Bill of Rights

Bill of Rights
PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Section 15, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Section 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Xxx
IN WHAT CASES SHALL HABEAS CORPUS BE AVAILABLE?
Sec. 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Villavicencio vs Lukban
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further
rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city,
who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women
of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without
either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when
and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved
parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.
Feria vs CA
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined
and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under
lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
WHO MAY GRANT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?

The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and
may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance,
or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.
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WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?

Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is
intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained on his liberty;
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown
or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who
is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;
(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without
impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority,
such fact shall appear.
CAN BE SUSPENDED? WHEN CAN THE PRIVILEGE BE SUSPENDED?

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Section 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
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SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.
Section 15 (1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
DOES THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES APPLY TO CASES UNDER

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE OMB?
Tatad vs Sandiganbayan
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of
the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of
close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar.
Duterte vs Sandiganbayan
Petitioners manifestation adopting the comments of their co-respondents was filed on 18 February
1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or four (4) years later, that petitioners received a
memorandum dated 8 February 1996 submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel M. De Guzman
recommending the filing of information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their cases. In Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, we held that an undue delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal
of the case xxx
The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not come into play only when political
considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no such distinction. While political motivation in
Tatad may have been a factor in the undue delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
therein to justify the invocation of their right to speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts of each
case must be taken into consideration in the grant of the relief sought.
IS THE PERIOD FOR FACT- FINDING INCLUDED IN THE COUNTING THE DELAY IN THE
DISPOSITION OF CASES?
Gerry vs Sandiganbayan
Anent the fact-finding investigation conducted by the DENR, Cagang v. Sandiganbayan 33 instructs
that the period devoted for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of a formal complaint should be
excluded in the determination of whether or not inordinate delay exists,
Cagang vs Sandiganbayan
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-
finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend
these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of
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a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable
cause to charge the accused.
This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as unbridled
license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in the extinction of criminal
liability through the prescription of the offense.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates
the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal
of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged
within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during
the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was
inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was
suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but
through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise
a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution
must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by
the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be
examined on a case-to-case basis.
DISTINGUISH THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL FROM THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES
Cagang vs Sandiganbayan
The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil,
criminal, or administrative cases before them.
Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the administration of justice. In
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable
dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy disposition of cases
may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and
may result in possible criminal liability. The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly
invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman
since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution.
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
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NON- IMPRISONMENT DUE SOLELY TO POLITICAL BELIEF AND RIGHT AGAINST

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.
Article 272, Revised Penal Code

Slavery. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding 10,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap or detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving
him.
If the crime be committed for the purpose of assigning the offended party to some immoral traffic, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Exploitation of child labor. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who, under the pretext of
reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody
of a minor, shall, against the latter's will, retain him in his service.

Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who,
in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against
his will, as household servant or farm laborer.
Section 3(f), Expanded Anti Human Trafficking Act

Involuntary Servitude – refers to a condition of enforced and compulsory service induced by means
of any scheme, plan or pattern, intended to cause a person to believe that if he or she did not enter into
or continue in such condition, he or she or another person would suffer serious harm or other forms of
abuse or physical restraint, or threat of abuse or harm, or coercion including depriving access to travel
documents and withholding salaries, or the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.
CAN A PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER HAS THE RIGHT TO RESTRAIN AN EMPLOYEE UNLESS THE
LATTER REIMBURSE THE EXPENSES MADE BY THE FORMER?
Caunca vs Salazar
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid,
has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her
personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous
belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element
that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect
of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
physical coercion.
CAN A COURT STENOGRAPHER BE COMPELLED TO TRANSCRIBE TSN EVEN IF NO LONGER

WORKING IN THE COURT?
Aclaracion vs Gatmaitan
We have given Aclaracion's petition the attention and study which it deserves. The habeas corpus
aspect of his petition has become moot in view of his release from jail during the pendency of his case.
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After much reflection, we have come to the conclusion that his request that he be relieved from
transcribing his notes in the other cases cannot be granted.
We hold that an Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his stenographic
notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent
powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the
due administration of justice (See State vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 5 Pac. 2d 192, 39 Ariz.
242, Note 74, 21 C. J. S. 41; 20 Am. Jur. 2d 440; Fuller vs. State, 57 So. 806, 100 Miss. 811).
Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute
involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another (Hodges vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660, 708) or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against
his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That
situation does not obtain in this case.
Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the imprisonment of a stenographer who had defied the
court's resolution for the transcription of the notes constitutes illegal detention. The incarceration of the
contemning stenographer is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a court
order.
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RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES AND INHUMANE PUNISHMENT

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.
Section 1, R.A. No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Death Penalty

The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-
Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders
and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
WHAT CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?
Perez vs People
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly defined. The Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution,67 the source of Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights68 of our
own Constitution, has yet to be put to the test to finally determine what constitutes cruel and inhuman
punishment.
Cases that have been decided described, rather than defined, what is meant by cruel and unusual
punishment. This is explained by the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court that "[t]he
clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive,
and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.
In Wilkerson v. Utah, Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme Court opined that "[d]ifficulty
would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of
torture, x x x and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment
to the constitution."
In In Re: Kemmler, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of that same Court stated that "[p]unishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
People vs Dacuycuy
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character
of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments
which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am.
Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would
not thus be within the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906).
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the
form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, 17 where an
"excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a recommendation for
executive clemency, thus:
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The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the
form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the crime.
xxx
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the
Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due
time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being
"cruel and unusual" or "excessive."
DOES THE DEATH PENALTY CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?
Echegaray vs SOJ
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice and must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment
had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe
in punishment." In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on
the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism
because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of
their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy
in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound,
when anger threatens to turn the
majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the minority fully hold.
As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill
of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."
Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will
bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame
of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test
only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.
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NON- IMRPISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY DEBTS OR POLL TAX

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
WHAT IS MEANT BY ”DEBT” UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE?
In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara

In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides
that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one
not arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or
implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were
ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the
order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the
rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them.
Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
People vs Nitafan
We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be
presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. This
understanding may be manifested by writing across the check "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem."
However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer
prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding
the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive
provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose
for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks.
After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will
once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks
if such checks will be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in
commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee
of payment. To determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for
their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
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RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.
Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court

Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:
a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ACCUSED TO AVAIL OF THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
People vs Obsiana
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:
a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a competent court;
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Esmena vs Pogoy
In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a
court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information.
When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240).
Almario vs CA
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only
(1) upon a valid indictment,
(2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
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WHEN IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY AVAILABLE DESPITE THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE

ACCUSED?
People vs Obsiana
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal
of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and
that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the
jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling
that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the
accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order,
the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Two issues are tendered for resolution, namely: first, are "lewd designs" an indispensable element
which should be alleged in the complaint?, and, second, does the present appeal place the accused in
double jeopardy?
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a
competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of
the case was without the express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his motion to
dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that under the prevailing jurisprudence, citing People vs.
Bangalao, et al. (94 Phil. 354, February 17, 1954), People vs. Labatete (L-12917, April 27, 1960),
People vs. Villarin (L-19795, July
31, 1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L-20314, August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal of a criminal
action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss, does not bar him from
pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal by the Government or in a new
prosecution for the same offense.
The accused suggests that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the previous ruling of this
Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other than on the merits, upon motion of the accused
personally or through counsel, such dismissal is to be regarded as with the express consent of the
accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived 4 his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he
is estopped 5 from claiming such defense on appeal by the Government or in another indictment for
the same offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy — dismissal or termination of the original case without the
express consent of the defendant — has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from this
Court. We must untangle this jurisprudential maze and fashion out in bold relief a ruling not susceptible
of equivocation. Hence, a searching extended review of the pertinent cases is imperative.
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no parallelism between Cloribel
and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and the instant case, on the other. Here the controverted
dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective
and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the right of the accused to a
speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this
case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the
other related cases the dismissal amounted to
an acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
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The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions:
first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and
second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been
preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence.
Esmena vs Pogoy
This case poses the issue of whether the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally
dismissed (after the accused had been arraigned) because of complainant's failure to appear at the
trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right to have a speedy
trial.
In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a
court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information. When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the
accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata
and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240).
In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of
the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if
respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent.
In this case, it is not very clear
that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case.
It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the
accused had already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the minutes of the
session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection
to the provisional dismissal.
The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified their
assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and
precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal.
The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial.
The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition
provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the
provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.
People vs Baladjay
The issue is whether the trial court’s order reinstating four criminal cases, which it had provisionally
dismissed because of the delay in prosecuting them and because the fiscal was not ready when the
cases were called for hearing, placed the accused in double jeopardy.
The prosecution also contends that the dismissal orders did not place the accused in jeopardy because
the dismissal was upon his own motion or with his consent. (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court).
We hold that the four dismissal orders, although provisional in character, which were issued upon
motion of the accused (after the case had been pending for more than eleven years without the
prosecution being able to finish the presentation of its evidence) and on the basis of his right to a
speedy trial placed him in jeopardy. The dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal. The reinstatement of
the cases would place him in double jeopardy (Esmeña v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981,
102 SCRA 861, 867).
"The rule that the dismissal of a criminal case upon defendant’s motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent of the defendant,
has no application to a case where the dismissal is predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy
trial.
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"The ‘provisional’ dismissal of a criminal case for failure to prosecute . . . is not truly a dismissal but an
acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time therefor came." (Syllabi,
People v. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775 citing People v. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People v. Labatete, 107
Phil. 697.)
Almario vs CA
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made
upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused
before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting
in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of
evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. 9 Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings
have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial.
WHEN WILL DOUBLE JEOPARDY SET IN?

for the same act.
...the same offense...
People vs Quijada
We observed in Tac-an:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double
jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal
Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one
from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be
regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
Cuison vs CA
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
. . . (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).
Petitioner contends that "the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court's
decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases
against the petitioner . . . ." In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of
an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his
April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act
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of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not
yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
WHEN IS AN OFFENSE CONSIDERED AS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE

CHARGED IN THE FIRST INFORMATION?
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court

When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter. (5a)
Melo vs People
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitutional inhibition is against a second jeopardy for
the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been
construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in
the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so- called "same-evidence test" which
was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate
form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense
may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a
part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, one who has been charged
with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser
or greater than the former.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another

offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in
existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then
inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a
subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there
can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to
recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist.
... doctrine of supervening event
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time
of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the
accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Philippine case of Diaz v.
U.S., 223 U.S., 442, followed by this Court in People v. Espino, G.R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and
these two cases are similar to the instant case. Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after
the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66),
the accused cannot
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Bill of Rights
be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
...the same act...

for the same act.
People vs Relova
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of
electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged
in the first inforrnation
The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may
be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses
spring from the same act or set of acts.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity
of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to
the two offenses: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.
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Bill of Rights
RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
WHAT IS AN EX POST FACTO LAW?
Indicators of an Ex Post Facto Law

◉ Makes criminal act which when done was not punished;
◉ Aggravates a crime;
◉ Inflicts greater punishment;
◉ Alters rules on evidence and receives less testimony to convict;
◉ Imposes deprivation of rights for something which when done was lawful;
◉ Deprives accused of legal protection, (such as double jeopardy, proclamation of amnesty)
WHAT IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER?
People vs Ferrer
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is
directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent,
suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act Was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder
because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country; its existence, a ‘clear, present and grave danger to the security of
the Philippines.’ "By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge,"
and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of the forms or
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because
it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply
to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist
Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove
at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.
Misolas vs Panga
But even if a challenge on the ground that P.D. 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately
considered, it will still be met with little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, supra, defined a bill of
attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group
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Bill of Rights
without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group
of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last
element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding
of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential [Id. at pp. 395-
397; 400-401].
P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment
without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a
corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty
that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There
is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been
committed and that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond
reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require.
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Bill of Rights
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ABODE AND TO TRAVEL?
Yap vs CA
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode
and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the
Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. In fact, the petition submits
that "the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape.
Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary.
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself
available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so.
Romualdez-Marcos vs Sandiganbayan
Considering the foregoing we cannot say that respondent court trifled with petitioner's constitutionally
guaranteed right to life, health and liberty. What petitioner denounces as the "unusual and unorthodox
conduct of the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it would seem, from the latter's robust
and rather active personality rather than to any ill motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner,
the latter's counsel or her witnesses. It is matter of record that on three different occasions, petitioner
had been permitted to travel abroad. But her later conviction in two cases dictated the need for greater
caution. To be sure, conviction is not yet final in view of a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
But a person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave
the jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion.
DOES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE
PHILIPPINES?
Marcos vs Manglapus
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one’s country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
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Bill of Rights
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)]
which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from
the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would
therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty
of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art.
12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose
of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially
material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against
the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty
to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See
Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that
an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the
President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace.
[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of
powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed
to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
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Bill of Rights
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that
she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual
bases for the President’s decision.
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Bill of Rights
RIGHT TO INFORMATION

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION?
Valmonte vs Belmonte
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But
this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in
the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-
making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi,
the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.”
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest"
or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
[Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability

In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of
executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative
process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated."
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege

applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making
of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative
process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and
covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones31 As a consequence,
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
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Bill of Rights
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION?
Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Assoc. vs PMB

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled: It will avail
the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their
individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were
engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...)
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving
undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited
(Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause
(Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees
or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing
right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings
case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more
justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.
DO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE A RIGHT TO STRIKE?
SSS Employees Assoc. vs CA

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended
to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of
E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 &
70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress
for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by
law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
22
Bill of Rights
walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands.
Is the compulsory membership to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a violation of the freedom to
associate?
In Re: IBP Membership Dues of Atty. Marcial Edillon

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became
a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide
an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share
in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs.
New York, 291 U.S. 502).
23
Bill of Rights
RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
NON- IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION

No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
IS THE PROHIBITION ON THE NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT LIMITED TO LAWS?
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs POEA

Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause
of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions
of the 1973. Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution
by placing them under a separate Article. 15 The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the
"heart of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice-Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma.
Xxx
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797,
which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that
they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine
and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT CLAUSE?

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value
and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating
to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may
thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to
regulate and control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power
of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
Goldenway Merchandising vs Equitable PCI Bank

The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the
banking industry which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public
interest.
24
Bill of Rights
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE?

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value
and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating
to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may
thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to
regulate and control them.
IS A TIMBER LICENSE AGREEMENT A CONTRACT PROTECTED UNDER SEC. 10, ART. III?
Alvarez vs PICOP
The Court of Appeals has this brief statement concerning the main issue of the MANDAMUS CASE:
The questioned warranty is a valid contract. It was freely entered into by the government and [PICOP].
Mutual considerations were taken into account in the execution of that contract. [PICOP] invested
billions of pesos in its concession areas. In return, the government assured [PICOP] of its tenurial rights
over TLA No. 43, as amended, as well as its exclusive right to cut, collect and saw timber and pulpwood
therein. The DENR must perforce honor and respect the warranty by maintaining the area alloted (sic)
to [PICOP] under TLA No. 43, as amended.
We are constrained to disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses
concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would
bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., where we held:

In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to
dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x
x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, [125 SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
25
Bill of Rights
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE? WHEN IS

THERE IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT?
Goldenway Merchandising vs Equitable PCI Bank

Petitioner’s contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violates the constitutional proscription against
impairment of the obligation of contract has no basis.
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts
against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by
subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties.
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions,
dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the
parties.
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only
modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in
Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires
upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There
is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from
its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their
redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
This legitimate public interest pursued by the legislature further enfeebles petitioner’s impairment of
contract theory.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute,
and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to
contract and to property, it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept
of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.
26
Bill of Rights
FREE ACCESS TO COURT AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 6, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

The separation of the Church and the State shall be inviolable.
Section 21, Rule 3, 2019 Amended Rules of Court

Section 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has
no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of dock et and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
dock et and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by
the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact
a person with sufficient income or property, the proper dock et and other lawful fees shall be assessed
and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution
shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
(21)
R.A. NO. 9406, An Act Reorganizing and Strengthening the PAO

SEC. 2. Section 14, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 14. Public Attorney's Office (PAO) . - The Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) is renamed
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) . It shall exercise the powers and functions as are now provided by law
for the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office or may hereafter be provided by law.
"The PAO shall be an independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice in
accordance with Sec. 38(3) , Chapter 7 of Book IV of this Code for the purposes of policy and program
coordination.
"The PAO shall be the principal law office of the government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases."
SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:
"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to render,
free of charge, legal representation, assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in criminal, civil,
labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the service, the PAO may be
called upon by proper government authorities to render such service to other persons, subject to
existing laws, rules and regulations."
27

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Bill of Rights

PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 15, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Section 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

IN WHAT CASES SHALL HABEAS CORPUS BE AVAILABLE?

Sec. 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court

WHO MAY GRANT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?

Sec. 2, Rule 102, Rules of Court

Sec. 3, Rule 102, Rules of Court

(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

CAN BE SUSPENDED? WHEN CAN THE PRIVILEGE BE SUSPENDED?

Section 15, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Section 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Section 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Section 15 (1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

DOES THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES APPLY TO CASES UNDER

NON- IMPRISONMENT DUE SOLELY TO POLITICAL BELIEF AND RIGHT AGAINST

Section 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Article 272, Revised Penal Code

Article 273, Revised Penal Code

Article 274, Revised Penal Code

Section 3(f), Expanded Anti Human Trafficking Act

CAN A COURT STENOGRAPHER BE COMPELLED TO TRANSCRIBE TSN EVEN IF NO LONGER

RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES AND INHUMANE PUNISHMENT

Section 19, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Section 1, R.A. No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Death Penalty

WHAT CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?

DOES THE DEATH PENALTY CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?

NON- IMRPISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY DEBTS OR POLL TAX

Section 20, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

WHAT IS MEANT BY ”DEBT” UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE?

In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Section 21, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court

WHEN IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY AVAILABLE DESPITE THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE

WHEN WILL DOUBLE JEOPARDY SET IN?

Section 21, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

...the same offense...

WHEN IS AN OFFENSE CONSIDERED AS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE

Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another

... doctrine of supervening event

be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

...the same act...

Section 21, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

Section 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

WHAT IS AN EX POST FACTO LAW?

Indicators of an Ex Post Facto Law

WHAT IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER?

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Section 6, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ABODE AND TO TRAVEL?

Section 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Section 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION?

Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability