UKUSA AUKUS – Anglosphere Together Again

On 15 September 2021 Prime Minister Boris Johnson, US President Joseph Biden and
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison issued a joint statement announcing the creation of
an “enhanced trilateral security partnership” called AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom
and the United States)
The statement also announces plans for further collaboration to “enhance our joint
capabilities and interoperability.” These will initially focus on cyber capabilities, artificial
intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities.
AUKUS comes with potentially lucrative defence and security opportunities for UK industry
not just in submarine build but in the other areas mentioned in the joint statement, of cyber,
artificial intelligence and quantum technologies. In recent years Australia has opted for BAE
Systems Type 26 design for the Royal Navy for its new Hunter-class frigate. The submarine
deal may help the Royal Navy with future submarine deployments in the Indo-Pacific by
potentially providing maintenance and port facilities in Australia.
The type of submarine is yet to be determined. It could be drawn from existing designs:
the US Virginia class or the UK Astute class. Or from the next generation attack
submarine programmes. The UK has begun a Submersible Ship Nuclear (Replacement)
project to explore what follows Astute.55 In terms of timing, AUKUS says only that it
intends to bring the submarine into service “at the earliest achievable date.”56 That is
not likely to be until at least the late 2030s, and Australia will extend the life of its
current Collins-class, although former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is sceptical of
the timings and worries Australia may be left with a submarine capability gap.
Nuclear propulsion offers “unambiguous advantages” over diesel-powered submarines, but
this should not be “overhyped”, says Euan Graham.58 Nuclearpowered submarines can
remain submerged at length, unlike diesel-electric submarines which need to resurface, and
therefore remain undetected for longer (in theory). However, they are not necessarily quieter
and require more expensive infrastructure and maintenance.
While President Obama’s strategy of a “pivot to Asia”, announced in 2011, did bring a
greater focus to US diplomatic efforts in the region, it was often criticised as having few
concrete achievements (though one of its tangible outcomes was a deployment of US
Marines to Darwin Australia on a rotational basis)
Another element of the AUKUS deal which has also raised concern, is Australia’s acquisition
of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles from the US. While not in direct contravention of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 74 the restraint on transfers of missile
technologies that is inherent in the regime could potentially be undermined and set a
dangerous precedent to other countries
A trilateral discussion was held between Johnson, Biden and Morrison at the June 2021
G7 summit held in Cornwall, England.[35][40] The talks took place without Macron's
knowledge.[37] This approach was possible as a result of the UK not entering into a formal
foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the EU. As a result, the UK
was free to pursue enhanced cooperation with other allies. [41] Axios reported that
the Biden administration sought assurances from Australia that cancelling the contract
was not dependent on the US providing them with assistance and that cancelling was a
fait accompli.[39] Morrison said Australia had been considering an alternative to
the Attack-class submarine deal for the past 18 months. Australia considered purchasing
French nuclear submarines which use nuclear reactors fuelled by low-enriched
uranium (LEU) at less than 6%. However, French reactor designs have to be refuelled
every ten years. The prospect of nuclear power in Australia has been a topic of public
debate since the 1950s. Australia has never had a nuclear power station. Australia hosts
33% of the world's uranium deposits and is the world's third largest producer of uranium
after Kazakhstan and Canada. In contrast, American and British designs power the
submarines for the expected life of the submarines using nuclear reactors fuelled
by highly enriched uranium (HEU) at 93% enrichment. The Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) allows non-nuclear-weapon states to produce the highly enriched
uranium for naval reactor fuel. Nevertheless, the agreement to transfer US or UK nuclear
submarine technology including possibly highly enriched uranium has been described as
an act of nuclear proliferation, and has been criticised by scholars and politicians. "the
nonproliferation implications of the AUKUS submarine deal are both negative and
serious. For Australia to operate nuclear-powered submarines, it will have to become the
first non-nuclear-weapon state to exercise a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear
material from the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I
have no real concerns that Australia will misuse this material itself, but I am concerned
that this removal will set a damaging precedent. In the future, would-be proliferators
could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons..
[87]
 20% is the minimum level required to make a nuclear weapon. Johnson responded to
French anger on 21 September by saying "I just think it's time for some of our dearest
friends around the world to prenez un grip about this and donnez-moi un break"; [93] the
latter being broken French for "get a grip and give me a break". President Joe Biden stated
that the deal was a way to "address both the current strategic environment in the (Indo-
Pacific) region and how it may evolve".[99] After a call between the French and US
presidents, the White House acknowledged the crisis could have been averted if there
had been open consultations between allies. It was agreed the process would continue in
such manner. The French government received official notification from Australia that
the Attack-class submarine project was to be cancelled only a few hours before it was
publicly announced.[102][12] Le Monde reported that the original cost of the project in 2016
was €35 billion of which €8 billion (A$12 billion) was to go to French companies. [103]
[104]
 The project was reportedly going to employ 4,000 people in France over six years at
Naval Group and its 200 subcontractors.[104] The French government was angered by both
the cancellation of the Attack-class submarine project and not being made aware of the
negotiations that led to the AUKUS agreement.[105] In a joint statement, French foreign
minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and armed forces minister Florence Parly expressed
disappointment at Australia's decision to abandon their joint submarine program with
France. Le Drian further stated in a radio interview that the contract termination was a
"stab in the back".[5] On 17 September, France recalled its ambassadors from Australia and
the US.[7] Despite tension in the past, France had never before withdrawn its ambassador
to the United States.[107] In a statement, Le Drian said that the "exceptional decision is
justified by the exceptional gravity of the [AUKUS] announcements" and that the snap
cancellation of the submarine contract "constitute[d] unacceptable behaviour between
allies and partners".[7] French president Emmanuel Macron has not commented but is
reported to be "furious" about the turn of events. In response to questions about the
Australia-EU trade deal currently being negotiated, French Secretary of State for
European Affairs Clément Beaune stated that he doesn't see how France can trust
Australia.[108] Arnaud Danjean, a French MEP, said that "Australians can expect more than
a delay in concluding the Free Trade Agreement with the EU".[108] French Lowy
Institute policy analyst Hervé Lemahieu said the diplomatic damage from the cancellation
will take years to repair and leave a lasting legacy of mistrust".[7] After a call between the
French and US presidents, the French ambassador is to return to the US. Beaune
described the United Kingdom as a junior partner and vassal of the United States due to
the pact, saying in an interview: "Our British friends explained to us they were leaving
the EU to create Global Britain. We can see that this is a return into the American lap and
a form of accepted vassalisation." [109] Le Drian stated that "We have recalled our
ambassadors to [Canberra and Washington] to re-evaluate the situation. With Britain,
there is no need. We know their constant opportunism. So there is no need to bring our
ambassador back to explain."[110] A Franco-British defence summit has been cancelled. A
foreign ministers meeting between France, Germany, the UK, and the US has been
postponed, and a ministerial meeting between Australia, France, and India was cancelled.
[114][115]
 France however, contacted India to talk about strengthening their cooperation in
the Indo-Pacific.[116] France's foreign commerce minister declined a meeting with his
Australian counterpart.[117] French president Macron said that Europe needs to stop being
naive when it comes to defending its interests and build its own military capacity.
France considers the Asia-Pacific region to be of key strategic and economic importance,
with 1.65 million French citizens on islands including La Réunion, New Caledonia,
Mayotte and French Polynesia
Over the past year, both France and the UK have been actively building on their ties with
the Indo-Pacific states, even though the UK’s tilt toward the region comes as a more
recent development, with much of its previous foreign and economic policy focus being
dedicated to Brexit. On the other hand, France considers itself a resident Indo-Pacific
power on account of its significant territories in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
which are home to 1.6 million citizens. These territories give France the world’s second
largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the region, which form the basis of French
interests in the region. This holds France with more stakes in the region compared to
other European powers. Amidst Brexit tensions, both the UK and France have been
embroiled in economic competition with each other. Now, with the AUKUS
announcement causing deep tensions between France and the three nations, how UK–
France (and UK–EU) relations will unfold remain to be seen.
Notably, France is set to hold presidential elections in the coming year, which will take
place during its EU presidency, which could see Macron doubling down and emphasising
French commitment to the Indo-Pacific, as well as its call for strategic autonomy.
However, even in the long-term, should there be a change in France’s leadership,
France’s deep territorial connect to the region, which has been solidified and
institutionalised through Paris’ Indo-Pacific strategy and partnerships, implies that
France’s stake in the region will persist. Although the incident may have been a setback
for its presence and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, Paris’ determination and
investments in the region suggest that it is unlikely to let the matter compromise its
regional outlook. While France’s cancellation of the India–France–Australia scheduled
trilateral meet is not an encouraging sign, it is worth remembering that the trilateral has
not been entirely disbanded and has every chance of being revived. Further, amidst
tensions with the US and Australia, France could enhance focus on other key partners,
such as India and Japan. Paris and New Delhi have already reiterated their commitment
to each other after the AUKUS debacle, with consultations at the highest levels between
state heads and foreign ministers. Already France has returned its ambassadors to
Australia and the US, suggesting that the initial French reaction to AUKUS was largely a
storm in a teacup.
President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who told CNN that "one of
our member states has been treated in a way that is not acceptable. ... We want to know
what happened and why."[158][159] The EU also demanded an apology from Australia.
[160]
 President of the European Council Charles Michel denounced a "lack of transparency
and loyalty" by the US.[161] The EU said the crisis affects the whole union.
Preparations for a new EU-US trade and technology council between the US and EU were
postponed.[127] France eventually dropped their opposition to these talks which took place
in Pittsburgh on September 29, 2021. France also attempted to delay the free trade talks
between the EU and Australia.[163] 
.
These submarines are much faster and harder to detect than conventionally powered
fleets. They can stay submerged for months, shoot missiles longer distances and also carry
more.
Having them stationed in Australia is critical to US influence in the region, analysts say.
The US is sharing its submarine technology for the first time in 50 years. It had previously
only shared technology with the UK.
Australia will become just the seventh nation in the world to operate nuclear-powered
submarines, after the US, UK, France, China, India and Russia.
Australia has reaffirmed it has no intention of obtaining nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile New Zealand said it would ban Australia's submarines from its waters, in line
with an existing policy on the presence of nuclear-powered submarines.
New Zealand, although a Five Eyes member, has been more cautious in aligning with
either the US or China in the Pacific.
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said her nation had not been approached to join the pact
This is a very significant decision by Australia,” said former Australian prime minister
Tony Abbott. “But as things stand, we’re not going to obtain an actual operational nuclear
submarine perhaps for two decades. And we need more and better submarines now.”

One proposed stopgap involves Canberra buying or leasing older US or British nuclear
submarines to buy time and build expertise. Campbell said on Friday that the US would
do “whatever possible” to get the vessels into Australia’s hands as soon as possible.
Australia’s current submarines sailing out of Perth can remain only 11 days in the South
China Sea, compared with 60 days for their nuclear counterparts.

And while the submarines may be built in Australia, given congested US and British
naval yards, it is unclear how willing Australian taxpayers might be to shoulder
significantly higher defence budgets, currently about 2 per cent of GDP, especially if
Beijing lowers the temperature. In addition to the estimated US$3 billion per vessel cost,
Canberra – which has never had nuclear-powered vessels – would need to upgrade ports,
shipbuilding and human skills.

“There are 66 billion reasons why France was upset,” said Heather Conley, Eurasia
programme director for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. “Now we’re in
the process of digging out of the hole we dug.
The Aukus alliance could also prompt realignments in the alphabet soup of existing
regional groupings, including the Quad, Anzus, the Five Eyes, Nato and the Asean
Regional Forum.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin, among others, has criticised Aukus
for embodying “Cold War mentality, double standards and contempt of rules with a clear
political agenda”.
By Chinese standards, however, Beijing’s response has been relatively mild, analysts said.
Some believe Beijing hopes the Washington-Paris strains will divide its adversaries by
themselves. Others conclude that China’s recent campaign to intimidate Australia
economically has backfired and that further pressure is counterproductive.

The state tabloid Global Times “at one point in time said, look, Australia is like the gum
on China’s shoe”, said John Thomas Schieffer, former US ambassador to Australia. “Never
tell an Australian something like that because they are one tough people, and they don’t
like to be leveraged and they don’t like to be squeezed.”
UKUSA – Five Eyes.
Global Surveillance disclosures.
Although the exact size of Snowden's disclosure remains unknown, the following
estimates have been put up by various government officials:

 At least 15,000 Australian intelligence files, according to Australian officials [41]

 At least 58,000 British intelligence files, according to British officials [66]
 About 1.7 million U.S. intelligence files, according to U.S. Department of
Defense talking points[23][67]
As a contractor of the NSA, Snowden was granted access to U.S. government documents
along with top secret documents of several allied governments, via the exclusive Five
Eyes network.[68] Snowden claims that he currently does not physically possess any of
these documents, having surrendered all copies to journalists he met in Hong Kong.[69]
According to his lawyer, Snowden has pledged not to release any documents while in
Russia, leaving the responsibility for further disclosures solely to journalists.
In July 2013, as part of the 2013 Edward Snowden revelations, it emerged that the NSA is
paying GCHQ for its services, with at least £100 million of payments made between 2010
and 2013.[36]
On 11 September 2013, The Guardian released a leaked document provided by Edward
Snowden which reveals a similar agreement between the NSA and Israel's Unit 8200.[37]
According to The Sydney Morning Herald, Australia operates clandestine surveillance
facilities at its embassies "without the knowledge of most Australian diplomats". These
facilities are part of an international espionage program known as STATEROOM.
In the 1950s several Nordic countries joined the community as "third party" participants.
They were soon followed by Denmark (1954) and West Germany (1955).[9][10][42]
According to Edward Snowden, the NSA has a "massive body" called the Foreign Affairs
Directorate that is responsible for partnering with other Western allies such as Israel.[43]
Unlike the "second party" members (that is, the Five Eyes themselves), "third party"
partners are not automatically exempt from intelligence targeting. According to an
internal NSA document leaked by Snowden, "We (the NSA) can, and often do, target the
signals of most 3rd party foreign partners."[44]
The Five Eyes are cooperating with various 3rd Party countries in at least two groups:

 The "Nine Eyes", consisting of the Five Eyes plus Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, and Norway.[45]
 The "Fourteen Eyes", consisting of the same countries as the Nine Eyes plus
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.[46] The actual name of this group
is SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) and its purpose is coordinating the
exchange of military signals intelligence among its members.[47]
Germany is reportedly interested in moving closer to the inner circle: an internal GCHQ
document from 2009 said that the "Germans were a little grumpy at not being invited to
join the 9-Eyes group." Germany may even wish to join Five Eyes. [48] Referring to Five
Eyes, former French President François Hollande has said that his country is "not within
that framework and we don't intend to join." [49] According to a former top US official,
"Germany joining would be a possibility, but not France – France itself spies on the US far
too aggressively for that."
The mutual surveillance and sharing of information between allies of the UK and US
resurfaced again during the 2013 mass surveillance disclosures. As described by the news
magazine Der Spiegel, this was done to circumvent domestic surveillance regulations:
Britain's GCHQ intelligence agency can spy on anyone but British nationals, the NSA can
conduct surveillance on anyone but Americans, and Germany's BND
(Bundesnachrichtendienst) foreign intelligence agency can spy on anyone but Germans.
That's how a matrix is created of boundless surveillance in which each partner aids in a
division of roles. They exchanged information. And they worked together extensively.
That applies to the British and the Americans, but also to the BND, which assists the NSA
in its Internet surveillance.[56]
According to The Guardian, the "Five Eyes" community is an exclusive club where new
members "do not seem to be welcome":
It does not matter how senior you are, and how close a friend you think you are
to Washington or London, your communications could easily be being shared among the
handful of white, English-speaking nations with membership privileges.[57]
In 2013, Canadian federal judge Richard Mosley strongly rebuked the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) for outsourcing its surveillance of Canadians to overseas
partner agencies. A 51-page ruling says that the CSIS and other Canadian federal agencies
are illegally enlisting US and British allies in global surveillance dragnets, while keeping
domestic federal courts in the dark
Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden described the Five Eyes as a "supra-
national intelligence organisation that does not answer to the known laws of its own
countries".[10] Documents leaked by Snowden in 2013 revealed that the FVEY has been
spying on one another's citizens and sharing the collected information with each other in
order to circumvent restrictive domestic regulations on surveillance of citizens
The AUKUS’ expansive, security-focused agenda indicates that the member countries will
be engaged in the region for several decades to come, making the grouping poised to
become a critical and permanent fixture in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, it comes as a
parallel or a complementary initiative to the anglosphere Five Eyes intelligence-sharing
alliance.
Similarly, the AUKUS triad is also poised to become a defining feature of the three
founding states and is likely to be at the center of their Indo-Pacific strategy and
engagement in the coming times. The AUKUS is therefore complimentary to the FVEY,
and it seeks to expand the grouping’s alliance structure beyond intelligence sharing and
into the domain of cutting-edge, critical defense-related technologies and industries. 8
When AUKUS was first introduced, the most prominent and attention-grabbing feature
of the announcement was the submarine initiative – the first undertaking under AUKUS,
which aims to build on their shared tradition as maritime democracies. This project will
involve the transfer of sensitive and highly prized nuclear propulsion technology, as well
as the requisite technical expertise, to the Royal Australian Navy to build nuclear-
powered submarines. The trilateral also includes significant cooperation in cutting-edge
defense-related science and technology, industrial bases and supply chains. Within the
emerging technology domain, AUKUS’ priorities include critical technologies, like
artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, cybersecurity and additional undersea
capabilities (likely including undersea fiber-optic cables. Notably, these technologies are
also at the forefront of intelligence gathering, and AUKUS will look to complement the
FVEY’s objectives by exploiting the potential of new emerging technologies, particularly
big data, advanced analytics and AI, for surveillance and intelligence operations. The
technology sector is set to define the US–China system-wide rivalry for supremacy;
advanced technologies will be currencies of power, driving strategic confrontation in a
new Cold War environment,13 making AUKUS’ comprehensive technology agenda
central to members’ future outlooks. In this context, the AUKUS is poised to become a
substantial and enduring grouping of the Indo-Pacific – much like the FVEY on a global
level. In other words, as of now, the Quad is primarily a political grouping rather than a
security-centered one like the AUKUS. The AUKUS states already have well-established
systems and practices in place, cultivated through their collaborations via the FVEY over
the past seven decades, making it poised to emerge as a security grouping adjunct and
complementary to the Quad and other regional alliances, like the FVEY.
Views remain divided whether AUKUS empowers Australia without eroding its
sovereignty, or reduces its sovereignty by making it more reliant on the US and risks
entrapping it in a potential US–China conflict.
From Washington’s perspective, AUKUS is to support its efforts to contain China’s
aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific, a hotbed of strategic technological competition and
a region facing growing “hybrid threats.” As such, cyberattacks, disinformation, economic
coercion, attacks on critical infrastructure and supply chain disruption are some of the
threats that Australia has had to directly face.8 In other words, AUKUS is about more
than submarines; it is to set up an information- and technology-sharing arrangement to
focus on critical technologies, such as AI and quantum. The race to master these is today a
geopolitical issue. 9 From Brussels’ perspective, AUKUS is also about more than
submarines. It raises difficult but certainly not new questions concerning both the EU’s
internal coherence and external relevance; two sides of the same coin. It is another wake-
up call to become more resilient and coherent at home to withstand threats, in order to
become more relevant abroad. The deal also affects perceptions of transatlantic ties; for
EU member states, AUKUS is indicative of how President Biden understands cooperation
and trust.
Brussels concluding negotiations with China on a Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment (CAI) in December 2020 did not go down well with incoming President
Biden. His administration had urged early consultations with the EU on China’s economic
practices.11 Instead, Berlin, holding the EU presidency at the time, made sure that, with
the support of Paris, CAI negotiations are concluded, despite resistance from some EU
member states, such as Poland
In an initial statement by the Chinese foreign ministry after AUKUS was announced, a
spokesperson stressed that “relevant countries” should give up “cold war zero-sum
thinking as well as “narrow geopolitical concepts” both of which run counter to the need
for enhanced cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.3 Subsequent Chinese government
statements, and some news organizations, also pointed to the potential damage which
AUKUS could cause for nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the Pacific Rim, given that
Australia is a non-nuclear state which would nonetheless receive nuclear materials
(specifically highly enriched uranium [HEU], also used in warheads) 4 and technology in
the form of the submarines, raising questions about both “double standards” in Western
views of preventing nuclear proliferation and the setting of future precedents regarding
the transfer of nuclear components. In late September, Beijing expressed interest in
improving dialogues with the French government, seeing a window of opportunity due
both to the chilled relations between Paris and AUKUS governments and the possibility
of a European political split over how to engage China in the near future. the chain of
events did help to further China’s narrative that the Xi Jinping government was
promoting cooperation, while the US was seeking division. As one Chinese spokesperson
described the situation, “People can tell that what China works for is economic
cooperation and regional integration. What the US and Australia push for is wars and
destruction.” Another phrase which has been used often in Chinese government
statements and media in relation to AUKUS has been “Anglo-Saxon clique reflecting the
view from Beijing that the alliance will only serve the very narrow interests of the three
members governments themselves at the expense of the international community, along
the same lines as other US-led security initiatives, such as the Quad security arrangement
and the “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing pact. India’s position on the AUKUS grouping has
thus far been careful, being mindful of its fine balance of emerging as a critical security
partner of the Indo-Pacific powers and the mainstream European actors (including
France). The AUKUS brings to scrutiny many things for India, including New Delhi’s ties
with the US, France, and even Russia. In a way, AUKUS has given rise to foreign policy
challenges for India in both Europe–Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitical domains.
Furthermore, the pact has encouraged New Delhi not to discard any power partnership,
but rather stay engaged with regional partners to prioritize India’s national interest. In
other words, the arrival of AUKUS has created an opportunity for India to stay
connected, as well as envision and strive for deeper, broader partnerships, with the
European Union (EU) at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is
witnessing weakening transatlantic strategic affinity amid tensions between the European
powers and the Anglosphere; in fact, this has led to NATO’s Secretary General call for
strengthening Europe–North America ties.
Of all the European Union countries, France is by far the most present in the Indo-Pacific
in terms of politics, defence and geography. It has the second-largest exclusive economic
zone in the world (after the US), and more than 90 per cent of that is linked to French
territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It also has several thousand military
personnel, 1.6 million French citizens and major defence, energy and infrastructure
sector interests in the region. Under President Donald J. Trump, there were marked
changes in the way that the US administration interacted with the region. One was
terminology. Previous administrations largely spoke about the ‘Asia-Pacific’. Under
Trump, the region was consistently referred to as the Indo-Pacific. That change is now
embedded in US policy circles. In June 2019, the Department of Defense published the
second key document Indo-Pacific  Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and
Promoting a  Networked Region.34 It opened with the statement, ‘The Indo-Pacific is the
Department of Defense’s priority theater.’ The reason for this was described thus, ‘the
People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks
to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence
operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations.’35 The document underlined
how the US considered the key to countering the challenge was to work more closely
with ‘allies and partners’. That was one of the reasons for the May 2018 change of name
for the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to US Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM). This highlighted the role of India in the region,36 and by extension
the growing focus on the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia.
UK foreign policy as a whole is undergoing epochal change. This is part of an ‘integrated
review’ described by the UK government as the ‘biggest review of foreign, defence and
development policy since the Cold War’.53 Brexit alone required a fundamental
reassessment of British foreign policy. Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting
in the UK in 2018, then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson announced the opening of nine
new diplomatic missions in Commonwealth countries, including three in Oceania.
Under President Macron, there has been a marked increase in intensity in France’s
strategic Indo-Pacific focus, with a clear emphasis on ‘French interests’. Apart from
regional high-level visits,65 in 2019 the French Ministry for the Armed Forces
published France’s Defence Strategy in  the  Indo-Pacific66 and the Ministry for Europe
and Foreign Affairs published The French Strategy in  the  Indo-Pacific.67 Officially the
French approach is coordinated with the EU, but there is not an EU Indo-Pacific policy,
due in part to the EU’s complex relationship with China. Participants stressed France’s
maritime role in the region, highlighting that France was appreciated by India as it had
good maritime domain awareness and brought an operational approach. Strategically,
France was said to consider the Indian Navy a net security provider in the region; the
primary France–India zone of engagement was the Indian Ocean, in particular the
northwest and southwest sectors, where France has territories and where India has
weaker links. Both countries wanted to build the partnership. In that context, France and
India were said to be deepening their relationship by collaborating on a constellation
of satellites for maritime traffic surveillance (India’s largest partnership of this
kind),72 as well as a mechanism for increased information exchange and logistics.
The perception was that when it comes to defence, India was agnostic and buys from
everywhere; the west coast of India had French submarines and the east coast had
Russian nuclear submarines. France itself had sold submarines to both India and Pakistan.
As a result, it was said that French industry knew that ‘deal-breaker’ conditions were
impossible – France did not have the ‘political force’ to impose any and taking a strong
stance would be detrimental to the French defence sector. France has large territories
in Oceania, including French Polynesia and New Caledonia, and Paris is trying to gain
trust and work more with its Oceania neighbours and regional organizations, especially
in areas such as climate change, environmental sustainability, monitoring of illegal
fishing, drugs trafficking and more. However, French Oceania has its own challenges.
According to participants, there was an awareness of growing Chinese investment
in French Polynesia, which is pitting economic considerations against security concerns,
as well as the perception that China was encouraging independence movements
in French territories. Paris has markedly increased its focus on the region, but
participants said there were still gaps.