31. Cuenca v CA, GR No.

109870, 1 December 1995

Doctrine: Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who
represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the
accused but to see that justice is done.

Facts:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for violation of the
"Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court, the petitioner filed on July
6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL" setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:

6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusable (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the
Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra;
and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why he was
unable to do so earlier.

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among other things, granted the substitution but denied the
motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9,
1994."

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994.

This time, the Court required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within
ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, the Solicitor General
himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that
a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which
may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability.

Issue/s: WON the Solicitor General was correct in recommending the motion for new trial be granted

Ruling:
Yes, the Sol-Gen was correct. Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca, the petitioner’s brother, is a declaration against his
own interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of
his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard
look by the Court.

The People is inclined to allow the petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his
brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the
People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to
see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
 Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to
see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern impartially is
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein,
published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.)

32. Ali v Bubong, AC No. 4018, 08 March 2005

Facts:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty
of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae
Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of the respondent.

The LRA, in an initial inquiry by the investigating officer Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the
charges brought against him.

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and then Secretary of Justice
Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of
documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT
No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against
Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon
recommended respondent's dismissal from service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos affirming the conclusion reached by Secretary
Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. The respondent subsequently
questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove
him from office.

The Court however denied the respondent’s petition.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, the complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of the respondent. The complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
"proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney" and that he poses a "serious
threat to the integrity of the legal profession."

Issue/s: WON the grave misconduct constitutes a ground for disbarment

Ruling:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar.
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of
the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.

33. Olazo v Tinga, AM No. 10-5-7-SC, 07 December 2010

Doctrine:
Facts:
This is a disbarment case filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged with violating Rule
6.02, Rule 6.03, and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig.

Violation of Rule 6.02

The complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of
his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that
the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of
the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent
brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez,
who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.

As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently
given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo,
the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct
Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s
promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose
of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed
that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated
that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. Thus, the approval
of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

Issue/s: WON the acts of the respondent constitute a violation of the aforementioned rules of the CPR;
WON or not the acts constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment

Ruling:
The petition is without merit. The Court finds the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent
abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner
defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March
1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending
before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo,
and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that
the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the
respondent’s elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.

There is no way the respondent could have influenced the denial of the sales application of the petitioner.

Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003, categorically stating that the
respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of
his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s
favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents
merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the
proclaimed areas) surveyed.

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.

34. Que v Revilla Jr., AC No. 7054, 04 December 2009

Doctrine:

Facts:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.

In a Decision dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law on
the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-
shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts;
maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.

This is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature. The Court also penalized him in
Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then
by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months.

In his plea, the respondent claimed that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the
practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, and has devoted himself in
the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, Commonwealth Avenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has
conducted regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has
participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court
to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose.

He further alleged that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now
become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and
undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the
practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay
Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

Issue/s: WON the respondent should be reinstated as a member of the bar.

Ruling:
No, although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by
his conduct prior to his disbarment, the Court is not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case, was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for
committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly
the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he
expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous
inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his
wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

35. PP v Maceda, GR No. 89591—96, 24 January 2000

Facts:
During Atty. Avelino Javellana’s hearing for petition for bail on September 14, 1989, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor John Turalba manifested that he was appearing only to reiterate the Señor State Prosecutor’s
motion for deferment of the scheduled hearings on Atty. Javellana’s motion for bail. Judge Maceda denied
the said motion. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba moved for reconsideration, claiming that his
position is subservient to that of the Senior State Prosecutor who is the duly designated principal
prosecutor and as a matter of conviction, he cannot proceed with the trial as well as with the subsequent
trials. Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration, and, again, directed the prosecution to
present its evidence.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba manifested that he was not participating in the proceedings and
begged to be allowed to leave the courtroom, which the respondent Judge refused. Nevertheless,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba walked out and, while walking towards the door, respondent
Judge ordered the Sheriff to arrest him. Judge Maceda issued an order finding Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Turalba in contempt of court; declaring the prosecution to have waived its right to present
evidence in opposition to private respondent’s petition for bail; and considering the said petition for bail
submitted for resolution. The respondent Judge imposed upon the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor the
penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment.

At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial
Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at the residence of
Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to
be held as detention prisoner in said residence. It was however found that the order was not strictly
complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about
his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Judge Maceda committed grave abuse of discretion when he insisted in
continuously hearing Atty. Javellana’s petition for bail and in ordering the arrest of APP Turalba
of contempt of court.

2. Whether or not the respondent may continue to practice his legal profession as a detention
prisoner.

Ruling:
1. Yes. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence,
a defiance of the court. While courts are inherently empowered to punish for contempt to the
end that they may enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and
insure the effectiveness of the administration of justice, nevertheless, such power should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, for the power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.

A perusal of the transcript of the hearing held on 14 September 1989 shows that Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba had not made any statement that could be considered as
“contumacious” or an affront to the dignity of the court. And, while the act of Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Turalba of “walking out” does not meet our approval — as he should have stayed after
the respondent Judge had denied his motion for permission to leave the courtroom — yet, the
respondent Judge, in ordering the incarceration of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba, acted
beyond the permissible limits of his power to punish for contempt.

A restraining order was issued on August 31, 1989 ordering Judge Maceda to cease and desist
from continuing the hearing of Atty. Javellana’s petition for bail until the motion for discharge of
Oscar Tianzon as state witness is resolved. When respondent Judge, therefore, denied the
prosecution’s motion for deferment of the scheduled hearings on private respondent’s petition
for bail and in proceeding to hear the said motion, by ordering the prosecution to present its
evidence — which precipitated the walk-out of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and his
consequent arrest and commitment to the Provincial Jail — he (respondent judge) was acting in
violation of the restraining order issued by this Court. Had the respondent Judge granted the
prosecution’s motion for deferment, this incident could have been avoided.

2. No. Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. As a detention prisoner
private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence
of his status as a detention prisoner.
 As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.

Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention.

36. Zeta v Malinao, AM No. P—220, 20 December 1978

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed against Felicisimo Malinao, a court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, by certain Julio Zeta charging him of illegally appearing in court; grave misconduct
in office inciting and instigating persons to grab land or coerce and tell them not to be afraid as he is a
court employee and has influence over judges; crime of falsification for tampering his daily time records
because even he has been out practicing in the court, he would fill his time record as present; and violation
of the Civil Service Law by engaging in private practice of profession without permission from the
Department Head.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of the respondent constitutes misconduct and result to his dismissal from service.

Ruling:

Yes. It is clear that respondent’s actions constitute grave misconduct and his defense that "his
participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, considering that in appearing as counsel
in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service
to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question.

The respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the
Court of First Instance, with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.

37. Tan, et al. v Balajadia, GR No. 169517, 14 March 2006

Facts:

This is an original petition for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao
Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia. Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent
filed a criminal case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of
authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking
fees by petitioners from respondent.

Respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-
207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted to
the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
Respondent avers that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that
the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Issue:
Whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer?

Ruling :
No. The respondent is not liable for indirect contempt.

SC ruled that records support respondent’s claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to
the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty. Aquino.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the
cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some
overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before court hearings as an
attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission
to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through
circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his
lack of intent to illegally practice law. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his
future actions.

38. Lijauco v Terrado, AC No. 6317, 31 August 2006

FACTS:
Sometime in January 2001, Luzviminda C. Lijauco engaged the services of Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for P
70,000 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank in the amount of P180,000 and
the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The said foreclosed house and lot
is the subject of a petition for the issuance of writ of possession then pending before the RTC of Binan
Laguna docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Ms. Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado failed to appear in the hearing for the issuance of Writ of Possession
and did not protect her interest in allowing her to participate in a Compromise Agreement in order to end
the LRC Case No. B-2610. She filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Terrado for gross misconduct,
malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

In his defense, Atty. Terrado claims that the P 70,000 legal fees he received is purely and solely for the
recovery of the P 180,000 savings account. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report finding Atty. Terrado guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS’ RECOMMENDATION:

An adoption of the investigating commissioner. WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for
aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that
he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely
dealt with.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors is proper?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The records show that Atty. Terrado acted as
complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between Ms. Lijauco and the bank
regarding LRC Case No. B-2610. He lured Ms. Lijauco to participate in a compromise agreement with a
false and misleading assurance that the latter can still recover her foreclosed property even after three
years from foreclosure. Atty. Terrado violated Rule1.01 Canon 1 of the CPR which says that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P 70,000 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit
amounting to P 180,000 is unreasonable and is violative of Canon 20 of the CPR. Atty. Terrada was also
found guilty of violating Rule 9.02 of the CPR by openly admitting that he divided the legal fees with two
other people as a referral fee.

WHEREFORE, He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and
STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to
RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco
and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

39. Plus Builders, Inc. v Revilla Jr., AC No. 7056, 13 September 2006

Nature: Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, finding
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court,
misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
Facts: On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in
favor of herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et
al., who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s
clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated
all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land.
Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to have committed intentional
falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through
the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last an action to quiet
title despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for
two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Respondent duly filed a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, appealing to the Court to take a second look
at his case and praying that the penalty of suspension of two years be reduced to mere reprimand or
admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients he was defending.
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he took were
not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were
based on his serious study, research and experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on
the facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in
this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to
listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what
the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. He avers that he merely exhausted all possible
remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the law, considering that his clients were
subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary eviction by the complainant. He
posits that he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective
of his own family, and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.p Anent the
issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, he humbly submits that
there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same or did he fail to dispute this, contrary to the
findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only
and not of the cooperative Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his office in this
cooperative, together with Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late Alfredo Caloico and
Marciano Villavert. He signed the retainer agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyer-
client relationship, and the complainants were fully aware of such arrangement.7
Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action he took in behalf
of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind consideration, pardon and forgiveness. He
reiterates that he does not deserve the penalty of two years’ suspension, considering that the complaint
fails to show him wanting in character, honesty, and probity; in fact, he has been a member of the bar for
more than 20 years, served as former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of IBP
Quezon City handling detention prisoners and pro bono cases, and is also a member of the Couples for
Christ, and has had strict training in the law school he graduated from and the law offices he worked with.
He is the sole breadwinner in the family with a wife who is jobless, four (4) children who are in school, a
mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support. The family’s only source of income is respondent’s
private practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be suspended. (YES)

Ruling:
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A
lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable
means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable
the latter’s cause to succeed.In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary,
it is apparent that the respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and
misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not
unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate.
The Supreme Court held that respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an
officer of the court. Lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of
the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. This is the
criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes. Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must have
realized with the sanction he received from this Court. However, the Court also knows how to show
compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of
mitigating factors. Thus, after a careful consideration of herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration
and humble acknowledgment of his misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of leniency
towards him. We find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law sufficient in this case

40. Pangan v Ramos, AC No. 1053, 7 September 1979

Dionisio Ramos filed a motion for postponement of an administrative case involving Santa Pangan. Pangan
then filed this motion to cite Ramos for contempt for allegedly deceiving the court in signing his name as
"Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos" even if what was registered in the Roll of Attorneys is "Dionisio D. Ramos."
For his part, Ramos claims that he uses the name Pedro D.D. Ramos because his registered name in his
birth certificate is "Pedro Dionisio Dayaw Ramos."

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should eb cited for contempt for using a name other than that registered in
the roll of attorneys

Held:
Yes. The Roll of Attorneys is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than that registered in the Roll
of Attorneys. In using the name "Pedro D.D. Ramos," respondent violated his oath stating that he will do
no falsehood.
As an officer of the court, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor, and frankness
which should characterize his or her conduct at all times. In resorting to falsehood, he demonstrated lack
of candor.