Received December 7, 2020, accepted December 14, 2020, date of publication December 16, 2020,

date of current version December 28, 2020.

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3045339

An Underground Mine Risk Identification Model

and Safety Management Method Based
on Explanation Graph-Probabilistic
Multi-Plan Analysis (EG-PMPA)
RUGAO GAO1,2,3 , (Member, IEEE), KEPING ZHOU1,3 , CHUN YANG 1,3 , AND KE ZHU1
1 School of Resources and Safety Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
2 Department of Mining and Materials Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 2A7, Canada
3 Research Center for Mining Engineering and Technology in Cold Regions, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China

Corresponding author: Chun Yang (chunyang@csu.edu.cn)

This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Project 51774323, and in part by the
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Central South University, China, under Grant 2018zzts216.

ABSTRACT In view of the problems of an imprecise safety system and the inefficient implementation
of responsibility in current underground mining, this study reveals the internal relationship of underground
mining safety management on the theoretical basis of process node management and probabilistic multi-plan
analysis (PMPA). By introducing a probabilistic multi-planning identification accident analysis algorithm,
a behavioural event planning library and a basic event explanation graph (EG) are constructed to determine
all possible behavioural explanation sets of the top event plan/goal. By defining the importance of the
explanation sets, the importance of the explanation set paths is sorted, and the important explanation set
achieved by the top event goal is found. Based on the validation, the EG accident analysis model proposed in
this paper is used to quantitatively analyse and rank the key risk factors in the modelling calculation of the risk
control case of stope blasting operations and to propose a risk factor management control implementation
plan, further verifying the feasibility of applying the explanation graph-probabilistic multi-plan analysis
(EG-PMPA) framework model in underground mining safety systems.

INDEX TERMS EG-PMPA, key risk factor, mining safety management, process node.

I. INTRODUCTION major resource development enterprises is large and complex,

In the construction of the national economy, mining is an and there are numerous potential hazards in the produc-
important raw material industry that provides a large amount tion process. At present, underground mining accidents still
of primary energy, industrial raw materials and agricultural occur frequently, causing many casualties and much loss of
means of production for economic development and daily property. Underground mining accidents usually take place
life [1]. Restricted by the overall slowdown of global eco- abruptly, with a wide range of influences and serious conse-
nomic growth, the demand for mineral resources in China quences [4], [5]. Underground mining is an accident-prone
and other developing countries is still at a high level in the area, the safety of which has always been the focus of
long run, and the mining industry will develop in a contin- safety management. According to figures released by the
uous and stable manner over a long period of time [2], [3]. National Bureau of Statistics on February 28, 2020, a total
However, the mining industry must be fully aware that the of 29,519 people died in various production safety acci-
situation of mining safety is still rather serious. Take China dents in 2019. There were 100,000 employees in industrial,
as an example: the underground mining production system of mining and commercial enterprises, among whom 1.474%
died in production safety accidents, a decrease of 4.7%
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and over the previous year, and 0.083% died in coal mines for
approving it for publication was Lorenzo Ciani . every million tons, a decrease of 10.8% [6]. Although the

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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death toll has been declining in recent years, accidents still II. RELATED WORK
frequently occur [7]. According to the analysis results of Over the years, many researchers have devoted themselves
accidents involving mining deaths, production safety acci- to the research and development of theories and models of
dents in underground mines mainly result from improper risk identification and safety management, and they have
operations by miners, unapproved materials and equipment, made some achievements [10]–[12]. Regarding risk identi-
and deficient safety management [8], [9]. In the work of fication, Yang [13] proposed a dynamic risk identification
mine safety production, there are mainly problems such model based on integrating the immune optimization algo-
as incomplete safety production legal systems, incomplete rithm (IOA) [13]. A dedicated human and organizational
safety management systems, insufficient safety investment, factor model of ship collision accidents between an assisted
low safety science and technology levels, a backward safety ship and an icebreaker was developed by Zhang et al. [14].
culture, and a lack of self-disciplinary mechanisms and Taofeeq et al. [15] employed a quantitative research design
self-management capabilities in large enterprises. The safety following the positivist research paradigm to determine the
status of an enterprise entirely depends on its safety man- factors influencing contractor risk attitudes. These methods
agement efficiency. Outdated and inappropriate safety man- are closely related to human factors. Currently, behaviour
agement models will affect the production of enterprises and analysis combined with human factors has been widely
cause serious harm to them. Although the key problems in applied in the field of national and social public secu-
underground mining safety production at this stage are well rity and decision-making evaluation. Traditional methods of
known and the safety management and standardization of behaviour analysis are mainly based on Markov or Bayesian
underground mines have been greatly improved, much work models or the direct study of human factors [16]–[19]. These
needs to be done to explore a more systematic, standardized, kinds of methods adopt a non-hierarchical programming rep-
and scientific risk analysis and operable safety management resentation, which can infer the intention and goal of an agent
mode. from different abstract levels. However, since the objectives at
In view of the problems faced by underground mining different levels all need to be identified, there are deficiencies
enterprises, namely, the bottleneck in safety management in the in-depth analysis of behaviour and the explanation
theory development, the lack of a systematic standardized of the results, greatly increasing the workload of the iden-
process, and the deficient implementation of safety man- tification task [20], [21]. The main purpose of behaviour
agement, this study proposes an accident analysis method analysis is to identify goal-oriented planning, and a method of
based on explanation graph-probabilistic multi-plan analysis behavioural intention analysis based on planning knowledge
(EG-PMPA) by introducing the theoretical basis of process can better solve the problem [22].
node management and probability risk identification and The idea of process management with regard to safety
combining the advantages of multi-planning identification management combined with risk assessment was first pro-
in the multi-objective, procedural and interpretive aspects of posed by scholars in the early 20th century. This approach
behaviour analysis. Through the construction of a behaviour includes Gantt charts, network planning technology, mate-
event planning library and a basic event explanation dia- rial requirement planning, enterprise resource planning and
gram, all possible behaviour explanation sets for top event business process reconstruction [23]. In recent years, process
planning or objectives are determined, and the degree of management has become not only an important management
importance of the explanation set paths is sorted by defining means in the field of business management but also the
the degree of importance of the explanation sets to realize theoretical basis for all walks of life to explore more advanced
the risk identification functions of process and node objects management modes [24]–[27]. Currently, researchers have
and the sequence of accidents. Combined with the identifi- proposed a variety of process management methods that can
cation results of the process node risk factors in the case, help to find the key process nodes, and such methods have
the EG accident analysis model is adopted to quantitatively been applied in some enterprises. In China, compared with
analyse and rank the key risk factors, based on which a the safety standardization management mode implemented
refined risk factor management and control scheme is con- by underground mining enterprises, the process management
structed. The method proposed by this study can obtain process is more rigorous and reliable, facilitating the imple-
a reasonable explanation of the top-level accident cause mentation of standardization in all aspects of safety produc-
by calculating the event logic relationship and the proba- tion. In the current stage, process node management has a
bility of occurrence, and it can classify the basic events certain theoretical basis in the field of safety, but research
that require multi-objective control. By emphasizing the on and the application of the management system formed
proceduralization of safety management and whole-process by the combination of process nodes and risk management
management, the method facilitates the meticulous discov- do not frequently occur. Moreover, much of the practice
ery of various accident hazards and problems as well as of process node theory in mining enterprises is still in the
the clear identification of the accident link. Additionally, framework and guidance stage. More research and prac-
the research results can be effectively applied in engineering tice in the field of system safety and risk assessment are
practice. needed.

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TABLE 1. Description of basic process types.

III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

A. UNDERGROUND MINING RISK IDENTIFICATION BASED
ON A PROCESS NODE
Due to the differences in risk characteristics, safety pro-
duction conditions, organizational settings, management
levels, etc., the process node management system for dif-
ferent underground mining enterprises will also be different,
but in general, the scope of hazard identification is simi-
lar to the range of risk assessment. Therefore, this paper
takes the more common function management system, pro-
duction system and operation system as the basis to make
the constructed model more applicable. Moreover, com-
bined with the basis of identifying hazardous and harm-
ful factors in underground mines, some process nodes are
endowed with risk attributes to realize safe production and
operation [28]. The process can be classified based on the
hierarchy of family, group, composite, base and process
FIGURE 1. Process node hierarchy diagram.
nodes, which is suitable for a process system with a large
production system, a complex management level and spe-
cial business requirements. The basic process is described In the cross-functional process chart, process nodes at
in Table 1. different levels can be divided into the start node, interface
A cross-department process group can be constructed node, process node, judgement node and end node based on
for an underground mining production system under com- the needs of process operations and the role of process nodes
plex conditions such as the safety management of the roof, in the process. The definitions and characteristics of each type
the management of the shaft and the mining shaft, the man- are shown in Fig. 2.
agement of the blasting equipment and its safety, ground Safety principles are highly applicable and inter-
pressure monitoring and prevention, the safety management disciplinary. However, practical applications have shown that
of the power supply and consumption, underground ven- only if process management is combined with safety or
tilation and dust control management, filling management, risk management (i.e., the use of the process node model
and underground transportation management [29]. Based to achieve effective risk prevention and control) will safety
on the process factors, each process group can be further management be effectively implemented. The principle of
sub-divided into organized compound processes. In other safety control based on the process node can be summarized
words, the department processes (production processes) can as follows: (1) the realization of safety management based
then be divided into multiple organized basic processes, that on function process construction; (2) the realization of safety
is, operation team processes or production personnel pro- control based on the property of the process node; (3) the
cesses. Finally, the basic processes can be broken down into realization of risk control based on the identification of key
process nodes, that is, the minimum risk factor identification processes; and (4) a linkage mechanism for multi-level and
and management unit. The process node hierarchy diagram is multi-cycle effects. The operational relationship is shown
shown in Fig. 1. in Fig. 3.

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FIGURE 2. Types and functions of process nodes.

FIGURE 3. Safety control principle based on process.

The models of processes at different management levels, classified as position, resource, environmental and internal
such as composite processes, basic processes and process risks [31]. The concept of process management and refine-
nodes, can be constructed by a cross-functional process chart. ment is embodied in the process of risk factor identification
Each process level generally includes four basic process and classification. Considering the requirements of process
elements, namely, the start, processing, judgement and end. node management in this study, the framework of relation-
The general process node and judgement node feature four ships in underground mining safety process management is
attributes, namely, basic, composition, function and value established, as shown in Fig. 4.
attributes. The basic properties of the process nodes are
shown in Table 2. B. EXPLANATION GRAPH THEORY OF PROBABILISTIC
Based on the different functional requirements of process PROGRAMMING
operations, the functional attributes of process nodes can be The planning identification method shows great advantages
further developed at different levels. The risk attribute is a key in predicting whether human or organizational behaviours
point of the process security control principle as well as an are involved. Traditional organizational planning usually
important combination point of risk analysis and evaluation assumes that intelligent agents such as humans or organiza-
in the process [30]. By combining the concept of process tions carry out only a single plan each time. However, in a
management and the classification of dangerous and harmful complex actual environment, the behaviour of individuals
factors in site safety management, the node risk attributes are or organizations is changeable, and it is likely that they

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TABLE 2. Classification of the basic attributes of process nodes.

will implement multiple plans at the same time [32], [33]. library is a collection of hierarchical partial-order plans. The
Multi-planning identification can deal with the problems basic behaviour in the planning structure corresponds to AND
posed by situations in which an individual or an organi- node ‘‘ ’’ or OR node ‘‘ ∧’’. At the AND node, each
^
zation implements one or more objective plans. Although child node is decomposed from the parent node with the
multi-objective and multi-programming reasoning has obvi- reunification probability, while at the OR node, the sum of
ous advantages, it is much more difficult to realize from the the reunification probabilities of all child nodes equals 1.
perspective of computational complexity. Then, an EG is constructed based on the given planning
The planning library is a collection of hierarchical partial- library, as shown in Fig. 7, which is a directed weighted
order programs in which each program is composed of graph. Each node in the graph represents a concrete or
abstract or basic behaviours in the form of a tree structure. abstract behaviour. The edges and directions between nodes
An abstract behaviour corresponds to an AND node (only represent decomposition or materialization relationships, and
one decomposition method) or an OR node (multiple decom- the probability on the edges represents the decomposition
position methods) [34]. Each observation may be a basic probability or materialization probability. The constructed
behaviour or state. The EG construction process is based graph is called the EG of observation quantity O, which con-
on the planning library, which generally takes the form of a tains all possible explanations corresponding to the observed
directed weighted graph. Each node in the graph represents a behaviour.
specific or abstract behaviour. When given a set of behaviour After the planning library is given, the observation
observations and a behaviour planning library, the original set is assumed to be O1:Fi = {O1 , CO2 , C · ··, COn ,
EG is first initialized as an empty set. By adding each and the probabilistic computing of explanations is Ej .
observed behaviour to the EG and searching the behaviour Thus, the conditional probability calculation formula is as
in the planning library, its parent node is found and then follows [37]:
added to the EG [35], [36]. The parent nodes of all observed
P Ej | O1:i = P Ej , CO1:i P (O1:i )



behaviours are extended, and during this process, the repeated
= P O1:i | Ej P(Ej ) P (O1:i )


nodes are merged. The new EG node continues to expand its (1)
parent node until a new node cannot be found. An auxiliary
1 P (O1:i ) is a constant for each EG, and P O1:i | Ej is the


node ‘‘dummy’’ is added to the top of the EG to connect
all top goals. The values of each connected edge represent occurrence probability of O1:i when Ej is given an explanation
the prior probability of the top goals. Hence, an EG is con- the value of which is fixed to 1. P(Ej ) is the prior probability,
structed based on the above method containing all possible that is, the original probability of EG in the tree structure.
explanations for the implementation of the goal planning of Assuming that the top goal is G1:m = {G1 , G2 , . . ., Gm }
the observed behaviour, which can be expressed in the form and the sub-goal is SG1:n = {SG1 , SG2 , . . ., SGn }, the node
shown in Fig. 5. set of Ej can be defined as V= dummy ∪ G1:m ∪SG1:n ∪O1:i .
The EG-based multi-program reasoning method is a E = {e1 = dummy → G1, CG2, C · ··, Ces = SGx →
method that combines probability theory with graph the- SGy , C · ··, Cet = SGz → Oi } is the edge set of Ej , and 1 ≤
ory. Given behavioural observations O and the hierarchical x, Cy, Cz ≤ n, C1 ≤ s ≤ t. Assuming that the decomposition
planning library, as shown in Fig. 6, a hierarchical planning of each behaviour is directly affected by the parent node,

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FIGURE 4. General diagram of underground mine safety process management.

the prior probability of explanation Ej is as follows: In the formula, given (V /Oi , CE/et ), P Oi , Cet
| V /Oi , CE/et is the probability after breaking down


P Ej = P(V , E)


the rule, et . Based on
the decomposition hypothesis,
= P Oi , Cet | V /Oi , CE/et ·P(iV /Oi , CE/et ) P Oi , Cet | V /Oi , CE/et = P(et = SGZ → Oi ). P (edge)

= Pet ·P(V /Oi , CE/et ) is the probability of the middle edge, and P(dummy) is the
Y a priori probability of organizational goal pursuit, which is
= P(dummy) · P (edge) (2) constant for every explanation.
edge∈E

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FIGURE 5. Example of the general form of an EG.

FIGURE 6. Behaviour planning library.

FIGURE 7. Model of the EG.

The method of finding the optimal explanation can be

expressed as follows: of edgei , since 0 < P(edgei ) < 1, we can conclude that
ln(P(1/edgei )) > 0.
Emax = arg max P O1:i | Ej P(Ej ) P (O1:i )


Ej ∈E ln(1/P(e)) is weighted for each line of the EG, and P(e) is
Y
the probability of line e. Then, the whole EG is transformed
= arg max P edgei into a weighted digraph. The issue of finding the best expla-
Ej ∈E
edgei ∈Ej
X nation is redefined as finding the minimum weight tree in the
= arg max ln(P(edgei )) EG. The fixed point of the tree is the ‘‘dummy’’ node, and the
Ej ∈E
edgei ∈Ej leaf node is the observation quantity.
X 1
= arg min ln(P( )) (3) IV. CASE STUDY
Ej ∈E edgei ∈Ej edgei
The previous theoretical derivation suggests that probabilistic
In the formula, P(edgei ) is the decomposition probability programming identification is feasible for accident behaviour
connected by edgei . Defining ln(P(1/edgei )) as the weight analysis. Taking an underground mine electric locomotive

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FIGURE 8. Behaviour planning database of an electric locomotive collision accident.

FIGURE 9. EG of observations of A1 , A2 , A3 , . . ., A14.

collision accident as an example, the construction steps and G1 , G2 and SG6 correspond to AND nodes, and the proba-
demonstration process of the accident analysis model are bility of the edge between each node is the materialization
illustrated. probability of each basic event or sub-goal. SG1 , SG2 , SG3 ,
SG4 , SG5 and SG7 correspond to OR nodes of the planning
A. EG-BASED PROBABILISTIC PROGRAMMING ACCIDENT structure. If the behaviour is observed at the SG1 node, it may
ANALYSIS MODEL execute ‘‘sleep on the track’’ with a certain probability, ‘‘rush
First, accident behaviour should be identified; that is, all to the road with the locomotive’’, ‘‘illegal proposal’’, or ‘‘slip
relevant accident behaviours that may lead to top accidents of the locomotive’’. The probability sum of the four observa-
should be identified. Then, an accident behaviour planning tions is supposed to be one.
database should be established, as shown in Fig. 8. The The EG is constructed based on the given behaviour obser-
nine partial-order plans in the figure include all the basic vation set O and PL. For each behaviour observation Ai (i =
behaviours (or states) that lead to top accidents. To prevent the 1, 2, 3, . . ., 14), A1 is first added to the EG. There is a search
occurrence of top accidents, it is necessary to prevent the real- for the behaviour in the behaviour planning library to find its
ization of G1 and G2 . Observation behaviour set O is defined parent node and add it to the EG. The structural relationship
as O = {A1 , A2 , A3 , . . ., A14 }. In the planning structure, at the node should be consistent with the planning library.

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TABLE 3. Occurrence probability of an event based on observation quantities.

TABLE 4. Edge probability and weight value of the EG.

Then, other observation behaviours are added in turn, and its AND node, the probability of each connecting edge is its
parent node is expanded in the same way until all observation materialization probability. At the OR node, the materializa-
behaviours are expanded. Repeated nodes in the expansion tion probability of each edge is first calculated, and then,
process are merged until no new nodes are added. Finally, ver- the sum of the probability of each connecting edge equals
tex G is added to the top of the EG to connect to the two goals 1 through normalization processing. For nodes that mix AND
G1 and G2 ; thus, the construction of the EG is completed, and OR (such as the SG3 node), normalization is carried out
as shown in Fig. 9. The EG contains all possible explanation on the basis of satisfying the logical calculation relationship,
paths corresponding to the behavioural observations. Signs such as the logical relationship of the SG3 node: P14 + P15 +
such as e1 , e2 , . . ., and e20 are the numbers connecting the P16 × P17 = 1. The decomposition probability of each edge
edges of each adjacent node. is determined.
The best explanation path leading to the top goal can be Based on the above rules, the probability of each directed
found through the EG. Equation (3) shows that each edge in edge in the EG, P(ei ), and the weight value of the correspond-
the EG needs to be weighted by ln(1/P(e)). Based on to the ing edge, wi , can be calculated. wi = ln(1/P(ei )), and the
statistics of the accident probability data, the probabilities of results are shown in Table 4.
event occurrence corresponding to the behaviour observation The value of wi represents the magnitude of the value,
quantities A1 , A2 , A3 , . . ., A14 are shown in Table 3 [38]. indicating the importance of the occurrence probability of
Based on Table 3, the materialization probability P1 , P2 , the child node (basic behaviour or sub-goal) connected to the
. . ., P20 of each node edge in the EG can be calculated. At the directed edge to the occurrence probability of the parent node

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(sub-goal or top goal). The greater the value of wi , the less Therefore, the order of the magnitude values of the expla-
important the corresponding child node is to the parent node, nation set is as follows:
and vice versa. W(SE1 ) < W(SE5 ) < W(SE3 ) < W(SE4 ) < W(SE2 ) <
The EG is a tree structure with 21 nodes, 20 edges, 14 W(SE14 ) < W(SE6 ) = W(SE7 ) < W(SE8 ) = W(SE9 ) <
behaviour observations, 4 sub-goals and 2 top goals to be W(SE12 ) = W(SE13 ) < W(SE11 ) < W(SE10 )
controlled. Concerning the tree-structured EG, the total num- The distribution table of the magnitude values of the expla-
ber of SEi in the explanation set is the total number of basic nation sets is shown in Table 5. The smaller the value is,
behaviour observations. The corresponding explanation sets the greater the magnitude, and the greater the possibility of
of behaviour observations A1 , A2 , A3 , . . ., A14 are as follows: an accident. Consequently, the basic event behaviour within
the small value interval should be proactively prevented and
SE 1 = {G1 , A1 SE}2 = {G1 , SG1 , A2 } controlled.
SE 3 = {G1 , SG1 , A3 SE}4 = {G1 , SG1 , A4 }
SE 5 = {G1 , SG1 , A5 SE}6 = {G2 , SG2 , A6 } B. DEMONSTRATION OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE MODEL
SE 7 = {G2 , SG2 , A7 SE}8 = {G2 , SG3 , A8 } FAT analysis is a common method in accident safety assess-
ment. In the quantitative analysis of FAT, the critical impor-
SE 9 = {G2 , SG3 , A9 SE}10 = {G2 , SG3 , A10 } tance coefficient is often used. This coefficient refers to the
SE 11 = {G2 , SG3 , A11 SE}12 = {G2 , SG4 , A12 } ratio of the relative change rate of the occurrence probability
SE 13 = {G2 , SG4 , A13 SE}14 = {G2 , SG4 , A14 } of a basic event to the change rate of the occurrence proba-
bility of the top event, also known as the ‘‘risk importance
The explanation set is a behaviour sequence from top goal factor’’ [39], [40]. FAT analysis is used to quantitatively
G1 or G2 to behaviour observation Ai , representing the real- analyse the accident of the underground electric locomotive
ization path of top events when basic events occur. It is also colliding with people, and its probability of a top event of the
an accident chain cutting path for accident prevention and ‘‘AND gate’’ is as follows:
control. Since each basic behaviour in this paper corresponds Yn
to only one goal or sub-goal, the form of the explanation P= qi (5)
i=1
set is relatively simple. If the behaviour observation quantity
corresponds to multiple goals or sub-goals at the same time, The probability of the top event of the ‘‘OR gate’’ is as
the calculation and expression methods of the explanation set follows:
Yn
are similar. To define the importance of the explanation set, P=1− (1 − qi ) (6)
which represents the importance of the explanation set to the i=1
top objectives, the calculation formula is as follows: qi is the occurrence probability of the ith basic event.
X The minimum cut set method is used to calculate the prob-
W (SE i ) = wi (4)
edgei ∈Ej ability of the top event, and it can be expressed as follows:
In the formula, W (SE i ) is the magnitude of the explanation k Y
X X Y
sets; wi is the weight value of each directed edge of the Q= qi − qi
xi ∈kj xi ∈kj ∪ks
explanation path of observation Ai . j=1 1≤j≤s≤k
The value of W (SE i ) itself has no specific meaning to the Yk
+ . . . + (−1)k−1 j = 1 qi (7)
EG, but its value can directly represent the influence of the
basic behaviour observation quantity on the top goal in the xi ∈ kj
explanation path to find the optimal explanation set of obser- In the formula, i is the ordinal number of the basic
vation behaviours in the EG. The smaller the value of W (SE i ) event;xi ∈ kj is the ith of the basic event belonging to the
is, the greater the influence of the basic observation quantity jth minimum cut set;j and s are the ordinal numbers of the
Ai on the top goal, which is supposed to be highly controlled, minimum cut set; k is the number of the minimum cut set;
and vice versa. According to equation (4), the magnitude of xi ∈ kj ∪ ks is the ith basic event xi belonging to the jth
explanation sets SE1 , SE2 , . . ., SE14 is calculated and sorted minimum cut set; and 1 ≤ j ≤ s ≤ k is the value range
based on the value, as shown below: of j and s.
The probability importance of basic events is expressed
W (SE 1 ) = 0.73233 W (SE 2 ) = 3.69579
by the probability importance coefficient. In general, it is
W (SE 3 ) = 2.62129 W (SE 4 ) = 3.00279 easier to reduce the probability of basic events with a high
W (SE 5 ) = 1.64809 W (SE 6 ) = 9.5711 probability than to reduce the probability of basic events
W (SE 7 ) = 9.5711 W (SE 8 ) = 9.5722 with a low probability. However, the probability importance
coefficient fails to reflect this fact. Therefore, it is necessary
W (SE 9 ) = 9.5722 W (SE 10 ) = 10.9996
to adopt the ratio of the relative change rate to measure the
W (SE 11 ) = 10.3065 W (SE 12 ) = 9.5962 importance of each basic event, that is, the ratio of the change
W (SE 13 ) = 9.5962 W (SE 14 ) = 8.5217 rate of the occurrence probability of the basic event to that of

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TABLE 5. Distribution table of the magnitude value of the explanation sets.

the top event, to determine the importance of each basic event, EG algorithm focus more on the path of the accident, that
known as the critical importance coefficient: is, the sequence of accident behaviours, to clearly locate the
∂lnQ qi cause section in the accident cause chain. The advantage of
Ie (i) = or Ie (i) = IP(i) (8) the EG algorithm is particularly obvious for situations in
∂lnqi Q
which a certain behaviour observation (or sub-goal) achieves
The critical importance of the event is calculated as multiple sub-goals (or goals) at the same time. The best
follows: explanation path can be found to determine which path of the
behaviour observation (or sub-goal) has a greater impact on
Ie (1) = 0.854 Ie (2) = 0.073
the sub-goals (or goals) and must thus be strictly controlled.
Ie (3) = 0.213 Ie (4) = 0.145 By sorting and demonstrating the importance of the expla-
Ie (5) = 0.563 Ie (6) = Ie (7) = 0.003 nation set, the following results are obtained:
Ie (8) = Ie (9) = Ie (10) = Ie (11) = 0.001 1) Explanation set SE1 is the most important to the top
Ie (12) = Ie (13) = 0.0012 Ie (14) = 0.035 events, and basic event A1 on this explanation path
should be given the greatest attention, followed by A5 ,
Therefore, the order of critical importance is as follows: A3 , A4 , . . ., while SE11 , SE10 , etc. are less important to
Ie (1) > Ie (5) > Ie (3) > Ie (4) > Ie (2) > Ie (14) > Ie (6) the top events, and their corresponding basic events and
paths can be placed in a secondary position.
= Ie (7) > Ie (12) = Ie (13) > Ie (8) = Ie (9)
2) The value of W (SE i ) suggests that the importance
= Ie (10) = Ie (11) value of each explanation set on the branch of top goal
G1 is significantly less than that of each explanation
By comparing the weight value ranking and critical impor-
set on the branch of top goal G2 , and there are obvious
tance coefficient ranking of the explanation set, the calcu-
intervals. Therefore, in accident prevention and control,
lation results of the two methods are found to be basically
more attention should be paid to the basic events on the
the same. However, there is no particularity or pertinence in
branch road where G1 is located.
the selection of planning library events and the selection of
3) To prevent the realization of top goal G, that is, to effec-
basic event probability values in this study. Consequently,
tively control the occurrence of human accidents in
the importance ranking of the explanation set obtained by
underground electric locomotive collision accidents,
the EG algorithm is credible, and it is feasible to apply the
it is necessary to prevent the realization of G1 and G2 at
EG algorithm based on multi-programming recognition of
the same time. Therefore, the basic events on the path
accident behaviour analysis.
of these two objectives can be classified in a simple
Compared with probability importance coefficient Ie (i),
manner so that accident prevention can be focused on.
the importance of the explanation set W (SE i ) obtained via
More attention should be paid to controlling the basic
the EG algorithm has obvious advantages, effectively dealing
events with smaller structure importance values on the
with situations in which the probability importance coeffi-
two branches, such as A1 , A5 , and A3 on the G1 branch
cients of several basic events are equal. The number of basic
and A14 , A6 , and A7 on the G2 branch.
events selected in this paper is relatively small, the planning
library and EG structure are relatively simple, and there are The EG calculation method based on probabilistic multi-
a few cases in which the ranking of the importance of the programming theory is based on the hierarchical program-
explanation set cannot be conducted. For example, the occur- ming library and observation set. The algorithm starts from
rence probabilities of basic events A6 and A7 are both 0.028, the observation quantity and extends the EG from bottom
and the directed logical relationship of the two events to the to top until vertex G is expanded. The explanation set and
top goal consists of passing through the OR node and then the importance of the explanation set of all behaviour obser-
the AND node at the same time. In addition, compared to vations are obtained by calculation. For accident behaviour
the quantitative analysis method of FAT, the results of the analysis with a large number of basic events, the complex

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TABLE 6. Risk factor analysis table of blind shot inspection and analysis.

logical structure of behaviour planning and the heavy identification shows obvious advantages in multi-objective
workload of EG construction, especially the analysis and process explanations of risk identification [41]. The blast-
of complex actors with multiple behaviour observations ing operation process was selected as the research object,
(or sub-objectives) corresponding to multiple sub-objectives the process node diagram was constructed, and qualitative
(or objectives), can be solved layer by layer, refined safety description of the node risk attribute was performed. The
management. process node factors were quantitatively sorted by using the
behaviour planning identification method, and the key risk
C. APPLICATION OF NODE RISK MANAGEMENT AND factors were identified. Finally, the risk control mode of the
CONTROL BASED ON THE EG-PMPA MODEL blasting operation process was constructed. The construc-
Compared with traditional risk analysis methods such as tion of the blasting work process adopts the operation flow
event tree analysis, operation condition analysis and fish bone and node diagram. First, detailed operation activity analy-
diagrams, the accident analysis model of behaviour planning sis is conducted, and the main type of worker in blasting

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TABLE 7. Probability and weight value of each edge of the EG.

operations is determined to be the blasting technician, who TABLE 8. Weight value of the risk factors of the EG.
is taken as the main construction object of the flow chart.
Other types of workers include the project leader, blasting
design reviewer, the blasting team leader, the rock driller
and the safety inspector. Based on the main operation activi-
ties of blasting technicians and participants, a node diagram
of the blasting operation process can be drawn, as shown
in Fig. 10.
The node diagram includes 33 process nodes, 4 types of
nodes, 15 major nodes, and 12 interface nodes, and it involves
6 functional positions. Each process node in the base process
has its own number and function. The process node diagram
is the basis of qualitative and quantitative risk analysis in the
follow-up.
It is true that it is important to recognize blind shots and to
deal with them properly. However, it is also necessary to anal-
yse their causes so that corresponding measures can be taken 2) Strictly control the quality and inspection of blast-
to reduce the probability of similar accidents. Combining the ing materials, and prohibit unapproved products from
definition of the risk attribute description of the process node entering the warehouse or operation site;
mentioned above, the risk factor identification process of the 3) Use new wires in the electric blasting network as far
node ‘‘inspection and analysis of blind shots D20’’ is selected as possible to ensure that the detonator has sufficient
here, as shown in Table 6. electric energy. The same blasting network must adopt
The identification of risk factors in the table shows that the electric detonators from the same factory, from the
main causes of blind shots are ‘‘position risk’’ and ‘‘resource same batch and of the same model;
risk’’, that is, the technical skills and operation status of the 4) Fully clean sundries around the blasthole before
staff, as well as the risk of the blasting explosive device charging to prevent blasthole blocking or grain
itself and the usage risk. Based on the qualitative analysis isolation;
in Table 6, the following measures to avoid blind shots can 5) Ensure that the charging force is appropriate, and
be taken. strictly follow the designed charge density;
1) Strengthen the education and training of designers and 6) Ensure the appropriate tightness of the network con-
constructors, and strictly comply with the design and nection. If it is too tight, it is easy to break, which will
construction specifications; lead to detonation failure.

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FIGURE 10. Node diagram for the blasting work flow.

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FIGURE 11. Behaviour planning of inspection and analysis of blind shots.

FIGURE 12. EG of risk factors A1, A2, A3, . . ., A15.

Apparently, the safety precautions obtained through a quali- Then, it is transformed into the EG, as shown in Fig. 12.
tative description of risk are too general and intuitive, which Table 7 shows the corresponding probability statistics of
is the case in the traditional safety management process. the event occurrence corresponding to behavioural risk fac-
In the implementation of safety standardization, the effec- tors A1 , A2 , A3 , . . ., A15 .
tiveness of safety precautions should be judged scientifically. Based on the calculation rules of different node types of the
Therefore, the risk factors in the sub-process set of the node EG, the weight value wi of each directional edge in the EG is
‘‘inspection and analysis of blind shots D20’’ should be calculated, as shown in Table 8.
quantitatively described. Taking the sub-process set of the The following is the corresponding explanation set SEi of
node ‘‘inspection and analysis of blind shots D20’’ {whether behaviour observations A1 , A2 , A3 , . . ., A15 :
the initiation network is in good condition, whether the det- SE1={G1, A1} SE2={G1, A2} SE3={G1, A3}
onator is in good condition, whether the detonating charge SE4={G1, A4};
is effective, whether the explosive is effective, whether the SE5={G2, A5} SE6={G2, A6};
charge structure is reasonable} as the goal behaviour of the SE7={G3, A7} SE8={G3, A8} SE9={G3, A9};
EG, the behaviour planning library is constructed, as shown SE10={G4, A10} SE11={G4, A11} SE12={G4, A12};
in Fig. 11. SE13={G5, A13} SE14={G5, A14} SE15={G5, A15};

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TABLE 9. Interval distribution table of the explanation sets.

TABLE 10. Identification and analysis of the key risk factors of blind shots.

Based on equation (4), the importance of the explanation explanation set is, the greater the importance of the explana-
sets SE1 , SE2 , . . ., SE15 is calculated and sorted based on the tion path to the top behaviour. That is, the order of importance
value, and the order is as follows: of the explanation path can be expressed as in Table 9.
W(SE3 ) < W(SE7 ) < W(SE4 ) < W(SE9 ) < W(SE5 ) < Based on the order of the importance value of the explana-
W(SE11 ) < W(SE1 ) = W(SE8 ) < W(SE12 ) < W(SE6 ) < tion set, the key risk factors leading to blind shots and their
W(SE13 ) < W(SE2 ) < W(SE10 ) = W(SE14 ) = W(SE15 ) ranking can be determined, as shown in Table 10.
Based on the definition of the importance of the expla- Based on the results of the risk factor identification and the
nation set, the smaller the value of the importance of the key node identification of the node ‘‘inspection and analysis

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TABLE 11. Detailed implementation table of blind shot risk control.

of blind shots’’ in blasting operations as well as the basic blasting operation process, the operation process node con-
theory of site management refinement, the daily safety con- tains 15 main process nodes, and each node has several risk
trol project is refined, and the person responsible for each factors and key risk factors to form the controlling object
functional position takes risk clearing measures based on the system of the key risk factors in the whole flow chart and
key risks of the project. The detailed implementation table to conduct management based on the corresponding person
of blind shot risk control is shown in Table 11. Risk clearing responsible for each risk factor.
measures must rely on strict rules and regulations. In summary, to refine site safety, first, ‘‘top-down’’ process
Risk factor identification and quantitative sequencing are decomposition and function division should be conducted.
conducted in the ‘‘blind shot operation’’ process. In the whole That is, the object of refined implementation is the risk factors

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and key risk factors at the end of the process. Second, quanti- facilitating the identification of numerous hidden risks
tative analysis of the node risk should be realized. For refined and problems and clearly positioning the accidental
safety management, the technique consists of implementing sections. The refined management framework of pro-
the safety management system via clear responsibility in the cess node safety provides a theoretical basis for the
process and improving the risk clearing measure plan by further realization of systematic and scientific infor-
conducting ‘‘bottom-up’’ quantitative analysis of the node mation management in underground mines. Risk data
risk. Finally, the implementation of refined control is realized. are the basis of model analysis. With the support of a
The goal of refined implementation is to implement safety big data cloud management platform, the application
responsibility, safety measures, daily safety supervision, etc. of risk analysis combining artificial intelligence algo-
and to continuously implement the accident accountability rithms and EG-PMPA to future research and practice
system. will help achieve efficient safety management.
V. CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
To address the shortcomings of traditional accident analysis
Chun Yang wishes to convey his gratitude for the financial
methods in the quantitative calculation and analysis of unsafe
support of the China Scholarship Council.
behaviours, this paper proposes an EG-based probabilistic
multi-programming reasoning accident analysis method. This
DATA AVAILABILITY
method can provide a reasonable explanation for the top acci-
All data in this paper are available from the corresponding
dent causes by calculating the event logical relationship and
author upon reasonable request.
occurrence probability and by classifying the basic events that
need multi-objective control. Thus, its practical application
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CHUN YANG received the B.S. and M.S. degrees KE ZHU received the B.S. degree in safety tech-
in mining engineering from the Central South nology and engineering from Chongqing Univer-
University, Changsha, China, in 2014 and 2017, sity, Chongqing, China, in 2014, and the M.S.
respectively, where he is currently pursuing the degree in safety engineering from the Central
Ph.D. degree with the School of Resources and South University, Changsha, China, in 2017. Her
Safety Engineering. His current research interests research interests include risk analysis and safety
include rock mechanics, numerical modeling, and science.
rock breaking.

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