Cases:

1. G.R. No. 198498, July 29, 2019, EDUARDO LAO, PETITIONER, VERSUS SPOUSES
ROBERTO HERNANDEZ AND PURIFICACION HERNANDEZ (Jurisdiction vs.
exercise of jurisdiction)

Facts. A simulated deed of sale of a registered land between the seller husband and
buyer was executed. The wife of the seller did not give consent to the sale. The buyer
then transferred registration of the subject land in his name. The said land was offered as
collateral in a REM. Later, the buyer failed to pay the loan. The seller then paid the loan.
Soon, the seller was apprised that the said land was levied upon in connection with a civil
case for collection of sum of money filed against the buyer. The levied land was sold on
execution sale and was awarded to a winning bidder.

The seller filed in the RTC a case for recovery of ownership against the buyer and the
judgment creditor in the said civil case for collection of money. These defendants were
placed under the jurisdiction of the court where the case for recovery of ownership was
filed via filing answer and motion to dismiss. This case for recovery of ownership was
decided in favor of the seller in 2005. The judgment creditor was directed not cause the
sale of the said property.

In 2009, the judgment creditor in the said civil case for collection of money filed an
action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47

Issues and Resolution.

1. Is the remedy availed by the judgment creditor proper?

No. Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules restricts the grounds thereof only to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. Lack of jurisdiction is confined only to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.

As to jurisdiction, the RTC has subject matter jurisdiction. Also, the RTC had acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein due to filing of answer and motion
to dismiss.

2. Is it not that the errors raised in the Rule 47 are errors of jurisdiction?

No. The issue raised was whether there exists an innocent purchaser for value as
contemplated in the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529). This is
an issue which is within the competent jurisdiction of the RTC in a recovery of ownership
or reconveyance case wherein the very title or ownership of the real property in dispute
is the sole issue to be resolved.

Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In the instant case, the errors raised in the petition for annulment of judgment pertain to
the court a quo's exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case.

3. The winning bidder was not impleaded. Still, any right of the winning bidder is
dependent on the right of the judgment debtor who, however, had no right as the
contract of sale was void.

2. [ G.R. No. 189852, August 17, 2016 ] THOMAS BEGNAEN, PETITIONER, VS.
SPOUSES LEO CALIGTAN AND ELMACALIGTAN (concurrent jurisdiction)

Facts. A land dispute case was initially referred to the NCIP (Regional Office). The NCIP-
RO dismissed the case for failure to refer the matter to the council of elders as required
in the IPRA, without prejudice to re-filing. The complainant filed an ejectment suit in the
MTC. The MTC dismissed the complaint as the dispute was already taken cognizance of
by the NCIP-RO. The RTC reversed the MTC decision stating that the MTC can take
cognizance of the case. The CA reversed the RTC decision stating that NCIP has exclusive
and primary jurisdiction, stating that the IPRA law has divested regular courts of their
jurisdiction when the parties involved are members of ICCs/IPs and the disputed property
forms part of their ancestral land/domain.

Issues and Resolution.

1. Does the IPRA law provide exclusive and primary jurisdiction to NCIP in
cases involving IPs/ICCs and ancestral lands or domains?

No. Section 66 of RA 8371 (IPRA) does not provide for exclusivity and primacy of
jurisdiction. The NCIP cannot be said to have even primary jurisdiction over all the
ICC/IP cases. We do not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in
Section 66 of the IPRA. Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

The limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts
in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies
brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.

2. Where is the concurrent jurisdiction of trial courts based on? BP 129, as

amended.

3. Does the NCIP has jurisdiction over the case? Yes. The NCIP is vested with
jurisdiction over (1) the parties, who are all members of the same ICC, and (2) the
subject property, which is ancestral land.

4. Which tribunal will exercise jurisdiction – MTC or NCIP?

While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the
same subject matter, We have consistently upheld the settled rule that the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of; the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.

Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction, "this concurrence is not to be taken

as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as
a contest between these bodies as to which1 will first complete the investigation."

It does not escape Our attention that petitioner-appellant first invoked the NCIP's
jurisdiction by filing with the RHO his complaint against respondents for "Land
Dispute and Enforcement of Rights." The initial filing of the instant case by petitioner-
appellant before the NCIP-RHO only showed that he fully recognized the NCIP's
jurisdiction over this case. However, when the Complaint was dismissed without
prejudice for failure of petitioner-appellant to first bring the matter for settlement
before the Council of Elders as mandated by the IPRA, petitioner-appellant took an
altogether different route via the MCTC.

The dismissal was pursuant to Section 9, Rule IV of NCIP Administrative Circular No.
1-03, which dictates that "No case shall be brought before the RHO or the
Commission unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided for under
customary laws," By doing so, the NCIP-RHO did not divest itself of its
jurisdiction over the case; it merely required compliance with the mandatory
settlement proceedings. As aptly observed by the MCTC, the case was dismissed
"not on the issue of jurisdiction as (the NCIP-RHO) has rightful jurisdiction over it, but
 on the ground of non-compliance with a condition sine qua non." However, instead of
simply complying with the RHO Order, petitioner-appellant filed a forcible entry case,
a complete deviation from customary practice.

Under the foregoing discussions, We find that jurisdiction remains vested in the NCIP-
RHO as the first agency to take cognizance over the case, to the exclusion of the
MCTC.

3. [ G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021 ] FELINO A. PALAFOX, JR., PETITIONER,
VS. HON. FRANCISCO G. MENDIOLA (hierarchy of courts)

Facts. Senator Angara filed a complaint for damages against Arch. Palafox in RTC Pasay
City. The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint due to improper venue, as
the parties are residents of Makati City. The RTC denied the motion. The defendant filed
a Rule 65 petition to the SC.

Issue. Is the remedy proper?

Resolution. No. The SC has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA on petitions for
certiorari. Yet, under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is
improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing
the overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court's original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the
ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (I) when
dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded
by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities;
or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified
the immediate and direct handling of the case.

Further, We have held that such serious and important reasons must be "clearly stated in
the petition.

Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to this Court despite the concurrent jurisdiction
of the appellate court. Significantly, he did not bother to provide any reason or
explanation to justify his noncompliance to the rule on hierarchy of courts.

4. G.R. No. 62051, March 18, 1985 ] RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.,
PETITIONER, VS. ISIDRA REMOLADO (law over equity)

Facts. A person was the registered owner of a parcel of land. It was mortgaged. For
failure to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed. The redemption period expired. The
bank consolidated ownership over the land. Still, the bank gave the former owner to
repurchase the property within a period of time. The former owner did not repurchase
the property within the time given. After the repurchase time lapsed, the former owner
tendered an amount for repurchase. This was not accepted by the bank. A case for
reconveyance was filed against the bank.

Issue. May reconveyance be ordered on the ground of equity?

Resolution. No. Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law.
There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning
compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the
disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy.

The choice between what is legally just and what is morally just, when these two options
do not coincide, is explained by Justice Moreland in Vales vs. Villa, 35 Phil. 769, 788
where he said:

"Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by
another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do
foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose
money by them — indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can
the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the
commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong before the courts are
authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it."

In the instant case, the bank acted within its legal rights when it refused to give
Remolado any extension to repurchase after October 31, 1973. It had given her about
two years to liquidate her obligation. She failed to do so.

This principle applies in application of the rules of procedure.

5. [ G.R. No. L-29701, March 16, 1987 ] PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,
PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA (law over equity)

Facts. A case was dismissed. The dismissal was made known to the aggrieved party’s
counsel on April 29, 1967 (arrived late and came to know of the dismissal on the said
date). The order of dismissal was received by the aggrieved party’s counsel on May 6,
1967. On 06 July 1967, 61 days from notice of the written order, a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 was filed.

Issue. Can the petition for relief from judgment be given due course?

Resolution. Sec. 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court clearly states that "A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or
order was entered or said proceeding was taken."

It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in this case was filed 61 days from receipt of
the notice of dismissal or one day late. In fact, the records show that counsel for
private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day, April 29, 1967, when he
arrived late for the hearing so that the Petition for Relief was at least eight (8) days
late. The records further show that counsel for private respondent did not move for
reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he appeal,
thereby allowing the decision to become final and executory. As a last resort, he could
have availed of the sixty day period provided for by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief
from judgment but again he allowed this opportunity to lapse. Indeed, to him is
applicable, the well known maxim that "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber
on their rights."

The rule is that, for a petition for relief under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the
petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the
provisions of said Rule. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Sec.
3, of the same, otherwise on this ground alone, the petition should be
dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, neither can private respondent invoke equity as a ground for
the reopening of the case "there being an express provision of law under which the
remedy can be invoked.” The rule is, "equity follows the law" and as discussed in
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence Vol. 2 pp. 188-189 (as cited in Appellant's Brief p. 20),
the meaning of the principle is stated as follows:

"There are instances, indeed, in which a court of equity gives a remedy,

where the law gives none; but where a particular remedy is given by the
law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it
would be very improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it
and to extend it further than the law allows."
6. G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003 DAVID REYES (SUBSTITUTED BY VICTORIA R.
FABELLA), PETITIONER, VS. JOSE LIM (equity jurisdiction)

Facts. A person is the owner of a land. A contract to sell said land was entered into
between the said owner and a buyer. Incidentally, there is an existing lease in the land
between the owner and the lessor. Pursuant to the contract to sell, the would-be buyer
paid the amount of Php10 million pesos as partial payment.

Later, the owner filed a complaint for annulment of the contract to sell, alleging fraud on
the part of the would-be buyer. It appeared that the owner already sold the same
property to another person. The would-be buyer also filed an answer for the rescission of
the contract to sell. The would-be buyer also moved to require the owner to provisionally
deposit in court the amount of Php10 million pesos.

Issue. Should the motion be granted?

Resolution. The Rules of Court does not include provisional deposit as among the
provisional remedies. The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus
in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust
enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution,
which is a precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks.
This is not a case of equity overruling a positive provision of law or judicial rule for there
is none that governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the
law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates
the courts to make a ruling despite the "silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."
This calls for the application of equity, which "fills the open spaces in the law."

Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit
of the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.
Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of
its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may
be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate.

Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. In his amended answer, Lim is also
seeking cancellation of the Contract to Sell. The trial court then ordered Reyes to deposit
in court the P10 million down payment that Lim made under the Contract to Sell. Reyes
admits receipt of the P10 million down payment but opposes the order to deposit the
amount in court. Reyes contends that prior to a judgment annulling the Contract to Sell,
he has the "right to use, possess and enjoy" the P10 million as its "owner" unless the
court orders its preliminary attachment.

To subscribe to Reyes' contention will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim. Reyes
sold to Line One the Property even before the balance of P18 million under the Contract
to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1 March 1995, Reyes signed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the Register of Deeds issued TCT
No. 134767 in the name of Line One. Reyes cannot claim ownership of the P10 million
down payment because Reyes had already sold to another buyer the Property for which
Lim made the down payment. In fact, in his Comment dated 20 March 1996, Reyes
reiterated his offer to return to Lim the P10 million down payment.

On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10
million down payment. The application of equity always involves a balancing of the
equities in a particular case, a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Here, we find the equities weigh heavily in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million down
payment in good faith only to discover later that Reyes had subsequently sold the
Property to another buyer.

7. G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004 FORTUNATO GOMEZ AND AURORA GOMEZ,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (classification of actions)

Facts. A parcel of land is owned by husband and wife. The said land was mortgaged to
another person. The loan was not paid, and so the real estate mortgage was foreclosed.
The owners still sold the land to another person, i.e., buyer. It was the buyer who
redeemed the property from the winning bidder in the foreclosure sale. Despite the sale,
the spouses refused to convey ownership of property to the buyer.

The buyer filed an action for specific performance. Incidentally, the husband died. Thus,
the case was filed against the heirs of the husband, which include the wife and the
children. One of the children was abroad, while the other one was in another place.
Service of summonses upon them was effected via substituted service on the wife.
Judgment was rendered in the said case against all the heirs of the husband.

Later, the children who were abroad and in another place filed a complaint for annulment
of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons.

Issue. Should the judgment be annulled?

Resolution. Yes.

The resolution of the present petition hinges on the issue of whether or not summons
was effectively served on respondents. If in the affirmative, the trial court had validly
acquired jurisdiction over their persons and therefore its judgment is valid.

To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature of
the action filed against them must first be determined. As the Court explained in
Asiavest Limited vs. Court of Appeals, it will be helpful to determine first whether the
action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the
action.

In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy

thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,[14] which states:

SEC. 7. Personal service of summons.-- The summons shall be served by handing

a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him.

If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, substituted

service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling
house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or by leaving the copies at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. In substituted service, it is mandated that the fact
of impossibility of personal service should be explained in the proof of service.

When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the
State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if
the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against
him. An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein service of summons
through the non-resident’s wife, who was a resident of the Philippines, was held valid, as
the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by the non-
resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case.[18]

Meanwhile, in actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
 acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served upon the
defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements. Thus, where the
defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines, and (1) the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of
which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the
property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been
attached in the Philippines, summons may be served extraterritorially by (a) personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court;
or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

In the present case, petitioners’ cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is anchored
on the claim that the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino reneged on their obligation to
convey ownership of the two parcels of land subject of their sale. Thus, petitioners pray
in their complaint that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the appropriate deed of
sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or in the alternative, that the
sale be revoked and rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners their
down payment in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted by
petitioners affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action
in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded.

Contrary to petitioners’ belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or
rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to
or possession of the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856,
it does not automatically follow that the action is already one in rem. In
Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Court made the following distinction:

In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on, real property.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal

liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of
against the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in
personam and not necessarily an action in rem.

The objective sought in petitioners’ complaint was to establish a claim against

respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to them the title to the two parcels of land
that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who was one of the sellers of the
properties to petitioners. Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action in
personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on the
basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the
defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their
persons.

A distinction, however, must be made with regard to service of summons on respondents

Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino. Adolfo Trocino, as records show, is already a
resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25 years. Being a non-resident, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against him.

On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly
acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him personally, or
through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such
impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be
explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the
service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return. Failure to
do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

In the present case, the process server served the summons and copies of the complaint
on respondents Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice and Racheal,[25]
through their mother, Caridad Trocino. The return did not contain any particulars as to
the impossibility of personal service on Mariano Trocino within a reasonable time. Such
improper service renders the same ineffective.

The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all the respondents without any
exception does not transform the ineffective service of summons into a valid one. It
does not constitute a valid waiver or even a voluntary submission to the trial court’s
jurisdiction. There was not even the slightest proof showing that respondents authorized
Atty. Bugarin’s appearance for and in their behalf.

Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed against respondents were rendered

without jurisdiction as there was neither a proper service of summons nor was there any
waiver or voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the same is
void, with regard to private respondents except Caridad Trocino.

Note. The SC decision affirmed the CA decision which prohibited transfer of registration
of title.

8. G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016 ] NESTOR CABRERA, PETITIONER, VS.
ARNEL CLARIN AND WIFE (jurisdiction is conferred by law; determined by the
allegations in the complaint or petition; estoppel by laches)

Facts. A person is the owner of a parcel of land. He discovered that portions thereof
were encroached upon by other individuals. A complaint for recovery of possession
(accion publiciana) was filed in the RTC. The complaint did not indicate the assessed
value of the subject property. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because of failure to allege the assessed value of the subject
property. The trial court denied the motion. Trial ensued, and the trial court granted the
complaint. On appeal, the complainant submitted tax declaration proving that the
assessed value of the subject property falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Issues and resolution.

1. What is the nature of accion publiciana? Real action.

2. Which court has jurisdiction over accion publiciana? The ruling then that it is the
RTC which has jurisdiction regardless of value of the property is no longer
available. BP 129, as amended, gives subject matter jurisdiction over real actions
to RTC and MTC, depending on the assessed value of the property involved.

Before the amendments, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought
before the RTC regardless of the value of the property. With the modifications
introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has
been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000.00, P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro
Manila. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the
property

3. How to determine jurisdiction? Allegations.

4. Did RTC acquire jurisdiction? No. The complaint failed to state the assessed value
of the subject land.

nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever
mentioned. On its face, there is no showing that the RTC has jurisdiction exclusive
of the MTC. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot readily be determined which court had original and exclusive
 jurisdiction over the case at bar. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of the land

5. Is it not that the tax declaration was submitted in the CA? Yes, but CA cannot
consider it. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The tax declaration was not offered in the trial court. Evidence not
formally offered can be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case. These conditions are not present in so far
as the said tax declaration is concerned.

6. Estoppel? No. Respondents are not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the subject civil case. Records reveal that even before filing their
Answer, respondents assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC through a motion to
dismiss as there was no mention of the assessed value of the property in the
complaint.

Also, the operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction

seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.
If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it
had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However,
if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party
who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume
an inconsistent position - that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle
of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not
depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

Likewise, the instant case does not involve a situation where a party who, after
obtaining affirmative relief from the court, later on turned around to assail the
jurisdiction of the same court that granted such relief by reason of an unfavorable
judgment. Respondents did not obtain affirmative relief from the trial court whose
jurisdiction they are assailing, as their motion to dismiss was denied and they
eventually lost their case in the proceedings below.

It bears emphasis that the ruling in Tijam establishes an exception which is to be

applied only under extraordinary circumstances or to those cases similar to its
factual situation. The general rule is that the lack of a court's jurisdiction is a non-
waivable defense that a party can raise at any stage of the proceedings in a case,
even on appeal; the doctrine of estoppel, being the exception to such non-
waivable defense, must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong
in its favor.

9. G.R. No. 124250, October 18, 2004 ] UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS,

PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (jurisdiction is determined by law in force
at the time of the commencement of action; curative legislation)

Facts. A lease contract was entered into. In the lease agreement, the lessee was
prohibited from introducing machineries which are also being offered by the lessor. An
ejectment suit was filed against the lessee for having violated the said condition. The
lessee made a counterclaim for damages due to illegal dismissal by the lessor
(employer). At the time of the filing of the ejectment suit, jurisdiction over damages in
labor dispute belongs to regular courts. However, during the pendency of the case, a law
was passed empowering labor arbiters to award damages as result of illegal dismissal
case.

Issue. May the trial court validly take cognizance of the counterclaim for damages
arising from employer-employee relationship?

Resolution. Generally, jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. When petitioner filed the ejectment case on May 17, 1979, the
applicable law was PD 1367, Section 1 of which provided that:

labor arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages.

However, on May 1, 1980, during the pendency of this case, PD 1691 was promulgated,
amending Section 1 of PD 1367:

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Commission. -- a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

x x x

3) All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment and

underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;

x x x

5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relation, unless expressly

excluded by this Code.

We now ask: did PD 1691 apply retroactively in this case so as to transfer jurisdiction
over respondent’s claims for damages from the courts to the labor arbiter/NLRC? Yes.

In Atlas Fertilizer Corporation vs. Navarro, the Court had the occasion to rule on conflicts
of jurisdiction between the courts and the labor agencies arising from the amendments to
PD 1367 by PD 1691. The later law, PD 1691, is a curative statute which corrected
the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiters at the start of the proceedings and
therefore should be given retroactive application vis-a-vis pending proceedings.
It was intended to correct a situation where two different tribunals had jurisdiction over
separate issues arising from the same labor conflict.

This principle was reiterated in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
where PD 1691 was given retroactive application as the amendment to the law was
crafted precisely to settle once and for all the conflict of jurisdiction between regular
courts and labor agencies.

We rule therefore that the award of damages by the trial court on the first cause of
action of respondent’s counterclaim cannot be sustained as the court a quo was bereft of
jurisdiction to grant the same.

10.[ G.R. No. 117383, March 06, 1995 ] RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION (RCBC), PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUCIA V. ISNANI (jurisdiction is
determined by law in force at the time of the commencement of action;
retroactive application)

Facts. A complaint for collection of sum of money in the amount of P137,675.00 was
filed in the RTC. The filing was done after the effectivity of the law which gives to the
MTC the jurisdiction to hear and decide such case, i.e., threshold then was
Php200,000.00. The RTC transmitted the case to the MTC.

Issue. Was the transmittal correct?

Resolution. No. Jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of commencement of

action. In the instant case, the principal demand prayed for in the complaint filed on 27
April 1994, or after R.A. 7691 had already become effective, with the Makati RTC, is only
 for US$5,000.00, or approximately P137,675.00 in Philippine currency, and thusly within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metro Manila MTCs. Instead of ordering the transfer of
the complaint to the MTC, respondent RTC judge, therefore, should have dismissed the
case prayed for by petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.

It could have been different if the law took effect at the time of pendency of the action
and that there is retroactivity provision in the supervening law.

11.[ G.R. NO. 161417, February 08, 2007 ] MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO,
PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK (jurisdiction over the
res)

Facts. The husband obtained loans from a bank. It is secured by real estate mortgage.
For failure of the husband to pay the loan, the bank foreclosed the mortgage through
judicial proceedings. The husband and wife were made defendants in the case. Summons
was personal served on the husband, while substituted service on the husband was made
for the wife. Judgment was rendered against the husband and wife. Deficiency judgment
was also made against the husband and wife considering that the property foreclosed
was not sufficient to pay the judgment obligation. The wife filed an action for annulment
of judgment as she was not served with summons.

Issue. Can the wife be made liable in the judicial foreclosure judgment? May the action
for annulment of judgment prosper?

Resolution. The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the
nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply
according to the nature of the action.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An
action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the
res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.[15]

Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.

A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this
case, must be personally served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time, substituted service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB

undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure
proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers
that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was served to her
through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular
surrogate service was resorted to.

Without ruling on petitioner's allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to
prevent summons from being served upon her personally, we can see that petitioner
was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial
foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of
summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court
(tantamount to lack of jurisdiction).

There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRB's ex-parte motion for deficiency
judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to
satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its
jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses
Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.

12.[ G.R. No. 175301, August 15, 2012 ]

EDITO GULFO AND EMMANUELA GULFO, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE P. ANCHETA
(jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint)

Facts. The parties are neighbors in a subdivision. The septic tank of one of the parties
overflowed. Upon inspection, it was found that the drainage from the said septic to the
subdivision’s drainage system was blocked due to constructions made by the other party.
An action for damages was filed in the RTC. The other party moved for the dismissal of
the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the dispute relates to intra-
corporate controversy which is under the jurisdiction of HIGC.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. The motion is denied. “The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the action and of which court has
jurisdiction over the matter.” Even a cursory reading of these allegations yield no
conclusion other than that the complaint is an ordinary action for damages that is purely
civil rather than corporate in character. The respondent merely seeks to be indemnified
for the harm he suffered; no question about the membership of the petitioners in the
association is involved, nor is the existence of the association in any manner under
question. In fact, these allegations are based on either Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code on human relations, and on the provisions on damages under Title XVIII of the
Civil Code. Thus, the CA decision is correct when it held that the acts alleged in the
subject complaint may also give rise to indemnification under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Since the issue of damages arising from the Civil Code, not intra-corporate controversy,
is involved, the RTC is the appropriate court with the power to try the case, not the
homeowners’ association, pursuant to Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.

We found from the allegations in the complaint that the respondent did not question the
status of the petitioners as members of the association. There were no allegations
assailing the petitioners' rights or obligations on the basis of the association's rules and
by-laws, or regarding the petitioners' relationships with the association. What were
 alleged were only demands tor civil indemnity and damages. The intent to seek
indemnification only (and not the petitioners' status, membership, or their rights in the
association) is clear from paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the complaint.

13. [ G.R. No. 146501, August 28, 2003 ] FLORDELIZA RIVERA, PETITIONER, VS. GREGORIA
SANTIAGO (jurisdiction is determined by defense)

Facts. A parcel of land was acquired by purchase. The buyer filed an ejectment suit
against the occupants. The occupants alleged tenancy relationship. The trial court
proceeded to exercise jurisdiction upon finding that there is no tenancy relationship
between the parties. The DARAB suit filed by the occupant to annul the sale was likewise
dismissed upon finding that there is no tenancy relationship, and thus the jurisdiction
belongs to the court.

Issue. Did the trial validly exercise jurisdiction?

Resolution. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,[15] as amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP) governs the
remedial aspects of such suits.

Under Section 50 of RA 6657, however, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is

vested with "primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform." In the present appeal, the Court is faced with the
question of which of these two laws apply. We hold that it is BP 129, not RA 6657.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. This is basic.

Unquestionably, petitioner lodged an action for ejectment before the MTC. Under BP 129,
the allegations in the complaint conferred initiatory jurisdiction on that first level court.

However, when tenancy is averred as a defense and is shown prima facie to be

the real issue, the MTC must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under RA
6657, it is the DAR that has authority to hear and decide when tenancy is legitimately
involved.

In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special

defense in their Answer with Counterclaim. Under the RSP, the MTC was supposed to
conduct a preliminary conference to determine if such relationship was indeed the real
issue. We emphasize that the MTC did not automatically lose its jurisdiction simply
because respondents raised tenancy as a defense. It continued to have the authority to
hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the
ejectment suit on its merits.

While the MTC conducted a preliminary conference, respondents contend that a

preliminary hearing, being mandatory, should have been held instead. Again, we clarify.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing may be conducted on any of the
affirmative grounds raised in an answer as though a motion to dismiss had been filed.
Although no motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter was filed in the MTC by herein respondents, they nonetheless insist that a
preliminary hearing should have been held as a matter of right. We hold, however, that a
hearing is merely discretionary. It is not a matter of right under the RSP and the Rules
then and now. Instead of a hearing, the MTC conducted a preliminary conference among
the parties. This is enough compliance with the Rules.

Prevailing rule. Trial court has to refer the matter to the DARAB for purpose of
determining whether there exists tenancy relationship. The DARAB then reports its
finding with the trial court. The trial court determines whether there is jurisdiction or not.

14. G.R. No. 222972, February 10, 2021 ] HERMOSA SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
REPRESENTED BY ITS STATUTORY LIQUIDATOR, THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION (PDIC), PETITIONER, VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(DBP), RESPONDENT (adherence of jurisdiction; curative legislation).

Facts. A bank obtained loans from DBP. Later, it was discovered that the bank submitted
forged documents of collaterals. The DBP then sued the bank for payment of the loan.
Pending the proceeding, a petition for liquidation was filed against the bank. The bank
was placed under receivership. The bank then moved to dismiss the civil case filed
against it.

Issue. Should the civil case be dismissed?

Resolution. Yes. The Court held in Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc, that the
rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute. One of the exceptions to the rule is
when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. According to the Court, Section
30[29] of RA 7653 "is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court
shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the
disputed claims against the Bank." The Court explained that the rationale for
consolidating all claims against the bank with the liquidation court is "to prevent
multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and x x x to establish due process and
orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to
avoid injustice and arbitrariness." The Court stated that it was the intention, of the
lawmaking body "that for convenience only one court, if possible, should pass upon the
claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the
Superintendent of Banks and regulate his operations."

It is of no moment that the complaint was filed by DBP before the Hermosa
Bank was placed under receivership. The Court had ruled that the time of the
filing of the complaint is immaterial as it is the execution that will obviously
prejudice the bank's other depositors and creditors.

To allow the complaint of DBP to proceed outside the Liquidation Court could result to
iniquity not only to Hermosa Bank's depositors who were the most directly affected by its
closure, but also to its other creditors because it would prioritize DBP's claim over their
claims. The CA also committed a reversible error in ruling that the Liquidation Court has
no jurisdiction over the bank employees who are being sued in their personal capacities.
Section 30 of RA 7653 gives the liquidation court the authority to "adjudicate disputed
claims against the institution, assist the enforcement of individual liabilities of the
stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on other issues as may be material to
implement the liquidation plan adopted." Hence, the Liquidation Court may resolve the
respective liabilities, if any, of Hermosa Bank's officers pursuant to Section 30 of RA
7653. Finally, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the RTC Branch 136 is a
provisional or ancillary remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect and preserve certain
rights and interests pending final judgment. With the dismissal of DBP's complaint, the
Writ of Preliminary Attachment no longer has a leg to stand on and should correctly be
dissolved.

15. Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003 (limitation on
exercise of civil jurisdiction).