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Tan v Ramirez
[G.R. No. 158929] | [August 3, 2010] | [BRION, J]

Petitioner: ROSARIO P. TAN

Respondents: ARTEMIO G. RAMIREZ, MOISES G. RAMIREZ, RODRIGO G. RAMIREZ, DOMINGO G.
RAMIREZ, and MODESTA RAMIREZ ANDRADE

Doctrine:

o Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary

 Ordinary – requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years.
 Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership
 There is "just title" when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right
 Extraordinary – requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need
of title or of good faith.
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CASE SUMMARY

Trigger word/s: ordinary acquisitive prescription, compromise agreement

FACTS: Petitioner Tan filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession and/or quieting of title of
a ½ portion of Lot No. 3483, an 86,433-sq parcel of land (subject property) in Leyte, against the respondents.
The CA declared Roberto Ramirez as the lawful owner of the entire are of the subject property on the ground
that the respondents had been possessors in good faith and with just title and could acquire the subject
property through ordinary acquisitive prescription based upon the compromise agreement and the contract of
sale Roberto entered into with Belacho.
HELD: There is no ordinary acquisitive prescription in favor of Roberto Ramirez. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. The compromise agreement and
contract of sale do not support respondents’ claim of good faith and just title. The compromise agreement was
executed to avoid conflict with Belacho and the contract of sale was entered into by Roberto during the
pendency of the case field by Belacho for ownership (Hence, vendor Belacho’s title was still disputed). There
was also no extraordinary acquisitive possession in favor of Roberto, which requires uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith. Respondents have only been in possession for 24
years (counted from the time the subject property was tax declared in1974 to the time of the filing of the
complaint in 1998).
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FACTS

Petitioner
 Petitioner alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona was the owner of the subject
property under a 1915 Tax Declaration (TD) No. 2724
  1997 - Nicomedesa discovered that since 1974, Roberto Ramirez had been reflecting the subject
property solely in his name under TD No. 4193
 1998 - Petitioner Tan, representing her parents (spouses Crispo and Nicomedesa P. Alumbro), filed
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Hindang-Inopacan, Leyte a complaint for the recovery
of ownership and possession and/or quieting of title of a one-half portion of the subject property against
the respondents
Respondents
 Respondent alleged: Roberto bought half of the subject property from Nicomedesa in 1965, and the
remaining half from Gavino's heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, in 1972.
 1975 - a certain Santa Belacho, claiming to be Gavino's natural child (Note: Gavina and Gliceria had no
legitimate children), filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baybay, Leyte against Roberto,
Nicomedesa, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, docketed as Civil Case No. B-565, for recovery of possession
and ownership of two (2) parcels of land, including the subject property;
 September 16, 1977 - Roberto bought the subject property from Belacho through a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Land
 October 5, 1977 - Roberto and Nicomedesa entered into a Compromise Agreement with Belacho to
settle Civil Case No. B-565. Belacho agreed in this settlement to dismiss the case and to waive her
interest over the subject property in favor of Roberto, and the other parcel of land in favor of
Nicomedesa in consideration of P1,800.00

CASE TRAIL

[MCTC]
 Roberto was entitled to only ¾ of subject property as this was Gavino's entire share (property was
conjugal property so the ½ share of his wife Gliceria should be equally divided between him and her
siblings) while the petitioner was entitled to ¼ of the subject property
 Respondents DID NOT ACQUIRE subject property by ordinary acquisitive possession
o Bad faith attended respondents’ possession because they were well aware of Nicomedesa's
claim of ownership over a ½ portion of the subject property, long before the property was tax
declared solely in Roberto's name in 1974
 The required 30-year period for extraordinary acquisitive prescription was not met because the
respondents had only 24 years of adverse possession, counted from 1974 until the filing of the
complaint in 1998.
[RTC] affirmed MCTC ruling with modification as to apportionment of subject property
  Parties are lawful co-owners of Lot 3483 and their shares shall be divided as follows:
1/3 – Tan
2/3 – Ramirez
 Respondents appealed from this ruling because they have already acquired the entire area of the
subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription
[CA] in favor of Roberto Ramirez
 Roberto is lawful owner of the entire area of the subject property.
o the October 5, 1977 Compromise Agreement executed by Belacho gave Roberto's possession
of the subject property the characters of possession in good faith and with just title;
o the respondents' 21 years of possession, from execution of the compromise agreement in 1977
until the filing of the case in 1998, is more than the required 10-year possession for ordinary
acquisitive prescription.
o Roberto also enjoyed just title because Belacho executed a contract of sale in his favor on
September 16, 1977
 Petitioner appealed from this ruling on the ground that:
o The parties merely entered into the compromise agreement to settle the case.
o Roberto entered the contract of sale in bad faith because the sale took place during the
pendency of Civil Case No. B-565
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ISSUES & HELD

1. Whether respondents had been possessors in good faith with just title and could acquire the subject
property through ordinary acquisitive prescription – NO
 Respondents: They are possessors in good faith and with just title because Roberto bought the subject
property from Belacho in a contract of sale dated September 16, 1977, and the compromise
agreement, executed on October 5, 1977, recognized Roberto's ownership of the subject property
 SC:
On Acquisitive Prescription
o Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property is
concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law namely that:
 The possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted,
and adverse
o Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary
 Ordinary – requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years.
 Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership
 There is "just title" when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right
 Extraordinary – requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need
of title or of good faith.
ICAB:
1. The Compromise agreement is not a valid basis of possession in good faith and with just title
through ordinary acquisitive prescription.
o Ramnani v. Court of Appeals - the main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to
litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it.
 o To avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto and Nicomedesa paid P1,800.00 in consideration of
Belacho's desistance from further pursuing her claim over two (2) parcels of land, including the
subject property. Thus, in executing the Compromise Agreement:
 no right can arise because the parties executed the same only to buy peace and to write
finis to the controversy;
 no ownership rights were created or transmitted over the subject property.
 the parties, in effect, merely reverted to their situation before Civil Case No. B-565 was
filed
2. The contract of sale cannot support claim of good faith and just title
o Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson – One who purchases real estate with
knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same
rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such
inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his
vendor.
o Good faith, or the want of it, can be ascertained only from the acts of the one claiming it, as
it is a condition of mind that can only be judged by actual or fancied token or signs
o Roberto, without Nicomedesa's knowledge or participation, bought the subject property during
the pendency of Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore, had actual knowledge that Belacho's
claim to ownership of the subject property, as Gavino's purported heir, was disputed because
he (Roberto) and Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No. B-565.
o Roberto even admitted that he bought the subject property from Belacho to "avoid any trouble."
He, thus, cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect or
dispute in the title of the vendor, Belacho.
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RULING: Petition granted (in favor of Petitioner Tan).

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated January
28, 2003 and the resolution dated June 19, 2003 of the former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.
R. SP No. 66120. The decision dated April 2, 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Hindang-Inopacan,
Leyte in Civil Case No. 196 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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NOTES

 Other issues
2. Whether RTC Decision should be reinstated – NO
SC: RTC Decision did not conform to the requirements of the Constitution and of the Rules of Court
o Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution & Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure:
A decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and
distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based.
o The RTC decision did not distinctly and clearly set forth, nor substantiate, the factual and legal
bases for its affirmance of the MCTC decision. It contained no analysis of the evidence of the
parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions.