Third 

Point LLC 
390 Park Avenue 
New York, NY  10022 
Tel 212 715 3880 

May 4, 2018

First Quarter Investor Letter

Review and Outlook

A benign and extended period of low market volatility ended abruptly in the first quarter of
2018. The S&P’s 12% peak‐to‐trough drawdown during the quarter was the sharpest since
Q1 2016 and the index’s overall quarterly losses of 0.8% marked its weakest annual start
since 2009. Third Point’s performance was less volatile but the end result was similar with
the Offshore Fund losing 0.6% and the levered Ultra Fund losing 1.5% through the end of
March. Losses during the quarter were driven primarily by long equity investments in
cyclical sectors while gains came from the short book and credit strategies. The funds were
profitable in April, bringing performance to roughly flat for the year.

A shift in markets occurred in Q1. After a two‐year period where growth surprised positively
and inflation was benign, we began to see volatility in each of these areas. While earnings
growth remains strong, investors now have to contend with increased uncertainty around
appropriate multiples. One cause of this uncertainty is that, after many years of very low
rates, there is finally an alternative to equities in the form of relatively riskless two‐year
money. We have seen the impact of this new option in money market flows where $400
billion has flooded in so far this year versus a total $80 billion of inflows in 2017. Also, as
manufacturing indices (PMI’s) cool from elevated levels, there is a real question about just
which inning of the late cycle we are in. While we don’t believe a recession is close, there is
definitely a concern that it is getting closer. Each of these considerations is weighing on
multiples. For investors, this means the S&P is effectively range‐bound and so, to generate
profits, investors will need to adjust exposures more aggressively and successfully choose
winners and losers across sectors.

We have responded to this regime shift in several ways. First, we have reduced net exposure
by over 20% this year. We have taken about 15% exposure out of our long book and boosted
shorts to about 25% of fund AUM. Last year’s focus on short selling after several years away
from the strategy was a return to our early success as short sellers. We intend to further
increase exposure to fundamental single names and quant‐derived baskets in 2018 and rely
less on market hedges to dampen volatility and reduce net exposure.

Beyond a balanced approach to equities, we are spending more time evaluating
opportunities in risk arbitrage. While credit strategies performed well in Q1, we find most
corporate credit markets are too richly valued relative to equities and so we have modest
exposure to the asset class. As we discuss below in our structured credit update, we have
been finding fewer opportunities in RMBS after selling most of our portfolio at a profit and
are currently focusing on marketplace lending deals instead.


Quarterly Results
Set forth below are our results through March 31, 2018:
Third Point Third Point
Offshore Ltd. Ultra Ltd. S&P 500

2018 YTD Performance* ‐0.6% ‐1.5% ‐0.8%

Annualized Return Since Inception** 15.6% 23.2%

Comparable S&P Annualized Return** 8.0% 7.9%

*Through March 31, 2018. **Return from inception, December 1996 for TP Offshore; from
inception, May 1997 for TP Ultra.

The top five winners for the quarter were Netflix Inc., Pagseguro Digital Ltd., Airbus SE,
BlackRock Inc., and CGG SA. The top five losers for the period were Nestlé SA, DowDuPont
Inc., Facebook Inc., Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, and Vulcan Materials Co.

Assets under management at March 31, 2018 were $17.7 billion.



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New Position

United Technologies Corporation

In the fourth quarter of 2017, Third Point initiated a significant stake in United Technologies
Corporation (“UTC” or the “Company”), a $100 billion industrial conglomerate organized
into four business units: Otis Elevator Company (“Otis”), UTC Climate, Controls & Security
(“CCS”), UTC Aerospace Systems (“UTAS”), and Pratt & Whitney. UTC has strong franchise
assets with leading market share within each segment but the Company’s shares have lagged
its industrial peers (XLI Index) by approximately 45% over the last five years. UTC fits a
pattern of many underperforming conglomerates where value is diminished by the ill effects
of a “one size fits all” approach to corporate strategy, incentive compensation, and capital
allocation. At UTC, this has led to a well‐documented history of poor management execution
– exemplified most recently by the botched ramp‐up of the next‐generation geared turbofan
(“GTF”) engine – as well as market share losses and underinvestment in key business areas.
We have initiated a dialogue with UTC’s Board of Directors to express our concerns about
the Company’s weak operating performance and the inherent disadvantages of its
conglomerate structure.

To reverse its years of underperformance and realize the full potential of its franchise assets,
we believe UTC should split into three focused, standalone businesses: Otis, CCS, and an
aerospace company (“Aerospace RemainCo”) encompassing UTAS and Pratt & Whitney. In
assessing the potential success of any such split, we ask ourselves two key questions: 1) are
the business units and their key stakeholders better off as standalone entities; and 2) does
the split create sustainable long‐term value? The answer to each of these questions is clearly
yes. We are encouraged that the Company’s CEO, Greg Hayes, has indicated that the Board
is undertaking a portfolio review. We expect that an honest process will lead the Board to
the same inescapable conclusion that UTC should be split into three.

The Case for a Split
As standalones, each of these businesses will benefit in the long run from a bespoke
corporate strategy, more flexibility in allocating capital, better alignment of management
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incentives, a dedicated board of directors with relevant industry experience, and greater
strategic optionality. The value creation from spin‐offs has been well documented in
academic studies and has many relevant precedents in the industrial sector including
Danaher/Fortive, Ingersoll‐Rand/Allegion, Northrop Grumman/Huntington Ingalls,
ITT/Xylem/Exelis, and Tyco/Covidien/TE Connectivity. Beyond these spin‐off benefits, we
believe the split would also highlight to the market the overlooked value of the GTF program
currently hidden within UTC.

The profitability of the GTF program will inflect positively as the GTF moves down the
manufacturing learning curve and the highly profitable service revenue stream ramps with
the installed base. Management has assessed the net present value of the GTF program at
approximately $15 billion1 or $19 per share. Giving credit to GTF’s NPV rather than
capitalizing today’s ramp‐up losses of $1.2 billion would lower UTC’s headline valuation
multiple of 11x forward EV/EBITDA to just 9x forward EV/EBITDA. The average forward
EV/EBITDA multiple for the US large‐cap multi‐industry peer group is 13x or ~40% higher.

We believe such a significant disconnect exists because – in addition to issues with
management execution – UTC’s current investor base is misaligned. Multi‐industrial
investors (a sector defined by low earnings volatility) value companies primarily on
multiples of next year’s earnings and cash flow. Aerospace investors, on the other hand, tend
to look through new program start‐up losses once they are comfortable that peak losses and
subsequent profit improvement are in sight. One clear example of this is Rolls‐Royce. If
Rolls‐Royce were a subsidiary of UTC, it certainly would not be valued currently at $23
billion or 36x forward P/E.

Even before giving credit to GTF’s NPV, a three‐way split would unlock in excess of $20
billion of value (>20% of market cap), net of separation costs. All three standalone entities

1 "The reality is just those 7,000 [GTF] engines we have on the order book today will generate more than $7

billion of positive value. Not negative. And by the way, that’s not the end of it. It’s not going to be that we are
done with 7,000 engines. That number is going to grow to 15,000 or more by the time we are done” – Akhil
Johri, UTC Investor Day, 3/10/16
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will likely trade at higher multiples than the lowest common denominator assigned to the
current UTC conglomerate. Otis peers Kone and Schindler trade on average at 15x forward
EV/EBITDA. CCS peers, Allegion, Ingersoll‐Rand, and Lennox2, trade on average at 13x
forward EV/EBITDA.

The remaining aerospace company would be the only liquid, US large‐cap aerospace supplier
other than TransDigm, which trades at 15x forward EV/EBITDA. Other US large‐cap
aerospace investment opportunities are limited to Boeing and Honeywell (only ~40%
aerospace), which trade at 14x and 15x forward EV/EBITDA3, respectively. The Aerospace
RemainCo will warrant a premium multiple due to synergy potential from Rockwell Collins
and Pratt & Whitney’s depressed earnings. If Pratt & Whitney achieves an 18% EBIT margin
by 2025, which management cited as a target, it will generate approximately $6 billion in
EBITDA, which compares to $2.3 billion this year. Assigning a 13x EV/EBITDA multiple to
Aerospace RemainCo after stripping out the GTF losses yields a UTC sum‐of‐the‐parts
valuation over $190 per share4 by year‐end 2019. We see further upside to $210 per share
if investors give credit to GTF’s positive NPV.

UTC’s management has acknowledged the disconnect between the Company’s intrinsic value
and share price but it seems less open to a three‐way split solution than shareholders might
expect. Management’s initial assessment of dissynergies and one‐time separation costs was
surprisingly high, particularly considering that at the Investor Day in March 2018, Greg
Hayes described each business unit as having “all the infrastructure and all the SG&A they
need to run on a day‐to‐day basis.” He claimed that the one‐time separation costs “could be
$2 billion to $3 billion”, citing debt refinancing costs as the largest contributor. However,
after reviewing UTC’s credit documents, we believe that the Company’s debt with maturities
between 2020 and 2027 could be refinanced with total costs (make‐whole payments and
fees) of approximately $200 million, and that the Company could elect to keep the post‐2027

2 Excluded Johnson Controls from CCS peer group due to secularly challenged Power Solutions division.
3 Honeywell EV/EBITDA and aerospace percentage is pro forma for recently announced spin‐off transactions

and reflects new pension accounting standard (ASU 2017‐07).

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maturities with the Aerospace RemainCo for no additional costs. Debt to be issued for the
Rockwell Collins deal also can be structured to minimize refinancing costs.

As far as dissynergies are concerned, Hayes has also given imprecise numbers ranging from
$100 million in 2015 to as much as $250 million in 2017 to set up standalone businesses5,
showing a lack of precision that belies a serious approach to considering how best to create
shareholder value. Our assessment of dissynergies is significantly lower based on both a
top‐down review of precedent spin‐off transactions as well as a bottom‐up assessment of
required new public company costs to replicate treasury, tax, pension, and shared services
provided by UTC corporate. For example, Danaher’s separation of Fortive resulted in less
than $50 million of incremental corporate costs between the two entities. Honeywell stated
that new public company costs for its two spin‐offs will not exceed the existing corporate
cost allocation. Furthermore, Honeywell has committed to eliminate any stranded corporate
costs at its RemainCo within two years. UTC management ought to adopt best practices and
demonstrate lean leadership in order to create shareholder value.

Third Point did not invest in UTC for what it is today but for what it could become. We intend
to work constructively with the Company to see the portfolio review conclude successfully.
We have shared our views in a more detailed letter to the Board. We are confident that, as
fiduciaries focused on creating long‐term value, they will come to agree that a separation
into three major business lines will create focused companies better able to adapt to the
challenges within their respective industries and encourage proper investment, driving
meaningful value for all of UTC’s stakeholders.


Equity Updates
Our portfolio contains several investments in cyclical companies undergoing M&A
transformations that we believe are not yet fully appreciated by shareholders. Such pro

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Hayes stated on the 2nd quarter earnings call in July 2015 that incremental corporate costs determined for
Sikorsky in the event of a spin would have been “about $100 million”. The costs “to set up a standalone public
company” ballooned to $200 million to $250 million during the EPG conference in July 2017 but were dialed
back to $200 million at the Barclays conference in February 2018.
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forma situations typically offer attractive entry points as impatient markets miss a value
synergy story that is 12 to 24 months from completion. The companies we own are attractive
because they have been punished by then recent cyclical unwind driven by the belief that we
are close to the end of the cycle, making their valuations very compelling. We have held a
number of these situations in our portfolio for over a year and we share updates on them
below.

DowDuPont (“DWDP”)

DWDP continues to be one of the fund’s largest positions. We remain confident in the
underlying business fundamentals and CEO Ed Breen’s plan to create value. Despite a series
of positive developments following the merger’s close last August, the discount to intrinsic
value has widened. Several prominent sell‐side analysts have noted the similarities between
DWDP’s three future spins (Materials Co, Specialty Co, and Ag Co) and three publicly traded
peers: LyondellBasell, 3M, and Monsanto. Consensus 2020 EBITDA for DWDP is $23 billion
– coincidentally the sum of 2020 estimates for LYB, MMM and MON is nearly identical at
$22.5 billion. However, the combined enterprise value for these three companies is $234
billion, about 40% higher than DWDP’s current enterprise value of $167 billion. Simply
applying a similar EV to DWDP (which we believe is justified) implies a stock price of $92,
nearly 50% higher than current levels. We expect this value gap to close over the next 12
months as synergies are realized and the three spin‐offs are finalized.

Lennar

We have long considered Lennar, which is led by Executive Chairman Stuart Miller, the best
homebuilder managed by the best team of industry veterans. We initiated our investment
shortly after Lennar announced its acquisition of its peer, CalAtlantic. The local market scale
created through this transaction will unlock several opportunities to improve unit
economics, returns on capital, and accelerate cash flow generation. Management is already
ahead of their plans to eliminate duplicative expenses, renegotiate contracts to lower
construction costs, and improve production efficiency and sales velocity. Lennar is also

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ahead of its peers in investing in technology and capabilities to greatly reduce customer
acquisition costs, expand financial services, and lower commission rates.

Early in the cycle, Lennar made smart investments in ancillary businesses, many of which do
not contribute to earnings and are not valued by investors. As these businesses are
monetized and result in several billion dollars of proceeds, Lennar’s low valuation will
become apparent. Taking into consideration Lennar’s strong integration execution and
housing industry fundamentals that support several more years of a positive cycle, we
believe buying Lennar’s core homebuilding operation at close to 6x pro forma earnings is a
bargain.

Dover
Since our last update, Dover has made several significant announcements. Dover decided to
1) spin its energy business, Apergy, thus greatly reducing earnings volatility; 2) switch to
“cash” EPS reporting to focus investors on the strong FCF generation of the portfolio; and 3)
transition to a new CEO, Richard Tobin, who has a strong background operating industrial
assets. Based on Apergy’s current when‐issued share price, the Dover RemainCo is currently
valued at an 8% FCF yield on our 2019 estimates, which represents a ~30% discount to the
US large‐cap multi‐industry peer group. With a high quality set of remaining assets,
increased strategic optionality, and a catalyst rich path over the next several months –
completion of the Apergy spin, repurchase of ~7% of outstanding shares, and
communication from the new CEO – we believe Dover’s RemainCo will close the valuation
gap to its multi‐industry peers.

Structured Credit Update
The Structured Products portfolio returned +6.9% on average exposure in Q1 compared to
a return of +0.9% by the HFN Mortgage Index for the same period. We have expressed our
belief in the fundamental health of consumers in a low rate environment by building an
attractive portfolio of reperforming whole mortgage loans over the last few years. Our bet
paid off in Q1 as a combination of continued ability to borrow and an uplift from tax reform
in late 2017 created a healthy environment for consumers and demand for our portfolio
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securities. We also saw strength in our modest European RMBS book which contains
primarily mezzanine securities in peripheral countries. Sovereign credit upgrades in
countries such as Greece and Portugal coupled with a rally for senior bonds in Q4 prompted
interest further down the capital structure and in the types of bonds we own.

While our portfolio today is more modest in size than it has been, we are continuing to find
different ways to look at residential credit and to find other opportunities in the large
universe of structured credit securities. Given recent macroeconomic headwinds, Third
Point has been defensive with our credit exposure and we have cut our duration profile in
half by engaging in new and interesting investment opportunities, such as partnering
selectively with consumer lending platforms. In Q1, we structured our fourth securitization
with Prosper which has been a productive partnership, creating investments with mid‐teens
yield profiles and significantly shorter duration compared to our historic non‐agency RMBS
CUSIP book. We still see value in the mortgage segment of the market and will continue to
explore new and innovative ways to migrate from personal loans to other sources of
consumer lending such as point of sale and virtual cards. We believe our network will
continue to afford us interesting abilities to source investments and take advantage of
further disruptions in the space.

Conclusion
On the eve of our twenty‐third birthday, we believe our longevity is largely due to our ability
to be flexible investors and to apply our framework to different economic and market
environments. Of course, we don’t always get it right. Market shifts are inherently difficult
to anticipate and when they happen, they do not ring a bell but they do blow a dog whistle,
as we have said in the past. Our job is to listen carefully and to take decisive action when we
suspect change is afoot. We believe that the increase in our short book and our reduced net
and gross reflect what we are hearing.

Sincerely,

Third Point LLC

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_____________________
Third Point LLC (“Third Point” or “Investment Manager”) is an SEC‐registered investment adviser headquartered in New
York. Third Point is primarily engaged in providing discretionary investment advisory services to its proprietary private
investment funds (each a “Fund” collectively, the “Funds”). Third Point’s Funds currently consist of Third Point Offshore
Fund, Ltd. (“TP Offshore”), Third Point Ultra Ltd., (“TP Ultra Ltd.”), Third Point Partners L.P. (“TP Partners LP”) and Third
Point Partners Qualified L.P. Third Point also currently manages separate accounts. The Funds and any separate accounts
managed by Third Point are generally managed as a single strategy while TP Ultra Ltd. has the ability to leverage the market
exposure of TP Offshore. All information contained herein relates to the Third Point Offshore Master Fund L.P. unless
otherwise specified. The information shown in the section entitled “Performance Statistics” represents that of Third Point
Partners L.P., which has been managed by Third Point, its related persons and/or its predecessors since June 1995. P&L
and AUM information are presented at the feeder fund level where applicable. Performance, portfolio exposure and other
data included herein may vary among the Funds. Sector and geographic categories are determined by Third Point in its
sole discretion.
All P & L and performance results are based on the NAV of fee paying investors only and are presented net of management
fees, brokerage commissions, administrative expenses, and accrued performance allocation, if any, and include the
reinvestment of all dividends, interest, and capital gains. While performance allocations are accrued monthly, they are
deducted from investor balances only annually (quarterly for Third Point Ultra) or upon withdrawal. The performance
results represent fund‐level returns, and are not an estimate of any specific investor’s actual performance, which may be
materially different from such performance depending on numerous factors. All performance results are estimates and
should not be regarded as final until audited financial statements are issued.
The performance data presented represents that of Third Point Partners L.P and Third Point Ultra Ltd. Exposure data
represents that of Third Point Offshore Master Fund L.P.
While the performances of the Funds have been compared here with the performance of a well‐known and widely
recognized index, the index has not been selected to represent an appropriate benchmark for the Funds whose holdings,
performance and volatility may differ significantly from the securities that comprise the index. Investors cannot invest
directly in an index (although one can invest in an index fund designed to closely track such index).
Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All information provided herein is for informational
purposes only and should not be deemed as a recommendation to buy or sell securities. All investments involve risk
including the loss of principal. This transmission is confidential and may not be redistributed without the express written
consent of Third Point LLC and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or
investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made by means of delivery of an approved confidential
offering memorandum.
Specific companies or securities shown in this presentation are meant to demonstrate Third Point’s investment style and
the types of industries and instruments in which we invest and are not selected based on past performance. The analyses
and conclusions of Third Point contained in this presentation include certain statements, assumptions, estimates and
projections that reflect various assumptions by Third Point concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to
significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for illustrative
purposes. No representations express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements,
assumptions, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. Third Point may buy, sell, cover or
otherwise change the nature, form or amount of its investments, including any investments identified in this letter, without

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further notice and in Third Point’s sole discretion and for any reason. Third Point hereby disclaims any duty to update any
information in this letter.
Information provided herein, or otherwise provided with respect to a potential investment in the Funds, may constitute
non‐public information regarding Third Point Offshore Investors Limited, a feeder fund listed on the London Stock
Exchange, as well as Third Point Reinsurance Ltd., a NYSE listed company, and therefore dealing or trading in the shares of
either on the basis of such information may violate securities laws in the United Kingdom, United States or elsewhere.

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