No. L-34395.

 May 19, 1981. *

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCKS DE LEGARDA, respondents.
Appeal; In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised.—In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised
under undisputed facts Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court
resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal, that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
Property; Succession; “Reserva Troncal” explained.—In reserva troncal, (1)
a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or
from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or
is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong
to the line from which the said property came.
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* SECOND DIVISION
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480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
 Same; Same; Same.—So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first
transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant
(causante de la reserva)in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmission of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the
reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother
or sister of the deceased descendant.
Same; Same; Same.—The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the
ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree
from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
Same; Same; The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property and
holds title subject to a resolutory condition.—The reservor has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that
such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.
Same; Same; The reservee has only an inchoate right. He cannot impugn a
conveyance made by the reservor.—On the other hand, the reservee has only an
inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor predecease
the reservee. The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor
but he can require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by
the purchaser.
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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
Same; Same; A reservee may sell his right but may not renounce it.—There is
a holding that the renunciation of the reservee’s right to the reservable property is
illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo,
58 Phil. 89, 96). And there is a dictum that the reservee’s right is a real right which
he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
Same; Same; Case at bar involve a reserva troncal.—In the instant case, the
properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty
when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Same; Same; All reservees are equally entitled to share in reserva troncal.—
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only
one reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise
true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no
reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived
of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

AQUINO, J.:

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of

First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition,
accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject
to reserva troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Roces
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The
facts are as follows: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito
Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by
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482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters
named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
 On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason
were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and
Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who
were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March
19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the
following:
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7
interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd.,
Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7
titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202,
48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
l/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of
Rizal, now Quezon City; l/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the
registry of deeds of Baguio;
l/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of
the Manila registry of deeds;
l/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael described in TCT Nos.
50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
l/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of
deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero);

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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of the registry of deeds of
Tayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited
from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro
and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
“A mis hijos.
“Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos, hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los
bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la
Destileria ‘La Rosario’ recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.
“De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un lote de terreno que yo he
donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit.
“La casa No. 181 San Rafael, la cedo a mi hijo Mandu, solo la casa; proque ella
esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Roces.
“(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
“6 Marzo 1953”

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and
her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the
one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De
la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878,
Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. The decree of
probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.
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484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the

testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory
of her mother’s estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda’s three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was
opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed
on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces and her mother’s estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren
to the ex elusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
Gonzales. In this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in
her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding
the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of
the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-
assignments of error contend that the lower court fired in not holding
that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena Legarda
in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her
husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs.
Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim
is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales’ petition for review is a closed matter. This
Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents’
motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
 In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts
the lower court resolved only the issue of
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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is

the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly
those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the
trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be
reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and
whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in her
will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she
inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third
degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that
inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the
six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of
first impression. It was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in
the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make
a brief discourse on the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal
familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five
briefs in descanting on the nature of reserva troncal, which together
with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code
Commission to prevent the decedent’s estate from being entailed, to
eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which
uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is
incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of
feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the
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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered

unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobeñas, has provoked questions and
doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads:
“ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este
hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se
halla obligado a reservar los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor
de los parientes que esten dentro del tercer grado y pertenezcan a la linea de donde
los bienes proceden.”
“ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
who belong to the line from which said property came.”
In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous
title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same
property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by
operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant
should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and
who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or
sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the
reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation,
and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
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reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the

relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging
to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobeñas. Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp.
198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus, where
one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son,
Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited
by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said
lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811
(Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant
by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to
the line (linea o tronco)from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.
 The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree
relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid “el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras”, or “impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas extrañas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en
ella” (6 Castan Tobenas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1980, p.
203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295. In that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from
his father Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902,
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single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from
him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the
paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register
the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land
was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they
survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906.
Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacieto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their
six children. It was held that the said one-half portion was reservable
property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should
be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and
maternal aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which
said onehalf portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac, 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva tronval are found in Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41
Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Halcita, 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs.
Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601, Riosa vs.
Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Velayo
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revoked by descent. He is called
the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190)
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordu inherited property from
her mother, Basilio Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her
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estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the property
was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled
to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was
her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be
within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104
Phil. 1065).
 Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donation and succession
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership
of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of
the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295: Lunsod
vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director
of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
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The reservor’s title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in
a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor’s alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor’s death,
there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the
reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the reservor’s death, the
transferee’s title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono vs. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
 On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased
the reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor predecease
the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor
but he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee’s right to the
reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee’s right is a real right which he
may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
“The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista’s lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed
to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.”
(J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
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“Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the

ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right
in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive (Ley
Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295).
 “This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that
the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may
not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
“The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista.” (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in
Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista’s death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, “automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property.” (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. 1, 5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of
her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as
reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second
degree, her three daughters and three sons.
As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa
juzgada.
492

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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to
her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties
did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees
inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She
could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be
given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was
ruled:
“Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant
(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants
as forced heir, forms no part of the latter’s lawful inheritance nor of the legitime,
for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving
the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its
delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest
(prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the
property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario” (reservee).
In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III. These two inherited pro-
493
 VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 493
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

perties from their father. Upon Apolonio III’s death in 1891, his
properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. In
her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her
properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife
Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his
first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share
in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III, which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II
and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff’s theory was that the said properties, as reservable
properties, could not be disposed of in Severina’s will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did
not form part of Severina’s estate and could not be inherited from her by
her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reservee,
to one-seventh of the properties. The other six-sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to
follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine
means that as long as during the reservor’s lifetime and upon his death
there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus, regardless of
whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whom
the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the common
descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would
be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of
the ruling in the Florentino case.
494

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are

not reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree
from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed
the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the
reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: “to prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein”.
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the
reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood
sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives
of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable
property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part
of the reservor’s estate nor of the daughter’s estate but should be given
to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the
third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable
property to only one reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers,
nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only
one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and
justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could
not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the
disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda’s six children as reservees within the second
degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must
495

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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27,

1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging
to the Legarda family, “except third-degree relatives who pertain to
both” the Legarda and Roces lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda’s death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are)
reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the
said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule
on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor’s holographic
will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda’s estate.
(Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision is reversed and set aside.
It is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces
Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits
and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and
Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
 SO ORDERED.
     Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
     Justice Concepcion Jr., is on leave. Justice Guerrero was
designated to sit in the Second Division.
Petition granted.
496

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Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

Notes.—The requisite conditions for tax purposes before a court may

issue an order of distribution of a decedent’s estate are: (1) when the
inheritance tax has been paid; (2) when sufficient bond is given to meet
the payment of the inheritance tax and all other obligations of the estate;
or (3) when the payment of the said tax and all other obligations has
been provided for. (Vera vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 408)
The cause of action of the reservee of a piece of property subject of
reserva troncal does not arise until the reservor dies (Chua vs. Court of
First Instance, 78 SCRA 412)
For purposes of reserva troncal there is gratuitous transfer when the
recipient does not give anything in return and it matters not that the
property is subject to prior charges, such as an order of the court
imposing the payment of a certain sum of money owned by the
deceased. (Chua vs. Court of First Instance, 78 SCRA 412)
Plaintiffs’ cession of rights in favor of the legatees and heirs named
in the will cut off whatever claims they may have had to the properties
of the estate for distribution (Corpus vs. Corpus, 7 SCRA 817)
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with
the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction
extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. (Abut vs. Abut, 45 SCRA 326)
Inability among the heirs to reach a novatory accord can not
invalidate the original compromise among them and any of the latter is
justified in finally seeking a court order for the approval and
enforcement of such compromise. (De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja, 46
SCRA 577)
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings it it had already been closed, and
not through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate
or intestate court already final and executed and reshuffle properties
long
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VOL. 104, MAY 25, 1981 497

People vs. Argel
ago distributed and disposed of. (Guilas vs. Judge of Court of First
Instance, 43 SCRA 111; Macias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251)
In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over
the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. (Sienes vs.
Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750).
When land is reservable property it is obligatory to reserve such
property for the benefit of the real heir. (Aglibot vs. Mañalac, 4 SCRA
1030)
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