Criminal Law Cases on reference

Part 1:

(1) Meaning of Law (Felonies in General)

Salvador Ad Hoc Fact Finding Comm. On Behest Loans vs Placido

Mapa
[GR No: 135080]
Nachura, J.

Facts:

On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Accordingly, an Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created”.

By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were
subsequently expanded. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans shall include in its
investigation, inventory, and study, all non-performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-
behest loans. Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both
may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal
liability.

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between
Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP). After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions,
the Committee determined that they
bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the
stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was
under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.

Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents Placido I. Mapa, et al. After considering
the Committee’s allegation, the Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution, dismissing the
complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of
preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint holding that the offenses charged had
already prescribed. 

Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and 1981
transpired at the time 
when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing them as Behest
or Non-Behest Loans. To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on
October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining
behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for
alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267 So
2dl, 5, held that "an ex-post facto law is defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment
upon a person for an act done which when it was committed, was innocent."

The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27,
1998.

Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are considered Ex
Post Facto Laws or Penal Laws?

Held: No, they are not considered ex post facto laws or Penal Laws.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and
which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list,
namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not
ex post facto laws.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The
subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this
definition. 

Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for
determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order
No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman
to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
 Since the Ombudsman erroneously dismissed the complaint on ground of prescription,
respondents’ respective defenses were never passed upon during the preliminary investigation. Thus,
the complaint should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its merit. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Office
of Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to
conduct with dispatch an evaluation of the merits of the complaint against the herein respo
ndents. SO ORDERED.

Panfilo Lacson vs Sandiganbayan, Prosecutor, DOJ, People of the Phil.

GR No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999
Austria – Martinez, J.
Case: Multiple murder

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended information before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did
not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase
“principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as
of the approval hereof.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 8249 is a penal law?

Held: No, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law.

 It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that
define crimes, treats of their nature, and provide for their punishment.

Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.

R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute, it
does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does
not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of
trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has
the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.

Ad Hoc on Behest Loan (PCGG) vs Hon. Aniano Desierto as

Ombudsman
GR No. 145184,March14,2008
Nachura, J.

Facts
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Accordingly, an Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created”.

By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were
subsequently expanded. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans shall include in its
investigation, inventory, and study, all non-performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-
behest loans. Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both
may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal
liability.

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan
transactions between Comptronics Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they bore
the characteristics of a behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. Consequently, Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the
Committee, and representing the PCGG, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for
violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
against the Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers
of ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal, Ambrosio C. Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Antonio A. Santiago,
Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G. Makalintal, Alfredo F. delos Angeles, Josery D. Ruede, Manuel Tupaz, Alberto
T. Perez and Gerardo A. Limjuco (private respondents). 

After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Memorandum, finding that: After going over the record, we find no probable cause to warrant the filing
of the instant case in court. To start with, the cause of action has prescribed. The transaction was duly
documented and the instruments drawn in support thereof were duly registered and open to public
scrutiny, the prescriptive period of any legal action in connection with the said transaction commenced
to run from the date the same was registered sometime in 1980.

Finally, the aforesaid Administrative and Memorandum Orders both issued by the President in
1992, may not be retroactively applied to the questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because
to do so would be tantamount to an ex post facto law which is proscribed by the Constitution.

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the Ombudsman denied the same on June 6, 2000.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are Ex Post Facto
Laws?

Held: No, they are not considered as Ex Post Facto Laws.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant; or (e)
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation
of a right which when exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 

The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.

Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It
merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its
composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply provides the frame
of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order
No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws.
Rimando vs COMELEC
GR 176364, September 18, 2009
Leonardo – De Castro, J.

JUANITO R. RIMANDO is the President and General Manager of the Illustrious Security and Investigation
Agency, Inc. Jacinto Carag and Jonry Enaya are security guards within the vicinity of Sta. Rosa Homes in
Santa Rosa, Laguna, where they were assigned to provide security to the residents thereof and provided
with licensed firearms which they never brought outside the subdivision. 

That on February 27, 2001, respondent-Security Guard JACINTO CARAG, without any justifiable
cause, with intent to kill, taking advantage of nighttime, with treachery and use of firearm, did then
there, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully shoot to death with a shotgun JONATHAN MAGNO, a 19-year
old unarmed and defenseless nautical student in his school uniform... that said respondent-Security
Guard CARAG immediately fled from the scene of the crime and is still at large, and that the fatal
weapon though recovered by the afore-named agency has not yet been surrendered by said respondent
RIMANDO to the police authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim represented
by the undersigned mother.

In his Counter-Affidavit, Rimando denied having violated COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 and
averred that on the day of the shooting incident, security guards Carag and Enaya were within the
vicinity of Sta. Rosa Homes in Santa Rosa, Laguna, where they were assigned to provide security to the
residents thereof and provided with licensed firearms which they never brought outside the subdivision.
Attached to his Counter-Affidavit was Memorandum 31-20009 of the Security Agencies and Guards
Supervision Division, Civil Security Group, PNP, which petitioner contended only prohibited private
security agencies, company security forces, government security forces and their security guards from
bearing guns outside the immediate vicinity of their places of work without written authority from the
COMELEC.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc issued : 1) Resolution promulgated on October

11, 2005 and 2)Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2007 in Election Offense (E.O.) Case No. 01-130
for Violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The first assailed Resolution granted private respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration and directed the COMELEC’s Law Department to file the proper information
against petitioner for violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code,
while the second Resolution denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the head of the agency who failed to secure a permit for exemption from the
Commission on Election is guilty of a criminal election offense under the Omnibus Election Code?

Held: No, they are not guilty.

A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and
establishes penalties for its violation. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its
punishment. Here, the above-quoted proviso does not prohibit certain acts or provide penalties for its
violation; neither does it describe the nature of a crime and its punishment. Consequently, the above-
quoted phrase cannot be considered a penal provision.
 To reiterate, under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is the
bearing of arms outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the election period and not
the failure of the head or responsible officer of the security agency to obtain prior written COMELEC
approval.

All told, petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with the doctrine of
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege - there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Thus, the
Court finds that respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
Resolutions.

WHEREFORE, The Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc issued on October 11, 2005 and January
5, 2007 in Election Case No. 01-130 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

(2) Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege

Villareal v People of the Philippines

G.R.NO.154954
Sereno, J.

Facts
In Feb 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
law signifies their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
Feb. 8, 1991, the neophytes were met by the members of the fraternity at the schools
lobby. They were briefed at the house of Michael Musngi (an Aquilan), of what to expect during
the initiation rites. They were informed that there will be physical beatings and that they can quit
anytime. Initiation rites were scheduled for 3 days.
They were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of
their initiation. As they walk towards the pelota court, some of the Aquilans delivered physical
blows to them. They were then subjected to the traditional form of the initiation rites.
These includes the:
“Indian Run”, required to run a gauntlet of 2 parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes.
“Bicol Express” - obliged neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their
legs outstretched while Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs.
“Rounds” - neophytes are held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (Aquilans charged
with the duty of assisting the neo during initiation rites), while they were being hit with fist
blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by 2 Aquilans.
“Auxies’ Privilege Round – auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain to the
neo.
They were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
After a while, alumni frat members, Dizon and Villareal demanded the rites to be
reopened. Victorino (head of the initiation rites), initially refused, but the 2 insisted, so he
reopened the initiation rites.
Frat members including Dizon and Villareal subjected neophytes to paddling and
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny (victim), received several blows, one of which was so
strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. Other neo heard him complain of intense pain and has
difficulty breathing. After their last session of physical beatings Lenny could no longer walk.
Auxiliaries carried him to the carport.
After an hour of sleep, neo were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumbling. Villareal and Dizon dismissed the rumblings as they thought he was only overacting.
When they realized he was really cold, they removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, he was brought to the hospital
and was pronounced dead on arrival.
Criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. The trial court rendered judgment
and hold 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. On 10 January
2002, the CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Nineteen of the accused
were acquitted, four were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and two of the
accused, Dizon and Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES
Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide

Ruling
1. No. Under art. 249 of RPC on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. None of the
fraternity members had the intent to kill Lenny Villa. However, he is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
- Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug and Dizon were all charged for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. With the absence of the anti-hazing law, they can only be charged according to the
existing laws at the time of his death.
Anti- hazing wasn’t in effect at that time, thus making it not a criminal liability – nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege
Evangelista vs. People
G.R. Nos. 108135-36, August 14, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Case: Motion for Reconsideration
Facts
On September 17, 1987, Tanduay Distillery, Inc. filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue an application for tax credit in the amount of P180,701,682.00, for allegedly erroneous
payments of ad valorem taxes from January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987. Tanduay claimed that it
is a rectifier of alcohol and other spirits, which per previous ruling of the BIR is only liable to
pay specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes. Upon receipt of the application, Aquilino Larin of
the Specific Tax Office sent a memorandum to the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD),
headed by petitioner, requesting the said office to check and verify whether the amounts
claimed by Tanduay were actually paid to the BIR as ad valorem taxes. Larin’s memorandum
was received by the Revenue Administrative Section (RAS), a subordinate office of the RAD.
After making the necessary verification, the RAS prepared a certification in the form of a 1st
Indorsement to the Specific Tax Office, dated September 25, 1987, which was signed by
petitioner as RAD chief.
Teodoro Pareño, head of the Tax and Alcohol Division, certified that Tanduay was a
rectifier not liable for ad valorem tax. Pareño recommended to Larin that the application for tax
credit be given due course. Hence, Larin recommended that Tanduay’s claim be approved, on the
basis of which Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos signed Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in
the amount of P180,701,682.00.
Certain Ruperto Lim wrote a letter-complaint to then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido
Tan, Jr. alleging that the grant of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 was irregular and anomalous.
Based on this, Larin, Pareño, Galban and petitioner Evangelista were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Galban, Pareño and Larin
were acquitted. Petitioner was also acquitted for violation of Section 268 (4) of the NIRC.
However, we found petitioner guilty of gross negligence in issuing a certification containing
TNCs which she did not know the meaning of and which, in turn, became the basis of the
Bureau’s grant of Tanduay’s application for tax credit. Thus, affirmed conviction for
violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issues
1. Whether or not the petitioner was convicted of a crime not punishable by law.
Ruling
1. Yes.
Petitioner was charged with violation of the R.A. 3019, Section 3 paragraph (e), the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The act provides as one of its elements that the public officer
should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner, in issuing the certification, did not cause any
undue injury to the Government. She also did not give unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to Tanduay. Neither did petitioner display manifest partiality to Tanduay nor act with
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Quite the contrary, petitioner’s certification
was against the interest of Tanduay. It did not advocate the grant of its application for tax credit.
More importantly, petitioner’s act of issuing the certification did not constitute corrupt
practices as defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. Also, petitioner should not be required to
describe in words the kinds of tax for which each TNC used stands for. The purpose of
introducing the use of tax numeric codes in the Bureau was to do away with descriptive words, in
order to expedite and facilitate communications among the different divisions therein. We find
that petitioner’s omission to indicate what kind of taxes TNC Nos. 3011-0001 and 0000-0000
stand for was not a criminal act. Applicable here is the familiar maxim in criminal law: Nullum
crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is no law punishing it.
Hence, motion for reconsideration is Granted. Petitioner is acquitted of the charge against her.

(3) Characteristics of Criminal Law

Suzette Sombilon vs Romulo (Foreign Affairs)

G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
Azcuna, J.

Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt.
Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the
crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
8353. the above-named accused's (sic), being then members of the United States Marine
Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another with lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of
superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal
knowledge of the victim inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways
Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven
by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas,
to her damage and prejudice. The United States, at its request, was granted custody of
defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its
Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, but accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER,
L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps
assigned at the USS Essex, are ACQUITTED to the crime charged.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a
contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention
under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements
between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of
December 19, 2006.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals, and petition was dismissed for
having become moot.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith
because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
Issue
1. Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA
is allowed "under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State."
2. Whether or not undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution (Art. 3, Sec. 1).
Ruling
1.Yes. VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty
by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United
States government. VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate
does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the
said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and
consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the
provisions of the so-called Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.

2. No. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a
different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one's territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent
agreed upon. Principle is that the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the
sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

Bayan Muna vs Romulo (Executive Secretary)

G.R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Velasco Jr., J.

Facts
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the
Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries
appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is
not among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter),
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals
embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US
government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and
defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express
consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled
to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a
third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third
country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country
to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies
the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall
continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective
date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-
surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law;
and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US
Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding
and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.

Ruling

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture
being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international

doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as
expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty

Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities
with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.
Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either
because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have
been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement
that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements
concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High
Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of
Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements – whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise –
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to
be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract
among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner
would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American
criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute,
contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement,
as aptly described by the Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try
and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy
and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow
Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial
and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with
the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or
violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by
both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

Notes:
Locus standi - a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. "a party's personal
and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result”
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

(4) Rules of Interpretation of Criminal Law

Bernandino and Tomas vs People
G.R. No. 170453, October 30, 2006,
Ynares – Santiago, J.

Case: Falsification of public documents.

MASCOM was first awarded of the bid for the construction/ extension of the public
market in Guimba. May 1998 election, new Mayor, Mayor Dizon awarded the bid to KYRO
Builder. MASCOM filed criminal case against Mayor Dizon and petitioner Barawid for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Mayor Dizon contended that the award to KYRO is proper because the project could not be
validly given to MASCOM as there was in fact no competitive public bidding held on December
8, 1997. In support thereof, he attached the similarly dated June 27, 2000 affidavits[8] of former
PBAC members, namely, Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara, Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F.
Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr., stating that no public
bidding was held in connection with the construction of the Guimba public market extension nor
was the local PBAC convened on December 8, 1997.
On the basis of the admission of the said affiants, the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the case against Mayor Dizon and petitioner Barawid and instead filed the instant
case for falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code against all the members of the PBAC members including the herein petitioners. Basis that
they make it appear like they conducted a bid when there was no such bidding. They were
found guilty by the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner Barawid and the other PBAC members also filed their separate motion for new
trial on the ground of alleged errors of law and irregularities in the trial of their case.

Ruling
Attendance of other accused in the public bidding were not proven, only Tomas was liable for
falsification as she was the only one who signed the "Minutes of the opening of bids' which
stated, among others, that COA representative Ronquillo attended the public bidding on
December 8, 1997. As acting Secretary of the PBAC she has the duty to prepare or intervene in
the preparation of the Minutes of the meetings of the PBAC which should be recorded pursuant
to Section 37[34] of the Local Government Code. In making it appear that COA representative
Ronquillo attended the bidding when the latter categorically testified that he never attended a
public bidding in the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija on December 8, 1997, petitioner
Tomas took advantage of her official position,[35] rendering her liable for falsification under Article
171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

Notes:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. When the guilt of the accused-appellants have not been proven with moral
certainty, it is our policy of long standing that their presumption of innocence must be
favored and their exoneration be granted as a matter of right.

In the instant case, petitioners were charged with falsification under paragraph 2, Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a
public officer, employee or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3)
that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated
in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.

People vs Abilong
G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948
Montemayor, J.

Case: Evasion of service of sentence.

Was charged with robbery and sentenced to destierro (100km from City of Manila), but evade
service of sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.

Petition - erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Words in question: imprisonment in English, however, in case of doubt, it should be referred to
the Spanish text ("Privación de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom”)

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his
sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the
City of Manila, he entered said City.

People vs Geronimo
G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Case/ charge: complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping
Accused are members of the CPP under HUKS (Hukbalahaps) or HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalaya
ng Bayan)
Accused contended/ appealed whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.

Accused avowed having committed the overt acts charged in all five counts; but that he only
admitted committing them in fact "as a necessary means", "in connection and in furtherance
of the rebellion", as expressly alleged by the prosecution. This is not only because the
information expressly alleged the necessary connection between the overt acts and the political
ends pursued by the accused, but in addition, it failed to charge that the appellant was impelled
by private motives. Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as essential ingredients of the
single crime of rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to this crime alone. Hence, there being
no complex crime, the appellant can only be sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion.

All crimes committed were for furtherance of the rebellion and no private intentions (all
political and no private gain). In other words, the suppression of article 244 of the old Penal
Code virtually negates the contention that the rebellion and the individual misdeeds committed
during the same should legally constitute one complex whole. Whether or not such policy should
be maintained is not for the courts, but for the Legislature, to say.

People vs Manaba
G.R. No. 38725, October 31, 1933
Vickers, J.

Case: rape

Accused contended of double jeopardy as he said he has been filed with a case by the chief of
police of Dumaguete (but was dismissed as the case should be filed by the offended party – Art
344 of RPC), dismissed by the court (accused claims of double jeopardy) as it was not
considered as valid complaint in accordance with the law.

Aggravating circumstance: nocturnity

“Filed” was not in Spanish text in reference to Art. 344 of RPC. The defendant was never in
jeopardy as the first complaint was not valid.
People vs Mangulabnan
G.R. No. L-8919, September 28, 1956
Felix, J.

Robbery with homicide

The crime committed in the case at bar, of which appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-
participant, is the crime of robbery with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of the offense was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength
and with the aid of armed man, and in consonance with the provisions of Article 63, No. 1 of the
same legal body, appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended by
the Solicitor General. However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital
penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty to be imposed upon Agustin
Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua (Section 9, Republic Act No.
296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).

English version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said
paragraph: Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion
del robo resultare homicidio."

In order to, determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a
homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.

People vs Regala
G.R. No. L-45749 January 29, 1938
Concepcion J.

The question raised on this appeal has to do with the correct translation in English of the words
"semilla alimenticia" in speaking of the crime of robbery, defined and penalized in article 303 of
the Revised Penal Code, corresponding to article 511 of the old Penal Code. The accused in
this case, according to the allegations of the information, entered into a warehouse by breaking
the padlock of the door, and took away seven sacks of rice valued at P42. Before arraignment,
he filed a motion to dismiss the information, on the allegation that the seven sacks of rice were
cereal within the meaning of this word as it is used in the English text of the Revised Penal
Code; therefore, the penalty imposable in this case is that provided in the second to the last
paragraph of article 302 in connection with article 303 of the Revised Penal Code; that is,
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degree, wherefore, the crime falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. Over the objection of the city fiscal, who contended
that the phrase "hulled rice" was not within the meaning of the "semilla alimenticia" as used in
the Spanish text of the aforesaid article 303 of the Revised Penal Code, the court sustained the
motion with instructions to the fiscal to file the information in the municipal court.

The words "semilla alimenticia" have a broader meaning, inasmuch as "semilla" (seedling) "is
a part of the fruit of the plant which produces it when it germinates under proper condition."
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 16th edition of 1936.) And according to Groizard, the
commentator on the Penal Code (volume 6 page 222), "seedling is the immediate product of the
soil." Hulled rice (arroz) is not the immediate and natural product of the soil, but the product
obtained from unhulled rice ( palay) through the employment of labor. Hulled rice (arroz) is,
therefore, not seedling. Flour which is obtained from wheat through the employment of labor, is
likewise not seedling (semilla alimenticia)

In cases of doubt in the interpretation of the Revised Penal Code, the Spanish text
should prevail.

Case is not under Art. 303 but under 302 of RPC (note that they wanted it to be under 303
as this has one lower degree in punishment than 302 of RPC - however what was taken
based on the report cannot be considered to be under 303, as from Spanish word, what
was stolen was not considered a seedling.

People vs Yabut
G.R. No. 39085, September 27, 1933
Butte,J.

Crime of murder and assessing the death penalty.

That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did
then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat
and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in
Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind
with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and
inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the
death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter. "That at the time of the commission of
this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice
of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences
rendered by competent tribunals.

Issue: the word another in Art.160 of RPC (applicable only when the new crime which is
committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is
serving sentence.)
The language is plain and unambiguous. It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute
or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to
the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text,
especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids
indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

(5) Trace the history of the Revised Penal Code or Philippine Criminal Law up to the Present.
(refer to Exam reviewer – Atty. Lesson)

(6) Theories of Criminal Law

De Joya vs Warden of Batangas

G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003
Callejo, Sr. J.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying for her release from
the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.

Case: BP 22 (Bounce check law); case is Sept. 28, 1994

Accused plead not guilty and while on trial jumped bail, no evidence adduced in her defense in
any of the 2 cases.

Dec. 14, 1995 – did not appear despite notice. Guilty on first case (CC 25484)
March 21, 1997 – in absentia, found guilty
Remained at large and no appeal filed of the said decisions.
Nov. 21, 2000 - the Court issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 enjoining
all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of the Court enunciated in
Vaca v. Court of Appeals[5] and Lim v. People[6] with regard to the imposition of the penalty for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
5 years after – finally arrested while applying for NBI Clearance (Dec. 3, 2002)
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant
to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention.
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, does not remove imprisonment as alternative penalty for
violations of BP 22, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for.

Ruling

In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into account the principal
objectives of the law, namely, the prohibition on the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public
interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a
thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal
law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of
criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of
the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the
aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to mention
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous crimes).
Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the important
factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his
relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2) his
relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the
imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.
The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be
retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new
life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. The
court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the moral
responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private complainant, the
intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime - was it done
by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need? The
court must also take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely, the
reformation of the offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender, the
repression of offenses in others. As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only
by a system of penalties which, from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than
to inflame those on whom they are imposed.[17] There is also merit in the view that punishment
inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much punishment of innocence.

In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised, retroactively,
the petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any evidence during
trial. The judgment of the court became final and executory upon her failure to appeal
therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt
to secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to elude the long arm of the law.

People vs Genosa
G.R. No. 135981, September 29, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.
Case: parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to death
15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds.

Genosa consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled
that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which resulted from her admitted
act of "smashing" him with a pipe.

She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was
equivalent to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she
killed her husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."

Proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not
performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court, through
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:

"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed
by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of
criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free
will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito
doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and
intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free
will appears unimpaired."
In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted
freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse.

Partly granted. To be assessed by an expert on the “battered woman syndrome" plea.

Vergara vs People
G.R. NO. 160328, February 04, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22)
ACQUITTED by the SC - Prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the evidentiary
facts that would establish the prima facie presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds. There is no proof exactly when petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there
was no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of BP 22 would start
and end. Even assuming that petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor, still, the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds would not arise.

(8) Extra- Territorial

AAA vs BBB
G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[BBB], being then legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish
by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his
purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning
about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited
law.
Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that
probable cause exists 0in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged,
considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him had
occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction
over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
Hence the petition.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to
BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally
charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of
conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this
case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is
conducted abroad.

ISSUE
Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be
filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad.

Ruling
We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No.
9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
PETITION GRANTED

(10) Felonies by intent and/or by fault

Centennial Transmarine Inc. vs Ruben Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 180719, August 22, 2008
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:

Illegal dismissal of an employee

On May 9, 2000, petitioner Centennial Transmarine, Inc., for and in behalf of its foreign
principal, petitioner Centennial Maritime Services, Corp., hired respondent Dela Cruz as Chief
Officer of the oil tanker vessel "MT Aquidneck," owned by petitioner B+H Equimar, Singapore,
Pte. Ltd., for a period of nine months.

However, on September 14, 2000, respondent was relieved of his duties and repatriated to the
Philippines. Failing to get a satisfactory explanation from petitioners for his relief, respondent
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of his salaries for the unexpired
portion of contract, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees on October 7, 2000.

Petitioner alleged that respondent was relieved of his functions as Chief Officer due to his
inefficiency and lack of job knowledge. Capt. Kowalewski allegedly informed them of
respondent's lack of experience in tanker operations which exposed the vessel and its crew to
danger and caused additional expenses. Petitioners allegedly advised respondent to take a
refresher course in order to facilitate his deployment to another vessel. However, instead of
taking a refresher course, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles rendered a Decision dismissing respondent's complaint. He

found that respondent was validly dismissed because he committed acts in violation of his
duties as Chief Officer, amounting to breach of trust and confidence.

Respondent filed petition and decision reversed and set aside in favor of Dela Cruz.
Centennial filed petition.
Moreover, records show that respondent was not afforded due process. For officers and
crew who are working in foreign vessels involved in overseas shipping, there must be
compliance with the applicable laws on overseas employment as well as with the
regulations issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), such
as those embodied in the Standard Contract for Seafarers Employed Abroad (Standard
Contract). Except for the self-serving allegation that respondent was required to explain why he
should not be relieved for being incompetent, petitioners offered no proof to show that they
furnished respondent a written notice of the charges against him, or that there was a formal
investigation of the charges, or that respondent was furnished a written notice of the penalty
imposed upon him. Respondent was verbally ordered to disembark the vessel and was
repatriated to the Philippines without being told of the reasons for his relief. Respondent's
dismissal was not for just cause and without due process. He is therefore entitled to be
paid his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract. Pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, respondent is also entitled to full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at 12% per annum.

Dr. Ninevetch Cruz vs CA and Umali

G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997
FRANCISCO, J.:
Medical malpractice suit. reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic)
homicide.
Prosecution cannot prove that the death was caused by imprudence or negligence of the doctor.
Death was caused by shock, secondary to blood loss. No loose sutures, it was due to DIC
which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or
negligence.
ACQUITTED but ordered to pay the heirs as civil liability.

Gaid vs People
G.R. No. 171636, April 07, 2009
TINGA, J.
Case: crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
October 25, 2001 the said accused while driving a passenger's jeepney has no precautionary
measure to preempt the accident, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran [sic]
over Michael Dayata resulting of [sic] his untimely death.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act.
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the
offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not
clearly manifest.
It must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have. It must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between
such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a
substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an
injury.
The evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged. Moreover, mere suspicions and
speculations that the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a
conviction in a criminal case. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the
guilt of the accused. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence
of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to his guilt.
The prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim's death
was petitioner's alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.
PETITION GRANTED; ACCUSED ACQUITTED

People vs Guillermo Nepomuceno

G.R. No. 127818, November 11, 1998
MELO, J.:
Crime: parricide penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
Facts
May 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, with whom he was married in lawful wedlock, by then and
there shooting her with a gun of unknown caliber hitting her on the left hip, thereby inflicting
gunshot wound which was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.
Accused-appellant's voluntary surrender is not sufficient ground to exculpate him from
criminal liability. The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of criminal offenders; it
merely considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. Non-flight is not proof of innocence.
Physical evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates high in our hierarchy
of trustworthy evidence.
Further, accused-appellant having admitted that he shot his wife, he has the burden of
proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility,
and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the
accused has admitted the killing.
Crime of Parricide AFFIRMED (reclusion perpetua not 40yrs of imprisonment) –
mitigated whien he voluntarily surrender.

Hospital Management vs AFW, Edna Castro

G.R. No. 176287, January 31, 2011
PERALTA, J.
The assailed CA decision ordered petitioner Hospital Management Services, Inc.-Medical
Center Manila to reinstate respondent Edna R. De Castro to her former position without loss of
seniority rights or by payroll reinstatement, pursuant to the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated
January 18, 2001, but with payment of full backwages and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the expiration of the 14-day suspension period up to actual
reinstatement.
On July 5, 1999, Janette A. Calixijan, HRD Officer issued a notice of termination, duly noted by
Dr. Abaya-Morido, upon respondent De Castro, effective at the close of office hours of July 20,
1999, for alleged violation of company rules and regulations, (1) negligence to follow company
policy on what to do with patient Rufina Causaren who fell from a hospital bed; (2) failure to
record and refer the incident to the physician-[on- duty and] allow[ing] a significant lapse of time
before reporting the incident; (3) deliberately instructing the staff to follow her version of the
incident in order to cover up the lapse; and (4) negligence and carelessness in carrying out her
duty as staff nurse-on-duty when the incident happened.
Labor arbiter requested she be reinstated, respondent appealed to NLRC, NLRC dismissed the
case for respondent’s negligence. CA reversed decision of NLRC, reinstated Labor Arbiter
decision.
Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. A single or
isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Being her first offense, respondent De Castro cannot be said to be grossly negligent so as to
justify her termination of employment. Moreover, petitioners' allegation, that respondent De
Castro exerted undue pressure upon her co-nurses to alter the actual time of the incident so as
to exculpate her from any liability, was not clearly substantiated. The Court had ruled that
sanctioning an erring employee with suspension would suffice as the extreme penalty of
dismissal would be too harsh. She has no previous derogatory record, her lapse was not
characterized by any wrongful motive or deceitful conduct, the Court deems it appropriate that,
instead of the harsh penalty of dismissal, she would be suspended.

Abdulla vs People
G.R. NO. 150129, April 06, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
Case: illegal use of public funds Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (technical malversation)
Facts
NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and
cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, while in the performance of their functions,
conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of
casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said
school, to the damage and prejudice of public
service.
Mahmud Darkis and Nenita P. Aguil are acquitted of the crime charged.
Issue
1. XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFUL
INTENT DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
2. XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
PROVE THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE
220 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE".
Ruling
1. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution
and not on the weakness of the defense. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no
basis to affirm appellant's conviction. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,' which expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
2. in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically
malversed, the use thereof for another public purpose will not make the accused guilty of
violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant used the remainder of the forty
thousand pesos, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school, cannot be held
guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth
elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.
PETITION GRANTED – ACCUSED ACQUITTED

People vs Mosende
G.R. No. 97170, December 10, 1993
NARVASA, C. J.:
Case: Murder of Carlo Alipao; his body was found only after 7 months, accordingly his mother
had a dream of his body’s whereabouts. 2 witnesses (Benceslao Resullar and Fidelino Balaga)
of the case, attested that they were asked by Rudy Mosende to dig inside their shack, and after
they were asked by him to move the dead body of presumed Carlo Alipao, from CR to the land
dig by the 2. When Rudy was asked who was the body, he accordingly answered that it was
Carlo and threatened that he’ll kill their parents should they report the incident. The 2 move to
Surigao City, out of the Mainit and only returned after Rudy was arrested and testified of the
case.
Ruling
The law is that circumstantial evidence will support and justify a verdict of conviction if there
be more than one circumstance, if the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven,
and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beond
reasonable doubt. These requisites are adequately met in the case at bar. There are several
circumstances generating certitude of Mosende’s guilt: Carlo was in their shack; body was
buried by the witness; Rudy invited the 2 witnesses; it was him who showed them the cadaver
and told them to bury him. That he threatened to kill their parents; and last day the victim was
seen he was allegedly to visit Rudy.
It cannot stand in the face of the positive declarations of disinterested witnesses having no
reasonable motive to give false evidence that he was at the scene of the crime on the day of its
commission and consummation and in fact sought to conceal it, apart from the fact that Tubod,
the place where he claimed to be residing, is “only eight kilometers away from Mainit,” as the
Trial Court points out, “and there are public conveyance(s) plying the road ** (and it) would have
been quite easy for the accused to take a jeepney ride to Mainit considering that it was nearly
fiesta and there were many jeepneys going to town.”
Aggravating circumstance against the accused: alevosia (victim was helpless and in no position
to offer resistance that the fatal blow was inflicted.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED – GUILTY

12. Actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind)

Aristotel Valenzuela Natividad vs People

G. R. NO. 160188, June 21, 2007
TINGA, J.:
Case: crime of theft
Whether the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated
Ruling
Art 6 of RPC –
Determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated. The critical distinction instead
is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of
whether the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on
the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally
furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an
important characteristic of a crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act
for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been
defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,"[37] and
"essential for criminal liability."[38] It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes
must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court
has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on
constitutionally protected rights." The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that
constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be
shown; there must also be an actus reus.
 Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one's personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an
act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. We can only conclude that
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can
only be attempted or consummated.

PETITION DENIED – COST ON PETITIONER

13. Mistake of Fact

People vs Gervero, Arbolonio, Castigador, Solomon and Bañes
G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018
MARTIRES, J.:

Facts
The above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they were then provided, through
treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit HERNANDO VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLEGAS and
BENITO BASUG, JR. with said firearms inflicting upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas
and Benito Basug, Jr. numerous gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused
their deaths immediately thereafter.
Accused claimed that they thought they were NPA.
Defense of misencounter due to mistake of fact was unbelievable.
Issue
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF
MISTAKE OF FACT.
Ruling
Mistake of fact finds no application in this case. The Court has ruled that mistake of fact applies
only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b)
that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or
the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the
offense.
Elements of the case
1. no reason for them not to recognize the victim; They saw Hernando earlier that day. It was
also an open field and properly illuminated.
2.. Hernando identified himself but they still shoot Hernando.
3. when victims fell down, accused approached their bodies and not contented sprayed the
victims with gunshot.
4. contradicting statement: at court they said the victims fired first; but when they were with
captain, they said they didn’t.
5. assumption for the victim to know the secret password

US vs Ah Chong
G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910
Carson, J.

Facts
August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. The room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom
he supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the
next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (justifying circumstances) but Art. 8 in old penal (same
provision) - par. 1
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitled to
complete exemption from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the
intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron,"
as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right
of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings, defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover
his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
As long as ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith

People vs Oanis
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
Moran, J.
Facts
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of
homicide through reckless imprudence. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." When
this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare. Brigida indicated the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Defendants
Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and
.45 caliber revolvers. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the
person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Ruling
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on
the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. the accused in the
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves and could even effect a bloodless arrest if
any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to
Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even
if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest
him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs.
Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es
preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa
intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la
intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7,
Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act
is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
Crime committed is murder with qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
Mitigating circumstance: Art. 11 par 5 (fulfillment of their duty or in lawful exercise of right or
office). Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by
him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take
no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

Wooden vs CSC
G.R. NO. 152884, September 30, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Case: Dismissed petitioner Derick D. Wooden from service for dishonesty thru falsification of
public document
Facts
School Year 1990-1991, petitioner, who was then a fourth-year student in Bachelor of
Secondary Education (BSED) applied for graduation. His application was approved subject to
completion of a two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer term of 1991 or by May
1991.Thereafter, he enrolled and completed his two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer
term of 1991 or by May 1991. petitioner filed his application for the Professional
Board Examinations for Teachers (PBET), stating therein that he graduated in March 1991. His
application was approved on September 20, 1991. Sometime in late October or early November
1991, upon petitioner's application for his transcript of records, SLU informed him that a
reevaluation of his scholastic records revealed that he needed to complete a three-unit English
subject. petitioner took the scheduled PBET. Subsequently, petitioner enrolled in SLU, under
protest, and completed the three-unit subject deficiency. Petitioner passed the PBET with a
rating of 76.38%.
Petitioner submitted his duly accomplished Personal Data Sheet (PDS). He indicated in Item
No. 17 of the PDS that he finished his BSED from SLU with inclusive dates of attendance from
1987 to 1991; and in Item No. 18, he indicated the PBET date of examination as 1992.
CSC filed a case, as he indicated that he graduated in 1991 but his records shows that he
graduated BSED as of March 1992. Said act is violative of Civil Service Law and Rules and
other related laws.
Petitioner alleged that he is confused of the actual date of graduation. He honestly believed all
the time that he graduated in March 1991 although with some deficiencies to be completed in
May, 1991; he completed his deficiencies in the summer of May, 1991.

Ruling
Dishonesty is defined as "intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion."
In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not
only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the petitioner, but
also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at
his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment.
Petitioner should not be faulted when he wrote "1987-1991" in his PDS under "Inclusive Dates
of Attendance" since he did attend the school during the given period and in fact graduated on
March 24, 1991. It is an honest mistake of fact induced by no fault of his own and excuses
him from the legal consequences of his act. Ignorantia facti excusat. To stress, petitioner
was asked mainly about the inclusive dates of his attendance in SLU. The official transcript of
records was issued on August 8, 1994. Understandably, it does not show the circumstances
that led petitioner in giving the subject answers in his application for PBET and PDS. The
transcript of records should not be made the basis for holding petitioner liable for dishonesty.

Salvador Yapyuco Enriquez vs Honorable Sandiganbayan

GR No. 122776, June 25, 2012
Peralta, J.
Facts
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the
Integrated National Police (INP).
Case: consummated murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder
We find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context
of criminal law, a “mistake of fact” is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have
justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable
mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The
inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,and it does not look at all to the belief or state
of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be
honest and reasonable; (b) that itbe a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability
required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
with respect to an element of the offense.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. Corpus delicti consists of two things:
first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. In homicide
(by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced
the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct
or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill.
Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at
the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate
act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no
intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the
penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only
to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these
offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the
other elements of said offenses.

14. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat vs Ignorantia facti excusat

Eduardo Manuel vs People
G.R. NO. 165842, November 29, 2005
Callejo, Sr. J.

Facts
Charge: Bigamy (contract 2nd marriage)
As per accused he did not hear from first wife for more than 20yrs

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have
been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural
or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in
a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
Sereno CJ.
Facts
Petitioner graduated bachelor of law in 1979 and passed the bar the same year. He was
scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys May 30, 1980 but failed to do so as he allegedly
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home
to his province for a vacation. Several years later he found the Notice and realized he have not
signed the roll yet. He was already working when he found the notice. Thus, he operated "under
the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.
6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter. The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a
lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25
Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Petitioner’s petition was granted, but he was to sign the roll of attorney one year after receipt of
the resolution.

15. Mala in se vs Mala prohibita

Filomena Villanueva vs People
G.R. No. 237738, June 10, 2019
PERLAS-BERNABE, J

Facts
Violation of Sec. 7 of RA 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
While in the performance of her official functions, as well as by taking advantage of her office,
she willfully obtained a P1,000,000.00 loan from the Claveria Agri-Based Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Incorporated (CABMPCI), thereby violating the aforesaid provision of law which
prohibits/disallows public officials/employees from directly/indirectly accepting/soliciting any loan
or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties.
In her defense, petitioner maintained that the loans[7] were obtained by virtue of her
membership in CABMPCI, and that the same had already been paid. Notably, she claimed that
notwithstanding her position in the CDA, she was nevertheless allowed under RA 6938,[8]
otherwise known as the "Cooperative Code of the Philippines," to become a member of
acooperative. Hence, she asserted that she may enjoy her rights incidental to her membership
in CABMPCI, and consequently, allowed to obtain loans.
Certain acts which violate these ethics, such as that provided under Section 7 (d), have been
declared unlawful and accordingly, classified as mala prohibita. Notably, RA 6713 exhorts that
"[p]ublic officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal
interest."Thus, public officials do not enjoy the same autonomy as that of private individuals,
and hence, usually normal transactions such as that of obtaining loans - as in this case - come
with necessary restrictions whereby personal interests take a back seat for the sake of
preserving the pristine image and unqualified integrity of one's public office.

Maynilad Water Services Inc. vs Secretary of DENR

G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019
HERNANDO, J.

Facts
These adjudications uniformly affirmed the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
(SENR), finding petitioners Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), Maynilad
Water Services Inc. (Maynilad) and Manila Water Company, Inc. (Manila Water), liable for
violation of and noncompliance with Section 8[9] of the Clean Water Act. Failure to provide,
install, operate, and maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage
system resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water
leading to Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the DENR's mandate to implement the
operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration of Manila Bay and its river tributaries.

As to the violation of Section 8 of R.A. 9275, the justification submitted by the respondent is
insufficient to justify its failure to comply with the said provision. R.A. 9275 is a statutory law,
compliance of which is mandatory. It is mala prohibita as opposed to mala in se. The rule is that
in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohibited act was intentionally done. x x x It has already been cited by the Supreme Court that
violation of environmental laws, are mala prohibita x x x. It is sufficient that the acts complained
of were proven (and in this instance admitted), and no amount of justification will clear it of any
violation.
It should be noted that the excuse offered by respondents that several customers refuse to
connect is irrelevant. Section 8 of R.A. 9275 itself makes it mandatory for any sewage and
septage to comply with the said rule to wit[:] "Provided, further, that all sources of sewage and
septage shall comply with the requirements herein". Persons in violation of such mandatory
provision may be held accountable in accordance with Section 28 of the said law. Thus, the
refusal of any person under the said law is already addressed by the same law.Moreover,
assuming that such excuse would justify non-compliance of a mandatory provision of the law,
such excuse partakes the nature of an affirmative defense. It is incumbent upon the respondent
to prove his affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence. x x x Aside from the mere
statements given by the respondent, no proof or evidence was shown to justify its stance.

Rowena Santos Comprado vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 242656, August 14, 2019
CAGUIOA, J.:[*]

Facts
Rowena Santos y Comprado (Rowena) and Ryan Santos y Comprado (Ryan) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended (RA 9165).
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However,
the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the
drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is
under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary.
The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place
where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
17 (a) Error in Personae (Mistake in the identity of the victim)
People vs Sabalones, Beronga, Alegarbes and Cabanero
G.R. No. 123485, August 31, 1998
Panganiban, J.
FACTS
Case: murder and frustrated murder
A shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two
persons and the wounding of three others, who were all riding in two vehicles which were
allegedly ambushed by appellants.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on
the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These
pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having
killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against
them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims’ vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the
avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that “mistake in the identity of
the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”. Be
that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is
better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than
aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the
other due to imprecision in the blow.

People vs Salarza
G.R. No. 117682, August 18, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts
Case: rape, accused imposed with death penalty
Zareen Smith, British, 30, television and stage actress. Have her vacation in the Philippines, in
Aklan Boracay. She developed a relationship with Enrico de Jesus, caretaker of the resort
owned by his parents. The accused was a friend of Enrico.
Zareen thought that the one she was making love with was Enrico.
Case was dismissed as there was no force employed, she was fully conscious when the act
was done, she isn’t below 12yrs and is not demented.
Justice Davide
The ponencia makes much of Zareen’s testimony that she was aware that someone pulled off
her underwear and spread her legs, then concludes that she must have been fully conscious
and could not have been mistaken as to her partner’s identity. However, to take this at face
value would not serve the ends of justice. Plainly, despite Zareen’s awareness of what was
being done to her, the question of who was doing it to her was a totally different matter. Her
accession to the what was premised on the belief, in good faith, that it was her boyfriend who
lay with her in bed. Her failure to ascertain the identity of her partner was a mistake in good faith
for which she should not be faulted; neither should it result in the acquittal of accused-appellant.
Zareen was clearly, in layman’s language: disoriented, drowsy or confused,[4] thus cannot be
held culpable for her failure to immediately recognize that it was not Ricky, nor her failure to
ascertain Jun’s identity, not even her assumption that it was Ricky who lay with her.
Returning to the legal front, what is material here is that any semblance of consent given was
clearly and painfully a mistake in good faith, as Zareen was not fully aware of the totality of the
circumstances, thus rendering her, for all legal intents and purposes, unconscious and unable to
give consent freely and intelligently. All told, this instance of reverse error in personae, clearly a
material factor in the grant of consent by the victim, resulted in total absence which accused-
appellant should be held criminally liable for as charged.

Aberratio Ictus (Mistake in the blow)

People vs Flora
G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts
Case: double murder and attempted murder
In the present case, when Hermogenes
Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead,
he became liable for Emerita's death and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability
on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended.

People vs Gemoya and Tionko

G.R. No. 132633, October 04, 2000
Melo, J.

Facts
Guilty of frustrated homicide and murder and sentenced to death
Used Indian Pana as weapon, Davao City Philipines, year 1996
When an accused admits having killed the victim, the burden of proving his innocence is shifted
to him. We ruled in People vs. Manlulu (231 SCRA 701 [1994]) that "by invoking self-defense,
the accused admit killing Alfaro. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. Their duty now is to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing." Accused-
appellant Gemoya can no longer invoke the constitutional right of being presumed innocent of
the crime charged. As far as he is concerned, the crime of murder in the case at bar is
established once the prosecution, establishes any of the qualifying circumstances with proof
beyond reasonable doubt. This is because the fact of death and the cause thereof are already
established by the admission. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death,
unless the accused proves by convincing evidence that any of the justifying circumstances in
Article 11 or any of the exempting circumstances in Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code,
is present.
The two accused-appellants herein are liable for the crime resulting from Gemoya's act of
releasing the second "indian pana", which accidentally hit Rosalie. Although Rosalie may not
have been their intended victim, accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with one another as
we have earlier discussed, are liable for the consequences of their felonious act (see:
Paragraph 1, Article 4, Revised Penal Code). Mistake in the identity of the victim, which may
either be (a) "error in personae" (mistake of the person), or (b) "aberratio ictus" (mistake in the
blow), is neither exempting nor mitigating (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605 [1930]). Accused
appellants, therefore, cannot escape the criminal liability resulting from the injury suffered by
Rosalie.

Peoplevs Inocencio Gonzalez Jr.

G.R. No. 139542, June 21, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in the
course of her husband's altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along the Garden of
Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused
guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly
sentenced him to death. This case is before us on automatic review.

The accused is liable for frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two small children because
he fired the shot at Noel Andres that hit instead his pregnant wife and two small children. He is
liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime committed is different from
that intended (aberratio ictus).
Decision of trial court was modified, accused was sentenced to be guilty of homicide for the
death of Feliber and slight physical injuries against Kenneth and Kevin.
Justice Pardo
Whether or not the attack succeeds against its intended victim or injures another, or whether the
crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the attack
is attended by treachery, the qualifying circumstance may still be considered. We cannot agree
with the accused or the view of the Solicitor General that the shooting was not attended by
treachery. Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife and child with him in his Tamaraw FX could
have provoked the situation but was not an aggressor. Initially he touted the accused for his
failure to observe traffic rules. One thing appears clear to us: the accused deliberately shot
complainant Noel Andres treacherously in cold blood. However, it was his wife who was fatally
hit in the head (aberratio ictus) and shrapnels hit two young innocent children.
We are convinced that the shooting was attended by treachery that qualified the crime of
murder aggravated by the use of a semi-automatic pistol specifically fitted with murderous
missile. The crime committed for the killing of Feliber Andres was murder, qualified by treachery
and aggravated by the use of firearm.

Praeter Intentionem
Atty. Gladdys Bernabe vs Judge Salvador Memoracion
No. RTJ-95-1303, August 11, 1997
Davide Jr. J.
Facts
Atty. Bernabe an attorney of CHR asked appropriateness of Judge’s modification on sentence
of accused in Criminal Case No. 1771-227 (Homicide with Double Frustrated Homicide was filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Basilan against three Marine soldiers namely, Pfc.
Vicente Machon, Pfc. Jerramy Degollado, and Pfc. Renato Castulo).
The respondent Judge admitted that he modified the decision but he did so before it became
final, which is allowed under Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He
claimed that the reasons adduced by the accused in their motion for the modification of the
judgment “are legal, reasonable and justifiable and are within the context of the evidences [sic]
presented by the parties”; besides, the prosecution did not file an opposition to that motion nor
did it present any objection during the hearing thereof, but instead, it manifested that it was
submitting the motion for resolution without any arguments. He further alleged that he denied
the prosecution’s motion for the reconsideration of the modified judgement because its
opposition, which was presented after he had already granted the accused’s motion, did not
present any legal issues that would justify the setting aside of the said order. He then concluded
that “there was no error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion ever committed in modifying
[the] decision of October 4, 1994.”
Besides, he took into account the fact that the accused, who are members of the Marine Corps
of the Philippine Navy, were first offenders and had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed. Had he not shown them any compassion and understanding by
granting them probation, he would have suffered “outrage, anger and madness from the whole
battalion of Marine Officers and Men in Basilan,” and if that outrage and anger were spewed
upon him no government officials, not even members of the judiciary would come forward to
give aid and comfort, except his family and immediate relatives. He also impressed upon this
Court that the situation in Basilan is far different from that in other provinces in the country, for in
Basilan “[k]idnappings with ransoms are weekly occurrences, big time illegal loggers, high
incidents [sic] of drug trafficking are common crimes which in spite of the presence of large
number of armed forces remained unabated.” He further narrated the sad plight of the Judges
assigned in Basilan.

People vs Ortega, Rivera

G.R. No. 116736, July 24, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Facts
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical consequences of his
wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an
accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what he thought was the lifeless body of
the victim can be held liable as a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that
the said victim was actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment
and burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable as a
principal because the prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning in the
Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship
with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.
Benjamin Ortega Jr. stabbed the victim, Quitlong and Ariel Caranto saw the events.
Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Jr. and Manuel Garcia disposed the body to the well the dropped
stones. Quitlong reported the incident to the police. Andre Mar (victim) was courting Raquel
Ortega.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that Appellant
Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of
the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide
although he had no original intent to kill.
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states
that criminal liability shall be incurred by “any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.” The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is
likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well,
Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of the
crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide.[30]
Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he
assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural
consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended.
Appellant Garcia was acquitted, although the direct cause of death was drowning as the
complaint or information does not include him. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that
an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information
would be a violation of this constitutional right. Although the prosecution was able to prove that
Appellant Garcia assisted in “concealing x x x the body of the crime, x x x in order to prevent its
discovery,” he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19,
par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of
Appellant Ortega. Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided
by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Santillana
G.R. No. 127815, June 09, 1999
Melo, J.

Facts
Case: murder
Assault and stab one Wilfredo Limpiado, hitting the latter on his abdomen which instantaneously
caused his death.
Teresita (wife of victim) asked appellant to stop working on the sink of their rented house as
they will elevate their house and the sink will obstruct. Santillana continued working, went up to
get knife and wire. Wilfredo emerged and inquired what was going on and asked appellant 3
times to stop immediately. Then appellant stabbed him with a knife and went back to his house.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND PRAETER INTENTIONEM.
Further, he invokes Paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code or the "lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong." He argues that he merely exercised his natural instinct of self-
preservation and defended himself from his assailant. He maintains that he did not have the
intent to kill. Being unintentional and accidental, the stabbing was done without any intent on the
part of accused-appellant to commit so grave a wrong.
Judgment modified, from murder to homicide, treachery was not considered as treachery means
there was deliberate intent and that it was planned, with the case at bar, the victim was not in
the place when the accused went up to the 2nd floor to get the knife.

18. Proximate Cause: He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused (el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado)
St. Mary’s Academy vs. William Carpitanos
G.R. No. 143363, February 06, 2002
Pardo, J.
Facts
“Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II
(recklessly drives the jeep) and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva (jeep owner) and St. Mary’s Academy (asked the students to
campaign for the enrollment) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
Reason why the academy was held liable by the CA: Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the
following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident.
“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence,no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.’”
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James
Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva (detachment of steering
wheel guide). Thus, it will not be the school who should be held liable but that of the owner of
the vehicle.

Vallacar Transit Inc. vs Jocelyn Catubig

G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
Civil Case No. 11360, an action for recovery of damages based on Article 2180, in relation to
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, filed by respondent Jocelyn Catubig against petitioner Vallacar
Transit, Inc. While the RTC dismissed respondent's claim for damages, the Court of Appeals
granted the same.
While approaching a curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig (husband) tried to overtake a slow
moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being
traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When
the two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle and died.
Bus driver acquitted of the charge as court finds that he was not negligent.
Catubig (wife) filed civil case on the employer based on Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of Civil
Code. Rewarded with 250,000 as full compensation for the death of husband. Thus, this
petition. (Court of Appeals)
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision, which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the sole negligence of
Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite
lane of the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner asked for the dismissal of
respondent's complaint for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as
there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of its
employee driver.
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not
because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if the Ceres Bus is running very fast on
its lane, it could not have caused the collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to
overtake a cargo truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while
approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed
reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would
have done under the circumstances.
Petition granted, decision of CA set aside

19. Efficient Intervening Cause

People vs Quianzon
G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935
Recto, J.
Facts
Case: homicide
Defense contended that he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical
injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it
had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the
infection.
Even without said act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient
had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable
act of the accused.
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury
contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes
contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. .
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the
present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act —
and in this case the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen
the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed,
but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the
deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its
effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
That every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and
wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-
operated in producing the fatal result.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so
grave a wrong as the committed should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant.

People vs Orlito Villacorta

G.R. No. 186412, September 07, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts
Case: murder
Stabbed the victim with sharpened bamboo stick
Jan. 23, 2002 (day the victim was stabbed); Feb. 15, 2002 (died due to tetanus secondary to
stab wound)..
Villacorta contended that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only
be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The
proximate cause of Cruz's death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
Issue therefore was whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from time victim
was wounded until his death.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).Doubts are present.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
Cruz's stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus
might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz's stab wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the
time of his death.
Decision reversed and set aside, accused with new judgment of Guilty of the crime of slight
physical injury.

US vs Filomeno Marasigan
G.R. No. L-9426 August 15, 1914
MORELAND, J.:
4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while engaged in
examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in
the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to
approach them. Accused asked why was the line curved, then the victim answered, why he
wants it to be straight so that it will put certain logs and trees on the land of the accused. The
accused drew his knife and struck Mendoza, causing a cut in his hand, which later makes the
middle finger useless.
We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the
purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the
middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered
useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could
be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results
of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the
consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

20. The penalty for impossible crime

De Joya vs Jail Warden of Batangas

G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts (refer to the theories of criminal law - #6)
Writ of habeas corpus (claiming that her detention was illegal)
Charge: BP Blg 22
Impossible crime:
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive
penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a
penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
Violation to BP Blg. 22 is not an offense against property but an offense against public order.
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal
law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of
criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total
of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of
the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not
to mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous
crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the
criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic
usefulness and other social ends. The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties
imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an
opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the
community.

Gemma Jacinto vs People

G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
PERALTA, J.:
Facts
Other petitioners: Anita Busog de Valencia Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle

Crime: Qualified theft (seeks to reverse decision of CA)

Deposited in their account P10,000, a payment made by customer (employees od Mega Foam
International Inc.)

Impossible crime
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in
Intod. In this case, (1) petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant
for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not
been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary
for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's
act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At
most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Decision of CA modified, GUILTY of IMPOSSIBLE CRIME

Anita Miranda vs People

G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts
Case: Qualified theft
Accused is a bookkeeper of the Video City Commercial Inc.
She deposited pre-signed checks by one of the franchise owner, Jefferson Tan
Art. 310 Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.
Pursuant to said case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the
value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds
P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in the maximum period. To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added
to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a
remainder of P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any
amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic
penalty. However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years.
Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion
temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court, as well as the
appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
Decision modified: from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
People vs Rogelio Gumimba Y Moradante
G.R. NO. 174056 [Formerly G.R. No. 138257], February 27, 2007
TINGA, J.

Facts
Crime: rape with homicide (8 yo child – appellant’s niece)

Accused admitted to the crime but mentioned that he was not alone in the commission of the
crime. He said that he was with Abapo, and that it was Abapo who raped AAA first, and the first
to struck the victim which caused its death. He claimed that he can only be charged with rape as
the victim was already dead when he struck her. He theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty
of an impossible crime (since he claimed that victim was already dead).

Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have known
positively that the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only
completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause of death. In light
of the particular circumstances of the event, appellant's mere conjecture that AAA had already
expired by the time he hacked her cannot be sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible
crime.

With the passage of RA No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty), penalty
cannot be imposed, thus reduced to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

People vs Callao Marcelino and Amad

G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018
CAGUIOA, J:
Facts
Case: murder
Strike the forehead, opened stomach and took out liver and feed it to the pig, sliced the flesh of
the thigh and again fed it to the pig.

Hesson denied the charges (saying that the victim was the son of his godfather), he was at
large for 2 years.
Denial, unsubstantiated by any credible evidence, deserves no weight in law. The prosecution
more than sufficiently established the participation of Hesson in the crime charged.
Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime.
Without admitting his guilt, Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of committing an
impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder because it was legally
impossible for him to kill Fernando as the latter was already dead when Hesson stabbed
him.
The victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently established by
the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead after he was
hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground motionless, this
statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando was already dead
when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived at by merely looking
at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as checking of Fernando's
pulse, heartbeat or breathing.

22. Dura lex sed lex (the law may be harsh but it is the law)
People vs Echegaray
G.R. No. 117472, February 07, 1997
PER CURIAM
Facts
Crime: rape
We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of
life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts
that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on
the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts
would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must
be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate
heinousness of the crime of rape.
Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if
infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition
seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will
have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that
tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is
a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be
retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false
delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival."

Roman Villanueva vs Judge Apolinario Estoque

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1494, November 29, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts
Judge was charged with alleged "Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion and
Unjust Decision."
Respondent judge admits disregarding the foregoing prohibition but he insists that "(i)f herein
undersigned respondent granted the respondent’s motion for extension of time to file position
paper/evidence in that subject forcible entry case, it is precisely because fair play dictates that in
all court proceedings each party must be given full and every opportunity to be heard, otherwise
the principle of due process would be violated.
There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 19 (e) of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure and judges have no option but to obey. When the law is clear, there is no
room for interpretation.[2] "For the first duty of the court is to apply the law.[3] The court has no
power to change but only to interpret the law as it stands at any given time."[4] A judge is limited
to interpreting or applying the law despite whatever doubts he may have about its wisdom.[5]
Observance of the law he is bound to know is required of respondent judge.
The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the
Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we feel it
incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as
harsh, unwise or morally wrong and may recommend to the authority or department concerned
its amendment, modification or repeal, still as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and
give it effect as decreed by the law-making body.

Ireneo Cahulogan vs People

G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts
Crime of fencing (Anti- Fencing Law of 1979) (petition for review)

The above-named accused, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or in any manner deal, Two Hundred Ten (210) cases of Coca Cola
products worth Php52,476.00 owned by and belonging to the offended party Johnson Tan which
accused know, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of Theft, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid sum of
Php52,476.00.
At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612 was
enacted in order to provide harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties which are
proceeds of the crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior to the enactment of said law, were
punished merely as accessories after the fact of the said crimes. The Court held that while a
Fence may be prosecuted either as an accessory of Robbery/Theft or a principal for Fencing,
there is a preference for the prosecution of the latter as it provides for harsher penalties.

Petition denied – decision affirmed with modification (lesser years of imprisonment)

Lito Corpuz vs People

G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
Facts
Crime of estafa. Petition for review on certiorari
Accused approached the complainant in a casino and offered that he’ll sell the jewelry on
commission basis. Both agreed that accused shall remit the proceeds of sale within period of 60
days, and return the unsold. However, accused failed to do so, after meeting, promised to pay
but to no avail.
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a
matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the
law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
which is plainly written.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete,
for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."[45]
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to
our modern time.

The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. x x x.