BAR Report Russia USSR Volume 2

BAR Special Report - USSR / Russia Volume 2 | 01
Contents
03 Editorial 92 Is Russia Preparing For War?
Dr Steven J Main
ARTICLES
104 Armata: Should The West
04 Application of Technology Be Worried?
to Russian Control Theory Major Sergio Miller
Brigadier (Ret’d) John Hemsley
112 Politeness As A Weapon
18 Do We Still Need of War, Part 1
International Defence Dr Steven J Main
Co-operation?
Major R.R. Smith 124 Politeness As A Weapon
of War, Part 2
32 Leaving Afghanistan – Dr Steven J Main
Soviet Withdrawal and
British Transistion 138 The Strategic Context of
Captain Mike Stevens Russian Policy
Professor Brendan Simms
46 Studying Soviet Battle
Strategy an Imperative 144 Russia’s Nuclear Sword:
Major Rupert Burridge The Strategic Missile Force
Dr Steven J Main
54 Russia and The Arctic
Dr Steven J Main 156 Operational Strategic
Command - Western
68 Nuclear Weapons in Soviet/ Military District
US Relations Dr Steven J Main
Major Oliver Ormiston
174 Russia’s Security
76 Russian Roulette Establishment
Chris Fisher Andra-Lucia Martinescu
All Images in this volume are Crown Copyright unless otherwise stated.
Cover Photo by: Vitaly V Kuzmin, Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 4.0 International licence, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net
The views expressed herein (including editorial content) are those of

the author concerned and do not necessarily conform to official policy.
02 | BAR Special Report - USSR / Russia Volume 2
Editorial
Here is the second of two volumes of the British Army Review Special Report: Russia and
the Soviet Union. This volume is primarily about Russia and all of the material within
these pages has been taken from the recent archives of British Army Review (BAR) and as
such, the material deals with the post-Cold War era up to the present day. Many of the
articles examine Russia’s resurgence and the build-up of its military forces.
So why publish articles that have already appeared in recent issues of BAR? The main
answer to that is to provide the reader with a ‘one-stop-shop’ of information and opinion
on Russia and the earlier Soviet Union with both of these volumes. The first two articles
of this volume written in the late 1990s, aside from dated references, chillingly reflect
current events happening across Eastern Europe as Russia builds up its military might.
Of course, it is up to the reader to take what they want from this volume. For me, if
one person downloads one or all of the articles onto their phone, tablet or computer and
uses the information to inform their own knowledge of Russia and the Soviet Union then
putting all the work into this has been worthwhile.
While the first volume dealt with the Soviet Union this second volume looks at the
military resurgence of Russia in the 21st Century. Taken together, both volumes should
provide the reader with an interesting and informed look at one of the key players of the
20th and 21st Centuries.
In order to make both volumes as accessible as possible it was decided that this
Special Report would be online only, enabling the reader to download both volumes from
the Army Knowledge Exchange web pages on the Defence Gateway onto whatever device
they choose, anywhere at any time.
Graham Thomas
Editor, British Army Review
The 202nd Air Defence Brigade in the Western Military District in Russia.
This air defence brigade is equipped with S-300V-SAMs.
This brigade received these systems in 1989. Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin,
This file is licenced under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 4.0 International licence, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net
Application of
Technology to
Russian Control
Theory
This article by Brigadier (Ret’d) John Hemsley was originally published in
BAR 100 April 1992.
Who would, or indeed could have predicted that the Soviet Union would have
collapsed so quickly. It is a time of great change on the global political scene although,
remembering that the last seventy years represent no more than a brush stroke
on the vast canvas of Russian history, there is always the danger that our perception of
change may be greater than the change itself. Nevertheless, recent events have shaken
the very foundations of the political systems in the East to the extent that many historians
are already looking back over the past four decades and viewing the Cold War with its
accompanying bi-polar super-power alliance, as representing a comfortable predictability
from which emerged a strange kind of stability. But whatever emerges from the present
uncertainty we can be sure of two things: first, that there will be no more return to the
status quo and second, and much more significant, there will be no fundamental change
to the Russian social psyche.
This is because Russia is more than just a geographical entity - it is a way of life;
indeed it can almost be termed a concept in itself. From the earliest history of Imperial
Russia, there has never been an occasion when the Russian (Soviet) Empire has
disappeared. Russia needs to be perceived in a geo-ethnic context, transcending political
systems. However, what it did have in common with Communism is centralism. The very
size of both old Imperial Russia and the recent Soviet Union dictated a strong centralised
system of control. The total area outside the former Soviet Union was one fifth of the
world’s land surface, the present Russian state represents one sixth. It was no accident
of history that Russia was the one country in which Communism took hold at a time
when, as a political concept, it was on the decline through the remainder of Europe. By
its theoretical nature, Communism took the place of a creed, a faith, a religion - whatever
you like to call it; but its ideology was open to interpretation which could be subtly
adapted to meet changing circumstances. This dialectic philosophy makes Communism
a more flexible ideology than its opponents frequently give it credit for. Therefore, it is
important that we in the West should not misunderstand or underestimate this capacity
for what the Russians term adativmost. In particular, we need to appreciate the Soviet
understanding of the nature of change. Change is regarded as part of the inevitable
process of historical materialism. Nevertheless, it was part of the Soviet paradox that the
Politburo in the Kremlin was always a highly conservative body. It preferred change to be
gradual. Abrupt and rapid change was seen as invariably leading to political uncertainty,
resulting in events and situations, which, more often than not would be characterised by
a degree of unpredictability and loss of control.
An appreciation of contemporary Russian political philosophy is fundamental to
our understanding of Russian control theory, since the latter is an institutional matter
and responsive to political doctrine; and institutions are more important than weapon
systems. There has been a great deal of discussion and speculation in the west about the
recent break-up of the Soviet Empire and the extinction of Communism. Disarmament
euphoria gripped many western countries and former Soviet republics were suddenly
perceived in a benevolent guise. This view was already being encouraged in Gorbachev’s
time by a series of exceptional Soviet international propaganda coups in the disarmament
field that had the effect of resting the initiative from the United States, leaving them in
the unaccustomed position of having constantly to react to events. Whilst scenarios for
the future of European security into the next century must necessarily remain conjectural,
there is an economic and potential political power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe.
Added to this, many Russians view another Russio-German conflict as inevitable as
German economics and political expansion moves eastward, threatening Russian long-
term ambitions of becoming a Eurasion power. Whatever the nature of stated political
futures or the short-term state of the economy, the core of military R&D is likely to remain
distinct from the civil sector, and it would be foolish to ignore developments in the
Russian military system.
The present Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Russia in particular, is
currently beset with social and economic problems of daunting proportions. However, this
is a sub-continent where such events have been experienced before on many occasions
throughout history. There is a close parallel with the late nineteenth century when Russia
became over capitalised and experienced severe economic difficulties. Circumstances do
have a habit of changing rapidly and new orders can emerge overnight (as recent political
events have proved only too vividly); therefore we need to look to the more permanent
institutional structures to point the way to the future. In the same way that the Russian
Federation dominated the old USSR, the present Russian state will continue to call the
shots in the CIS, in so far as this is likely to last. Meanwhile, one does not have to be a
militarist to remain sceptical of Russian intentions until conclusively proved wrong. Russia
is the most powerful state in the CIS, with the strongest institutional base, and is unlikely
to have any scruples over taking what it wants, by force if necessary. Therefore, we must
ask ourselves the question(s) the Russians ask themselves; what are the determinates of
military power? What strategies are required and what command and control systems are
needed to support them?
As with the former Soviet Union, one of Russia’s major pre-occupations is the
search for acceptability through recognition of legitimacy. Whatever the colour of the
glass western analysts use through which to view them, Russia’s political leaders are
by conditioning still Marxist/Leninists. Their long term political strategy will be to make
Russia eventually into a political and economic power as well as a military power. In the
light of the probable development of a multi-polar global scenario for the next century,
the vision is for a socialist Europe, dominated by Russia and its satraps in the long
term, having hopefully shifted the economic burden of developing the peripheral former
COMECON countries to the West in the medium term.1 This, together with the fifteen year
breathing space required by all members of the CIS to attain some semblance of economic
viability and high tech implementation, is almost certainly the prime motive behind the
1 Erickson, J., Some Speculations on Soviet Military Re-structuring, Unpublished Paper, Edinburgh University
February 1989, p 1
A brigade command and

control post of 202nd
Air Defence Brigade
Western Military District
as part of the S-300V air
defence missile system.
This unit trains for the air
defence of Moscow and
is one of the few units in
Land Forces that spends
several months a year
training at full strength.
Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin,
This file is licenced under
the Creative Commons
Attribution-Share
Alike 4.0 International
licence, http://www.
vitalykuzmin.net
current apparent softer attitude towards traditional Russian imperialism.

However, this cannot disguise the fact that an economically resource-poor civil sector
produces little prospect of supporting a strong economic expansion. Therefore Russian
expansionist imperatives can, in the short term, still only be expressed in politico-military
or territorial terms. Either way this requires underwriting by credible military power,
and the strength and sophistication of recent Soviet military potential, coupled with the
growth of its real strategic capability over the past fifteen years has given the Russian
state the foundation on which to base a significant potential increase in global political
influence, once current international problems have been resolved. The implications of
this for the West were aptly summed up by a sometime SACEUR, General Lemnitzer,
who said:
Military planning must be orientated only to the capabilities of a potential

enemy, not his assumed intentions. Intentions can change overnight.
The Council of Defence for the CIS today is engaged in doctrinal revision affecting all
branches of the armed forces. Therefore when addressing military developments in Russia
tomorrow, it will be important to look beneath the surface to determine what it is that we
are really seeing, and then to evaluate the technological significance in relation to former
Soviet military doctrine and control theory under the rubric of upravleniya salami [the
main Russian term for C3 Command, Control and Communications], or perhaps more
properly upravlenie voiskami.2 The development of future Russian command technology
2 Erickson, J., Mountbatten Lecture, Edinburgh University, 8 November 1989. Here distinction is made between
the terms automated control of weapons systems (ASUO) and automation of command and control systems
(ASUV).
can then be properly placed into the practical context of current military doctrinal
development.
In order to do this, as well as understanding what is happening to control theory
inside the Soviet Union, we really need to go back in time to trace the evolution of Soviet
doctrine since the end of the Second World War.3 What we see now, is the practical
implementation of the last four distinctive and clearly discernible phases of military
developments since 1945. The first of these occurred during the period 1945 to 1953,
which represented the immediate aftermath of the war. During this time all military
operational thinking was conducted under the pervasive constraints of what was known
as Stalin’s five ‘permanent operating factors’. Weapons and equipment were still those
of the 1944-45 era, although nuclear weapons were being developed behind the scenes.
Nevertheless, doctrine inevitably remained tied to the same dimensions of technology and
tactical thought that existed at the end of the war. On this basis there was neither the
requirement nor incentive to upgrade C3 structures.
The period 1953-1960 saw the establishment of strategic nuclear weapons with the
accompanying philosophies of intercontinental strikes, together with the first introduction
of a tactical nuclear battlefield concept that resulted in the development of combat
operations designed to cope in a nuclear environment. At this point it was deduced that
a robust and redundant operations C3 hierarchy was required to maintain any sort of
continuity of control on the nuclear battlefield.4
This was followed by the period 1960 to 1970. This was a decade that saw
some radical changes to the basic structure of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union,
largely brought about as a result of the concept of an operational and tactical nuclear
battlefield insofar as the Ground Forces were concerned. The emphasis was firmly
based on widening the technological base, with the priority almost exclusively geared
to armaments, and there was a large qualitative improvement in equipment generally. It
was during this time that the T-62 main battle tank, the BMP tracked armoured personnel
carrier and the M-1970 main battle tank were produced - the latter two vehicles
being designed particularly for a nuclear campaign in Europe. Concurrently, some far
reaching steps were taken in the field of aircraft design and the development of aircraft
technology, and perhaps most significant of all was the expansion of the Soviet Navy
under Admiral Gorshkov. Inevitably, this evolution brought about accompanying changes
in command and organisational structures along with an overhaul of training methods.
However, not least, the importance of the application of science to every facet of military
3 Derevyanko, P.M., (ed) Problemy revolyutsii v voennom dele, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965 – contains a series
of essays involving the automation of specific weapons systems concerning the PVO and certain functions of
the C3 process; also in Maltsev, Y.E., (ed.), The Communist Party of the Soviet Union – The Organizer of the
Defence of the Socialist Fatherland, pp 392-393, translated in Strategic Digest, Spring 1976, pp 132-133
4 Although MSU Sakarov started systems analysis and ADP technology in 1967, the real groundwork was laid
in 1973 by Kulikov who came close to understanding the full scope of the problem.
The Topol Nuclear Weapon

Delivery System is one of the
most recent intercontinental
ballistic missiles to be deployed
by Russia, and the first to be
developed after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. Photo Vitaly
V Kuzmin, This file is licenced
under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
International licence, http://www.
vitalykuzmin.net
work and thinking was about to permeate Soviet society, and during this period a number
of high technology projects were undoubtedly on the drawing board. This was the largely
unrecognized nascence of an engineering culture that was to assume such institutional
importance in the USSR. It was also a time of some national satisfaction in achieving
parity with the USA; albeit there was a degree of foreboding for the future, especially
regarding what was seen as deterioration in the strategic environment.
The final, and to some extent, continuing phase started in the early 1970s. In 1973
the Soviet High Command suffered a severe shock as a result of Egyptian C2 failures in
the Yom Kippur War. These were largely due to systemic rigidities throughout the whole
command and control matrix, which directly reflected Soviet C2 doctrinal teaching. For
the rest of the decade, the main volume and weight of Soviet discussion and work was
on the technicalities of command and control, which has been systematically examined
and mathematically modelled. The result was a complete rethink and restructuring of the
military system that has been taking place since 1980 and was well advanced by the time
Gorbachev was ousted as President.
This period has been dominated by two main occurrences that have been developing
in parallel; the first being the emergence of the theatre war concept, together with a
non-nuclear or conventional as opposed to global nuclear war strategy. Here it must be
emphasised that until the mid-to-late 1980s, and insofar as any operations against NATO
in the European Theatre were concerned, any conventional option would almost certainly
be conducted against what might be termed a nuclear back drop. During this period we
saw some major associated restructuring of some of the Soviet services, principally in
the air and air defence forces, to meet the new strategic requirements resulting from the
implantation of the TVD high command structure.5
5 Teatr voyennykh deistvii (TVO) translates to Theatre of Strategic Military Action

The second important factor lay in the impact that new and developing technology,
particularly in electronics, had made on Soviet theory and practice of warfare. Nowhere
has this been more obvious than in the field of C3 and here, in terms of field technology,
the USSR had until the late 1980s maintained a distinct lead over NATO. Indeed, their
first generation of automated C3I systems were operating down to divisional level in
the 1970s whilst the British, Americans and French were still at the design and testing
stage with their WAVELL, TOS and SYCAMORE systems respectively. During the last
twenty years automation has been introduced into the Soviet military command and
control network extending into the operational and tactical headquarters in the field, as
well as into a wide range of weapon systems. Sophisticated equipment has come into
service with all branches of the Soviet forces, along with computers providing information
technology to every branch and level of the military organisation.
Though this last phase has been a continuing period of doctrinal development,
it might equally be described as a period of transition reaching into the mid-1990s.
Before the dissolution of the Union there had been much debate over what has been
interpreted by many in the West as the emergence of a new Soviet doctrine of ‘defensive
defence’. It was always difficult in any analysis of sequential development to make a clear
demarcation between the ending of one phase and the beginning of another; and never
more so when one is attempting a contemporary commentary without the benefit of
hindsight. However, the pleonasm ‘defensive defence’, which is in fact really a Western
invention, actually describes the logical culmination of a doctrinal revision that has been
going on with the Soviet Armed Forces for a long time. Evolving Soviet philosophies of C3
must inevitably be linked to doctrine; the USSR always regarded its strategic doctrine as a
prescription for national survival.
Soviet military doctrine was essentially predictive. It is concerned with the nature
of future conflict, whilst military science is seen as both shaping and validating the
theory by providing the means for practical achievement and future technological
development. Soviet military doctrine was political in essence and defined the nature of
war by establishing principles of organisation and prescribing methods for accomplishing
missions once military goals had been determined. The Russians consider military
doctrine to be scientifically founded, reflecting the objective laws of armed conflict.
The conclusions of military science concerning the theory and practice of war are key
factors in determining its development. Therefore, this is the context in which we need
to examine the Russian theory and practice of C3. In this context it may well be that they
are better prepared than many of the countries of the NATO alliance to meet the military
structural implications arising out of a major shift in the confrontational centre of gravity
away from North West Europe, with all that this implies in terms of collective security
6 Erickson, J., Some Speculations on Soviet Military Re-structuring, Unpublished Paper, Edinburgh University,
February 1989, p 3
measures, restructuring forces for a rapid reaction role, and global geo-strategic C3
capabilities.
When considering ‘defensivism’ and its implications for Russian C3, it is important
not to confuse this with the idea of ‘razumnaya dostalochnost’ that is ‘defensive
sufficiency’, or ‘reliable defence,’ which is not, and was never intended to be, a formal
military doctrine,6 although this is certainly a key issue to be considered when
determining the degree of force multiplication that should be attributed to Soviet C3I
(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) systems. In this connection it is
worth noting that, for all the ostentatious Soviet propaganda in 1990 regarding troop
reductions and withdrawals, the actual military capabilities were reduced by as little
as 5%, and in fact were actually improved through organisational restructuring and
rationalisation. In any case, all this would have been offset by improved conventional and
bio-chemical weaponry, with the future being taken care of by the enormous effort being
put into space as the decisive ‘fourth dimension.’7
This needs to be examined in a little more detail. First of all, what is the essence
Inside Russian Command Vehicle R145BMA at the 16th International Exhibition Interpolitex-2012, October 2012
in Moscow. The Exhibition was organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service, Federal
Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and Exhibition Companies Group BIZON. Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin,
This file is licenced under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International licence, http://www.
vitalykuzmin.net
7 Ibid, p 13
of the debate on the ‘offence/defence’ relationship? This is by no means new and goes
back to the late 1960s when, despite impressive force modernisation, the Soviet military
was increasingly subjected to budgetary constraints, civilian theoretical restructuring
of defence policy and, in the view of the Soviet General Staff, other intrusive political
interference by the Party. Therefore there is a critical disparity between the Gorbachev
and now Yeltsin public announcements on ‘defensive restructuring’, and the true military
objective which entails the total integration of technology into a comprehensive strategic
military framework with a global dimension. This fully integrated model specifically
includes a space component and will provide the basic element for both defence and
offence; all operating within the high-tech environment that has for so long
characterised Soviet military thinking.
In many ways this substantiates the thesis regarding consistency and continuity of
Russian/CIS strategic thinking. Current political imperatives apart, what we are seeing
today in Russia in military terms are some contemporary adjustments to the logical
continuation of a process of equipment rationalisation and organisational restructuring
to meet a long-term strategic requirement; the emphasis being on conventional warfare
fully integrated within the TVD, with space as the key to the future. This doctrine had
its theoretical genesis in the mid-to-late 1970s when it was formulated and agreed.
Its practical implementation started in the early 1980s and is still going on subject
to necessary fine turning.8 Military restructuring started down at the strategic and
operational levels; and is now at the tactical level looking bottom up in order to improve
flexibility and adaptability at the lower levels. But C3 underpins the whole system. It is
highly time sensitive, and remember that the High Command sees time as the principle
measure of effectiveness.
Russian military modelling would relate the relationship of effectiveness with time in
the form of an equation such as:
Time = C3I = Effectiveness = efficiency = defensive efficiency
The relevance of this lies in its affinity to established original Soviet strategic aspirations;
therefore it could be said to establish a rationale, as well as a degree of provenance,
for Russian military C3 praxis. For the past thirty years there has been a continuing
8 Paterson, P., and Hines, J., The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive, International Defence Review, No 10, 1983,
pp 1391-1395; also The Soviet Conventional Defence in Europe, Military Review, April 1984, p 10
9 Kipp, J.W., From Foresight to Forecasting: the Russian and Soviet Military Experience, Stratech Study SS88-1,
Centre for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1988
10 Alekseyev, V., Characteristic Features of Contemporary Naval Battles, Morskoy sbornik, No 10, October 1986,
pp 17-22; Fritz F., Soviet C2 Information Systems Theories, Concepts, Evaluations, reprinted in Signal Journal
(AFCEA), December 1988, pp 35-42; Grinkevich, D., The Time Factor in Battle, Voyennii Vestnik, No 11,
November 1986, pp 2-5; Krasnov A., The Cost of Lost Minutes, Aviatsiia I kosmonavtika, No 10, October 1986,
pp 18-19; Morozov I., et al., Opportunities and Problems in Mastering Computer Technology, April 1987, pp
41-46
recognition of the urgent need to improve decision-making techniques, particularly in

the military sphere, both at the higher echelons as well as at the lower executive levels.
To take one instance, the adoption of automation at all levels throughout the command
hierarchy and management process has facilitated scientific forecasting9 thus leading to
the application of operational research as the main means of balancing the requirements
for military growth against expenditure.
However, in order to consider the implications in terms of operational control,
one only has to follow the Russian approach to the IADA cycle (information/analysis/
decision/action), which will be familiar to most Western analysts.10 Computers now play
a vital role in all four major functions of this cycle. Initially they manage the automated
reception, filtering and correlation of information, which is then fed into a fusion centre.
Here all-source information is subject to a continuous cycle where it is automatically
cross-referenced, supplemented, revised and matched against existing data and the
current situation to produce a coherent intelligence evaluation for the commander.
These fusion centres necessitate high rates of processing using arrays and simultaneous
processing techniques, larger memory capacities, faster access and better data retention.
The commander’s analysis is fed into a computer, where decisions are tested against
algorithms of combat models and effectiveness criteria. The staff produce and promulgate
the detailed operational plan. This work may be carried out in a number of networked
‘battle planning centres’ involving regrouping (perigruppirovka) implying both cross-
posting and resubordination), weaponeering, integrated artillery fire planning and
air support tasking, the co-ordination of the recce-strike complex11, logistic planning,
movement and rear area real estate management. All these staff planning functions
readily lend themselves to automation in order to enhance C3 in terms of increased
firepower and mobility, facilitating the breakthrough and encirclement operations which,
in turn, are fundamental to the effective employment of follow-up or deep penetration
forces. All this accords with Russian doctrine whilst at the same time placing very high
demands upon C3I systems, particularly in a rugged and demanding military environment,
which makes the whole subject of the application of information technology to military
tasks extremely esoteric.12
Mention was made earlier regarding the tendency for Soviet planners to opt for
fielded technology that frequently represents a lower technological state of the art than
that reached by Western R&D to meet the same specification. Similarly, the CIS has a
reputable signal processing capability with a mix of optical and electrical, and we in the
West tend to forget that the Russians will design and install equipment to meet their
11 Reznichenko, V. G., et al., Taktika (2nd Edition), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, p 9

12 Altukhov, P.K., et al., Osnovi Teori Upravlenyia Voiskami, Moscow Voenizdat, 1984. In this context much
might be deduced by looking in detail at the operational rear area and what happens when this is
disrupted in war. In other words at the significance of Soviet damage control and C2.
particular purposes. Therefore it by no means follows that Russian perceptions and

requirements will necessarily match the Western approach towards a similar problem.
There is a very well-established relationship between engineering design and practical
application; we should consider carefully whether this should not be the bench mark
against which we need to evaluate and judge their C3I architectures.13
For example, the technical application of their information systems can be clearly
illustrated by the underground strategic electro-optical communications links that have
been in operation for several years between Moscow, the military districts and groups
of forces outside the former metropolitan USSR. These fibre optic links are capable of
accepting large data packages with a very high degree of security.14 Due to the fact that
there is less attenuation on fibre optic cable than metal, fewer repeater stations are
required - of the order of only one for every 100 km for low capacity channels. The data
flow can be increased by using a multi-light laser (i.e. by transmitting red, green and
blue light.)15
It is interesting that Soviet technology has been criticised in the West for its reliance
on analogue systems which, until recently, have been considered inferior and less
accurate when compared to digital systems. For instance, back in the 1970s Soviet
airborne synthetic aperture radar was translating radar pictures to film that was then
scanned optically. In fact, the USSR was using dumped film in the interim until they were
able to make a laser or other more suitable, more high capacity, downlink in real time.
Although analogue systems may be less flexible, they have a high rate of processing, and
the capability for holographic reconstruction gives them a degree of jam resistance.16
The Soviet SALYUT satellite is currently relaying holographic transmissions from orbit
to ground.
In addition, we should perhaps remember that despite their supposed technological
inferiority, Russian research and development (and in some places application) is
well advanced on such projects as: artificial intelligence and expert systems, laser
communications and electro-optics, advanced sensors especially AD radar sensors, laser
radars and netting of radar systems, again especially for air defence, genetic engineering,
robotics and machine intelligence, directed energy, hypersonics, aerodynamics and
advanced materials, kinetic energy weapons17, and signature reduction (i.e. STEALTH).
13 Pollock, M.A., Stubbs, K.D., Thomas, R.E., and Waddell, S.R., Soviet Optical Data Processing and its Suitability
for Troop Control, Centre of Strategic Technology, Texas Engineering Experiment Station of the Texas A&M
University System, College Station, January 1990
14 Ibid, pp 171-172
15 Some Western analysists have speculated whether there is a shortage of copper in the USSR, hence the move
towards fibre optics and ceramics.
16 Pollock, M.A., op cit., pp 141-142
17 Soviet investigations into directed energy covers a wide range of research, including particle beam, very low
frequency acoustics, and electrical discharge, gas-dynamic, chemical-pulsed lasers. See Bogart, P., Soviet
Military Space Programmes, International Defence Review, Vol 23, No 1, 1990, pp 23-26
In short, we have been witnessing the development of a large engineering culture,

which points to future doctrine being based firmly upon technology.18 Nevertheless,
deficiencies in command and control at the tactical level of the Ground Forces is another
of the major concerns facing the High Command. This is an organisational problem
presented by the span of command, reflecting the overload on the staff at regimental
level and a lack of well-trained officers and senior NCOs at battalion level. New
organisational structures at the tactical level will provide a better base for an integrated
combined arms formation, with the ability for the rapid concentration of mass at the
higher level as a result of improved C3 responsiveness.
Notwithstanding all this, as the Soviet Group Forces discovered in the 1970s, at
the level of battlefield management both cybernetic and ergonomic problems impose
a practical limit on the proliferation of very sophisticated C3I systems. It requires little
imagination to appreciate that the difficulties inherent in macro-systems, such as strategic
missile forces and major air defence systems, are immeasurably more tractable than
those relating to tactical handling. In terms of battlefield information technology, the
Ground Forces see the greatest area of difficulty lying first and foremost in the reporting
system with anomalies between generation and automated evaluation. In addition, there
are some clearly recognised vulnerabilities in a number of other areas regarding the
maintenance of high-tech equipment, professional and technical training, headquarters’
structures,19 handling procedures coupled with the volume of data for processing, as well
as EW and ECM.
In conclusion, the aim of this article has been to demonstrate that command
technology (voennaya sistemotekhnika) will be totally integrated into any future
Russian military doctrine, and has therefore become a major dimension in the Russians’
perception of their system’s effectiveness. They see the measure of the control cycle
as a measure of efficiency. Operational research is now an eclectic mix of ergonomics,
military engineering psychology and cybernetics.20 Overall C3I structures display some
undoubted strengths as well as weaknesses; however, the effectiveness can only truly be
assessed by evaluating the whole, rather than by comparing specific technology levels
with those of the West on the basis of comparing like systems. In general terms the
High Command C3 architecture at the strategic and higher operational levels has a high
degree of flexibility, redundancy, security, interoperability and survivability. However, at
the lower military tactical levels, whilst weapons control systems are generally successful,
there are still many problems to be overcome. For a variety of reasons, it is unlikely that
18 Erickson, J., Victory Cannot be Computed, Unpublished script for lecture to Royal Corps of Signals, Blandford,
November 1989
19 This refers particularly to the size of signals support units, in addition to those employed in HQ staff functions
20 Erickson, J., op. cit.
the present system will be unable to translate effectively the direction from a flexible,
highly automated, higher command attempting to conduct a fast moving battle, to form
tactical coherence out of a confused, real-time battlefield. Their operational and doctrinal
concepts are essentially dynamic; the question is whether the systemic deficiencies will
allow them to achieve the performance or effectiveness they desire.
Nevertheless they have certainly had more ‘hands on’ experience at this level than
the NATO equivalent. Vulnerabilities cannot be identified with individual equipment. The
crux is whether the ‘system’ will work on the day. The only real test can be the result of
military operations against an enemy also employing a sophisticated C3I technology.
The Combat Robot MRK-002-BG-57 displayed at the tactical exercises of

internal troops, special and rapid deployment units at ODON division training
ground. Internal Troops of the Ministry for Internal Affairs celebrated the 204th
anniversary of foundation on March 27th 2015. Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin, This file
is licenced under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International
licence, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net
Do We Still Need
International Defence
Co-operation now
that the Cold War
is Over?
A Kuwaiti M-113 armored personnel carrier crosses

a trench during a capabilities demonstration at a
Kuwaiti outpost during Operation Desert Shield.
Photo Technical Sergeant H.H. Deffner, US Army,
Released.
This article by Major RR Smith was originally published in BAR 106,

April 1994.
Whilst the end of the Cold War was greeted by a sense of optimism and welcomed as an
opportunity to restructure international relations, its aftermath also witnessed a growing
diversity amongst the nations, which had previously been united in a sense of common
purpose. In a period characterized by the perception of a greatly diminished threat of
global war, economic restraint and a wide desire to focus on domestic matters, the path
of international defence cooperation became increasingly less easy. The difficulty was
trying to achieve consensus in a much changed security environment, and arguably a far
more complex one than the clear-cut and bipolar framework of the Cold War. If the risk
of a cataclysmic and global war has receded, then the danger of regional uncertainty
has increased, which if left unattended could threaten to reverse many of the benefits
obtained in bringing about the end of the Cold War. The West cannot afford to be
complacent in its success or opt merely to preserve the status quo, for there can be no
lasting peace and security while the risk of instability remains both in Europe and in the
world in general. It is in this climate that the continuing requirement for international
defence co-operation must be fashioned. Primarily it will need a more flexible and
expansive approach to meet the new challenges posed by the altered situation of
the prevailing international order. The whole question of defence co-operation must
be viewed in its widest sense to include not only purely military issues, but also to
encompass the associated political, economic and social implications. Moreover, this
approach will require the commitment of the principal nations in the West to overcome
parochial aspirations and to redefine their common interests and objectives, with the
aim of projecting a coherent policy of stability and confidence initially in Europe and
then beyond it. This should be fulfilled by implementing the existing range of defence
organizations, which will need to be adapted to reflect their new roles whilst remaining
complementary to each other. The task of achieving this web of security architecture
should not be underestimated. The alternative, however, of not persevering with the need
for international defence co-operation would be a gradual return to an unpredictable
international community with a diminished sense of order.
UK Troops lead Exercise VENERABLE GAUNTLET with more than 3000 troops from 14
different NATO countries taking part on the Sennelager Ranges in Germany for the NATO
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). Photo Dominic King, Crown Copyright
Dilemmas of International Defence Co- operation After the Cold War

The premise for international defence co-operation during the Cold War was founded on
the need to counter the monolithic threat of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). This
allowed for the development of the Western Alliance, based on the principle of collective
defence, to deter the outbreak of a catastrophic war involving nuclear weapons on the
continent of Europe. Co-operation in this context was possible because the ideological
threat of the Eastern bloc, portrayed as an expansionist and militaristic opponent,
generated a sense of unity and common purpose amongst the Alliance’s members.
Subsequently, in the wave of optimism that greeted the demise of the Cold War,
it was adjudged that the opportunity existed to restructure the international order beyond
the linear confrontation in Europe of the previous forty-five years. President Bush called
for the creation of a New World Order, which would be reliant upon ‘a set of principles
that underpin our relations, peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression,
reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all people.1 Such an ideal might
have been interpreted as offering a shared vision for the international community of
finally achieving its most cherished values of peace, stability and justice. In addition to
this development, the European Community sought to reinitiate progress towards closer
political and military integration. Through the Treaty of Maastricht in December 1991,
it agreed to ‘the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including
the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence.’2
The problem for international defence cooperation in this period has been, however,
that idealistic rhetoric has tended to advance ahead of reality. In the aftermath of
the Gulf War, President Bush’s vision of a New World Order may have been prone to
exaggeration. With Saddam Hussein still in power, evident signs of frailty amongst certain
Arab members of the Coalition as the war reached its conclusion, and international
attention focused on the more discreditable aspects of the post-war condition of Iraq,
a more pragmatic vision of the emerging international order might have been a greater
awareness of the need to maintain an orderly world,3 yet without the agreed means to
achieve it.
Equally in Western Europe similar restraining factors became apparent. Primarily,
in view of the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the
perception was of a greatly-reduced threat that no longer warranted the maintenance
of significant military forces deployed in a role of Forward Defence in Europe. This
perception was further compounded by the atmosphere of economic recession throughout
the world at the turn of the decade, leading to a common desire to spend less on defence
1 Bush, G., Speech at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base on 13April 1991. (US Information Service)
2 Article 13, Title One of Treaty on European Union, (Brussels, European Communities, 1992}, p 7
3 Friedman, L., The Gulf War and the new world order, Survival, Vol 33, No 3 (May/June 1991), pp 196-7
and to concentrate instead on domestic issues. The net result has been a perceptible
erosion of the sense of unity evident during the Cold War, reflected by a tendency
towards a greater diversity of opinion aired with less inhibition and the risk of a return
to states pursuing policies based on a more narrow conception of national interests.4
The signs of this diversity have gradually become evident. America found it difficult to
reconcile her desire to see Europe assume a greater responsibility for its own security,
while remaining suspicious of the potential competition posed by a more united Europe.
Within Western Europe, Britain mooted that she would accept a move to a stronger
European defence identity so long as it did not undermine the position of NATO as the
ascendant organization for collective security. In contrast, France retained her traditional
Gaullist desire for autonomy and her wariness of an American-led NATO. She preferred to
place greater emphasis on promoting the Western European Union (WEU) and proceeded
to cultivate bilateral links independently with members of NATO. In part, the consequence
was the creation of the Franco- German Corps, arguably in direct rivalry to NATO’s Rapid
Reaction Corps headed by Britain5 and as a means of ensuring the future commitment
of Germany in the European process. As for Germany, she has sought to play a tactful
M-109 155mm self-propelled howitzers of the Egyptian army’s 3rd Armored Brigade move into a holding
area prior to decontamination during a field demonstration, part of Operation Desert Shield. Photo Technical
Sergeant H.H. Deffner, U.S. Air Force, Released
4 Brenner, M., Multilateralism and European Security, Survival, Vol 35, No 2, (Summer 1993), p 142
5 Menon, A, Forster, A., and Wallace, W., A Common European Defence, Survival, Vol 34, No 3, (Autumn
1992), p 104 and pp 107-110
role between France and America, but has remained hamstrung by her constitutional
restrictions preventing her from assuming a truly global role with its associated military
risks.6 Thus there is a danger that the optimism emanating from the end of the Cold War
is slowly being eroded, reflecting the difficulties of achieving defence co-operation at a
time when states’ priorities lie elsewhere.
Changed Security Environment after the Cold War

The crux of these difficulties is the problem of applying a system of defence co-operation
in a markedly different security environment from that prevailing during the Cold War, and
one in which the international community must recognize both its strengths, and more
importantly its weaknesses. In Europe the changes have been most obvious and perhaps
because they were largely achieved without recourse to violence, a sense of complacency
has begun to emerge within the West disguising the sources of potential danger that
still remain. The combined effect of the collapse of Communism and the break-up of the
former Soviet Union has left a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, with the
risk of future uncertainty and potential instability in that region (now seen by the crisis
in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia; Ed.) If communism has failed, then
it must be remembered that the process to develop democracy and market-regulated
economies in its place is firstly still very much in its infancy, and also is occurring in states
more used to operating under central direction and under the predominance of military
influence over their civil institutions.
Central to this assessment remains Russia that continues to possess a significant
military capability, which she is currently in the process of reallocating to new roles within
her own borders. Of further concern is the state of her nuclear armoury, particularly those
strategic weapons located in the successor states of the former Soviet Union; namely
Belarus, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who now seem intent on retaining control of these
weapons for use as bargaining counters in future negotiations.7 Moreover, the region of
Central and Eastern Europe will be exposed to a number of specific sources of instability.
First amongst these will be the threat of intra-state conflict, based upon the re-
emergence of bitter religious, ethnic and nationalist rivalries previously held in abeyance
by the authoritarian control of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore this region is likely
to be prone to economic fragility and a resulting trend towards a destabilizing migration
of refugees from the former East to the West. If these dangers are less cataclysmic
than during the Cold War, they are potentially more difficult to address for they do not
necessarily threaten the vital interests of the West. Yet if they are left to fester, they might
6 Bluth, C., Germany: Towards A New Security Format, The World Today, (November 1992), pp 197-8
7 Winkler, T., Central Europe and the Post- Cold War European Security Order, European Security, Vol 1, No 4,
(Winter 1992), pp 18-19
Two U.S. Marine AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit fly over the live fire
range at Glamoc, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on April 2, 1998. Assigned to the Strategic Reserve Force of the
Stabilization Force, the Marines are taking part in Exercise Dynamic Response 98, a training exercise designed
to familiarize the reserve forces with the territory and their operational capabilities within this region. Photo
Chief Petty Officer Steve Briggs, US Navy, Released.
begin to pose wider security implications to which the West would be forced to respond,
possibly in less than favourable circumstances.
Nor should this overview be confined to Europe for if the changes outside Europe
have been less dramatic, potentially they could have even greater implications for the
security environment. The demise of the influence of superpower bipolarity has created
a power vacuum paralleling the security vacuum postulated above. This is being filled
by the emergence of a number of regional powers with greater access to a sophisticated
military capability through the recent growth of the international arms industry. Within
this framework, many developing countries of the former Third World in Africa and the
Middle and Far East, which are already prone to political and economic frailty, will be
uniquely vulnerable to the external attention from the emerging regional powers.8
8 Sayigh, Yezid, Confronting the 1990s Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Paper No 25,
(Summer 1990), p 39
Requirement for Future International Defence Co-operation

Against this background the requirement for international defence co-operation remains,
albeit in a different form. The problem will be how to move from a bipolar system of
closely controlled alliances, dominated by the threat of nuclear destruction, to a freer
and yet stable framework.9 Maintaining cooperation will be more complex in a multipolar
environment away from the clear structure of the Cold War, in which the rules of conduct
were tacitly understood by both sides. In essence, the aim must be to build on the
achievements of the past, but then also to amend existing concepts and practices to
reflect the new realities in the international community. While during the Cold War the
emphasis was placed on containing the threat and maintaining the status quo, now the
focus should be on a positive reshaping of the international order, starting within Europe
as a baseline and then reaching beyond the confines of Europe.
The field of defence must be seen in its widest context as contributing towards
an overall security policy. This will mean the consideration not just of purely military
More than 30,000 soldiers from 24 participating nations deployed on Exercise Anakonda 2016 a Polish-led
joint multinational exercise designed to test the interoperability of the Polish forces and its NATO allies.
Members of 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop, Royal Engineers, alongside German soldiers from Pionierbattalion
130 demonstrate the unique capabilities of their M3 Amphibious Rig to enable the US Army’s 2 Cavalry
Regiment to quickly cross the River Vistula. Photo Dominic King, Crown Copyright
9 O’Neill, Robert, Securing Peace In Europe in the 1990s, cited in Heuser Beatrice, and O’Neill Robert, (ed),
Securing Peace In Europe, 1945-1962, (London, Macmillan Academic and Professional Limited, 1992), p 313
matters such as equipment, training, operational strategy and logistics, but also the
associated-political, economic and social implications. There will need to be flexibility
to accommodate disagreements between members of the same defence organization,
and even the ability for a state to opt out of a certain military option should it so chose.
Yet at the same time there must be a strong political will to achieve cooperation and
make difficult political decisions, overriding the temptation for national parochialism. In
a period of reduced defence expenditure and rationalized military capabilities, the way
forward must be through multilateralism. Indeed, few Western countries would now
envisage using force beyond their borders except in a multilateral context, for such an
approach helps to neutralize domestic political opposition and reassure the international
community that operations have limited and legitimate goals.10 Flexible, yet coherent,
multilateralism will be the realistic means for resolving future conflicts, but its foundations
must be laid now before the opportunity passes. Within these parameters, it is vital
that the international community, led by the West as the principal beneficiaries from the
passing of the Cold War, should identify areas of common interest from which to fashion
the basis for future defence co-operation.
Common Security Objectives

Primarily, this co-operation will be dependent upon the continued health and existence
of the Euro-Atlantic relationship. It will remain the bedrock upon which stability in the
West is based and will also provide the ultimate guarantee of Western security against the
possibility of a resurgent Russia or even ominous instability in Central and Eastern Europe.
It is important that the West is stable, for signs of dissonance or alienation, either between
Western Europe and the American continent or indeed within Western Europe itself, will
diminish its ability to act as a model for the East. Finally, the EuroAtlantic relationship will
act as a platform for contingency planning and force projection outside Europe. Thus it
will still be the linchpin of Western security and will also have significant global implications,
but it will need to adapt in its character.
The essential premise of this relationship will be the continued presence of American
troops in Europe. As history has shown, it will not only be in Europe’s interests to retain
a permanent American involvement,11 but it will also serve American interests to be in
a forward position to influence both European and global security issues and to act as
a counterbalance to Russia.12
Equally, with America seeking to reduce her standing commitment in Europe, the
EuroAtlantic relationship will need to evolve into more of a partnership in which Western
Europe assumes a greater responsibility for the provision of its security. A manifest sign
10 Roberts, A., The United Nations and International Security, Survival, Vol 35, No 2, (Summer 1993), p 6
11 Heisbourg, F., The European-US Alliance, International Affairs, Vol 68, No 4, (1992), p 669
12 Snider, D., US Military Forces in Europe, How Low Can We Go, Survival, Vol 34, No 4, (Winter 1992-93), p 26
of this requirement will be the need to obtain greater co-operation in the area of the
arms industry, both in terms of achieving a higher degree of collaboration on common
weapons programmes and in imposing a degree of control on a proliferating export market
throughout the world. It cannot be sensible for states to pursue their own independent
projects, with their associated costs of research and development, when the future
emphasis must be on a multilateral capability. At the same time, there is a moral
obligation to control the sale of arms to countries and regions which might prove
to be inherently unstable.
From this foundation, it will be possible for the West to project an atmosphere of
stability and confidence into Central and Eastern Europe, with the overall aim of creating
an integrated continent assured in its security. It is important that the West should play
a primary role in the restructuring and reshaping of Central and Eastern Europe for two
reasons, Firstly, it would be prudent to ensure that the states in this region do not pursue
their own foreign policies independently of any Western influence, and also because
the West cannot afford for the process of transition to democracy and market-regulated
economies to fail. The onus must be on providing initiatives to embrace both security-
related matters and political, economic and social issues. Of paramount significance is the
need to avoid the creation of a new East-West poverty line. Ultimately, it will be necessary
to include Russia in this process, even if on a more graduated timescale. The objective
Members of the Coalition forces drive a T-72 main battle tank along a channel cleared of mines during
Operation Desert Storm. Photo Staff Sergeant Dean M. Fox, U.S. Air Force, Released.
13 Traditional Peacekeeping was developed by the UN as a non-coercive instrument of conflict management to

separate the opposing armies of two states by patrolling a buffer zone and thus creating an atmosphere more
conducive for negotiations
must be to involve her within the European structure rather than risk her acting in isolation
outside it.
A further common interest lies in a desire amongst developed nations to contribute
towards the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. In the prevailing
sense of optimism after the Cold War, there has been a growing interest in the provision of
assistance to a range of peace support operations. Of particular note is that while there has
been a continued commitment to support traditional peacekeeping operations,13 increasing
attention is being paid to the problem of finding a peaceful solution to the rising incidence
of intra-state conflict throughout the world. Under the pressure of the media and world
opinion, highlighting the cases of humanitarian hardship and abuse often associated with
these conflicts, the international community is finding it progressively more difficult to
ignore a moral obligation to intervene. The ability to resolve these crises or better still
to prevent their outbreak, is proving to require a significant degree of international
co-operation.
Ultimately, there is a requirement to maintain a multilateral ability to respond to an
international crisis or contingency crisis anywhere in the world. This response could be to
counter an unacceptable act of aggression or to protect a perceived vital interest.
As Professor Lawrence Freedman has noted:
There are now very few national interests that are both truly vital and
truly unique. There will always be small-scale operations that a single
country undertakes by itself in support of secondary interests, but
the truly vital interests are collective, and they will require a collective
response.14
The international community’s reaction to Iraq’s unacceptable invasion of Kuwait

and the threat she posed to vital oil resources was a case in point. In order to project this
capability, the West will need to develop a multinational, flexible and highly-equipped force
that is ready to intervene at short notice.
The Role of Institutions for International Defence Co-Operation

The means of fulfilling these common objectives will be through the application of
the existing range of security-based organizations, which will serve to integrate the
international community towards a co-ordinated response to arising security issues. Given
the diversity of the current multipolar environment and the need to accommodate a wide
membership of states of different political and economic status, there will be a requirement
for a span of institutions to build up a gradual process of stability and confidence. These
14 Freedman, L., Escalators and Quagmires, International Affairs, Vol 67, No 1, (1991), P 30
institutions should seek to maintain continuity with past practices, while adapting to
the new security circumstances. The key aspect, however, is that they should provide a
complementary framework with a clear understanding on how each organization ties in
with the others. The recent tendency towards rivalry, evident between Western institutions,
must be avoided.
At the heart of this framework will be NATO for which, as its Secretary-General has
observed, ‘there is no immediate or near-term alternative in resolving the dilemma that each
Western democracy faces; to reduce force levels in response to the end of the clear and
present danger but still preserve the long-term basis of its security in an uncertain world’.15
Yet it will also have to adapt, perhaps in a fairly radical manner, if it is to survive. Primarily,
it must seek a more even partnership with its European members and encourage the
creation of a more united European defence identity in support of this partnership. Equally,
NATO will have a critical role in the process of the integration of Europe. Through its use of
the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), it has achieved an important dialogue with
the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The NACC, however, should only be the apex of
its efforts. NATO will have to consider expanding in the future, probably beginning with the
initial offer of associate membership to the more established countries of Central Europe.
This will require careful handling to ensure that the Alliance firstly does not isolate Russia by
spreading eastwards, and also that it does not become a convenient repository for resolving
internal issues that the newly joined states do not wish to tackle themselves. Ultimately,
NATO will have to contemplate developing its ethos beyond the basis of Article 5 enshrined
in its Charter, to encompass a more expansive role for the resolution of conflicts outside its
traditional territory.
Again it has made a start in this direction, when during 1992 it pledged its active
support to the operations of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
and then the United Nations (UN). Similarly, however, this may not be enough by itself.
A recent study from the Rand Corporation in America has even gone as far as to suggest
that the Alliance must ‘go out of area or out of business ‘.16
Closely associated with NATO, particularly in Europe, will be the role of the WEU.
With the move of its Council from London to Brussels and the establishment of its Military
Planning Cell in April 1993, the WEU has received a new impetus to its existence in recent
years. It is critical that this regeneration should be guided in the right direction. It must seek
to create a European defence identity, but one which is complementary to NATO. It should
act as the European pillar of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and should provide the essential
link between the European Community and NATO. Above all, it cannot afford to set itself up
in direct competition to NATO nor look to duplicate the Alliance’s capabilities. In any event,
15 Woerner, M., The Alliance in the New European security environment, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, Vol 38, No 3,
(1993), p 10
16 Kempe, F., NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business, The Wall Street Journal Europe, (9 August 1993)
Europe is likely to remain dependent upon America’s military capacity in the foreseeable
future, specifically in the areas of strategic airlift, logistics and satellite-based intelligence.
There are few circumstances in which the WEU should seek to intervene without having
first consulted NATO, yet there may be circumstances in which America does not wish to
become involved but is prepared to allow the WEU access to her infrastructure and facilities
committed to NATO.
The CSCE will continue to work towards the integration of Europe through the
maintenance of an essential dialogue with the states of Central and Eastern Europe,
and through the resulting projection of confidence and stability. The severe limitations
in its executive powers may also be seen as a strength. Since it is essentially a forum for
discussion, it is able to attract a wide membership. The significance of the CSCE is that it
acts as a precursor for other more formal institutions such as NATO and the WEU. As such,
it fulfils a critical task in the graduated process of creating an interlocking security structure
in Europe.
Finally, the UN is likely to play a pivotal role in the future, in contributing towards the
maintenance of peace and security in the international order. The aftermath of the Cold
War heralded a resurgence of interest in the potential capabilities of the UN. In the resulting
atmosphere of international collegiacy, particularly amongst the Permanent Five members
of the Security Council, the UN was able to launch as many peace support operations in the
period 1988-92 as it was in the first forty five years of its existence. Moreover, following
its central part as an objective broker in the Gulf War, growing international attention has
been focused on the UN as a means for conflict resolution. Herein lies a major difficulty,
however, for it is by no means certain that the UN is yet ready to take on this burden. There
are growing signs that excessive demands are being placed upon its finite resources. It is
being called upon to prevent the outbreak of conflict, as well as having to defeat aggression
and tackle the after-effects of war.17 As Richard Connaughton noted, ‘a wave of enthusiasm
exists for the UN but it will have to work very hard to rise to the challenge before the
moment passes ‘.18 The task of equipping the UN to meet this challenge should be at
the top of the international community’s agenda.
Conclusion
This assessment has presented many of the difficulties confronting the current task
of achieving effective international defence co-operation, and has suggested that a
conservative approach of either maintaining the status quo or implementing piecemeal
change may not be sufficient. There are, however, some welcome signs that these
difficulties have been recognized and that progress is being made towards the fulfilment of
17 Roberts, A., The United Nations and International Security, p 3

18 Connaughton, Richard M., Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute,
The Occasional, (1992), p 12
common objectives. Notably, in May 1992 the current Secretary of State for Defence made
an important contribution to the process of redefining the Euro-Atlantic partnership, when
he called for the WEU to be responsible for threats to European interests in Europe but to
do so in support of NATO. He envisaged a system in which forces could be double-hatted to
both the WEU and NATO, but that their use by the WEU should first be cleared through the
North Atlantic Council.19 Shortly afterwards France responded to this offer of a compromise,
and declared that her forces committed to the Franco-German Corps could be made
available both to the WEU and NATO in the event of a crisis in Europe. Equally important is
that, with the recent deployment of her troops to Somalia in support of the UN, Germany
may be prepared to make a more active contribution towards global security in the future.
Thus there is a requirement for the continuation of international defence co-operation, not
19 Rifkind, M., A Decade of Change in European Security Speech to the Centre for Defence Studies,
King’s College, London, 14 May 1992, (Verbatim Service, Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
only to build on the principal achievement of the Cold War in preventing the outbreak
of a Third World War, but also to respond to the uncertainty in the new security
environment. It will need a different form of co-operation. It will involve the development
of a comprehensive security structure, in which defence co-operation must be seen in
its widest context. Purely military matters will have to be considered in conjunction with
associated political, economic and social initiatives. Perhaps above all, it will require
a strong political will to make some difficult decisions now to build for the future.
The alternative to this complex process should be borne in mind. A failure to achieve
this cooperation could mean a gradual return to the predominance of parochial national
interests, and the reversion towards an anarchic international order without any sense
of conformity or coherence.
The tires of an Iraqi BRDM-2 amphibious scout car continue to burn as an FV432 armored personnel carrier of
the 7th Brigade Royal Scots, 1st United Kingdom Armored Division, advances east into Kuwait from southern
Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. Photo PHC Holmes, U.S. Navy, Released.
Rusting Soviet T54 and T55 or T55a Main Battle Tanks left over from the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. US Navy
Leaving Afghanistan:
Soviet Withdrawal
and British Transition
This article by Captain Mike Stevens, originally published in BAR 153
Winter 2011/2012, looks at the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
the security environment and how the Soviet experience informed
the British transition away from combat operations.
When in early 1980s the Soviet deputy foreign minister pointed out to
his boss, Andrei Gromyko, that three previous invasions by the British had
failed, Gromyko asked sternly: ‘Are you comparing our internationalist
forces to those of the British imperialists?’ ‘No, sir, of course not,’
answered his deputy. ‘But the mountains are the same.’1
On February 15, 1989, Commanding General Boris Gromov was the

last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan, walking across the Friendship
Bridge that connected the war-torn country with what was then Soviet
Uzbekistan.3
So ends the popular account of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The reality is
that as Gromov, commander of the 40th Army, crossed the bridge that day he was by
no means the last Soviet to leave Afghanistan. He was not the last soldier and he was
not the last to see combat. Behind him he left embassy staff, technical advisers, military
guards, special forces, missile operators and even deserters who had taken up arms with
the mujahideen.3 For those soldiers who returned to Soviet soil, the Afgantsy, many
An Afghan Border Policeman stands watch on the Freedom Bridge crossing

the Amu Darya River. US Navy Wikimedia
1 Franchetti, Mark, Can the West avoid Russia’s fate in Afghanistan?, The Times, 3 January 2010.
2 Afghanistan: Lessons from Soviet Withdrawal, Voice of America News, 11 February 2009.
3 Braithwaite, Roderic, Afgantsy, (Profile Books, 2011), p.321.
remained brutalised by the conflict and the ‘bleeding wound’ did not heal until years later
when their country finally began to understand their experience. The message is clear:
leaving Afghanistan is not clean and it is not easy.
The Soviet Helmand

For the Soviets, Helmand province was ‘a relatively self-contained theatre of operation.’4
Resistance activity in Helmand was based more on clan loyalties than it was on affiliation
to mujahideen parties and so did not often reach outside the provincial boundaries. A
crucial point in analysing the security picture immediately before the Soviet withdrawal
is the extent to which the Afghan army had already become side-lined in favour of
government-sponsored militias. This catalysed the rise of men who would eventually
become the warlords of the civil war. These men were themselves a product of the Soviet
occupation as the old khan families were usurped. Security became the foremost concern
and this led to a generation of leaders who wielded power manifested in armed force.5
To characterise these men as on the government or mujahideen side is only one
way of looking at conflict in the south. Though useful, it more often than not conceals
the interwoven nature of power alignments based upon the advancement of personal
ambition. Loyalty to the government was just one amongst many competing loyalties and
was based on money rather than ideology in most cases.
To help identify trends that resonated with commanders in Helmand prior to the
withdrawal of combat troups we can look at two illuminating case studies immediately
before the Soviet withdrawal - the mujahideen group commanded by Nasim Akhundzada
and the government militia commanded by Khan Mohammed.
The Akhundzadas
An Alizai originating from Musa Qala, Mohammad Nasim Akhundzada became a
prominent commander in the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, the leading mujahideen party
in Helmand. His reputation for conducting many successful attacks against Soviet and
government forces has been exaggerated and he was in fact responsible for sustained
fighting against other mujahideen groups. Jihad gave Nasim a vehicle through which to
surpass the land-owning khans, the traditional empowered elite of Helmand. Two other
mujahideen families competed with the rising Akhundzadas. The old khan family of Abdul
Rahman Khan around Gereshk formed an alliance with that of Abdul Wahid around Kajaki
in order to combat Nasim. This reveals the inter-mujahideen clashes in Helmand as a
rivalry between the Akhundzada family and forces aligned to the old khans he had come
to surpass.
4 The Orkand Corporation, Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces, (Silvery Spring, Maryland, 1989), p.164.
5 Giustozzi, Antonio, Ullah, Noor, Tribes and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan 1980-2005 Working
Paper no. 7, (Crisis States Research Centre: September 2006), p.5.
Nasim’s most significant achievement was his monopolisation of the narcotics trade.
Though the northern Helmand river valley had a tradition of poppy cultivation, Nasim
encouraged the spreading of poppy south into the irrigation canals of central Helmand.
Nasim’s ‘salam’ system contributed to poppy proliferation,6 making this profitable and
robust crop a sensible economic choice. Nasim catalysed this process as he continued to
expand his territory across Helmand to secure poppy trading routes.
Khano
Central Helmand was less receptive to tribally-based groups such as Nasim’s. Though the
traditional population still dominated along the central green zone, the irrigation project
to the west of the river was tribally mixed and made up of recently arrived and relatively
disenfranchised groups. Conditions here favoured the recruitment of militias based upon
other sources of cohesion, whether ideological or economic.
The government militia of Khan Mohammed, known as Khano, recruited from
unemployed youth around the Canal Zone and Lashkar Gah. He paid well and was a
charismatic leader, which was enough for most of his followers. Khano, originally from
Farah province, was joined by Allah Noor, a Barakzai commander from Nawa district.
Forming an alliance, the success of the Lashkar Gah militias attracted money and
resources, a self-reinforcing cycle that encouraged further recruitment as the Afghan
government relied on anyone who would fight in their support. As the Soviet departure
became imminent, these pro-government militias must have been increasingly uneasy at
the prospect of a post-Soviet Helmand.
Soviet and Government Forces

The Soviets had two main objectives in Helmand. The first one was to protect the vital
highway; the second was to control the corridor that followed the power lines from the
dam at Kajaki down the river valley to Lashkar Gah. Control was limited in most areas to
a small geographical patch around the municipal buildings of the district centre, though
Gereshk and Lashkar Gah were considered relatively secure with Soviet garrisons in both
towns until 1988. Immediately prior to withdrawal, fighting reached as far north as Kajaki
as part of a joint Soviet-Afghan offensive in February 1988. The intent was to reinforce
the regime’s position and contemporary sources noted that the campaign had a major
element of what might now be called stabilisation activity, for example the extension of
electricity supplies to several villages.7
This development activity was a strand of the Soviet withdrawal strategy and
complemented economic incentives for communities and militias to join the government
side. At the same time, the government reached out to seven major mujahideen
6 Rubin, Barnett, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Second Edition, Yale University Press, 1995.
commanders nationwide to seek reconciliation, this included Nasim Akhundzada but he

refused and so the military campaign shifted to exert increased pressure on his network.
The campaign involved a high proportion of tribal militias. This demonstrated
another strand of the Soviet withdrawal strategy, whereby locally recruited militias
were increasingly relied upon in combat operations. Some were militias recruited for
ideological or monetary reasons, whilst others were former mujahideen kinship groups
whose allegiance had been directly purchased. The operation coincided with violent
fighting between rival mujahideen commanders in the area, as Nasim Akhundzada fought
Afghan resistance fighters return to a village destroyed by Soviet forces. Wikimedia Commons
with Abdul Wahid’s forces around Kajaki. The fighting reached such intensity that locals
reportedly welcomed Soviet troops as a pacification force in the area.8
So this snapshot of Helmand before withdrawal reveals a province comprehensively
7 Urban, Mark, War in Afghanistan (Macmillan Press, 1990), p.240.

damaged by conflict. As the drugs war between the mujahideen groups grew in intensity,
so the Soviet attempts to secure the province with money and military force cast further
fractures in Helmand’s human landscape. Bombing missions devastated the irrigation
canals on which the farms relied, which led to widespread depopulation, contemporary
estimates placing the figure at one-fifth of the population leaving the area.9 The prospect
of Soviet withdrawal seemed to offer hope that the fighting would cease, and few would
have anticipated the civil war that came in the wake of departing Soviet forces.
Back to the Future: Predicting Withdrawal
International Opinion
In his authoritative account of Afghan history, Thomas Barfield states that in 1989 it
was ‘universally believed that once the Soviets left, the mujahideen would overrun
government outposts, take the regional cities, and then march on Kabul in triumph in a
matter of months, if not weeks.’10 The Orkand Report, commissioned by the United
States and published in 1989, stated that Kandahar City ‘will probably succumb within
a month. After this occurs, the province capitals of Qalat in Zabul and Lashkar Gah in
Helmand will most likely surrender. Then, at long last, peace will come to this area.’11
This assessment focused too heavily on the presence of the Soviets as a source of
violence and did not take into account two key factors. First, that the absence of Soviet
forces removed the enemy presence, which meant that after an initial mujahideen surge,
the resistance was deprived of its unifying purpose and broader jihad justification.
Second, in the longer term the assessment misses the latent capacity for violence that
conflict had ingrained in the south, a capacity that found a fratricidal outlet in civil war
once Najibullah fell. This tendency to overestimate mujahideen unity was emphasised
further by speculation in international media that the southern mujahideen might unite
and move north, chasing the withdrawing Soviets. The reality was that, particularly in
the south, the resistance was based on territorial and clan allegiances that could not be
transplanted elsewhere.
CIA Assessment
In a special estimate from March 1988, the CIA stated that ‘the Najibullah regime
will not long survive the completion of Soviet withdrawal even with continued Soviet
assistance. The regime may fall before withdrawal is complete.’12 This represented the
consolidated opinion of US intelligence agencies at the time and demonstrates the extent
to which observers underestimated the resilience of the regime, the fractious nature of
8 Giustozzi and Ullah, op.cit., p.10.

9 Orkand, op.cit.
10 Barfield, Thomas, Afghanistan A Cultural and Political History, Princeton University Press, 2010, p.241.
11 Emphasis mine. Orkand, op.cit.
the resistance and crucially, the unifying force of Soviet presence. Offering balance to the
main assessment, the same document presents two alternative scenarios. Firstly, that
‘the Kabul regime manages to survive for a protracted period after withdrawal, due to
an increasingly divided resistance.’ Secondly, that ‘fighting among resistance groups will
produce so much chaos that no stable government will take hold for an extended period
after the Afghan Communist regime collapses.’
As it turned out, both assessments materialised over time, with Najibullah’s regime
initially surviving and successfully fracturing the resistance, followed by the chaos of
civil war once the government fell. As is often the case with the business of intelligence,
simple predictions cannot be made with any surety. Instead, complicated scenarios play
out over time as the balance of contributing factors shift. Crucially, all predictions are
subject to the tyranny of events. The CIA may have hoped for the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but it was thought too improbable to factor into any assessment.
Soviet Outlook
Colonel Tsagalov, a Soviet officer serving in Afghanistan, sent a letter to the Soviet
Minister of Defence in 1987 in which he laid out a stark and uncomfortably honest
account of his opinion on the progress of the Soviet campaign.13 He stated bluntly that the
regime was ‘moving toward its political death… efforts in this respect can only prolong
the death throes.’ His statement ultimately proved correct, but the death throes of the
regime transformed it almost beyond recognition. In contrast to its communist origin, by
1990 the new constitution confirmed Islam as the religion of the state and held sharia
as the ultimate authority above state law.14 This again highlights the extent to which the
survival instinct of those who benefit from an imposed system are reluctant to give up the
power they have gained by virtue of that system. In holding on to that power, the system
may transform beyond recognition and not in a direction favoured by its architects.
Soviet Withdrawal
By January, ‘optimize’ had become the most popular word amongst the
Soviets in Kabul… It meant to reduce the number of Soviet personnel to
an optimal level. The question ‘How’s it going?’ was typically answered,
‘They haven’t optimized me yet. What about you?’15
The popular perception today is that the Soviets were chased from Afghanistan by the
victorious mujahideen. Lester Grau states the reality quite forcefully: ‘When the Soviets
12 Central Intelligence Agency, USSR Withdrawal From Afghanistan, Special National Intelligence Estimate 11/37-
88, March 1988, p.1.
13 Tsagolov, Colonel, Letter to USSR Minister of Defence Dmitry Yazov, August 13, 1987.
Pullout of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. 1988. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev. Wikimedia
left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so in a coordinated, deliberate, professional manner,

leaving behind a functioning government, an improved military and an advisory and
economic effort insuring the continued viability of the government.’16 By mid-1988 the
total Soviet force numbered around 100,000. The basic plan was to withdraw around half
by 15 August 1988 and the remainder by 15 February 1989. Yet as early as January 1987
the Soviet effort consciously shifted towards minimising casualties and ensuring route
security in order to prepare for a successful withdrawal. This further damaged the already
fragile morale of the Afghan armed forces, who resented bearing the brunt of casualties.
When it came to withdrawal, the Soviets reversed their invasion routes and folded
outlying garrisons into larger garrisons as the main body of forces moved back to the
north. After the official withdrawal order was given, the Soviets withdrew 50,000
troops from ten major garrisons including Lashkar Gah in the summer of 1988.17 The few
remaining Soviet-held district centres in Helmand were abandoned and Lashkar Gah was
ceded to its militias. The last remaining regular government force to leave Helmand was
a Soviet spetznaz battalion, which left Kajaki to Nasim in October 1988.
14 Rubin, op.cit., p.166.

15 Borovik, op.cit., p.241.
16 TGrau, Lester W., Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2007,
Volume 20 Number 2, p.1.
17 Grau,op.cit., p.10
The Immediate Aftermath of Withdrawal
The moment our troops leave… groups of local mujahideen with diverse
leanings but consolidated by the struggle against our troops - the
‘infidels’ - instantly fall apart and begin competing with one another, if
not militarily, then at least politically and economically.18
The Akhundzadas
By the time the Soviets came to withdraw from Helmand, Nasim Akhundzada controlled
around 1,200 core mujahideen. As soon as the Soviets left, several government militia
groups switched allegiance to Nasim as the now pre-eminent power in the area. Despite
calls from previously pro-resistance clergy to suspend hostilities in the absence of the
Soviets, Nasim set about consolidating his position and began to clear up his mujahideen
rivals. In 1990 he was assassinated in Pakistan, allegedly by Hizb-e-Islami associates over
a drugs-related dispute.19 The Akhundzada clan rode out this assassination as Nasim’s
brothers, Rasul and Ghafar, took over the business, though they did not really manage
to extend their power base beyond their own Alizai tribe. Abdul Rahman was forced
to withdraw to Gereshk, which he held until 1990 when the Akhundzadas took his
last stronghold.20
Khano
For Khano the withdrawal of the Soviets saw his fortunes take a significant downturn.
Confined to Lashkar Gah by the time Najibullah fell, Khano relied on Allah Noor to use his
Barakzai kinship ties to gain support in holding onto the town.21 This alliance managed
to resist the Akhundzada’s encroachment long enough to establish relationships with
the new Rabbani government in Kabul, which provided a new source of patronage and
supplies. It is clear that Khano’s economically motivated militia required the addition of
traditional tribal support to survive the shocks of the Soviet exit and the fall of Najibullah.
Though Khano had initially gained agility by transcending tribal basis, he was forced to
resort to tribal links when under pressure from the Akhundzadas. His downfall became
inevitable when the Akhundzadas attracted support from the formidable Ismail Khan in
Herat and were able to crush Khano and Allah Noor’s resistance to their expansion into
Lashkar Gah, with Khano finally ceding control in 1993. Khano’s network was based on
money and personal charisma, making it far more vulnerable to a decisive defeat than
the kinship based Akhundzadas.
18 Prokhanov, A., Afghanistan, International Affairs, (Moscow), Aug 1988, p.21

19 Ibid, p.12
20 Giustozzi and Ullah, op.cit., p.10
21 Ibid, p.16
Helmand’s Soviet Legacy

The Soviet campaign depopulated rural Helmand. For those Helmandis displaced south of
the Durand line, the breakdown of social structure was complete and it was here that the
Soviet legacy remains today by creating a basis for Pakistani involvement. Moving from
the isolation of the kishlak or village to the massed humanity of the refugee camp was
a journey during which all the certainties of social order were broken. Here young men
were politicised by Pakistani intelligence, which asserted control over the Pashtun refugee
population. Though Pakistani involvement is significantly reduced today, proximity to
Helmand means that mid-level commanders who exert considerable influence in the
districts of Helmand are able to retreat south of the border to escape targeting by ISAF.
Also during the Soviet campaign many young men began to earn a living from war.
Mullah Zaeef, a former member of the Taliban government, found himself unable to do
anything other than fight once the Soviets left.22 The same trend is seen in Helmand today
- a Taliban mullah from Garmsir described the younger generation of Taliban fighters as
‘war addicted’.23 Violence has become an alternative source of loyalty ties, known as
andiwali or brotherhood of arms. These networks of old comrades are extremely difficult
to decipher as they transcend tribal and social divisions. This information is still vital
today for commanders seeking to understand the allegiances of the Afghans with whom
they interact.
Another strand of the Soviet legacy originates from Nasim Akhundzada spreading
poppy cultivation south down the river valley into what remained of the irrigated areas
of central Helmand. The trafficking system that the mujahideen fought to control has
now become a multi-million dollar industry. Today, the interests of the Taliban and of
22 GZaeef, Abdul Salam, My Life With the Taliban, Hurst & Company, 2010
23 Coghlan, Tom, The Taliban in Helmand, Decoding The New Taliban, Hurst & Company, 2009, p.133.
Pieces of Soviet artillery and equipment fill a junkyard in Panjshir Province. US Army
the traffickers have intertwined so that their relationship has become almost symbiotic
- the most obvious demonstration of this being the relative quiet of the poppy harvest
when insurgent manpower is devoted to labouring in the fields. To say that the Taliban
have become a narco-insurgency is excessive, but the two streams of activity are almost
inextricably linked.
Lessons for Transition
One major mistake that the Soviets made was to establish a public
timetable for the withdrawal without any proviso for modifying or
reversing the withdrawal if the political or military situation
drastically changed.24
One of the clearest differences between the Soviet withdrawal and the planned transition
for UK troops is that the Soviets were fixed to a withdrawal deadline down to a specified
day - ‘a recipe for trouble’25 which galvanised the Afghan-led policy of reconciliation and
forced the Afghan government to anticipate a future without Soviet presence. However,
the lack of flexibility increased pressure on supply lines and forced the withdrawing troops
to cross perilous mountain passes in winter conditions.
By contrast, much is made of the conditions-based withdrawal adopted by ISAF.
The difficulty is that progress is fragile, unevenly distributed and can be reversed.
There are three rough ‘types’ of area in Helmand. First, areas such as Kajaki and the
area west of the Nahr-e-Bughra canal have been largely governed by the insurgency with
only intermittent disruption by ISAF, so transition may have little visible effect. Second,
areas such as Gereshk have not had much in the way of permanent British security
presence and yet have remained permissive to the government. In this sense Gereshk
is something of a test-case for what Helmand will look like post-transition, with the
interests of powerbrokers, militias, narcotics dealers and the government balanced out of
economic necessity. Tellingly, the towns of Gereshk and Lashkar Gah where the situation
is relatively stable are the same areas where the Soviets had most success.
Finally, there are the densely populated rural areas of central Helmand such as Nad-
e-Ali and Marjeh, where the government and insurgency compete for control. Establishing
government ascendancy in these areas would exceed Soviet success, as Soviet control
never really extended beyond the urban areas. Here the very fact that there is a transition
deadline at all means that the insurgent narrative gains compelling longevity against the
government alternative. Though Nad-e-Ali has seen significant improvements in security
over the past year, taking troops away to resource other areas can only create space for
24 Grau, op.cit., p.22.

the insurgency to resurface. A hard-learned lesson of Helmand is that if you lose trust
once through a lack of enduring presence, it is far harder to win it back a second time.
The key question is not only whether the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are
capable of providing security but crucially whether the contested population perceive
them as in control now and likely to remain so after transition.
This leads into the question of what we now call ‘over the horizon’ support.
Looking back to the Soviet era the question of whether the Kabul government would
have survived but for the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is academic. Lester Grau
states quite simply, ‘the Soviets did not abandon the Afghan government - the Russian
Federation did.’26 It is important to recognise that the decisive reduction in aid to Kabul
deprived Najibullah of the ability to pay his militias. These militias then turned on the
government and Kabul became a battlefield for competing warlords as the civil war
began. The monetary cost of supporting the ANSF is unsustainable without a continued
flow of foreign cash.
Looking at the component parts of the ANSF, the Afghan National Army has a lack
of logistical capacity that will make it difficult to maintain a significant footprint in
remote areas. Crucially, the army is not the best counter-insurgent force as sustained
control requires a force that lives and works amongst the people in the same way that
the insurgent does, so the focus of effort before transition must lie with the police. The
Soviets arguably failed to produce a viable conventional police force, with the Ministry of
Interior police or Sarandoi neglected in favour of KhAD,27 the equivalent of the National
Directorate of Security. Though the Afghan National Police force is troubled and corrupt,
it is improving and arguably holds the key to success in a post-transition environment.
The most imminent question is the extent to which Afghan Local Police programmes
can be integrated with the National Police. Though the Soviets relied heavily on mobile
militias and irregular forces, these groups were not based at the kishlak or community
level in the same way that the Local Police are today. If these community forces can be
linked successfully into the nervous system of the National Police, then they provide
a good way of preventing the predatory behaviour that has so severely undermined
previous policing efforts. If this integration fails, then community defence groups pose a
serious risk of further fracturing an already fragile transition process.
Though the collapse of the Soviet Union was decisive, the fact that Pakistan managed
to persuade the United States to continue supporting the Peshawar mujahideen parties
against Najibullah once the Soviets left was a significant factor. The Peshawar parties
were divorced from the reality of fighting on the ground and deceptively feeble in
terms of genuine public support. The parallels to the Quetta shura are evident - the
physical distance and operational separation of Quetta is a source of resentment for

27 Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati (Government Intelligence Service).
those commanders fighting and dying on Afghan soil. Yet one of the Taliban senior
leadership’s foremost achievements has been the artificial inflation of western perceptions
of its control over the insurgency. Having existed as a power in waiting for so long, it is
questionable whether Quetta will seek to negotiate or reconcile unless faced with the
realistic prospect of defeat. The next question is whether Quetta even has the authority
to compel the new breed of young, aggressive commanders to relinquish the power
they have won through violence. Furthermore, as we search for mid-level insurgent
commanders who are willing to reintegrate, Quetta will equally seek to hide those
individuals from us by moving the most hard-line commanders into the most closely
contested areas, looking to dislocate reintegration efforts.
Beyond Transition
What will Helmand look like post-transition? The prevailing media and intelligence
opinion in the moments before the Soviet withdrawal showed predictions can be utterly
misguided. Once the Soviets left, the fight in Helmand shed the façade of resistance
and became a war to secure drugs trafficking routes. Many militias switched from
the government side or rival mujahideen groups to join Nasim Akhundzada and this
identification of Nasim as the rising power gave him a self-reinforcing momentum.
What were the factors that contributed to Nasim’s success? The first one is that
he possessed de facto power centred on his militia, which had managed to suppress
significant opposition. This first factor is linked to the second, which is that he had
money, specifically narcotics revenue. This money enabled him to sustain his force of
arms and also to patronise the clergy, giving him an important network of opinion-makers
through the mullahs. The final factor is that he had a tribal basis and it was this that
allowed the Akhundzada family to survive Nasim’s death and continue their campaign
to secure Helmand in the early 1990s. In summary, the conditions for success in
Helmand are power, money and an enduring loyalty network.
The tribal element is tempered by the fact that the Taliban managed to transcend
tribal divisions more effectively than any group has so far managed. This is a warning
for those who argue that ‘he may be a bad guy, but he’s our bad guy’ when selecting
powerbrokers such as Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as front-runners for success after
transition. Though Sher Mohammed has the factors that contribute to survival, the
likelihood of marginalised groups turning against him cannot be ignored.
It is crucial to recognise that the divisions between those groups who benefit from
government rule and those who are marginalised by it are sufficiently entrenched to
prevent anything except a compromise solution before UK transition. Commanders will
increasingly have to accommodate ‘acceptable’ levels of corruption and of insurgent
association. Our threshold for acceptance may be less palatable than we might like,
and one aspect of this is that those who have bought into the government system will
prioritise their own survival over that of the system. In doing so, the system may change
out of recognition to its current form and only through ruthless prioritisation of what
we are seeking post-transition can we guide this evolution to secure essential security
goals. We must admit this openly, so that our planning does not develop a schizophrenic
divergence between an idealised narrative and a much darker reality.
One final question remains: ‘How important is Helmand post-transition?’ Once the
troops leave, the measurement of kinetic activity will drop. Limited by logistics, it is
likely that the Afghan government will only seek to hold those urban areas close to the
highways, particularly Gereshk and Lashkar Gah. Once this happens, Helmand won’t look
too different to how it did at the end of the Soviet campaign. However, the one aspect
of Helmand that makes it of continued, undeniable relevance is the extent to which its
poppy fields contribute to instability. From an insurgent perspective, Helmand has become
the Taliban’s bank account. It is the confluence of narcotics and insurgency that will make
Helmand globally relevant beyond transition as it becomes a seam of insecurity that could
yet be exploited by non-state actors and could once again destabilise a still-fragile region.
Soldiers from 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment on a routine patrol in the Showal bazaar area with the
Afghan National Army. Crown Copyright
Preserved Soviet T34 Main Battle Tank at ‘Tank Taran’ in the Valley of Death, Slovak
Republic. Author’s copyright printed by permission.
Studying Soviet
Battle Strategy
an Imperative
This article by Major Rupert Burridge, Royal Engineers, was originally
published in BAR 154, Spring/summer 2012 and looks at Soviet military
strategy of the Carpatho-Dukla Operations in 1944 in the context of
contemporary British doctrine.
The timely study, generalisation and application of war experience is an

important task of all commanders and staffs.
Soviet High Command Directive, 9 November 1942
An understanding of the Soviet approach to the study of war can provide

a vehicle for comparison and the analysis and critique of our own.
Colonel D Glantz US Army, Soviet Military Operational Art, 1991
Battlefield studies, which also combine and supersede the terms ‘staff rides’,
battlefield talks war walks and so on, constitute the study of historical operations in order
to further develop the current conceptual component of Fighting Power.1 As our training
becomes more and more restrained by commitments, time and resources, such activities
represent one of the few remaining ways to develop military thought outside periods
of formal staff training. Battlefield studies have been described as ‘the vital ground of
the conceptual component’.2 It is imperative these limited opportunities are created and
developed to best align current training output with known and probable unit missions
and the knowledge, perspectives and intellectual skills required of commanders and
their staffs.
This article recommends greater attention be paid during the conceptualisation phase
of a battlefield study meaning that the instruction for studies that normally lie in the
NATO European area should be understood to include certain battlefields on the Eastern
Front. Indeed, studying Soviet military thought has more relevance to contemporary
Western military activities than many studies more commonly undertaken. This can be
seen in the first British study of the Carpatho-Dukla operation that demonstrates both the
practicability and desirability of studying a Soviet battle.
The Carpatho-Dukla Battlefields

Soviet military historians identify January 1944 as the date from which concentrated
mobile forces achieved the deep operations conceived in the 1930s. Of the subsequent
‘Ten Stalinist Crushing Blows’ the most important and largest of the Second World War
was Op BAGRATION, launched from latter day Belarus towards Poland and, ultimately,
Germany and Berlin.
On 29 August a popular revolt in the Axis dominated Slovak Republic created an
opportunity for the Soviet 38th Army to swing South and open up a new operational
corridor. This would require it to breach the ‘Dukla Pass’, a natural choke point
constituting the only significant crossing through the Eastern High Tatras. The outcome,
between September and October 1944, was a concentrated battle with the German
1 23.004, AGAI 23.

2 GOC 3rd (United Kingdom) Division Directive: 2011/12, dated 6 Sep 11.
Map of Operation Bagration. Wikimedia.
1st Panzer Army on the Polish/Slovak border resulting in around 100,000 men killed,
wounded and missing. The battle has a spiritual resonance for Slovaks because of
participation of the 1st Czechoslovak Corps as the founding act of their post-War nation.
The area is now well-maintained with many positions and equipments still in situ. The
first British military survey of the Dukla Pass, and the associated ‘Valley of Death’, was
undertaken as a unit battlefield study by 22 Engineer Regiment in September 2011.
Terrain
Studying military activity above the tactical level can by physically difficult as most spaces
involved are usually too vast to draw meaningful lessons from any single vantage point,
except in urban operations. However, such studies have particular utility at the higher
levels. One solution is to focus upon areas such as the Dukla Pass where conditions forced
the concentration of normally dispersed forces. This further enables the study of air power
as a land supporting component where the use of ‘huge tactical air forces employed
as flying artillery’3 by both Soviets and the Axis contrasts with the discrete strategic air
3 Holmes R. (ed), The Oxford Companion to Military History, 2001, p 271.

forces more commonly employed in the West. Indeed, it is hard to envisage a better
area realistically accessible in which to study the evolution of an air/land battle.
The Soviet practice of installing and maintaining politically-focused battlefield
equipments, memorials and other reminders to the populations of Eastern Block and
former SSR nations of the debt owed to their liberators enriches the experience.4
Of course, careful research must be done to separate the real from the propaganda.
The battlerun of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade through the Valley of Death is easy to
follow as a Soviet T-34 is preserved at the exact location each original tank was
knocked out.
The Study Soviet Military Thought

If the aim of a study is for commanders to understand contemporary British doctrine5
there is utility in examining combatants with doctrines similar to those we and our allies
employ today. Once terminology has been negotiated the enduring utility of historical
Soviet military thought is almost overwhelming: this is well illustrated through the
concept of ‘operational art’. Compare the following:
At [the operational] level, abstract strategic objectives are translated

into practical tactical actions and then resourced6
Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art determines

methods of preparing for and conducting operations to achieve
strategic goals7
The first extract is from Army Doctrine Publication: Operations (2010), the second
from an article entitled ‘Voina’ [War] by the Soviet military thinker Mikhail Tukhachevsky
published in 1926.
The Soviet understanding of military doctrine8 combined both military-technical and
social-political aspects: their ‘operational art’ included analysis of the broader factors
influencing operations ‘including politics, geography, technology, and the state of
weaponry’.9 In consciously situating the political below the strategic the Soviets thought
about war in a manner that now manifests as modern and convincing. It is extraordinary
4 E.g. Stalin’s armoured train in Gori, Georgia and the (reconstructed, and possibly fabricated) Frunze birthplace
in Bishkek, latter day Kyrgy Republic.
5 23.004, AGAI 23.
6 0314, Army Doctrine Publication: Operations, 2010.
7 Tukhachevsky M. N., Voina, 1926, Voprosy Strategii, pp 104-5.
8 In the Soviet context, the term ‘doctrine’ must be understood as emanating from the nation rather than
the military. What we would recognise as military doctrine the Soviets term ‘military science’, a system of
knowledge of war which cannot be independent of the objective political truths of socialism.
9 Colonel Glantz D. US Army, Soviet Military Operational Art, 1991, p 12.
to recall such sophisticated dogma, which is remarkably similar to the ‘comprehensive

approach’ and predates the Second Gulf War by over seventy-five years.
Born from the First World War and the Russian Civil War the understanding that the
quest for a single, climatic battle must be replaced with a series of military operations
caused the Soviets to champion the new concept of ‘ deep operations’ (glubokaia
operatsiia). This articulation of the requirement to simultaneously affect the enemy
through the depth of his defences was a precursor to many of the technologies and
structures, deep surveillance, joint fires, special operations forces, now common within
the Western military lexicon. The 1936 Field Regulation must be considered both the
acme and conclusion of this productive stage of Soviet military thought. The following
year the Stalinist purges subsequently liquidated or suppressed every important theorist
in the Red Army.
Soviet military equipments represented a practical expression of Soviet military
thought. Whilst the platforms - if not the lessons - of the Western Front are consigned
to museums the British Army has encountered the direct evolutions of Soviet equipments
and associated tactics in every land campaign (excepting Northern Ireland) since Suez.
Even in hybrid training there is little purpose simulating combat against an enemy lacking
this equipment and tactics of any we might reasonably expect to encounter. Indeed,
significant efforts have been made to ensure the generic enemies we train against are
associated with actual and potential adversaries. Why, then, should we choose to study
historical battles devoid of such relevance? Whilst we persist with Arnhem and Normandy
there is much greater utility in studying Second World War Soviet doctrine than British!
Engineer Regiment at ‘Tank Taran’ Valley of Death Slovak Republic. Author’s copyright printed by permission.
The Carpatho-Dukla battlefields illustrate the ease by which higher military thought
can be appreciated within the parameters of a unit study. The aggressing structures
are armies, or ‘fronts’ and are the level the Soviets considered appropriate to conduct
combined and independent operations. The employment of operational art may be
dissected through the economic imperative which led the 38th Army to prioritise the fight
for the oil producing regions of Krosno over the military logic of securing the Dukla Pass.
The Slovak National Uprising in context with partisan activity including deep target
acquisition, special operations forces; the forcing of a pass that involved a weather
aborted brigade level descant operation through three lines of German defences demands
discussion of glubokaia operatsiia. This is amply aided through the military positions
and equipment, including aircraft, memorials, heroic cemeteries and two dedicated
museums all laid out in an area 30 km by 20 km that can be viewed from a 49m high
observation tower at its highest point.
Reinvesting Academic Responsibility

Clausewitz reminds us that, ‘the conceptual component is meant to educate the mind
of the future commander or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education’10 For
the professional soldier learning is an individual experience where more can be achieved
through encouragement rather than prescription. On a battlefield study every attempt
must be made to encourage the active engagement of all participants: the experience
must be the converse of the passive receipt of historical information that has limited
relevance to contemporary operations.
Our particular study was designed around syndicate questions which were researched
on the ground and the resultant backbriefs promoted general group discussions. Those
questions while matching historical methodologies to contemporary doctrine, tactics and
equipment, with current doctrinal publications and field manuals on hand, proved most
successful. It was heartening see junior officers and SNCOs confidently and effectively
utilise texts on, for example, Soviet operational strategy to develop and present complex
and relevant observations upon contemporary military activities.
The British military’s propensity to divest itself of the role of interpreting, instructing
and advising upon strategy must appear peculiar to other nations, not least the
Americans whose war colleges routinely employ serving officers in academic roles. To the
Soviets, who formalised the scientific exploitation of military historical experience within
their operational analysis, the idea of outsourcing such core functions would be absurd.
Our officers should be encouraged to research, prepare, lecture on and guide battlefield
studies: this will ensure a clear and efficient focus on contemporary military objectives
whilst developing the individuals’ academic skills. Regarding the Carpatho-Dukla
operation this was achieved without much pain by normally busy Regimental personnel
10 Clausewitz, Karl von,, On War, translated by Howard M. and Paret P., 1989, p 90.
for a campaign that is obscure in the West and lacked any English military guidebook.11
Mater artium necessitas. To develop the conceptual component (and ensure maximum
value for money) we must practice doing this for ourselves.
Conclusion
Battlefield studies represent one of the few remaining opportunities for imaginative
and challenging conceptual development at unit level. The study of Soviet battle is
practicable12 and inspiring, allowing us to better understand our adversaries and
ourselves. In accessibility, concentration, interpretative experience and continued
relevance the Carpatho-Dukla operation offers a rich unsurpassed opportunity for unit
level military study.
11 Once the usual British sources had been exhausted, expert assistance was forthcoming (in perfect English)
from Lieutenant Colonel Miloslav Caplovic PhD, Executive Director of the Slovak Institute of Military History.
Can the British Army generate a comparably qualified individual?
12 It is also affordable. 22 Engineer Regiment’s effort cost £15.6K, which compares favourably with the
£25-30K HQ 3(UK) Div specify for a unit battlefield study.
Major Rupert Burridge is a Squadron Commander at 22 Engineer

Regiment. In previous posts he coordinated UK military attendance on
exercises within the former Soviet Socialist Republics and was seconded
as an instructor at a NATO staff college in the Slovak Republic. He will
next be an Army graduate student at Cambridge University studying
international relations. Ed.
Slovak partisans alongside Soviet soldiers are depicted on the memorial

at Svdnik in Slovakia. Author’s copyright printed by permission.
Russian Internal troops special units take part in counter-terrorism tactics exercises. This image illustrates
the types of tactics and weapons used in the extreme northern districts of Russia. Photo Copyright Vitaly V
Kusmin, March 27 2013, Creative Commons Share Alike Attribute License Wikimedia
Russia and
the Arctic
This article by Dr Steven J. Main, originally published in BAR 159 Winter
2014, argues that it is time to change the way the Western militaries
view the Russian military using Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).
For too long now a degree of intellectual and policy complacency has crept into examining
and analysing the Russian military over the past twenty years. Whilst this may have been
understandable in the decades following the collapse of the USSR in August 1991, it is
time in this author’s opinion that this position was either significantly re-evaluated or
dumped, once and for all.
As the Russian military becomes visibly more prominent, particularly inside Russia
itself and Russia’s politicians become more assertive in defending and advancing their
country’s position on a whole range of international security questions (Iran, Syria, the
Arctic), the previous intellectual and policy stance of the past has to be put to one side
and Russian military policy, in particular, re-evaluated, if further damage to the West’s
capability to objectively analyse the current and future intent of Russian military policy is
to be avoided. This does not mean a return to an ideological Cold War, but it does mean
a mature realisation and acceptance of the fact that Russia, given its increasing resource-
based revenue wealth and its expanding leverage on the global stage, has to be studied
and analysed, as in the past, as one of the world’s great powers, one which will have a
significant say in the future development of the global political, military and economic
environment.
Anyone with any knowledge of Russia’s past, not just of the last century but long
before the USSR existed, already knows and understands that Russia has a very specific
way of interpreting the world, different from the way that the West perceives the world.
This is a point which Russians themselves make time and again and one which the West
largely seems either to have forgotten, or simply ignores. It behoves us to look at these
issues with open eyes.
In the 19th century, a truism voiced in Russia was that the country had only two
allies - the Army and the Navy. Given recent pronouncements, it would appear that
contemporary Russia is, once again, heading back along that particular line of thinking.
Russia is no longer constrained by the double-edged sword of an all-encompassing,
global ideology (Communism), nor tied down by an expensive alliance system in the West
(the Warsaw Pact). In short, Russia can - and will - pursue and defend its own interests.
If this assessment is correct, then it has one very obvious danger, both for Russia and
the wider, global community: the country could run the risk of isolation as it pursues its
national interests. Given the projected trends in defence spending over the next decade,
Russia could also have the military muscle to back up its position, either in relation to any
of the current global hotspots, or future areas of contention.1
In this specific area, open source intelligence becomes ever more important. Good
intelligence does not need to come with a hefty price tag, but bad intelligence can
cost a lot more than staff salaries and departmental operating costs. Simply put, bad
intelligence can cost lives. In essence, this article is an example of what publicly-funded
OSINT can still do, if properly supported. Good intelligence can point out that, contrary to
perceived wisdom, the situation in one important part of the globe is not as benign as it
would appear or as others assume it to be.
This article examines Russian military and security policy in relation to one part of
the globe which could become a potential source of conflict over the next few decades
- the Arctic. Like many similar pieces of analysis - once regularly produced by the UK
1 Even in the space of the next couple of years, Russian defence spending will show a healthy increase – from
3.1% of GNP in 2012 to 3.8% by 2015, Norwegian threat assessment focuses on Russian defence, borders,
Arctic, BBC Monitoring Service, hereinafter simply referred to as BBCM, 4/3/2013
MOD’s in-house Soviet Studies /Conflict Studies/ Research Centre (1972-2007) - the
references are entirely drawn from open sources - a mixture of published expert articles,
policy statements and public pronouncements by Russia’s leading political and military
figures. Hopefully this will encourage a re-think on how better to assess the potential
threat emanating in the northern hemisphere, not necessarily solely from Russia itself, but
arising from a clash of interests in an increasingly important part of the world, involving a
number of the world’s great powers.
For several reasons, the Arctic has recently rarely been out of the news either as a
result of Shell’s ongoing problems in beginning drilling operations in the Chukchi Sea,
north of Alaska,2 the potential economic impact of the melting of Arctic sea ice,3 or
the growing influence of China on Arctic development.4 This increasing concern for the
world’s last great wilderness is also heavily wrapped up in the potential economic wealth
of the area and its impact on not just the member-states of the Arctic Five (Russia, USA,
Canada, Norway and Greenland-Denmark), but also on the wider global community
(particularly, but not solely, China). The region’s hydrocarbon and mineral wealth - as
well as the potential opening up of a new trade route between East and West, in the
Special units of Russia’s Internal Troops take part in winter exercises. This image illustrates
the types of tactics and weapons used in the extreme northern districts of the country.
Photo: Copyright Vitaly V Kusmin, March 27 2013, Creative Commons Attribute License,
Wikimedia
2 The Independent, 28/2/2013

3 The Daily Telegraph, 5/3/2013
4 The Guardian, 19/3/2013
shape of the Northern Sea Route, in the decades ahead - are a few of the many reasons
why so many of the world’s great powers are interested in developments far removed
form their normal shores. If, as predicted, Arctic summer ice disappears within the space
of the next 30-40 years, the security ramifications of the latter could mean a significant
and fundamental re-drawing of the global security picture, affecting the interests and
well-being of the inhabitants of a lot more of the states which have already declared their
vital, strategic interests to lie in the Arctic.
Despite the collapse of the USSR in August 1991 and the subsequent reduction in
Russia’s immediate military threat, the country with the largest security footprint in the
Arctic is Russia. Given its previous historical record, this should come as no surprise.
Referencing Russia’s long association with the Arctic, President Vladimir Putin alluded
to this at the end of 2011 in an address to the Russian Geographical Society stating that
Russian sailors had been active in the area since the 11th century and that Russia/USSR
had been at the forefront of developing the region over the centuries:
Russia has played a leading role in the construction of the Northern Sea
Route, it has been at the birth of the ice-breaking fleet, Polar aviation,
created a whole network of stationary and drift stations in the Arctic.5
Further on in his address, he also reminded his distinguished audience that ‘70% of
Russia’s physical territory is in the North.’6
In other words, both in relation to the country’s historical record - a not insignificant
detail when the commission of the United Nations Convention of the Law On the Sea
(UNCLOS) rules on which state gets what of the physical territory of the Arctic and the
surrounding seas in the years ahead and its actual, physical territory, Russia is dominant
in the region, in a way that no other member of the Arctic Five is. Russia’s current Arctic
zone is of great economic importance to Russia: in his very first opening address to the
Russian Security Council as President in September 2008, the former President of the
Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev - Russia’s current PM - outlined the contemporary
importance of Russia’s Arctic zone to the Federation, as a whole:
According to figures which we have to hand, about 20% of Russia’s

GDP and 22% of Russian exports are produced in the region. We extract
rare and precious metals in the Arctic region. Here are located oil-gas
provinces such as Western Siberia, Tiumen-Pechora and Eastern Siberia.
According to experts, the Arctic’s continental shelf could contain ¼ of
5 The Independent, 28/2/2013

6 The Daily Telegraph, 5/3/2013
all…the reserves of the hydrocarbons in the world. The use of the energy
reserves…is a security guarantee, an energy security guarantee for Russia,
as a whole.7
In terms of the future potential hydrocarbon wealth of the hydrocarbon wealth of the
region, experts reckon that there could be as much as 83-110 billion tonnes of oil and
gas in the disputed part of Russia’s continental shelf zone alone.8 If this estimate proves
to be correct, then its impact on Russia would be considerable, allowing the country to
continue developing economically in a controlled and sustainable fashion. That being
the case, it would also allow the country to project itself more prominently on the
global stage.
In terms of the current importance of the region to Russia, one other factor which
tends to be overlooked is the region’s biological wealth. Russia’s fishing fleet pulls in an
annual bounty of 500,000-600,000 tonnes from the seas in the High North, representing
some 50% of Russia’s total annual catch.9 Thus, given its current and future value to the
country, it is no surprise that Russia’s current senior political leadership views the Arctic
as the country’s main resource base for its future economic and political development.10
This was further borne out recently by the country’s former permanent representative
to NATO, currently Deputy Russian PM, Dmitry Rogozin, in an address to the country’s
Maritime Board in December 2012:
It is extremely important that we place markers…that we mark the

perimeter of our national interests in the region. If we do not do that,
we will lose the battle for resources and thus lose the great battle for the
right to have our own sovereignty and independence.11
Rogozin warned of the danger that, by the middle of the 21st century, the battle
for natural resources will acquire ‘completely uncivilised forms.’ He also made a point
of informing his audience that the Arctic was a ‘constant’ feature in many NATO
discussions.12
Rogozin, like many senior figures in the current Russian establishment, do not baulk
at the talk of possible conflict in the future over the world’s diminishing resources,
7 Vystupleniye na zasedanii Soveta Bezopasnosti ‘o zashchite natsional’nykh interesov Rossii v Arktike’”, (http://
www.kremlin.ru/news/1434).
8 V Apanasenko, interesy desiatkov stran soshlis’ u zemnoi osi, (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23/11/2012).
9 S Koz’menko, S Kovalev, Morskaya politika v Arktike I sistema natsional’noi bezopasnosti, (Morskoi sbornik, 8,
2009, 57-63; 57).
10 Vystupleniye…, ibid.
11 Russian ‘independence’ depends on the Arctic ‘battle for resources’- deputy PM (BBCM, 4/12/2013).
12 Ibid. Rogozin has also recently remarked that, in relation to the Arctic, diplomacy has to be tempered, when
the occasion arises, like ‘a steel fist in a kid glove,’ (Defence minister invites NATO for more drills in Norway,
BBCM, 28/2/2013).
believing that ‘resource nationalism’ will become an ever more prominent feature of
conflict in the years to come. In his report to a conference, examining military security
in 21st century, held in Moscow in February 2013, the current Chairman of the Russian
State duma’s (parliament) influential defence committee, (former Commander of Black Sea
Fleet and a former first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet), Vice-Admiral Vladimir
Komoedov stated that:
In the first half of the 21st century, the battle for the sources of raw
materials will become the main cause of acute socio-economic and
geopolitical contradictions in the world. After 2015, Russia could be at
the very heart of the intensified grab [skhvatka] for natural resources.13
Komoedov then spent a large part of the rest of his report to the conference
identifying and outlining the main source of the threat to Russia - NATO headed by the
USA. This may prove to have been uncomfortable reading, especially for those involved -
on both sides - in the NATO-Russia Council - but the views of such a prominent figure in
the country’s military/political elite can neither be ignored, nor dismissed. An additional
element of proof would appear to be that NATO has failed to convince an important
section of Russia’s current military-political elite that it is a benign alliance and has no
quarrel with Russia that cannot be settled peaceably.
NATO may be right, but surely greater effort and analysis should be made to
understand Russia’s security position on a whole range of questions than would appear
to have been the case in the past few years? It would be counter-productive to simply
ignore this sentiment, even if it is held by a minority. It helps no-one for Russia to be in
a security dilemma. It would certainly appear to be the case that an important section of
Russia’s military-political elite - never mind the wider section of the country’s population
- do not think that they have got it wrong. Indeed at the beginning of his address to the
conference, Komoedov also made a point of quoting Putin’s earlier remark that Russia is
only treated with respect ‘when it is strong, when it stands on its own feet.’14
The main documents dealing, either wholly or partly, in defining Russia’s national
security interests in the Arctic are the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian
Federation (RF) on the Arctic for the period to 2020 and beyond15 a revised version of
Russia’s National Security Strategy, approved by the country’s Security Council in May
2009 and a recently approved Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the RF
and the maintenance of national security for the period to 2020.16
13 V Komoedov, Chto ugrozhaet Rossii, (Voenno-promyshlenniy kur’er, no.8, (476), 27/2-5-3-2013, 9); Military
News Bulletin, 8, 1998, 10.
14 Komoedov. ibid.
15 Approved by the President in September 2008, but not actually published until March 2009
16 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30/3/2009; http;//www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html; Krasnaya zvezda, 20/2/2013.
From left to right the 9A85, 9A84 and 9A83 of the S-300V Surface to Air Missile systems currently operated by
the 202nd Air Defence Brigade in the Western Military District in Russia. This brigade received these systems in
1989. The image illustrates the types of tactics and weapons used in the extreme northern districts of Russia.
Photo: Copyright Vitaly V Kusmin, Feb 02 2012, Creative Commons Attribute License, Wikimedia
Reading through all three documents provides the reader with a clear understanding
of Russia’s publicly stated position on how it sees the future development of the Arctic.
The earliest of the three documents openly stated that it will be necessary to create
groups of general purpose forces from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other
troops, military formations… capable of providing military security under various military-
political conditions; optimise the system of complex control over the situation
in the Arctic, including border control at the main points of entry along the
length of state border of the Russian Federation [some 20,000 kms], introduce
a regime of border [guard] zones in the administrative-territorial units of the
Russian Federation’s Arctic zone…bringing border [guard] organs up to [full]
capability in accord with the nature of the threat in RF’s Arctic zone.17
Russia has made considerable inroads into realising the above. The document also
stated that Russia’s eventual aim in the Arctic is to become the latter’s leading power - no
17 VRossiyskaya gazeta, ibid. In September 2011, Putin announced that 134 billion roubles would be spent over
the next 9 years upgrading the border zone in the Arctic, (O Elenskiy, Bor’ba za bogatstva eshche vperedi,
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9/11/2012)
mean ambition when one considers the membership of the Arctic Five, or the growing
presence of China in the Arctic.
The country’s revised National Security Strategy made little direct reference to the
Arctic but, again, is important in outlining the attitude of the country’s senior political
and military elite in relation to Russia’s current and future position on the world stage.
In its opening statement, it noted that:
Russia has overcome the consequences of the systematic political and

socio-economic crisis of the late 20th century…maintained its sovereignty
and territorial integrity, restored the possibility, by strengthening its
market competitiveness and defending its national interests, of becoming
a key element in the formation of multi-polar relations.18
Similar to the country’s earlier published - and current official Military Doctrine
(February 2010) - the Strategy also warned against ‘non-regional actors’ becoming
involved in solutions to ‘existing regional problems and crisis situations.’ So as to avoid
any ambiguity, the Strategy made it clear what it meant by the phrase, ‘non-regional
actors’: the unsustainability of the existing global and regional [security] architecture
focussed particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region, solely on the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation…more and more creates a threat to international security.19
In listing the threats facing the international community, in general, the Strategy also
listed the danger posed by ‘an increasingly noticeable deficit in fresh drinking water’- of
which an important future source could be the water trapped in the ice of the Arctic.20
However, the Strategy also pointed out the impact of the decline in energy resources:
The focus of international politics in the long term…will be concentrated

on securing sources of energy, including the Middle East, on the shelf of
the Barents Sea and in other regions of the Arctic.21
Further reference to the future importance of the Arctic to Russia is revealed in the
section on economic growth:
In the interests of maintaining national security in the medium term…the

energy, information and military infrastructure, particularly in the Arctic
zone…must be developed.22
18 Strategiya…, ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
In short, although there are only a few references to the Arctic in the Strategy, the
latter helped place Russian security policy in the Arctic against the general background
of current and future trends in global politics: occasionally, it is important to see both
the wood and the trees. Combined with the earlier published Fundamentals - as well as
the country’s Military Doctrine - the economic and security importance of the Arctic to
Russia will be a major concern for Russia both in the short to long-term. If one believes
that more conflict will arise as a result of resource nationalism, then the publicly-made
statements by senior members of the Russian political/military elite would appear to
indicate that Russia will do all it can not only to maintain its dominant influence in the
area, but defend it, as well. If the velvet glove does not work Russia is readying an Arctic
fist. In a commentary on the recently published Strategy For The Development Of
The Arctic Zone (February 2013), the author wrote:
It is [generally] held that the probability of military conflicts [breaking

out] over the division of the hydrocarbon reserves on the Arctic shelf
is not great. Nonetheless, the Arctic today is a tasty morsel [lakomiy
kusok] not only for the Arctic powers. Thus, a new strategy has been
developed taking into account Russia’s strategic priorities, maintaining
Russia’s national security and the steady socio-economic development
of the country’s Arctic zone. The strategy is designed to assist solving
the most fundamental tasks of the state in the Arctic zone under current
circumstances.23
The author did not hesitate to point out that, as distinct from the recent past, the
Arctic was now home to fairly large regular military units, the areas themselves include,
according to various estimates, 30% of the world’s unexploited reserves of oil and 15%
of the world’s unexploited reserves of gas, without exaggeration constituting one of the
main oil-gas reserves of the planet.24
Bemoaning the military presence of the Norwegians and South Koreans in the region,
in particular, the author also described the increasing use of the Northern Sea Route
to freight traffic along the most northern part of the globe - last year, 46 ships made
the journey; by 2020, the UN estimates this figure will increase by a factor of 40!25 All
told, the reasons for Russia maintaining and developing its presence in the region look
incontrovertible.
Not long after the publication of the Fundamentals, the Russian news agency, RIA-
Novosti, published the following expert commentary on the overall strategic and military
importance of the Arctic to Russia:
23 E Orlova, Ukrepit’ arkticheskiy perimeter, Krasnaya zvezda, 20/2/2013.

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Increased traffic along the Northern Sea Route will require the
development of the coastal infrastructure along the length of the
Route…This will require tighter military and border controls to check any
attempt to violate the freedom of the seas. Busy maritime traffic is often
accompanied by smuggling, poaching and piracy. Growing seaports
will also need greater protection as they will become attractive military
targets. The Russian Security Council’s decision to maintain a military
force…in the Arctic is aimed at enhancing such protection. To control the
Arctic region, an effective coast guard system should be established, as
well as a developed border [guard] infrastructure in Russia’s Arctic zone
and strong, well-equipped military contingents in the military districts.
Russia’s Northern and Pacific Fleets will shoulder the greatest burden
in protecting the Arctic and the Arctic region.26
Kramnik also made no bones of the fact that currently [Russia] has the strongest
standing position in the impending race for the Arctic. Russia controls the Northern Sea
Route and has some infrastructure along the Arctic, including cities and seaports, which
could be used as bases for further development. Finally, Russia today has the greatest
military potential in the Arctic, as its Northern Fleet is based there, along with several air
force units. These forces are far superior to those [which] other countries in the region
could deploy in the Arctic.27
According to official reports, in 2012 alone, the Northern Fleet carried out 1,300
combat training drills, 60% of which involved ‘the practical use of weaponry’.28
The same newspaper report also detailed a joint inter-branch Command Post Exercise
(CPX), held in September 2012, involving naval, ground and air components, designed
‘to defend the economic and scientific targets in the Arctic region.’29
In a later interview of the current C-in-C of the Northern Fleet, Vice-Admiral Vladimir
Korolyov openly admitted that in 2012, submarine crews of 30 of the Fleet’s
submarine force attested to their combat readiness. Crews of 40 of the
Fleet’s surface vessels also carried out a range of combat exercises. The subs
were at sea for a total of 800 days; the ships - 900 days. Whilst out on patrol,
ship-borne aircraft flew 150 missions in the Atlantic, Northern, Norwegian,
Barents Seas and the Mediterranean. The large anti-submarine warfare ship,
‘Vice-Admiral Kulakov’ was at sea for 159 consecutive days - a record for the
ship - and steamed 29,000 nautical miles.30
26 I Kramnik, Russian Security Council turns to the Arctic, RIA-Novosti, 30/3/2009.

27 Kramnik, ibid.
28 O Vorob’yeva, Zapolyarnye orientiry Severnogo flota, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12/12/2012.
29 Ibid.
30 O Vorob’eva, Severniy shchit Rossii, Krasnaya Zvezda, 19/12/2012.
In the interview, Korolyov also outlined the scope of the earlier-mentioned inter-
branch CPX: it involved a total of 7,000 military personnel, 20 surface ships and
submarines, 30 aircraft and more than 150 pieces of other military kit.31
A contemporary press release of the Western Military District added further
operational detail about the inter-branch CPX, reporting that Marines of the Northern
Fleet had made their first-ever sea-borne landing on the shores of Kotel’niy Island, the
deployment operation involved the study of new navigable areas and military landing
opportunities in different locations along the Arctic shore. Reconnaissance of areas on
the islands of the Novosibirsk archipelago was conducted, as was field testing of military
equipment and ordnance under Arctic conditions.32
The press release also highlighted the fact that the operation was ‘the first time
that combat training of this kind has focussed on protecting civilian facilities, research
stations, drilling facilities and energy-industry installations in the Arctic region.’33 In short,
Russia’s intentions are increasingly more and more obvious in relation to the Arctic: it
sees the latter as vital to its future development and seems to be readying for any and all
The Russian Topol RT-2PM2 Topol-M-05 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile which can be launched from a mobile
carrier or from a silo. This image illustrates the types of tactics and weapons used in the extreme northern
districts of Russia. Photo: Copyright Vitaly V Kusmin, 19 March 2012, Creative Commons Attribute License,
Wikimedia
31 Ibid.
32 A Kislyakov, Russia deploys Arctic troops, http://rbth/artilces/2012/11/02/russia_deploys_arctic_troops_19711.html
33 Ibid.
types of eventuality in the region, including military operations. It would be foolhardy, on

the part of the West, not to recognise and properly analyse Russia’s publicly voiced policy
and practical activity and its determination to maintain, develop and defend its presence
in the region.
It should also not be forgotten that the Arctic is the main operational base for
Russia’s SLBM force, crucial in providing the country with a creditable nuclear deterrent.
If Russia’s SLBM force was compelled to be based and forced to operate in waters
other than those of the Arctic seas, it would become increasingly vulnerable both to
outside monitoring and possible attack, in the event of nuclear conflict. Again, this is an
important consideration for the Russians, the Arctic, enhancing Russia’s overall nuclear
deterrent posture, a factor which should neither be underestimated, nor ignored, in
analysing Russia’s security posture in the region.
Indeed, in a recent interview of the Commander of the Northern Fleet’s submarine
forces, Rear Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev not only confirmed that the Fleet’s submarines
had carried out a large number of combat-training exercises in 2012, but also that the
infrastructure was in place for the arrival of the Russian Navy’s new batch of nuclear-
powered submarine missile cruisers, beginning with the arrival of Yury Dolgorukiy in
January 2013.34 The recently-appointed Russian Minister of Defence, General S Shoigu
confirmed that, in accordance with the country’s published state armaments programme,
by 2020, it is planned that the Russian Navy will receive a further 14 strategic and multi-
role nuclear submarines, of the Borey and Yasen class.35 Shoigu also confirmed that since
the programme has been adopted, the monies allocated, it is simply now a question of
the shipyards building the boats. Once the Navy is satisfied with their performance they
will enter service by the end of the decade. In other words, it is a question of when they
enter service, not if. As noted above, Yury Dolgorukiy has already arrived at Gadzhieva;
a further two of its class are scheduled to join it by the end of next year.36
In an earlier comment on the role of the Arctic in maintaining the effectiveness
of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, one expert noted:
Great is the role of the Arctic in maintaining the defence capability

of Russia…in controlling the sea, air and [land] expanse of our country.
However, its main [importance] is containing the growing military-
political pressure and deep penetration of NATO and the USA in Russia’s
northern geopolitical space, designed to neutralise Russia’s nuclear
containment potential.37
34 O Vorob’eva, Po dolgu lidera, Krasnaya Zvezda, 15/3/2013.

35 Russian Navy to get another 14 nuclear submarines by 2020 – defence minister, BBCM, 10/1/2013.
36 Russian Navy will receive…, ibid.
37 S Koz’menko, V Selin, Kontseptsiya soglasovaniya ekonomicheskoi i oboronnoi deyatel’nosti v Arktike,
(Morskoi sbornik, 4, 2009, 55-56; 55)
There is a lot at stake for Russia in the Arctic. If the relevant commission of the UN does
decide in favour of Russia’s territorial claim for an additional 1.2 m sq kms, then Russia
will be able to proceed to explore, develop and exploit the additional hydrocarbon and
mineral reserves for the benefit of the Russian economy. This could help increase the
country’s internal stability, as well as increase further its external influence.
However, at this point, it would be wise to introduce a number of caveats: firstly,
the figures concerning the potential hydrocarbon and mineral wealth of the region are
estimates - admittedly produced by the highly reputable US Geological Survey, but still
estimates. There could be less there which is economically recoverable than people think;
secondly, even taking into account the prediction of the impact of global warming on
the Arctic, the latter will still be an inhospitable environment to work in and to defend.
Despite the stature of the UN, UNCLOS’s eventual decisions on all the territorial claims
in relation to the Arctic will not be legally binding so, even if the UN commission accepts
Russia’s territorial claim, the other member-states of the UN do not have to. Similarly if
Russia’s claim is rejected - it has been before - by the UN commission, then Russia does
not have to accept the decision, either.
If the decision, as regards the ownership of the Arctic continental shelf, does not
go Russia’s way, what would Russia do then? Abide by it, or ignore it? Will it calmly sit
back and see what it perceives to be a national resource developed by other nations for
the benefit of others? Two member states of the Arctic Five are West European states
(Greenland-Denmark and Norway); a further two are North American(USA and Canada)
and, Russia, well, Euro-Asiatic?
An Su 27SM3 in flight during the Celebration of the 100th Anniversary

of the Russian Air Force in Zhukovskiy. This image illustrates the types
of tactics and weapons used in the extreme northern districts of
Russia. Photo: Copyright Vitaly V Kusmin, 12 August 2012, Creative
Commons Attribute License, Wikimedia
In other words, 4 of the Arctic Five are prominent member-states of NATO and, as
previously described, Russia has a big problem with what it perceives to be a non-
regional actor becoming involved in regional issues. Hence, whilst it has considerably
less problems dealing with USA, Canada, Norway, etc., on a bilateral basis in relation to
the Arctic, it would have a serious problem dealing with NATO, as a bloc, on the Arctic.
Russia is firm in its belief that the Arctic is ours, that it is a national resource, whose
wealth should be used to help develop Russia, primarily. Any NATO involvement in trying
to influence the course of events in the Arctic would be strongly viewed by Russia not
only with suspicion, but almost as interference in its internal affairs. Thus, whilst, in the
normal course of business, it has never ruled out mutually beneficial co-operation to
unleash the natural wealth of the region, it does see the wealth of the Arctic as being
primarily for the development of its economy. Needless to say, this is not a view shared
by many outside of Russia, not least being China. In March 2010, the retired Chinese Rear
Admiral, In Chzho, openly declared that the Arctic belongs to all the peoples of the
world, no one nation can claim sovereignty over it.38
Given the historical, scientific, even emotional, legacy of the Arctic, as well as the
practical economic and military benefits which the Arctic does and could still bring to
Russia, one of the key questions in the first half of the 21st century which has to be
addressed, in the West, Russia and in other states is the following: has Russia drawn a
new red line in the ice of the Arctic?
38 N Volkovskiy, A Pronin, Voina na Arktike, Voenno-promyshlenniy kur’er, 4, 9472) 30-1/5-2-2013.

President John F. Kennedy meets with the Soviet Ambassador and Ministers at the White House Oval Office 18
October 1962. Photo: Robert Knudson, National Archive and Records Administration.
Nuclear Weapons in
Soviet/US Relations
In this article, originally published in BAR 163 Spring 2015, Major Oliver
Ormiston looks at the role that nuclear weapons played in Soviet/US
relations during the 1950s and the 1960s.
This is not a blockade. This is language. A new vocabulary,

the likes of which the world has never seen.1
1 Robert McNamara, portrayed in 13 Days (2000).

By the early 1950s nuclear technology had advanced from the 20 kiloton atom bombs
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to thermo-nuclear bombs with a yield of up to 1 megaton;
the 1954 BRAVO test generated 17 megatons, and the Tsar Bomber in 1961 was 58
megatons.2 Devastation on a scale that had never been seen before had moved the
world from ‘Mediocristan’ to ‘Extremistan’.3 What role did nuclear weapons therefore
have on the diplomatic and military levers of power?4 The main argument here is that the
key impact of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s was the establishment of new
boundaries of escalation; the top rung of escalation ladders was now no longer a very
large conventional war5, but potentially the end of the world.6 There are also secondary
impacts such as nuclear weapons reinforcing spheres of influence, which, in turn, enabled
and forced the use of proxy wars.
Boundaries Of Escalation And Policy By Other Means

The 1950s was a ‘critical’ decade.7 The two superpowers were coming to terms with
the implications of having nuclear weapons, and trying to establish the new rules of
international interaction. Eisenhower articulated the impact early, speaking to the UN
about the ‘new language of atomic warfare’, the ‘probability of civilization destroyed’,
and his fear that the ‘two atomic colossi [were] doomed to malevolently eye each other
indefinitely across a trembling world’.8 This was more than mere political grandstanding;
there is significant supporting evidence from behind-the-scenes correspondence with
Soviet diplomats that he was genuinely concerned.9
Khrushchev expressed similar views a number of times. He would only have started
a war because ‘he was under some great pressure’.10 However, Khrushchev also saw
advancement in nuclear capability (and technology in general) as one of the few metrics
by which the Soviet Union could claim superiority over the US; witness, for example, his
bragging to New York Times journalist James Reston after the launch of Sputnik in 1957.11
Nuclear weapons are an instrument of war, and their use is thus ultimately a
policy tool.12 John Dulles recognised this, and evidenced a number of events in which
(he believed) the threat of nuclear attack influenced policy: Korea in 1953, the Indo-
China partition of 1954, and the prevention of a Chinese invasion of Quemoy-Matsu in
2 ICAN (2013).
3 Taleb (2007).
4 See Army Doctrine Publication: Operations (2011), pp. 3-17.
5 Freedman (1986) provides a thorough study of nuclear escalation ladders (pp. 735-778).
6 For a sobering account of the impact of a nuclear war see Kahn (2007), pp. 40-95.
7 Gaddis (1997), p. 191. Trory (1992) ascribes particular importance to 1952 (pp. 9-29).
8 Eisenhower Archives (1953).
9 For example: Smirnov, Yuri and Zubok, Vladislav (1994), p. 16; FRUS 1952-1954, Vol II, Part 2, Document 231;
and ibid., Document 127.
10 Kahn, op. cit., p. 134.
11 Gaddis, op. cit., p. 240.
12 ‘War is policy by other means’ (Clausewitz (2012), Book 1.24).
Aerial Photograph of Medium Range Ballistic Missile Launch Site Two at San Cristobal. Photo Department of
Defense, 1 November 1962, National Archives and Records Administration.
1954-5.13 Despite his belligerence even Khrushchev held a grudging respect for Dulles’
comprehension of diplomacy; he ‘knew how far he could push us, and he never pushed
us too far... [H]e had never stepped over that brink which he was always talking about in
his speeches.’14 In this diplomatic framework, although the existence of nuclear weapons
raised the stakes, the classic rules of diplomacy and bluffing still provided a basis for
international relations. Both sides bought into the concept of ‘Finite Deterrence; ... that
no nation whose decision makers are sane would attack another nation which was armed
with a sufficiently large number of thermonuclear bombs.’15
Containment and Coexistence

Boundaries were therefore established. But there was still a requirement for geopolitical
manoeuvring and political grandstanding, such as the discussions over the future of
13 Rees (1967), p. 55. See Rosendorf (2005), p. 63, for Dulles’ ‘nuclear schizophrenia’ and ‘oscillating thinking’.
14 Khrushchev (1971), p. 398.
15 Khan, op. cit., p. 8.
Germany and the disarmament posturing at the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955.
However, the fact that these were mere talks, with no hint of military action, were a
marked shift in a European history that had so often seen escalation to violence in the
form of land-centric warfare as the natural conclusion. By now there is the first evidence
of Khrushchev’s emerging ‘coexistence’ policy16, an implicit acceptance that despite
Marxist theory advocating the demise of capitalism, in reality the US (and the West)
were far stronger than envisioned.17 It was the Soviet answer to Kennan’s
‘Containment’ strategy.18
Despite this, the knowledge that Eisenhower genuinely sought to avoid nuclear war
gave Khrushchev freedom of manoeuvre; the possibility of nuclear war had imposed
‘drastic limitations on [US] policies’.19 Soviet influence in the Middle-East and later Cuba
was not deterred. Brutal repressions in Berlin, Hungary, and Poland went unanswered;
Eisenhower was so afraid of potential nuclear conflict that he actively sought to reassure
Khrushchev after the Hungary repression. Later in the same year he drove a clear
wedge between US and UK/French policy over Suez, putting more value on avoiding
confrontation with the USSR than on maintaining good relations with historical and
ideologically aligned allies. Khrushchev had identified this earlier as an element of
Eisenhower’s personality; ‘He was a good man, but he wasn’t very tough. There was
something soft about his character.’20 Khrushchev sniffed weakness and, like all good
(Machiavellian) statesmen, was not afraid to exploit it.
The establishment of these spheres of influence enabled, and even forced low-level
- and relatively nuclear-safe - projections of power. The boundaries were predominantly
geographical, and generally in keeping with Huntingdon’s civilizational fault lines.21
However, there were exceptions, and one that was glaringly obvious: Cuba.
Looking Into The Abyss

The Cuban Missile Crisis was ‘the epochal military confrontation of the cold war’22;
a turning point, and ‘the beginning of a tacit détente between Washington and Moscow
… based on a realisation in Moscow of superior American power’.23 The world had
never come closer to a nuclear war, and both sides saw how quickly (just thirteen days)
situations could escalate. For the only time in its history the US raised its nuclear alert
levels for elements of its military to DEFCON 2.24 Through a combination of diplomatic
16 Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 393-4.

17 Rees (1968), p. 62.
18 See Kennan (1947), pp. 566-582, for the provenance of ‘Containment’.
19 FRUS, op. cit., Document 368.
20 Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 397.
21 Huntingdon (1992), pp.. 22-49).
22 Betts (1987), p. 109.
23 Rees, op. cit., p. 95.
friction, misjudgement of Kennedy’s resolve by Khrushchev (understandable, considering

the Bay of Pigs debacle, Kennnedy’s youth and political inexperience, and Khrushchev’s
experience with Eisenhower), internal pressure, and sheer brinkmanship on the part of
Khrushchev, the Soviet Union brought nuclear weapons to the United States’ back yard.
There was no obvious change in international relations following Cuba. The relevance
of spheres of influence was challenged - Khrushchev would later remark that ‘The USA
has always liked to fight its wars in other people’s lands, but now things have changed.
Every part of the globe is exposed’25 - but proxy wars continued (Vietnam), oppression
of satellite states went unabated (Czechoslovakia), and smaller states played the two
superpowers off against each other (Egypt). What was established was a recognition that
relations between the US and the USSR could escalate rapidly. Indeed, the event probably
served to reinforce spheres of influence. Both nations were now even more cautious
about operating in the other’s area, and the establishment of a hotline and arms controls
were pivotal in preventing future escalations; witness, for example, Kosygin’s message to
Johnson in 1967 regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.26
John F. Kennedy meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna. Photograph from the U. S. Department of State in
the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston
24 Only Strategic Air Command (SAC) went to DEF CON 2; the remainder went to DEF CON 3.
25 Heikal (1978), p. 128.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the primary role of nuclear weapons in Soviet-US relations in
the 1950s-1960s was to expand the boundaries within which international politics could
be played to a level that had never been seen before: Extremistan. Like all weapons,
nuclear weapons remained tools of policy. Secondary effects of these new weapons were
examined: the rational recognition of Mutually Assured Destruction; the brinkmanship
and bluff-calling that was played out both directly and indirectly through spheres of
influence within quickly established strategies of Containment and Peaceful Coexistence;
and finally the main repercussions of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nuclear weapons did not
become the driver for Soviet-US relations, but rather established guidelines within which
normal geopolitics continued to be played out. The consequences of getting it wrong,
however, were far greater than ever before.
Bibliography:
Books
• Betts, Richard K (1987), Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

(Washington DC: Brookings)
• Clausewitz, Carl Von (2012), On War (Acheron Press), Kindle edition
• Gaddis, John Lewis (1997), We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War
History (Croydon: OUP)
• Haselkorn, Avigdor (1978), The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy
1965-1976 (New York: Crane, Russak & Company Inc)
• Heikal, Mohamed (1978), Sphinx and Commissar (London: Collins)
• Kahn, Herman (2007), On Thermonuclear War (New Jersey:
Transaction)
• Khrushchev, Nikita (1971), Khrushchev Remembers, tr. Strobe Talbot
(London: Little, Brown & Co)
• Rees, David (1968), The Age of Containment (Glasgow: Macmillan)
• Saull, Richard (2001), Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War
(London: Frank Cass).
• Taleb, Nicholas (2007), Black Swan (Kindle Edition)
• Trory, Ernie (1998), Peace and the Cold War (Hove: Crabtree Press)
• Wolfson, Murray ed., Essays on the Cold War (Chippenham: Macmillan)
• Army Doctrine Publication: Operations (Andover: DCDC, 2011).
26 FRUS, Vol XIX, Document 156.

Articles
• Freedman, Lawrence (1986), ‘The First Two Generations of nuclear

Strategies’, in Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert eds.,
Makers of Modern Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 735-778
• Huntingdon, Samuel (1992), ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1992, pp. 22-49
• Kennan, George (1947), ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, Jul 1947, pp. 566-582
• Rosendorf, Neal (2005), ‘John Foster Dulles; Nuclear Schizophrenia’, in
Gaddis, John Lewis, Gordon, Philip H., May, Ernest R., and Rosenberg,
Jonathan eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb (New York:
Oxford University Press)
• Smirnov, Yuri, and Zubok, Vladislav (1994), ‘Nuclear Weapons after
Stalin’s Death: Moscow Enters the H-bomb age’, in Cold War History
Project Bulletin, Issue 4, Fall 1994
Websites
• ICAN, http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/the-nuclear-age/
Films
• 13 Days (New Line Cinema, 2000).
Other sources
• Text of the address delivered by the President of the United States

before the General assembly of the United Nations in New York City,
Tuesday afternoon, December 8, 1953, from the Eisenhower Archives,
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research
• Memorandum from the US Dept of State to the Embassy of the
Soviet Union of 9 Jul 1954, (Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952–1954 Volume II, Part 2, National Security Affairs, Document 231,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments
• Memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to the US Embassy in
the Soviet Union (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954
Volume II, Part 2, National Security Affairs, Document 127, 6 Dec

1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments
• Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International
Information Activities (Washington), June 30, 1953, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1952–1954, Volume II, Part 2, National Security
Affairs, Document 368, from http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/
files/document_conversions/45/jackson_report.pdf
• Message from Premier Kosygin to President Johnson, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XIX, Arab-Israeli
Crisis and War, 1967, document 156, from http://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments
This 1962 Photo from the U.S. Department of Defense shows Soviet missile equipment being loaded
at port in Cuba. Photo: U.S. Department of Defense.
A minibus burnt by pro-Russian attackers during the Odessa clashes May 2014 at Gretska Plochcha. Photo Yuriy
Kvach, Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike 3.0 Unported License, Wikimedia.
Russian Roulette
Originally published in BAR 163 Spring 2015, this article by Chris Fisher
looks at how Russian President Vladimir Putin has learned to beat us at
our own game
In his seminal article on the Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism Ian Hurd
depicts international institutional norms and symbols as a strategic resource that is open
to manipulation by states.1 President Vladimir Putin has played out Hurd’s thesis to great
effect: Russia has annexed strategically crucial territory, cowed a rebellious neighbour
1 Hurd, Ian, (2005) The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003.
International Organization, 59, pp 495-526.
and shown the helplessness of Western powers. Russia has been able to do so partly
as a result of the West overdrawing on what Hurd describes as the ‘moral economy of
symbolic politics.2 His actions challenge and may have unintended consequences on the
very international norms and institutions in question.
I focus my analysis on one international regime, International Law, and two
institutions: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN Security Council. Case
studies are based in Russian activity in its ‘near abroad’, particularly the 2008 war against
Georgia resulting in the permanent occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and more
recent events in the Crimea and the Ukraine. I draw on a number of well documented
sources but the most recent events will be dependent on (in some cases unconfirmed)
media reports owing to the very current and essentially presentational nature of
the subject.
Background
Russia has acquired something of a track record in terms of powerful displays of force
in its near abroad: of the four ‘frozen conflicts’ that International Law recognises three3,
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, involve Russia as the main protagonist. At
the time of writing it appears that she has just added a fourth to that account in the
form of Crimea, recently annexed from Ukraine. In each example Russia has used force
to take de facto control of the internationally recognised sovereign territory of a former
constituent state of the Soviet Union where there is a preponderance of ethnic Russians.
Each one appears to be a prima facia case of aggression and expansionism, but despite
this, Russian rhetoric has been laced with the language of Western liberalism and of
International Law. Despite the gravity of the purported violations of International Law
both the ICJ and the Security Council, the two international bodies that could wield
appropriate authority, have been conspicuously silent.4
Ian Hurd’s article is based on the story of the alleged Lockerbie-bombers and Libya’s
legal battle with the US and UK to prevent their extradition and subsequent trial. In a
somewhat surprising turn of events, despite the overwhelming material power enjoyed by
the US and UK and the apparent ‘moral high ground’ of their argument, they were forced
into a humiliating climb down and an unanticipated compromise. The themes that Hurd
brings out are worth highlighting. Hurd posits that in a social constructivist interpretation
of international relations, legitimacy, or perhaps more accurately the perception of
legitimacy, is of great importance. Powerful states may elect to delegate actions to
international institutions precisely in order to enhance those perceptions of legitimacy so
that they appear to be carried out for a greater good and in keeping with international
2 ibid, p.528
3 Weller, 2014
4 The ICJ pronounced in 2011 that it did not have jurisdiction in the Russia-Georgia case.
norms of good behaviour rather than simply being viewed as unilateral expressions
of self-interest. The Libya case demonstrates how the symbols associated with those
institutions can be hijacked or misappropriated by states for their own ends using the
‘natural incompleteness of authority to undermine existing power relations.’5
The three themes (or symbols) that were the foundation of the US/UK argument (the
threat posed to international peace and security; Libya’s non-compliance with procedural
justice and her defiance of the collective will of the international community) were
turned on their head by the Libyan regime to such an extent that it achieved a growing
consensus (particularly amongst African and developing states) that it was in fact the US/
UK that were out of kilter with international norms. Compliance and defection problems
gave Libya the ammunition she needed to successfully portray her opponents as bullying,
colonial powers, paying lip-service to an international legal system that was supposed
to protect smaller, vulnerable states. Indeed, this narrative threatened to undermine the
legitimacy of international institutions (particularly the UN Security Council) that the US/
UK had used to press their case. An alternative view of the institutions as instruments of
Western foreign policy rather than objective, non-partisan bodies started to take hold.
The threat posed to those institutions, became so grave that the US/UK felt compelled
to compromise in order to safeguard their considerable investment in those
institutions themselves.
Norms and Symbols of International Law

Russia has attempted to reframe the narrative of its recent adventures using two
ostensibly inviolable principles of International Law: the prohibition of the use of force
and sanctity of territorial integrity. The symbolic nature of each of these is deeply
ingrained in international treaty and case law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is explicit:
‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’ The International
Law Commission Articles6 make the use of force a jus cogens issue, that is to say an
infringement of a peremptory norm of International Law that enjoys a higher status, a fact
confirmed in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention Law on Treaties. In Nicaragua vs
US7 the ICJ confirmed the prohibition of the use of force had, through custom, become a
Principle of International Law. In 1990 the violent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, in breach
of this law, led to immediate condemnation by the UN Security Council and a unanimous
resolution (660) that required Iraq to withdraw to pre-invasion positions.
There are two widely acknowledged exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force.
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter the right of a state to act in Self Defence if she comes
5 Hurd p. 502
6 ILC Articles, 1966
7 International Court of Justice, 1986
The United Nations Building in New York. UN Photo/Andrea Brizzi
under armed attack. The use of force narrowly constrained however through minute
definition of what in fact constitutes ‘armed attack’.8 The second exception is when
the UN Security Council mandates action under Chapter VII of the Charter. In this case
definition is subjective but the use of force is constrained by the process (members of the
8 See treaty law such as the Helsinki Final Act or UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the Definition of an
Act of Aggression; and ICJ case law such as the Caroline and Nicaragua cases
Council must be convinced enough to vote for it; P5 states must be convinced enough not
veto it) and mandate (the wording of the resolution adopted may impose limitations on
the nature of the force used). On the only four occasions when there has been a ‘breach
of the peace’ the UN Security Council has taken positive Chapter VII action three times
to restore the status quo.9
The principle of Territorial Integrity enjoys an equally lofty status. It can be traced
back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the birth of the modern state system, with
which it is in some ways synonymous. It is also enshrined in the 1933 Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States and in the UN Charter (see above).
The doctrine of self-determination, which in principle allows for peoples to determine
their own government is highly restricted to colonial and constitutional instances by
UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541. There has been only one successful
example of unilateral opposed self-determination since the Second World War, this being
the unique circumstances of Bangladesh in 1971.10 Examples of illegal entities such as
South Rhodesia and the Bantustans, which were created in violation of International
Law were squashed by UN Security Council action.
The Use of Symbols

Western states have been unambiguous in their condemnation of Russia’s actions using
the symbolic importance of the two norms above to justify their outrage. It is instructive
to observe how central the theme of international unity is to President Obama’s
statement:
[W]e have been guided by a fundamental principle - the future of

Ukraine must be decided by the people of Ukraine. That means Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected, and international
law must be upheld… Russia’s decision to send troops into Crimea has
rightly drawn global condemnation. From the start, the United States has
mobilized the international community in support of Ukraine to isolate
Russia for its actions and to reassure our allies and partners. We saw this
international unity again over the weekend, when Russia stood alone in
the U.N. Security Council defending its actions in Crimea.11
UK politicians have unsurprisingly used similar symbology, although it is worth noting

that the emphasis on unity and the threat posed to the international community has a
distinctly European flavour to it:
9 Korea 1951, Falkland Islands 1982, Iran-Iraq 1987, Iraq-Kuwait 1991

10 Crawford, 1999
11 www.whitehouse.gov, 17-03-2014
A wake ceremony in Kulikovo Pole square Odessa takes place on the 9th day of the death of the victims of
the Odessa clashes, 2nd May 2014. Photo HOBOPOCC, Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike License,
Wikimedia.
The steps taken by President Putin today to attempt to annex Crimea

to Russia are in flagrant breach of international law and send a chilling
message across the continent of Europe. Britain depends on the stability
and security of the international order. That relies on a rules based system
where those who ignore it face consequences. And that’s why the EU and
the United States have already imposed sanctions.12
Both of these statements (which were no doubt agreed between London and Washington
prior to release) echo the narrative in the initial stage of Hurd’s examination of the Libya-
Lockerbie case: an isolated state has acted in blatant contravention of international norms
and taken unilateral action that will be punished by sanctions imposed by an indignant
and united international community.
But how has Russia reframed this narrative using the very same symbols?
12 www.gov.uk, 18-03-2014
Protection of Russian Citizens

This theme is aimed at addressing the issue of intervention and was at the forefront
of Russian statements in both the Georgia War and events in Ukraine. The essence of
the argument is that Russia has a constitutional obligation to protect it citizens abroad.
Russian Judge Zorkin states that wheresoever there is a clash of interests the Russian
Constitution will take precedence over International Law.13 Whilst this argument is
unlikely to win much support amongst international lawyers it is not without precedent
as we shall see. Perhaps more persuasive is the argument that Russia’s use of force is
really a form of humanitarian intervention. This doctrine, which finds favour among some
international lawyers14, also has precedent in Kosovo and Iraq but was described warily
by Lord Goldsmith in 2003 only as ‘emerging as a further, exceptional, basis for the use of
force’15 [my emphasis]. In order to support this argument Russia has focused on the threat
posed to ethnic Russians by the armed forces of the other state.
Pro-Russian rally in Donetsk. Photo Andrew Butko, Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike License,
Wikimedia.
In the Georgian case this is relatively straightforward: the first armed action was
carried out by Georgia herself against the two breakaway republics who had enjoyed
de facto independence from Georgia for some time. Mikheil Saakashvili, a hot-headed
13 Issaeva, Sergeeva & Suchkova, 2011, p.80

14 Weller, 2008
15 Goldsmith, 07-03-2003
and nationalistic leader had ordered the action on the night of 7th August 2008 under
the cover of opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. Russian troops responded
quickly routing the Georgian armed forces and occupying parts of uncontested Georgian
territory. Russia accused the Georgian forces of genocide and ethnic cleansing16; Putin,
then Prime Minister, flew to the Russian side of the border and enjoyed lavish press
coverage listening to horror stories of Georgians ‘burning young girls alive …stabbing
babies and running tanks over old women and children’ from refugees who had fled north
to escape the conflict.’17
Illegality of Other State’s Actions

In Crimea, reframing Ukraine’s actions was also critical to the justification of the
occupation, however Russia’s armed seizure of Crimea was unopposed and Ukraine’s
armed forces remained confined to barracks without firing a shot. Instead, Russian
rhetoric focussed on activity in Kiev. Moscow refused to recognise the interim government
that formed after President Yanukovych fled the country. Yanukovych, they insisted,
had been removed by a counter-constitutional coup and remained the legitimate leader
of the Ukraine.18 By doing so Russia compared the situation with coups that had taken
place in Haiti and in Sierra Leone which, despite being the internal affairs of those states,
the international community, led by the West had condemned and refused to accept.
Reinforcing those symbols, the Russian Ambassador to the UN brandished a letter from
the ousted Yanukovych to the Russian leader requesting military support and in effect
inviting Russian forces to protect his government against this coup.19
Russia insisted that the new authority in Kiev was not only undemocratic, but that
it was fascist. Dredging up images of the horrors of the Second World War would have
a profound effect on Russia’s domestic population as well as those ethnic Russians
living in Ukraine. Russian state media routinely used the swastika to symbolise the new
government. In doing so they were making the most of the participation of far-right
elements in the months of protests and were assisted by incidents such as that (widely
rebroadcast by the state media) in which far-right Ukrainian MP Svobodovtsy beat up
a television producer before forcing him to resign.20 The effect was to create doubt and
fear about the legitimacy, nature and intentions of the new Ukrainian regime. This was
underpinned with frequent references to the West and especially the EU, as having played
a destabilising role that had politically fractured the Ukraine allowing fascists elements to
seize control.21
16 Medvedev, 26-08-2008
17 Economist, 16-08-2008
18 Medvedev, 25-02-2014
19 Churkin, 04-03-2014
20 YouTube, 19-03-2014
21 Putin, 19-03-14
They’re Not Our Troops!

Moscow insisted that the men dressed in Russian army uniforms, driving Russian
registered army vehicles who appeared shortly after the arrival of a number of Russian
air transport vehicles that landed at the Russian airbase, were not Russians but elements
of a Crimean Self-Defence force. These well-drilled and well-equipped irregulars wore
no insignia and did not fly the Russian tricolour. They did not speak to the Ukrainian
soldiers that they kept besieged in their bases and they did not give interviews. Whilst
this deception was quickly unveiled22, it nevertheless distorts perception. If they were
locally recruited volunteers then the situation would conveniently resemble that of
the Kosovo Liberation Army that had sought to protect ethnic Albanians from Serbian
human rights abuses over a decade before, and which enjoyed the support of Western
powers. Whoever they were, they also behaved with remarkable discipline and restraint:
performing their duties with weapons unloaded, firing warning shots rather than killing
shots when challenged and enjoying widespread, if sometimes somewhat staged,
support from Crimean locals. The fact that the military occupation of the Crimea was
achieved peacefully was a powerful symbol of legitimacy in itself.
Self-Determination
The Georgian War took place only months after Kosovo had declared independence
from Serbia and the Russian government went to great lengths to demonstrate that
the independence of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were echoes of the same event.
Although both entities had long since declared independence, Russia became the first
state to internationally recognise them on 26 Aug 2008:
A decision needs to be taken based on the situation on the ground.

Considering the freely expressed will of the Ossetian and Abkhaz
peoples and being guided by the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Governing Friendly
Relations Between States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and
other fundamental international instruments, I signed Decrees on the
recognition by the Russian Federation of South Ossetia’s and
Abkhazia’s independence.23
Medvedev followed up his statement with a comparison to Kosovo:
Western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo’s illegal declaration of

independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be
22 Stopfake, 06-03-14
23 Medvedev
A burned residential apartment

building in Lysychansk, July 28
2014. Photo Pryshutova Viktoria,
Creative Commons Attribution
Share Alike license, Wikimedia.
impossible, after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens
of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo
Albanians was not good for them. In international relations, you cannot
have one rule for some and another rule for others.24
Whilst very few states joined Russia in recognising the two states, Russia had
couched the issue in international legal terminology: she emphasised the free and
democratic will of the people of both of breakaway republics and went through an
ostensibly democratic process herself as the matter was dealt with by the Federation
Council and State Duma (the elected representatives of the people) on whose authority
Medvedev acted.
Events in Ukraine followed a similar pattern six years later. The Duma authorised the
deployment of Russian troops to the Crimean peninsular, a referendum was quickly held
effectively subordinating the choice of government to the will of the people and Russia’s
recognition was carried out with all the pomp and ceremony that could be mustered.
The signing of Russia’s formal acceptance of the newly independent Crimea by Putin and
Sergey Aksyoov, the erstwhile Prime Minister of Crimea, was framed as a triumph of the
popular will of the people of both Crimea and Russia over the chaos and tyranny of an
illegal far-right regime in Kiev.
Righting a Historical Wrong

Unlike the other frozen conflicts, Russia chose to integrate Crimea into the Russian
Federation itself, a significantly more profound act than simply recognising an
independent (albeit vassal) state. Russia based the justification of its actions on the
unique place that Crimea enjoys in the Russian psyche, drawing on the symbolic
24 FT, 26-08-2008
importance of the Crimean War and the unusual circumstances of its transfer to Ukrainian
sovereignty in 1954. Putin offered up an apparently emotive narrative that suggested that
Crimea had never really ceased to be part of Russia and that the half-century of Ukrainian
primacy in the peninsular had really just been a technicality.25
Regardless of legality Russia was able to successfully appropriate the symbols
associated with the legal use of force and the legal manifestation of self-determination.
The Russian narrative above avoids dwelling on counter-arguments such as the many
treaties broken by the actions, Russia’s status as a guarantor of Ukrainian territorial
integrity, the legitimacy of referenda held at gunpoint, the status of the Ukrainian and
Georgian Constitutions or the absence of any meaningful evidence of atrocities in South
Ossetia. But it offers much more than simply a defence of Russian actions: appealing to
both domestic and international audiences it turns the tables on Western powers, blaming
them for interference and accusing them of stoking anti-Russian sentiment amongst
traditional Russian allies; it accuses them of hypocrisy and double standards.
If Hurd is right and there exists a ‘moral economy of symbolic politics’26 then perhaps
it is true that West has overdrawn on its account? Since the end of the Cold War the West
and the US in particular have become embroiled in a series of contentious conflicts that
have tested the rule of International Law. The prohibition of the use of force appears
clear in classical International Law but recent developments including the evolution of the
doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention introduce a grey area. NATO’s actions in bombing
Belgrade and moving ground forces into Kosovo in 1999 were achieved without a Security
Council mandate and certainly did not meet the criteria for self-defence. Similarly the
US-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq was justified by tenuous links to a mandate over ten
years old. The legality of both was challenged by the so-called ‘status quo’ powers China
and Russia. Afghanistan (2001) and Libya (2011) have both been cited as examples of the
West exceeding the terms of a Security Council mandate in order to achieve their own
discrete objectives (regime change).
Similarly the widespread recognition of Kosovo by the West in 2008 was vehemently
opposed by Russia. Putin claimed that it was a:
Terrible precedent, which will de facto blow apart the whole system of
international relations, developed not over decades, but over centuries …
they have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At the
end of the day it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back
and hit them in the face.
25 Putin, 18-03-2014
26 Hurd, 2005
Although the West had made a case that this was sui generis (circumstances were
unique and that it would set no precedent) there was no consensus; the issue split the
international community with 107 of 192 states officially recognising Kosovo.27
The US has gained a degree of notoriety as the global hegemon leading some to
believe that it can pick and chose when to play by the rules. The ICJ’s28 decision that US
intervention in Nicaragua had been contrary to International Law received great criticism
in Congress and resulted in the US withdrawing jurisdiction from the ICJ. The judgement
called for the US to pay reparations to the Nicaraguan regime but US subsequently
blocked draft Security Council resolutions calling for compliance with the ruling. A later
General Assembly vote demanding compliance was passed by 94 votes to 3 and was
ignored by the US. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the US ambassador to the UN dismissed the ICJ
as ‘semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body, which nations sometimes accept and
sometimes don’t.’29
In 2003 the US defended its use of force against Iran in the Oil Platforms case as self
defence. This argument was dismissed by the ICJ who ruled against the US and demanded
once again that they pay reparations. Once again, the judgement was roundly ignored.30
Seen here are the effects of the attacks during the ongoing Ukraine Crisis on the Donetsk Regional Museum.
Photo by Andrew Butko, GNU FDL Creative Commons Attribution License, Wikimedia.
27 kosovothanksyou.com
28 Liptak, 10-03-2010
29 Kirkpatrick,1986
30 Harris, 2010
None of this makes Russia’s recent activity any more legal; two wrongs do not make
a right. Nor does it necessarily foretell the demise of the international legal order; as in
domestic law, actors may break laws but that does not mean that that law no longer
exists. Panke and Petersohn, for example, provide evidence that ‘norm degeneration
processes are more likely to take place if other actions do not or cannot invest resources
to punish obvious or hidden instances of non-compliance in order to stabilise the norm in
question’.31 The point of the examples above is not to condemn Western action32 but to
show that by continual unchecked infringement, the norm itself can be weakened.
That Russian action may be a thin liberal institutional veil to disguise a materialistic
intent is irrelevant to Hurd: ‘sincerity is beside the point … [w]hat matters is how the
audience reacts to the claims’. In fact, international opinion has not achieved anywhere
near the same consensus as the Lockerbie case and instead of being faced with defection
problems, Western states are struggling to achieve unity in the first place. Whilst there
are no examples of outright support for Russian intervention the developing world has
been circumspect in its response and cautious to avoid condemnation. When the US
sponsored a Security Council draft resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea
the Chinese ambassador abstained stating noncommittally that, ‘[t]he vote… at this
juncture will only result in confrontation and further complicate the situation, which is
not in conformity with the common interest of both the people of Ukraine and those of
the international community’,33 a position consistent with China’s stance on the Georgian
breakaway republics. The Economist reported a source close to Xi Jinping claiming that
the Chinese President has telephoned President Putin to advise him against holding a
referendum in Crimea, but that ‘in no case will China criticise Russia publicly’.34 India,
has also been reluctant to criticise Russia recognising ‘legitimate Russian and other
interests involved’.35
Indeed there has hardly been unity amongst Western powers on the strength of the
response and whilst there was finally a statement from the G7 countries condemning
Russian action, European states, particularly Germany have been noticeably more ‘dovish’
in their negotiating position than the harder line taken by Washington.36 Putin appears
to have opened up cracks in the coalition of states that oppose him. There is evidence
too of a two-level game being played out.37 Reports suggest that European powers are
more reluctant to adopt sanctions against Russia because they fear damage to their
31 PPanke & Petersohn, 2011

32 There are many crucial differences from the Russian cases: concerted attempts to obtain Security Council
resolutions, the legitimising effect of coalition support or the fruitless decade of international negotiation that
exhausted settlement options prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence to name a few.
33 Xinhua, 16-03-14
34 Economist, 15-03-2014
35 ibid
36 Waterfield, 20-03-2014
37 Putnam, 1988
own economies that are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies.38 Russia’s claims
that its actions are legitimate and legal may offer Western states a way to avoid a costly
confrontation whilst simultaneously appealing to domestic audiences that they stand by
their principles.
The international bodies that were instrumental in the isolation of Libya in the
Lockerbie case have been rendered redundant. The ICJ does not have jurisdiction unless
both state-parties give their consent, something that Russia is extremely unlikely to do;
the Security Council has also been frozen out by Russia’s veto although the vote of 13
out of 15 states to adopt the resolution condemning the Russian annexation suggests a
majority of states fall into line with the US when they are compelled to give an opinion.39
Whilst commentators and politicians can make all the claims they like, with institutional
paralysis there will be (as with Georgia) no definitive judgement of legality. All that is
left is international opinion, and when that becomes divided then legitimacy becomes
ambiguous. Much will depend on ‘floating voters’ like China and India who, for selfish
or ideological reasons, seem likely to continue to refuse to express an opinion.
The long-term effect on the use of force and territorial integrity norms is unclear
although Panke and Petersohn offer cause for hope. Two factors that they determine
may give a norm longevity are the presence of competing norms and the inherent
imprecision of the norm itself.40 The West has already indicated that it will not surrender
its interpretation of these norms and is making efforts to achieve global consensus.
Ironically, the norms themselves may also be less brittle and fragile thanks to years of
inconclusive debate over grey area issues such as pre-emptive, self-defence or remedial
self-determination.
Conclusions
Russia’s actions in her ‘near abroad’ broadly confirm Hurd’s three principles. That
legitimacy is central in international relations is evidenced in the lengths to which Russia
and the West have tried to frame the narrative using the symbology of international law
to convince domestic and international audiences that their interpretation is correct. What
is perhaps surprising is the shallowness of legitimacy given that when one cuts away the
rhetoric, international law in this case seems to be fairly clear.41 But without the voice of
international institutions to iterate it, that same rhetoric clouds the issue and offers states
that may not wish to take sides a way of doing so without doing themselves harm.
There also appears to be a ‘moral economy of symbolic politics’ and Russia has made
full use of what it sees as Western hypocrisy. In the Russian narrative it is the Western
38 ITARTASS, 27-03-2014, WSJ, 03-03-2014

39 UN News Centre, 15-03-2014
40 2011, p.735
41 Weller, 2014
powers that have weakened the norms in question whilst she has simply had to adjust to
this changing dynamic. A brief counterfactual thought analysis illustrates how valuable
this has been: if Russia had not been able to allude to changing norms or the weakening
effect of Western actions then her legal argument would carry much less power and
be presentationally less compelling. Moreover, she may have decided to fall back on
a unilateral right to exert force in these circumstances or her argument that she was
righting a historic wrong. Such a brazen abuse of norms would surely have left developing
states less room for ambiguity and would have pushed wavering European states towards
a harder line and more punitive countermeasures.
Russia’s argument becomes absurd however when examined in any detail: far from
internalising a norm as it cascades 42 Russia has herself adopted a schizophrenic position
that sees her using the symbols of self-determination and humanitarian intervention:
on the one hand Putin made extraordinary use of the Kosovo example in his speech
accepting Crimea into the Russian Federation43 but at the same time continues to block
Kosovo’s entry into the United Nations and views her declaration of independence illegal.
Similarly Russia shows no signs of adopting a more liberal view of her own territorial
integrity vis-a-vis a referendum on the independence of Chechnya. Contradictory signals
like this allow us to remove any doubt we may have about Russian altruism and see how
cynically she has deployed the symbology of international law to her advantage.
Finally, it has reinforced Hurd’s assertion that material power is not necessarily a
good indicator of the distribution of power in a moral economy. Russia has been able
to take action without any serious threat to her own security and at time of writing an
unknown severity of economic sanctions. She has been able to do so despite having given
the world a dress-rehearsal in Georgia in 2008. In fact the attitudes in the West seem to
be shaped by how much worse it could be if Russia were to invade Eastern Ukraine.
The scale of Russia’s actions is of course far greater than those of Libya refusing to
hand over a couple of suspected terrorists, no matter what their crime. Russia has not
only challenged US and Western power by using force to annex Crimea, she has shaken
the international system and the laws that purport to govern it. In the fullness of time
this may backfire as certain ‘floating voters’, in particular China, would potentially stand
to lose a great deal if the international legal system and UN Security Council were to be
weakened. The powerlessness of crucial international institutions, or as Hurd would put
it the ‘natural incompleteness of authority’ has been laid bare. Whether these norms and
institutions that the West has come to rely on are strong enough to survive this challenge
remains to be seen.
42 Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998

43 17-03-2014
The wake ceremony in Odessa’s Kulikovo Pole Square remembering the victims of the Odessa clashes.
Photo HOBOPOCC, Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike License, Wikimedia.
Russian T-80 Main Battle Tank: Photo Vitaly V Kusmin http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/188
Is Russia Preparing
For War?
In this article, published in BAR 164 Autumn 2015, Dr. Steven J Main of
the Russian Military Studies Office (RMSO) looks at the creation of the
Russian National Defence Management Centre in March 2015 and asks
if Russia is preparing for conflict.
The current consensus in the West is that recent events in eastern Ukraine could simply
be a foretaste of even worse things to come. Given the recently announced weapons
procurement figures for 20151, (never mind the regular probing, for instance, of Britain’s
air defence system), Russia’s re-militarisation looks set to continue and primarily designed
to aid Russia claw back some of the strategic ground lost in the 1990s. However,
this article is not greatly interested in examining the equipment side of Russia’s re-
militarisation plans, but is much more focussed on the organisational nature of changes
which have taken place inside the Russian military-civil complex, recently, and which have
largely gone by without comment, or analysis, in the West.2
Just as important, if not more so, than having the equipment to wage war is ensuring
that all the relevant component parts of the state, which are designed to wage war, are
in place and fully operational from the top down. Largely ignored in the West, Russia
took a giant step forward in this particular area with the full operational activation of the
National Defence Management Centre (NDMC) at the end of 2014. Built at an estimated
cost of 40 pre-sanction/oil plummet-price/ billion roubles, in terms of its physical size,
this significant building - it has a number of helipads and its own berth on the Moscow
riverbank and is reputed to be as big below ground as above3 - is located within the
complex of the Main Command of Ground Forces in Moscow - and looks destined to be
the head designed to control the body in the run up to and, more significantly, in the
event of war.4
Frunzenskaya embankment, Moscow, headquarter of the Russian Ground Forces and the National Defence
Management Centre. Photo Ikar.us, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License, Wikipedia.
1 According to official figures, published in the Russian media, in 2015 alone, the Russian Armed Forces are
scheduled to receive 701 new tanks, BMPs, armoured transport carriers; 126 new planes; 88 new helicopters;
5 new surface warships; 50 ICBMs, etc (ITAR-TASS, ‘Oboronniy zakaz na 2015 god’,
http://tass.ru/infographics/8249
2 Only available comment that this author could find in English on the subject was an English translation of
an original piece in Russian namely, ‘Russia launches ‘wartime government’ HQ in major military upgrade’,
(1/12/2014: http://rt.com/news/210307-russia-natioonal-defence-center/
3 V Miasnikov, ‘Natsional’niy tsentr upravleniia oboronoi RF’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No.40
(829), 7-13/11/2014; Yu Gavrilov, ‘Dom na naberezhnoi. Strogo sekretno…V Moskve nachalos’ stroitekl’stvo
Natsional’nogo tsentra upravleniia oboronoi Rossii’, http://www.rg.ru/printable/2014/012/20/oborona-site.html
Whilst its exact role, for instance, in relation to Russia’s action in eastern Ukraine,
can only be surmised at present, there can be little doubt that, given its published
responsibilities and, more to the point, capabilities, it can be safely assumed that it
played its part and helped Putin ascertain Russia’s best way forward in relation to
the (eventual) settlement arrived at in Minsk. Headed by Lieutenant-General Mikhail
Mizintsev5 the Centre became fully operational on 1st December 2014, having successfully
completed an initial trial period (which included the large-scale ‘Vostok-2014’ CPX held
in the Russian Far East).6 As will be detailed below, the Centre has its own trained staff,
uniform, standard, even an anthem and, as implied by the opening paragraph, a number
of official statements have been made (including by the Russian Minister of Defence,
Sergey Shoigu and the Head of the Centre, M Mizintsev) which have compared the
Centre’s duties to that of a modern version of a number of important Soviet organs of
WW2.7 Psychologically, this in itself is interesting, as it would imply that Russia is, not to
put too fine a point on things, preparing for war or, at least, military conflict. This should
not be taken to mean that Russia will declare war this time tomorrow afternoon, but it
does imply that, having examined and analysed military conflict over the past 20 years, in
particular, Russia is stealing a march on its Western counterparts and, given the Russian
historical memory - especially prevalent this year - has no intention of being strategically
blind-sided by events either inside, or outside, its territorial boundaries.
The immediate background to the creation of the Centre would appear to confirm
not only the importance of the work of the earlier-created Crisis Situation Centre, (part
of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, (MES)); the ruling regime’s analysis surrounding
the ’coloured’ revolutions of the past decade in various republics of the former Soviet
Union but, most importantly of all, the importance of the appointment of the previous
head of MES,Sergey Shoigu, to the post of Minister of Defence in November 2012.8 Along
with the appointment of Shoigu, the restructuring of the Russian Ministry of Defence
continued, with the swift appointment of former Commander of Western Military District
(MD), Colonel-General Bakin as Shoigu’s First Deputy Minister of Defence, just three days
after Shoigu’s appointment.9 By the middle of January 2013, Shoigu had appointed a
further two new deputy Ministers of Defence (Yu E Sadovenko and R Kh Tsalikov), men
4 Miasnikov, ibid.; ‘Na boevoe dezhurstvo zastupila operativnaia dezhurnaia smena Natsional’nogo tsentra
upravlenia oboronoi Rossii, (http://function.mil.ru/news _page/country/more.htm?id=12002205@News&_
print=t; D Semenov, ‘K upravleniu oboronoi strany – pristupit’!’ Krasnaia Zvezda, 1/12/2014; D Tel’manov,
‘Shoigu peredet na Frunzenskiui naberezhnuiu’, Izvestiia, 2/8/13, (http://izvestia.ru/news/554789
5 Lieutenant-General M E Mizintsev (DoB 10/9/1962) is, by all accounts, an extremely experienced and able
Staff officer. Latest information is that he’s currently being considered for one of the prestigious State Russian
Federation MSU G K Zhukov awards, Krasnaia Zvezda, 27/2/2015.
6 Miasnikov,’Natsional’bniy tsentr…’ ibid.
7 At various times, both Shoigu and Mizintsev have compared the Centre to Stavka (GHQ) of the Red Army in
WW2, whilst other commentators have compared it to the USSR’s WW2 State Defence Committee
8 Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoi Federatsii: Ministr oborony Shoigu Sergei Kuzhugetovich, http://structure.mil.
ru/management/minister.htm?fid=null&_print=true
9 Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoi Federatsii: informatsiia o rukovoditele Bakhin Arkady Viktorovich,
http://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy/more.htm?id=10330380@SD_Employee&
who had worked with him in the MES. The appointment of Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov
to the post of CGS on 9th November 201210 - the same day as Bakin’s appointment -
meant that, not long after becoming Russia’s MoD, Shoigu had a number of men at the
top of Russia’s military tree who had either worked with him in the MES, or when he
was Governor of Moscow oblast’. This would ensure a smooth path for any reform he
wished to push through, (always assuming, of course, presidential approval). As borne
out by subsequent events, this bode well for the creation of the NDMC. Given the weight
of the MES element in the top military hierarchy, it would appear that the decision and
drive to create the Centre came from the former, an assertion further supported by a
statement in one of Russia’s main newspapers following the appointment of yet another
long-standing colleague of Shoigu’s - Pavel Popov - to the post of Deputy Defence
Minister on 7th November 2013. According to the newspaper article: ‘as deputy head in
the defence ministry, he [Popov] will continue to work on creating the State’s National
Defence Management Centre, [my emphasis] as well as innovative research, designs and
the ‘informatisation’ [‘informatizatsiia’] of the activity of the military department.’ As the
article also pointed out, Popov had previous experience in this area, when he helped to
create the MES’s own Crisis Management Centre.
It is also interesting to note the relative speed in which Putin took the decision to
proceed with the creation of NDMC - according to a number of accounts, Putin took
the decision in May 2013 at a session of the country’s Security Council11 - thereby
inferring that Russia not only has a very active Minister of Defence, but also one who
has a very good, working relationship with the country’s President. As stated earlier,
the Centre would appear to be a new 21st century version of organs from the country’s
military-historical past, whose main objective was to assess the military-security threat,
coordinate the actions of the relevant civilian and military organs of the state and
then proceed to counter-act the military threat to the country as best they could. Of
course, times have changed and now the Centre boasts the very latest communications
technology, including the capability ‘through open sources’ to monitor ‘the military-
political situation’ over significant parts of the globe.12 It trains its own personnel: all
the sources talk about the Centre being staffed by ‘500 well-trained personnel’ and, in
one interview given by Mizintsev, the quality and training of the Centre’s personnel are
particularly emphasised:
10 Minsisterstvo oborony Rossiyskoi Federatsii: informatsiia o rukovoditele Gerasimov Valeriy Vasil’evich,

http://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy/more.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee&
11 ‘Natsional’niy tsentr upravleniia oboronoi Rossii zastupil na boevoe dezhurstvo’, (http://lenta.ru/
news/2014/12/01/defence/;’Na boevoe dezhurstvo zastupila operativnaiai smena Natsional’nogo tsentra
upravleniia oboronoi Rossii’, (http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12002205@egNews&_
print=t); D Tel’manov, ‘V Rossii sozdaiut Natsional’niy tsentr upravleniia oboronoi’, (http://izvestiya.ru/
news/551033 28/5/2013.
12 ‘Tsentr upravleniia oboronoi Rossii nauchitsiia analizirovat’ politicheskuiu situatsiiu’, (http://itar-tass.com/
armiya - i opk/1727256
This is an absolutely new management organ, in the history of the Armed

Forces there has never been…such an organ. In order to staff it, only the
most advanced and experienced officers are selected, having either rich
practical experience in commanding and/or managing complex weapon
systems in the field, as well as experience of staff work. But to work in
NDMC, even this level of training is not enough. Thus, in the interests of
the National centre, a scrupulous selection and re-training of officers in
the eight military academies [is undertaken] and additional professional
instruction [given] with the emphasis on acquiring skills in the most up
to date information-telecommunications technologies.13
The article also pointed out that the General Staff Academy had its own training
centre for personnel aspiring to work in the NDMC, simply entitled ‘institute for the
management of national defence.14
The Centre coordinates, or controls, not only the country’s Armed Forces (both
conventional and nuclear), but also those ministries and government departments (49 in
total) actively involved in the country’s national Defence Plan.15 In short, this is an organ
deserving of our utmost attention and analysis, especially if, as is likely, it is destined
to play a key role - if not THE key role - in Russia’s future military threat assessment
and decision-making process in counter-acting any perceived threat to Russia’s national
security (both internal and external).
One of the earliest, if not the earliest, mentions of the Centre, appeared in the
newspaper, Izvestiya, towards the end of May 2013. The article was simply entitled,
National Defence Management Centre is being created in Russia. It will link the
Crisis Centre of MChS [MES], the Central Command Post of the General Staff, ‘Rosatom’,
‘Rosgidromet’ and other departments in a single system.16
The beginning of the article would imply that Gerasimov’s role in drafting the original
proposal was primary although, given what has been described earlier, it is hard to
imagine that Shoigu was nothing but crucial in drawing up the plan for the creation of
NDMC and was the elemental drive behind its creation:
The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia Valeriy
Gerasimov has approved the draft [for the creation] of the State National
Defence Management Centre (SNDMC), which will unite all current
13 O Vladykin, ‘Tsentr krugovoi oborony strany’, (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No.44 (833), 5-11/12/14).
14 Vladykin, ibid.
15 D Tel’manov, ‘Shoigu peredet na Frunzenskuiu naberezhnuiu’, Izvestiya, 2/8/2013, http://izvestia.ru/
news/554789
16 Tel’manov, ‘V Rossii sozdaiut…’, ibid.
departmental management and monitoring systems. According to

‘Izvestiya’s sources, the draft will be presented to the Minister of
Defence Sergei Shoigu on Friday [the newspaper article was published
on Tuesday].17
Further, according to the newspaper source, ‘SNDMC will carry out the tasks of
controlling and managing all the forces and means involved in the interests of defending
the country both in wartime and in peace time.’18 The source also revealed that the
Centre would be ‘informationally’ (‘informatsionno’) linked with the General Staff’s
Central Command Post (CCP) and all other government control and management centres,
e.g. EmerCom Russia’s National Crisis Situation Management Centre, ‘Rosatom’,
‘Rosgidromet’, ‘Rosvodoresursy’, etc.19 Emphasising the integrated nature of the
33rd Special Purpose Unit Peresvet of

Internal troops. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin
http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/188
17 Tel’manov, ‘V Rossii sozdaiut…’ Interesting to note that the word, ‘state’ has been dropped off the official
title of the Centre. Although this is purely speculative, could it be that the title bore too much resemblance
to the WW2 State Defence Committee’s title? State National Defence Management Centre too close to State
Defence Committee?
18 Tel’manov, ‘V Rossii sozdaiut…’
work of the Centre, particularly in relation to the country’s Armed Forces, the article
outlined that the Centre itself would be made of 3 main components, also, somewhat
confusingly, dubbed ‘centres’, these being the ‘higher command centre’ (designed to
unite the country’s leadership and military infrastructure, acting like an ‘electronic version
of the country’s Security Council’; the ‘centre of combat control’ (commanding military
operations) and, finally, the ‘centre of everyday activity’, designed to coordinate the work
of the power ministries and departments in peace time.20
In an interview published not long after the Centre became fully operational in
December 2014, Mizintsev explored part of the thinking not only behind the creation of
the Centre, but also its future role.
The necessity and, more importantly, the advisability in creating the

NDMC, on the basis of the CCP of the General Staff, has much deeper
reasons than simply increasing [the former’s] status…The fact is that
the CCP, created in Soviet times, did maintain the reliable control of the
Armed Forces, including the use of the strategic nuclear forces and other
means and forces on combat duty. However, the organisation of the
country’s defence has become much more complicated.21
The article went on:
Mizintsev explained that the process is not only limited to managing

the Armed Forces. In the event of the appearance of a real threat to the
security of our country [occurring] in the period of threat, all federal
departments, regional and local organs of power will be included in the
process of organising defence. On top of that, the resources of non-state
structures of all forms of ownership [‘vsekh form sobstvennosti’] will [also]
be used to assist defence: [private] enterprises, fuel-energy complex,
transport…And here, taking into account the colossal scale of the various
resources [to be used], as well as the geographical length of our country,
special significance will be attached to the necessity of optimising their
distribution and concentration in any given region, synchronising
their deployment with the operational plans of the Armed Forces
[my emphasis].’22

21 Vladykin, ‘Tsentr krugovoi…’,ibid.
These sentences are crucial in evaluating the role of the Centre, it is almost a
throwback to WW2, when the USSR, in the first week of the war, took the decision
to organise the State Defence Committee, whose main function was to ensure that,
economically, the Armed Forces of the USSR would have everything required to beat back
the Nazi invaders. ‘Optimising’ resource distribution would seem to imply the possibility
that Russia may embark on 21st century version of pre-WW2 and WW2 programme
of ‘carriages to the East‘, the transfer of economic production to less vulnerable areas
to attack. ‘Synchronising the deployment’ of economic resources with the operational
plans of the Armed forces would also seem to imply a much greater role for the state
in ensuring, again, the defence needs of the state were higher placed in the country’s
economic development than has been the case over the past 20 years, or so. There is a
strong implication that every region in Russia, not just those with heavy concentrations
of obvious defence production facilities, but every region, will have a carefully thought-
through, pre- allocated role to fulfil in terms of the country’s defence needs - worked
out, no doubt, partly by the Centre itself and that will monitor, on a daily basis, what is
being done in order to ensure that the defence plan is being complied with and that the
state has everything it needs - including intelligence - to protect itself against all threats,
internal and external, (hence the decision to give power to the Centre to monitor social
websites and calls for more powers to be given to the Centre to monitor other electronic
means of communication).23
Mizintsev also outlined the role of recent past conflict in determining the future role
of the Centre:
A profound analysis of current existing threats to [our] security and

the possibilities of the country’s military organs to neutralise them
showed that, under contemporary conditions, for the Army and other
power structures to guarantee the [successful] fulfilment of the tasks
placed before them would require a single organ of control, operating
on completely new principles and equipped with the most up to date
telecommunication systems. Such an organ…would have to operate in
conditions of ‘real’ time, uninterruptedly able to track changes in the
world military-political situation, receive full and reliable information on
the state of all the troops and military units [operating] in the country.
Being faced with a concrete task, it would be necessary, on the basis
of a full analysis, model the development of the situation and propose
22 VVladykin, ibid
23 Yu Gorbachev, ‘Bor’ba v eletronnom prostranstve usilivaetsiia’. (Nezavismoe voennoe obozrenie, No.3 (839),
30-1/5/2/2015.
to the country’s leadership one, or several, variants, guaranteeing the

[successful] completion of the task.24
Mizintsev pointed out that, in order to be able to fulfil its overall function, the Centre
had ‘one of the most powerful super-computers in the world.’25 According to a number of
other open source materials, the Centre will operate a number of computer programmes
that will allow it to look at a whole range of material over a wide range of media – radio,
social media websites, TV, etc. - and, at least initially, in 5-6 different languages. The
Centre will also have the capability to ‘automatically collect information, classify it and,
using expert analysis, model possible variants in development [of crisis situation].26 One
Russian news agency has also reported that the Centre can store 19.6 x more information
than its American equivalent-the Pentagon-and the speed of its processing capability is
equivalent to processing the equivalent content of 50 Lenin Libraries…per second!27
One other thing that is worth noting: all the computer technology was designed and
built in Russia.28 As is typical of other such organisations all over the world, access to
information is on a ‘need to know’ basis, with only the country’s most senior military-
political leadership having unfettered access. However, when/if/ the situation arises,
Project 775 landing ship Korolev that took part in the Victory Day Parade in St
Petersburg. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/188
24 Vladykin, ‘Tsentr krugovoi…’. ibid.

25 Vladykin, ibid.
26 Avdeyev, ‘Kompiutery…’, ibid. ; ‘Minoborony Rossii zaymetsia…’, ibid.
27 Shoigu rasskazal o preimushchestve Tsentra oborony Rossii pered Pentagonom’, 25-12-14: http://lenta.ru/
news/2014/12/25/Shoigu/
individual military units would receive the necessary information enabling them to
fulfil their mission properly.29 In other words, from top to bottom, those needing the
information to make the decisions will have all the necessary information supplied.
According to Russian open source material, regional Centres have been created in
Ekaterinburg and Severomorsk and territorial Centres in Samara and Novosibirsk. Some
information is available regarding the regional Centres but, to date (March 2015), no
information has been found examining the work of the territorial Centres.
The work of the regional Centre operating in Ekaterinburg, the latter is based in the
Staff HQ of the Central Military District (MD) and, as such, is responsible for 29 ‘subjects’
of the Russian Federation (‘subject’ here being a territorial entity within the Russian
Federation), as well as the Russian military garrisons based in Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan
and Kirghizstan. According to the official Central MD press release, ‘on a 24-hour rolling
basis, daily, duty officers will conduct an analysis of the situation along various trends,
monitor the daily activity of the military units of Central MD, manage the fulfilment of the
decisions of the state’s military-political leadership. One of the most important functions
of the Centre is the effective coordination of the activity of all the regional ministries and
departments of the ‘subjects’ of the RF [Russian Federation] in the interests of ensuring
the defence and security of the state, cooperation with the municipal organs of power.’30
In similar vein, but more detailed, was a report of the regional management centre
(‘regional’niy tsentr upravleniia’, RTsU) operating in Severomorsk, home not only to the
Northern Fleet, but also Russia’s ‘5th MD’ – the ‘North’ Unified Strategic Command. The
report was a summary of a meeting held in Severomorsk in December 2014, under the
auspices of the Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral V Korolyov:
In Severomorsk in December 2014, under the leadership of the

Commander of Northern Fleet, Admiral V Korolyov, a meeting [‘sbor’]
was held of the command staff of the unified strategic command [‘OSK’
in Russian, USC in English] in which took part the commanders of
formations, units, heads of organs of military administration [control] of
the Northern Fleet. Invited to attend the meeting were representatives
of the Presidential apparatus of North-Western Federal District, heads
of executive regional organs of Murmansk oblast’, the [other] power
structures and a number of civilian departments…Particular attention
was paid to working out a single [unified] approach to solving issues [in
relation to] ensuring the security of the economic activity of the Russian
28 ‘Putin, Lukashenko, Sargsian, Nazarbaev I Atambaev poseteli tsentr upravleniia oboronoi’, http://itar-tass.com/
armiya-i-opk/1668052
29 Tel’manov, ‘V Rossii zsozdaiut…’
30 Lieutenant-Colonel Yu Pogrebnoi, ‘Upravlenie oboronoi’, Ural’skie voennye novosti’, No.13, 5/4/14
The latest Russian Main Battle

Tank T-14, based on the Armata
platform drives by during a
rehearsal for the Victory Day
parade, May 2015. Photo Vitaly
V Kusmin http://vitalykuzmin.
net/?q=node/188
Federation in the Arctic, taking into account the growth in the duties and
zone of responsibility of the operation of the OSK Northern Fleet, the
Centre for managing the means and forces of the fleet was accorded the
status of a regional [defence] management centre (‘RTsU’) RMC of the
Russian Federation. In the words of the chief of staff of the NF, Vice-
Admiral N Evmenov, the necessity in creating a regional management
centre, allowing the Fleet command to monitor the situation ‘on-line’
was dictated by life itself, as with the increase of the Fleet’s zone of
responsibility, so [too] grew the significance of the speed of reaction
of the command to all the processes [‘protsessy’] taking place in it [‘the
zone’]. The RTsU of NF, in 24-hour rolling cycle, will collect and conduct
an operational analysis of information coming into the Centre about the
daily and combat activity of the units both onshore and at sea, monitor
and control the creation of the military infrastructure, from creating
the berths for the strategic missile cruisers, like the ‘Borey’… to the
construction of military garrisons on the islands of the Arctic Ocean.
Equipped with the most modern means of automation, communication
and information display systems, the duty officers will be able to manage
all the processes in ‘real’ time.31
Commemorating the first month’s full operational activity of the NDMC, the official
Russian MoD website carried the following ‘report’ of the NDMC’s role:
The NTs UO [English transliteration of the Centre’s Russian abbreviation]

is a permanent, working single (both in peace and wartime) organ for the
operational control [‘upravlenie’] of the state’s military organisation.
It is a multi-layered system and operates in a system of regulated regional
and territorial control points of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian
31 ‘Ofitsial’niy otdel’, Morskoi sbornik, No.2, 2015, 11.

Federation, guaranteeing the concentration of all the information-

analytical resources of the Armed Forces and the federal organs of
executive power.
The technical capability of the Centre allows [both] operationally
and uninterruptedly, the coordination of the activity of [all] the executive
organs [operating] in the defence sphere, as well as [allowing the Centre]
to receive the necessary data from all parts of Russia in [near] real time,
model various scenarios, concerning the development of [crisis] situation
[both] in the country and in the world, timeously determining global
tendencies and phenomena, guaranteeing the conduct of strategic and
operational planning and the adoption of decisions by the leaders of the
state, both in peace and war-time.
The National Centre consists of three control centres: the combat
control centre, the daily functioning Armed forces’ control centre, the
strategic nuclear forces control centre.32
Given its immediate organisational background, the previous historical precedent

of both the Red Army’s/Soviet state’s WW2 organs, Stavka and GKO, its wide-ranging
powers over the country’s conventional and nuclear forces, (both in peace-and war-
time), its enhanced monitoring capabilities, its control over a number of government
ministries and departments, Russia looks already to have created its wartime command
and control organ. We may also have witnessed - possibly are still witnessing - part of its
future operational activity in Russia’s handling of the situation in the Crimea and eastern
Ukraine. It is pertinent, at this point, to remember the words of a former Soviet CGS,
Marshal of the Soviet Union, V Kulikov:
One of the lessons of the war [referencing the Great Patriotic War, 1941-
1945] is that the system of strategic leadership must be thought through,
worked on and knitted together in all details beforehand, long before
the beginning of war, [my emphasis]. 33
Has Russia stolen a march on the Western powers and is already actively engaged in
working out the ‘strategic leadership’ of the country/Armed Forces for the conflict
to come?
32 Vladykin, ibid.
33 General V Kulikov, ‘Strategicheskoe rukovodstvo Vooruzhennymi Silami’, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No.6,
1975, 12-24; 14
The T-14 Armata Main Battle Tank prototype based on the heavy unified tracked platform – Armata, at the
Victory Day parade in Moscow 2015. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported License.
Armata: Should The

West Be Worried?
This article, originally published in BAR 164 Autumn 2015, represents
the author’s own views and should not be interpreted as an official MOD
statement. The author, Major Sergio Miller, provides an analysis of the
latest Russian Tank known as the T-14 Armata.
Russian tank designers have done it again. With a coup de théâtre, Moscow displayed its
latest tank at the May Day parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of VE Day. It is
called Armata, plural of the Latin ‘arma’ meaning weapon. The NATO nomenclature is
T-14. Without hyperbole, Armata represents the most revolutionary step change in tank
design in the last half century. For the first time, a fully automatic, digitized, unmanned
turret has been incorporated into a main battle tank. And for the first time, a tank crew
is embedded within an armoured capsule in the hull front. Unsurprisingly, the tank has
caused a sensation.
None of this should surprise us. The Russian love affair with the tank is deep and
enduring. From the battlements of the Kremlin, this has always been the great symbol of
the armed proletariat - a tractor with a gun. Today, the wartime T-34 is as venerated as
the Spitfire in Britain (it featured in the May Day parade). Almost 60,000 were built and
over twenty countries still fielded this remarkable vehicle at the end of the last century.1
No wonder von Kleist - no mean exponent of armoured warfare - judged it ‘the finest
tank of the war’.
Post-war, Soviet designers set about revolutionizing the workers’ war chariot. Russian
tanks were the first to feature an inverted ‘saucepan’ turret (the T-54/55). They were the
first mass production tanks with a 100mm gun (which prompted the British response of
the Royal Ordnance L7 rifled gun). Russian tanks were the first to switch to a three man
crew and to incorporate an automatic loader (the T-64). They could ford and snorkel. In
the 1970s, Russian tanks began to feature explosive reactive armours. The latest - Relikt -
is said to be able to defeat NATO High Velocity Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding
Sabot (HVAPFSDS). Russian tanks were also the first to feature gun-launched missiles
and electro-optical defensive aids (Shtora-1, or ‘curtain’ in English), capable of spoofing
wire-guided missiles such as TOW, as well as laser-guided missiles like Hellfire. They also
first fielded Doppler radar-based defensive aids - Arena - a system that launches a charge
against incoming projectiles.
In other respects, Soviet tank design has been poor. Russian engineers persisted
with infra-red technology when it was clear that the future lay in thermal imaging. Fire
control and stabilization remained comparatively rudimentary. The automatic loader
proved troublesome (T-64 was never exported), and dangerous to the crew. In the first
Gulf War, Iraq’s T-72s gained the nickname ‘pop-tops’ because of their propensity to
detonate catastrophically. In the post-Soviet period, Western technology has provided
useful upgrades, notably to sensor and fire control systems (the French Thales Optronique
Catherine thermal imager, for example, which incidentally was also procured for the
British Army’s BGTI upgrade). Today, the export version T-72M1 is as fine a tank as any
found in Western inventories.
1 Zaloga & Kinnear 1996:pp.42–43.

The T-15 Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Object 149) built on the heavy unified tracked Armata platform
shown at the Moscow Victory Day Parade. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
3.0 Unported License.
The Armata, examined in this article, is not just a tank but a proposed future family
of armoured vehicles. Are we on the cusp of a new technological arms race? Has an
understandable focus on defeating the single threat of IEDs distracted Western military
vehicle designers? A more or less unmodified Challenger 2 is currently due to remain in
service until 2030 and beyond. Is it time to re-think?
Origins of ‘Object 148’

Armata, codenamed ‘Object 148’, has origins in the fall-out from the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Tank production was split between the Ukraine (Kharkov) and Russia (at
Omsk, Leningrad, and at Nizhny Tagil in the Urals). This eventually led to two separate
tank lines: the Ukrainian T80UD and today’s T-84, and the Russian T-72 series culminating
in the current T-90. Along the way, Russian designers flirted with a revolutionary T-95
‘Black Eagle’ and T-99, both prototypes to Armata. Over the same period resurgent
Russian nationalism; a growing obsolescence in the Russian army’s tank fleet (some ten
tank types in forty variants); and a realization that Western defence technology had raced
ahead, all acted as incentives for implementing a major modernization program.
The output of this program has been the ‘Universal Combat Platform’. Armata
has stolen the show but six additional armoured vehicles have also been added to the
stable. These include a heavy infantry fighting vehicle (Kurganets-25); a heavy armoured
personnel carrier (T-15); a wheeled armoured personnel carrier (Bumerang); a tank
support combat vehicle (BM-2 (TOS-2) launching thermobaric rockets); a self-propelled
artillery system (2S35 Koalitsiya-SV); and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-T T-16).
Other vehicles reportedly on the drawing board include an MT-A armoured bridgelayer,
MYM-A engineering vehicle, and USM-1 minelayer.2
Of note, it appears that Russian designers have responded to enhanced Western AFV
cannon (the 40mm CTAI weapon being fitted on the British Army’s Scout and upgraded
Warrior, for example), with more armour (protection) and a new 57mm AU-220M turret.
In a familiar story of measure and counter-measure, the intelligence assumptions that
informed the procurement of Scout as a superior battle-winning platform may now be
open to question. There is competition on the block.
What’s New?
Armata has grabbed the headlines as the world’s first main battle tank with a
fully automated, digitized and unmanned turret. The design corollary to this novel
configuration is the armoured crew capsule located in the hull front. What is perhaps
not emphasized is that designers had to address the long–standing problem of crew
vulnerability caused by the automatic loader and unprotected, semi-combustible
propellant charges that have featured in Russian tanks since the mid-1960s.
In itself, the automatic loader does not make a tank dangerous to the crew. But
coupled with a consistent design philosophy that has produced medium-weight tanks,
it has proved so. Over the last four decades, Russian tanks have given away between
15-20 tons to Western counterparts. The justification for this comparative difference
has been enhanced mobility and a low profile. But the experience from Middle Eastern
wars has shown that 15-20 tons less armour represents a significant loss of protection.
Unlike Western tanks that employ a safer system of compartmentalized ammunition and
manual loading, unlucky T-72s crews have discovered that sitting on a carousel of live
ammunition can be a lethal experience.
Russian designers faced two choices: either add weight (protection) and change the
ammunition loading mechanism (perhaps even adding a fourth crew member); or come up
with a completely novel solution. They chose the latter, unwilling it seems to sacrifice the
basic principle that Russian tanks must be fast, low and light.
Other novel features include a reported radar system derived from the AESAKA
band radar fitted on the Sukhoi T-50 fifth-generation fighter, and new composite
armour designated 44S-sv-SH, designed by the JSC Research Institute of Steel. The radar
will presumably underpin a reported new Afganit defensive aids suite. A traditional
configuration of six road wheels has been increased to seven, reflecting the increased
length of the new family of vehicles. The main caliber gun is an upgraded smoothbore
125mm 2A82-1M with a reported higher muzzle velocity. This can fire a mix of
APFSDS, HEAT, and HE-FRAG rounds, as well as launch the 9M119M Refleks anti-tank
2 http://www.janes.com/article/50896/new-russian-heavy-armour-breaks-cover
guided missiles (NATO designation Sniper-B). In a radio interview with Moscow radio
Stolitsa FM, the Vice-President of the Russian Commission for Defense industry has
claimed that Armata will launch a ‘new missile’, but this is often double-speak for an
ungraded existing missile.3 The tank also features a remote weapon station fitted with
a 7.62mm 6P7K machinegun, identical to the system fitted on T-90MS. Some reporting
has suggested that Armata may be fitted with the more powerful NSVK 12.7mm
machinegun, or even the Epoch 2A42 remote station 30mm cannon.4 As a complete
package, Armata certainly deserves its billing as the most revolutionary tank in
a generation.
T-14 Main Battle Tanks on parade during the Victory Day Parade at the
Alabino Training Ground on the 22nd April. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin,
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
Words Of Caution
Some caution, however, is requisite. To date, it is believed that only twelve Armata have
actually been built.5 Unlike Western procurement practice, Russian industry produces
the prototype in expectation of orders and before trials. In this respect, Armata is an
unproven tank with trials due to start in 2016.
From visual inspection, some practical problems can be seen straight away by
the tank’s novel design. Manoeuvring a tank is a cooperative endeavour between the
commander who enjoys the elevated, panoramic view, and the driver who has
3 http://www.armyrecognition.com/component/content/?id=9938&lang=en&task=view
4 http://rt.com/news/234363-armata-tracked-armored-platform/
5 http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/01/10/tank-arms-race-introducing-russias-21st-century-ar.aspx.
a restricted, frontal view. An unmanned turret raises the obvious question: how will
the crew reverse Armata? How will they negotiate tight, urban spaces? How will they
maintain vigilance over their vulnerable rear and sides? Setting aside these questions of
practicalities, nobody knows how a crew may be psychologically affected fighting such
a tank. The equivalent would be taping up all the vision blocks on Challenger 2 and only
allowing the crew to view the outside world through the commander or gunner sights.
It may be guessed such a loss of situational awareness would multiply a crew’s
nervousness manifold.
The examples paraded in Red Square revealed their prototypical state in other ways.
One tank embarrassingly broke down (the parade announcer explained this away as a
deliberate act to demonstrate recovery procedures, but only succeeded in producing a
ripple of laughter in the crowds).6 A prominent commander’s sight was evident (which
resembles the commander’s sight on T-90MS), but where was the gunner’s sight? And is
there a reversionary mode? Armata will reportedly be fitted with 360 degree cameras
but none of these were evident (the vehicles paraded in Red Square did not even feature
rear view mirrors). The meteorological mast was present, but not an obvious radar mount.
Three prominent recesses were evident on the turret front, but what systems are these
designed to fit? - Shtora 1, Arena, Afganit, or another system altogether? Where were
the electro-optical dazzlers that have become standard features on Russian tanks? Or the
IR search light? Which ERA will be fitted? These and many other unanswered technical
questions surround Armata.
Important questions also hang over production numbers. It has been widely reported
that the Russian government intends to procure 2,300 Armata, eventually replacing
70 per cent of its operational tank fleet. However, the Russian-speaking Gazeta.Ru
reports tense negotiations between the Russian Ministry of Defence (MinOboron), and
the manufacturer UralVagonZavod (UVZ).7 In a tale familiar to Western procurement
programs, the Ministry is reportedly concerned over costs and completion, even
threatening to procure the perfectly good and proven T-90 instead.
To date, a modest 15 billion roubles (approximately £200 million) has been
sunk in the project. A further 39 billion roubles is in the Ministry budget to proceed
with development. Plainly, these sums are grossly insufficient to proceed with mass
production. According to inside sources, MinOboron has dug in its heels and is refusing
to authorise serial production unless costs are driven down. This presents a problem for
UVZ as the current schedule forecasts 40 tanks in 2016 (for trial purposes), 70 in 2017,
and 120 in each succeeding year. At this rate of production, it would take 20 years to
complete the order. Lenta.Ru, another Russian-speaking news outlet, suggests a cost of
6 The Times, 8 May 2015.

7 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/12/10_a_6336601.shtml,
The highly successful and proven T-90 Main Battle Tank seen here at the Alabino Training Ground during a
rehearsal for the Victory Day Parade in 2013. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
3.0 Unported License.
$4-5 million per tank, or roughly half the cost of Western tanks.8 However, Lenta.Ru has
simultaneously quoted a Russian officer who has reported ‘the tank currently doesn’t have
a price’. This vagueness does not bode well. The total cost of the program is reportedly
in the order of £6 billion. Even in the context of a ten year £260 billion Russian defence
spending spree (which is unlikely to be met due to falling oil prices), this is a significant
sum for a single vehicle that is not yet proven, still less, operational.
A Top Tank?
The unveiling of Armata has inevitably provoked a torrent of comparisons with current
Western tanks, not least from blogging armour enthusiasts. Much of this debate is
idle speculation. The true test of the battle-worthiness of a tank is war. Until Armata
joins battle, we will not know how it stands in the rankings of modern battle tanks.
Comparisons also amount to conjecture because a tank is not an autonomous platform.
The secret to its success has always been rooted in its combination with the other arms
and mass. The tank was invented to save the infantry, but needs the infantry to save it
from anti-tank weapons. In an age of air-launched precision weapons, it also needs an
effective air defence screen. Esprit de corps, bold leadership, smart tactics, good drills,
8 http://lenta.ru/news/2015/01/20/armata/
and realistic training - all these factors also contribute significantly to the successful
employment of armour.
Perhaps the single factor which the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation can
count on is mass. The Russian Army maintains an active fleet of some 2,500 tanks with
a reserve of 12,500 (or thirty-five times the size of the fleet in the British Army). With such
numbers, decisive effect is credibly achievable and losses are less important. In Russian
military academies, ‘manoeuvrism’ has always meant mass. Next year, as Armata enters
its trial phases, the steppes around the Nizhny Tagil training area will no doubt witness
many such mass manoeuvres. With so much political momentum behind the ‘Universal
Combat Platform’ it seems likely Armata will pass muster. But it is not inconceivable
that a decision may be taken to suspend development on the unmanned turret and invest
instead in the T-90, which is already proving an export success. This scenario is not as
implausible as it sounds. As late as last year, the Russian defence media outlet Army
News.Ru was referring to ‘Object 195’ or the T-90AM tank as Armata, and indeed it
was this tank that was featuring in released imagery (hence all the mistaken artists’
visual impressions of the future tank).9
Whatever the future of the unmanned turret variant of Armata, the designers at
UralVagonZavod deserve some applause. They have re-enlivened the tank debate and
demonstrated with a typically Russian impulsive flourish that there is still plenty of track
mileage left in this century-old war horse.
The crew of a T-80U Main Battle Tank demonstrate the

tank’s capabilities during the Third International Forum
‘Engineering Technologies 2014’ from 13 to 17 August
in Zhukovskiy. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
9 http://army-news.ru/2011/06/kakim-mozhet-byt-tank-armata/
Hague and Kerry discussing on Ukraine Crisis, US State Department, Public Domain
Politeness As
A Weapon Of War:
V Gerasimov (CGS),
Russia And The Crimea
- Part One
In this first part of a two-part article by Dr. Steven J Main, RMSO,
originally published in BAR 165 Winter 2016, he looks at the Russian
annex of the Crimea in the context of open source Russian material
in order to discover how Russia might act in the future.
Much has been written - and, no doubt, will be written - about Russia’s annexation of the
Crimea. However, despite the wealth of material available, comparatively little has been
written in the West using the large body of Russian-language material on the subject.
This is largely due to politics: in the West, the perception of events in Ukraine is largely
viewed through a Ukrainian filter and Russian-language based material has either tended
to be overlooked, or simply ignored. This is a pity if, for no other reason in that if one
applies the necessary intellectual and cultural ‘filters’ there is much hard information out
there, both officially and non-officially approved which, if put alongside what we already
know adds considerably to our knowledge of Moscow’s actions in February/March 2014,
as well as point out the way Moscow could act in the future. As in the past, Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT) has an important role to play here, one which will be clearly shown in
the following articles.
In March 2013, an article appeared in the influential weekly newspaper of the Russian
military defence complex, the Military-Industrial Courier (Voenno-promyshlenniy
ku’rer, VPK), which was a summary version of an address to the Russian Academy of
Military Science delivered by the current Russian Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Valery
Gerasimov, entitled ‘Fundamental Tendencies in Developing the Forms and Ways
of Usingthe A[rmed] F[orces], real tasks of military science to improve them.’1
In general, his address was a public statement of his thoughts on the future conduct of
military operations, as well as an analysis of the importance of military thought on the
development and role of Russia’s Armed Forces, in particular. As such, it was an important
address, but was largely overlooked by the Western media, with the exception of one
commentator who, more than a year later, praised it as being ‘the most lucid exposition’
of the concept of ‘hybrid’ war.2 As alluded to by Jones, examined carefully, the address
may well provide a number of ‘pointers’ as regards the conduct and future development
of Russian military policy. However, if used as basis for examining a number of other
developments - some high-lightened by Russian military action in Crimea, for example -
then there can be little doubt that OSINT can help to forecast what Russia may do in terms
of its global role in the months and years ahead.
In his address, Gerasimov emphasised that the distinction between war and peace
had become increasingly blurred over the past couple of decades and traditional ideas
and concepts associated with war and peace have largely become outmoded, no longer
reflecting conflict, both within and outwith society/country:
…in the XXI century, the tendency of an erosion of the differences

between the state of war and peace has become ever more apparent.
1 V Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii’, VPK, No.8 (476), 27/2-5/3/2013, 1, 3.

2 S Jones, ‘Russia’s new art of war”, The Financial Times, 29/8/2014.
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Russian Federation, First
Deputy Minister of Defence of the
Russian Federation, General of the
Army Valeriy Gerasimov. Ministry of
Defence of the Russian Federation,
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
License, Mil.ru
Wars are no longer [formally] announced, but having begun - do not

follow their normal course. The [recent] experience of military conflict,
including those associated with the so-called coloured revolutions in
North Africa and the Near East demonstrate that [even] a very well-off
state, within the space of a few months, even days, can become an arena
for fierce military struggle, can become a victim of foreign intervention,
can descend into an abyss of chaos, a humanitarian catastrophe and
civil war.3
In other words, any society/country could potentially find itself in conflict, either with
its own population, or directly/indirectly with an outside power, which could, in turn, lead
to the fall of the ruling regime. In reference, for instance, to the ‘Arab spring’, Gerasimov
urged caution on those who doubt the relevance and importance of such events to the
professional military:
…of course, it would be easier to assert that, in the events of the ‘Arab
spring’, it was not a war, so there is nothing for us, the military, to learn.
But perhaps the opposite is the case – namely that these events are the
typical war of the 21st century?4
In his opinion, these conflicts can have consequences similar to those of a conventional war:
…such conflicts of the new type are comparable, in terms of their
3 Gerasimov, ibid., 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
consequences, to a real war.5

Indeed, Gerasimov also pointed out that the role of non-military factors in the pursuit of
strategic and political goals could be just as telling as any of the more traditional military
methods:
…the role of non-military means to achieve political and strategic

goals has increased and in a number of instances, in terms of their
effectiveness, significantly exceeded the power of arms.6
Further on in the address, Gerasimov also made reference to ‘the protest potential
of the population’ as being one of the non-military means which could play a vital role in
future conflict. Finally, Gerasimov also hinted at the darker side of forces sent in to try and
ameliorate the brewing crisis:
…the open use of force is often disguised as peace-keeping activity and

crisis management, only eventually becoming, at a certain stage, an
essential [element] in achieving ultimate success.7
Having outlined his views on the nature of conflict in the modern era, Gerasimov
proceeded to detail his views on how best such threats could be countered. At this point,
it’s worth pointing out that Gerasimov’s military career has been an impressive one,
rising through the ranks of tank troops before being appointed commander of a motor-
rifle division in 1993 and then a number of increasingly ever more senior appointments
until his latest appointment as CGS in November 2012. Throughout his military career, he
has graduated from a number of military academies, either with the gold medal or ‘with
distinction’.8 Thus, in the person of the current Russian CGS, to put it somewhat crudely,
you have a ’thinker’ as well as a ‘doer’.
In the next part of his address, Gerasimov outlined a few of the major changes in
future military conflicts:
….the role of mobile inter-service groups of forces is increasing, operating

in a unified intelligence-information environment…Military operations
are more dynamic, active and effective. Tactical and operational pauses
have disappeared…New information technology has allowed a significant
reduction in the space, time and information gap between troops and
organs of command and control. Frontal clashes involving large groups
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Voennaya elita Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Kratkiy entsiklopedicheskiy spravochnik, M.2014, 46-47.
Anti War Protests In Odessa by Yuriy Kvach, Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike 3.0 Unported license,
Wikimedia.
of troops (forces) at the strategic and operational-level are gradually

receding into the past. Distant, non-contact coercion against the
enemy has become the main way to achieve [both] battle and
operational objectives.9
Hence, it should come as no surprise that the development of pilotless aircraft has now
become one of the main areas of future development for the Russian Armed Forces.10
Referring back to Soviet operational art, Gerasimov was also keen to point out
that, thanks to modern technology, there was now little distinction between strategic,
operational and tactical targets: ‘destruction of his [the enemy] targets is to be carried out
over the entire length of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational and
tactical, offensive and defensive operations, are evaporating.’11
Classic Soviet military-operational theory always made a distinction between phases of
an operation and the targets to be destroyed, relevant to specific phases of the operation.
Interestingly enough, in his address, Gerasimov quoted from the work of one of the early
fathers of Soviet operational art, namely G S Isserson, a divisional commander who not only
managed to survive the Stalinist purges of the USSR’s Armed Forces in the late 1930s, but
9 Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost’ nauki…ibid., 3.

10 A Tikhonov, ‘Prioritety voennogo stroitel’stva’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 14/2/14.
11 Gerasimov, ibid.
12 Isserson published a two-part article in the Soviet military history journal in the early 1960s, entitled ‘Razvitie
teorii sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva v 30-e gody’, (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no.1, 36-46 and no.3,
48-61, both published in 1965; for biographical information – in Russian – see Yu Gorelik, untitled article
in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no.6, 1978, p.125; ‘Voennaya entsiklopediya’, vol.3, (M.1995), p.400; N S
Chermushev, ‘Rasstrelianaia elita RKKA… (M.2012), pp.219-220.
also continued to write on Soviet operational art in the 1960s, dying in 1976.12
Gerasimov’s reference to past Soviet military thinking, in general, and the works of
Isserson, in particular, was important for a number of reasons: first of all, it allowed him a
platform to criticise the current state of Russian military thinking and, secondly, it allowed
him the necessary historical background to further reinforce one of the main points of his
address – the nature of military conflict is changing irrevocably and Russian military thinking
must reflect, if not drive, the way ahead. New technology is driving through change at an
incredible rate and, in the opinion of the CGS, this has to be reflected in current Russian
military thinking. Modern conflict has changed considerably over the past two decades and,
Gerasimov seems to be arguing that, unless Russia changes its perceptions of the different
types of conflict which it may face, it may be caught out by a conflict which it simply does
not understand, due to lack of advanced military thinking, never mind being able to know
how best to react to the unfolding turn of events. Again, he was keen to use the analogy of
pre-WW2 history of the Red Army in order to further underline this particular point:
…one cannot compare current native military science with the bloom of
military-theoretical thought [which occurred] in our country on the eve
of the Second World War. Of course, there are a number of objective,
as well as, subjective reasons [for this] and it is impossible to blame,
concretely, one [single] person for this. Not by me was it said that it is
impossible to generate ideas by command. I agree with this but [even so]
cannot but recognise something else: then there were no Doctors, no
Candidates of Science, no scientific schools or tendencies. There were
extraordinary individuals with brilliant ideas. I would call them fanatics of
[military] science, but in the good sense of the word. Perhaps today we
do not have enough such people.13
As noted earlier, Gerasimov then went on to praise the work of Isserson:
…such people, for example, like divisional commander, Georgiy Isserson

who, despite the prevailing views which existed in the pre-war period,
published a book [entitled] New Forms of Combat. In it, the Soviet
military theoretician predicted: ‘in general, war will not be announced
[formally]. It will simply begin earlier [than traditionally] by deploying the
armed forces. Mobilisation and concentration [of forces] will take place
not in the period after the announcement of a state of war as was the
case in 1914 [Isserson’s work was published in 1940] but, unnoticed,
13 Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost nauki…’ ibid., 3.

gradually, long before this [formal announcement of a state of war].’

Tragic was the fate ‘of the prophet in his own land’. Our country paid a
high price because it did not heed the conclusions of the Professor from
the General Staff Academy.14
Gerasimov drew one main conclusion from Isserson’s work and fate:
…a negative attitude towards new ideas, non-standard approaches, to

a different point of view in military science is unacceptable. And even
more unacceptable is a negative attitude towards science [scientific
approach] on the part of the practitioners. In conclusion, I would like to
say that, regardless of the strength of the enemy, regardless of his forces
and means of warfare, their forms and capabilities…he will always have
vulnerable spots which means that the possibility exists of adequate
counter-measures. This being the case, we must not copy alien experience
and attempt to catch up with the leading countries, but work to surpass
them and place ourselves in the leading position.15
Aware of the cost of past shortcomings in examining new ideas and approaches to
modern conflict, Gerasimov is intent that Russia not be out-thought, both in assessing
the new threats, as well as being able to adequately counter-act them. Interesting also
that he chose to focus on Isserson, rather than, M N Tukhachevsky, or V K Triandafilov,
the most commonly cited authors on Soviet operational art, Isserson himself being the
least well-known of the three, even to a Russian audience. Gerasimov’s deliberate use of
Isserson may well have been the CGS underlining one of his main points: the importance
of the non-traditional, non-conventional, approach to analysing conflict.
Moving on from the relevance of understanding the changing nature of modern
conflict, Gerasimov switched his attention to outlining the lessons to be learned from
asymmetric warfare over the past twenty years:
…asymmetric operations are more widespread [now] allowing for [the

possibility] of nullifying the [military] superiority of the opponent in
the armed [military] struggle. These [operations] include using special
operational forces and the internal opposition [combined] in order to
create a constantly active [operational] front over the entire territory of
14 Ibid. Whilst ‘tragic’ may be the normal term used to describe the fate of one of the Red Army’s senior
commanders caught up in the Stalinist repressions of the late 1930s/early 1940s, according to one source,
Isserson was punished not without reason: his record in the 1939/1940 Soviet-Finnish War earned him formal
censure and demotion in rank, (Cherushev, N.S. ‘Rasstreliania elita RKKA: komandarmy 1-go I 2-go rangov,
komkory, komdivy I im ravnye 1937-1941: biograficheskii slovar’ ‘, (M.2012), 219-220.
15 Ibid.
Military base at Perevalne during the 2014 Crimean crisis. Photo Anton Holoborodko, Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license, Wikimedia
the opponent’s state, as well as information coercion [‘informatsionnoe

vozdeystvie’], the forms and capabilities of which are forever improving.16
Despite their widespread application, however, according to Gerasimov, such operations

were not very well-understood in contemporary Russian military thinking:
one has to admit that we understand the essence of traditional military

operations, which are carried out by regular armed forces, but our
knowledge about asymmetric forms and means is superficial.17
One should be careful not to take the above statement, in particular, at face value:
Russia’s knowledge of conventional military operations shows that they understand the
latter a lot more deeply than simply their ‘essence’ and, more importantly, given the
success of the operation to seize the Crimea, there is ample evidence - as will be shown in
the next part in more detail - that, at least on a practical level, the Russians are already in
possession of the ‘weapons’ and skills required to ensure pro-Russia regimes both within
and immediately out-with Russia itself.
The USSR’s activities in Afghanistan also had a role to play in formulating current
Russian military thinking on the ways to combat a particular form of conflict:
16 Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost’ nauki…’ ibid., 3.

17 Ibid.
I would like to underline [the fact] that throughout the length of the
Afghan war [the Russian version!] specific forms and methods of
conducting military actions were born. At the heart of these were
surprise, high tempos of movement forward, bold use of tactical para
troops and evasive units which, in total, allowed [us] to forestall the plans
of the enemy and inflict telling damage on him.18
Slightly more worrying was a section of his address concerning ‘the operational use
of the Armed Forces…beyond the borders of the state’. Gerasimov contended that the
state should look at a number of steps ‘including the introduction of simplified procedures
for crossing the state border, use of air space and territorial waters of foreign states, the
order of co-operation with the authorities of the countries of arrival [for peace-keeping
operations].’19
In general terms, Gerasimov’s 2013 address contained a number of important
‘pointers’, both as regards current top-level Russian military thinking about what the
future may hold in store for Russia, as well as a clear indication that the country’s top
military leadership is not only aware of the potential dangers ahead for the country, but
that past modes of thinking are no longer useful in examining, never mind planning for,
new conflict situations. In short, Russia has a CGS for the 21st century.
In his address to the 2014 AGM of the Academy of Military Science, Gerasimov spoke
about the role of his organ - the General Staff - in preparing the country’s defence system
and revealed a number of features concerning the earlier approved ‘Plan for the defence
of the Russian Federation’, (January 2012). In his words, the Plan:
…is a complex [i.e. multi-agency] execution of general state strategic

containment measures, planned to prevent military conflict. It [the Plan]
consists of political-diplomatic and foreign economic measures, which
are closely linked in with military, information and others. In general, they
are designed to form [in the minds] of potential aggressors the conviction
of the futility of any forms of pressure being applied to the Russian
Federation and its allies.20
In addition to the Plan, it was also decided to create an entirely new organ in the
state’s defence structure, namely the National Centre for Managing the Defence of the
Russian Federation, (Natsional’niy tsentr upravleniia oboronoi Rossiyskoi Federatsii)
18 Ibid.
19 Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost’ nauki..’, Ibid.
20 Gerasimov, V.V., ‘Rol’ General’nogo shtaba v organizatsii oborony strany v stroitel’stve s novym polozheniem
o General’nom shtabe, utverzhedennym prezidentom Rossiyskoi Federatsii’, (Vestnik AVN, no.1 (46) 2014,
14-22; 16).
subordinate to the General Staff.21 According to one source, the new body is designed to
prepare proposals in relation to specific events, rather than long-term planning:
…the General Staff is [still] charged with issues relating to current, future
and long-term planning. The National Centre creates proposals directly
in relation to [specific] events. Once a decision has been made, [then]
the General Staff takes control…the National Centre has the function to
inform all the necessary interested structures and controls the fulfilment
of allotted tasks.22
Although the National Centre is still in its operational infancy, it would appear that
the organ is designed to introduce a greater degree of operational flexibility in the senior
military and political command structure, allowing the country’s political and military
leadership to react to ‘events’ as and when they occur and ensure that the appropriate
counter-measures are not only adopted, but put into immediate effect. To all intents and
purposes, the new organ would appear to be a considerably enhanced version of the
previous Central Command Post of the General Staff, designed to increase the operational
‘real-time’ reaction of the Armed Forces to a wide range of ‘crisis’ situations.23
All these changes in the Russian approach to conflict in the future have also been
mirrored by a number of changes at less senior-level, most noticeably in the area of
combat training of the men and soldiers themselves. Gerasimov seems to be determined
to make sure that not only will the Russian Armed Forces be intellectually ready to meet
any challenge - regardless of the nature and colour of the threat – but will also have the
relevant skill set and kit to carry out their allotted tasks. To this end, the central military
authorities are in the process of kitting out 4 state of the art combat-training facilities,
one for each of the operational-strategic commands/MDs of the Russian Federation.
The first one to be ready is based in Gorokhovetsky training range, Mulino, in Nizhny
Novgorod oblast’ (Western MD). The re-vamped site at Mulino involved the German firm,
Rheinmetall Defence Electronics, as well as a number of Russian high-tech firms, most
notably RusBITeKh.24 In an interview, the C-in-C of Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-
General V V Chirkin, stated that ‘for the first time, the means of training the command
and control organs, simulator complexes, weapons and [various] military technology,
computer classes, laser-firing simulators, [all] will operate in a unified information
space.’25 Chirkin also confirmed that the new equipment will allow for both individual and
21 Gerasimov, ‘Ro’ Generalnogo…’, ibid., 16.

22 ‘Minstr oborony menyaet adres, a shtab VMF – net’, (VPK, No.40 (558), 29 October-4 November, 2014, 1.
23 Miasnikov, V., ‘Natsional’niy tsentr upravleniia oboronoi gotov k deystviyu’ (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,
No.40 (829), 7-13/11/2014, 1, 3.
24 Tikhonov, A., ‘Poligon blizhayshchego budushchego’, (Krasnaya Zvezda, 23/1/2013)
25 Khudoleyev, V., ‘V Mulino za navykami’ (Krasnaia Zvezda, 21/3/2013)
unit training, the intent being that, once having completed the course, the soldier/unit will
be able ‘ to fight in any TVD’ (TVD - ‘teatr voennykh deistviy’ literally ‘theatre of military
operations’).26 According to another interview, given by First Deputy Minister of Defence,
General A V Bakhin, the process of training at the Centre will entail a measure of tailored
assessment of each individual soldier:
….on arrival at the Centre, first of all, the individual qualities of every
soldier will be assessed…During the training, professional instructors will
fight against those who are being trained, using laser-simulator firing
systems and, only after that, will the units be allowed access to live-firing
[part] of the exercises.27
More detail on the projected work of the Centre was revealed earlier last year: each
Centre will be able to train, annually, 5-6 motor-rifle, tank units of the Ground Forces, as
well as other units and types of troops (including naval infantry and parachute troops).
Each course will last 7 weeks: ‘during the 7-week cycle of the training course, the officers
and men of the units will improve their training level by using computer technology and
modern simulators. The end of the unit’s training [period] will be [marked by] the holding
of a multi-tactical exercise, using laser simulators.’28
An article which appeared on the internet spoke about the possibility of each of the
new training Centres being able to train up to 9 brigades per year. The article also stated
that units will arrive with full kit. It confirmed that each individual would be assessed as
U.S. Army Europe Stryker soldiers aim at targets at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, while Observer-Controllers
monitor during Saber Junction 2012, Oct. 13. The U.S. Army Europe’s exercise Saber Junction 2012 trains U.S.
personnel and more than 1800 multinational partners from 18 different nations, including Ukraine, ensuring
multinational interoperability and an agile, ready coalition force. U.S. Army Photo Markus Rachenberger Released
26 Ibid.
27 ‘Boevoi podgotovke – novye podkhody’, (Krasnaia Zvezda, 4/2/2014.
28 Grozniy, O., ‘Novye tsentry boevoi podgotovki’, (Krasnaia Zvezda, 4/4/2014).
to their own military shortcomings. Interestingly enough, in terms of the ‘enemy’ to be

faced in the tactical exercises, the latter were described as highly-trained professional
soldiers, skilled in foreign (enemy) tactics in order to help increase the ‘authenticity’ of
the final tactical exercises. The article also confirmed that live ammo would be used and,
somewhat laconically, stated that ‘you could be wounded, you could be killed.’29
Thus, before the Russian take-over of the Crimea and military action in Ukraine,
the country’s CGS had strongly hinted that the Russian military were on a new course
of intellectual development and that, given military events over the past two decades,
a number of lessons had been learnt to ensure that Russia would not become the victim
of a ‘coloured’ revolution, nor fall victim to the ambitions of other powers. It would also
take a more proactive stance to ensure its own national security: subsequent steps taken
on a more practical level would appear to confirm that Russia does take the training and
equipping of its men in a much more serious fashion that it has done since the collapse
of the USSR. Gerasimov is part of a powerful domestic triumvirate - Shoigu and Putin
being the other two members - which seems to be intent on creating a new, powerful
military machine, able to cope with whatever military challenge may face Russia in the
years ahead. As will be detailed in the next part, a more detailed analysis of what exactly
happened in the Russian seizure of the Crimea would appear to confirm that Russia’s
future actions on the world stage are not that difficult to fathom, if one analyses their
perceptions, writings and history and take into account that, whilst the case may still be
out as regards Russia’s long-term ambitions, what can no longer be in any doubt is that
Russia is back as one of the world’s key international players, whose interests, fears and
concerns can no longer be ignored or dismissed and, if and when, will use force and/or
the threat of force to promote and defend its national interests.
Formerly a Senior Lecturer, attached to the UK MoD’s old Conflict Studies

Research Centre, (initially based at RMA Sandhurst before being moved
to Defence Academy of UK, Shrivenham, in 2005), Dr S J Main created
the Russian Military Studies Office towards the end of 2013, providing
accurate and in-depth research, using primarily Russian-language military
and historical source material, on various aspects of the Russian Armed
Forces, current and past.
Another image from the military

base at Perevalne during the
Crimean Crisis in 2014. Photo
Anton Holoborodko, Creative
Commons Attribution-Share Alike
3.0 Unported license, Wikimedia
29 ‘O Tsentre boevoi podgotovki’, (http:twower.livejournal.com/1080594.html). Accessed 29/10/2014.

A T-72B3M/B4 of the Russian Team takes part in the Final of International Tank biathlon 2014 competition at the
Alabino training ground of 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. Crews from Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan
and China took part in the competition and the Russians came first. The tank shown is a special biathlon version
of T-72B3 called T-72B3M/B4. Photo Copyright Vitaly V Kusmin http://vitalykuzmin.net
‘Politeness’ As A
Weapon Of War:
Part Two - Russia
And The Crimea
Part Two of the article, Politeness As A Weapon of War by
Dr Steven J Main, RMSO, published in BAR 166 Spring 2016
examines the annexation of the Crimea and its impact on the West.
As detailed in part one, under Gerasimov, Shoigu, and Putin, the Russian military has
assumed a much more assertive stance in the face of changes in the nature of conflict
over the past two decades. The current senior military-political leadership would seem
to be intent on restoring Russia, if not to the former super-power status of the USSR, at
least to Great Power status, one that can decide, not to put too fine a point on things,
the fate of other nations. We in the West may find this repugnant, especially given our
values and traditions, but how better to understand current Russian political and military
policy unless we acknowledge, first and foremost, that the Russians see the world very
differently than us. Secondly, that Russia, through dint of size, history and previous
military conflict, is a nation obsessed with security, both internal and external. In other
words, Russia will pursue any policy that significantly enhances its security, regardless,
almost, of the consequences. It had, and still has, an imperial mentality and thinks that
the future position and status of Russia in the new world order has been weak, that
its concerns and fears have largely been ignored too many times and that raw, military
power, is one of the few avenues open to it to try and re-dress the decline in its power
and influence that has been taking place since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
However, on saying that, it would be wise to exercise a degree of caution at this
point. This should not be taken to mean that Russia is Hell-bent on re-creating the
former USSR. Why should it? The physical cost would be too great and, at the end of the
day, would probably not enhance that much, the actual physical security of the Russian
Federation. It has no all-encompassing ideology that demands that it seeks to create
a Communist, Marxist-Leninist, global order. It will seek, when and where it can, to
improve its security, but there would be little gain in attempting to try and re-establish,
in any meaningful sense, the Warsaw Pact or Comecon. Rightly, or wrongly, it equates
military power with political influence; it sees great value in beefing up its Armed Forces
and ensuring that they are well-trained, well-equipped and ready for any sort of military
conflict in the future. Hence, Gerasimov’s attempts to persuade the senior military-
intellectual leadership of Russia to start generating ideas and new ways of thinking about
future conflict and how it should be best tackled and, on a more practical-level, the
re-vamping of the country’s military-training centre network, again, designed to make the
men better able to deal with any type of future conflict. Combining various elements of
both drives was the operation to seize and then hold the Crimea earlier this year.
A largely unfussy military operation, the latter could easily be a foretaste of things
to come representing a new, more committed approach to securing Russia’s national
interests on the global stage.
The Russian take-over of the Crimea - despite the Ukrainian military presence in
the area1 - was largely a military operation carried out with no mean skill and speed
1 According to one Russian source, the Ukrainian Navy alone numbered approximately 11,000 officers and
men in the Black Sea region (Grinevetskiy, S.R., Zonn, I.S., Zhil’tsov, S.S., ‘Chernomorskaia entsiklopediia’,
(M.2006), 119.
in its execution. It underlines the fact that a great amount of thought must have gone
into the whole operation involving, no doubt, Russia’s General Staff. Although initially
denying direct Russian military involvement in the operation, there is now no doubt that
the operation was carried out by units of the Russian Armed Forces, probably special
operation forces.2
Whilst the choice of targets for the men in unmarked uniforms were conventional,
part of their operational methods were not. Despite their seizure of key elements of the
peninsula’s infrastructure, they carried out their tasks with quiet efficiency and with no
formal/informal announcement of who they were, or from whence they came; in other
words, operational silence was an essential component of the tactics employed. Needless
to say, speculation was rife at this time about the exact origins of these forces. Thus,
as part of the public reaction to their demeanour - as well as a half-hearted comment
that became blown out of all proportion by social media -they became known as ‘the
polite people’ (‘vezhlivie liudi’ is the normal phrase you would use in reference to ‘polite’
Unmarked soldiers at the Perevalne Military Base during the Crimean crisis. Photo Anton
Holoborodko, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 license, Wikimedia
2 ‘Vezhliviye liudi’, (http://nl.wikipedia.org.wiki/%D0%92%D0%B5%D0%B6%BB%...; ‘Putin zayavil, chto v

Krymu deystviut ne rossiyskiye voiska, a mestnye sily samooborony’ (http://zn.ua/POLITICS/putin-zayavil-
chto-v- krymu-destvuyut-ne-rossiyskie-voyska...; ‘Vezhliviye liudi’ rozhdalis’ v mukakh: istoria poyavleniya
sil spetsoperatsiy Minoborony. U istokov SSO stoyal polkovnik Kvachkov’, (http://www.mk.ru/politics/
artuicle/2014/14/1013909-verzhliviye-lyudi-rozhdalis-v-m…
people). Indeed, the term itself has become part and parcel of the geopolitical vocabulary
in that part of the world. It is now being used in an attempt to improve and bolster
the image of the Russian armed forces, as a whole. It has been formally registered as a
brand, with a variety of merchandise being produced and on sale for the general public
to buy, either incorporating the phrase, or simply very positive images of Russian military
personnel in a helping gesture/pose. There is even one T-shirt bearing a suitable muscular
portrait of Putin with the phrase, ‘the most polite person in Russia’. To help further
enhance the message, there is an official anthem and there was even talk about creating
an official commemorative day, Day of the Polite People, marked down for 7th October -
Putin’s birthday!3
The contemporary origins of the phrase lay in the events of late February 2014 when
a group of unidentifiable, but well-armed and trained men initially seized the airport at
Simferopol, a key strategic target in any attempt to seize control of the Crimea. According
to the Russian Wikipedia entry, ‘the polite people’ phrase now specifically refers to the
Russian military action and south-eastern Ukraine:
…in a number of instances, the terms ‘polite people’ and ‘little green
men’ refer to units of Russian military service personnel, as well as those
who, at the beginning of April 2014, took part in protests in south-
eastern Ukraine, during the phase of open armed resistance to the Kiev
authorities, forming units of ‘people’s militia’ and seizing a number of
targets in Donestk and Lugansk oblasts.4
Further on, there is a more Crimea-orientated explanation concerning the newer use of
the phrase, ‘the polite people’:
The expression, ‘the polite people’, came into use when, at the end
of February-beginning of March 2014, unknown men in camouflage
occupied a number of strategic sites in the Crimea. These men, in military
uniform but without badges of rank or insignia, did not enter into
dialogue with representatives of the mass media and said nothing about
where they came from, but conducted themselves ‘very politely’. Ukraine,
3 Demidiuk N, ‘Vezhlivost’ goroda beret.’ Internet-tem-‘vezhliviye liudi stanet brendon’, (http://www.mk.ru/

economics/article/2014/04/17/1015873 - vezhlivost-goroda-beret-int...Accessed 21/8/2014); Rossiyskie voennye
k 9 maya nachnut prodazhu odezhdy ‘vezhliviye liudi’, (http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140516/1007988002.
html; ‘Putin: vezhlivym liudiam, v ispolnenii Ansambliya Aleksandrova sniskal populiarnost’ na YouTube’
(http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/4/25/684011.print.html; ‘Minoborony Rossii zapustilo liniyu odezhdy ‘vezhliviye
liudi’ (http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2014/05/140508_polite_people_brand.Shtml; ‘Vezhliviye liudi’
kak noviy obraz Rossiyskoi armii’ (http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140516/1007988002.html; ‘Peskov: v Kremle
znaiut ob initsiative uchredit’ v RF Den’ vezhlivykh liudey’ (http://itar-tass. Com/politika/1484464.
4 ‘Vezhliviye liudi’ entry (http://nl.wikipedia.or/wiki/%D0%92%D0%A5%d0%b6%d0%b8%d0...
many [other] countries, NATO, as well as a number of Russian sources,

surmised that ‘the polite people’ were military personnel from the
Russian Federation.5
Officially, both Putin and Shoigu, at the beginning of March 2014, denied
wholeheartedly that these ‘polite people’ were Russian military personnel, claiming that
the uniforms, for instance, could be bought in any number of shops in the post-Soviet
space. Interestingly enough, though, and a point worth bearing in mind for the future,
notwithstanding the actual origins of the men involved in Crimea, Putin did assert that
Russian troops would get involved ‘to defend [our] citizens.’6 One should always bear
in mind that, following the collapse of the USSR in August 1991, there are still a lot of
Russian citizens scattered all over the former republics of the USSR, out with the Russian
Federation: is Putin hinting at the possibility of future Russian military action within the
confines of the ex-USSR? Events in Ukraine would seem to point, at least, to a partial
answer to that particular question.
The Russian Wikipedia article attributed the actual ‘authorship’ of the phrase itself
to ‘a number of activists’ from the pro-Kremlin, youth movement, ‘Set’ (Russian word
meaning ‘network’) and the pro-Kremlin blogger, ‘Politrush’, otherwise known as
Stanislav Apet’yan.7 According to one local Ukrainian source, between 28th February -
4th May (inclusive), the phrase was used more than 3,000 times by various Ukrainian
news agencies. According to another Ukrainian journal editor, the term itself denotes
a new way of thinking in terms of waging the military struggle:
…principally, this is a new piece of kit, it’s a new weapon, new means of
communication, [it’s not just] about speed and decisiveness of operations. 8
‘Politeness’- A Weapon Of War

The current close identification of the phrase with the new image being built around the
Russian Armed Forces was further confirmed by a Russian news agency poll carried out in
the middle of May 2014 of a group of experts that showed that the expression itself ‘was/
is gradually becoming a symbol of the Armed forces of the Russian Federation.’9
Internet-chatter aside, according to another contemporary account, the phrase’s
origins were very simple:
5 ‘Ibid, a recent article has appeared in the Russian military press confirming the identity of the troops used: a
battalion of Marines from the nearby Caspian Flotilla, (Sh Khayrullin, ‘Krymskiy ekzamen’, Krasnaia Zvezda,
26/11/2014).
6 Putin zayavil chto v Krymu deistviut ne rossiyskie voiska, a mestny sily samooborony (http: //zn. ua/POLITICS/
putin-zayavil-chto-v krymu-deystvuyut – ne- rossiyskie-voiska…
7 ‘Vezhlivie liudi..’ ibid.
8 ‘Vezhlivie liudi…’, ibid.
9 Ibid.
….it originated formally from many posts, ‘polite people have seized
2 airports in the Crimea’, which was written on the night of 28th
February…Part of the story rung thus. The airport at Simferopol’ was
seized by unknown armed men who, probably, were [also] involved in
the seizure of a number of government and parliament buildings in the
Crimea. This was passed on to ‘navigator’ by a source from the Crimean
militia HQ, ‘Approximately at 1 o’clock in the morning, the airport at
Simferopol’ was seized – by the very same people. Carrying weapons,
strong, in the same uniform. Head of security reported that the men
politely asked them [local security personnel] to leave…’ It is worth noting
that the Crimea militia still do not know [the report is dated 23/3/2014]
who these people are, who occupy the main administrative buildings in
the Crimea. ‘All that is known [for sure] is that they speak pure Russian
without a Caucasus or Moscow accent.’’10
And the rest, as they say, is history.

From the Russian point of view, it is obvious why the phrase has proved to be so
compelling: it is much more attractive than phrases like ‘occupation force’, or ‘invasion
force’. Before the appearance of ‘the polite people’ Crimea was a formal part of Ukraine
and, as such, had contingents of Ukrainian Armed Forces - ground, air force and naval
personnel. Thus, in order to reduce the possibility of a Ukrainian military reaction, it
was imperative that Ukraine was left second-guessing on what was actually taking
place. Speed, decisiveness, and sewing as much confusion as possible in the mind of
‘the enemy’, were all key components of the operation to seize and then hold on to the
Crimea, whilst the local authorities organised the ‘referendum’ that eventually led to the
annexation of the peninsula to Russia. On the eve of the operation, as recorded by
a number of Russian commentators, as well as American and European, even ‘silence’
had a role to play:
US and European commentators have noted that, on the eve of the

appearance of ‘the polite people’ at the administrative buildings in
Simferopol’, no [extra] activity had been detected in signals traffic…
The operation, begun on 27th February, caught the intelligence
services of various countries by complete surprise.11
According to the same source, the Russian General Staff even planned for active
military resistance on the part of Ukrainian para-military units operating in the Crimea
10 http://www.iarex.ru/articles/46396.html
11 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/63246.html
(‘Right Sector’); the possibility of attacks on installations of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF);
hostage-taking of BSF personnel; even the possibility of local Crimean Tatars taking up
arms against the Russians.12 That none of these things actually happened again is further
proof of the speed and thoroughness of the operation carried out - an indication of good
operational planning and the success achieved by total surprise. That no blood was spilt
was, judging by Russian version of events, due to the fact that neither local Russian nor
Ukrainian military units wanted to be the first to resort to large-scale use of the weaponry
at their disposal, fearful of the consequences:
….the operations of the Russian military were so unexpected that they

simply did not allow their Ukrainian colleagues to respond in kind,
allowing control of the targets to be achieved by negotiation. [However]
The most important factor in this dramatic stand-off [protivosostoyanie]
was the understanding, on both sides of the conflict, that the use of
weapons could have catastrophic consequences. Thus, in the first stage
[of the operation] the main task…was seizing and the safe blocking of the
weapon stores and arsenals.13
The troops deployed were also instructed to specifically protect local kindergartens,
in order to prevent hostage-taking of local kids: one sad lesson learnt, no doubt, from the
horrific experience at Beslan.14
Signing of the Treaty on the adoption of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia. Left to right: S.
Aksyonov, V. Konstantinov, V. Putin and A. Chalyi, www.kremlin.ru/news, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
license, Wikimedia
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
In an interview published in the Russian MoD’s main newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda,

one of the local Ukrainian military commanders, caught up in the events of February/
March 2014, (and who eventually defected to the Russians), described the situation for
Ukrainian military personnel, based in Crimea, as being caught up in a situation that they
could not have imagined let alone prepared for. Commander of 501st Independent Naval
Infantry [Marine] Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel A Saenko, a professional, career soldier,
described the almost impossible situation facing him and his men:
…at the end of February [2014], the unit was blocked in by a detachment
of Crimean self-defence [personnel]. At any moment, it [the self-defence
unit] could have begun storming [our] unit. In reply to our reports
concerning the [increasing] worsening of the situation, our higher
HQs said [only] one thing: ‘Hold on!’ But supplies from the Ministry of
Defence had practically ceased…There was a feeling [afoot] that we had
been thrown to our fate. At the beginning of March, military personnel
wearing Russian military field uniform arrived at the units’ command
post. Judging by their kit, they were paras. Their senior [officer] correctly
explained his duties - not to allow any provocation from either side, guard
the unit and not to allow the passage of weapons beyond the confines of
the base.15
Saenko, for his part, had no doubt at the time that these men were all professional
Russian military personnel:
…a military professional could easily assess the discipline and training

of these calm and confident warriors. The brief orders were carried out
exactly and without fuss. The conversations were minimal-laconic and
precise. Even in holding their weapons, one felt that these paras were at
one [with their weapons]. One sensed that they were professionals. Our
contract soldiers tried to get close to them, but they correctly kept their
distance. And that is how they kept themselves in relation to the local
population, who turned up at our command post. In their behaviour,
there was not a gram of haughtiness or bravado, although everyone
understood well exactly what serious force was behind them.16
In a later published interview, Saenko detailed the increasingly tense political situation
surrounding the base in March, as well as the mood of his own men to events outside:
15 ‘Vezhlivie liudi’ silnoi Rossii’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 19/8/2014, 2.

16 Ibid.
….during these days in March, the Crimea was like a storm…During the
time when the referendum was being prepared for and held, we raised
the Ukrainian flag. But in front of the [unit’s] command post parents of
our men, as well as activists from various public organisations, met under
the Russian tricolour. Imagine what it was like how, through the wire
fence, a Marine asking his brother: ‘How’s mum? Dad? What’s situation
like in town?’ And he answers: ‘We will soon be in Russia. When are you
going to give up?’ Can you imagine what the feelings were like?
Of course, making a decision as a commander was complicated. It’s one
thing when you’re only responsible for yourself, it’s another thing when
you’re responsible for a whole military unit. I immediately determined
[what I was going to do]. And this choice was determined, partly, by
family-officer traditions from the Soviet period. Other than that, the
Crimea - where I had served after the Academy - had become my own
little Motherland, here lives my mum, my family, here was my home.17
Largely abandoned, as he saw it, by the central political and military command, and
responsible for the safety of his men, what was he to do? In part, he was assisted by one
of the local senior military commanders who was prepared to make a decision and sort
out the situation. On the day of the referendum, the battalion was visited by the Head of
Shore Troops of the BSF, Major-General A Ostrikov. According to the published account,
Ostrikov ‘with complete objectivity, correctly and in detail, sketched out the situation and
invited the personnel to make a decision where they would continue to serve.’18
Saenko detailed what happened next:
The day after the proposal made by General Aleksandr Ostrikov was spent
in deep thought. I then called the battalion to order and announced my
decision. Those who wanted to leave and serve in Ukraine, I ordered to
take two steps forward, those who could not decide or wanted to quit
the service [altogether] - one step forward, those who wanted to transfer
and serve Russia - stay as you were. Thus, the battalion was divided
into three parts: 50 took two steps, one step - [further] 20, which left
220 naval infantrymen [Marines] as they were. The result was totally
predictable. You see, our battalion was a contract battalion, 78% of the
personnel were local men. I know that from ‘Ukrainian’, 50, a good half
would also have wanted to stay [in Crimea], but neither their parents nor
their relatives would have understood their choice. All who decided to
17 Sosnitskiy V, ‘Pod Andreyevskim flagom’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 26/9/2014.

18 ‘Vezhlivie liuidi…’ ibid.
serve in the Armed Forces of Russia, without delay, received the passports
of citizens of the RF. Literally within a few days, they gave us our new
uniforms. Dining rooms were transferred to offering 3 courses per day.
Earlier, it was only dinner.19
Saenko also noted that all ranks and previous qualifications were to be formally
recognised and honoured and pay for all ranks significantly improved. He also noted an
unprecedented increase in the number of senior officers visiting the unit since its transfer
of allegiance:
…in the past month [the article was published in September 2014], I
have never saw so many senior officers visiting the unit than in all my
previous years of service. And it’s not a question of controlling this unit of
recruits. Many operational questions on [future] organisation of service,
maintenance of the unit, working with the personnel, have been decided.
The main thing now is that we all serve under the flag of St. Andrew and
are proud to serve it!20
A Soviet AN-225 aircraft banks into a turn during a flight

demonstration held as part of Airshow Canada ‘89. Photo U.S.
Department of Defense, Wikimedia, Released
19 Sosnitskiy, ibid.
20 Ibid.
Propaganda aside, the extracts from the interview do give a flavour of what it was
like as a serving Ukrainian officer based in the Crimea at this time. His earlier comments
concerning ‘the polite people’ are further proof, in their own way that, under Gerasimov
and Putin, Russia would appear now to have a senior military-political leadership who
have a focussed and determined approach to defending and advancing Russia’s national
security interests. Just as important, Russia appears to have a strategy - to be further
revealed in the upcoming new Military Doctrine - and an improving and reactive military
capability to ensure that Russia can no longer be ignored as a former spent super power.
The West does not like what Russia has achieved in the Crimea and, more recently, in
Ukraine, but it cannot deny the relative success of the strategy, so far.
Russia has seized the Crimea in an almost bloodless fashion, thereby securing its
position in the strategically important South; events now in Ukraine owe as much to
Moscow’s influence, as Kiev’s and, unless the central political authority in Kiev adopts a
decisive strategy in relation to Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts, it is hard to see how Kiev
will maintain any sort of influence in that part of its own country. Economic sanctions will
tell on Russia, but the Kremlin looks intent on riding them out and, as long as the other
non-Western countries are prepared to trade with Russia, the latter will be in business,
so-to-speak, in the years ahead.
As was warned by this author last year in this very journal, Russia will not play
the international game according to OUR rules, it has its own historical and military
experience to draw upon. Gerasimov’s quotes from Isserson are proof not only of the
country’s rich military-theoretical thought, but also the fact that, for the Russian CGS,
history still has relevant lessons to be drawn and that, as the nature of war changes so
too must the methods. Isserson himself wrote on the eve of the Soviet-German War of
1941-1945, ‘if you fight with the old methods, you will repeat the old stories’.21
Events in the Crimea and Ukraine would appear to demonstrate that Russia has learnt
and is learning that modern conflict can and does come in all shapes, colours and sizes,
that in this highly communicative age, even silence, ‘politeness’, can be part of a nation’s
armoury. The Western countries must fundamentally re-evaluate where Russia is going
and how best to counter-act Russian moves in what is going to be an increasingly complex
game. On untangling and comprehending the game ahead, OSINT has a very definite and
important role to play. We really do need to know what they’re saying in Russia.22 As the
recently departed former Secretary-General of NATO, A Rasmussen, remarked:
…from Moldova to Georgia, and now in Ukraine, Russia uses a mix

of economic, political, propaganda and military pressure, to produce
instability and manufacture hot conflicts which it can freeze at will.
21 ‘Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh,, (1917-1940 gg),’ (M.1965), 425.
22 Preston P, We need to know what they’re saying in Russia, The Observer, 16/11/14.
Moscow’s master plan is to prevent its neighbours from choosing their

own path so that it can rebuild a sphere of influence. Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine has challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free and at
peace. Despite our efforts since the collapse of communism, Russia clearly
views Nato not as a partner, but as an adversary.23
Whilst seeking to avoid blaming NATO for its own attempts to create ‘stability’ in
Europe by increasing both the size of the Alliance, as well as its proximity to the Russian
border, and blindly ignoring, for instance, the wars in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in
the 1990s, Rasmussen would appear to have grasped the head of the nettle by implying
that Russia will not play ‘the game’ according to our interpretation and understanding of
the international arena. Russia’s view, for instance, of recent events on the global stage is
very different from ours but, like Rasmussen’s, does point to a potentially very adversarial
relationship with the West in the years to come:
…after the disappearance of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the USA
decided not only to keep NATO, but advanced the initiative of expanding
the alliance to include the republics of the former Soviet Union. Thus,
what unfolded was the military and geopolitical occupation of the space
which Russia left [behind] because of its weakness - beginning in the
Balkans, then the Baltics and the Black Sea, including the Caucasus and
Central Asia. The Alliance proceeded a planned operation to carry out its
new global role - securing the interests of the West, above all the USA,
over the Earth, confirming the priority of the Euro-Atlantic civilisation in
the world community.24
Bartosh, a prominent member of the Russian Academy of Military Science, also

argued that there are two main tendencies at work in global international affairs:
The first is connected to the strengthening of the economic and political

position of Russia, China, India and a number of other states, their
amalgamated unions, improving the mechanism for a multi-layered
management of international processes.25
The ‘second tendency’, in his opinion, refers back to an earlier, less complicated
period in global relations, a time when international affairs could and often were
decided by a small group of powerful states, or even just by one state:
23 Rasmussen A., Putin’s Russia has been my biggest regret, The Guardian, 28/9/14.
24 Bartosh A., Geopoliticheskie proektsii vtorogo fronta’, Nezavismoe voennoe obozrenie, No.22, 4-10/7/2014.
25 Bartosh, ibid.
The second tendency manifests itself through the policy of the USA and
NATO, creating a structure [model] of international relations, based on
the dominance on the world stage of the developed Western nations,
led by America, and based on a one-sided, primarily military-force
[adjective, not the noun], solution of the key problems on the planet,
avoiding UN and the fundamental norms of international law.26
In Bartosh’s opinion, these tendencies will eventually clash, especially taking into account
the world’s diminishing natural resources and Russia’s own national interests:
…the strategy of Atlantism is aimed at the global dominance of

Washington in a radically reformed world. Today, the process of
reforming within the confines of the Euroatlantic security space is
determined by several powerful vectors: the war in Ukraine, the current
withdrawal of the USA and NATO from Afghanistan, American plans
to transfer the strategic centre of force from the Euroatlantic region to
the Asian-Pacific region. The resultant force of these factors determines
the actions of the USA and its allies, at the basis of which is the
understanding that without mastery over Europe, it will be
Internal Troops from the 604th Special

Purpose Centre sit on top of a BTR-80 during
the International Operators Exhibition
“Interpolitex-2014” in Moscow from 21st to
24th October 2014. Demonstrations also took
place at the testing and shooting range of the
Federal State Enterprise ‘Geodesia’ in the town
of Krasnoarmeysk. Here, special units from
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Drug Control
Service and Federal Service for Execution of
Punishments took part in the demonstration, as
well as military vehicles. Photo Copyright Vitaly
V Kusmin http://vitalykuzmin.net
26 Ibid.
impossible to realise the global redistribution of resources to their

advantage. The national strategy of the Russian Federation, based on
the projected and strategic planning for the steady development of the
country, must oppose attempts to establish such supremacy.27
Thus, as outlined throughout these two articles, events in 2014, particularly in

relation to the Crimea and Ukraine have shown that, for good or bad, Russia has
re-announced its presence at the top table of global affairs. The prediction made by
this author in this journal over two years ago has proven to be accurate: NATO must
fundamentally re-examine its attitude to, and relationship with, Russia. Russia’s effortless
take over of the Crimea; its activities in eastern Ukraine; its promotion of a much more
appealing image of its Armed Forces; the increasing regularity of holding larger military
exercises of all types and at different levels; the improvement of combat-training facilities
at Mulino and elsewhere, etc., show that Russia is now a power to be reckoned with.
OSINT has a vital role in helping both the West to better understand, and react, to
Russia’s future interventions on the world stage. Russia has learnt lessons from the way
modern conflict can occur and develop. It remains to be seen, how and in what ways,
the West and the world’s other major powers, meet the new Russian security challenge.
27 Ibid.
A Russian T72 Main Battle Tank of the Russian Team during the opening
of the Tank Biathlon 2014. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons
The Strategic
Context Of
Russian Policy
This article by Professor Brendan Simms, originally published in BAR 167
Summer 2016, examines some of the recurring patterns and themes in
Russian policy.
Russia perceives the West as a threat in two ways. The first is as a territorial and military
challenge. She has repeatedly been invaded from that side over the past three hundred
years: by Sweden, France, Poland and Germany. This has led her to think of her security
in terms of buffers and a territorial glacis so extensively as to make her an aggressively
annexationist power herself. Throughout the past four hundred years, Russia advanced
relentlessly westwards, absorbing swathes of the Baltic, Poland, Germany, Romania
and other states. This trend was only reversed after 1991, and has revived again in
recent times. Moreover, unlike the West, which sees the stability and prosperity of her
neighbourhood as the key to her security, Russia feels safer the more it can make the
areas bordering her unsafe and unstable. This means that the security of Russia can only
be achieved, in the Kremlin’s mind, through the insecurity of others, either by taking
territory from them or preventing them from settling down. It is a zero-sum game.
Secondly, Russia fears the West as an ideological challenge to her form of politics:
universal and open, as opposed to national and closed. The Tsarist regime worried after
the Napoleonic Wars that returning Russian soldiers would bring the contamination of
western ideas with them. Stalin feared the same after the Second World War. Today, Putin
is concerned about the infiltration of ideas not so much through western NGOs, which
he now has largely under control, but across borders from the eastern members of the
European Union, and the lands between, especially Ukraine. The one thing he cannot risk
is a repeat of the Polish experience, after which that country went from having a standard
of living roughly comparable to that of the Ukraine to a multiple of that today. If Ukraine
were to progress in a similar fashion after joining the EU, then the population of Russia
proper would start asking him awkward questions.
It is against this background that Putin’s grand strategy should be understood today.
He is not, as his biographer Masha Gessen suggests, simply an opportunist though he will
exploit western weakness quickly once identified. Nor is Mr Putin just nostalgic for the
Soviet Union. Putin’s aim, instead, is to give Russia the critical mass it needs to survive
in the global great power contest. In October 2011 he announced the launch of a new
‘many-tiered, multi-speed integration project in the post-Soviet space’, primarily designed
to bring Ukraine more closely into his orbit. Mr Putin’s objective is nothing less than the
creation of what he calls ‘a higher level of integration- a Eurasian Union’, a ‘powerful
supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world’
alongside the EU, China and the United States. What he is driving at, in short, is not the
reconstitution of the Soviet Union, still less world hegemony, but a Russian-dominated
Eurasian commonwealth that would give him some kind of global parity with the other
world ‘poles’.
The execution of this policy has involved the destabilisation of neighbouring states,
to keep them weak, remind them of their weakness, and if possible to draw them back
into the Russian orbit. Its modus operandi reminds one of the old Bolsheviks. ‘When
a man sticks in a bayonet and strikes mush, he keeps pushing’, Lenin once remarked
approvingly, ‘but if he hits cold steel, he pulls back’. His successor Nikita Kruschchev
was fond of repeating this remark, as he tested the West in Berlin, Cuba and elsewhere
during the Cold War. For some years now the Russian leader, and former communist
secret service agent, Vladimir Putin has also been sticking in the bayonet and, so far, he
has only encountered mush. In 2007 he was behind a ‘cyber attack’ on the Baltic Republic
of Estonia. A year later he invaded the sovereign state of Georgia, handed out Russian
passports and effectively annexed the territory of South Ossetia. Most recently, he has
invaded the sovereign state of Ukraine, annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in
the eastern part of the country. At every stage, Mr Putin has proceeded carefully, using
hooded ‘deniable’ units in the Crimea, only throwing off the mask, and proceeding to full
annexation, when he thought it was safe to do so.
Russia’s gamble succeeded largely because the West was slow and weak, but also
because it was confused. The public, and even well-informed observers, were temporarily
disorientated by Russian propaganda that the Ukrainian revolution was dominated by
‘fascists’ and that intervention was necessary to rescue the Russian population from
them. Mr Putin spoke of ‘reactionary, nationalist and anti-semitic forces going on the
rampage in certain parts of the Ukraine, including Kiev’. There was, in fact, never any
serious threat against Ukrainian Jews, the Russian population, or any other minority
group. But by the time the truth was clear, it was too late to do anything about it.
At the same time, and without any sense of contradiction, Russia has opened a new
political front within Europe by supporting the far right against the liberal European
Union. She champions their hostility to globalisation, universalism, humanitarian
intervention, immigration and much else as part of a global resistance against a western
hegemonic project. Moscow specifically invited representatives of European far-right
parties, including the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party, to observe
the referendum in the Crimea, hardly the actions of a government concerned about
A Russian SU34 demonstrates its capabilities at the International Aviation and Space Salon, MAKS 2015.
Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
‘extremism’. There are now governments, for example in Hungary and Greece, which
openly sympathise with Putin and his challenge to the European Union. The result is
that there is a substantial ‘fifth column’ in western and central Europe that weakens our
response to Russian aggression.
Since then, the west has woken up to the threat of ‘hybrid warfare’. ‘Its not just the
old Fulda gap, for those who remember the Cold War issue of tanks crossing over’, US
Defence Secretary Ashton Carter said a month ago, ‘Its the little green men phenomenon
as well. This is a new playbook’. Across the continent, the phenomenon is being analysed
in conferences and staff colleges. New structures are being devised to cope with it.
Herein, however, lies the danger. We may neglect conventional defence and
deterrence. The decisive factor over the past few years has not been the strength of
‘hybrid warfare’, or any Russian overall military advantage, but the absence of western
forces on the spot and in particular the lack of a credible threat to use them. Moscow
could have been stopped by early action. If Mr Putin had been deterred from attacking
Georgia, or put under such intense political, economic and military pressure as to force
him to withdraw, then he would never have dared occupy Crimea. If the Americans, who
must have seen the build-up on their satellites, had deployed naval forces to the Black Sea
just before or immediately after the Russian incursion, while it was still being conducted
at arm’s length by Moscow, Putin’s men could have been overpowered, probably without
the use of firearms, and he would probably have disavowed them. He would then never
have attacked eastern Ukraine. A similar confrontation at Pristina airport in 1999 at the
end of the Kosovo crisis, saw NATO intervention to prevent reinforcements from reaching
the Russian advance guard and a compromise solution. Failure to respond robustly in the
early stages of this crisis, by contrast, has emboldened Mr Putin and led to a crisis, which
has far from run its course.
The current danger is not that Russia will use hybrid warfare to take over the Baltic
states - we are wise to that. It is that she will use the advantages of surprise with massive
conventional force to present us with a fait accompli to which we cannot respond without
embarking on an unacceptable escalation. We will have failed, not because Moscow has
bamboozled us with ‘measures short of war’ but because we have failed a Cold War-style
test of deterrence. In that sense, we must hold on to the old playbook, and quite a lot of
the old equipment too.
The UK contribution here should be twofold. First, to recognise that Europe is the
most important area of national security and that Russia constitutes the most serious
challenge there. Secondly, to act on this realisation with the dispatch of substantial
ground forces, including armour, to Poland and the Baltic states.
Professor Simms is the author of Europe. The Struggle For Supremacy,

1453 To The Present (Allen Lane, 2013)
Infantry Fighting Vehicle Object 695, on a medium unified tracked platform Kurganets-25 on display for the first
time at the Victory Parade 2015 rehearsal in Alabino training area. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons
The back end of the formidable Topol Ballistic Missile System as seen at the Victory Day Parade
rehearsal near Moscow. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported License.
Russia’s Nuclear
Sword: The Strategic
Missile Forces
This article by Dr Steven J Main, originally published in BAR 167
Summer 2016, looks at Russia’s intent behind their Strategic Missile
Forces from open sources across the web.
On 30th October 2015, the Russian TASS news agency reported that, as part of a planned
test of the country’s nuclear command and control system, a series of missile launches
had taken place, involving a number of elements of the country’s sea, land and airborne
nuclear weapon systems. SLBMs were launched from the ‘Briansk’ (Northern Fleet) and
‘Podol’sk (Pacific Fleet) submarine cruisers; ICBM (Topol) launched from the Cosmodrome
at Plesetsk and ‘Cruise’ missiles were launched from strategic bombers - Tu-160 -
operating from bases in the Komi Republic and Kamchatka.
Not only did the launches test both the men and the missiles but, as the reports also
noted, so too was the country’s entire nuclear command and control system, from the
National Centre for Managing the Defence of the Russian Federation to the command
posts of the various military units taking part in the planned exercise.1 Interestingly
enough, on the exact same day as the planned launches were taking place, TASS also
reported that Putin had chaired a meeting of the country’s Security Council, at which he
instructed the Council ‘to prepare a system of contemporary views on security threats’
facing the country, hinting that the security threats facing Russia had increased - probably
as a consequence of Russia’s actions both in relation to eastern Ukraine, as well as
Russia’s air campaign in Syria - and that the country, despite the publication of a new
Military Doctrine at the end of 2014, was already in need of a revised list of threats and
how best to combat them.2
Given Russia’s decision to mount an independent air campaign in the skies over
Syria - regardless of Western criticism - to date, the campaign clearly demonstrates that
not only does Russia possess the necessary conventional military capability to launch
such an operation but, arguably even more important than that, the will to use military
force in yet another attempt to advance, or protect, the country’s national interests. The
planned series of launches and Putin’s instruction concerning the new series of threats
facing the country, taken together, show that it is more important than ever that a
fundamental examination of Russian material is conducted to ascertain, particularly in
relation to Russia’s nuclear ‘sword’ - the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) -(Raketnye voiska
strategicheskogo naznacheniia) - the intent behind the weapons.
What follows, based on Russian open source material, is an examination of the
country’s current publicly stated nuclear posture (capability and doctrine). This should
allow the reader a reasonable basis for him/her to answer the question: will Russia use its
nuclear capability if the need arises? Given that the issue of ‘Trident’ renewal in Britain is
fast becoming a very ‘hot’ political issue, in answering the earlier posed question, the
1 ‘Korabli i podlodki VMF RF proveli boevye puski v khode planovoi proverki sistemy upravleniia’, (http://
tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2392989. 30-10-2015, accessed – 30/10/2015. For more on Russia’s National Defence
Management Centre, see ‘Is Russia preparing for war?’, British Army Review, 164, autumn 2015, 27-35
2 ‘Putin provedet zasedanie Sovbeza RF po yadernoi I khimicheskoi bezopasnosti strany’ 30-10-2015,
(http://tass.ru/politika/2390769. Accessed – 30/10/2015; ‘Patrushev: Putin poruchil sformirovat’ sistemu
sovremennykh vzgliadov na ugrozy bezopasnosti’, 30-10-2015 (http://tass.ru/politika/2393215. Accessed –
30/10/2015)
The Iskander Ballistic Missile Launcher as seen at the Victory Day Parade 2013 rehearsal near Moscow. Photo
Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
reader may reassess the value of renewing Britain’s nuclear deterrent in an increasingly
fractious world.
According to the Russian MoD’s official website, the Strategic Missile Forces
(SMF) were created on 17th December 1959,3 and are ‘the main component of…the
Strategic Nuclear Forces’, (SNF), whose main purpose is ‘nuclear containment [yadernoe
sderzhivanie] of possible aggression and to strike [back] either as an element of SNF, or
independently, or en masse, or single nuclear missile strikes at strategic targets…forming
the basis of the enemy’s military and military-economic potential.’4
Conditions concerning their potential use are to be found in the country’s updated
Military Doctrine (MD), formally approved by Putin on Christmas Day, 2014. In the section
outlining the Russian state’s formal position on the use of the country’s nuclear arsenal,
the MD stated that:
The Russian Federation reserves itself the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to their use against it and (or) its allies nuclear and other types
of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the event of aggression
against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, placing
under threat the very existence of the state. The decision to use nuclear
weapons will be taken by the President of the Russian Federation.5
3 Khronika osnovnykh sobytiy istorii Raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo naznacheniia, (M.1994), 238-239
4 Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoi Federatsii: raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniia, (http://structure.
mil.ru/structure/forces.strategic_rocket.htm?fid=null&print=true. Accessed – 16/9/2015)
5 ‘Voennaia doktrina Rossii’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 13/1/2015
Compared, however, to late Soviet nuclear strategy, Russian nuclear strategy would
appear to have become more assertive in its stance on using nuclear weapons to defend
the country. In a recent Russian analysis of the country’s nuclear strategy, the Soviet
emphasis on non-first use of nuclear weapons was outlined - as well as the reaction of
the nuclear and non-nuclear actors of the time:
….in the late Soviet period, official nuclear strategy was based on the
principle of non-first use of this type of weapon against nuclear states
and complete non-use of it against non-nuclear states (unless their
territory was being used to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR).
This principle, adopted by L I Brezhnev [the contemporary General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]…was met
(especially amongst nuclear states ) abroad with disbelief. They considered
it to be one of many tricks of Soviet foreign policy propaganda, one of
the directions of the so-called ‘Soviet peace offensive.’6
Thus, the element of doubt would seem to have been removed from official
pronouncements on the country’s potential use of nuclear weapons: only when the very
existence of the state is under real threat will the Russian President sanction their use.
(Unless conventional weapons are used that could also threaten the existence of the
state). This statement would appear to be clear and unambiguous. Of course, no nuclear
deterrent can be effective unless the potential enemy believes that not only do you have
the capability to inflict unacceptable damage to the opponent’s military and civilian
infrastructure, but also the will to unleash such calamitous destruction should the
need arise.
As will be shown later, Russia certainly does have the capability but, public
pronouncements aside, assessing the will is much harder to ascertain. The recent
history of the SMF, as described by the SMF’s own Commander, Colonel-General Sergei
Viktorovich Karakayev,7 may help us understand if the will and the intent are there for
their potential use.
6 Konyshev, N., Sergunin, A.A., ‘Sovremennaia voennaia strategiia’, M.2014, 81

7 Karakayev, Sergei Viktorovich; In 1983, he completed the Chief Marshal of Artillery M I Nedelin Rostov
Higher Military Command-Engineering Academy. In 1994, he finished the F E Dzerzhisnkiy Military Academy,
in 2009, the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, (with
distinction). April 2006, he was Commander of 27th Missile Army. October 2009 he became 1st Deputy
Commander of SMF; June 2010- Commander of SMF. In August 2012 he was promoted to the rank of
Colonel-General. Awarded Orders ‘For Service to the Fatherland’ (4th class); ‘For Military Service’, other
medals. (sources: Voennaia elita Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Kratkiy entsiklopwedicheskiy spravochnik, M.2014,
72; http://astructure.mil.ru/management/types_of_troops/more.htm?id=10330373@sd_e... http://ria.org/
spravka/20100622/2490112368.html
The business end of the Topol Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System as seen
at the Victory Day Parade 2012 rehearsal near Moscow. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin,
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
During a detailed and lengthy interview Karakayev lost no time in outlining what he saw
as the main role of the SMF in the more troubled periods in its recent history:
….there were certain periods when, namely the might of the SMF
preserved the Russian state on the political map, as well as the unique
Russian world - on the earth. There is no need to kid ourselves [teshit’
sebia] with hopes of the peace-loving [nature] and goodwill of those
‘gentlemen’, whose predecessors were the first to unleash nuclear
weapons. They do not take into consideration the interests of unarmed
states, they respect only strength. And from the second half of the 20th
century - [only] nuclear strength.8
This theme, that the SMF guarantees both the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the state, is a fairly ‘standard’ line used by many previous Commanders of the SMF over
decades. However, for the current generation of the SMF’s senior military leadership,
who have had to endure both the collapse of Soviet military might and the parlous state
8 Karakeyev, S., ‘Raketno-yaderniy obereg Rossii’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 16/12/2014

of Russia’s conventional military power throughout the 1990s-2000s, it must seem as a

self-evident truth that had it not been for Russia’s strategic, nuclear arsenal, Russia would
have not survived intact over the past two decades. In a similar vein, Putin also remarked
concerning the guarantee of Russian sovereignty provided by the country’s
nuclear arsenal:
For 50 years [the remarks were made in 2013] they [SMF] have formed
the basis of our defence capability…guaranteeing our sovereignty.9
Russia has not, nor will it ever, rely on maintaining its security on the ‘goodwill’
of others. Thus, in understanding Russia’s contemporary attitude towards maintaining
and developing its nuclear arsenal, one has to remember that the weapons are viewed
not simply as a deterrent to being attacked, but also as a vital element - if not the vital
element - in guaranteeing Russia’s very existence on the planet. As conventional military
force eventually ensured Soviet military victory in The Second World War, for those
commanders who were young officers at the time of the collapse of the USSR and who
witnessed the deterioration in Russia’s conventional military power, the SMF have no less
a role, or importance, in guaranteeing Russia’s geopolitical existence today, underlined
by recent events in Russia’s recent past. On top of this, it would also appear that Russia
is not planning to give them up any time soon. According to one of the country’s leading
specialists on Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Vasiliy Lata, the weapons are going to form an
important part of Russia’s military stance for many years to come:
Nuclear weapons will hardly diminish in importance over the next 10-15
years and probably not for a long period of time.10
In a more recently published statement on the importance of nuclear weapons to

Russia, the emphasis was still firmly placed on Russia’s nuclear weapons capability
representing the country’s final ‘argument’ in maintaining its sovereignty and power:
….saving SMF-saved Russia. This assertion immediately becomes apparent

when one reflects back on the historical miracle which saved our country
on the threshold of the second and third millennia…namely our nuclear
missiles, in the silos and on mobile platforms, capable of reaching any
target on the globe, were at that time the final argument which had to
be taken seriously.11
9 Soveshchanie po voprosam razvitiia RVSN’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 27-11-2013

10 Khvastov, A., ‘RVSN segodnia i zavtra’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 27-2-2014
11 Tikhonov, A., ‘Rakety dlia suveriniteta’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 15/12/2015
150 | BAR Special Report - Learning 2017 Volume 1
In short, the whole attitude towards the country’s nuclear arsenal, both in the past
and now, could almost be reduced to a simple formula: no nuclear weapons - no Russia.
Moving on from outlining the overall importance of the SMF in Russia’s most recent
history, Karakayev outlined the importance of the SMF element in the SNF, as a whole:
Today, the Strategic Missile Forces, as before, are the key component of
the triad making up the Strategic Nuclear Forces of Russia, tasked, along
with the other parts [of the triad] to containing aggression against Russia
and its allies and, in the event of war, to destroying the objects of military
and economic potential of the enemy by nuclear-missile strikes.
The particular role of the SMF in the structure of the SNF is determined by
a number of objective factors. The land-based strategic weapon systems
are quicker and easier to create and made militarily effective. They have
high indicators of combat use, operational-technical characteristics,
safety in maintenance and use. The quantity, the ability to vary the type
and power of the warheads, the high level of operational and technical
readiness of the mobile complexes for combat use, the reliability of
the command and control systems of the strategic weapons, the great
robustness and durability of the weapons…enables SMF to solve the
majority of tasks placed before Russia’s SNF.12
Further on in the interview, Karakayev expanded on both the men and the missile
complexes that make up the SMF. He stated that approximately ‘6,000 people are at
their duty combat stations on a daily basis’ and that no less than ‘95% of the missile
complexes are ready for a quick launch’, should the need arise. Currently, SMF has 6
different types of missile complex - 3 silo-based and 3 based on mobile platforms. In
terms of the strike power of the country’s total nuclear force, SMF accounts for ‘2/3 of
the total number of nuclear warheads.’ On constant combat alert, currently, there are
400 ICBMs; in terms of the SMF’s total number of warheads, the majority are silo-based,
approximately 70% of the SMF’s overall nuclear potential.’13
Outlining the achievements of 2014, Karakayev described the ongoing
modernisation programme:
In 2014, we continued the rearming of the group [SMF] with the newest
missile complexes, which have greatly enhanced methods of overcoming
existing and future anti-missile defence measures. The troops received 16
‘Yars’ ICBMs: 12 of which are mobile-based and 4 silo-based.14
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Karakayev, ‘Raketno-yaderniy obereg Rossii’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 16/12/2014
The Pantsir Erector Launcher Missile System as seen at the Victory Day Parade
2012 rehearsal near Moscow. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons
Discussing future improvements, Karakayev underlined the state’s commitment to further

modernise and develop the forces under his command:
The State Defence Order envisages the further development of the strike
capability of the SMF… First of all…the [further] test-design work on the
modern, strategic missile complex, ‘Yars’ will be completed. Secondly,
there are plans to finish the experimental work on the testing of the silo-
based ‘Sarmat’ missile complex. Thirdly, work will continue on creating
the rail-based missile complex, ‘Barguzin.’ Plans for 2015 included the
delivery of a further 24 ‘Yars’ ICBMs to SMF, as well as carrying out a
further 14 test launches of the new missile.15
Karakayev also reported that, by the end of 2014, half of the missile complexes
making up the strike potential of the SMF were of ‘the newest type.’ However, this figure
is set to rise to ‘100%’ by the end of 2020.
Officially, SMF will undergo another intensive year of training in 2016: more than
100 exercises - of all types - are due to be held, all aimed at improving the ‘habits’ of
the missile men and women, under conditions as close as possible to those of modern
warfare. The year is also going to witness an increase in the number of ‘snap’ checks of
the units, again designed to increase their overall combat readiness.16
Thus, at least judging by Russia’s own figures, the SMF under Karakayev would
appear to be not only well-equipped but set to become even stronger in the not too
distant future. Whilst outlining Russia’s plans to develop a rail-based ICBM system,
(‘Barguzin’), Karakayev also made a couple of passing references to the situation as
regards Ukraine and Crimea. Even before the situation in eastern Ukraine soured relations
between Ukraine and Russia, Russia had stopped using Ukraine to assist Russia in
developing components for its planned rail-based ICBM system. In relation to Ukraine,
as he simply put it, there is ‘no plan’ to base SMF forces in the peninsula, there being ‘no
necessity’ for such a deployment. He underlined this point further by pointing out that the
range of modern ICBMs did not make this necessary:
The range of modern ballistic missiles allows targets to be attacked

anywhere in the world…Thus [our] missile complexes are located deep
within our territory, where they enjoy the maximum [possible] protection
from the enemy’s means of attack.17
In a more recent statement, Karakaev has also ruled out the possibility of the
weapons being used against ISIS.18
In terms of the human element of SMF, Karakayev stated that, as reflected in the
technical demands of the force, ‘more than 98%’ of its personnel have higher educational
qualifications; the personnel are also comparatively young, average age being 31. The
15 Karakayev, ibid. An interesting report appeared in October last year, concerning Russia’s possible
deployment of ‘false’ SMF divisions, consisting of holographic ‘Yars’, ’V RVSN razrabatyvaiutsia lozhnye
golograficheskie puskovye ustanovki PGRK, ‘Yars’, 5/10/2015, (http://function.mil.ru.news_page/country.
more.htm?id=12059623@News&_print=t…5/10/2015
16 ‘V 2016 gody v RVSN znachitel’no uvelichitsia kolichestvo vnezapnykh proverok sostoianiia bovoi gotovnosti’,
1/12/2015, (http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=1207628@egNews&-print=t...)
17 Ibid
18 ‘General-polkovnik Karakaev: amerikanskaia PRO ne mozhet protivostoiat’ rossiyskim RVSN’, 16/12/2015,
(http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2533141)
last autumn call-up into the ranks of the SMF would again clearly demonstrate that the
SMF, as a whole, is staffed by extremely well-educated men and women. According to
official figures, 25% of those called up had degrees - the highest figure ever recorded in
the history of the SMF.19 The number of contract personnel in the SMF is also increasing
- doubling in the past three years alone.20 The SMF also boasts fairly impressive training/
educational facilities. The Peter the Great Strategic Missile Academy, for instance, is
regularly assessed as being one of the best academies in the entire MoD network.21
According to one official account, of 900 students who enrolled into the Academy in
2013, 95% gave a positive assessment of their time there. On top of that, again according
to the same source, 98% of all officer vacancies in the SMF were filled.22
Towards the end of the interview, Karakayev once again emphasised the pivotal
role of the SMF in guaranteeing Russia’s national sovereignty in an ever-changing global
military-political environment:
Undoubtedly, the firmness and success of the political steps in

strengthening Russia’s position on the international stage is secured by
its corresponding force potential. Taking into account the dynamically
developing military-political situation in 2014, great attention was paid
to the Missile Forces. It should be emphasised that the Missile Forces are
supported by the required number of nuclear containment, combat ready
in silos. More than 95% of the strike capability of SMF is maintained in
readiness for immediate launch…Peace is maintained largely due to the
fact that our country possesses nuclear weapons. Today, as in the past,
the Strategic Rocket Forces are the real military force of our state and one
of the fundamental instruments in maintaining its security.23
As if to further underline this, reports appeared in late January 2016 that 10 SMF
regiments were now at full combat readiness and that seven of the ten had been on field
manoeuvres in various parts of Russia, as well as in the Altai and the Republic of Mari El.24
We have been warned.
19 Http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12073752@News&_print=t... 14/1/2016.
20 Http://function.mil.ru.news_page/country/more.htm?id=12073513@News&_print=t..., 9/1/2016.
21 Ibid. The reputation of the Academy may, however, be under threat: the Academy has been forced to move
from its previous site in central Moscow to a complex near the town of Balashikha, hours travelling distance
from Moscow itself. The move has been widely condemned by a number of specialists, who now fear the
impact the move could have on the country’s overall defence capability in the short-to medium-term, (N
Kotlovtsev, R Markitan, V Sredin, A Raskolov, ‘Okhopta na Akademiiu’, VPK, no.14, (580), 15-21 April 2015,
4; R Markitan, A Rassolov, ‘Vezhliviy raketniy Pinok’, VPK, no.16, (582), 29 April-12 May 2015, 4; ‘V Balashiku
pereekhala akademiia RVSN imeni Petra Velikogo’, 17/9/2015, http://www.vbalashihe.ru/news/news/
.php?news_id=24791
22 Khvastov, A., ‘’Sarmat’ na smenu ‘Voevode’’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 19/12/2013
23 Karakayev, ‘Raketno-yaderniy obereg Rossii’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 16/12/2014
24 ‘Desiat’ polkov RVSN priveli v vyshshie stepeni boegotovnosti,’ 26/1/2016 (http://tass.ru/armia-i opk/2614459)
The Russian S-400 Missile Erector Launcher System known as Triumf as seen at the Victory Day
Parade 2012 rehearsal near Moscow. Photo Vitaly V Kusmin, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported License.
4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, part of the Western Military District, on exercises. This T-80 prepares
firing 12.7 mm machine gun NSVT. Photo Vitaly V. Kuzmin, www.vitalykuzmin.net, Creative Commons Attribution
– Share Alike 4.0 International License, Wikimedia
Operational
Strategic Command -
the Western Military
District (MD)
This article by Dr Steven J. Main was originally published in BAR 168
Winter 2017 and it analyses the creation and command structure of the
Russian Western Military District.
Russia’s recent military actions over the past couple of years have forced the West to
ask a number of uncomfortable questions: will Russia resort ever more increasingly to
military force to solve external/internal security issues? Will the West still undervalue, or
overestimate, the influence and scope of Russian military power? What follows below,
exclusively based on open Russian source material, is an examination and assessment
of the command and forces currently (April 2016) making up one of five of Russia’s
operational/strategic commands: the Western Military District (MD). For those in the
know, it should provide extra valuable information to make a correct assessment of the
exact composition of the Russian military challenge facing the West in Europe; for those
not in that position, it should hopefully open their eyes to the reality of the Russian
military machine physically based in those areas bordering a number of NATO
member states.
Creation
The Western MD came into being following the publication of presidential decree,
No. 1144, ‘on the military-administrative division of the Russian Federation’, dated 20th
September 2010.1 At that time, the Western MD consisted of troops and forces of the
former Moscow and Leningrad MDs, the Northern and Baltic Fleets, 1st Command of
the Air Force and Air Defence, as well as all the military units subordinate to the control
of the MoD Russian Federation (RF) (including units of the Railway Troops). In its ‘zone
of responsibility’ are 30 constitutional areas (‘sub’ekty’) of the RF (making 13.72% of
Russia’s landmass, with a total population in excess of 50.5 million, in other words, more
than 1/3 of the country’s total population. This is the most significant MD of Russia.2 As
it is an operational-strategic command, the Western MD Commander has operational
control of all MVD Interior Ministry Troops, FSB Border Guard Troops, Emergency Situation
Troops (MChS), as well as all other relevant units of other government ministries and
departments, operating within the Western MD’s ‘zone of responsibility’, (including the
Operational Group of Russian Forces in Pridnestr region of Moldova).3 In terms of its land
borders, the Western MD has hundreds of kilometres of border with a number of NATO
member-states (Norway, Estonia, Latvia) as well as with Finland, Ukraine and Belarus’.
As Kaliningrad oblast’ is also part of the MD, this means that, technically speaking,
the MD also shares a common border with another two NATO member-states, namely
Lithuania and Poland. If nothing else, this further adds to the interest of the MD for a
1 Miranovich, G., Pochiniuk, O., ‘Severo-zapadniy rubezh’, Krasnaia Zvedza, 6/3/20102.

2 Miranovich, ibid. Since December 2014, the Northern Fleet has been transferred from the Western MD
command and is now the main command organ for the newly-created operational-strategic command,
‘Sever’, (Morskoi sbornik, 2, 2015, 11).
3 Miranovich, ibid.
Western Military District HQ Building in St Petersburg. Photo Andrew Butko, GNU Free
Documentation License, Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 3.0 Unported License, Wikimedia
Western audience. In the words of one Russian analyst ‘without fear of exaggeration,
one can say that it [Western MD] is Russia’s leading edge.’4
Early Days
Appointed by presidential decree, dated 28th October 2010, the first Commander of the
MD was Colonel-General Arkady Viktotovich Bakhin, himself a native of Lithuania. 15
months after assuming command, Bakhin had this to say about the MD’s early history:
..the exercises and manoeuvres undertaken during the first year of

existence of the Western MD showed that the combat potential of
the intra-departmental group of troops and forces, created within the
district, were able to adequately react to the emerging threats in the
region by using ground, naval and air force components. During the first
year of operations of the Western MD, more than 3,000 exercises and
manoeuvres were conducted. Pilots doubled their flying time. During this
4 Ibid.
period, particular attention was paid, during the combat and operational
preparation, to working out methods of joint operations of both
combined ground force units, naval, Air Force/PVO and parachute units.5
Although the word was not used by Bakhin, already one can detect a new ‘intensity’
being shown by the forces deployed in the Western MD, the word itself having now
become very much a part of the every day lexicon of the reformed Russian Armed Forces.
Bakhin described the early thinking behind the reform being carried out in the MD:
..it was necessary to gather together in one fist [my emphasis] all the
various troops and forces, to smooth out a system of control so that all
the forces and means (including the nuclear element) would be able to
cooperate [together] in a regime of real time…Probably it is still too early
to assert, and I will not take on the responsibility of doing so, that the
cooperation of the commanders and staffs of the various forces in the
District is as smooth as it should be…However, the main thing, and this
is the common opinion, has been achieved: a principally new organ of
military control has been created – the unified strategic command (USC
‘West’) , in which is concentrated all the forces and means, designed for
joint operations in the Western strategic axis [‘napravlenii’]6
As will be shown below, given subsequent events, it certainly would appear that
Bakhin was correct in his initial assessment of the work undertaken in the first couple
of years of the operation of the Western MD: as the intensity and depth of the military
exercises continues unabated. The Western MD may be the ‘lead’ MD, in some respects,
in terms of the practical implementation of the military reform conducted in the past
3 years, in particular, but it would be foolhardy for us in the West to assume that such
‘intensity’ was not being carried out in Russia’s other operational-strategic commands
(most notably in the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ for obvious geo-political concerns) and work
should be undertaken, as a matter of some urgency, to analyse what has been going on
in the other commands, thereby allowing us the possibility of better understanding of -
and reacting to - any subsequent shifts in Russia’s geopolitical stance, either in Europe,
or on the wider global stage.
Post-Bakhin (2012-2016)- Sidorov and Kartapolov

Following Shoigu’s appointment as Minister of Defence in November 2012, Bakhin was
promoted to the post of First Minister of Defence with responsibility, amongst other
5 Miranovich, ibid.
6 Ibid.
things, for combat training in the Armed Forces.7 This obviously meant a change in the
command structure of the Western MD: appointed to (temporarily) head the MD was
Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Alekseyevich Sidorov, (by December of that year, however,
the appointment was made permanent).8 Sidorov has an interesting military career,
having seen active military service both in Afghanistan and in Chechnya. Indeed, similar
to Bakhin, he is also on the official Ukraine sanctions list for his participation in the plan
to annex Crimea in early 2014.9 Before leaving the Western MD late last year, Sidorov
made an important presentation to a military-scientific conference held in Moscow earlier
in the year. Since it was a presentation analysing Russian perceptions of the threat in the
West, it is worthy of examination and may help the reader better understand Russian
current military thinking on the threat from NATO in Russia’s strategic hinterland.10
Sidorov did not lose any time in describing Russia’s current geopolitical condition:
….an analysis of the activities of the USA and Western countries shows
that, against the Russian Federation, is being conducted the first phase
of a hybrid war, consisting of a thought-out destabilisation of the internal
political situation of the state by a [variety] of political and economic
measures, [using] international and European structures under their [USA
and Western countries] control. The USA, using as an excuse, the increase
in the intensity of measures of operational and combat readiness of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Western strategic axis, as
well as the reunification of the Crimea, are creating an image of Russia
as an aggressor to European states. Within the parameters of the NATO
operation, ‘Atlantic Readiness’, the military presence of the Alliance in
Eastern Europe has increased significantly. The anti-Russian course of
the military political leadership of the Baltic countries has allowed the
additional deployment of leading groups from 3 motorized division of
the US Ground Forces on the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
an additional 1,000 men…On top of that, the situation in the region is
marked by the conduct of an information campaign, whose fundamental
aim is the development in society of a solid, anti-Russian mood.’11
7 Shoigu, Sergei Kuzhugetovich: Ministr oborony, (http://structure.mil.ru/management/minister.htm?fid=1&_

print=true Accessed 18/4/2016; Bakhin, Arkady Viktorovich (https://ru/wikiperdia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%
B0%D1%85%D0%B8%D0%BD,_%D...) Accessed -8/4/2016; Voennaya elita Rossiyskoi Federatsii. Kratkiy
entsiklopedicheskiy spravochnik, M.2014, 140.
8 Na strazhe Rodiny, 1/12/2012; Na strazhe Rodiny, 29/12/2012.
9 Sidorov, Anatoliy Alekseyevich (https:ru.wikipedia.org/wiki%D0%A1%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%80
%D0…). Accessed – 15/4/2016.
10 Colonel-General A A Sidorov, ‘Kharakter ugroz voennoi bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii na Zapadnom
strategicheskom napravlenii I sposoby protivodeistviia im vo vzaimodeistvii s ob’edinennym strategicheskim
komandovaniem Severnogo flota’, Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk, no.2 (51) 2015, 40-42.
11 Sidorov, ibid., 40.
And if this was not enough, Sidorov also outlined the activities of the ‘non-friends’
- countries like Sweden, Finland, Moldova - and continuing attempts by both the USA
and the European Union ‘to turn’ Belarus’ - ‘our most steadfast ally in Europe’ - against
Russia.12 Vital to Russia’s long term economic prosperity and, therefore, the country’s
political stability, Sidorov outlined the military threat to the Arctic:
….the main threats to the military security of the RF in the Arctic Ocean
region continue to remain the possibility of territorial claims, by other
states, to the Russian shelf, as well as the status of the Northern Sea
Route. On top of that, the military-political leadership of the USA,
Norway and a number of other states, have already declared their plans
concerning increasing their military presence in the Arctic, which could
lead to a breach in the existing balance of forces in the region, including
strategic weapons.13
Thus, on the face of things, from a Russian perspective, the situation would appear to
look pretty grim and, given Russia’s inherent distrust of many things emanating from the
West, Sidorov’s publicly stated views, like those of his successor examined below, would
appear to be indicative of many held by the country’s senior military-political leadership.
This being the case, although many in the West would not accept such views, we do,
at least, need to try and understand them. From the little bit of Russia, sandwiched
between Lithuania and Poland - Kaliningrad oblast’ - to its not inconsiderable border with
a number of NATO states in the West and, at the time of Sidorov’s presentation, Russia’s
Arctic territory, in the mind-set of the senior Russian military, Russia is being ‘hemmed
in’ and the subject, already, of what Sidorov et al. would argue is in the first phase of the
‘hybrid war’ being conducted against the state. Should the situation deteriorate further,
Sidorov outlined what the next course of action should be for the forces in the Western MD:
…in the period of direct preparation for, and repulsion of, aggression, it
will be necessary to undertake the following:
transfer of the troops (forces) of the Western Military District to the
corresponding level of combat readiness; maintain a state of martial law;
putting into effect steps for territorial defence, as well as carrying out,
within the established order, measures for civil defence; deploying groups
to the areas most under threat; repulsing mass missile-air strikes of the
probable enemy, liquidating the means of air attack, directed against
12 Sidorov, ibid., 40-41.

13 Sidorov, ibid., 41.
14 Ibid.
those targets, located in the heart of the European part of the

Russian Federation.14
No timetable given, obviously, so it is impossible to assess how much time Sidorov

thought would be necessary to put all of the above into effect. Certainly, as will be shown
below, the Western MD would appear to have improved its performance considerably
through the use of ‘snap’ inspections, better training facilities, better kit, etc. It would
also appear to be the case - briefly touched upon earlier - that the Russian soldier now
spends more time learning what he needs to know in order to be able to carry out his
primary duty of ‘defending’ Russia. Given Russia’s current level of military activity, it
would be fair to assume that the West is facing a very different military force compared
to the one 5, never mind 10, years ago and part of the credit for that must belong to men
like Sidorov and Bakhin who, having been through combat, knew first-hand in what ways
the Russian Army needed to reform to become an effective fighting force.
September 2015 brought mixed results for Sidorov, not only was he included on
Ukraine’s sanction list, but at a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, his
candidature for the post of Chief of Staff of the Unified Staff HQ of the organisation was
unanimously approved. On 10th November 2015, Putin signed the relevant decree and
Sidorov took up his new appointment on 23rd November 2015.15
Kartapolov, Andrey Valerievich

Following on from Sidorov’s promotion, the Western MD was not to remain in want
of a new leader for long: on 10th November 2015, Putin signed the decree appointing
the former Chief of the Main Operations directorate, deputy-chief of the General Staff,
Colonel-General A V Kartapolov to the post.16 Kartapolov had been a previous Chief of
Staff of the Western MD back in 2013-2014, but came to more prominent attention more
recently as one of the main spokesmen for the Russian Armed Forces in describing to the
media the Russian air campaign in Syria.
In his address to the assembled military and civilian staff, Shoigu outlined a number
of the qualities of the new Commander:
Andrey Valerievich is well known in the Armed Forces. In his service

record - responsible posts in the Far Eastern, Siberian, North Caucasus
and Western regions. He has passed through all the ranks from
commander of motor rifle squad to command of the largest combat army.
14 Ibid.
15 Sidorov, Anatoliy Alekseyevich… ibid.
16 Minstr oborony predstavil novogo komadiushchego’, Na strazhe Rodiny, No.44, 27/11/2015; http://structure.
mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=11960036@SD_Employee&_print=tr... Accessed-18/4/2016.
Colonel-General Kartapolov, head

of the Western Military District, 2016. Photo, Mil.
ru, Ministry of the Russian Federation, Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 Licence, Wikimedia
He has been Chief of Staff-1st deputy commander of the Western MD,

acquired the experience of solving complicated and responsible tasks,
placed in front of a Unified strategic command. In June 2014, Andrey
Valerievich headed the Main Operations directorate of the General Staff.
This burden coincided with the period of the intense conduct of strategic
exercises and snap inspections of combat readiness of the Armed Forces.
He showed himself to be a skilled military leader with a broad operational
outlook. The successful actions of our group in Syria - this is his work.17
Of course, how much credit can be given to Kartapolov for his contribution to
the ‘success’ of Russia’s air campaign in Syria, only time can tell but, what can be
in little doubt, is that the new Commander of the Western MD is a ‘thinker’, as well
as a practitioner. Addressing the same conference as Sidorov last year, Kartapolov’s
presentation outlined his views on the nature of recent conflict and the potential
course of future conflict and represents the single, most comprehensive and publicly
accessible statement of Kartapolov’s views on the subject. As such, it is worthy of
detailed examination.18
17 Ibid.
18 Kartapolov, Andrey Valerievich Lieutenant-General ‘Uroki voennykh konfliktov, perspektivy razvitiia sredstv i
sposobov ikh vedeniia. Priamye i nepriamye deystviia v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh konfliktakh,‘ (Vestnik
Akademii Voennykh Nauk, No. 2(51), 2015, 26-36.
He began his presentation, emphasising economics as one of the main causes leading
to conflict amongst the country’s leading states:
…historical experience shows that, at the heart of practically all modern

international conflict lies the economic interests of the world’s leading
states. At the present time, in conditions of a reduction in the quantities
of natural resources and climate change, the economically advanced
states strive to gain access to the energy resources of other countries
by all accessible means.19
This being the case, what he terms as ‘the state-aggressor’ piles on pressure on ‘the
state-victim’, using ‘non-traditional means of conflict’:
….the state-aggressor puts pressure on the state-victim, more and more

often using non-traditional method of conflict…with the aim of securing
legitimacy for the unleashing of military conflict.20
He proceeded to outline the ‘elements’ in the overall process eventually leading

to conflict:
….first of all, the state-victim is chosen.

Then you think through, organise and present to the international
community more or less incontestable evidence proving the threat to
international security, emanating from this state. An active information
campaign is waged, the aim of which is to convince the international
community that there is no alternative to the use of military force.
In relation to the opponent-state, sanctions are imposed. On those
countries, opposing the policies of the Western countries in the region
of the conflict, political, economic and other forms of pressure are
applied. A coalition of interested states is formed, ready to use their
armed forces in order to achieve their aims…Groups of troops (forces)
are created in the area of the future armed conflict. A decision of the
UN’s Security Council for the use of military force is achieved. The last
condition is becoming more and more often not compulsory. Examples
of the deployment of such a scenario have been the military operations
of interested states against Iraq and Libya. Today, the countries of the
West have positioned themselves in the position of the main ‘architects’
19 Kartapolov, ibid., 26.

20 Ibid.
of the international relations system and the USA - the world’s sole
‘super power’. This stance was reflected in the renewed national security
strategy of the USA, which was presented to the American Congress by
President Obama on 6th February this year.21
This may seem at best, a very cynical approach to contemporary international

relations over the past 20 years or, at worse, a sign of the increasing mis-match between
the way we approach the world and the way the Russians approach the world. However,
this should not be used as an excuse either not to examine their position on world issues,
or attempt to explain, as best we can, why Russia adopts a certain course of action,
directly contrary to our own. We cannot hope to understand their position, if we
do not, at least, make an effort to find out what it is.
Immediately following on from his brief description of the scenario unfolding between
the ‘state-aggressor’ and the ‘state-victim’, Kartapolov made an odd statement:
…however, not all states, including Russia, have the possibility

of conducting an equal military struggle [‘ravnopravnoe voennoe
protivoborstvo’] with the American armed forces.22
He then accused the US of conducting a policy of ‘strategic containment’ against Russia,

designed to, ‘at any price maintain its [USA] leading geopolitical and economic position,
not allowing the creation of new centres of power.’23
21 Kartapolov, ibid., 26, 28.

22 Ibid., 28.
23 Ibid.
Tactical exercises of 137th Guards Airborne Order of the Red Star Regiment 106th Guards Airborne Division.
Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin, Creative Commons Attribtution-Share Alike 4.0 International licence, Wikimedia
So, the Western powers combined are, more or less, in cahoots with one another to
ensure that Russia stays within its own borders and thwart any other country’s right to
challenge the global hegemony of the USA. In many ways, this is ‘old thinking’, an idea
further underlined a few sentences later when he accuses the USA of using tactics from
the era of the Cold War:
demonisation of the opponent, break in communications, knitting

together of an ideological campaign, advancement of American
and NATO infrastructure to our borders, unleashing an arms race,
manipulation of the energy markets, involving us in smouldering,
regional conflicts.24
Hard to imagine, given the current leadership in control, Russia becoming involved
in a conflict that it had no desire to be involved in. There is a growing call for Russian
soldiers to fight, in effect, solely for Russia’s interests as defined by the state itself,
so it is difficult to imagine exactly what Kartapolov has in mind when he writes about
‘smouldering regional conflicts’, unless he means the situation, for example, in the
Russian South? However, a strong argument could be made that in relation to the
Caucasus, Ukraine, Moldova, etc. Russia is pursuing its own very distinctive aims in
the region.
Emphasising the ‘fact’ that the USA and its allies have used military force on more
than 50 occasions ‘in recent decades’, Kartapolov, also made a clear correlation between
the USA and its allies subverting countries not through direct military pressure, but by
employing other ‘means of influence’:
…in modern military conflicts more and more apparent is the tendency,
when their [USA and its allies] aim is not the physical liquidation of the
enemy or the infrastructure of the state, but the complete subjugation
of the leadership and the elite to their [USA and its allies] will. This is
achieved by various technologies and means of influence.25
Thus, regardless of the actual reality of events on the ground, Kartapolov made the
case that the USA and NATO’s leading member-states are actively employing new ‘hybrid’
methods of warfare:
..the USA and the other leading countries of NATO for 20 years have
already actively practised ‘hybrid methods’ in the interest of achieving
24 Ibid.
their military-strategic aims in different parts of the world. This became

especially more evident after the operation conducted by the Russian
Federation forcing Georgia to peace in 2008, when certain Western
countries were sharply critical of NATO in the inadequacy of its methods
of inter-state conflict to contain Russia.26
Kartapolov is convinced that, using non-direct methods of force will allow the USA
to achieve two of its long-term goals:
..rock the economy of our country by the blows of sanctions and hinder
the strengthening of the independent activity of the European Union and
its main ‘locomotives’ - Germany and France.27
Differentiating the classical forms of warfare from the new, ‘indirect’ forms of
warfare, Kartapolov argues that ‘the essence’ of the ‘indirect’ forms of warfare ‘lies in
their hidden influence, directed at inflaming internal contradictions in the state of the
opponent, or in making use of ‘third force.’’28
In his evaluation of the practice of ‘indirect operations’ in modern conflict, Kartapolov
noted one particularly important feature, the lack of open hostility:
..the peculiarity of indirect operations is that, on the eve of war, there

may be no hostility between the conflicting sides. But certain third
parties, either from inside or from the outside, artificially form and fan
the flames of discourse, and then incite the sides to military conflict in
their own interests.29
Kartapolov expanded on what he understood by the phrase, ‘third parties/third force’

[‘tret’Ie sily’]:
individual countries, or blocs of states, influential international

organisations, trans-national companies, individual political forces within
the state, international extremist organisations - anyone interested in such
a war, he who gains most from it.30
26 Ibid., 29.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Not a long list, but a fairly comprehensive one. It fits a whole range of potential
‘enemies’ to the state. Since, in his analysis, there must be someone who has the power
to ‘order’ such a turn of events, he described the ‘customer’:
such a ‘customer’ [‘zakazchik’] does not rush to the direct use of force:
he tries to secure his interests, operating ‘behind the wings’, egging
the conflicting sides to active hostile actions, feeding one side, or the
other, with money, weapons, advisers, information. The true role, place,
interests and aims of the ‘customer’ are removed from the public’s
attention, hidden behind an ‘information barrage’ in the form of political
campaigns about violations of human rights, production of weapons of
mass destruction or the lack of democracy.31
It could be mere coincidence but, in the next paragraph, he discussed the role of the
US law ‘on supporting the freedom of Ukraine’, the activity of NGOs in Russia, helping
‘to disorganise the national development of Russia.’32 With further reference to events
Member of the 45th

Separate Reconnaissance Unit
demonstrate their skils in the
Wings of Victory Airborne Forces
demonstration in Kubinka, 2008.
Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin, Creative
Commons Attribtution-Share
Alike 4.0 International licence,
Wikimedia

32 Ibid
in Ukraine, Kartapolov saw the effect of information war being ‘comparable with the
results of a large-scale use of troops and forces.’33 He also emphasised the ‘twenty year’
campaign of ‘hate towards the Russian language and the Russian people by the modern
Ukrainophiles’ that, in his opinion, ‘has led to a whole generation of people, radically
predisposed against Russian culture and Russia.’34
We would be wise not to dismiss such views out of hand: we may find them
uncomfortable to read but, given the position of the author and the intellectual level of
the audience he was addressing, we would compound his error by ignoring such views,
or dismissing them out of hand. In expanding his overall thesis about the importance
of information as a tool of the new type of war now being fought, Kartapolov made an
important point about the delay, shown by various leaderships, to the rapidly unfolding
nature of events taking place:
..a peculiar feature of the developing conflict is that the leadership and
population of the state-victim, under the influence of the information
pressure, do not realise at once what is happening…The uncertain
attempts by the political leadership to stabilise the situation in the country
often end in failure. In conditions of the lack of outside aggression, inside
the state suddenly appear ‘peaceful’ meetings, demonstrations and anti-
government actions of resistance of opposition forces. In this situation,
the government is placed in a very difficult situation. There haven’t
been such types of war before, and how [best] to react to ‘peaceful’
demonstrations of your own people-very difficult to determine.35
This led him to assert that the ‘frontline’ now goes through ‘the consciousness of the
public and inside the head of every person.’36 In this sense, non-government organisations
can be used as a cover for the activities of those wishing to undermine, if not overthrow,
the ruling regime:
…the region of conflict or military operations is flooded by

representatives of a multitude of various international and foreign non-
government organisations - humanitarian, medical, social, legal. Under
their cover can operate foreign intelligence services, provocateurs and
bandits of all hues. As a result, it is difficult to understand who is fighting
for what, where is the truth and where is the lie.37
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Again, we may find such views hard to understand, but they do clearly show that,
in their analysis of military conflict, both current and future, the Russians have their own
distinctive view and, unless we understand the essence of what the differences are, then
the West will continue to be ‘caught out’ by Russia’s future interventions in the affairs
of others. Pointing out that the vast majority of victims of this new type of warfare are
civilians, Kartapolov draws the inevitable conclusion and a bitter historical parallel:
…modern war more clearly assumes the character of genocide - mass

liquidation of the population, the bitter experience of which our people
endured during the Great Patriotic War.38
Similar in thought, almost in word, to a famous pre-WW2 Soviet military theorist - G I

Isserson - Kartapolov made the obvious distinction between this new type of warfare and
the ‘classical’ type of years gone by:
..as different from classical operations in previous wars with a diplomatic

note at the beginning of the war and a peace treaty at the end of it, wars
of the new type are never announced and never end.39
Further comparing and contrasting the two very different approaches to war,
Kartapolov stated that:
..the classical war of the XX century usually consisted of 80% force,

20% propaganda. Wars of the new type are 80-90% propaganda
and 10-20% force.40
But there was still an important place for the conduct of ‘classical’ military operations:
…in spite of the cardinal changes in the means of the conduct of modern
military conflict, one cannot forget or ignore the classical operations in
conducting war…During the course of holding exercises…still great attention
should be paid…to raid operations, seizing the commanding heights,
conducting operations on encircling and carving up the enemy, tank strikes…
But the most important thing in all of this is the principle of activeness in
operations, regardless of whether it is offensive or defensive. The passive
38 Ibid., 33.
39 Ibid. For more on this particular theme, see Steven J Main, ‘’You cannot generate ideas by orders‘: the
continuing importance of studying Soviet military history – G.S.Isserson and Russia’s current geo-political
stance’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2016, vol.29, 48-72.
40 Ibid.
Demonstration of recon battalion of 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division in 2014 at
the Alabino Training Centre near Moscow. Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin, Creative Commons Attribtution-
Share Alike 4.0 International licence, Wikimedia
conduct of combat operations…will inevitably lead to a loss of control of your

own groups [of forces] and, eventually - defeat.41
In short, the Russian Armed Forces have to be ready for all types of conflict:
…in these difficult conditions, the Russian Armed Forces have to be ready
for operations in all types of armed conflict, threatening the security of
41 Ibid.
the Russian Federation, regardless of their complexity, scale and use of

weapons. At the present moment in time, all the necessary decisions
taken to improve combat capabilities of the army and the navy have
been taken and are being put into effect.42
Conclusion
The Western MD has been and is commanded by men with previous combat experience,
who have a very definite and different world view than their equivalent NATO opposite
numbers. As such, their views have to be examined, analysed and understood so that,
in the future, Western military and political leaders are not taken by total surprise by
future Russian military action, particularly within Europe. The views quoted here may
leave us wondering what the ultimate end game is, as viewed by Russia’s senior military
command in the West. Is Russia preparing for unleashing the new type of war, or laying
the groundwork in order to protect itself against the new threats to its national security?
Should such views frighten us, give us food for thought, or should we continue to ignore
them as part of an agenda, which we cannot hope to understand?

Open water competition was held on 6th August in Vladimir oblast east of Moscow in the WMD. Here T
80 tanks come ashore. Russian team took the first place, China was the second and Serbian team was the third.
Photo Vitaly V Kuzmin, Creative Commons Attribtution-Share Alike 4.0 International licence, Wikimedia
Berkut guards man a entrance checkpoint to the Crimea Peninsula, March 10, 2014. Photo Sasha Maksymenko,
Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License, Wikimedia.
Russia’s Security
Establishment:
Towards
Understanding
Russia’s Actions?
This article by Andra-Lucia Martinescu, Former Research Fellow at
CHACR, was originally published in BAR 168 Winter 2017, and it
explores Russia’s internal power politics, focusing on its security,
military and intelligence establishments.
Active measures (aktivka) of espionage, political subversion or even targeted

assassinations abound throughout Russia’s history. Yet, it is the prevalence and
worrisome expansion of such practices on the European mainland, and beyond, that
should raise concerns. Russia’s pervasive security and intelligence apparatus controls a
vast tactical ‘arsenal’, unrestrainedly deployed to serve a geopolitical vision that mirrors
the Kremlin’s immediate interests. By generating instability abroad, Russia’s security
bureaucracy thrives and survives internally.
In a similar way, President Vladimir Putin’s regime ‘feeds’ on external threats - an
encroachment of Russia’s interests, its vital spheres of influence, borders or nationhood
- to compensate for domestic deficiencies. The use of threat, however, is not new and
its roots can be traced historically. Tsarist Russia exhibited a similar siege mentality,
whereby the acute perception of external and internal threats inflicted a permanent state
of emergency, which in turn, required extraordinary measures of control. At a larger scale,
the Soviet bureaucracy relied on similar mechanisms to identify, manipulate and eliminate
dissent. Internal repression (the systematic targeting of political opposition or perceived
‘enemies’) and external destabilisation function as two facets of the same coin - a means
of safeguarding the system of privileges and favouritism that devolves from the seat
of power to its patrimonial networks. That is, maintaining the leadership’s established
interests and practices unchallenged.
Today, old practices resurface under new guises. To sustain this almost permanent
and politically opportunistic siege mentality, the Kremlin’s numerous and often-
overlapping ‘special services’ pursue economic and political destabilisation through
various methods spanning from non-military measures (propaganda) to covert military
operations and the ‘implausibly deniable’ aktivka (active measures). These actions serve
the short-term or intermediate goals of those who have consolidated, and wish to further
consolidate, their grip on power - clusters of loyalists, the siloviki who, like the President,
share a background in the military, security or intelligence services. They reinforce,
execute and (at times) partake in the informal, yet highly centralised decision-making -
the power vertikal. By and large, Russia’s deep-rooted state-security tradition governs
both domestic and foreign policies.
Hence, the systemic connection between foreign policy and internal politics should
not be underestimated. On the contrary, a brief foray into Russia’s institutional power
politics will point to an autocratic regime that uses its various capabilities and institutions
to strengthen its own domestic power base. There is indeed a blurred delineation
between internal and external aims. For example, Vladimir Putin’s leadership met high
approval ratings following the 2nd Chechen war (2003), after the Georgian campaign
in 2008, and more recently after Crimea’s annexation. As one astute observer noted, it
seems that he ‘is pitching military victories to maintain legitimacy’. It is not the accuracy
of this statement that matters but rather what it alludes to - tactics do not necessarily
Showpiece of the exhibition dedicated

to the 80th anniversary of Russian
foreign intelligence service. The
Central Museum of the Great Patriotic
War of 1941-1945 at Poklonnaya
Mount, December 2000. Photo RIA
Novosti archive, image #654319 /
Dmitry Korobeinikov / CC-BY-SA 3.0,
Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 3.0 Unported license. Wikimedia
inform a long-term strategic outlook, but are essentially conflated with political
opportunism. Although Vladimir Putin unleashed the agencies’ overarching control,
the security and intelligence establishment is far more divided, with various branches
competing for resources, influence and access to the Kremlin’s power structures.
Survival in Darwinian terms has become the norm.
A Post-Soviet History of Security and Intelligence

In the post-Soviet era, the security establishment has gained new scope and impetus.
Paradoxically, this is both a successful continuation of a Soviet-style ‘cadre policy’ and
a departure from the Soviet political model. The KGB was the Communist Party’s (CP)
‘sword and shield’ or ‘combat division’, a state within a state, but with no authority over
decision-making. In delivering the Politburo’s (the CP’s main decision-making body)
surveillance and repression functions, the KGB (and its predecessors) had built a vast
infrastructure of cadres (operatives and collaborators) infiltrated in key strategic positions,
and essentially all walks of life. These penetrative tactics were maintained by the KGB’s
successor organisations whose power, influence and pervasiveness increased with
Vladimir Putin’s coming to power. Thus, there is a clear continuity in both practice and
ideology between the former KGB and the post-Soviet security services.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union fostered some hope that a democratic outlook
would replace the ‘old ways’. Following glasnost and perestroika polities of liberalisation
and a rise of opposition forces, however timid, created a historic opportunity for
the KGB’s liquidation. Instead, chaos and instability settled in. Cutbacks in defence
budgets temporarily suspended the agency’s reach, but reforms lacked actual intent and
structural depth. As President Boris Yeltsin admitted at the time, ‘the system of political
police has been preserved and could be resurrected’. Though he failed to dismantle the
KGB altogether, his prophecy has been painfully validated decades later. The security
establishment is more powerful today than it was in the past.
Symptomatic of a shared optimism that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union,
many (including Western leaders) placed their trust in President Boris Yeltsin’s reformist
impulses. His mandates, however, were marred by deep running tensions between a
nominal ambition for democratisation and the parallel intent of maintaining personal
power and control over all-state operations. Although Yeltsin had a decisive role in
dismantling the Communist Party and severing the planned economy, his authoritarian
tendencies coupled with political bankruptcy and abuse of power undermined any
meaningful changes. Ultimately, the structural weaknesses that characterised Russia’s
‘democratic and economic’ transition provided fertile ground for the security services’
reinvigorated monopoly.
Attempts at reforming or even legalising the former KGB proved superficial. Despite
its formal dissolution the agency survived, not in name but in ethos. The First Chief
Directorate tasked with espionage was spun off into a separate intelligence service,
the FSK, subsequently renamed the FSB. Other branches were also divided into several
autonomous institutions. The KGB’s organisational culture remained very much alive,
although the KGB corps was largely excluded from the post-Soviet redistribution of
assets, which at the beginning of the 1990s led to the meteoric rise of a new, politically
opportunistic oligarchic elite. In an unstable climate plagued by rampant criminality,
this new elite sought to safeguard its fortunes. High and low ranking officers (from the
former KGB or its spinoffs) entered the service of the nouveau riche as private security
consultants in charge of corporate security departments, or even bodyguards. As cohorts
of agents effectively migrated to the private sphere, the negative impact on intelligence
assets and their recruitment proved severe. It was a serious, and equally humiliating,
blow given the KGB’s heavy reliance on its human resources.
To understand the recentralisation of power and return to authoritarianism one must
look at the failures and frustrations cumulated during the spurious attempts at reform.
Rife with the influence of criminal networks, Boris Yeltsin’s bid to privatise state assets
and strategic resources spiralled into widespread instability. The ‘shock therapy’ market
reforms failed to deliver results, promoting instead very few politically endorsed groups
(mostly the President’s circles of trustees) that siphoned state-resources at the expense
of a generally impoverished population. These manifold administrative and economic
inefficiencies, nepotism and rampant corruption deepened public discontent. Towards
the end of his second mandate, Yeltsin believed that reviving a strong-handed security
establishment would help restore law and order. A (then) relatively unknown figure,
Vladimir Putin (former KGB operative and director of the FSB) was groomed to become
his successor. Unlike his predecessor, Putin believed that the Soviet Union’s demise was
a geopolitical catastrophe and so proceeded to recover Russia’s seemingly weakened
power status.
Files from the criminal cases fund

of the FSB Central Archives. RIA
Novosti archive, image #926077
/ Sergey Pyatakov / CC-BY-SA 3.0,
Creative Commons Attribution-
Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
Wikimedia
As Yeltsin’s infrastructure crumbled under Vladimir Putin, a centralised patrimonial

network, faithful to the Kremlin’s new leadership, subdued the transition’s alternative
sources of power. Soon after he assumed ‘command’ Putin moved to confiscate and
renationalise assets owned by the most influential, Yeltsin-made business magnates.
Coincidentally, those targeted were also the most politically active. Only a few were left
unscathed and managed to bolster their fortunes even further. Roman Abramovich was
one of them. Perhaps part of the succession arrangement, Yeltsin himself and his closest
entourage (mostly relatives) were granted amnesty and immunity from prosecution.
With the President’s overt support a new ruling elite replaced the defunct one. This ‘new
nobility’ in Nikolai Patrushev’s (former internal security chief) words swiftly colonised
public and private sectors, appropriating all the posts deemed of leverage. Siloviki,
translated as men of force, designates a group of former KGB, or operatives from
successor organisations (including the military) who accumulated substantial powers,
effectively controlling the economy, media, as well as the military and security sectors.
Their clout also extends to state companies, which enables unimpeded access to vast
financial resources. Although the dispossession of former oligarchs eliminated the
siloviki’s domestic opponents, it also deepened divisions between the newly empowered
security clans, and their competing financial-corporate interests.
With their shared beliefs and similar backgrounds, these new elites appear as
a homogenous group. Nonetheless, competition runs deep in the veins of Russia’s
security turned-political-turned-corporate ‘praetorians’. Within the power vertikal, which
essentially describes Russia’s top-down command structure access to the President’s inner
circles of decision-making garners influence. Political and economic life is thus regulated
by a system of favours bestowed on those loyalists able (and most willing) to deliver
a promising agenda - an agenda that successfully meets or reinforces the leadership’s
expectations and worldviews.
The same competitive ethos applies to the KGB’s successor agencies. Institutional
‘turf wars’ regulate access to resources and guarantee survival. In this sense, the
President and partly his ‘gatekeepers’ - those already within the circles of trustees,
and often acting as an informal Politburo - define and arbiter success. They dispense
the resources, deciding the future of these structures and whether mandates should
be expanded or not. As long as they prove useful to the Kremlin the agencies and
their leaders prosper. Conversely, any deviation from the status quo may result in
disbandment, demotion or the restructuring of assets.
The Agencies - An Anatomy

Russia’s security (and intelligence) establishment comprises an array of agencies, many
with overlapping functions, political agendas and territorial reach. Most key security
agencies are subordinated to the President, and thus (at least in theory) able to brief
him directly. This is a prized institutional capability, commensurate with the various
services’ (and their chiefs’) status and success. Despite their ideological affiliation with
Soviet state-security traditions, the KGB successors developed somewhat distinctive
organisational and operational cultures.
The FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) is the main internal
security agency and the KGB’s principal successor. Its attributions ostensibly cover
domestic affairs, counterespionage, the prevention of organised crime, terrorism and drug
smuggling. In reality, the agency’s remit is far wider, and involves intelligence gathering
abroad, intimidation and targeted assassinations. In the 1990s, the FSB suffered from
budgetary constraints and political uncertainty. Its status and capabilities were further
eroded by corruption and an exodus of its most able officers, who migrated into the
service of President Yeltsin’s rising oligarchs. Only under Vladimir Putin did the FSB
recover its privileged status and esprit de corps. The agency absorbed the Federal Border
Guards Service and FAPSI, a former government agency responsible for communications
and signals intelligence. Following an extensive restructuring campaign, Vladimir Putin
placed the agencies under his direct control. He expanded the FSB’s mandate and assets,
Federal Security Service employees searching Moscow’s Prague restaurant, August 2009. Photo RIA Novosti
archive, image #421316 / Andrey Stenin / CC-BY-SA 3.0, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0
Unported license. Wikimedia
and so by the end of the 2000s the agency became Russia’s dominant intelligence
body. That Vladimir Putin is of FSB extraction, openly revering the legacy of its Chekist
hardliners (the first political police) offers an indication as to why the FSB has been the
disproportionate beneficiary of presidential favours. The FSB’s strategic prominence over
other armed branches, coupled with an enhanced capacity to project military power in
outer-areas of geopolitical interest, mirror this dynamic.
Although the FSB is a domestic security agency, its extensive presence, influence and
operations abroad blur the external-internal distinction. Preferable to, or perhaps more
trusted than other agencies, the FSB also provides a cordon sanitaire of intimate loyalists,
effectively taming the political ambitions of key military figures. This mistrust was not
entirely of a subjective nature, but equally the by-product of the President’s formation
and embedded experience as an operative within the KGB, and later, at the helm of
the FSB. In some ways, Putin epitomises the historical clash between two of Russia’s
most enduring organisational cultures, the armed forces, on the one hand, and security
services, on the other.
The MVD, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was, and continues to be,
another key institution of state control, surviving both Imperial Russia and the Soviet
era. It commands the police forces, as well as the Interior Troops, the latter acting as
a parallel army with its own ranks, culture and organisation. Plagued with corruption
and underfunding during Yeltsin’s presidency, under Vladimir Putin the MVD’s budgets
gradually recovered. The FSO (Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany) provides protection services
for the Kremlin, State Duma (the Russian Parliament) and other government bodies.
It derived from the KGB’s 9th Directorate, which performed similar functions for the
Soviet leadership.
Part of a reform plan for overhauling law enforcement agencies, the President
announced the creation of a National Guard, to be headed by his long-time collaborator
and bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov. In his speech, Vladimir Putin referred to ominous external
enemies that try to destabilise Russia from within by fomenting uprisings and revolution.
Such a development raises concerns for several reasons. Firstly, the National Guard acts
as an army, capable of conducting military operations internally. Secondly, the agency will
be invested with substantial powers, taking over key policing functions previously handled
by Ministry of Interior forces. There are also some overlaps with the FSB. Thirdly, members
of the National Guard are to be exempted from any responsibilities should they cause
damage to individuals and legal entities. This lack of accountability means that individuals
or groups can be randomly targeted without prior notification if deemed to pose a threat.
Although the President declared the fight against terrorism and organised crime as the
agency’s main objective, recent exercises showcase the National Guard mobilising in
scenarios of mass protest.
Human rights activist, priest Gleb Yakunin (center
of the second row) performing a service for the
victims of the Stalinist political repressions at a stone
from the then Solovetsky special-purpose camp
(the Solovetsky Monastery) set up in front of the
KGB headquarters in Lubyanskaya Square, Moscow,
on October 30, 1990. Photo RIA Novosti archive,
image #749019 / Alexander Makarov / CC-BY-SA
3.0, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0
Unported license, Wikimedia.
This clearly signals the leadership’s actual intent, that of creating a deterrence
asset against social unrest and an instrument of repression similar to the Soviet
regime’s insidious political police. So far the mock-mobilisations have been received
enthusiastically and it seems lawmakers embrace the proposal. It is just a matter of
time until the State Duma (the legislature) signs the final bill. Upon ratification, the
nascent agency will gain unhindered control over domestic security, with access to
military capabilities, including armoured vehicles, heavy artillery, and attack helicopters.
Moreover, the National Guard would become Vladimir Putin’s private army, an extension
of his powers beyond the regular armies, which are traditionally controlled by the
Ministry of Defence. This can be interpreted as a balancing act, an insurance policy
against potential contestations from within the circles of power. Some argue that Defence
Minister Sergey Shoigu enjoys high levels of popularity following Russia’s campaigns in
Ukraine and Syria. In this sense, the President may be increasingly apprehensive of a
coup, thus seeking to suppress any potential contenders, imagined or real.
The SVR (the Foreign Intelligence Service – Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) and the GRU
(the military intelligence directorate) are tasked with foreign intelligence gathering. The
SVR is a successor of KGB’s First Chief Directorate (the PGU), with Yevgeny Primakhov as
its first chief. Also the first civilian to hold the job, Primakov was astutely versed in foreign
affairs, and an equally apt politician. He redirected the SVR’s focus towards Russia’s
near abroad, maintaining a cautious, anti-Western position, particularly against NATO’s
expansion. In terms of outlook, not much has changed since Primakov’s initial designs.
Part of the intricate security nexus, the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate of the
General Staff), the military equivalent of the foreign intelligence service, in command of
the Special Forces (Spetsnaz) provides an interesting case. The GRU acted independently
from the KGB and managed its own assets, an autonomy that survived the Soviet Union’s
dissolution. The fact that the GRU has had a historical predisposition for independent
actions may have generated some unease among Kremlin’s political circles, especially
with Vladimir Putin’s coming to power. In the not so distant past, the organisation
witnessed a severe decline, with budgetary and personnel cuts, plummeting role and
prestige. Other agencies (the SVR and FSB) but also the Army’s territorial commands
coveted its capabilities. The fate of the GRU was overturned in 2014 following a series
of tactical successes. The role of the GRU Special Forces in the takeover of Crimea in
2014 and in the undeclared, low intensity, war that soon followed in Eastern Ukraine, led
to the GRU recovering its position. For the time being the threat of its demotion within
the services’ power-hierarchy has been eliminated. However, this clearly indicates that
‘turf wars’ (for influence, resources or even personal reasons) are deeply ingrained in the
organisational culture(s) of Russia’s vast security establishment.
An Alarm at the Khorgos border post in the Taldy Kurgan Region 1984. Photo RIA Novosti archive, image
#630589 / Yuriy Kuydin / CC-BY-SA 3.0, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
Wikimedia
Some Considerations
• Vladimir Putin bolstered the role of the security agencies, employing them
unrestrainedly to articulate his interests abroad and to maximise and
safeguard the foundations of his power domestically
• By constantly (re)-structuring the security establishment, reshuffling assets
between the branches, Vladimir Putin bends the agencies to his will.
Thus, he achieves a balance of power by keeping potential contenders in
check. The National Guard is a powerful example of how he intends to
control both the elite and the wider population.
• Russia’s key security agencies have overlapping functions, mandates and
territorial reach. This competition is amply reflected in their operational
practice. A significant increase in the use of covert tactics (distraction,
assassinations, kidnappings, political and economic subversion) shows
that risk-taking behaviours are not only preferred but also encouraged by
the Kremlin.
• Such risk-taking propensities also mirror President’s Putin’s decision-

making. Vladimir Putin’s ambition to revise the international order goes
hand in hand with his willingness to assume much-greater strategic risks
than the supposed threats. Military ventures in Ukraine and Syria are
risk-taking gambits, not feats in long-term strategic planning. Alas, this is
unlikely to change.
• The agencies share and reinforce the leadership’s worldview. To sustain a
narrative of enmity and the permanent siege mentality security agencies
feed on threats, real or imagined. Threats justify the need for continued
destabilisation abroad, actions that essentially guarantee the agencies’
survival.
• Military campaigns in Georgia (2008), Chechnya (2003), but also Ukraine
(2014) witnessed an intense competition between security factions for
tactical successes. Some may even argue that security hardliners compete
to ‘sell’ external threats at the expense of more calculated strategic
considerations, in a constant effort to maintain their institutions’ status,
assets and most importantly, access to the inner circles of decision-
making. In this sense, personal and institutional interests are
often inter-changeable.
Headquarters Building of the Belarusian KGB (still in use 2011) in central Minsk.
Photo John Oldale, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 license, Wikimedia
Antiterrorist operation in Makhachkala”. Russian Federal Security Service employees during a special operation
in Makhachkala. One militant was killed and two terrorist attacks prevented. RIA Novosti archive, image
#835340 / CC-BY-SA 3.0 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. Wikimedia
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published in this Special Report except where
acknowledgement is made to another copyright
holder; this does not affect the intellectual
property rights of non-MoD authors. No article,
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the permission of the Editor.
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BAR Special Report - USSR / Russia Volume 2 | 01

The views expressed herein (including editorial content) are those of

A brigade command and

current apparent softer attitude towards traditional Russian imperialism.

Military planning must be orientated only to the capabilities of a potential

The Topol Nuclear Weapon

5 Teatr voyennykh deistvii (TVO) translates to Theatre of Strategic Military Action

Time = C3I = Effectiveness = efficiency = defensive efficiency

recognition of the urgent need to improve decision-making techniques, particularly in

11 Reznichenko, V. G., et al., Taktika (2nd Edition), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, p 9

particular purposes. Therefore it by no means follows that Russian perceptions and

In short, we have been witnessing the development of a large engineering culture,

The Combat Robot MRK-002-BG-57 displayed at the tactical exercises of

A Kuwaiti M-113 armored personnel carrier crosses

This article by Major RR Smith was originally published in BAR 106,

Dilemmas of International Defence Co­- operation After the Cold War

Changed Security Environment after the Cold War

Requirement for Future International Defence Co-operation

Common Security Objectives

13 Traditional Peacekeeping was developed by the UN as a non-coercive instrument of conflict management to

The international community’s reaction to Iraq’s unacceptable invasion of Kuwait

The Role of Institutions for International Defence Co-Operation

17 Roberts, A., The United Nations and International Security, p 3

On February 15, 1989, Commanding General Boris Gromov was the

An Afghan Border Policeman stands watch on the Freedom Bridge crossing

The Soviet Helmand

Soviet and Government Forces

commanders nationwide to seek reconciliation, this included Nasim Akhundzada but he

7 Urban, Mark, War in Afghanistan (Macmillan Press, 1990), p.240.

Back to the Future: Predicting Withdrawal

8 Giustozzi and Ullah, op.cit., p.10.

left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so in a coordinated, deliberate, professional manner,

14 Rubin, op.cit., p.166.

The Immediate Aftermath of Withdrawal

18 Prokhanov, A., Afghanistan, International Affairs, (Moscow), Aug 1988, p.21

Helmand’s Soviet Legacy

Lessons for Transition

24 Grau, op.cit., p.22.

26 Grau, op.cit., p.21.

The timely study, generalisation and application of war experience is an

An understanding of the Soviet approach to the study of war can provide

The Carpatho-Dukla Battlefields

1 23.004, AGAI 23.

Map of Operation Bagration. Wikimedia.

3 Holmes R. (ed), The Oxford Companion to Military History, 2001, p 271.

The Study Soviet Military Thought

At [the operational] level, abstract strategic objectives are translated

Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art determines

to recall such sophisticated dogma, which is remarkably similar to the ‘comprehensive

Reinvesting Academic Responsibility

Major Rupert Burridge is a Squadron Commander at 22 Engineer

Slovak partisans alongside Soviet soldiers are depicted on the memorial

2 The Independent, 28/2/2013

According to figures which we have to hand, about 20% of Russia’s

5 The Independent, 28/2/2013

It is extremely important that we place markers…that we mark the

Dilemmas of International Defence Co- operation After the Cold War