof
America•s economy.Certainly,in thecasesof railroads, steel,andautomobiles,the
structuralistprogression makessense,as firms in eachof theseindustries did
developin a linearprogression, movingfrom entrepreneurial organization to
modernbusiness enterprisethroughthe vehicleof professional management.But
even when productioncharacteristics were conduciveto economiesof scale,
professional management wasnotalwaystheanswer.
The structuralist approachshysawayfrom thisconclusion by focusingon
thoseindustrieswhereprofessional management was successful -- U.S. Steel,
GeneralMotors, and Du Pont eachprovideexcellentcasestudiesof competent
managerial enterprise.Littleattention ispaidto firmswheremanagers madethe
wrongdecisions andbackedthe wrongtechnology.This is truein theprivate
sectorbecause thesefirmsno longerexist-- but in thepublicsector,poorchoices
areoftensubsidized for decadesat publicexpense.Insulatedfromthe vicissitudes
of markets andsubsidized bypublicfunds,managers in thepublicsectorhavein the
 163

pastcreatedinstitutional
rigiditiesin entireindustries
by embracing
technologies
or
regulatoryprogramswhosecostsfar exceedtheirbenefits.
America's garbageindustryis a casein point. By introducing
professional
management, thepublicsectordid indeedimprovethe levelof local service,but
publicinterventionalsoimpededthedevelopment of a moreintegrated
industry.
By selectingvery expensivewastemanagement technologiesand thenspending
twenty yearstrying to make them cost less,the modernizersdemonstratehow
managerialhierarchies,whenharnessed
to the wrongsolution,cando moreharm
thangood.

References

1. F.R. Bowennan,"WhatCitiesUseIncinerators--AndWhy?"AmericanCity(March 1952),100-105.

2. Harold Crooks, Dirty Business:The InsideStoryt•' the New GarbageAgglomerates(Toronto,
1983).
3. Joseph
E. Gill,"Garbage
Reduction
andIncineration
Combined
in Philadelphia
Plant,"AmericanCity
(December 1935), 57-58.
4. Goodrich,W. Francis.TheEconomicalDisposalof Towns'Rql'•se(New York 1901).
5. RudolphHeringand SamuelGreeley, The Collectionand Disposalof MunicipalReJhse(New
York, 1921).
6. T.B. Kimber, "City of Akron GarbageSurvey--Organization and Procedure,"American City
(September1938),72-76.
7. JudithWalzer Leavitt,"TheWasteland:Garbageand SanitaryReformin the NineteenthCentury
AmericanCity," Journalof the Historyof Medicineand Allied Sciences,35 (October1980),
431-452.
8. MartinV. Melosi,Garbagein the Cities:ReJhse,
ReJbrm,
andtheEnvironment,
1880-1980(College
Station, 1982).
9. H. De B. Parsons,TheDisposalof MunicipalRe.{•se(New York 1901).
10. Daniel ThoreauSicular,"Currentsin the Waste Stream:A History of RefuseManagementand
ResourceRecoveryin America,"M.A. thesis(Berkeley,1984).
I I. W. RaynerStraus,"Useof SanitaryFill in Baltimoreto ContinueAfter TheWar,"AmericanCity,
(January1945),82-85.
12. A.M. Thresher,"Refusehandlingin New Bedford,"AmericanCity, (November1939),69-72.
13. DesmondP. Tynam, "ModernGarbageDisposal,"AmericanCity, (June1939), 100-102.