Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without
proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill
may be established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the
offender before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and
number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.

The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on
September 27, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction
for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment
rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in
Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2

Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:

x x x On December 24, 1997, at about ten o’clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo
(hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay
Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman
(hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter
"Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did
to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and
told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest
for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went
down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo
suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and
chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left
portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo
stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride)
and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander.
Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40
minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he
was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the
Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical
examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the
zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest
which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line
measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the
thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the
thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove
the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the
victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and
could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn,
July 8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him,
on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was,
then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back,
causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a
fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit
Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.3

The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds

accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in
Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six
(6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant compensatory

damages in the amount of ₱14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged,
was not established; that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during the fist fight between them; that
he did not inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another person could have
inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on
Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The

September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6

Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide?

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and
appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under
Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of
the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight
between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the
fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only
inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to
have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries
because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as
homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to kill is the
main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently
shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the

offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned
by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of
the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.
People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent
to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location,
and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the
offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the
victim.10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present.
We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds
sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or
as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife
in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other
on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife
used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly
proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the
wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not
for the timely medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a
consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will,
i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found
guilty of frustrated homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial
and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed
that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to
support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling
application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable
credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself,
and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in
which the latter committed the crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the
petitioner’s mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by
the credible physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the
circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for frustrated
homicide. The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the
indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR
as MAXIMUM"12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite the CA concurring with the
trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an
indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum
term and a minimum term.13 The maximum term is the penalty properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending modifying
circumstances; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed.
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is
punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty
for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayor in its
medium period – from eight years and one day to 10 years – is proper. As can be
seen, the maximum of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC
and affirmed by the CA was not within the medium period of prision mayor.
Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of
₱14,170.35 as compensatory damages "representing the actual pecuniary loss
suffered by Alexander as he has duly proven." 15 We need to revise such civil
liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we emphatically declared to be "imperative
that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and
determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery." We
explained why in the following manner:

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if
it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused
in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3)
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to
act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their
omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the
final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at
any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs
that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established
facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for
only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to
the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be
alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases.
They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the
law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will
be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine
and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court
mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.17

Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the
offender committed violence that nearly took away the victim’s life. "Moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission."18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the
right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries.19 Towards that end, the
Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a
reasonable award of moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover
civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation
and proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner shall earn
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment by the accused. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS
the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00; moral
damages of ₱30,000.00; and compensatory damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest
of 6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Vice Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Special Order No. 1885
dated November 24, 2014.

1 Rollo, pp 74-79; penned by Associate Justice El vi John S. Asuncion, with the

concurrence of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this
Court) and Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon.

2 Id. at 29-35; penned by Presiding Judge Amalia F. Dy.

3 Id. at 75-76.

4 Id. at 35.

5 Id. at 79.

6 Id. at 90.

7 Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 322, 339.

8 Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 737; Rivera
v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196.

9 Rivera v. People, supra at 197, citing People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January
28, 2003, 396 SCRA 386, 400.

10 Serrano v. People, supra note 7, at 335-336.

11 Cabildo v. People, G.R. No. 189971, August 23, 2010, 628 SCRA 602, 609.

12 Supra note 3.

13 Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by

the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.

14 Article 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The

penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

15 Supra note 3.

16 G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229.

17 Id. at 239-240 (the bold underscoring is part of the original text).

18 Article 2217, Civil Code.

19 Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:

xxxx

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

xxxx

20 Nacario v. People, G.R. No. 173106, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 262, 268;
Angeles v. People, G.R. No. 172744, September 29, 2008, G.R. No. 172744, 567
SCRA 20, 30; Adame v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139830, November 21, 2002,
392 SCRA 305, 316.

21 Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181625, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 611, 626.