Assignment 4
Assignment 4
Assignment 4
Conflict between Confidentiality Ring Regulations with the Evidence Act and Advocates
Act
Research
https://www.cyrilshroff.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Client-Alert-CCIs-new-
confidentiality-regime.pdf
1. On April 8, 2022, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) announced important changes to the
regulations for the treatment of confidential information in its proceedings. The changes were notified
by substituting Regulation 35 of the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009
(the “Amended Regulation”).1
Self-Certification
3. Parties now have to submit an undertaking certifying their confidentiality claims, along with cogent
reasons for seeking it. The process for assessment of each such claim by the CCI/ Director General (the
“DG”), the acceptance/ rejection orders passed by the CCI/ DG and the appeals process against such
orders stand replaced by the self-certification regime in the Amended Regulation.
4. Parties would continue to explain their reasons for claiming protection against making the information
public.
5. The self-certification is subject to an undertaking that (i) the information is not available in the public
domain; (ii) it is ‘known only to limited persons’ involved in the party’s business; (iii) ‘adequate
measures’ have been taken to guard the secrecy of such information; and (iv) it cannot be acquired or
duplicated by others.
6. If an incorrect self-certification is furnished, the party will be liable to be penalised under the
provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 (as amended) (the “Act”). The penalty for providing an
incorrect undertaking could be covered under Section 45 of the Act, dealing with penalty for
furnishing, inter alia, false statements/ documents, where the CCI may impose a monetary penalty of
up to INR 10 million (approximately USD 130,608).
All ‘personal information’ has automatic protection under the Amended Regulation. That said, personal
information has not been defined under the Act or the regulations. However, guidance is available in
the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data
or information) Rules, 20112, which defines personal information.
With a view to allow parties access to confidential information/ documents of other parties during an
investigation, to defend themselves effectively, the CCI has introduced the concept of the
“confidentiality ring”. The CCI may at its discretion set up a confidentiality ring comprising
representatives of the parties who will be given access to all confidential information (including the
confidential version of the DG’s report, documents obtained during search and seizure and complete
version of the CCI’s orders).
Parties would have to undertake that their respective members would not disclose the information
provided to them with anyone outside the confidentiality ring. If members breach their undertaking, the
CCI will have complete authority to impose penalties, and counter parties may also seek suitable
remedies as per applicable law. It is unclear which provision of the Act would be applicable for the
imposition of such penalty by the CCI.
10.The informant (complainant) will be included in the confidentiality ring only if the CCI considers it
necessary.
The changes to the confidentiality regime bring the CCI’s standard closer to global best practices. In practice,
the CCI had already started creating confidentiality rings after sharing the DG report with parties, codifying this
practice is a step in the right direction. It will not only help the CCI in preserving confidential information of
parties, but also in balancing the right to defence of one party vis-à-vis the right of the other party to protect its
confidential information.
Concerns:
(a) the circumstances/ minimum threshold where the CCI will set up confidentiality rings. Will it be a standard
protocol for all enforcement matters?
(b) the process of setting up a confidentiality ring and at what stage of investigation it would be set up. For
instance, in the recent cases, confidentiality rings were set up by the CCI and members were granted access only
after the DG’s investigation report was shared with the parties. It is unclear if the CCI will be open to setting up
a confidentiality ring at an earlier stage, i.e., before passing a prima facie order;
i. what would be acceptable to the CCI as amounting to ‘disclosure of trade secrets’, or ‘destruction or
appreciable diminution of the commercial value’ of any information, or ‘disclosure which is reasonably
expected to cause serious injury’ in order to claim confidentiality? For example, the European Commission’s
guidance note on confidentiality claims during antitrust procedures 3 provides illustrations of the information that
may or may not be considered as business secrets4. Similar guidance from the CCI will be helpful, considering
the penalty risks associated with incorrect identification of confidentiality claims; and
ii. what the terms such as ‘known only to limited persons’ or ‘adequate measures’ to guard the secrecy of such
information state.
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/business_secrets_en.pdf
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7141cc81-4f65-404b-9487-8a202540914c
Adhering to the principles of “due processes”, Indian judicial and regulatory authorities
have been taking steps to reduce delays in adjudicatory processes. Enforcement
proceedings relating to anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance before the
Competition Commission of India (CCI) may also not be immune to such inordinate
delays. Thus, it may require fresh attempts to get the processes streamlined to the
extent possible.
ssues relating to the protection of one’s confidential data / gaining access to the
confidential data of the other parties at the CCI generally take a life of their own in the
form of parallel or interlocutory adjudicatory processes. At times, such issues can
percolate to the Indian constitutional courts for adjudication. In the past, the Delhi High
Court tried to achieve a balance by limiting the number of people who would gain access
to confidential information on behalf of the receiving party on an ad hoc basis.2
Therefore, CCI felt the necessity to create a streamlined and faster process which could
align the right to protect confidential information with the right of the party affected by
such confidentiality claims.
Further, the draft amendment stated that members of CRs shall be from “commercially
non-operational streams” to the extent possible. However, the extant Amendment
empowers the CCI to make any person a member of the CR, including a market facing
employee. In this regard, market distorting competitive concerns may potentially arise if
market facing employees utilise such confidential information in their day-to-day
functioning. Pertinently, this risk can be mitigated if such information is accessed only
by members from “commercially non-operational streams” who cannot use the
confidential information in their usual operations to lower the level of competition in a
market.
The proviso to the amended Regulation 35(7) also states that “representatives” of
parties shall be held liable for breach of undertakings. However, a CR arrangement is
strictly inter se the CCI and the parties, and the definition of “party” under the existing
CCI (General) Regulations, 2009 does not include “representatives”.4 Thus, it appears
that the Amendment is drafted specifically to expand the scope of the master regulation.
Further, legal representatives of parties are already bound to maintain client
confidentiality under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Advocates Act, 1961.
Therefore, adding further pecuniary onus in this regard may cause friction between
various legal frameworks.
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/confidentiality-ring-amendment-could-
make-antitrust-disputes-more-opaque-7873696/
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has realised that disputes arising out of antitrust
matters, also known as competition or cartelisation, require confidentiality. The problems that
arise in the commission’s investigation under Sections 3, 4 or 5 of the Competition Act are
germane to the suo motu powers given to the director-general of the commission, which have
now extended toward establishing an opaque confidentiality ring. This was recently used in
an order dated March 7, passed by the DG-CCI on the Amazon dispute, wherein Amazon (the
defendant) decided to take the confidentiality route towards its submissions.
In Europe, where Amazon has a presence, antitrust matters are largely regulated under the
guidance note for Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the European Union, which states:
“Through confidentiality rings, DG Competition (EU) can safeguard the rights of defence
while respecting the legitimate interests in the confidentiality of the information providers. In
addition, confidentiality rings remove or reduce the burden of preparing non-confidential
versions of documents.”
In 2015, the EU mandated the creation of a data room to respect the confidentiality of certain
documents. The EU has to protect this mandate to ensure that the right of defence is not
prejudiced. The CCI has taken an alternative view by vaguely replacing the intent with the
regulation which states, “Confidentiality Ring (sic) the Commission may do so after
providing a reasonable opportunity to the informant to represent its case before the
Commission.” This casts an onus on the informant. Turning to the provider of confidential
information, the party seeking confidentiality has to submit reasons and the same must be
rebutted by the informant, CCI or any other parties, largely driven by the CCI. The question
before the CCI now is whether it must adhere to the rule that every party to a dispute must be
heard. Yes, but as redacted by the parties seeking to present the information, at the discretion
of the CCI. This presents a two-pronged issue. First, what would happen if the informant
seeks additional documents so that the agency is not prejudiced? By hearing parties
out,through redacted information the CCI is bound to be questioned as to the reasons for
deciding in a certain manner and worse, could stifle the process at the start.
The second question is about the relief under Section 35 of the Act that empowers the CCI to
establish a confidentiality ring including the parties in dispute to disseminate the information
for which the confidentiality clause is invoked. However, this is immediately caveated by
Regulation 8 of the “Confidentiality Ring” Amendment of April 8, which states that the
informant shall not be part of the ring. This will essentially lead the CCI to gather more
information surreptitiously for the determination of the case. It has also effectively rejected
the informant’s right to know the information, which would be necessary to establish their
claim.
We have imported the “Confidentiality Ring” from the EU but we may have done it in a
manner that none of the decisions can be challenged. The protection provided to the
informants, unfortunately, turns out to be to the advantage of the defendants, who are usually
large multi-billion dollar entities. It enables the CCI to ringfence its investigation creating
legal immunity for “all” involved.
It is clear that competition law cases, by their very nature, are more likely to give rise
to an application for orders that a confidentiality ring be put in place with rules
around the manner in which documents can be dealt with when disclosed by one
party to the other. Mr Justice Barrett observed that confidentiality rings are
increasingly becoming standard practice in competition law proceedings in the
United Kingdom. In the particular circumstances of Goode Concrete, the Judge made
the following orders, which are representative of the typical orders one finds:
it was not necessary for Mr. PG, as distinct from independent expert
advisors engaged by Goode Concrete, to see any material that was
ordered to be discovered,
all the legal advisors to Goode Concrete would undertake to the court (i)
not to disclose to any party outside the confidentiality ring the
substance or tenor of any such discovered documentation aforesaid,
and (ii) to respect the spirit as well as the letter of the order concerning
the establishment of the confidentiality ring, and
(6) The Commission may, if considered necessary or expedient, set up Confidentiality Ring(s)
comprising of such authorised representatives of the parties, including, but not limited to, the
authorised representatives specified under Section 35 of the Act, who would be able to access
the information as mentioned in sub-regulation (5), as required, in unredacted form in terms of
Regulation 37 of these regulations:
Provided that the Commission, while setting up a Confidentiality Ring, may decide the extent of
information to be made accessible, as well as the parties and their members to be included, in
the Confidentiality Ring, as deemed appropriate, for the purpose: Provided further that the
documents/ material mentioned in proviso to sub-regulation (5) which have been relied upon in
the confidential version of the report of the Director General, shall be made accessible to the
members of the Confidentiality Ring.
https://www.barandbench.com/columns/confidentiality-and-ring-fencing-pitfalls-the-
competition-commission-of-india-must-avoid
However, such measures should not dissuade from the fact that
protection of confidential information plays a pivotal role in any
investigation undertaken by the Commission. It is pertinent to note
that the Commission has extensive access to sensitive information
of the enterprise under investigation and this makes it necessary for
any confidential information obtained to be given due protection.
https://indiacorplaw.in/2021/08/confidentiality-rings-under-competition-law-need-
for-ironing-out-wrinkles.html
Pursuant to this objective, the principle of confidentiality, which also found mention in the
erstwhile Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, has been enshrined in the
Competition Act, 2002 (the ‘Act’). However, this statutory protection is occasionally at
loggerheads with the equally important right of the other party to be afforded access to
certain information in order to effectively prepare its defence. Thus arises the challenge for
the fair market regulator to strike the right balance between the two often conflicting right
The idea of setting up confidentiality rings is not completely novel to this draft regulation and
has previously been discussed in a few instances, one such instance being the TLM Ericsson
v Xiaomi Technology case, wherein the Delhi High Court ordered for instituting a
confidentiality ring comprising a specified number of lawyers and expert witnesses. But
institutionalizing such a mechanism also engenders the possibility of misuse at the hands of
parties solely intending to gain access to rival confidential data, which would compromise
with the latter’s right to confidentiality.
Confidentiality rings could very well help the regulator mitigate protracted litigation, but it
could pose new challenges in striking a balance between principles of natural justice and
confidentiality. The CCI should be wary of the available avenues within the draft regulations
that are vulnerable to exploitation by parties.
Regulation 2(6) of the draft regulations vests discretionary powers on the CCI to set up
confidentiality rings. However, the specific grounds that can be invoked to trigger the
formation of these rings have not been delineated. This can lead to potential difficulties in the
future when such confidential rings are employed in practice. The draft regulations are also
silent as to whether the power to constitute confidential rings will be restricted to the CCI. If
the regulator affords parties the power to make a reasoned application for setting up a
confidentiality ring, it should be made explicit under the envisioned scheme. The authors feel
that involving the parties will draw more sanctity to the process and will also help in retaining
the confidence of the parties.
Mature regulators like the European Commission have set out explicit grounds to invoke the
formation of confidentiality rings. The European Commission permits disclosure through
confidentiality rings only when such disclosure is instrumental in proving infringement or
safeguarding the rights of defence of the parties
However, the ultimate discretion to accept or reject the proposal put forth by the informant
rests on the DG. Hence, it is important for India to assimilate practices from mature
jurisdictions to successfully employ confidentiality rings.
urther, the competition watchdog proposed a tweak to the regulations to put the onus of justifying claims for confidentiality
on the parties through self-certification.
This would include an undertaking from a company secretary or authorised officer of the firm to state the extent to which the
information is known to outside public, measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information and the ease or difficulty
with which the information could be acquired or duplicated.
Additionally, representatives of the confidentiality ring would be liable to penal action under the Competition Act, for breach
of undertakings or submitting incorrect information while claiming confidentiality on self-certification basis, the CCI said.
“Up until now, one could ask for inspection of records only post the filing of the DGs report before the commission but the
draft regulations say that a similar confidentiality ring may be set up at the level of the DG,” Nayar said, adding, “This could
lead to ambiguities regarding when one could inspect the confidential records and may need to be made more explicit in the
amended regulations.”
https://www.irccl.in/post/confidentiality-rings-under-the-competition-law-taking-a-
cue-from-the-eu
On multiple occasions, the Indian courts have accepted an application for the setting up of a
CR. For instance, the Delhi High Court, in cases involving Telefonaktiebolaget v. Xiaomi
Technology
ordered the creation of CR comprising of a specified number of lawyers. Similarly, in order t
o devisea procedure to ensure the confidentiality of the information, documents, and database
, the Delhi High Court in Mvf Aps and Others v. M Sivasamy and
Others limited the number of people who can have access to confidential information.
Furthermore, perhaps the most important aspect of CR is the nature and magnitude of penalty
on lawyers upon sharing information with others as it is expected to deter lawyers from com
mitting disclosure. In the EU, such disclosure invites disciplinary action by the bar associatio
n against the concerned lawyer(s). In India, in case of disclosure, the amendment provides for
the imposition of penalty as per the provisions of the Act. It appears that for offences related t
o information as covered under Chapter VI of the
Act, the penalty will be in the nature of the imposition of a fine. Moreover, each provision set
s an upper limit on the amount of fine that can be imposed; thus, a lawyer can collude with its
client and share information where the benefit of such sharing might outstrip the amount of p
enalty.
https://www.mondaq.com/india/cartels-monopolies/1148418/recommendations-
on-the-review-of-extant-confidentiality-regime-under-regulation-35-of-the-
competition-commission-of-india-general-regulations-2009
7. Under the Regulation 6 of the CCI (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009 ("Lesser
Penalty Regulations"), the CCI is required totreat as confidential the identity of
the leniency applicant as well as the information /documents/evidence as
furnished by it; unless there has been a disclosure by the applicant etc. or the
Director General ("DG"), CCI deems it necessary to disclose the same.
8. However, post submission of the DG's investigation report, the confidentiality
envisaged under Regulation 6 of Lesser Penalty Regulations is not available and
confidentiality as granted under Regulation 35 of General Regulation survives
and the remaining non-confidential information is made open to the parties for
inspection.
9. The confidentiality provisions enshrined under the Competition Act and allied
Regulations ought to be interpreted and applied by the CCI in such a manner
that it strikes a balance between the protection of confidential information, the
interest of the disclosing party and the other party's right to a fair trial and
defend its case effectively. A balance so implemented will help steer clear of
allegations of confirmation-bias or bias of any form towards any party (including
itself).
10. Confidentiality has always been one of the important aspects in the Indian
Competition Law regime. Its importance was recognized even under the erstwhile
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, the predecessor to the
Competition Act.
11. It must be noted that similar to Section 57 of the Competition Act, the Section 60
of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 also envisaged a
restriction on the disclosure of information obtained by or on behalf of the
Commission.
12. Further, the Competition Law Review Committee ("CLRC"), instituted in 2019,
in its report notes that
".Regulation 35 sets out the factors that the CCI or the DG may consider while arriving at a
decision regarding confidentiality. Notably, the CCI or the DG may reject the request and, in
such cases, parties will be informed about the intention of CCI or DG."6
13. In light of the above, it becomes clear that legislative intent behind Regulation 35
of the General Regulation has always been to ensure that the confidentiality
regime is intact to protect the personal and commercial interests of the parties
involved in such investigations and that there is a constant debate/ discussion
around it so that, if the need be, the regulations can be periodically amended.
Confidentiality rings are a form of negotiated disclosure, set out to safeguard the rights
of defence while respecting the legitimate interests of information providers. Under the
European Union ("EU") framework, it is the DG Competition who has the discretion to
decide whether the formation of a confidentiality ring is appropriate, either suo-moto or
on a request made in this regard by the parties. The EU framework permits any party
requiring access to confidential or commercially sensitive information to negotiate with
the party which submits such information to the antitrust authority so as to determine
the persons/ individuals who should be a part of or constitute the confidentiality ring.
Adoption of this methodology or procedure is likely to ensure minimal disputes and
litigation between the parties.
70. It must be noted that the Proposed Amendment introduces the concept of
Confidentiality rings under the Competition Act to regulate the dispensation of
confidential information amongst parties in a manner that is not prejudicial to
the information provider or the other parties' right to defence. In this context, it
must be pointed out that in In Re: NSK Ltd. and Ors. 43, back in 2014, the CCI upon
mutual agreement of the parties had allowed for the formation of a
confidentiality ring to disclose the confidential information.
71. Therefore, it is clear that the protection of confidential information, while
ensuring that the right of defense and fair trial is afforded to the other parties,
has always been of utmost importance under the Indian jurisprudence.
116. The proposed Sub-Regulation 6 stipulates that the Commission may set
up Confidentiality Rings comprising of authorised representatives of the parties
to an investigation. The rationale behind setting up of Confidentiality Rings is to
enable all the parties to have access to unredacted versions of the relevant
documents, at the same time, in terms of Regulation 37 of the General
Regulations.
117. The proposed regulations also does not expressly include advocates as a
part of the confidentiality ring. In terms of the current practice, the legal
representatives/ advocates are not allowed to accompany parties/ witness, while
recording of statements before the DG and they are made to sit in a separate
room. This is to ensure that the advocates do not listen to the questions as asked
by the DG and answers as given by the parties. However, as part of the
confidential ring, the advocates should not be denied access to such statements.
Accordingly, it is advisable that the same is clarified in the Proposed Regulations.
Further, liability imposed on CR members for breach of
confidentiality undertakings seems to be dual pronged. While the CCI
has stated that members breaching the CR undertaking will be
proceeded against “as per the provisions of the Act”, it also gives a
right to the disclosing party to avail suitable remedies “as per law”.
Accordingly, once a breach of CR is established, a member may face
two parallel proceedings, (i) one under the scheme of the Act; and
(ii) another civil proceeding for compensation / damages.
The proviso to the amended Regulation 35(7) also states that
“representatives” of parties shall be held liable for breach of
undertakings. However, a CR arrangement is strictly inter se the CCI
and the parties, and the definition of “party” under the existing CCI
(General) Regulations, 2009 does not include “representatives”.
[4] Thus, it appears that the Amendment is drafted specifically to
expand the scope of the master regulation.
Further, legal representatives of parties are already bound to
maintain client confidentiality under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
and the Advocates Act, 1961. Therefore, adding further pecuniary
onus in this regard may cause friction between various legal
frameworks.