Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1403 October 29, 1948

VICENTE CALUAG and JULIANA GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.

POTENCIANO PECSON and ANGEL H. MOJICA, Judges of the Court of First

Instance of Bulacan, and LEON ALEJO, respondents.

Marcial G. Mendiola for petitioners.

Antonio Gonzalez for respondent L. Alejo.

The respondent Judge Pecson in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioners on the
ground that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the
court in rendering the resolution dated April 1, 1947, which declares the petitioners guilty
of contempt of court for not complying or performing the order of the court of January 7,
1947, in case No. 5486 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, requiring the petitioners
to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one-half of the land pro indiviso in
question, within ten days from the receipt of copy of said resolution, and which orders
that the petitioners be imprisoned until they perform the said act.

The first ground on which the petition is based is that the judgment of the court
which the petitioners are ordered to perform has not yet become final. This ground is
unfounded. From the pleadings and annexes it appears that the judgment of the lower
against the petitioners was appealed to the Court of Appeals and was affirmed by the
latter in its decision promulgated on May 30, 1944; that the petition to appeal to the
Supreme Court by certiorari filed by the petitioners was denied on July 24, 1944; that a
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also denied on August 21, 1944;
that the record of the case, having been destroyed during the liberation, was reconstituted;
that on September 24, 1945, the Deputy Clerk of this Court wrote a letter to and notified
the petitioners of the resolution of the Court declaring said record reconstituted, together
with the copies of the decision of the Court of Appeals and resolutions of the Supreme
Court during Japanese occupation of June 24 and August 21, 1944; and that on October
23, 1946, the clerk of Court of First Instance of Bulacan notified the attorneys for both
parties of the said decision of the Court of Appeals and resolutions of the Supreme Court.
There can be no question, therefore, that the judgment of the Court of First Instance
above-mentioned, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has become final and executory.

The other two grounds alleged by the petitioners in support of the present petition
for certiorari are: that plaintiff's action abated or was extinguished upon the death of the
plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal redemption was a personal one, and
therefore not transferable to his successors in interest; and that, even assuming that it is a
personal one and therefore transferable, his successors in interest have failed to secure the
substitution of said deceased by his legal representative under section 17, Rule 3. These
reasons or grounds do not deserve any serious consideration, not only because they are
without merits, but because the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, having jurisdiction to
render that judgment, the latter cannot be disobeyed however erroneous it may be
(Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., 33 Phil., 503;
Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941). And this Court cannot in this proceeding correct any
error which may have been committed by the lower court.

However, although not alleged, we may properly take judicial notice of the fact
that the respondent Judges have acted without jurisdiction in proceeding against and
declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt of court.

The contempt supposed to have been committed by the petitioners is not a direct
contempt under section 1, Rule 64, for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. It is an indirect
contempt or disobedience of a lawful order of the court, under section 3, Rule 64, of the
Rules of Court. According to sections 4 and 5 of said rule, where a contempt under
section 3 has been committed against a superior court or judge the charge may be filed
with such superior court, and the accused put under custody; but if the hearing is ordered
to be had forthwith, the accused may be released from custody upon filing a bond in an
amount to be fixed by the court for his appearance to answer the charge. From the record
it appears that no charge for contempt was filed against the petitioners nor was a trial
held. The only proceeding had in this case which led to the conviction of the defendants
are: the order of January 7, 1947, issued by the lower court requiring the defendants to
execute the deed of conveyance as direct in the judgment within ten days from the receipt
of the copy of said order, with the admonition that upon failure to do so said petitioners
will be dealt with for contempt of court; the motion of March 21, 1947, filed by the
attorney for the respondent Leon Alejo, administrator of the estate of Fortunato Alejo,
that the petitioners be punished for contempt; and the resolution of the court of April 1,
1947, denying the second motion for reconsideration of March 17, 1947, of the order of
January 7, 1947, filed by the petitioners, and ordering the petitioners to be imprisoned in
the provincial jail until they have complied with the order of the court above mentioned.

It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is

something more than the general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance
of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs. It is not enough that a
court has power in abstract to try and decide the class of litigations to which a case
belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called into activity, by the
filing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading. A Court of First Instance has
an abstract jurisdiction or power to try and decide criminal cases for homicide committed
within its territorial jurisdiction; but it has no power to try and decide a criminal case
against a person for homicide committed within its territory, unless a complaint or
information against him be filed with the said court. And it has also power to try civil
cases involving title to real estate situated within its district; but it has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a dispute or controversy between two persons over title of real
property located in his province, unless a proper complaint be filed with its court. So,
although the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has power conferred by law to punish as
guilty of indirect contempt a party who disobeys its order or judgment, it did not have or
acquire jurisdiction of the particular case under consideration to declare the petitioners
guilty of indirect contempt, and order their confinement until they have executed the deed
of conveyance in question, because neither a charge has been filed against them nor a
hearing thereof held as required by law.

The respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in
proceeding against and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the confinement of the petitioners, because it had no power to
impose such punishment upon the latter.

The respondent judge has no power under the law to order the confinement of the
petitioners until they have compiled with the order of the court. Section 9, Rule 39, in
connection with section 7 of Rule 64, provides that if a person is required by a judgment
or order of the court to perform any other act than the payment of money or sale or
delivery of real or personal property, and said person disobeys such judgment or order
while it is yet in his power to perform it, he may be punished for contempt and
imprisoned until he performs said order. This provision is applicable only to specific acts
other than those provided for or covered by section 10 of the same Rule, that is, it refers
to a specific act which the party or person must personally do, because his personal
qualification and circumstances have been taken into consideration in accordance with
the provision of article 1161 of the Civil Code. But if a judgment directs a party to
execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any
specific act which may be performed by some other person, or in some other way
provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not said
section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the provision of said section 10, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other person
appointed or designated by the court, and the act when so done shall have like effect as if
done by the party himself.

It is also well settled by the authorities that a judgment may be void for want of
power to render the particular judgment, though the court may have had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties. A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's
authority is erroneous and may be corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a
wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is void, and may be set aside either directly
or collaterally, where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it. Hence
though the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the particular case
has been submitted properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its jurisdiction
if it renders a judgment which it has no power under the law to render. A sentence which
imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty different from or in
excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense of
which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction, as to the
excess in the latter case. And a judgment of imprisonment which the court has no
constitutional or statutory power to impose, as in the present case, may also be
collaterally attacked for want or rather in excess of jurisdiction.

In Cruz vs. Director of Prisons (17 Phil., 269, 272, 273), this Court said the
following applicable to punishment imposed for contempt of court:

. . . The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of
the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the
courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are
separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of
habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. (Ex parte
Erdmann, 88 Cal., 579; Lowrey vs. Hogue, 85 Cal., 600; Armstrong vs. People, 37 Ill.,
459; State vs. Brannon, 34 La Ann., 942; People vs. Liscomb, 19 Am. Rep., 211; In re
Taylor, 7 S. D., 382, 45 L. R. A., 136; Ex parte Mooney, 26 W. Va., 36, 53 Am. Rep., 59;
U. S. vs. Pridgeon, 153 U. S., 48; In re Graham, 138 U. S., 461.)

In the present case, in view of the failure of the petitioners to execute the deed of
conveyance directed in the judgment of the court, the respondent may, under section 10,
Rule 39, either order its execution by some other person appointed or designated by the
court at the expense of the petitioners, or enter a judgment divesting the title of the
petitioner over the property in question and vesting it in Leon Alejo, administrator of
estate of the deceased Fortunato Alejo, and such judgment has the force and effect of a
conveyance executed in due form of law.

In view of the foregoing, the order of the court of April 7, 1947, ordering the
confinement of the petitioners in the provincial jail until they have complied with the
order of the court, is set aside without costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

On August 10, 1937, Fortunato Alejo filed a complaint against the spouses Vicente
Caluag and Juliana Garcia, herein petitioners, for the redemption of one-half pro indiviso
of a parcel of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan, covered by transfer certificate No. 19178. After
trial, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered judgment on June 23, 1941, ordering
petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of Fortunato Alejo, upon payment by
plaintiff, as purchase price, of the amount of P2,551. The judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals of Central Luzon on May 30, 1944. A petition for review on certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court of the so-called Republic of the Philippines on July 28,
1944. Petitioners' counsel alleges, under oath, that he was not notified of said denial. The
record of the case was lost or burned during the liberation of Manila. Fortunato Alejo
died on December 10, 1944, petitioners made aware of the fact only on December 1,
1946. The record, upon petition, was duly reconstituted on August 30, 1946, a resolution
to said effect having been issued by this Court.

On October 21, 1946, respondent Leon Alejo, judicial administrator of the estate of
Fortunato Alejo, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
execution of the judgment. On October 28, the motion was indefinitely postponed. On
November 21, Leon Alejo filed another motion for the execution of the judgment, which
was granted on January 7, 1947, Judge Potenciano Pecson ordering defendants "to
execute the deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P2,551 over one-half of
the land pro indiviso described in transfer certificate of title No. 19178 within ten days
from the receipt of a copy of this order; upon failure to do so the said defendants will be
dealt with for contempt of court:"
On February 3, 1947, Leon Alejo filed a petition praying that defendants be punished for
contempt for having failed to comply with the order of January 7. On February 19,
defendants filed a petition seeking reconsidering of the order of January 7, and dismissal
of the complaint for contempt, upon three grounds: (a) That the judgment of the Court of
Appeals of Central Luzon, has not become final and executory; (b) That the plaintiff's
action was abated or extinguished upon Fortunato Alejo's death, his right to legal
redemption being personal; and (c) That his successors cannot ask for the execution of
the judgment because they failed to secure the reglementary substitution of parties and
amendment of the judgment.

On March 3, Judge Pecson denied defendants' petition and granted them five days within
which to comply with the order of January 7, otherwise they would be held in contempt
of court. On March 17, defendants filed another petition for reconsideration. On March
21, Leon Alejo moved again that defendants be punished for contempt. On April 1, Judge
Angel H. Mojica issued a resolution denying the second petition for reconsideration,
finding defendants guilty of contempt of court and ordering their confinement in the
provincial jail of Bulacan until they have complied with the order of January 7, directing
further that warrant of arrest be issued to said effect. On April 1, 1947, Leon Alejo
deposited with the court of first instance the amount of P2,261.63, evidenced by
provincial receipt No. 211013.

Upon the above facts, petitioners raise before us several questions.

(a) LACK OF NOTIFICATION

Petitioners maintain that the decision of the Court of Appeals of Central Luzon,
promulgated on May 30, 1944, and the resolution of the Supreme Court of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, issued on July 24, 1944, denying their petition for review on
certiorari, had not yet become final, because their counsel has not yet received a copy of
the resolution of denial dated July 24, 1944.

Although the allegation of non-receipt of notice is made under oath and the opposing
party does not specifically contradict the allegation, in respondent Leon Alejo's answer it
is stated that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of denial of
July 24, 1944, and the motion was denied on August 21, 1944.

A perusal of the record as declared reconstituted by this Court demonstrates that on

August 11, 1944, the Supreme Court of the so-called Republic of the Philippines adopted
a resolution granting petitioners an extension of five days only of the reglementary period
within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of denial of July 24,
1944, the extension granted being in response to petitioners' prayer for an extension of
ten days, and that on August 21, 1944, said Supreme Court issued a resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, with Mr. Justice Ozaeta dissenting.

The authenticity of the copies of papers forming part of the reconstituted record has not
been disputed by petitioners. We may, therefore, assume that said record represents the
proceedings which have taken place. Upon this premise, we are constrained to dismiss
petitioners' allegation that they were not notified of the resolution of denial of July 24,
1944, as, otherwise, they could not have filed a petition for extension of ten days and,
after being given an extension of only five days, a motion for reconsideration, the filing
of which was necessarily based on petitioners' knowledge of the resolution of denial of
July 24, 1944, knowledge that they should have obtained, in the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, from official notification.

Petitioners' contention, being based on a fact that is unacceptable, has no leg to stand on.

(b) EFFECT OF FORTUNATO ALEJO'S DEATH

The next question raised by petitioners is that upon Fortunato Alejo's death on December
10, 1944, the complaint "was abated or extinguished," his "act of legal redemption being
personal and not real," and his heirs "could not have acquired that right" (of legal
redemption).

Petitioners appear to labor under the confusion of mistaken concepts. They assume that
the right of legal redemption of Fortunato Alejo is of such personal nature that it could
not be transmitted to his heirs. The proposition has no basis in law. There is absolutely no
reason why his heirs could not inherit said right of legal redemption. Petitioners then
jump to the proposition that Fortunato Alejo's death "abated or extinguished" his
complaint, premised on the wrong idea that the right of legal redemption is not
transmissible by inheritance. The reasoning is the result of a confusion of petitioners'
wrong concept on substantive law with a mistaken idea of adjective law.

Petitioners' contention has no merit.

(c) NINE-DAY PERIOD

Petitioners contend that, granting arguendo that the judgment has become final and
executory and that Fortunato Alejo's heirs stepped into his shoes after his death and could
have exercised his right of legal redemption, "they should have done or exercised it
within nine days from his death or knowledge thereof."

Petitioners chose not to adduce any reason in support of the theory which has absolutely
no basis in law.

(d) PROCEDURAL OMISSIONS

Petitioners allege that Fortunato Alejo's heirs, or the administrator or executor of his
estate, are not entitled to the execution of the judgment due to three procedural omissions,
i.e.: (a) No petition for substitution has been filed with the Court of Appeals of Central
Luzon; (b) No petition to secure amendment of the judgment so as to make effective the
substitution; and (c) No petition to remand the record to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.

The grounds alleged are exclusively technical in nature and of scant importance. After the
judgment became final and executory, it is late to raise the question of substitution. In the
present case, it happens that Leon Alejo is appearing as the judicial administrator of the
deceased Fortunato Alejo. Such a representative capacity, undoubtedly given to him by
proper judicial appointment, satisfies fully the legal purposes of substitution. The
remanding of the record to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is a matter of official
duty, compliance of which does not require any initiative from any party.

(e) CONTEMPT OF COURT

Petitioners allege that they could not properly and legally be declared in contempt of
court because: (a) The judgment sought to be executed ordered them to execute the
corresponding deed of sale upon payment by plaintiff of the sum of P2,551, and only the
sum of P2,261.63 has so far been paid or consigned, thus leaving a balance of P289.37,
and (b). The judgment provides that the sale be executed "in favor of Fortunato Alejo,
who is now dead."

Respondent Leon Alejo answered that the amount deposited with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan is P2,551. At the hearing, his attorney explained that two deposits
were made, one in the sum of P2,261.63 and the other in the amount of P289.37, due to a
misunderstanding of the clerk of the lower court of said respondent. But the fact that the
deposit was made only on April 1, 1947, as alleged under oath by petitioners, is not
denied by respondent. April 1, 1947, is the date of the resolution issued by Judge Mojica,
ordering confinement of petitioners in the provincial jail of Bulacan until they comply
with the order of January 7, 1947.

Upon the technicality of substitution, petitioners' contention is without merit.

We are of opinion that the resolution holding petitioners guilty of contempt and ordering
their confinement in the provincial jail of Bulacan should be denied force and effect upon
weightier grounds than the ones alleged by petitioners.

The applicable provisions of law in this case is section 10 of Rule 39 which provides:

Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. — If a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other
specific act, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct
the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by
the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or
personal property is within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance
thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and
such judgment shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of
law.

Accordingly, instead of intimidating petitioners to be dealt with for contempt of court, as

provided in the last part of its order of January 7, 1947, and insisting in its order of March
3, 1947, that petitioners should comply with said order of January 7, reiterating that,
otherwise, "the court will be constrained to hold said defendants in contempt of court"
and, lastly, in issuing the resolution of April 1, 1947, finding petitioners guilty of
contempt, ordering their confinement in the provincial jail of Bulacan, until they have
complied with the order of January 7, and, to said effect, ordering their arrest, the lower
court should have directed that the deed of sale provided in the judgment and in the order
of January 7, to be executed by petitioners, be done by some other person "appointed by
the court" and "at the cost of the disobedient party." The lower court's orders intimidating
petitioners with punishment for contempt, and ordering their arrest and confinement in
the provincial jail of Bulacan for an indeterminate period, until they have complied with
the order of January 7, a course of action that petitioners may not follow until their
respective deaths, must be declared null and void.

There are members of this Court which hold the position that the lower court could have
legally followed two alternatives, either by applying the above-quoted section 10 of Rule
39 or by punishing petitioners for contempt, by applying section 9 of the same Rule 39,
but they are of opinion that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion by
resorting to the drastic measure of contempt proceedings, when the proceeding outlined
by section 10 of Rule 39 could be availed of easily and without causing unnecessary
suffering to any party. The rule is that when two or more means are available to attain a
legal end, harsher ones should only be adopted as a last resort.

There are other members of this Court, among them the writer of this opinion, that are
convinced that in the case at bar section 9 of Rule 39 is not applicable and the lower court
could not have followed other proceeding than the one outlined by section 10 of Rule 39.
Furthermore, those of us who maintain such position, are of opinion that, even in the
hypothesis that the lower court could have followed the contempt proceedings outlined
by section 9 of Rule 39, the lower court could only punish petitioners with fine or fixed
term of imprisonment, or both, as provided by section 6 of Rule 64, but never to hold
them in confinement, as provided in the resolution of April 1, 1947, for an indefinite
period, until petitioners should choose to execute the deed of sale in question. Although
that authority is granted in section 7 of Rule 64, we hold that said section cannot be given
force nor effect, because it is null and void as violative of the following constitutional
mandate: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." (Section 1 [19], Article III of the Constitution.).

While petitioners could have avoided altogether any imprisonment or they could reduce
its term to any period of time they may choose, there is nothing to preclude them from
undergoing forty or more years imprisonment, if they decide to continue refusing that
long, while the life imprisonment provided by the Revised Penal Code for the most
heinous crimes, murder, parricide, treason, and others, is limited to a maximum of thirty
years. Is it not shocking that a longer term should be imposed for a simple refusal to sign
a deed of sale, for which refusal the disobedient party may have strong reasons, because
he may deem it humiliating, than for the most hateful crimes known under our laws? By
the way, is it not absurd for the lower court to wait for petitioners to execute the deed of
sale until they choose to perform the action required of them, which may take years,
instead of appointing a third person to perform the act according to section 10 Rule 39,
which will take just a small fraction of a day?

For all the foregoing, the orders of the lower court of January 7, March 3, and April 1,
1947, are set aside. To make effective the execution of the deed of sale as provided in the
judgment in question, upon the validity of which the members of this Court follow the
same alignment as that in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez, L-5, 1 the lower court is
ordered to follow the procedure outlined by section 10 of Rule 39. The petition is denied
in all other respects.

Footnotes

1 75 Phil., 113 and 371.